Congressional Documents
59 006
105 th Congress
Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session
105 508
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999
May 5 , 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. Goss , from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
REPORT
[To accompany H.R. 3694]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 3694) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
The bill as reported 2
Purpose 5
Overall perspective on the intelligence budget and committee inte6
Scope of committee review 6
Committee findings and recommendations 7
Areas of Special Interest
9
The National Security Agency Budget, Culture, Method
of Operation
9
National Reconnaissance Program
11
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
12
Imagery Archiving
13
Automated Intelligence Data Fusion
14
Imagery Server Systems
14
Defense Counterintelligence
15
Intelligence Congressional Justification Books
16
Joint Military Intelligence Program
16
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
28
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill as Reported
33
Title I--Intelligence Activities
33
Section 101--Authorization of Appropriations
33
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations
33
Section 103--Personnel Ceiling Adjustments
33
Section 104--Community Management Account
33
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
and Disability System
35
Section 201--Authorization of Appropriations
35
Title III--General Provisions
35
Section 301--Increase in Employee Compensation and Benefits
Authorized by Law
35
Section 302--Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence Activities
35
Section 303--Application of Sanctions Laws to Intelligence Activities
35
Section 304--Sense of Congress on Intelligence Community Contracting
36
Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency
36
Section 401--Extension of CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act
36
Section 402--Enhanced Protective Authority for CIA Personnel and
Family Members
37
Section 403--Technical Corrections
38
Title V--Department of Defense
38
Section 501--Extension of Authority to Engage in Commercial
Activities as Security for Intelligence Collection Activities
38
Committee position
39
Findings and recommendations of the Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight
39
Oversight findings
39
Fiscal year cost projections
39
Congressional Budget Office estimates
39
Committee cost estimates
41
Specific Constitutional authority for Congressional enactment of this
legislation
42
Changes to existing law
42
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof
the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community management account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Application of sanctions laws to intelligence activities.
Sec. 304. Sense of Congress on intelligence community contracting.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Extension of the CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act.
Sec. 402. Enhanced protective authority for CIA personnel and
family members.
Sec. 403. Technical amendments.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501. Extension of authority to engage in commercial
activities as security for intelligence collection activities.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1999
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the
Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1999, for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 3694 of the 105th
Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the
executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of
the number authorized for fiscal year 1999 under section 102 when the
Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except
that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized
under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence
community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel
authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted
by this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of
Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1999 the sum of $139,123,000.
Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research
and Development Committee shall remain available until September 30,
2000.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Community
Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized
283 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1999. Personnel serving in
such elements may be permanent employees of the Community Management
Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States
Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account by
subsection (a), there is also authorized to be appropriated for the
Community Management Account for fiscal year 1999 such additional
amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a).
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Community Management
Account as of September 30, 1999, there is authorized such additional
personnel for such elements as of that date as is specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National
Security Act of 1947, during fiscal year 1999, any officer or employee
of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to
the staff of the Community Management Account from another element of
the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis,
except that any such officer, employee or member may be detailed on a
nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the
performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of
Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the
authorization in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000 shall be
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount,
funds provided for research, development, test, and evaluation purposes
shall remain available until September 30, 2000, and funds provided for
procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2001.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall
transfer to the Attorney General of the United States funds available
for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The
Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities
of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions
of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403
3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the
National Drug Intelligence Center.
(f) Transfer Authority for Funds for Security Requirements at
Overseas Locations.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the
authorization in subsection (a), the Director of Central Intelligence
may transfer funds to departments or other agencies for the sole purpose
of supporting certain intelligence community security requirements at
overseas locations, as specified by the Director.
(2) Limitation.--Amounts made available for departments or agencies
under paragraph (1) shall be--
(A) transferred to the specific appropriation;
(B) allocated to the specific account in the specific amount, as
determined by the Director;
(C) merged with funds in such account that are available for
architectural and engineering support expenses at overseas locations;
and
(D) available only for the same purposes, and subject to the same
terms and conditions, as the funds described in subparagraph (C).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1999 the sum of
$201,500,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the
United States.
SEC. 303. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441d) is
amended by striking out ``January 6, 1999'' and inserting in lieu
thereof ``January 6, 2000''.
SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING.
It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence
should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community,
whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United
States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to
the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should
competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the procurement
of products properly designated as having been made in the United
States.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. EXTENSION OF THE CIA VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY ACT.
Section 2(f) of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation
Pay Act (Public Law 103 36, 50 U.S.C. 403 4 note) is amended by striking
out ``September 30, 1999'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``September 30,
2001''.
SEC. 402. ENHANCED PROTECTIVE AUTHORITY FOR CIA PERSONNEL AND
FAMILY MEMBERS.
Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended by striking out ``and the protection of
Agency personnel and of defectors, their families'' and inserting in
lieu thereof ``and the protection of current and former Agency personnel
and their immediate families, and defectors and their immediate
families''.
SEC. 403. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.
(a) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section 5(a)(1) of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is
amended--
(A) by striking out ``subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section
102(a)(2)'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``paragraphs (2) and (3) of
section 102(a)'';
(B) by striking out ``(c)(5)'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``(c)(6)'';
(C) by inserting ``(3),'' after ``403(a)(2),'';
(D) by inserting ``(c)(6), (d)'' after ``403 3''; and
(E) by inserting ``(a), (g)'' after ``403 4''.
(2) Section 6 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking out
``(c)(5)'' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof
``(c)(6)''.
(b) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 201(c) of
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is
amended by striking out ``(c)(5)'' each place it appears and inserting
in lieu thereof ``(c)(6)''.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.
Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
striking out ``December 31, 1998'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``December 31, 2001''.
PURPOSE
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999 for (a) the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government,
(b) the Community Management Account, and (c) the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 1999 for the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government
and permit the Director of Central Intelligence to authorize personnel
ceilings in Fiscal Year 1999 for any intelligence element up to two
percent above the authorized levels, with the approval of the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget;
(3) Authorize $27 million for the National Drug Intelligence Center
in Johnstown, Pennsylvania;
(4) Extend the authority of the President to defer the imposition of
sanctions through January 6, 2000, when to proceed without delay would
seriously risk the compromise of an intelligence source or method, or an
ongoing criminal investigation;
(5) Extend the CIA's authority to offer ``early out'' incentives to
employees to enable the CIA to meet the intelligence personnel needs of
the next century;
(6) Enhance the CIA's ability to provide personal protection to its
employees and defectors and the families of such protectees in
situations presenting specific or credible threats of physical harm; and
(7) Extend the current Department of Defense authority to engage in
commercial activities as security for intelligence collection.
OVERALL PERSPECTIVE ON THE INTELLIGENCE BUDGET AND COMMITTEE INTENT
The classified annex to this public report includes the classified
Schedule of Authorizations and its associated language. The committee
views the classified Annex as an integral part of this legislation. The
classified Annex contains a thorough discussion of all budget issues
considered by the committee, which underlies the funding authorization
found in the Schedule of Authorizations. The committee intends that all
intelligence programs discussed in the classified Annex to this report
be conducted in accord with the guidance and limitations set forth as
associate language therein. The classified Schedule is incorporated
directly into this legislation. The classified Annex is available for
review by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject to the
requirements of clause 13 of rule XLIII of the House.
SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW
U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under the
jurisdiction of the committee include the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
(TIARA) and the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) of the
Department of Defense.
The NFIP consists of all programs of the Central Intelligence Agency,
as well as those national foreign intelligence and/or
counterintelligence programs conducted by: (1) the Department of
Defense; (2) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (3) the National Security
Agency; (4) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (5) the
Department of State; (6) the Department of the Treasury; (7) the
Department of Energy; (8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (9) the
National Reconnaissance Office; and (10) the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency.
The Department of Defense TIARA are a diverse array of reconnaissance
and target acquisition programs that are a functional part of the basic
military force structure and provide direct information support to
military operations. TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence activities
outside the General Defense Intelligence Program that respond to the
needs of military commanders for operational support information, as
well as to national command, control, and intelligence requirements. The
Committee on National Security in the House of Representatives has joint
oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the programs comprising TIARA.
The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated program
management of defense intelligence elements that support defense-wide or
theater-level consumers. Included within JMIP are aggregations created
for management efficiency and characterized by similarity, either in
intelligence discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery
Intelligence (IMINT)), or function (e.g., satellite support, aerial
reconnaissance). The following aggregations are included in the JMIP:
(1) the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP); (2) the Defense Imagery and
Mapping Program (DIMAP); (3) the Defense General Intelligence
Applications Program (DGIAP), which itself includes (a) the Defense
Airborne Reconnaissance Program (DARP), (b) the Defense Intelligence
Tactical Program (DITP), (c) the Defense Intelligence Special
Technologies Program (DISTP), (d) the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug
Program (DICP), and (e) the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program (DSRP).
COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The committee completed its review of the President's fiscal year
1999 budget, carrying out its annual responsibility to prepare an
authorization based on close examination of intelligence programs and
proposed expenditures. The review reflected the committee's continuing
belief that intelligence activities must be examined by function as well
as by program. Thus, the committee's review was structured across
program lines and intelligence disciplines and themes. The committee
held seven full committee budget-related hearings on budgetary issues,
including: acquisition of overhead collection systems, SIGINT issues,
IMINT issues, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) issues, Analysis and
Production, and Covert Action. A specific hearing was also held that
dealt with the Future Imagery Architecture, and two hearings were held
at which the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) testified, in order
to understand his views and plans for the future of intelligence and the
Intelligence Community (IC). The committee also held six full-committee
briefings on areas such as commercial mapping technology, collection
management, and the status of the space reconnaissance programs, in
particular, and the status of IC acquisition processes, in general.
There were, in addition, numerous individual briefings of Members and
over 100 staff briefings on programs, specific activities, and budget
requests.
The committee continued to place heavy emphasis on understanding and
addressing the future needs of the IC, and the several distinct roles
that it plays in national security. For the past three years, the
committee has discussed the fact that our national security is affected
by a set of issues more broad than those emphasized for the past 50
years. Heretofore, some of these issues have not been identified so
readily with our global interests. Throughout our continuing review,
there has been a constant theme: the threats that face our nation demand
that the IC be vigilant on both the strategic and tactical levels and
the IC must maintain a world-wide view, with a highly flexible set of
resources.
The committee is struck by what can be characterized as a growing
sense of apathy toward our national security and intelligence. Because
the threats are less obvious and untraditional, many inside and outside
of government believe that our nation has fewer worries and is somehow
safer. That we can dramatically reduce our intelligence and defense
resources, because we are at peace, is a concept that many endorse,
especially when weighing such expenditures against those needed
domestically. Unfortunately, our nation is no less at risk now than
during the Cold War. What has changed is the nature of the threat. The
likelihood of a major nuclear confrontation has receded. But other
aspects of our security are at greater risk, including the growing
possibility that a rogue nation will attack United States' interests, or
even the United States itself, with a nuclear device or some other
weapon of mass destruction.
Two specific incidents occurred recently that have shown light on how
much at risk, and how ill-prepared, we are. First is the most recent
confrontation with Iraq. Yet again, the United States faced a dilemma in
how to deal with Saddam Hussein, a dictator possessing weapons of mass
destruction and a demonstrated will to use them, who has consistently
threatened stability of a critically important, strategic region. The
real issues in this situation could be boiled down to two--did we have a
policy, and did we have the intelligence that would not only support a
policy decision and its implementation, but would also provide the
information necessary to develop options? Regarding the latter, the
answer was a resounding ``no.''
The second incident is related to our nation's vulnerability to
technological attack. In February 1998, Department of Defense computer
systems fell victim to systematic, coordinated attacks by individuals
who, luckily, appeared to be driven by the challenge of conducting such
attacks rather than by malicious intent. Regardless of intent, the
attack again demonstrates that information technology has become this
nation's strength as well as its Achilles' heel. Consequently, high
priority must be placed on developing our abilities to warn, detect and
defend against such attacks, as well as to be positioned to conduct such
attacks when necessary. The committee stresses that this is a national
security issue that encompasses the entirety of our nation's
infrastructure, not just that of Defense or of the government. Likewise,
this issue must be faced in terms of threat and attack, not just in
terms of law enforcement. At the end of the day, we must be vigilant in
ensuring that the IC is positioned to address this new challenge.
Our intelligence capabilities have dwindled since the breakup of the
Soviet Union, and we have failed to build new capabilities that will
become increasingly critical. This is especially true in the areas of
espionage, covert action, and in our toughest SIGINT activities. We, as
a nation, cannot continue this course. The world is such that
individuals and groups will continue to disrupt our foreign policy
objectives and threaten our national security. The only thing that will
change will be that their resources will increase and their capabilities
will grow ever more fearsome. We must be prepared, by having the
intelligence resources we need, well before a crisis occurs, and
preferably in a fashion that might allow us to preempt it. We can do no
less.
As a result of these demands, the committee evaluated the budget
submission with an eye toward looking at future needs and capabilities.
Specifically, five major themes came out of this evaluation:
We must invest in a recapitalization and modernization of our SIGINT
capabilities;
We must invest in re-establishing and rebuilding our clandestine
espionage or HUMINT infrastructure;
We must continue to invest in all-source analysis, establishing a
``global,'' strategic outlook that will allow for proper indications and
warning for the policymakers and key decision makers throughout
government;
We must rebuild covert action capabilities; and,
We must invest in advanced research and development in all programs
within the IC.
Likewise, the committee's review brought to light some fundamental
questions that are partially addressed in this budget, and will be
specifically pursued over the next year. These include:
Will the growing cost of the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP)
continue unabated, and how is this affecting the other programs within
the NFIP?
Are we placing the proper requirements on the development of our
future overhead systems? In essence, are we structuring it only to
monitor and surveil known targets, or do we want to develop systems that
focus on reconnaissance and uncovering truly secret information?
Is financial management within the IC, specifically within the NRP
and the National Imagery and Mapping Program, rigorous enough that the
DCI can make needed tradeoffs?
Is the balance of investment between overhead systems and other
methods of collection correct, given the types of information that is
needed for national security and foreign policy planning?
Are we properly emphasizing and investing in areas such as
processing, analysis and distribution, the activities that make useful
the massive amounts of data that is anticipated with new technical
collection systems?
Is the IC approaching information operations in a fashion that
properly positions us to face the future challenges?
Are we investing properly in the right types of research and fully
exploiting commercially available technologies?
These are questions that must be addressed. They will be the focus of
the committee's future oversight and actions.
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY BUDGET, CULTURE, METHOD OF OPERATION
The committee has concluded that very large changes in the National
Security Agency's culture and method of operations need to take place,
including changes in its budget methodology. NSA should be given credit
for many changes already introduced, but the committee believes that the
results have not gone far enough, and that NSA will not meet its Unified
Cryptologic Architecture (UCA) goals without tackling head-on some very
fundamental internal obstacles.
Additions to the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) budget are
being used as leverage to effect some of the internal reforms urgently
needed. This is being done in several ways. First, the committee is
funding and mandating external management reviews. Second, the committee
is attempting to infuse fresh thought, needed expertise (especially in
systems engineering), and greater fairness by insisting that significant
portions of certain categories be contracted out and that outside
proposals and expertise be solicited, notably in systems engineering,
advanced research and development, and in development activities
conducted by the Advanced Technology Centers. Third, fences have been
placed on portions of the budget, with the prospect that a considerable
amount of money could be reprogrammed for other IC needs if NSA does not
develop detailed strategic and business planning.
These steps are taken partially because the committee has been
frustrated in attempts to start needed reforms during fiscal year 1998.
Outside management reviews, budget cuts and adds to reduce acquisition
cycle time, plus cuts to lower the budget percentage allocated to
support, were initiated in the fiscal year 1998 authorization process,
but all have met resistance and have been deflected from their intended
purpose. Subsequently, the committee also found unreceptiveness to
development of cost effectiveness analyses that could direct the
agency's and SIGINT community's investment priorities. It also found
that fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 1999 investments of money and
personnel in categories critical to the future, continue to be
minimized, at best, and that NSA often cannot track allocations for
critical functions that cross the old program and bureaucratic lines,
much less enforce implementation of DIRNSA policy priorities.
Therefore, the committee concludes that a far more radical revision
of the budget process than presently contemplated is necessary. Just as
the military must train the way it will fight, NSA must budget according
to the critical categories of a new and completely different
architecture and mode of operations. Further, the old budget categories
have provided little insight into and fulfillment of the old
architecture.
Most difficult of all, NSA must develop a new culture in which all
team together on a new architecture, rather than bubbling up disparate
ideas and programs from across NSA and expending much of its energy on
probable duplication. This challenge cannot be minimized, because much
of NSA's past strength has come from its localized creativity and
quick-reaction
capability, which enabled it to rise when necessary to
overcome the stultifying effect that the bureaucracy of such a large
organization can have.
It has often been said, by both Congress and the administration, that
the IC neglects processing and the entire ``downstream'' area in favor
of more exotic and interesting collection programs, and that this trend
has worsened in recent years. The committee requests that, after
receiving this bill, the Community Management Staff (CMS) organize an
effort to provide statistics on trends for investment in collection as
opposed to processing or downstream areas. Even if comparable data
cannot be found to document the balance over the past ten years, we
should establish a 1997 baseline, if practicable, and keep track
thereafter. Eventually, we may be able to establish some rule of thumb
for the amount of downstream investment required to use efficiently our
investments in collection, although this could be subject to changing
technology and the effect on costs at either end. The CMS is asked to
explore this possible system for tracking SIGINT investment, in
conjunction with NSA, which has thought about potential methodologies.
CMS participation appears necessary because much SIGINT collection and
processing crosses program boundaries and accumulation of the data would
require access to information outside NSA, as well as the presence of an
objective arbiter.
For the same reasons, CMS is also asked to undertake immediately the
establishment of meaningful metrics to evaluate henceforth the cost
effectiveness of various SIGINT collection programs. NSA has resisted
this on grounds that meaningful metrics cannot be found, but the
committee believes they must be found and that NSA and other community
programs must be run more like a corporation that systematically
evaluates the productivity of various lines of operation, terminates or
downgrades some accordingly, and switches available dollars to those
that produce the most return or have the greatest promise. Such data is
needed across the IC to determine where our funds should be placed, and
should have been developed to help guide the UCA deliberations. It can
still have a major impact on UCA implementation plans. There are many
other potential uses, including for decisions on the elimination of
legacy systems within NSA and for DCI and DoD consideration of
cross-program trades.
Finally, the committee has requested that an independent panel assess
community-wide Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) planning and budgeting.
National Reconnaissance Program
For several years, the committee has been concerned with the
increasing costs of several major National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
programs and the NRP's growing share of the NFIP budget. Not seeing any
relief from the tight fiscal environment, the committee has sought to
find technological innovations and managerial reforms in the NRP that
could reduce costs. This goal lay behind the committee's push to shift
to larger numbers of smaller satellites, which the committee thought
also would provide better performance against hard targets, reduce
satellite vulnerability, and help to counter foreign denial and
deception practices.
The committee had hoped that acquisition reform and a shift in
strategy to smaller satellites would control if not reduce costs in the
near-term, and enable the DCI to increase investment elsewhere in the
NFIP and the NRO to invest new technologies, in support of new or higher
priority missions, like counter-proliferation. So far, however, this
hope has not been fulfilled, but the committee still believes that this
strategy, if properly enforced, will produce results in time. The
committee is now exploring also the benefits of cost caps, believing
with the DCI that they may help to discipline the acquisition system.
The committee, in summary, is not satisfied that all appropriate
measures have been taken to reduce or control costs in the NRP or to
adequately measure the cost-effectiveness of all overhead collection
activities. The committee believes that the DCI needs to exercise much
more knowledgeable and diligent oversight of NRO programs, with an eye
to freeing up funds for investment elsewhere, wherever possible. This
oversight must extend from requirements tradeoffs, to cost estimating,
to acquisition oversight. The DCI also needs to acquire the expertise
necessary to make tradeoffs across the major NFIP programs. The DCI can
no longer afford to rely on the major program managers to police their
organizations and budgets. The committee has recommended additional
funds for the DCI to accelerate the development of these capabilities.
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
The committee is very concerned about incidents which cause it to
question the adequacy of financial management at NIMA. Although the
committee appreciates the extra information given in the CBJB addenda
and found the data to be helpful in tracking general costs, it has been
almost impossible to get consistent budget information from NIMA on
detailed questions. There have been numerous instances over the past few
months where NIMA has provided conflicting data on major programs and
has been unable to reconcile the different numbers. Committee inquiries
aside, these are basic questions that NIMA must be able to answer
internally in order to function.
Of further concern, the committee learned the evening before the
committee mark that NIMA is facing a shortfall in fiscal year 1999 in
its civilian pay, similar to that faced last year. Although the
committee understands the difficulty in forecasting civilian pay, most
agencies' problems occur during a fiscal year when promotions or new
hiring outpaces attrition. The committee does not understand why NIMA is
already forecasting a shortfall for fiscal year 1999, especially since
the agency lost hundreds of employees in fiscal year 1998.
The committee is also concerned about the internal reallocation of
funds that NIMA has implemented, thus far, in fiscal year 1998. Although
the committee understands that NIMA took its share of unallocated cuts,
this does not fully explain the movement of money between programs, nor
why reprogramming requests were not received. Further, the apparent
ambiguity associated with these actions, the apparent fungibility of the
accounts, and the fact that, on occasion, NIMA had difficulty explaining
such actions, draws into question whether the management at NIMA has the
ability or desire to force analytic rigor over the budget process.
The committee is concerned that NIMA either simply does not want to
tell Congress of its dealings, or it simply doesn't know how money is
being spent and managed. Neither option
is good. Generally, the committee is skeptical regarding
whether NIMA has the ability to forecast, manage, and execute its
budget.
Two factors weigh in NIMA's favor, however. First, the new Director
of NIMA has indicated his understanding that changes, and some difficult
decisions, must be made. He has also indicated his willingness and
desire to work with the committee to take on these challenges. Second,
the committee is aware of the DCI's budget task force on NIMA (within
the Community Management Staff) and strongly supports this effort. The
committee encourages the Director of NIMA to fully utilize the task
force resources to provide concrete steps in getting NIMA on track. Put
simply, NIMA must make significant changes in the way it executes and
manages its budget, and relates this information to Congress, in order
to establish any credibility.
Imagery Archiving
The committee believes there is a need for a long-term, cohesive
strategy for preserving the Nation's investment in space and airborne
reconnaissance imagery (including all formats: film-based,
electro-optic, infrared, radar and video). Currently, the responsibility
of archiving imagery belongs to various organizations, including the
NIMA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National Archives.
Each maintains literally millions of images in various formats.
The committee is concerned that these archiving efforts are
disjointed and do not provide an indefinite, cost-effective retention
solution. Although much of the value associated with investments in
imagery relates to short-term, national defense requirements, the future
value to scientific and domestic requirements cannot be adequately
estimated. The life expectancy of archived imagery, however, is
dependent on the various storage media; some of these media may not
survive even for longer-term national defense use. The committee
believes recent technological developments in the commercial sector can
provide economical and extremely long-life mass imagery storage. These
technologies also provide an opportunity for developing and instituting
a cohesive long-term strategy for archiving imagery.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to
develop, and report to the congressional defense and intelligence
committees not later than February 28, 1999, a cohesive and coordinated
set of practices and procedures for storing and archiving all
imagery--both U.S. reconnaissance and, to the extent necessary,
commercially-procured imagery. This report will include a recommendation
for consolidating these responsibilities under a single organization.
Further, the report will include the new processes and technologies
necessary for maintaining imagery ``on-line'' for national and military
use and the processes for subsequently archiving all U.S. government
imagery indefinitely and at the lowest cost. The committee recommends
that the Administration investigate the latest data storage technologies
that are capable of indefinitely maintaining data quality to determine
whether their application will decrease archival costs by allowing,
among other things, higher density storage, longer-term (hundreds of
years) storage between restorations, and less stringent
storage-environment requirements.
Automated Intelligence Data Fusion
The committee is disturbed by the number of requests in the
Congressional Justification Books (CJBs) that are justified by the
development and fielding of data ``fusion'' algorithms, systems, and
processes. Although the committee fully supports the need to assist
human analytical processes with automated capabilities, the committee
believes there is no intelligence community leadership coordinating
these various developments and activities to ensure that the proper
fusion efforts are being undertaken and that there are no, or at least
minimal, duplications of effort.
Further, the committee notes that the very notion of data fusion is
enigmatic to the point that ``correlation'' and ``fusion'' become
interchangeable, and the very definitions preclude a holistic view of
the issue. There have been no agreed goals regarding what fusion is to
provide, what it is to accomplish or what products it is to create.
Simply put, there is no way the Congress can fully understand the issues
of intelligence data fusion because the IC does not seem to understand
it.
The committee believes that community-wide emphasis is necessary to
address the many issues surrounding ``fusion.'' Therefore, the committee
requests that the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management (DDCI/CM) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence)(ASD(C\3\I)) provide the
intelligence committees with a long-term strategy and plan for
coordinating and developing the various intelligence data fusion
efforts. The committee believes that this plan should include the
establishment of community-wide definitions, required products and
services of fusion developments, a highly visible insight as to the
numerous projects to promote interoperability and coordination of
developments, and a detailed funding plan for community-wide fusion
needs. The committee requests this plan be provided no later than April
15, 1999.
Imagery Server Systems
In response to a critical need for imagery dissemination, the Office
of Special Technologies, ASD (C\3\I), sponsored a U.S. Pacific Command
project to put digitized imagery on a server-based network. This project
became known as the Demand Driven Direct Digital Dissemination System,
or 5D. This system was meant as an interim solution, to eventually be
incorporated into NIMA's Imagery Product Archive/Imagery Product Library
(IPA/IPL) server system.
The committee understands that, despite expectations, the 5D imagery
server system will not be replaced soon by NIMA's libraries program. The
reasons for this are numerous, and range from slow software development
for the IPA and the initial version of the IPL, to obsolete 5D hardware
that cannot run the new IPL software. This latter issue is particularly
problematic since it means that replacement of 5D systems requires new
hardware procurement that is not funded in NIMA's current Libraries
budget. In fact, there are many 5D terminals not included in the IPL
systems currently funded in NIMA's budget.
The committee notes that NIMA will soon field the national-level
Library and expects that 5D users will want to be able to interface with
it immediately. As stated before, this may not be possible with current
5D hardware. The committee believes that 5D systems should be replaced
as soon as possible, but that current users cannot afford a lapse in
image product availability. Finally, the committee notes that NIMA funds
the maintenance of the 5D but that the ASD(C\3\I) sponsors the system,
and that both have informed the committee that there are limited funds
available to keep 5D fully functional. These problems must be solved.
The committee requests that ASD(C\3\I) and the Director of NIMA
provide the committee a report on the background, status, direction, and
cost of both the 5D and IPL systems. Further, the committee requests
that during the preparation of the fiscal year 2000 budget request, a
plan be prepared for correcting the funding and system fielding problems
outlined above.
DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
For several years, the committee has raised concerns about downsizing
Department of Defense Counterintelligence (CI) personnel and funding at
the same time that Defense CI is being asked to take on additional
responsibilities and cope with an unprecedented increase in operations
tempo. For example, the FCIP has been challenged to improve its
counterterrorism and force protection capabilities. The revised DoD CI
strategic plan suggests that future FCIP budgets may reflect further
shifts in resources to support military commanders in these areas. At
the same time, the FCIP must continue its traditional counterespionage
activities, provide protection to U.S. military acquisition activities,
better analyze and detect anomalies that might detect espionage
activities and, most recently, develop a computer intrusion
investigations capability and training regimen. The downsizing of CI
seems to take place almost absent analysis of the importance of the CI
contribution, for example, to the intelligence effort supporting
deployed commanders. Feedback from recent deployments indicates that CI
and HUMINT have been preeminent intelligence disciplines and, in fact,
have been described by G2s and commanders as the disciplines of choice
within the Defense Department. Yet, in the competition for funding
within the Defense Department and across the National Foreign
Intelligence Program, the FCIP's resource needs, in the committee's
opinion, are frequently shortchanged.
The program elements that fund counterintelligence within the Defense
Department are complex and spread across the Department. In addition to
the FCIP, CI programs can be found in the Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities budget. Dispersed CI funding has value in that
tactical CI elements maintain close operational relationships with their
assigned units, both in terms of presence and resources. Totally
centralized management of CI might diminish these operational
relationships and the responsiveness of the elements to unique Service
requirements. However, the limited authority that the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) focal point for CI has to oversee and
evaluate the various CI programs within the Department has made it
difficult to develop or sustain a comprehensive CI capability for
Defense. This is particularly evident in the apparently limited ability
of OSD to influence resource allocation decisions concerning the
Department's aggregate CI capabilities.
The committee understands that efforts are underway to centralize and
improve OSD's focus on significant CI activities government-wide which
have an impact on the Department. This is a step in the right direction.
Yet, there may be need for more to be done. For example, many have been
concerned that limited procurement dollars in the FCIP and other CI
programs can make even modest equipment acquisition or modernization
programs almost impossible. Repeatedly, Congress has had to increase
funding lines so that reasonable levels of modernization or equipment
purchases could occur. The intelligence committees have acted to repair
shortages in funding for operational and investigative activities in the
last few FCIP budget submissions, and they have expressed concern about
the impact of continued manpower downsizing on the CI program.
INTELLIGENCE CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION BOOKS
In the committee report on H.R. 1119 (H. Rept. 105 132), the
committee directed that the Congressional Justification Books (CJB) and
the Congressional Budget Justification Books (CBJB) accompanying the
intelligence budget request must contain all direct costs of a program,
including the costs of operating and maintaining the systems or project.
The committee notes the very good progress the Intelligence Community
made in this respect with the fiscal year 1999 CBJBs, but that the
materials received were still not complete with the information
required. For example, in the CJBs, the operations and maintenance costs
of some intelligence aircraft systems show the direct operating costs,
but do not reflect the direct depot maintenance costs. Numerous service
systems show procurement costs, but do not reflect the operations costs
for fielded systems nor the personnel required to man them. In the
CBJBs, there were large gaps in necessary budget crosswalks from past
years to the current year. In fact, some of the fiscal year 1999 CBJBs
had less budget information on programs than was available in the fiscal
year 1998 CBJB. At best, these gaps make understanding the total costs
of a program difficult; at worst, this is suggestive of an attempt to
hide total program costs.
The committee directs, beginning with the fiscal year 2000 budget
request that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central
Intelligence include all associated costs of an intelligence program or
project within the justification materials. The committee will monitor
progress carefully over the next year and will consider stronger
measures as necessary.
JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
ES 3A,-$3.2 million
The budget request contained $3.2 million in research and
development, Defense-Wide, for continued upgrade of the SIGINT systems
on the ES 3A aircraft.
The committee has been informed that the Navy has decided to
terminate this aircraft. The committee, therefore, recommends no funding
for the requested upgrades.
Tactical Control and Analysis Center, Transfer $800,000
The budget request included $800,000 in research and development,
Defense-Wide, for continued development of the Marine Corps Tactical
Control and Analysis Center (TCAC).
The committee believes the development of an analytical center for
Marine Corps tactical operations is more appropriately a Marine Corps
responsibility rather than a National Security Agency, Defense
Cryptologic Program activity. Therefore, the committee recommends the
budget request in research and development, Marine Corps, line 170.
Information production, -$10.0 million
The committee understands that NIMA is testing and evaluating COTS
applications as part of the USIGS migration and firmly approves of this
approach. However, it also appears that NIMA continues to do a
substantial amount of proprietary development. Therefore, the committee
authorizes a reduction to this account by $10.0 million and recommends
that NIMA decrease its development of proprietary applications.
Information production: Product generation, -$15.0 million
Information production: Product outsourcing, +$15.0 million
Information production: Integrated product cells, +$5.0 million
The budget request contains $740.6 million for National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA) operations, including $391.5 million for
geospatial information production.
The committee is very supportive of NIMA's efforts to outsource the
acquisition of a global feature foundation database. Because of this,
the committee believes that NIMA should not wait to develop the most
manpower intensive of the production functions--NIMA's standard
products--within the private sector. The committee authorizes an
additional $15 million to the geospatial information production request
to be used to begin demonstrations with industry similar to the process
whereby NIMA-qualified contractors produce its feature foundation data.
The committee has also been impressed with the efficiencies gained in
NIMA's integrated production cells, now called NIMA Production Cells.
NIMA is only projecting an increase of about five new cells per year
over the FYDP. The committee authorizes an additional $5.0 million over
the budget request, to allow NIMA to acquire more cells in fiscal year
1999.
As indicated above, the committee is interested in seeing NIMA's
efficiencies increase through the use of more modern technologies and
outsourcing. NIMA faces a funding shortfall in its civilian pay accounts
and also must modernize its infrastructure to effectively produce
products in a timely fashion. NIMA can no longer afford a
disproportionate portion of its budget going to civilian pay and
maintenance of legacy systems. NIMA must move more of its funds to
investment. By outsourcing, NIMA will be able to leverage leading-edge
commercial imaging and mapping technologies and production capabilities.
To further encourage NIMA to address this issue in the near term, the
committee decreases the overall amount requested in operations and
maintenance by $15.0 million. This decrease may be applied as NIMA
judges most appropriate, except that no reductions should be made to the
funds authorized and appropriated for outsourcing or for NIMA Production
Cells, and no more than half of the decrease may be applied to
personnel. The committee will evaluate any potential impacts this
reduction may have on NIMA as it prepares for conference. NIMA is
encouraged to develop options and impact assessments for this purpose.
Information Applications & Systems/National Technology
Alliance (NTA), +$5.0 million
The committee continues to believe that NIMA must pursue commercial
alternatives to its legacy systems. The National Technology Alliance
(NTA) has developed an alternative approach to the Defense Dissemination
System (DDS) and the Enhanced Processing Segment (EPS) in response to
the Navy's concern over high operations and maintenance costs for the
DDS system. Therefore, the committee authorizes $5.0 million within the
US Imagery and Geospatial Information System line for the NTA to
demonstrate this capability with the Navy. The committee requests a
progress report on this activity by January 31, 1999, including an
evaluation by the Navy's N6 organization and NIMA.
Sustaining capabilities, -$14.0 million
The committee does not understand why the Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP) portion of sustaining capabilities is only reduced by
$4.2 million between fiscal years 1998 and 1999. NIMA lost the lease on
the old DMA headquarters building when it consolidated at the Bethesda
facility. Also, the Philadelphia distribution center is being closed as
well as other Washington, DC facilities as described in the
Congressional Justification Book. Further, the committee is confused as
to why this activity has increased its personnel by 65 people (all in
the civilian workforce) during this same period, when NIMA lost about
800 people in fiscal year 1998. The committee assumes that, with less
people in the workforce, corporate affairs, and management and
administration would also need less personnel and should see a
corresponding reduction, not an increase. Finally, the committee
assumes, with the implementation of the Peoplesoft software that
automates many of the functions of the human resources (HR) area, NIMA
would be able to downsize its HR department. Given all of this, the
committee would expect to see a larger reduction in the O&M of NIMA's
sustaining capabilities segment and, therefore, recommend a reduction to
this account of $14.0 million.
Geospatial database integration and display, no budgetary change
In two studies, NIMA has concluded that the commercial sector has
already developed innovative, high quality, affordable software products
to integrate and display NIMA's digital geospatial databases. However,
the services and defense agencies continue to invest substantial funds
in government-developed, custom products that cost the government more
than they should, inhibit achieving a common operating picture, and
complicate training. The committee is particularly concerned that the
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is funding a custom software
development program for the Joint Mapping Tool Kit (JMTK) module of the
Global Command and Control System (GCCS), even though commercial
products already exist that can meet the need and even though NIMA, the
functional manager with expertise in this area, has recommended against
this acquisition strategy.
The committee notes that NIMA is trying again to convince DISA of the
wisdom of a commercial procurement. The committee recommends that no
funds authorized and appropriated to NIMA be made available for the JMTK
module for GCCS until the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence certifies that DISA will
procure this module commercially, or reports to the Congressional
intelligence and defense committees as to why a commercial procurement
does not make sense. The committee requests that the Assistant Secretary
also establish a defense-wide policy for acquiring geospatial database
integration, display, and visualization capabilities. As part of this
policy review, the Assistant Secretary should examine individual service
and defense agency acquisition programs to ensure that they are
cost-effective, and not duplicative.
In addition, although NIMA is itself utilizing commercial
visualization tools internally, the committee is concerned that NIMA is
not aggressively taking steps to ensure that such database integration
and display capabilities are available for procurement, or licensing, by
its customers, apart from the JMTK module in GCCS. These capabilities,
after all, are a central part of NIMA's mission and provide a primary
means by which NIMA's customers can understand and exploit the
underlying data and products that NIMA provides. The committee notes
that the recent Defense Science Board study of DoD mapping urged that
NIMA rapidly develop or acquire such capabilities. The committee
recommends that NIMA begin to acquire the ability to make these products
available to its customers in fiscal year 1999 from within available
resources, and develop a plan to expand and sustain this effort in
fiscal year 2000 and beyond.
Geospatial database production, no budgetary change
The mapping strategy of the Defense Mapping Agency had been to meet
as many of its customers' requirements for detailed, comprehensive
mapping products in as many areas of the world as possible. Since
resources were quite limited, however, this strategy meant that only a
small portion of overall requirements could be met, and large parts of
the world were not mapped at all or the products that were available
were terribly out of date.
NIMA's strategy is to try to produce a minimal set of mapping data
for the world, or most of it, and enhance that data as rapidly as need
arises. This strategy requires NIMA's customers to accept less detail
and comprehensiveness in some geographic areas--presumably high priority
ones--in exchange for a higher overall readiness level in much larger
geographic areas.
The key issues facing NIMA as it tries to implement this strategy are
these:
Will NIMA require additional funding up front to create the
foundation level data base, or can it generate the necessary resources
through internal reforms, competitive outsourcing, process
modernization, and shifts in priorities?
Once created, is this data base inexpensive to keep current, since it
is less detailed than the standard products NIMA produces today and
since much of it is automated? In other words, would the investment
needed to create the data base above NIMA's planned budgets truly be a
non-recurring expense?
If additional funding is required, will the Defense Department agree
that the requirement competes favorably with other defense priorities?
If not, could less than global coverage for the foundation level data
base be acceptable? Alternatively, is it acceptable for NIMA to achieve
the desired level of geographic coverage for its foundation level data
base over a longer period of time, without causing the data base to
become stale?
At what pace will NIMA's customers allow it to cut back on the
production of standard products now to shift resources to building the
foundation level data base? How far can NIMA go in the near-term in
shifting resources to this function, given that NIMA will have to retain
the ability to surge to enhance the foundation data base to support
ongoing operations, potential major and minor contingencies, and other
crises (since the commercial sector does not yet possess much capacity
for this function)?
How much efficiency will NIMA gain by modernizing its production
processes under the so-called ``USIGS Migration'' program? Can these
gains be realized in time to help with the near-term creation of the
foundation level data base?
How much will NIMA be able to reduce the time required to enhance the
foundation data base to support crises, through equipment and process
modernization and through outsourcing? Will it be enough to support the
overall strategy?
The answers to these questions will determine the pace by which NIMA
can competitively procure a foundation level data base. The committee
believes that these issues must be addressed as part of the preparation
of the fiscal year 2000 Future Years Defense Program budget. The
committee requests the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense assign
these issues to the Intelligence Program Review Group and Expanded
Defense Resources Board, or some other suitable forum, for resolution.
In any event, the committee requests the NIMA
Director to prepare answers to these questions and report to
the Congressional intelligence and defense committees by March 1, 1999.
Endurance unmanned aerial vehicle, No budgetary change
The budget request contained $178.7 million in PE 35205D8Z for
endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, and included $40.6 million for the
Dark Star stealthy high altitude endurance (HAE) unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV), $90.1 million for Global Hawk HAE UAV, and $48.0 million for the
common ground segment.
The committee is aware that Global Hawk has made its first flight,
but that continuing problems with the Dark Star development has
prevented its continued flight test. The committee is concerned by
continuing delays in the Dark Star testing, reportedly caused by a lack
of redundancy of the aircraft's systems and a continuing series of
hardware and software failures. Further, the committee is aware that
there has been a tendency to describe existing advanced concept
technology demonstration (ACTD) aircraft such as Dark Star and Global
Hawk as systems that may, in part, replace manned reconnaissance
aircraft. Though noting that ACTD aircraft may form the basis for a
future capability, the committee has been informed by operational users
that the new HAE UAVs must undergo a thorough user evaluation to
determine military utility. Such demonstration aircraft are not, nor
were they designed to be, operational aircraft. Potential users note
that subsequent to evaluation, the ACTD aircraft design must be
modified, as necessary, based on information gathered, to meet an
operational requirement. Based on service requirements, they then must
be procured using the established acquisition process. Predator, the
first ACTD UAV to transition to production has followed this process.
The committee reminds the Secretary of Defense that the ACTD program is
not to be used to circumvent established acquisition procedures.
The committee strongly supports continued development of HAE UAVs as
potential replacements for manned reconnaissance aircraft, and
recommends $178.7 million only for HAE UAV and common ground segment
development.
Joint signals intelligence avionics family, No budgetary change
The budget request contained $80.4 million in PE 35206D8Z for the
joint signals intelligence avionics family (JSAF).
The committee continues to be concerned by problems with JSAF
developments. While the committee is encouraged by progress in design of
the low band subsystem (LBSS), it is concerned by schedule delays and
cost increases that have forced reduction of system performance to
remain within budget. Further, the committee remains doubtful that the
high band subsystem (HBSS) development can successfully meet its cost
and performance goals. The committee's concerns are heightened by the
fact that the JSAF development is the only planned upgrade for future
airborne SIGINT reconnaissance. If JSAF fails to provide the needed
capabilities, users ranging from theater tactical forces to national
policy makers will be severely impacted.
Executive Order 12333 charges the Director of the National Security
Agency (NSA) to conduct ``research and development to meet the needs of
the United States for signals intelligence * * *''. To ensure proper
joint oversight of JSAF development, the committee recommends the budget
request be authorized in PE 35885G, the Defense Cryptologic Program. The
committee believes this will allow the Air Force, as the executive agent
for JSAF, to continue to execute the program, while providing joint
oversight by NSA.
Tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, Funding transfers
The budget request contained $75.6 million in PE 35204A and $37.2
million in PE 35204D8Z for tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).
The committee notes that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology recently provided the Congressional defense
and intelligence committees with the Department's plan to implement
legislative direction included in the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105 85) for reorganization of the Defense
Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) and commends the Department for
its prompt response. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1998 (P.L. 105 85) contained further direction that the Department
of Defense review commercial solutions for the various UAV requirements.
The committee notes that the Navy is now conducting a three-phase
competitive demonstration of vertical takeoff or landing (VTOL) UAVs to
meet the Navy and Marine Corps VTAL UAV requirements. The committee
continues to support this approach and urges the Navy to continue the
multiple-participant competitive demonstration through the shipboard
phase prior to final selection using the funds provided.
The committee notes the proposed plan for transfer of DARO funding
included in the fiscal year 1999 request to appropriate service accounts
and recommends the following adjustments: $49.6 million in PE 35204A for
Army tactical UAV, a decrease of $26.0 million; $18.0 million in PE
35204N for VTOL UAV; $37.2 million in PE 35204N for ongoing common
tactical control system development previously managed by the Joint
Program Office; and $8.0 million in PE 35204M for the Marine Corps'
close range tactical UAV.
Defense airborne reconnaissance program management,-$4.7 million
The budget request contained $15.7 million for Defense Airborne
Reconnaissance Program (DARP) integration and support in PE 35209D8Z.
The committee notes that, subsequent to development of this year's
budget request, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) has
been eliminated and its functions absorbed within the reorganized office
of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and
within the military services. The committee supports actions that adhere
to the Department's stated objective of maintaining a very small cadre
oversight organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), focused solely on policy level guidance to ensure reconnaissance
system interoperability and architectural compliance. The
Department has indicated that it plans to request reprogramming
authority to shift DARO funding for DARP integration and support from PE
35209D8Z to program elements within the Air Force and other DoD
agencies, as well as Defense-wide operations and maintenance.
The committee supports this transfer of funding, and, therefore
recommends $7.0 million in Operations & Maintenance, Defense-wide, $1.0
million in PE 35208F, $1.0 million in PE 35208BQ, $1.0 million in
35208G, and $1.0 million in PE 35208L, a total decrease of $4.7 million.
18 reconnaissance capable, -$1.0 million, transfer $42.4 million
The budget request included $43.4 million for developing the Super
Hornet Advanced Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP).
The committee continues to fully support the development of a podded
tactical reconnaissance capability for use by fighter aircraft and has
supported the concept that a podded reconnaissance capability should not
be focused strictly on the E/F 18 aircraft. The Navy has agreed with
this broader concept and has decided to change the name SHARP to the
Shared Reconnaissance Pod to reflect the change in approach.
Due to this decision, the committee believes the funds should be more
appropriately reflected in the Joint Military Intelligence Program,
within the Navy's Manned Reconnaissance line. Therefore, the committee
recommends $42.4 million in P.E. 35207N for this purpose.
Advanced synthetic aperture radar system improvement program,
+$8.0 million
The budget request contained $5.0 million in PE 35207D8Z for the
Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS) Improvement Program
(AIP) for the U 2 aircraft. As a result of the termination of the
Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology sent a letter to the Congress
recommending specific redistribution of Defense Airborne Reconnaissance
Program funding in fiscal year 1999. Included in this recommendation was
an additional $2.5 million for AIP research and development. Further,
the Air Force has requested a transfer of AIP procurement funding into
the research and development account.
The AIP program will dramatically increase the U 2's radar system
with significantly improved synthetic aperture radar imagery, a highly
capable moving target indicator tracking capability, and integral
onboard processing functions. Unfortunately, the AIP has suffered cost
growth and has a fiscal year 1999 shortfall of over $18.0 million. Some
of this growth is due to contractor overruns and schedule slips caused
by late deliveries of commercial processors. Some of this growth is due
to a decision to postpone certain Global Hawk High Altitude Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle radar developments that were cost sharing with AIP. This
growth has forced the Air Force to make decisions to slip the AIP,
thereby further increasing costs. In order to deliver the AIP when
required, the Air Force has stated a need to reprogram funding from
procurement to research and development in fiscal year 1999. However,
such a step would have a significant procurement funding impact in
fiscal year 2000.
The committee recommends an authorization of $13.0 million, an
increase of $8.0 million for AIP development.
Electro-optic framing technologies, +$8.0 million
The budget request contained $5.4 million in PE 35207D8Z for
electro-optic (EO) framing technology.
The committee continues to support the state-of-the-art EO framing
with on-chip forward motion compensation (FMC). This technology is
proving itself in operationally deployed systems.
The committee recommends $13.4 million, an increase of $8.0 million
in PE 35206N for the purposes of furthering the EO with on-chip FMC
technologies. Specifically, these additional funds are to be used for
continued development of the ultra-high resolution focal plane array and
conformance with JPEG 2000 compression standards. These developments
should produce form/fit operational insertions into currently deployed
CA 260 framing cameras. Further, these funds are to be used to develop
infra-red EO framing technologies and image intensified EO framing
sensors with FMC for operational insertion into existing Air National
Guard tactical reconnaissance aircraft and other aircraft as
appropriate.
Unmanned aerial vehicle systems integration laboratory, No
budgetary change
The budget request contained $5.0 million in PE 35204D8Z for the U.S.
Army's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Systems Integration Laboratory
(SIL), and included $3.0 million for continued development of the
Multiple UAV Simulation Environment (MUSE).
The committee supports the SIL's joint UAV developmental work and it
is concerned that the reorganization of Defense Airborne Reconnaissance
Program will leave the SIL without a sponsor, thereby possibly losing a
valuable joint UAV integration organization and jeopardizing continued
evolution and improvement of the MUSE tool. While SIL is clearly a
service organization, it provides joint support that may well be
overseen directly by the new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(DASD) for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance.
Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) to provide the
congressional defense and intelligence committees a plan, which includes
a funding profile, for the continued operation of the SIL, no later than
March 31, 1999.
Multi-function self aligned gate technology, +$4.0 million
The budget request contained $32.1 million for continued development
of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) tactical control system (TCS).
The committee notes that the TCS will provide interoperability and
commonality for mission planning, command and control, communications,
and data dissemination for the current and future family of tactical and
medium altitude endurance UAVS. The multi-function self aligned gate
(MSAG) technology developed as part of the TCS development has been
successfully demonstrated and is now ready for larger scale testing. The
committee supports MSAG and recommends $36.1 million, an increase of
$4.0 million for fabrication and testing of prototype MSAG active array
antennae for TCS UAVS.
Finally, the committee is aware that after the field tests of the AAA
in fiscal year 1998, there are no plans to continue to develop, produce
or test this technology. The committee believes this technology has the
potential for many applications, including use as highly reliable
satellite communications antennas with no mechanical parts. Therefore,
committee requests the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence) to provide the defense and
intelligence committees a plan for moving forward with, and possibly
fielding, this technology. This plan should include a spend plan for the
fiscal year 1999 funding, potential users--including National Foreign
Intelligence Program users--and schedule. The committee requests the
plan be provided no later than 31 January 1999.
Integrated imagery planning, No budgetary change
The committee believes that the numerous, but separate, Department of
Defense and Intelligence Community (IC) imagery programs should be
closely coordinated and integrated to maximize their collective
capabilities. Better planning of visible and multi-spectral imagery,
synthetic aperture radar (SAR), moving target indicator (MTI) radar, and
video collection could improve support to military operations and save
resources.
Moving target indicator (MTI) radar provides a real-time acquisition
and can provide continuous tracking capability, but has limited
abilities for target identification. Electro-optic (EO) and SAR imagery,
in contrast, are excellent for target classification and identification,
but are exploited by humans and do not provide a continuous tracking
capability. It would appear that the two types of imagery are highly
complementary, and that their individual strengths offset their
individual deficiencies. For example, if proper MTI coverage of an area
could be maintained, EO or SAR imagery, even with significant latencies,
could be used to identify immediate targets without additional imaging.
Logically, the need for repeatedly imaging those targets with high
resolution sensors might be reduced, as would associated communications
requirements. Unfortunately, these complementary types of imagery have
been managed, and moreover, tasked, in isolation.
DoD is, for example, acquiring a host of unrelated MTI capable
systems. With few exceptions, these systems are not interoperable. If
adequate numbers of systems could be fielded and their data streams
integrated, however, overall performance could be far greater than the
sum of their parts, improving the chances for continuous and precise
tracking. Similarly, the DoD and IC are operating and acquiring a host
of imagery systems. Although the products may be interoperable in many
cases, there is reason for concern that we have not yet determined the
right relationship and balance between these systems to best combine
their total capabilities.
Finally, every imagery requirements analysis has concluded that two
foot resolution is necessary for imagery analysts conducting wide-area
search. Many sensors do not meet this standard--particularly those being
planned for the unmanned aerial vehicles. Meeting such requirements, and
absorbing the costs associated, may not be necessary if the various
forms of ``imagery'' can be combined into a holistic information effort.
The committee believes that there is a compelling need to carefully
examine ways to integrate imagery and MTI systems to not only make
requirements, cost and capability tradeoffs across programs, but,
moreover, to take fullest advantage of the totality of all our
information capabilities. This will require better mission planning and
tasking, more robust connectivity between sensors, fusion developments,
and analysis interactions. Further, it will require a removal of
stovepiped management processes.
The committee directs DoD and the IC to conduct a study on the issues
discussed above, using the study of MTI technical issues and
requirements mandated by Congress last year as a model. The committee
expects the technical assessment portion of the study to be led jointly
by ASD(C3I) in coordination and the Community Management Staff, with
appropriate participation of NIMA, NRO, DARPA, the services, and the
joint staff. The committee directs that this study be completed and the
results conveyed to the congressional defense and intelligence
committees no later than March 1, 1999.
Defense imagery program, Funding transfers
The budget request included $29.4 million in research and
development, defense-wide, line 150 for the Common Imagery
Ground/Surface Station (CIGSS) and $1.9 million for development of the
standards for the Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS). The
committee believes there is a need for the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA) to create from within existing resources a management
structure analogous to the National Security Agency's Defense
Cryptologic Program (DCP). The DCP is responsible for coordinating and
providing funding for advanced research and development of signals
intelligence capabilities that have applicability across all services.
This structure requires close coordination with the services as they
develop, field, and evolve tactical systems, with the service needs
driving the leading edge developments. The committee believes that, just
as the Director, NSA is responsible for coordinating research and
development to meet the tactical needs of the U.S. Cryptologic System,
so should the Director, NIMA for the U.S. Imagery System.
Therefore, the committee recommends these funding requests be
authorized in research and development, defense-wide, line 138A.
Further, the committee directs NIMA to create a management structure to
provide a Defense Imagery Program within the Defense Imagery and
Mapping Agency Program of the Joint Military Intelligence
Program. No additional billets are authorized for this management.
Integrated architecture plan, +$3.0 million
The budget request contained $6.1 million for the Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Integrated Architecture Plan (CIAP).
CIAP has been strongly endorsed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence as well as the
commanders-in-chief of the nine unified commands. The CIAP developments
have included the highly successful C4ISR Architecture Framework for the
Department of Defense, the Command C4ISR Architectures for the regional
Commanders in Chief, and the initiation of the C4ISR Architectures for
the Warfighter (CAW) effort at selected unified commands. The committee
believes this later effort should be extended to all nine unified
commands.
The committee believes these architectural developments will provide
a cohesive and more cost effective strategy for developing and procuring
the proper intelligence support systems for the users. The committee
recommends $9.1 million for the continuation of these efforts and
extension of the CAW to all unified commands.
Joint reserve intelligence program, +$3.0 million
The budget request contained $9.4 million in operations and
maintenance, defense-wide, for continued reserve component man days for
the conduct of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP).
The committee is favorably impressed by the intelligence production
mission load the JRIP has been able to accommodate in support of the
active forces. This has been particularly true of the JRIP support to
the European Joint Analysis Center (JAC) from the Fort Sheridan,
Illinois, Joint Reserve Intelligence Center. This world-wide support has
included direct personnel support via temporary duty assignments as well
as support from the continental United States via virtual connectivity
whereby reservists can drill with their gaining units without having to
leave their home area. Further, this support, in excess of 34,000 man
days, has provided the active components with critical intelligence
augmentation to conduct collection operations, process backlogs, and
produce targeting materials, final reports and studies--all without
having to use the presidential selected reserve call-up authority.
The committee believes this program should be expanded and its
benefits maximized to the extent possible. The committee recommends
$12.6 million, an increase of $3 million for these purposes.
Joint inter-agency task force west, -$3.5 million
The budget request included $4.2 million for operating an all-source
intelligence analysis cell for the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF)
West. This cell is focused on coordinating tactical and operational
intelligence support to U.S. Embassy Country Teams performing
counter-drug operations in the Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia areas.
The committee notes that JIATF-West is attached to PACOM, but appears
to have little command support. Further, the Drug Enforcement Agency,
the Crime and Narcotics Center, and other JIATFs have indicated to the
committee that this cell offers little value for the funds expended and
has not produced any actionable tactical intelligence or strategic
analysis. Therefore the committee recommends an authorization of
$700,000 for this intelligence function, and recommends an evaluation to
terminate it altogether.
Defense support program office training and exercise, -$7.8 million
The budget request contained $7.8 million for Defense Support Program
Office (DSPO) training and exercise support.
The Secretary of Defense has informed the committee that the DSPO is
being abolished and its functions consolidated within the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The committee understands that the National
Military and Operations Support Office within the NRO is also charged
with, and funded for, training and exercise support. Therefore, the
committee believes the DSPO training and exercise support funding is no
longer required and recommends no authorization for this purpose.
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Tactical exploitation of national capabilities, -$4.6 million
The budget request contained $44.7 million in PE 64766A for Army
tactical exploitation of national capabilities (TENCAP).
The committee notes that the amount requested represents nearly a
$26.0 million increase from the level approved for fiscal year 1998. The
committee is concerned that the Army may be using the TENCAP program as
a means for bypassing the ``normal'' acquisition process allowing it to
procure and operate combat systems associated with space sensors. The
committee is supportive of TENCAP efforts for short-term, high-pay
concepts and initiatives that improve the use of national space sensors
and systems. The committee will not, however, support TENCAP funded
development and production of entire weapons systems. Therefore, the
committee directs that future TENCAP requests be limited to space
exploitation initiatives and projects that are of short-duration and
high payoff.
The committee recommends $40.1 million for the Army's TENCAP program
in fiscal year 1999, a reduction of 4.6 million in PE 64766A.
Ground based common sensor (GBCS), -$9.7 million
The budget request contained $25.4 million for the GBCS-Light system,
of which $1.5 million is for the Common Module Electronics Intelligence
System (CMES).
The committee notes that $1.5 million for CMES procurement is
requested twice. Consequently, the committee recommends a reduction of
$1.5 million.
Additionally, the committee notes that the GBCS-L system has had
numerous technical difficulties and experienced a fielding delay as a
result of a two-year slip in initial operational test and evaluation
(IOT&E). This delay has resulted in the Department twice having used
GBCS as a source of funds for reprogramming requests.
Just as the committee was marking up the fiscal year 1999 request, it
learned that, due to continuing integration problems, the GBCS-L IOT&E
will not be conducted again in fiscal year 1998. This third and latest
slip is very disturbing and signals to the committee that there are more
problems with this system than the Army is admitting. As a result of the
program's past and current performance, it believes that all of the
requested funding will not be executable in fiscal year 1999 and it
recommends a reduction of $9.7 million for GBCS-L hardware. Finally, the
committee notes that the Department of Defense has requested nearly $500
million for this relatively small and low complexity program. This
committee finds this cost excessive for the capability required, and
therefore requests the Secretary of Defense to conduct an Inspector
General audit of the GBCS program; its costs, its technical approach,
and management.
All source analysis system (ASAS), +$2.0 million
The budget request contained $28.1 million in PE 64321A for the ASAS
intelligence support system.
The committee recommends $30.1 million, an increase of $2.0 million
in PE 64321A, to continue the development of situation display fusion
algorithms, to transfer these algorithms to the other service
intelligence support systems, and to achieve ASAS Block II
interoperability with the Defense Intelligence Agency's Modernized
Integrated Data Base.
Distributed surveillance system, +$6.7 million
The budget request contained $42.0 million in PE 64784N for advanced
deployable system (ADS) engineering and manufacturing development.
The committee recommends $48.7 million, including an increase of $6.7
million to continue the planned introduction of automation and data
fusion capability for the ADS demonstration system.
Navy joint surveillance and target attack radar system
(JSTARS), +$3.0 million
The budget request included no funding for completing the
developments for integrating a capability on U.S. Navy surface vessels
to receive processed JSTARS MTI data over UHF satellite communications
and Link 16.
In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998,
Congress provided $5.0 million for the Navy to begin integrating the
Link 16 data into the Joint Maritime Command and Control System (JMCIS)
and the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). The committee has
learned that the Link 16 integration into GCCS will satisfy many DoD
data dissemination requirements, including the JSTARS. Therefore, the
committee recommends an additional $3 million for these purposes within
the Navy's JMCIS line.
Also, as noted elsewhere in this report, the committee is convinced
that the Navy will require access to the full range of JSTARS'
capabilities to support Navy targeting requirements. Such full access
will require a wide-band data link capability between the aircraft and
the surface vessels. The wide-band Common Data Link (CDL) is DoD's
standard, high-rate data link that will be installed on nearly thirty
Navy aircraft carriers, amphibious, and command ships early in the next
decade. The committee believes that it would be illogical for the Navy
to install another expensive, unique data link such as the low data rate
Secure Common Data Link (SCDL), currently employed on the JSTARS, on its
major combatants. Instead, the committee believes it is necessary to add
as soon as possible a data broadcast capability based on the CDL
standard to the JSTARS fleet. Also as noted elsewhere, the Navy clearly
needs a CDL capability on the P-3 fleet to take full advantage of the
range of radar, SIGINT, and imagery capabilities planned or programmed
for the various elements of that fleet.
If the Navy's requirement for CDL-compatible wide-band airborne data
links turns out to be the recently demonstrated Tactical CDL (TCDL), the
committee believes it would be wise for the Navy to consider modifying
its currently planned CDL installations, to be compatible with both the
CDL and TCDL, before or as they are installed. The committee will be
reluctant to approve purchase of TCDL ground stations without first
receiving a solid Navy commitment to modify all of its shipboard CDL
systems to be compatible with both.
Based on the above, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy
to report to the congressional defense and intelligence committees, by
March 1, 1999, on the Navy's requirements and plans for
CDL/TCDL-compatible data links.
Fleet air reconnaissance, -$5.2 million
The budget request contained $5.2 million for ES 3A modification kits.
The Navy has informed the committee that it intends to terminate the
ES 3 program in fiscal year 2000. Based on this decision, the committee
sees no need for modifying these aircraft prior to their removal from
the fleet. The committee, therefore, recommends no funding for these
modifications.
Marine Corps electronic warfare support system, Fence $16.4 million
The budget request contained $16.4 million for acquiring two Marine
Corps Electronic Warfare Support Systems (MEWSS).
The committee directs that none of the authorized and appropriated
funding be obligated or expended until completion of a successful
initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E). The committee
understands the development and IOT&E of the MEWSS is directly tied to
the Army' Ground-Based Common Sensor (GBCS) system. The committee
believes, however, that IOT&E success or failure, and, therefore,
subsequent procurement decisions, should be based on the individual
system merits based on their operational concepts. Therefore, the
committee does not see a specific need to make a successful IOT&E of
MEWSS contingent on a successful IOT&E of GBCS.
Marine Corps tactical intelligence equipment, +$1.0 million
The budget request contained no funds for purchasing and evaluating
commercial imagery display tools, or modern printer technologies.
The committee is aware of the highly successful Marine Corps use of
the Remote Replication System (RRS). The RRS allows the Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) to deploy with automated equipment that
provides the capability to ``reach back'' to National Imagery and
Mapping Agency data bases and ``pull forward'' data in order to
construct mapping and imagery products. The committee believes this
concept has the potential to reduce drastically the paper products with
which the MEF currently deploys. Despite the success of the RRS concept,
however, the committee understands that there has been little attention
paid to providing modern display and printing technologies. Therefore,
the committee recommends $1.0 million in procurement, Marine Corps, for
purchasing and evaluating commercial imagery manipulation tools,
state-of-the-art display devices, and high quality large format printers
for field use.
Air Force/NRO partnership, -$2.6 million
The budget request contained $17.6 million in research and
development, Air Force, for the joint Air Force, National Reconnaissance
Office, and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency advanced space
technology demonstrator.
The partnership funding for this demonstration is an equal share of
one third each. The fiscal year 1999 Air Force request exceeds its
share. Therefore, the committee recommends an authorization of $15
million, or a reduction of $2.6 million.
Joint tactical terminal, +$8.0 million
The budget request contained $6.5 million in other procurement, Army,
and $4.2 million in other procurement, Air Force, for the Joint Tactical
Terminal intelligence broadcast transceivers.
These radios are an integral part of the Integrated Broadcast Service
that the committee fully supports. The committee is concerned that,
because of contract protests that have resulted in delays in final
contract award, the fielding of these radios has slipped, leaving
operational users without the ability to receive tactical intelligence
data broadcasts. In order to correct this problem, the committee
recommends $11.5 million and $7.2 million, an increase of $5.0 million
for the Army and $3.0 million for the Air Force, respectively, for
accelerating the purchase and fielding of these radios.
``Senior Scout,'' No budgetary change
The budget request contained $14.3 million in operations and
maintenance, Air National Guard, partially for the continued operation
of the Senior Scout tactical reconnaissance system. Senior Scout is a C
130-employed, roll-on/roll-off, reconnaissance capability operated by
the Air National Guard. It provides an airborne reconnaissance
collection capability that is complementary to other airborne collection
systems operated by the active component.
The committee perceives a lack of direction and support for Senior
Scout, noting that on several occasions, the Air Force has nearly
terminated the program, that the system has not been well supported in
terms of upgrades or sensor improvements, and that it has certainly not
maintained technological pace with the RC 135 Rivet Joint aircraft or
other similar reconnaissance platforms. Consequently, the committee does
not believe continuing the Senior Scout to be either cost or mission
effective. The committee believes, however, that the Air National Guard
linguists currently operating the Senior Scout are vital to the overall
national
reconnaissance effort. The committee perceives a critical need
to retain these Guard reconnaissance personnel and training them on more
modern equipment.
In fiscal year 1997, Congress authorized and appropriated funding for
two additional RC 135 Rivet Joint aircraft. The committee has learned
that the Air Force is having difficulty fully manning these aircraft.
The committee believes that since the Guard personnel are currently
tasked to supplement active component RC 135 operations, providing at
least one of these aircraft on a rotational basis to the Air National
Guard would both resolve the manpower problem and take greater advantage
of an available resource.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to
provide the congressional defense and intelligence committees a plan for
phasing out the Senior Scout reconnaissance system and replacing it with
an RC 135 alternative no later than October 1, 1999.
``Pacer Coin,'' -$2.4 million
The budget request contained $2.4 million in aircraft spares and
repair parts for the transfer of mission equipment from retiring Pacer
Coin aircraft to the non-dedicated, follow-on C 130 reconnaissance
aircraft. The committee notes that a fiscal year 1998 reprogramming
action stated that all funds for the C 130 follow-on program were
included in that request.
Furthermore, the committee does not agree that $2.4 million of
procurement funding is required to transfer equipment from one aircraft
to another. Therefore, the committee recommends no funding for this
purpose.
Joint surveillance and target attack system, Fence $40.2 million
The budget request included $123.8 million in research and
development for the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack System
(JSTARS), including $5.6 million for studies and miscellaneous efforts.
The committee recommends a total of $118.2 million for these purposes.
The committee is concerned by the extraordinary costs of the JSTARS
program. The committee understands each aircraft must undergo a
forty-one month, $110 million, refurbishment effort to restore the old
707-based airframes to flying condition before the aircraft begins its
modification to JSTARS configuration. This is more than triple what the
aircraft cost new, and is more expensive than purchasing a new 757
aircraft. Further, current projections show that the JSTARS latest
improvement program will cost the U.S. taxpayer well in excess of a
billion dollars to upgrade only a limited number of the thirteen JSTARS
aircraft. While the committee may fully support necessary upgrades to
this important system, there needs to be a significant effort to curb
costs.
Therefore, the committee requests the Secretary of the Air Force to
provide a report of audit on the costs of the JSTARS aircraft: the basic
airframe costs, the modification costs, and the costs of the upgrade
programs. This audit should be provided to the defense and intelligence
committees no later than 31 March 1999.
Finally, the committee has been asked in the President's budget
request to authorize the full request of the radar technology
improvement program. The Department of Defense has not agreed to brief
Members of the committee on all aspects of this upgrade, or even on how
the requested funding will be spent. Therefore, the committee directs
that no funding for the RTIP upgrade be obligated or expended until the
committee is fully briefed on this program.
Special operations intelligence systems, +$5.0 million
The budget request contained $1.8 million in PE 1160405BB for the
special operations systems development.
The committee notes that the special operations forces intelligence
vehicle (SOF IV) is an evolutionary ongoing effort that requires
additional funding to complete development. The committee recommends
$6.8 million, an increase of $5.0 million for SOF IV in PE 1160405BB.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE BILL AS REPORTED
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999
Title I: Intelligence activities
Section 101--Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists those elements of the United States Government for
whose intelligence and intelligence-related activities the Act
authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 1999.
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has been listed in section
101 of past Intelligence Authorization Acts. The DEA, however, does not
receive appropriations authorized by this legislation. Thus, the
committee does not include DEA in section 101.
The fact that DEA is no longer included, however, should not be
understood by either the DEA or any element of the intelligence
community as a reason to reduce the level of cooperation that currently
exists between the DEA and the various elements of the community. The
committee expects and demands a continuation of the very beneficial
working relationship that has developed between the community and the
DEA. The committee recognizes the efficacy of the DEA's partnership with
the intelligence community on the extremely serious national security
issue of international drug trafficking. It is the committee's
expectation, in spite of the removal of the DEA from section 101 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, that this
partnership will remain solid and continue to develop in the best
interests of the people of the United States.
The committee similarly insists upon a continuation of the level of
close communication between the committee and the DEA, with respect to
notification of developments, successes, failures, or compromises of the
foreign counternarcotics activities of the United States. The committee
will not countenance any attenuation of its ability to ensure that the
intelligence community is working together with law enforcement, where
necessary and appropriate, to advance our national security interests.
Section 102--Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 incorporates by reference the classified Schedule of
Authorizations. That schedule sets forth the specific amounts authorized
to be appropriated for specific intelligence and intelligence-related
activities and personnel ceilings for fiscal year 1999 for those United
States government elements listed in section 101. The details of the
Schedule are explained in the classified annex to this report. The
Schedule of Authorizations correlates to the President's budget request,
which was submitted to Congress, and remains, in classified form.
Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence, with the
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
in fiscal year 1999, to exceed the personnel ceilings applicable to the
components of the intelligence community under section 102 by an amount
not to exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings otherwise
applicable under section 102. The Director may exercise this authority
only when necessary to the performance of important intelligence
functions. Any exercise of this authority must be reported to the two
intelligence committees of the Congress.
The committee emphasizes that the authority conferred by section 103
is not intended to permit the wholesale raising of personnel strength in
any intelligence component. Rather, the section provides the Director of
Central Intelligence with flexibility to adjust personnel levels
temporarily for contingencies, and for overages caused by an imbalance
between hiring of new employees and attrition of current employees. The
committee does not expect the Director of Central Intelligence to allow
heads of intelligence components to plan to exceed levels set in the
Schedule of Authorizations, except for the satisfaction of clearly
identified hiring needs that are consistent with the authorization of
personnel strengths in this legislation. In no case is this authority to
be used to provide for positions otherwise denied by Congress.
Section 104--Community management account
Section 104 details the amount and composition of the Community
Management Account (CMA) of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Subsection (a) of section 104 authorizes appropriations in the amount
of $139,123,000 for fiscal year 1999 for the staffing and administration
of various components under the CMA. Subsection (a) also authorizes
funds identified for the Advanced Research and Development Committee and
the Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program to remain
available for two years.
Subsection (b) authorizes a total of 283 full-time personnel for
elements within the CMA for fiscal year 1999 and provides that such
personnel may be permanent employees of the CMA element or detailed from
other elements of the United States Government.
Subsection (c) explicitly authorizes the classified portion of the CMA.
Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed on a reimbursable
basis, with certain exceptions.
Subsection (e) authorizes $27,000,000 of the amount authorized for
the CMA under subsection (a) to be made available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center (NDIC) in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Subsection (e)
requires the Director of Central Intelligence to transfer the
$27,000,000 to the Department of Justice to be used for NDIC activities
under the authority of the Attorney General, and subject to section
103(d)(1) of the National Security Act.
Subsection (f) earmarks funds that are allocated for the CMA under
subsection (a) and authorizes those funds to be made immediately
available to the Department of State for the express purpose of
supporting intelligence community requirements related to the security
of overseas facilities. This subsection authorizes a one-time-only
immediate transfer of funds by the Director of Central Intelligence from
the CMA's Center for Security Evaluation to the Department of State to
ensure that architectural and engineering services related to several
overseas locations in fiscal year 1999 can begin immediately. These
funds shall only be available for the same purposes, and subject to the
same terms and conditions, as the funds in the appropriation accounts to
which these funds will be transferred.
The committee understands that an agreement among the departments or
agencies affected has been reached with respect to the specific amounts
and locations involved.
Title II: Central Intelligence Agency retirement and disability system
Section 201--Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of $201,500,000
for fiscal year 1999 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability Fund.
Title III: General provisions
Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law
Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by this Act for
salary, pay, retirement and other benefits for federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary
for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of appropriations within
the Act does not constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity that is precluded by the Constitution or other
laws of the United States.
Section 303--Extension of application of sanctions laws to
intelligence activities
Section 303 amends section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947,
which authorizes the President to delay the imposition of an economic,
cultural, diplomatic, or other sanction upon a foreign government based
on his determination that proceeding with such sanction could compromise
an ongoing criminal investigation or an intelligence source or method.
Section 905 was first enacted as part of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996. This authority has been extended every year
since for one year intervals.
Section 303 extends this authority until January 6, 2000. The
committee finds that there is a continuing need for this authority
because the immediate imposition of sanctions, without some delay,
could, in particular cases, seriously jeopardize a criminal
investigation or sources and methods of intelligence collection.
The committee reaffirms, without restating here, the position
asserted in its report accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1998 (Rpt. No. 105 135, part I), with respect to this
section.
Section 304--Sense of Congress regarding intelligence
community contracting
Section 304 expresses the sense of Congress that the DCI should
continue to direct elements of the intelligence community to award
contracts in a manner that would maximize the procurement of products
produced in the United States, when such action is compatible with the
national security interests of the United States, consistent with
operational and security concerns, and fiscally sound.
Title IV: Central Intelligence Agency
Section 401--Extension of the CIA Voluntary Separation of
Pay Act provisions
Section 401 amends section 2(f) of the Central Intelligence Agency
Voluntary Separation Pay Act (P.L. 103 36)(50 U.S.C. 403 4 note) to
extend the Agency's authority to offer ``early-out'' incentives until
September 30, 2001. Without this amendment, the Agency's authority to
offer such incentives would expire on September 30, 1999.
Although, CIA's ``early out'' incentive has been an effective
workforce reduction tool, the Agency must continue to address skills mix
issues, and ensure that personnel reductions are not undertaken simply
for the sake of reduction. The net impact of the six CIA early-out
exercises thus far, along with normal attrition and reduced hiring, has
been a significant drop in the Agency's on-duty strength since the
separation incentive program began in fiscal year 1993. The committee is
concerned that such reductions could result in gaps of coverage,
especially in critical areas.
The committee acknowledges that the CIA has worked hard over the past
decade to streamline and refocus its workforce to address critical,
cutting-edge national security issues. The Agency should be commended
for its efforts to reengineer its business processes, hire personnel
with new and vital skills, expand the capabilities and experiences
within the Agency workforce, and acquire new technologies to meet the
demands of today's collection requirements.
Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay authority should only be used for
specific, targeted populations and is intended to help the CIA achieve
its skill mix goals without resorting to involuntary separations in
certain occupational categories.
The committee believes that without this continued authority
separation rates would decline. This would limit the Agency's ability to
keep pace with rapidly expanding technologies and the dynamic
geopolitical realities that we face. The ability to adapt to such
dynamic changes is central to the Agency's mission.
Section 402--Enhanced protective authority for CIA personnel
and family members
Section 402 of the Act amends section 5(a)(4) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (``CIA Act''). This provision will
enable the Agency to use firearms to protect current and former Agency
personnel and their immediate families, as well as defectors and their
immediate families, who are in the United States. This authority is
granted for those situations when the Director of Central Intelligence
determines such protection is necessary for the performance of the
authorized functions of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Current Section 5(a)(4) of the CIA Act permits the CIA to use
firearms within the United States to protect only certain categories of
individuals limited to Agency personnel, defectors, and the families of
defectors, and other persons in the United States under Agency auspices.
This provision does not limit or amend any aspect of this authority.
Protection may sometimes be appropriate for former Agency personnel
because the distinction between former and current CIA personnel will be
of little consequence to terrorists seeking to harm CIA. In addition,
prudence dictates that if former or current CIA personnel are threatened
with harm, the protection provided to them should, in appropriate
circumstances, be extended to their immediate families as well. The
committee intends that the authority provided by this amendment will be
used only when the Director determines that there are specific and
credible threats to the protectees while in the United States and that
those threats arise from the protectee's affiliation with the CIA. The
committee expects that the Director will advise the intelligence
committees when this authority is exercised.
Similarly, the committee believes the Agency must advise the Attorney
General when such specific and credible threats against a protected
individual occurs. In this way, the United States government's
prosecutorial rights that could result from such criminal activity will
be protected.
The committee does not anticipate that the authority provided by
section 402 will be used to provide protectees with armed security
protection when threatened with harm that arises for reasons unrelated
to an individual's current or former affiliation with CIA (e.g.,
domestic violence or general threat of criminal violence in the area of
a CIA employee's residence in the United States).
In the wake of the 1993 assassination of CIA employees, the CIA
discussed the protection issue with local jurisdictions. These local law
enforcement agencies indicated that they did not have the resources,
training, or charter to provide such protection. More recently during
and after the trial of Mir Aimal Kasi, the need for this enhanced
authority was established. The immediate families of those killed or
injured provided a target for threats, causing additional anguish for
them.
The committee notes that this additional grant of protective
authority is not without precedent. The United States Marshals Service
(USMS) provides protection to the families of certain personnel under
certain circumstances. The USMS has the authority to provide protection
to any USMS employee, officer, or witness or anyone involved in judicial
process who is deemed by the USMS Director to be under threat. Such
examples include federal judges, prosecutors, witnesses, jurors, and any
of their family members against whom a threat has been directed.
The committee understands that the CIA is a target or recipient of a
large volume of unsolicited calls, letters, and visits by potentially
hostile individuals. Many of these contacts are the work of disturbed
individuals, some of whom make threats and then ``close the gap'',
actually appearing at the CIA Headquarters compound (or other Agency
facilities). Implicit in this kind of potential threat is the chance
that hostile or aggressive behavior may be directed against the families
of CIA personnel.
The amendment made by section 402 would not extend or expand, in any
way, the carefully limited law enforcement authority and jurisdiction
provided to the Agency in section 15 of the CIA Act. Simply put, it
authorizes the Agency to protect Agency employees, current and former,
and their families, in the United States, in the same manner as they are
authorized to protect defectors in the United States.
Section 403--Technical corrections
Section 403 makes technical corrections to section 5(a)(1) and
section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Act of 1949 and
section 201(c) of the CIA Retirement Act. The cross-reference in section
5(a)(1) of the CIA Act to subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section 102(a)(2)
of the National Security Act is no longer current or accurate, and
should cite instead to subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) of section 102.
Section 805(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 (P.L. No. 104 293) changed what had been sections 102(a)(2) (B) and
(C) of the National Security Act to sections 102(a)(2) and (a)(3) of
that Act. Similarly, the cross-references in section 5(a)(1) and section
6 of the CIA Act to ``subsection (c)(5) of section 103'' and to
``section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403
3(c)(5))'', respectively, are no longer current or accurate. The
cross-reference in section 201(c) of the CIA Retirement Act to that same
provision of the National Security Act is also outdated. Section
807(a)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
changed what had been section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act (50
U.S.C. 403 3(c)(5)) to section 103(c)(6) (50 U.S.C. 403 3(c)(6)).
Section 401 of the present legislation simply updates the
cross-references in section 5(a)(1) and section 6 of the CIA Act and
section 201(c) of the CIA Retirement Act to the pertinent provision of
the National Security Act.
Title V: Department of Defense
Section 501-- Extension of authority to engage in commercial
activities as security for intelligence collection activities
Section 501 amends section 431(a) of title 10 to continue current
Department of Defense authority to engage in commercial activities as
security for intelligence collection activities beyond December 31,
1999, which is the date on which the current statutory authorization
expires. The Committee has extended this provision for an additional
three years through and until December 31, 2002.
COMMITTEE POSITION
On April 29, 1998, in open session, a quorum being present, the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, by a recorded vote of 12
ayes to 0 noes, approved the bill, H.R. 3694, as amended by an amendment
in the nature of a substitute. By that vote, the committee ordered the
bill, as amended, reported favorably to the House. On that vote, the
Members present recorded their votes as follows:
Mr. Goss (Chairman)--aye; Mr. Shuster--aye; Mr. McCollum--aye; Mr.
Castle--aye; Mr. Boehlert--aye; Mr. Bass--aye; Mr. Gibbons--aye; Mr.
Dicks--aye; Mr. Skaggs--aye; Ms. Harman--aye; Mr. Skelton--aye; Mr.
Bishop--aye.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND
OVERSIGHT
With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the House of
Representatives, the committee has not received a report from the
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight pertaining to the subject
of this bill.
OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee held seven full-committee
hearings, as well as six full-committee briefings, on the classified
budgetary issues raised by H.R. 3694. Testimony was taken from the
Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security
Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Directors for Operations
and Intelligence, numerous program managers, and various other
knowledgeable witnesses on the activities and plans of the intelligence
community covered by the provisions and authorizations, both classified
and unclassified, of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1999. The bill, as reported by the committee, reflects conclusions
reached by the committee in light of that oversight activity.
FISCAL YEAR COST PROJECTIONS
The committee has attempted, pursuant to clause 7(a) of rule XIII of
the Rules of the House of Representatives, to ascertain the outlays that
will occur in fiscal year 1999 and the five years following if the
amounts authorized are appropriated. These estimates are contained in
the classified annex and are in accordance with those of the executive
branch.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(B) and (C) of rule XI of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, and pursuant to sections 308 and 403 of
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the committee submits the
following estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, May 5, 1998.
Hon. Porter J. Goss, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the
enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3694, the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1999.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to
provide them. The CBO staff contact is Dawn Sauter.
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neill, Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 3694--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999
Summary: H.R. 3694 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year
1999 for intelligence activities of the United States government, the
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of the bill. On
that limited basis, CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 3694 would result
in additional spending of $139 million over the 1999 2003 period,
assuming appropriation of the authorized amounts. CBO believes that
section 401 of the bill, which would extend the authority of the CIA to
offer incentive payments to employees who voluntarily retire or resign,
would increase direct spending by $1 million or more in at least one
year during the 2000 2003 period. However, CBO cannot give a precise
estimate of the increase in spending because data to support a cost
estimate are classified. Because the bill would raise direct spending,
pay-as-you-go procedures would apply.
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) excludes from
application of the act legislative provisions that are necessary for the
national security. CBO has determined that all of the provisions of this
bill either fit within that exclusion or do not contain
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined by UMRA.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary
impact of the unclassified portions of H.R. 3694 is shown in the
following table. CBO is unable to obtain the necessary information to
estimate the costs for the entire bill because parts are classified at a
level above clearances held by CBO employees. The costs of this
legislation fall within budget function 050 (national defense).
The bill would authorize appropriations of $139 million for the
Community Management Account. In addition, the bill would authorize $202
million for CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to military
service and various unfunded liabilities. The payment to CIARDS is
considered mandatory, and the authorization under this bill would be the
same as assumed in the CBO baseline.
CBO believes that section 401 of the bill would increase direct
spending by $1 million or more in at least one year during the 2000 2003
period. Section 401 would extend the authority of the CIA to offer
incentive payments to employees who voluntarily retire or resign. Under
current law this authority expires on September 30, 1999. Section 401
would extend this authority starting in fiscal year 2000 until September
30, 2001. This extension would induce some employees to retire earlier
than under current law, thereby increasing federal outlays for
retirement benefits. CBO cannot give a precise estimate of the increase
in spending because data to support a cost estimate are classified.
[By fiscal year, in millions of dollars]
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Spending under current law for the community management account: 94 0 0 0 0 0
Proposed changes: 0 139 0 0 0 0
Spending under H.R. 3694 for the community management account: 94 139 0 0 0 0
CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING
Estimated budget authority 0 0 (\2\) (\2\) (\2\) (\2\)
Estimated outlays 0 0 (\2\) (\2\) (\2\) (\2\)
\1\The 1998 level is the amount appropriated for that year.
\2\CBO believes that H.R. 3694 would increase direct spending by $1 million or
more in at least one year over the 2000 2003 period. However, CBO cannot give
a precise estimate because data to support a cost estimate are classified.
For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R. 3694 will
be enacted by October 1, 1998, and that the full amounts authorized will
be appropriated for fiscal year 1999. Outlays are estimated according to
historical spending patterns for intelligence programs.
Pay-as-you-go considerations: Section 401 of the bill would affect
direct spending, and therefore the bill would be subject to
pay-as-you-go procedures. The estimated pay-as-you-go impact would be $1
million or more in at least one year over the 2000 2003 period.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) excludes from application of the act
legislative provisions that are necessary for the national security. CBO
has determined that all of the provisions of this bill either fit within
that exclusion or do not contain intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined by UMRA.
Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Dawn Sauter; Impact on State,
local and tribal governments: Teri Gullo; Impact on the private sector:
Bill Thomas.
Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant Director
for Budget Analysis.
COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATES
The committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional Budget
Office.
SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENT OF THIS
LEGISLATION
The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States government are carried out to support the national security
interests of the United States, to support and assist the armed forces
of the United States, and to support the President in the execution of
the foreign policy of the United States. Article I, section 8, of the
Constitution of the United States provides, in pertinent part, that
``Congress shall have power * * * to pay the debts and provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the United States; * * * ``; ``to
raise and support Armies, * * * ``; ``to provide and maintain a Navy; *
* * `` and ``to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution * * * all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.'' Therefore, pursuant to such authority,
Congress is empowered to enact this legislation.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported,
are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in
black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which
no change is proposed is shown in roman):
SECTION 905 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
APPLICATION
Sec. 905. This title shall cease to be effective on January 6, 1999
January 6, 2000 .
SECTION 2 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY
ACT
SEC. 2. SEPARATION PAY.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f) Termination.--No amount shall be payable under this section based
on any separation occurring after September 30, 1999 September 30, 2001
.
* * * * * * *
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
GENERAL AUTHORITIES
Sec. 5. (a) In the performance of its functions, the Central
Intelligence Agency is authorized to--
(1) Transfer to and receive from other Government agencies such sums
as may be approved by the Office of Management and Budget, for the
performance of any of the functions or activities authorized under
subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section 102(a)(2) paragraphs (2) and (3) of
section 102(a) , subsections (c)(5) (c)(6) and (d) of section 103,
subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403 3 (c)(6), (d) , 403
4 (a), (g) , and 405), and any other Government agency is authorized to
transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any
provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between
appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance with this
paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under the authority of
this Act
without regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred;
* * * * * * *
(4) Authorize personnel designated by the Director to carry firearms
to the extent necessary for the performance of the Agency's authorized
functions, except that, within the United States, such authority shall
be limited to the purposes of protection of classified materials and
information, the training of Agency personnel and other authorized
persons in the use of firearms, the protection of Agency installations
and property, and the protection of Agency personnel and of defectors,
their families and the protection of current and former Agency personnel
and their immediate families, and defectors and their immediate families
, and other persons in the United States under Agency auspices;
* * * * * * *
Sec. 6. In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence
activities of the United States and in order further to implement
section 103(c)(5) (c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403 3(c)(5) (c)(6) ) that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be
responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure, the Agency shall be exempted from the
provisions of sections 1 and 2, chapter 795 of the Act of August 28,
1935 (49 Stat. 956, 957; 5 U.S.C. 654), and the provisions of any other
laws which require the publication or disclosure of the organization,
functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel
employed by the Agency: Provided, That in furtherance of this section,
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall make no
reports to the Congress in connection with the Agency under section 607,
title VI, chapter 212 of the Act of June 30, 1945, as amended (5 U.S.C.
947(b)).
* * * * * * *
SECTION 201 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT
SEC. 201. THE CIARDS SYSTEM.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Finality of Decisions of DCI. --In the interests of the security
of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States and in order
further to implement section 103(c)(5) (c)(6) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403 3(c)(5) (c)(6) ) that the Director of Central
Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure, and notwithstanding the
provisions of chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code, or any other
provision of law (except section 305(b) of this Act), any determination
by the Director authorized by this Act shall be final and conclusive and
shall not be subject to review by any court.
SECTION 413 OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
431. Authority to engage in commercial activities as security
for intelligence collection activities
(a) Authority.-- The Secretary of Defense, subject to the provisions
of this subchapter, may authorize the conduct of those commercial
activities necessary to provide security for authorized intelligence
collection activities abroad undertaken by the Department of Defense. No
commercial activity may be initiated pursuant to this subchapter after
December 31, 1998 December 31, 2001 .
* * * * * * *