1998 Congressional Hearings
Intelligence and Security

Mr. Chairman, I am again pleased to have the opportunity to provide the Defense Intelligence Agency’s perspective on the threats and challenges confronting the United States now and in the decades ahead.

The testimony I provided before the Committee last February reflected the extensive analysis done by the Defense Intelligence Community in support of the Joint Strategy Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review. The conclusions drawn from that effort were based on our understanding of the most important trends and factors shaping the international security environment over the long term. Much of what I testified to last year remains valid. The "headline" events of the past year – confrontation with Iraq, developments in Bosnia, NATO expansion, unrest in Central Africa, the troubled Middle East peace process, rogue state efforts to acquire advanced weapons, and the economic crisis in Asia – reinforce the central themes from that testimony:

In attempting to analyze this uncertain environment, we make two basic assumptions:

"There are many truths, some valid for one, some for another.

The objective global conditions that have driven the turmoil and instability of the post-Cold War era remain largely in effect. The most important include:

These factors bring great stress to the international order. No condition, circumstance, or power is likely to emerge over the next 10-20 years, which will somehow transcend them and lead to a more stable global order. The international security environment will remain dynamic, complex, and challenging for US security policy planners and operators.

During the Cold War, the predominance of the Soviet threat, and the bi-polar nature of superpower competition, allowed for substantial continuity in US defense planning and force development. Defending the ‘western way of life’ against Soviet expansion provided the basic context for US security policy decisionmaking. Meanwhile, Soviet doctrine, warfighting concepts, and equipment – combined with Warsaw Pact-NATO force ratios and mobilization potential, and the unique terrain and geographic features of Central Europe – provided the basis for our doctrine, strategy, tactics, and materiel development, our force sizing criteria, our equipment, operational, and organizational requirements, and our functional characteristics. Within this broad "Soviet threat" paradigm, other force requirements were generally considered lesser-included cases, on the assumption that if the US could handle the Soviets in Central Europe, we could also handle everything else.

One of the more intriguing aspects of the post Cold War era is that while the global strategic threat to US interests has greatly diminished in comparison to the Soviet era, the residual regional and transnational threats are much more complex and diverse, and much harder to plan for. For instance, Iraq and North Korea, currently our most likely opponents in a major theater conflict, pose significantly different challenges in terms of their tactics, equipment, and capabilities, and the theater terrain and locale. Neither state presents a pacing technology threat, although it is likely that North Korea has a limited nuclear capability and the capability to engage in chemical warfare. Meanwhile, Russia and our European and Asian allies represent our most important military technological "competitors," but we are not likely to face any of these states in a direct military conflict during the next ten-to-twenty years. Similarly, our most pressing current challenges – terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and other criminal activity with national security implications – and the biggest emerging threats – weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile proliferation – have limited utility as the basis for sizing and defining future force requirements.

This complexity and diversity presents a unique challenge for Defense Intelligence: to discern, from the general mix of global political, economic, military, technological, and social conditions, a specific characterization of extant, emerging, and potential threats and circumstances. Our efforts to address this challenge and establish a new threat paradigm center on three general factors:

Using this general analytic framework, and our assessment of the key factors shaping the global security environment, we can outline the three central features of the new global paradigm.

And finally…

Beyond this general description of the new global threat paradigm, we are also able to identify a number of specific threats and potentially threatening conditions. The most important of these are outlined below.

No state has the potential to match the worldwide strength and influence of the United States – in terms of combined political, economic, technological, military, and cultural power – over the next two decades. However, a select group of states – Russia, China, Japan, Europe (collectively or a coalition of key European nations), and India – will likely possess capabilities that are an echelon above other regional powers and nations. These major powers will routinely exert influence within their own regions, and in some cases or dimensions, will also exert influence on a global scale. They will retain unique capabilities to either assist or frustrate US interests and policies. Each nation will also continue to compete for regional and global influence, and for access to or control of resources, markets, and technology. Relations between and among these major powers and the US – particularly the nature and extent of their competition – will be a primary factor shaping the future global security environment. In this regard, there are two potential – though unlikely – developments that would be especially troubling for the US:

Beyond this interaction between the major powers, there are a wide variety of conditions, circumstances, states, and individuals who either now do, or could in the future, threaten the vital interests of the United States. We generally classify these current and potential threats as either transnational or regional.

Proliferation

The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, missiles, and other key technologies remains the greatest direct threat to US interests worldwide. More than 20 states are actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), motivated either by regional competition or the desire to develop a deterrent or counter to the concomitant superiority of others, including the US.

Terrorism will continue as a global challenge so long as groups and individuals oppose established political, economic, and social processes due to perceived ethnic, religious, nationalist, political, and other forms of discrimination. In some cases, the use of extreme violence for some identifiable goal will be more criminal and less political than in the past, blurring the line between terrorism and common crime. The characteristics of the most effective "terrorists groups" – highly compartmented operations planning, good cover and security, extreme suspicion of outsiders, and ruthlessness – make them very challenging intelligence targets. The following emerging trends are particularly noteworthy:

International drug cultivation, production, transport, and use will remain a major source of instability, both within drug producing, transit, and target countries, and between trafficking and consumer nations. The connection between drug cartels, corruption, and antigovernment activities (terrorism and insurgency) will increase as the narcotics trade provides an important funding source for criminal and antigovernment groups. States with weak democratic traditions and poor economic performance and prospects will be particularly susceptible. Counternarcotic activities will become more complex and difficult to discern as new areas of cultivation and transit emerge and traffickers exploit advances in technology, communications, transportation, and finance. Illicit synthetic drug production in urban areas is a significant and growing threat.

International organized crime will pose an increasing threat to US interests. Criminal cartels are becoming more sophisticated at exploiting technology, developing or taking control of "legitimate" commercial activities, and seeking to directly influence – through infiltration, manipulation, and bribery – local, state, and national governments, legitimate transnational organizations, and businesses. Increased cooperation between independent criminal elements, including terrorist organizations, is likely. We expect that greater interaction between the US military and other federal agencies will be required to counter this growing threat.

North Korea – A Failing State

North Korea remains in crisis. As the pressure builds on the economy, society, and military, the potential for internal collapse, instability, and leadership change is rising. Some form of significant – perhaps violent – change is likely in the next five years. There are four basic alternatives: leadership change, government collapse, negotiated accommodation with the South, or major economic reform. Any of these scenarios will have significant security challenges for the US.

In the meantime, North Korea’s overall military readiness continues to erode in line with its worsening economic situation. However, because the North retains significant, forward-deployed strike systems – artillery, missiles, rocket launchers, and aircraft – it will maintain its capability to inflict enormous damage on heavily populated northern areas of South Korea with little or no warning. In fact, over the next several years Pyongyang’s WMD, missile, artillery, and special operations force capabilities will likely improve, despite

China’s top priorities will continue to be economic development, modernization, and domestic political stability. The Chinese regime is

the dire economic situation. Continued vigilance and readiness, for both "implosion and explosion" scenarios, is requransition /Tired.

likely to become more responsive to the desires and needs of its people, but not significantly more democratic or pro-Western. Beijing’s foreign policy will seek to avoid conflict and sustain the trade, investment, and access to technology that are essential to economic development. Within this cooperative framework, however, several points of friction will persist:

China's military strategy will continue to emphasize the development of a survivable nuclear retaliatory capability as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by the United States, Russia, or India. There is no indication that China will field the much larger number of missiles necessary to shift from a minimalist, retaliation strategy to a first-strike strategy.

China’s conventional force modernization will continue at a measured pace, with emphasis on developing a more credible military threat against Taiwan (though not the large amphibious capability necessary for invasion), and protecting claims in the South China Sea against Southeast Asian rivals. China is not likely to build the capability to project large conventional forces beyond its immediate borders or nearby seas.

Russia will remain focused on internal political, economic, and social imperatives for at least the next decade. The periodic turmoil that has plagued Moscow since the late 1980s will continue. Immature political institutions, economic weakness, organized crime, and corruption will heighten the potential for political instability, particularly during periods of leadership transition.

As with the other components of Russia’s social order, economic progress is the key to the future of Russia’s military. Over the next several years, Moscow will be hard pressed to maintain the modicum of conventional military capability it now has. Barring a significant increase in Russia's external threat perception, non-military issues will continue to receive priority in terms of national leadership attention, resources, and popular concern. Moreover, other para-military and internal security forces will continue to compete with the Ministry of Defense for scarce security resources.

Iraq will remain capable of limited incursions against its neighbors but incapable of holding against a determined "western" counterattack. Saddam retains the goal of dominating Kuwait, but his options to destabilize the Gulf region and the GCC will remain limited so long as UN sanctions are in place and effective.

Iran is deliberately building up its military and developing new capabilities, motivated by its desire to provide a means to intimidate its Gulf Arab neighbors, to limit the regional influence of the west -- particularly the United States -- and to deter a resurgent Iraq or any other potential aggressor. Tehran will gradually overcome its near term economic difficulties, although progress will be slowed by the dual challenges of a rapidly growing population and uncertainties over the pace and extent of internal reform. Over the longer term, Iran will probably eschew some of its more visible unacceptable practices abroad and seek better relations with the US – although its early moves in this direction are likely to be tactical expedients. However, Tehran will not abandon its drive for regional hegemony and circumstantial domination or for increased WMD capabilities.

The tense rivalry between India and Pakistan remains an important security concern. India’s economic growth is likely to continue at a brisk pace, while Pakistan’s problems – including weak infrastructure, high illiteracy, weak political institutions, and the slow pace of reform – will temper economic growth. As a result, India’s considerable military advantage is likely to increase, leaving Pakistan feeling more vulnerable, and more dependent on international moderating influences and its WMD, especially nuclear, deterrent. Both countries will remain beset by numerous internal challenges to national unity. While India will continue to pursue improved ties to other Asian states and the west, proliferation concerns will remain a source of friction.

In the military sphere, India and Pakistan both continue to view their security relationship in zero-sum terms, possess sufficient material to assemble a limited number of nuclear weapons, have short range ballistic missiles, and maintain large standing forces in close proximity across a tense line of control. In short, although the prospect for major war between India and Pakistan is low at present, we remain concerned about the potential, particularly over the near term, for one of their occasional military clashes to escalate into a wider conflict. Over the longer term, however, the threat of large-scale war should diminish.

The outlook for democracy in Latin America is good. The acceptance of military subordination to civil control will expand and should be commonplace over the next two decades. Nevertheless, there will be a continuing susceptibility to setbacks and stresses rooted in the persistent political, social, and economic problems of many countries. The scourge of narco-trafficking, related money laundering, weapons and contraband smuggling, illegal migration, and insurgency will remain the principal obstacles to stability and democratic progress.

The prospect for interstate warfare in Latin America will remain low. Historic, unresolved border issues – such as the dispute between Peru and Ecuador – have the potential to erupt abruptly into armed conflict, but these conflicts will generally be limited in scope and duration.

With some notable exceptions, relations between Latin American states and the US will remain positive and friendly. There is virtually no threat of armed conflict with the US. However, the US military is likely to deploy to Latin America for operations at the lower end of conflict spectrum – natural disasters requiring humanitarian assistance, counterdrug operations, military assistance, etc. Evolving conditions in Cuba, Haiti, and several drug producing and transit countries may lead to some greater concern.

Ankara’s failure to obtain European Union membership has raised the sense of isolation for some Turks, while others have been "vindicated" in their anti-western rhetoric. Security assistance and economic cooperation with the US will help alleviate Turkish concerns, but any withdrawal of US interests in the next few years will exacerbate Turkish fears and frustration. These conditions could foster more extreme nationalism, and could undermine the government’s efforts to sustain secular stability.

Black and gray arms markets will continue to be the primary venue for military forces to acquire new equipment. Small arms and light weapons – which are cheaper, easier to transfer, and require minimal maintenance – will be emphasized.

Relations between Sub-Saharan countries and the US will generally be friendly and positive as these nations seek increased US trade and economic investment.

The region will continue to experience ethnic, tribal, and other forms of internecine conflict and it is probable that Central Asian problems and Central Asian involvement in ethnic issues will "spillover" into both China and Russia. Relations between the US and the various states of the region should remain "fair-to-good" as many explore economic ties to the west.

The rapid pace of military technology advancement – particularly in the areas of precision weapons, information and communications – will continue. Major technological breakthroughs in military capability are likely in the next two decades. Some aspects of our technological dominance – especially those with commercial and industrial applications – will be difficult to maintain because the transfer of these capabilities will initially appear as purely civilian events. Perhaps our greatest challenge is that a rogue nation or sub-national group might acquire key technologies, which would lead to some form of strategic technical surprise.

Overall, the impact of applied automation and computers, electromagnetic warfare, brilliant sensors, and the other technologies listed below will lead to the rise of a military-techno culture in which time, space, speed, and other fundamental conditions are radically changed. These developments have the potential to dramatically alter the nature of warfare and the characteristics of future threats.

To date the development and integrated application of the most important military technologies and concepts has been limited to the advanced western militaries -- particularly the United States. One key reason is economic. In general, these technologies are very expensive to develop and maintain and most nations have emphasized other priorities since the end of the Cold War. In fact, non-US global defense spending has dropped some 40 percent since the late 1980s, and the "military modernization accounts" – research and development, and procurement – have been hit even harder. Moreover, during the same period, the global arms market has decreased by more than 50 percent. With reduced domestic procurement, declining foreign consumption, and other spending imperatives, many nations have had neither the motivation, the resources, nor the capability to pursue high technology military endeavors. Over the next decade, however, as post Cold War defense reorganizations are completed, defense industries stabilize, and funding (potentially) increases, these areas could see additional, albeit still limited, emphasis.

Technology, combined with the creative genius of military thinkers around the world, is leading to the development and application of new forms of warfare, and the innovative modification of traditional military practices. While the US and its allies are the source of much of this innovation, others are motivated by the dominant military position of the US, and our demonstrated commitment to maintaining our military lead. This basic reality is forcing many of our adversaries (current and potential) to seek other means to attack our interests. Some of the more important are listed below:

Many ground forces throughout the world are being reduced due to diminished threat perceptions and other, mostly economic, imperatives. Many developing nations – who still see ground forces as the essential force component – are saddled with outdated equipment that is either non-operational or in serious disrepair. These states hope to "modernize" – within economic limits – with surplus Cold War stocks. For many, however, overall combat effectiveness will remain limited due to persistent shortfalls in training, maintenance, leadership, operational concepts, and morale.

The developed states are in various stages of modernization, but ground forces are a low priority for many of these countries. In terms of doctrine, few states have either the inclination or the capability for anything other than old western or Soviet-era equipment and practices. Training and logistics are generally in tandem with modernization and doctrinal advancement. Most nations do little beyond battalion level training and few have any proficiency at joint or combined arms operations.

To balance the demands of responding rapidly to local or regional contingencies, while maintaining the capacity to mobilize for large scale war, many states are adopting a two-tiered readiness structure consisting of a few "ready" units (smaller, more mobile, better-equipped, trained, and manned), and a larger component of "not-ready" units (usually large units, with older equipment, manned at pre-mobilization or cadre status).

Those nations with the motivation and resources to upgrade their armies will generally be able to acquire improved tanks and fighting vehicles (primarily with western fire controls, night-vision devices, add-on passive or reactive armor, threat warning and obscurant systems, and, in the more distant future, active protective systems).

The foreign naval threat in the next 20 years will consist of both larger numbers of older weapons systems and a smaller yet more diverse set of modern systems. Naval warfare will become more complex, with a wide variety of potential adversaries, situations, and forces capable of confronting the US during the execution of overseas presence and warfighting missions. This is especially true in littoral regions.

Global combat aircraft inventories will decline over the next two decades, but residual aircraft will be more technologically capable and lethal (extended ranges, multirole mission capability, and multiple engagement capability). The proliferation of advanced air-to-air missiles, precision-guided munitions, land attack cruise missiles, and "smart weapons" will increase the defensive and strike capabilities of air forces globally. Most countries will focus on modified and upgraded versions of proven airframes.

Overall, however, resource shortfalls, qualitative training deficiencies, and limited C3I, electronic warfare, logistics, and maintenance capabilities will limit the combat effectiveness of most air forces.

Cognizant of the advantages afforded those nations possessing superior air warfare capabilities, and unwilling or unable to bear the high cost of advanced air superiority aircraft, many nations will place a high premium on improving their ground-based air defenses. Across-the-board upgrades in missiles and sensor capabilities – improved seekers, propulsion, guidance, and control – will occur. However, most states will lack the resources and technological sophistication necessary to acquire and field integrated air defense networks and systems. As a result, the operational effectiveness of these advanced weapons systems will remain limited, albeit challenging.

While the US will remain the world’s dominant space power, over the next two decades, increased foreign military and civilian space capabilities will erode the relative US advantage in satellite reconnaissance, communications, mapping, and navigation. The space systems of 2018 will be much more capable and more widely used than those of today. By that time, nearly 40 countries will have their own satellites (compared with about two dozen today), and more than a dozen commercial consortia will provide satellite services (imagery, geo-spatial data, communications) to the rest of the world. As part of this general commercialization of space, the number of countries capable of using space-based platforms or capabilities for military purposes will increase. We must also consider the increased potential for future adversaries to employ a wide variety of means to disrupt, degrade, or defeat portions of the US space support system.

As the protracted transition from the Cold War order to an uncertain future continues the United States will remain the world’s dominant power. Beyond the enduring challenge posed by the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and China, the global threats facing the United States are diminished in magnitude when compared to the Cold War era. This relative "strategic hiatus" provides the opportunity for a breathing space in which the US gains time at reduced risk.

However, the world remains a very dangerous and complex place and there is no relief from the high tempo of operational activity short of war as US forces respond to a broad spectrum of challenges resulting from the general global turmoil. A wide variety of operations – peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counternarcotics, humanitarian emergencies, non-combatant evacuations, military assistance, and limited conflict when necessary – will continue to place our military personnel at risk. Operational environments in these contingencies range from relatively benign, to non-permissive, to hostile.

We are trying to maintain military superiority and to use military capability in positive and constructive ways in an environment in which espionage and the selective public disclosure of US classified information is commonplace. Unless we make progress in preventing espionage and stopping the unauthorized public disclosure of classified information, we should anticipate a steady erosion of confidence in our abilities and the real loss of advantage to our adversaries.

A number of nations, especially rogue states like North Korea and Iraq, retain capabilities to directly threaten US interests. This condition demands constant US vigilance and the retention of demonstrable warfighting capabilities.

Various transnational threats – weapons smuggling, terrorism, drug trafficking and other forms of criminal activity – continue to plague the international environment and pose the most direct daily threat to US citizens, forces, property, and interests. Some aspects of these threats have national security implications and will continue to involve US military forces and capabilities in the future.

The changing nature of future warfare – including the application of new technologies and innovative doctrinal concepts, and the development of new forms of asymmetric and asynchronous warfare – presents a constant challenge for US strategy, doctrine, force structure, and materiel development.

The continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and related technologies, will result in a broadly increasing threat to stability and a specific direct threat to US military forces.

The global presence of the United States – our tremendous power, influence, and willingness to remain engaged – is the key factor affecting the future shape of the international security environment. We in the Defense Intelligence Community remain committed to providing the best possible military intelligence support to US and allied leaders engaged in planning for and acting in any contingency or crisis.