The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Fletcher). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, as I have done frequently in the past, I want to just talk this evening about a situation that occurred in a hearing this week relative to our relations with Russia.

The last time I addressed this body it was to focus on a new direction in our relations with Russia, a new set of eight principles that the factions of the state Duma had agreed with, allowing us to continue to provide investment and economic opportunity in Russia but to set some new guidelines. That bill, which I dropped approximately one month ago, had 25 Democrat and 25 Republican sponsors when I introduced it. We have now gotten additional support and, in fact, we are hoping to continue to grow the kind of movement in the Congress that says that in spite of Russia's economic problems, we must still be engaged but be engaged in a different way.

I rise tonight, however, Mr. Speaker, to discuss a security issue relative to Russia based on a set of hearings that I have conducted on my subcommittee over the past 5 years. Two years ago, Mr. Speaker, I had the highest ranking GRU defector ever from the former Soviet Union, Stanislav Lunev come before our Committee on Armed Services, and in a hearing that was open to the public, but in which hearing we had to hide his identity because he is in a witness protection program in this country, he testified about his role as a GRU agent and what his responsibilities were.

During that testimony, besides giving us an insight into the mindset of Soviet intelligence, he talked about what he thought may in fact continue to be some problems with our relationship with Russia today. One of the more troubling things that Lunev spoke of was when he was assigned to the Washington embassy of the former Soviet Union, under the cover of being a Tass correspondent, one of his primary responsibilities was to identify and locate potential sites for the drops and the location of sensitive Soviet military equipment and hardware that could be accessed in time of a conflict in the United States.

Now, we had no separate way of corroborating the testimony of Mr. Lunev at that time, yet these comments were made on the public record and were obviously of great concern to us. Well, this past summer something new happened, Mr. Speaker, and that was that the Cambridge scholar Christopher Andrew, who has written over 10 books, very scholarly books on intelligence operations around the world, and who has specialized in the intelligence of the former Soviet Union and the current practices of the current intelligence operations inside of Russia, Christopher Andrew was able to get access to a series of files that have been given to the British Government.

For 6 years he worked on the files in a way that allowed him to produce a book last month which was the basis of the hearing that I chaired. I want to go through that because the testimony of Christopher Andrew reinforces what Stanislav Lunev had said in our committee hearing 2 years prior. Some very troubling information came out of that, and there is, I think, reason for us to move quickly.

I have written to Secretary Albright and hope tonight to dwell upon why I think it is important for the administration to act on the findings of Christopher Andrew in his book.

It seems as though, Mr. Speaker, that the head archivist for the KGB files in Moscow for a period of over 20 decades by the name of Mitrokhin did not like the kind of activities the KGB was involved in in the Soviet era.

During his tenure as the chief archivist, there was a decision made in Moscow to relocate the central files of the KGB from downtown Moscow to one of the Ring Road sites. Since Mitrokhin was in charge of the archives, his job was to monitor these archives and always keep them under his control. In fact, he oversaw the move of the files had to be checked out of the Moscow site and then checked in at the new site, both of which were done by Mitrokhin and people who worked for him.

Now, he had been recognized during his career as an outstanding public servant in the Soviet Union. In fact in the book, there is a photograph of the documentation awarded to him signed by the chief of the KGB praising him for the outstanding work he did on behalf of the Soviet Union.

But because Mitrokhin privately did not like many of the practices of the KGB, especially those individual attacks on people and the attacks on ethnic groups, he secretly during his career of over 2 decades on a daily basis copied down in his own handwriting as many of the KGB files as he could. Each day during his tenure as the head archivist of the KGB, he would then place these handwritten notes inside of his clothing, would sneak them out of the KGB headquarters, and on a daily basis put them under the flooring of his dacha. He did this for a number of years, assembling a huge file of handwritten notes that basically were copied from the KGB archives.

In 1992, after the reforms took place in Russia, Mitrokhin emigrated through one the three Baltic states. He initially went to an American embassy and told them who he was and the kind of information he had. For some reason, he was not able to link up with the American Government to allow him to emigrate to the West. He then went to the British Embassy, and the Brits offered him complete asylum for himself and his family.

In fact, since 1992, he has been living along with his family under a secret identity in Great Britain. He brought the files with him, the handwritten notes that he had copied from the KGB archives.

Obviously, there was a huge wealth of information about actions that went on within the Soviet Union by their intelligence services. The Brits, when they got this cache of information, realized they had something that was invaluable because it gave the West the first complete insight into what kinds of actions and activities the KGB was involved in, what kinds of things against America and the West.

There were some other startling pieces of information in those files. The British Government, in getting these files, wanted them to be thoroughly examined, reviewed, and translated by someone that they had confidence in. And because of Christopher Andrew's reputation as a Cambridge scholar and Russian intelligence expert, they brought him in and gave him complete access to the Mitrokhin files.

For 6 years, Mr. Speaker, Mitrokhin on a regular daily basis met with Andrew and he and Christopher Andrew developed this publication which was released on the market in September of this year, just one month ago, entitled `The KGB Files: The Sword and the Shield, the Mitrokhin Archives and the Secret History of the KGB.'

There is extensive documentation of what Mitrokhin found and the files that he was able to remove in his own handwritten notes. But, Mr. Speaker, I do not have time tonight to go into all the details the way the KGB manipulated the response in America to the J.F.K. assassination, the way the KGB attempted to manipulate the perceptions of the FBI here in our country. But all that is here in the book.

But there is one set of facts that I do want to focus on this evening because they involve the security of American people throughout this Nation.

Mr. Speaker, I am not satisfied with the response to date of what is contained in the files. In the files, Mr. Speaker, Mitrokhin spoke of the KGB during the Cold War era prelocating military hardware and equipment throughout Europe and throughout North America. These caches of weapons included transmitter technology, included in some cases detonating devices, in some cases included classified information about that country and its operations, and perhaps even included material that would be necessary for producing a weapon of mass destruction or perhaps even a weapon of mass destruction itself.

When Mitrokhin copied down the notes in this area, he could not copy down, because of time limitations and his own interest, every detailed location of every site in both Europe and North America because there were extensive amounts of sites all over the world, but he did document a few. But he also referenced locations throughout North America, many of which were in the United States where the KGB deliberately stored military materiel under the Earth in selected spots that were booby-trapped. These booby-trapped spots evidently are still in place today.

Now, when Mitrokhin in the archives gave this information to Christopher Andrew, who published this in his book, this reinforces, Mr. Speaker, what Stanislav Lunev told us 2 years ago, that the Soviet Union and the KGB had taken great efforts to pre-position military hardware inside of our country's borders buried at specific locations that could be accessed by Soviet operatives if and when the time came for conflict with the Soviet Union.

These sites were also located throughout Europe and the European countries. In fact, in the Mitrokhin archives it was noted that many, if not most, of these sites were booby-trapped with bombs that would go off if someone attempted to dig up the cache of weapon materiel.

Mr. Speaker, at least two countries that I am aware of, in getting information from the Mitrokhin files, were able to get the exact locations of the sites that Mitrokhin copied down from the KGB files, Switzerland and Brussels. In each case, the governments of those two countries went to the exact sites identified in the KGB files as outlined in this book.

The exact locations marked off by landmarks above ground led the governments and the agents of both of these countries to sites where they dug down. In each case, the sites were booby-trapped.

In fact, following the Swiss excavation of the one site, the Swiss Government put out a warning to its citizens that if they were to encounter a similar site, they should not go near it because the bombing device that was used to protect the site of the Soviet weaponry was strong enough to kill a human being.

The Swiss Government and the Belgium Government dug up these sites, and exactly where the Mitrokhin files said they would be, they found the military hardware that the Soviet Union had placed there without those countries having any idea of what the Soviets had done.

Now, someone would consider that to be an act of provocation for a foreign government to specifically locate materiel that could be used for war on the territory of another country during time of peace. In fact, in the book, Mr. Speaker, there are photographs of the site in Switzerland where the digging was done, where the cache of weapons was located, and there are photographs of what the Swiss recovered from that site.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record a press release dated September 15, 1999.

From the Agence France--Presse, Sept. 15, 1999

KGB Caches Discovered in Belgium

Brussels, Sept. 15 (AFP)--Three secret depots used by the Soviet intelligence service, the KGB, have been discovered in Belgium, national papers reported Wednesday.

The caches were found in forests in the centre of the country, and contained radio sets dating from the late 1960s, according to Jos Colpin, spokesman for the Brussels prosecutor's office.

The location of the hiding-places was revealed in documents passed over to Britain in 1992 by the former KGB archivist Vasily Mitrokhin.

Those documents form the basis of a new book--the Mitrokhin Archives, by British academic Christopher Andrew, to be published shortly.

Well, that book has since been published.

So now, Mr. Speaker, we not only have the testimony of Lunev 2 years ago that, in fact, his job as an agent in the Soviet Embassy here in Washington was to locate sites in America where weapons caches could be prelocated, now we have confirmed information that several of these sites have been located based on the Mitrokhin files in both Switzerland and Belgium.

The question then arises, what about the sites in the United States?

Now, after talking to Christopher Andrew at length and after talking to the highest ranking KGB defector ever from the Soviet Union, Oleg Gordievski, who I had flown over here this past Wednesday to also testify before my committee, we now have information that in the Mitrokhin files are references to a number of sites throughout the U.S. where similar caches of weapons and technology were stored by the Soviet Union underground in specifically marked locations.

In talking to Christopher Andrew personally and in the hearing, we questioned him at length about whether or not the specific sites were noted as they were noted in the case of the Swiss and the Belgium sightings of the KGB materials. Christopher Andrew said that, to the best of his ability, he went through the Mitrokhin files, the notes, and he could not find specific locations in America of the kind that were provided for Switzerland and Belgium.

Now, I also called in the FBI, Mr. Speaker, last week before Christopher Andrew came in; and I talked to Louis Freeh and asked him to send over some agents, which he did. On Wednesday of last week, I met with three FBI agents who focus on Russia; and I asked them if they were aware of the Mitrokhin files, and they said they were. They agreed it was a massive source of unbelievable data that allowed to us see the kind of activities that the KGB had been involved in.

I asked the FBI if they knew whether or not their ability to have access to the Mitrokhin files provided by the British intelligence service allowed the FBI to see specific locations, and they told me that it did not. They knew of the general locations. They knew that there were locations supposedly in Minnesota, someplace near Brainerd, Minnesota; in Montana; in New York, presumably by the harbor there; near a pipeline in Texas; near harbor installations in California, as well as a number of general sites throughout America.

Neither the FBI nor Christopher Andrew were able to give me specific locations where we could direct our military or the FBI to go in and conduct an expedition to actually dig up the equipment much in the way that the Swiss and the Belgians did.

Our military, Mr. Speaker, in a press conference that was held at the Pentagon last month, was also asked a question by a media reporter after the book came out, if our military had been advised or if they knew that there were caches of weapons and materials that had been stored in the United States without our knowledge as documented by the Mitrokhin files.

The military officer who was conducting the press conference said the military was aware of the book, aware of the Mitrokhin archives, but were not aware of any specific sites identified.

Mr. Speaker, at the hearing that occurred this past Wednesday, where I had Christopher Andrew himself and where I had Oleg Gordievski himself, the highest ranking KGB defector from Russia ever who in fact was the KGB London chief who ran that office there, and who worked in the KGB for decades, both of them unequivocally, emphatically said there is no doubt, no doubt whatsoever in their minds that the Soviets stored military equipment and hardware throughout the United States at installations that their agents dug up, placed this equipment underground, that this equipment was probably booby-trapped and it included not just telemetry equipment, not just radio equipment but probably included material that could be used for weapons, detonation equipment or perhaps even material involving weapons of mass destruction.

So now, Mr. Speaker, we have three people. We have Stanislav Lunev who 2 years ago said his job as an agent in Washington was to locate sites, in fact he said they were out in the Shenandoah Valley and in suburban Washington that he specifically went to to point out to his superiors back in Moscow, locations where the Soviets could drop materials, military materials, materials that could be accessed by Soviet agents. This past Wednesday, we have two other individuals, Gordievski, the KGB defector, and Christopher Andrew who has worked for 6 years with Mitrokhin on the archives, who have both unequivocally stated that there is no doubt in their minds that there is equipment today throughout the U.S. stored in sites that only the KGB knows the exact locations of.

Mr. Speaker, I am concerned, because this means that throughout this country, perhaps in forested areas as we saw occur in Belgium, perhaps in remote towns and villages or perhaps outside of major cities, there are perhaps scores of locations that have been secretly listed in the KGB archives that Mitrokhin did not copy down the exact locations of because he could not copy down every location of every site. That was not his main purpose. He wanted to show examples. The examples he picked were in Europe. But there is no doubt in the minds of the London chief of the KGB and Christopher Andrew who worked with Mitrokhin that in the KGB files back in Moscow are the specific identifying locations of every site in the U.S., in every State where these materials were deposited during the Cold War.

That would lead one to the obvious question that we would think would have already been asked, and that is what I asked of the FBI: Have we as a Nation since we found out this information asked Russia to give us the identity of the sites? Mr. Speaker, I can tell you in my conversation with the three FBI agents that I met with, their answer was that our government has not yet asked the Russian government to give us the exact locations of these sites. To further confirm that, when the Pentagon press conference was held last month on the same issue when it came up at a press conference, the Pentagon officer that was responding was asked the same question, have we asked the Russians for the specific sites of the U.S. locations. The answer was the same answer that I got from this FBI last week: `No, we have not asked that question.'

Mr. Speaker, on the record this past Wednesday, Christopher Andrew told me on the record that our government has known about the sites in the U.S. for a minimum of 3 years, that he is aware of, where FBI and U.S. intelligence had access to the Mitrokhin files. His best guess is that the British intelligence probably gave these archives to the FBI when they got them back in 1992 and in 1993. And if that is the case, it means our government has known that this information existed for 6
or 7 years.

Mr. Speaker, what this tells us is for the past 6 or 7 years, no one from this administration has felt it
important enough to ask the Russian government to give us the sites where these materials were
stored by the Soviet Union during the Cold War which are still in place and which are probably in
fact booby-trapped as the sites in Switzerland and Belgium were booby-trapped.

Now, Mr. Speaker, to me that is an outrage. It is an outrage and a dereliction of duties on the part
of this administration. If we know as I now know that we know that the Mitrokhin archive records
show that there are specific locations in America that we do not have the exact identity of, then it
behooves this administration to make this a formal request of the Russian government. What amazes me, Mr. Speaker, is over the past 6 and 7 years, we have given the Russian government on average a billion dollars a year through direct programs. We have replenished the IMF with billions of dollars to help Russia's economy, even though much of it was ripped off by the corruption in Russia, largely centered around Boris Yeltsin. And we have also given money to the World Bank which has been used in Russia. We have leverage. I think it behooves Russia without leverage in this age of new cooperation to give us the specific information from the previous Communist-controlled KGB about where these materials were stored. We do not have that information today, Mr. Speaker.

At this point in time, Mr. Speaker, I would like to submit a letter for the Record signed by myself and the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar).

House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, October 22, 1999.

Hon. Madeleine Albright,
Secretary of State,
Washington, DC.

Dear Secretary Albright:

This week, the House Military Research and Development Subcommittee will hear testimony from author Christopher Andrew (`The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB' and `KGB: The Inside Story') on KGB operations during the Soviet era and contemporary Russian threat perceptions.

In his most recent book, Andrew documents the extent to which Soviet leaders were convinced of an imminent nuclear was--as late as the 1980s. He also describes in great detail the lengths to which they were willing to go to prevail in the event of such a conflict. Among the more chilling revelations is the documented pre-deployment of arms and high explosives in Europe and the United States.

These plans were documented by KGB archivist and defector Vasili Mitrokhin--who shared the most extensive collection of classified KGB notes ever with the British Intelligence Service, the United States and author Christopher Andrew.

While the disclosure of the KGB's weapons pre-deployment plan has led to the unearthing of weapons caches in Switzerland and Belgium, we understand that the United States still has not located Russian weapons sites here. According to officials at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the United States only has information on the general vicinity of pre-deployed Russian weapons caches--such as the one reported to be located near Brainerd, Minnesota.

The Mitrokhin files were made available to the West in 1992, and European weapons sites were identified and removed last year. We are concerned that the United States still lacks the critical information necessary to remove these known dangers to its citizens. More troubling, these recent findings appear to confirm the testimony of former Russian military intelligence officer Stanislav Lenev, who last year told the House Military Research and Development Subcommittee of GRU operations involving the pre-deployment of atomic demolition units (often referred to as `nuclear suitcases') in the United States.

We are writing to inquire whether the United States government has ever asked the Russian government to provide detailed site information on pre-deployed weapons. If not, why not? Do we plan to request that information of the Russian government now? If the United States has requested that information of the Russians, please inform us when those inquiries were made, and what information was provided.

As we struggle to forge a new relationship with Russia, the existence of these weapons sites only serves to aggravate remaining tensions between our countries. We believe it is absolutely essential that the United States aggressively pursue the Russian government to identify all pre-deployed weapons sites in the United States, and that we eliminate such remnants of the Cold War. We ask your cooperation to ensure that happens, and look forward to hearing from you on the status of that effort.

Sincerely,

JAMES OBERSTAR,
Member of Congress.

CURT WELDON,
Member of Congress.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Minnesota is a colleague of ours, a very capable Member, a member of the other party who lives and represents the district including Brainerd, Minnesota. I went to the gentleman from Minnesota when I had interviewed Christopher Andrew and when I told him I had Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievski coming to Washington to testify in open hearing. The gentleman from Minnesota came over to that hearing because obviously he is concerned for the safety of his constituents. He expressed the same degree of frustration that the administration had not yet asked the question as I did. So he and I penned this letter which is now a part of the Congressional Record for all Americans to see which he and I signed jointly on October 22 and sent to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In the letter, we outline that the Mitrokhin files which our intelligence and the British intelligence have said are the most significant information we have ever gotten from the former Soviet intelligence service and the fact that we have had access to these
intelligence files for at least 3 and probably as much as 7 years, and yet we have been told by both the military and by the FBI that we have not asked the Russian government to provide detailed information on these predeployed weapons and military technology. And we asked the Secretary of State in the letter, if our information is wrong, if the FBI is mistaken, if the military is mistaken, then, Madam Secretary, tell us that we have asked the Russians, tell us when we asked the Russians and tell us what the response was so that we can reassure our constituents that we have located and dug up every site where the Soviets prelocated this military hardware and equipment. And if we have not requested that information from the Russians, which I am assuming we have not, then the question is, why have we not and when are we going to question the Russians to get their intelligence service, now known as the SBR, no longer the KGB, to give us the exact locations of the storage of these materials.

Mr. Speaker, I am not here to alarm the American people. I do not think that the Russians would be foolish enough, even the KGB, to store portable weapons of mass destruction in America underground, although I was with General Alexander Lebed 2 1/2 years ago in May in his office in Moscow when he outlined to me that one of his responsibilities when he worked for Yeltsin as security adviser was to locate 132 suitcase-sized nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union had built, and using all the influence of his office, he was only able to locate 48 of those devices. Each of these small atomic demolition munitions, carrying a capacity of one to 10 kilotons. That is about the size of the bombing of Hiroshima, 10 kilotons, so it would produce a massive, massive explosion. After Lebed told us the story, and there were five Members of Congress with me from both parties, I came back to Washington and I asked the CIA if we had any information to know whether or not Lebed would in fact know this information that he had told us about trying to identify these small nuclear devices and whether or not we knew if they were safe. The CIA told me we did not have any way of knowing whether or not Lebed was being factual with us.

A TV producer for `60 Minutes' got ahold of our trip report when it was filed 2 months after we had been in Moscow and met with Lebed. The producer asked me if I was willing to do an interview on camera, which I agreed to. They traveled to Moscow and interviewed General Lebed, who by the way is now the governor of Krasnoyarsk, one of the largest republics in Russia. Those interviews aired in the lead story on national TV 2 months ago last September, and in that story Lebed reaffirmed what he told me and our delegation, that there were in fact loose nuclear suitcases, small atomic demolition munitions that  he could not locate when he was Boris Yeltsin's top security adviser. The Russian government ridiculed Lebed when that came out publicly and they called him a traitor and said they had never produced such devices.

The worst part is, Mr. Speaker, when a press briefer over at the Pentagon following the criticism by the Russian government of Lebed, when that press briefer was asked to comment on the revelation by Lebed about the small nuclear suitcases, our government official at the Pentagon said, we have no reason to doubt the Russian government, thereby agreeing with the Russian government that they never produced these devices.

I then brought over a Russian friend of mine, Dr. Alexi Yablakov, who is one of the leading academic scientists in Russia, and in October of that year I had him testify before my committee. In a public hearing in Washington, he stated, not only was he aware of these devices but he had scientist friends who worked on these devices, some of which were being produced for the KGB. That is in the public record. So we had another individual from Russia, Alexi Yablakov, confirming what Lebed said about the production of small nuclear weapons that are portable and can be carried around. Again, the Russian government criticized Yablakov and said he was a fool and did not know what he was talking about.

Wanting to get to the bottom of the story, I traveled to Moscow in December of that year and I had a meeting with the defense minister of all of Russia, Defense Minister Sergeyev. He knows that I have been working on some proactive, positive efforts to help the Russian military, help them develop housing for their troops, helping them develop solutions for a terrible problem they have with their nuclear waste. After discussing the positive things that we are doing with the Russian military, I asked Defense Minister Sergeyev point-blank across the table, Defense Minister, will you please tell me, what is the truth about these small atomic demolition devices that Lebed has said existed that he could not locate and that Yablakov has verified were produced. The defense minister for Russia said to me in that meeting, yes, Russia produced such devices during the Cold War. And he further went on to say, and so did you in the States. He said, we are aware that you destroyed your small atomic demolition munitions years ago because we had witnessed such destruction. He went on to say, `Congressman Weldon, I assure you that by the year 2000, we will have dismantled all of our small atomic demolition munitions.' That was 2 years ago come this December, Mr.  speaker. Whether or not they have all been destroyed, we have no idea. Whether or not Lebed was accurate in saying that some of them could in fact be up for sale to rogue nations or terrorists, we do not know.

Whether or not Lunev was correct in saying his job as a Tass correspondent was to locate sites to put materials, we have to assume. But we now have two additional witnesses. We now have the highest ranking KGB defector in the history of the KGB, Oleg Gordievski, and we now have Christopher Andrew who has had access to the Mitrokhin files of the KGB's own archives telling us, there is no doubt, 100 percent certainty that the Soviet Union located military hardware and equipment inside the territory of our country at a number of locations which may have included, may, a nuclear device.

Now, we have no evidence to verify that such a device was located, but in the written and stated public testimony of both of these individuals on Wednesday, they both said there was a possibility that such devices could have been stored in an underground facility or an underground pit that would have been dug up by Soviet operators during the Cold War.

Now, Mr. Speaker, again I am not trying to arouse a sense of uneasiness. I am just saying that we just do not know, we just do not know what types of devices were stored in our country underground at specific locations by Russian agents, Soviet agents, KGB agents. But we do know the storage was completed, we do know that there are sites all over this country where these materials are today still under ground probably in locations that are booby trapped if people were to approach them not knowing what they were encountering, and to the best of my knowledge at this moment our government has not asked the question of the Russian government about where these sites are.

Now one would ask the logical question: Why would our government not want to ask the Russian government? After all, they have said publicly that the files are the best information we have ever gotten.

Our intelligence service has said publicly that this is the best hard information we have ever gotten from the KGB. We have independently confirmed by Oleg Gordievsky, the highest-ranking KGB defector ever who was the London chief of the KGB desk for the Soviet Union.

So we have confirmation. There is no reason to doubt that what Mitrokhin found in the archives is true and that all over America today, perhaps in mountainous areas, perhaps in national parks, perhaps in remote and isolated areas that only the Soviet KGB knows, are stored Russian military equipment, technology and hardware, and the door is left open that perhaps there are weapons stored at some of these sites, weapons that could kill or harm significant numbers of American people.

Mr. Speaker, I am outraged that we have not asked the question. I bring this special order tonight before our colleagues and the American people because I want answers. I want to know what this administration is going to do to hold Russia accountable, to obtain the information from the SVR-KGB archives about the specific sites that have been identified that we know are in the KGB archives that we need to see and be able to respond to.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the staff for sticking around for this special order, I urge our colleagues to contact and interact with their constituents, and I urge Americans all over this country to interact with Members of Congress to demand of both a Member of Congress and the White House that we get answers about the Mitrokhin files, about this particular information relative to weapon storage and military material storage and to also begin to ask questions about much of the other material that is contained in the Mitrokhin archives.

This is only the first edition. Christopher Andrew expects a second edition to be out sometime in the Year 2000 which will go into more detail. We cannot wait for the second edition because we are then going to be able to see some people in America who during the Cold War the KGB thought were really acting on their behalf as opposed to America's behalf. They are going to be named in the next edition, and perhaps America will have a better insight into what really happened in this city during the Cold War period when the Soviet KGB was relying on key Americans to help them weaken our country and perhaps prepare for the ultimate, which would have been a direct military confrontation with our Nation.

Mr. Speaker, I bring this information to the attention of our colleagues in the spirit of wanting to work in a positive relationship with Russia, one that I consistently say must be based on strength, consistency and candor. In my opinion this administration has none of those three attributes, which is why we do not today have the information relative to this because I am convinced this administration does not want to raise this information because they think it would further embarrass Boris Yeltsin, and that has been the basis of our relationship for 8 years. President Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, Al Gore, Victor Chernomyrdrin until he was removed from office, anything that surfaced that would embarrass either of those two Russian leaders we pretend it did not happen, whether it was the theft of IMF, whether it was the abuse of one of our Navy officers like Lieutenant Jack Daly, whether it was arms control violations, which I have said at numerous times on the floor of this House, or whether it was instability in Russia, that we did not want to call the attention of the people of this country for fear that it would embarrass Yeltsin in his homeland because that is the mainstay of our relationship, and I am convinced that that perhaps is the reason why we have failed to ask the question of the Russians about these devices, because this administration perhaps fears that when we start to dig up all over America locations of equipment that we know have been there for 3 or perhaps 7 years, there are going to be a lot of people in this country who are going to start to ask some very difficult questions of their elected leaders.