Congressional Documents
Calendar No. 74
105th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 105-24
_______________________________________________________________________
AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998 FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
_______
June 9, 1997.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Shelby, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 858]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered the
original bill (S. 858), which authorizes appropriations for
fiscal year 1998 for the intelligence activities and programs
of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and which accomplishes
other purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that
the bill do pass.
purpose of the bill
This bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for
(a) the intelligence activities and programs of the
United States Government; (b) the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System; and (c) the
Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings as of September
30, 1998, for the intelligence activities of the United
States Government and for the Community Management
Account of the Director of Central Intelligence;
(3) Authorize the Director of Central Intelligence,
with Office of Management and Budget approval, to
exceed the personnel ceilings by up to two percent;
(4) Extend for two additional years the President's
authority to delay the imposition of proliferation-
related sanctions when necessary to protect an
intelligence source or method or an ongoing criminal
investigation;
(5) Direct the Director of Central Intelligence to
conduct a survey of standards for foreign names and
places in intelligence reporting and to issue
guidelines to ensure community-wide continuity;
(6) Authorize the head of a department or agency
having jurisdiction over an element in the intelligence
community or the head of an element of the intelligence
community to detail their employees to serve in the
Intelligence Community Assignment Program;
(7) Encourage the disclosure of certain information
to Congress by employees of the executive branch and
employees of contractors carrying out activities under
classified contracts;
(8) Ensure that the United States Government takes
all appropriate actions to make available to victims
and families of victims, information regarding violent
crimes committed against United States citizens abroad;
and
(9) Authorize the Central Intelligence Agency to
enter into multi-year leases subject to the
availability of appropriations.
the classified supplement to the committee report
The classified nature of United States intelligence
activities prevents the Committee from disclosing the details
of its budgetary recommendations in this Report.
The Committee has prepared a classified supplement to this
Report, which contains (a) the classified annex to this Report
and (b) the classified schedule of authorizations which is
incorporated by reference in the Act and has the same legal
status as a public law. The classified annex to this report
explains the full scope and intent of the Committee's actions
as set forth in the classified schedule of authorizations. The
classified annex has the same status as any Senate Report, and
the Committee fully expects the Intelligence Community to
comply with the limitations, guidelines, directions, and
recommendations contained therein.
This classified supplement to the Committee Report is
available for review by any Member of the Senate, subject to
the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress.
The classified supplement is made available to the
President who shall provide for suitable distribution within
the Executive Branch.
scope of committee review
The Committee conducted a detailed review of the
Administration's three major intelligence budget requests for
fiscal year 1998: the National Foreign Intelligence Program
(NFIP) of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense; and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
(TIARA) of the Military Services. The Committee's review
included a series of briefings and hearings with senior
intelligence officials, numerous staff briefings, review of
budget justification materials, and numerous written responses
provided by the Intelligence Community to specific questions
posed by the Committee.
In addition to its annual review of the Administration's
budget request, the Committee performs continuing oversight of
various intelligence activities and programs, to include the
conduct of audits and reviews by the Committee's audit staff.
For example, the Committee has recently concluded audits of the
CIA Inspector General's Office and a major NRO program. These
inquiries frequently lead to actions initiated by the Committee
with respect to the authorities, applicable laws, and the
budget of the activity or program concerned.
As a result of a Memorandum of Agreement entered into in
1996 between the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) and Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC),
the Committee is including its recommendations on both JMIP and
TIARA in its public report and classified annex. The SSCI has
agreed that JMIP and TIARA issues will continue to be
authorized in the defense authorization bill. The SASC has
agreed to involve the SSCI staff in staff-level defense
authorization conference meetings and to provide the Chairman
and Vice Chairman of the SSCI the opportunity to consult with
the SASC Chairman and Ranking Member before a JMIP or TIARA
issue is finally closed out in conference in a manner with
which they disagree. The Committee looks forward to continuing
its productive relationship with the SASC on all issues of
mutual concern.
committee recommendations
Most of the Committee's specific recommendations related to
the Administration's budget request for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities are classified. This includes
the amount of the total fiscal year 1998 budget request, as
well as any comprehensive treatment of program elements.
However, the Committee is committed, consistent with security
considerations, to making its concerns and priorities for
intelligence public to the extent possible. Further
recommendations, as well as classified details on these
unclassified recommendations, are provided in the classified
annex accompanying this bill.
national foreign intelligence program
Areas of committee emphasis
The Committee has continued its bipartisan efforts to
``right-size'' and ``re-tool'' U.S. Intelligence Community
programs and activities to reflect the new, post-Cold War era
threats and challenges to U.S. national security.
Specifically, the Committee recommends important new
investments and initiatives in certain high-priority areas.
These include: aggressive efforts in what the committee
chairman has called the ``five C's'' (counter-proliferation,
counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, and
covert action); bolstering advanced research and development
across the Intelligence Community to maintain the U.S.
technological edge; improving the skills and tools of
clandestine service personnel; developing new and innovative
approaches to understanding ``hard target'' countries; and
enhancing analytical capabilities as well as tools for
conducting information operations.
The Committee recommends significant funding increases in
each of the priority areas listed above. At the same time,
however, the Committee recommends reductions in lower-priority,
poorly justified, or programs and activities that cannot be
executed. Details of the Committee's recommendations are
included in the Classified Annex accompanying this report.
NRO financial management
The Committee continues to watch closely the financial
management of the National Reconnaissance Program. In order to
gain a fuller understanding of the effect of Congressionally-
directed and NRO-directed actions, the Committee conducted an
audit of the financial management of one large classified
program within the NRO. While noting that the NRO has made
significant strides in improving its financial management
posture, the audit also identified several areas where
improvements could be made in the financial management of this
program, as well as other NRO programs. The audit also
concluded that the added reporting requirements created by the
new NRO policies and procedures have not created an unnecessary
or excessive burden upon the classified Program Office.
The Committee believes the Director, NRO, must continue to
pursue aggressively better financial management procedures. The
initial phases of the comprehensive new Financial Management
System must be in place and operational by October 1, 1997, and
follow-on system capabilities, such as an integrated budget
tool, should be added as soon as possible thereafter. The
National Reconnaissance Program section of the classified annex
to this report includes recommendations for several actions
intended to further strengthen NRO financial management.
Report on foreign counterintelligence reform in the FBI
The Committee is concerned that the Bureau has not
adequately addressed the recommendations of the Department of
Justice Inspector General included in ``A Review of the FBI's
Performance in Uncovering the Espionage Activities of Aldrich
Hazen Ames.'' The Committee understands that the Bureau has
incorporated some of the Inspector General's recommendations
into its operating procedures. The Bureau has not, however,
assured the Committee that it intends to give serious
consideration to the remaining recommendations. Therefore, not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives a report on the Department of Justice
Inspector General's recommendations contained in ``A Review of
the FBI's Performance in Uncovering the Espionage Activities of
Aldrich Hazen Ames.'' This report shall provide a thorough
analysis of each of the recommendations and include the
Director's position with respect to each recommendation. Should
the Director disagree with a particular recommendation, the
reasons for such dissent shall be provided. Further, the report
shall contain any actions taken by the Director in response to
each of the Inspector General's recommendations.
Providing intelligence to the warfighter: The Khamisiyah experience
The Khamisiyah experience revealed the need for the
Intelligence and Defense Communities to improve the provision,
handling, and use of intelligence information during a crisis
situation. The Select Committee on Intelligence has undertaken
an investigation into Intelligence Community warnings to the
U.S. Army about chemical warfare agents at Khamisiyah, Iraq, in
1991 and suspicions that U.S. forces conducting demolition
activities to the site may have been exposed to Chemical
Weapons (CW) agents. Our preliminary review indicates
substantial mismanagement and lack of communication among
elements of the military and the Intelligence Community
regarding information and warnings provided on Iraqi CW
facilities, including Khamisiyah, as well as in the use made of
this information. Intelligence support associated with
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, particularly in the
area of information distribution and analysis, was often
spotty, inconsistent, and slow. In addition, there were
problems with multiple databases; inconsistent foreign language
place names; limited sharing of sensitive but vital
information; and incomplete searches of files in preparing
lists of known or suspect CW facilities in Iraq. The Committee
addresses the problem of inconsistent place names in Section
308 by directing the Director of Central Intelligence to issue
guidelines to ensure the use of uniform spelling of foreign
names and places and the uniform use of geographic coordinates.
This should alleviate the problem of locating geographic places
when searching intelligence reports, products, and databases in
the future.
The Committee directs the Director of Central Intelligence
to submit to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, and the Senate Defense
Subcommittee on Appropriations, no later than March 1, 1998, a
report that identifies the specific actions that have been
taken or are being taken to enhance cooperation between
Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community by
improving the provision, handling, and use of intelligence
information in preparation for, during, and after battle. Such
a report shall include those steps that intelligence agencies
are undertaking to reconcile information in databases in order
to eliminate confusion over potential targets (facilities and
other sites). It shall also include a review of how
intelligence components handle sensitive information and of
their procedures for deciding how and what vital information to
share with others. Further, the report shall contain an
enumeration of those steps that intelligence agencies are
undertaking to ensure that information searches are more
thorough in order to provide military commanders on the ground
with complete and timely information.
Threats to the United States--Estimate
The Committee is concerned that there exists no recent,
comprehensive Intelligence Community estimate on the present
and emerging threat of terrorist or other ``non-traditional''
attacks against North America using weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). The Committee also notes that the November 1995 National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on missile threats to North America
is based on information and analysis that is now two years old.
The Committee believes that a new and updated analysis is
required. Given the critical importance of the subject matter,
and the rapid pace of technological change, the Committee
believes, further, that these analyses should be updated on an
annual basis.
In his unclassified confirmation testimony before the
Committee, the Acting DCI committed to prepare annual National
Intelligence Estimates or comparable reports on (1) the
ballistic and cruise missile threats to the United States, and
(2) the threat to the United States of ``non-traditional''
attacks using chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons
delivered by means other than by ballistic or cruise missiles.
The Committee welcomes the ADCI's commitment in this regard,
and looks forward to reviewing these products. These estimates
should be provided to the congressional Intelligence Committees
annually, on or before February 15, with the first report to be
submitted on or before February 15, 1998.
The annual estimate on the ``non-traditional'' WMD threat
to the United States shall include, at a minimum:
(1) The current threat of an attack against the
United States using a weapon of mass destruction,
including the ability of terrorist groups or hostile
governments to produce and deliver to the United States
a WMD, or the components thereof;
(2) The degree to which the threat will increase by
the year 2010;
(3) The sources of the threat;
(4) The potential delivery means of carrying out a
WMD attack against the United States;
(5) The relative feasibility of different means of
delivery and the probability that such an attack
against the United States would use ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles or any other means of delivery; and
(6) The vulnerability of the United States to such an
attack, including, but not limited to, the ability of
terrorist groups or hostile governments to
clandestinely transport into the United States a WMD or
the components necessary to construct a WMD, and the
capability of the United States to detect and intercept
the importation of such a weapon.
Not later than March 15, 1998, the President shall submit
to the congressional Intelligence Committees a report that
identifies the funds appropriated in Fiscal Year 1998 and
requested in the Fiscal Year 1999 budget to defend the United
States against a nuclear, biological or chemical weapons attack
using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or any other means of
delivery.
joint military intelligence program
National Imagery and Mapping Agency
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) was
established in law in the Department of Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1997 and is jointly funded within the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP).
In creating NIMA, the Congress recognized the primary need
to create a single agency to ensure that timely, relevant, and
accurate imagery, imagery intelligence and geospatial
information was provided to support our national security
objectives, policy decisions, and mapping requirements.
There are two areas that remain of consistent concern to
the Committee. The first is related to the dissemination of
satellite and airborne imagery below the Joint TaskForce level.
One of the most important lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm
was the need to rapidly disseminate imagery to the lowest levels
required. It has been six years since the allied victory in the Gulf,
and little progress has been made to correct this problem. A
significant component of the imagery dissemination shortfall, however,
is the lack of upgraded communications capabilities through which
imagery and other intelligence related information can be transmitted
to the users. The collection and production of imagery products is only
valuable if it can be transmitted to those who need it the most.
The second area of concern is the use of commercial, civil
and foreign (CCF) imagery to meet many of our needs. The
Committee's interest in the use of CCF imagery dates back to
1993. Over the ensuing four years, the Department of Defense
and CIA have been urged to more aggressively pursue the use of
CCF imagery, with little or no result. The Committee notes that
the Defense Science board 1996 summer Study, ``Achieving an
Innovative Support Structure for 21st Century Military
Superiority,'' made a strong recommendation to rely more on
commercial imagery. In spite of this recommendation and
prodding by the Congress, we are only acquiring a very small
amount of CCF imagery per year, which is far below industry
capacity to support our needs.
The Committee has received a report from NIMA indicating
that a Commercial Imagery Implementation Team will report to
the Director of NIMA in June of 1997 regarding a strategy for
increased utilization of CCF imagery. It is the Committee's
intent to review this implementation plan in detail prior to
making final recommendations on funding for NIMA for fiscal
year 1998.
Tactical unmanned aerial vehicle
Providing a reliable tactical unmanned aerial vehicle
(TUAV) to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition in support of maneuver battalion and brigade
commanders and naval commanders remains a Congressional
priority. Unfortunately, the Committee received testimony on
the Outrider TUAV program indicating serious difficulty in the
current Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)
program. As a result, it has become apparent that the current
schedule cannot be maintained.
Therefore, the Committee recommends a reduction of $75.0
million in the fiscal year 1998 RDT&E request for Outrider.
More than $34.0 million in fiscal year 1997 funds remain
unobligated at this time. The fiscal year 1997 balances
combined with a reduced fiscal year 1998 authorization should
be sufficient to maintain an ACTD of reduced scope. Also, the
Committee has learned that existing unmanned aerial vehicles in
production may meet most, if not all, of the requirements of
maneuver battalion and brigade commanders. The Committee
recommends that the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office
(DARO) explore an existing UAV as an alternative to Outrider.
Joint airborne SIGINT architecture
The Advanced Sensors project under JASA calls for $52.6
million in fiscal year 1998 to continue A-kit development for
Joint SIGINT Avionics Family (JSAF) integration and testing.
The A-kit modifications include wiring, antennas, and
infrastructure within an aircraft.
The Committee questions the amount requested. The EP-3 is
the prototype for JSAF as is scheduled for delivery in fiscal
year 1997. Therefore, the A-kit development for EP-3 should be
largely completed. Additionally, Global Hawk is an unmanned
aerial vehicle that is not scheduled to make its initial test
flight until late fiscal year 1997 or fiscal year 1998.
Approving $9.6 million for A-kit development on an air vehicle
that has yet to fly seems premature at this time. As a result
of these concerns, the Committee believes that this request can
be reduced by $10.0 million.
Joint SIGINT avionics family enhancements
The Joint SIGINT Avionics Family (JSAF) was structured as
an evolutionary development program. The steps in the evolution
were defined primarily by three factors: available funds,
technology, and total development risk. The committee feels
that the program, as presently structured, is resource
constrained rather than limited by technological shortcomings
or developmental risk. The capabilities selected initially were
those that met high priority operational needs for which the
current systems have limited or no capability. The Committee
has learned that certain capabilities were omitted from the
initial increment even though the technologies are mature. One
such example is the complete family of PROFORMA signals.
Another area of concern to the Committee is the significant
number of platforms that are not programmed to receive any JSAF
upgrades. The JSAF was designed as a modern interoperable
family of SIGINT suites that could be scaled to support a
variety of Service collection platforms. The proven operational
benefits of commonality and interoperability would suggest that
all DOD collection platforms should adopt a common architecture
where possible. Funding for the initial studies for a JSAF
compliant Senior Scout system has been addressed in Air Force
TIARA, and the Committee recommends that $4.0 million be
provided to undertake the necessary studies for other
platforms.
The Committee has also learned that the schedule for
delivery of JSAF configured platforms can be accelerated
substantially with a modest increase in funds. Specifically,
the delivery schedule completion of the current planned JSAF
configured platforms could be moved up from fiscal year 2007 to
fiscal year 2005. The Committee believesthat an accelerated
schedule should be adopted and that potential savings can be obtained
by such an alteration in the delivery schedule.
During the initial planning for the Joint Airborne SIGINT
Architecture, it was unclear as to whether or not a digital
approach to ELINT was viable. Recent developments at Wright
Laboratories have demonstrated the viability of this approach.
The Committee recommends $5.0 million be provided to commence a
risk reduction effort to create a digital capability in the
High Band Subsystem (HBSS) and the remaining $36.0 million be
applied to schedule acceleration of the initial platforms
programmed for JSAF configuration.
RC-135 engine replacement
Replacing the engines in the KC-135 fleet with more
efficient CFM-56 engines has long been supported by the
Congress. In FY96, however, the Congress provided the first
funds to re-engine RC-135 aircraft. After careful review of the
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the RC-135 fleet, the Committee
believes that the priority should be shifted to the RC-135
fleet. At the present time, the RC-135 fleet consists of 21
aircraft and will grow to 23 aircraft with the delivery of
Rivet Joint 15 and 16.
The OPTEMPO requirements for the RC-135 fleet in support of
the unified combatant commands has resulted in use rates of
more than three times those of the KC-135 fleet. The Air Force
estimates that the annual savings in operations and maintenance
costs from replacing the engines on the RC-135 fleet would pay
for the cost of replacing the engines on the 23 aircraft in
less than seven years. Accordingly, the Committee recommends
$100.0 million in FY1998 to re-engine four RC-135 aircraft.
Rivet Joint cabin equipment air temperature environment
Adequate air conditioning necessary to cool Rivet Joint
mission equipment and provide for crew comfort has long been
difficult to maintain. This results from two factors. The first
is related to the amount of onboard equipment carried on Rivet
Joint required to perform its primary mission. This equipment
relies primarily on copper wiring which is a source of much of
the heat generated by the equipment. The second factor is
related to the outdated engines currently in use on Rivet
Joint. As mission requirements have changed and expanded over
the years, more equipment has been added to the aircraft, which
has added significantly to the heat load. In turn, the majority
of conditioned air, by necessity, must be dedicated to cooling
the equipment. The result is wide fluctuations in the
temperature range within the crew compartment.
In addition to the planned installation of a new family of
SIGINT equipment on Rivet Joint, there are two solutions to the
problem. The first is the CFM-56 engine upgrade which has been
addressed elsewhere in this report. The second solution
requires the installation of additional skin heat exchangers.
The Rivet Joint program office has developed a new skin heat
exchanger that is significantly more efficient than those
currently installed on the aircraft. Installing two of these
heat exchangers on a Rivet Joint adds the equivalent of about
three tons of conditioned air per hour.
The Committee has learned that these kits can be installed
in the field at low cost to the immediate benefit of the crews.
Therefore, the Committee recommends an additional $6.0 which
will fund new heat exchangers for the entire Rivet Joint fleet.
RC-135 Rivet Joint theater airborne warning system
The ability to detect and track theater ballistic missile
launches, provide accurate launch site data for counter-attack,
and provide impact point data is critical to the warfighter.
Last year, the Committee received a proposal to transfer medium
wave infrared (MWIR) sensor technology from Cobra Ball to the
RC-135 Rivet Joint fleet as a way of providing the theater
commander with a low cost fused and space-based airborne
infrared capability.
As a result of Congressional interest, the Ballistic
Missile Defense Office (BMDO) conducted a review of
requirements for theater ballistic missile launch detection and
tracking capabilities and evaluated three candidate
technologies. The candidate technologies were placing MWIR on
Rivet Joint, the Extended Airborne Global Launch Evaluator
(EAGLE) on AWACS aircraft, and the Airborne Laser Sensor.
The BMDO recommended termination of MWIR and EAGLE as
candidates and pursuit of the Airborne Laser Sensor option. The
Committee notes, however, that the Airborne Laser Sensor will
not be deployed until well after the turn of the century. Also,
the Senate Armed Services Committee received testimony from the
Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Space Command in support of theater
airborne warning systems as an interim capability until more
capable airborne and space based systems can be fielded. To
meet these interim requirements, the Committee recommends an
additional $20.0 million to fund nonrecurring engineering costs
and to equip two Rivet Joint aircraft with MWIR sensors.
Airborne reconnaissance recapitalization
The Committee remains concerned about the lack of
modernization for airborne reconnaissance aircraft. These
assets all have high utilization rates requiring large
sustainment costs on an annual basis. The high cost of
sustainment of these platforms limits the investment in
upgrades that will improve capabilities and readiness, while
potentially reducing the cost of ownership. For example, as the
Committee has noted previously, the Air Force estimates that
replacing the engines on the RC-135 fleet withCFM-56 engines
would reduce operations and maintenance (O&M) costs to such a degree
that the annual savings in O&M funds would pay for the cost of
replacing the engines in less than seven years.
The Committee believes that a long-term airborne
reconnaissance recapitalization plan is required to provide
funds for needed upgrades to Rivet Joint, U-2, and EP-3 and
recommends that the Director Defense Airborne Reconnaissance
Office and the military services develop such a plan. Expanded
use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items, streamlined
management arrangements, optimized maintenance schedules, and
reductions in contractor field service representatives should
help reduce the cost of ownership. These savings could then be
applied to systems upgrades.
Interferometric synthetic aperture radar
A radar imaging system that merges radar images of a target
from difference angles is capable of producing highly accurate
three-dimensional images. Maps that display target areas in
altitude, latitude and longitude are invaluable to pilots who
must fly low level missions in unfamiliar terrain. This form of
mapping can also improve the accuracy of precision guided
munitions. The technique is known as interferometrics and was
jointly tested in Bosnia in support of U.S. ground forces by
the Army and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA).
The Committee finds this technology promising and believes
that further development in fiscal year 1998 is warranted. To
this end, the Committee recommends that $6.0 million be
provided to begin development of IFSAR capabilities for the U-2
and High Altitude Endurance UAV's
Common Automatic Recovery System
The Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 provided funds to purchase the Common Automatic Recovery
System (CARS) for the Predator UAV. Funds provided last year
were sufficient to acquire seven of the twelve systems. The
Committee recommends $3.5 million to purchase five more CARS
and $4.5 million for initial logistics support for Predator.
While these funds are not sufficient to fully fund the
costs of fielding Predator, the Committee expects the
Administration's budget request for fiscal year 1999 to contain
funds to continue procurement of initial logistics support, pay
retrofit costs, and acquire Predator system introduction
requirements such as training and technical manuals.
Global Hawk production gap
Global Hawk is a Department of Defense Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program designed to rapidly
develop a conventional High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (HAE-UAV). The program was begun in October 1994 when
the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency awarded design
contracts to five teams with the intent to award two fly-off
contracts. A single team was selected in May 1995 due to a lack
of funds.
The contractor and the Department of Defense are currently
restructuring the program to include both Global Hawk and Dark
Star in the Phase III demonstration program. The current
budget, however, was developed prior the restructuring of the
program. The Department of Defense estimates that the Global
Hawk program is underfunded by $25.0 million in fiscal year
1998. This in turn will delay the program by one year, or
longer. In an effort to maintain the projected schedule, the
Committee recommends an additional $25.0 million for Global
Hawk for fiscal year 1998.
Dark Star High Altitude Endurance UAV
Dark Star is the Low Observable High Altitude Endurance
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HAE-UAV) portion of the Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) for HAE-UAV's. It
should be noted that the Dark Star program, because of its
design as a Low Observable platform, entails a much higher
level of technological risk than a platform based on
conventional aircraft design, such as Global Hawk. The
Department of Defense's long struggle with the development of a
successful tactical unmanned aerial vehicle causes concern when
stealth technologies must supplant conventional aircraft
designs, and the Dark Star program has proven those concerns
valid. While the Committee strongly supports UAV technology,
the crash of a test vehicle, reports that Dark Star's actual
radar cross section may be understated, and contractor
proposals to substantially restructure the program, indicate
that the Congress should reevaluate the program.
Funds requested for fiscal year 1998 will complete air
vehicles number three and four. Initial fabrication of air
vehicles five and six would also be undertaken with fiscal year
1998 funds. The Committee supports completion of air vehicles
three and four, but construction of additional air vehicles
prior to further flight testing is premature. Therefore, the
Committee recommends a reduction of $20.0 million in the Dark
Star program and a prohibition against acquisition of air
vehicles five and six in fiscal year 1998.
Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office
The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) was
created in November 1993 as the primary Department of Defense
(DOD) management oversight office for all joint military
department and defense-wide manned and unmanned
reconnaissancecapabilities. These capabilities include platforms,
sensors, data links, data relays, and ground stations. The DARO was
placed under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology to bring attention, order, and efficiency to
the development and acquisition of the airborne reconnaissance
capabilities.
Created less than four years ago, the DARO has demonstrated
effective management of resources and programs. One of the
hallmarks of effective business practices in centralized
decision making coupled with decentralized execution. This has
been a DARO trademark. One of the most important issues in
defense programming is interoperability. Failures in this area
are too numerous to list here. The DARO, however, has ensured
that interoperability and commonality are designed into new
capabilities rather than considered after the fact.
For example, the Common Imagery Ground/Surface System
(CIGSS) was established by the DARO to supplant the Joint
Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS) program. Due to
diverging Service requirements, JSIPS was experiencing
substantial cost increases. The DARO restructured the program
to CIGSS which provides for the migration of all airborne
imagery ground systems to a common interoperable baseline
necessary to meet joint warfighting requirements. The CIGSS was
the first airborne reconnaissance ground system to be approved
by both the JROC and the CIO. The CIGSS is a prime example of
the level of interoperability the Department of Defense should
strive for across the board.
There are numerous other examples, from the Joint SIGINT
Avionics Family to Common Data Link, that demonstrate DARO's
effective stewardship of limited resources. The Committee
recommends that the Secretary of Defense and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology consider
transferring more, if not all, remaining reconnaissance assets
to the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program.
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
Joint tactical terminal
In October of 1995, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD C3I)
issued guidance requiring that tactical intelligence
dissemination systems of the military services conform with
Department of Defense Integrated Broadcast interoperability and
commonality objectives. The Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT) meets
this requirement for all services by providing commanders a
secure, dedicated path for tactical intelligence dissemination
networks and broadcasts. Within the Army, JTT replaces the
Commanders' Tactical Terminal (CTT).
The procurement of JTT is strongly supported by the
Congress. As a result of a prolonged contract dispute, however,
the delivery schedule for JTT has slipped indefinitely. To meet
urgent interim requirements, the Army needs to procure a
limited number of the Commanders' Tactical Terminal 3 (CTT3).
Funds authorized and appropriated for fiscal year 1997 are
sufficient to meet the interim requirements for CTT3. The
Committee recommends the acquisition of CTT3 using fiscal year
1997 funds.
CI/HUMINT automated tool set
Formerly known as Theater Rapid Response Intelligence
Package (TRRIP), the Army has an unfunded requirement of $4.5
million to complete the inventory objective for CI/HUMINT
Automated Tool Sets (CHATS). The Committee recommends a
reduction of $5.7 million in fiscal year 1998 Operations and
Maintenance Army (OMA) funds as an offset to pay for CHATS. The
OMA funds originally designated for Contractor Logistics
Support associated with the potential fielding of the Hunter
UAV are no longer needed based upon the decision not to field
Hunter.
GUARDRAIL common sensor
The Committee recommends a reduction to the GUARDRAIL
Common Sensor (GRCS) fiscal year 1998 OMA funds of $6.7
million. The funds are not required in fiscal year 1998 as a
result of changes in GRCS fielding. The Committee recommends
that these funds be transferred to Aircraft Procurement Army
(APA) to complete fielding of the GRCS program embedded
training requirement.
Ground based common sensor
The Committee has learned that $26.8 million in Other
Procurement Army funds for Ground Based Common Sensor (GBCS) in
the President's budget request for FY 1998 will not be
necessary due to a decision to reschedule the IOT&E or FY 1998.
The Committee recommends a decrement in Other Procurement Army
in the amount of $26.8 million and that $6.5 million be
transferred to the Aircraft Procurement Army line to procure
Ground Based Common Sensor/Advanced Quick Fix (GBCS/AQF)
institutional training devices. There are two training devices
needed for GBCS/AQF, one for the system operators and one for
maintenance training.
Focused intelligence support for USFK
Focused Intelligence provides the commander the capability
to exploit real-time information allowing him to focus assets
in time and space to defeat an adaptive threat. The enabling
technologies that provide Focused Intelligence can be divided
into three functional areas: (1) Shared Battlefield Awareness;
(2) Information Management; and (3) Predictive Analysis. an
architecture that integrates these functions into a
collaborative environment provides a commander with Information
Dominance and allows him to operate within and disrupt the
decision and operating cycles of the adversary.
In USFK, Command Post Tango is the location where Focused
Intelligence is required to support the CINC. Unfortunately,
USFK operates with an antiquated system using ``post it'' notes
and grease pencils rather than current generation hardware and
software. At the present time, some information from
subordinate elements is delivered to CP Tango by hand in hard
copy, which then has to be manually added to a display board.
Modernization of CP Tango will provide the Commander-in-
Chief USFK with a capability comparable to that of the NATO
commander in Vicenza, Italy, known as the Combined Air
Operations Center (CAOC). The architecture will be
interoperable with follow-on technologies and will allow more
rapid integration of these technologies as they become
available. The outdated infrastructure at CP Tango today
prevents USFK from exploiting existing information technologies
much less evolving technologies.
The Committee notes that the Air Force completed the
upgrades at the CAOC in 1996 for around $10.0 million. Due to
the increased threat situation in Korea, the Committee believes
that upgrades to CP Tango should be a high priority for the
Army and the Commander-in-Chief USFK in fiscal year 1998.
Therefore, the Committee recommends $10.0 million to provide
Focused Intelligence in CP Tango.
ASAS remote work stations
The All Source Analysis System (ASAS) Remote Work Station
(RWS) is the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW)
component of the Army Tactical Command and Control System
(ATCCS) and the tactical commander's primary intelligence
processor and graphics display system. It provides a collateral
common intelligence picture tailored from the ASAS all source
data base and is capable of interfacing with Army area
communications systems as well as IEW special purpose
communications.
If approved, the Committee's recommendation will provide
ASAS RWS for the Army Force Package One, which is comprised of
early deploying units and the training base necessary to
support fielding the system. The Defense Science Board Task
Force on ``Improved Application Of Intelligence To The
Battlefield'' emphasized the importance of maximizing the
dissemination of intelligence down to the battalion level. The
Committee's recommendation $26.5 million will field ASAS RWS
down to the battalion level.
Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar Systems
Joint STARS is a modified Boeing 707 airframe outfitted
with a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) for surveillance of
stationary targets and a Wide Area Surveillance radar to
detect, locate, classify, track and monitor moving targets.
Although the Air Force plans had sought an inventory of 19
JSTARS aircraft, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) has
recommended that the inventory objective be reduced to 13
aircraft.
The President's budget also requested $119.0 million for
RDT&E for JSTARS. Given the recommended reduction in scope of
the program, the Committee believes that the RDT&E effort for
JSTARS should be refocused for emphasis on follow-on platforms
and upgraded capabilities to the existing JSTARS aircraft.
Upgrades to JSTARS are addressed elsewhere in this report.
Therefore, the Committee recommends a reduction of $20.0
million in RDT&E associated with JSTARS.
GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
MASINT IR discrimination
The Committee continues to believe that measures and
signature intelligence (MASINT) is an underdeveloped discipline
that can provide valuable and unique intelligence--especially
in priority areas such as chemical, biological, nuclear and
missile proliferation and counternarcotics. The Committee notes
that the majority of the NFIP MASINT funds requested for FY1998
are located in the GDIP--home of MASINT management--and is
disappointed that the GDIP Program Manager has decreased
funding from last year's level-of-effort. The Committee also
notes that GDIP's advanced R&D funds, the majority of which is
related to MASINT, was drastically cut from last year's
appropriated amount. The Committee urges the reversal of this
trend line. In this regard, the Committee directs the
investment of $10.0 million to evaluate infrared (IR)
discrimination technology. The Committee notes that preliminary
findingsin this area suggest that this capability may enhance
detectability, selectivity, and/or discrimination of targets from
surrounding clutter. In essence, these advanced research and
development efforts in passive polarimetric sensors show promise of
enhancing the value of data collected by IR sensors.
Conventional thermal sensors, such as forward looking
infrared devices (FLIRs), in widespread use by DoD and the
Intelligence Community, measures the intensity of energy from
objects, while this new sensor technology concept measures
intensity and direction of polarization thereby adding
significant information content on targets of interest. Test
results have demonstrated that a whole new set of discriminants
can be extracted from thermal polarization signals to improve
target detection, identification, and characterization.
Inherent sensor characteristics include improved signal-to-
noise performance and natural countermeasure rejection
capability.
The Committee directs the Central MASINT Office to develop
a plan to demonstrate the utility of passive IR polarization
sensors in reconnaissance applications. The plan should
include: (1) development of a polarization sensor; (2)
collection of polarization data on specific targets; (3)
development of computer simulations describing the sensors
utility; (4) development of automatic target recognition
algorithms; and (5) an analysis of the costs and benefits of
continuing the development of this technology versus other
promising MASINT collection initiatives. The Committee also
directs that a cost-benefit analysis be conducted to assess the
value of either incorporating this technology into existing
systems through a product improvement program or inserting the
technology into new systems. The Program Manager is directed to
provide the Committee detailed spending and contract
competition plans prior to the Fiscal Year 1998 Intelligence
Authorization Conference.
SURF EAGLE--MASINT
The FY1998 request does not sustain the Congressional
FY1997 add for project SURF EAGLE. In addition, the Program
Manager (PM) proposes to transfer this capability to the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP).
With previous Congressional plus-up funds of $11.4 million,
the Navy's Meteorologic and Oceanographic Command's Warfighting
Support Center is now capable of fusing data derived from
national technical means (NTM) with publicly available and open
source data (maritime, LANDSAT, French SPOT, ACINT,
meteorologic, and oceanographic). This capability allows
analysts to better characterize littoral ocean areas and
satisfy special operation and Naval/expeditionary warfare
requirements. This effort, known as SURF EAGLE, enables the
digital receipt, exploitation, archival, fusion, and
dissemination of this processed data. Retaining this capability
within GDIP is appropriate because at least two of SURF EAGLE's
primary customers are GDIP units--Marine Corps Intelligence
Activity and SOCOM'S Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). Both
units rely heavily on SURF EAGLE-processed MASINT to produce
tailored material for the warfighter.
The Committee understands that an out year commitment to
support and maintain the capital expenditures already made for
SURF EAGLE has been programmed at $1.5 million per year. To be
determined is the appropriate level of personnel required to
carry out the intelligence-related functions of requesting and
processing NTM information, an adjunct to funded oceanographic
personnel already in place. The Committee understands that an
estimate in the 20-40 person range has been discussed, but not
fully analyzed. The Committee requests that the DNI in
consultation with Commander, Naval Meteorology, and
Oceanography Command provide an analysis of the level of GDIP-
funded personnel to carry out the intelligence related
functions of SURF EAGLE by January 10, 1998.
Only $0.2 million of the necessary $3.5 million is
identified in the FY 1998 budget submission. The FY 1998
request under funds the SURF EAGLE requirement by $3.3 million.
The Committee supports a $3.5 million sustainment level of
effort for SURF EAGLE and adds $1.0 million for digitization.
In addition, the Committee denies the transfer of funds to JMIP
and directs this capability remain in the GDIP.
Project 2000
The budget request includes $10.0 million to address the
``Year 2000'' date problem for GDIP units and activities. In
response to a Congressional question-for-the-record, the
Program Manager indicated that an overall program plan for
addressing the ``Year 2000'' problem has yet to be developed.
The Committee believes it would be inappropriate to permit
expenditure of these funds in the absence of such a detailed
plan and therefore directs that none of these funds be
obligated or expended pending receipt by the Congressional
Intelligence Committees of a detailed spending plan.
Air Force replacement ADP
The GDIP Air Force National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC)
replacement ADP effort has been significantly reduced as a
result of the DCI-mandated $50.0 million in over budget
guidance reinvestment initiatives for facility upgrades.
Specifically, NAICs' FY1998 budget submission leaves the Center
without an acceptable recapitalization program to sustain its
core mission computing needs. A recent staff visit found that
NAIC's ``resource baseline is currently inadequate to support *
* * common use ADP suite'' and that the Center ``will suffer
significant mission degradation starting around 2000.'' In
addition, the NAIC commander noted that ``[w]ithout
recapitalization, current base mission analysis and processing
will not be possible'' and added that, because of funding
shortfalls, the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture
``cannot be implemented at NAIC.'' In a response to a
Congressional question-for-the-record, the GDIP Program Manager
indicated that if additional funds were made available, he
would ``accelerate current plans to recapitalize automation
equipment.'' Therefore, the Committee adds $3.1 million to
restore GDIP replacement ADP funds to the FY 1998 requested
level.
Infrastructure base funds
The FY 1998 GDIP budget request includes an infrastructure
growth of $9.2 million, or 212% expansion above the FY1996
actual funding level, for a ``base'' Operations and Maintenance
appropriation category titled ``Other Expenses.'' As defined by
DoD Procedural Guidance, the ``base'' budget category consists
of programs or activities whose funds do not expand upon an
existing capability. The category titled ``Other Expenses'' is
defined as capital investments in land and structures, grants,
subscriptions, automotive fuel, and minor repairs costing less
than $50,000. Adequate CBJB justification for this increase of
funds has not been provided. The budget submission also
reflects a ``base'' growth of $3.4 million or 160% increase
above the FY1996 actual level for a GDIP-DIA Emergency and
Extraordinary Expense (E&E) budget line. GDIP E&E expenses are
defined as special funds for emergent requirements to include
Official Representation Funds and Confidential Military Purpose
Funds. Again, adequate CBJB justification for this increase of
funds has not been provided. In light of the current budget
environment and poor justification, the Committee recommends
sustaining these efforts at well above the FY1996 actual level
but deletes a total of $7.6 million from these two line items.
Base ``other management'' funds
The FY1998 budget request includes an infrastructure spike
of $7.7 million, or 145% increase above the FY1996 actual
funding level of $17.1, for a GDIP ``base'' category titled
``Other Management.'' As noted earlier, the ``base'' budget
category is defined as programs or activities whose funds do
not expand upon an existing capability. The CBJB does not
justify this one-year ``base'' increase. Fiscal constraints
necessitate that the Committee maintain this ``Other
Management'' funding line closer to the FY1996 actual level,
thereby reducing the request by $3.85 million.
JIVA enhancement
The Committee notes that the Program Manager sustained the
FY1997 increase for the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture
(JIVA). JIVA connects the Washington-hub to tactical forces
through the theater commands. JIVA focuses on commercial
software to provide collaborative and cognitive tools for data
mining, white boarding, improved use of multimedia, video-
teleconferencing, and office automation. Correspondingly, the
JIVA capability integrates modern techniques for data
warehousing to handle vast amounts of information made
available by the collaborative environment. JIVA also focuses
on enhancements that include upgrading site-internal
communications bandwidth to accommodate the needs arising from
multimedia and desktop video usage.
The budget request includes $26.3 million in FY1998 and
$57.2 programmed for FY1999. However, no JIVA funding was
reflected in the FY1998 budget for U.S. Space Command, Special
Operations Command, Transportation Command or U.S. Central
Command. In response to a Congressional Directed Action and to
a question-for-the-record, the Program Manager indicated that
``[f]unding for FY1998 may need to be realigned within the
program to ensure that investment is focused on the most
profitable technologies,'' and that JIVA funding anomalies in
the CBJB were a result of budget cutbacks incurred during the
Community Management Staff's budget review. The Committee
acknowledges the increased emphasis that the GDIP has placed on
JIVA and therefore provides an additional $24.75 million to
accelerate this project.
Base Navy administration and facility
The request includes an infrastructure ``base'' increase of
$2.1 million or 10% growth above the FY1997 appropriated
funding level for a category title ``Navy Intelligence
Administration and Facility.'' The DoD Procedural Guidance
manual defines the budget category of ``base'' as programs or
activities whose funds do not expand upon an existing
capability. The CBJB indicates that this increase is due to
higher cost of ADP and furniture. Of note, the facility is only
three years old with personnel numbers reduced by 19%. Fiscal
concerns necessitate that the Committee sustain this funding
effort at its FY1997 appropriated level and thus reduces the
request by $2.1 million.
DIA's high performance computer replacement
In response to a question-for-the-record, the GDIP program
manager indicated that his highest priority unfunded project is
to recapitalize ADP. According to the commander of DIA's
Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), MSIC's mission-
essential High Performance Computer (HPC) will be obsolete by
the year 2000. While the Center has requested out year life
cycle replacement funds, the request is not reflected in the
DoD or NFIP budget submissions. Of note, the Army's Strategic
and Space Defense Command is co-located on the same
installation and houses one of 13 DoD HPC distribution centers.
The Committee is disappointed that the Program Manager has
shown little effort to date in fully investigating linking the
GDIP computer needs to the $2 billion DoD HPC Modernization
Program, nor has the Program Manager aggressively investigated
the use of NSA's supercomputing systems.
The Committee directs the Program Manager to conduct a
study of the following possible options: (1) use of DoD's HPC
Modernization funds; (2) use of DoD's HPC Modernization
capability; (3) leasing capability elsewhere; (4) procuring the
use of NSA's supercomputing systems; or (5) procuring a new HPC
for MSIC. The Committee requests that the report be submitted
prior to the meeting of the Intelligence Authorization
Conference. The Committee also recommends an additional $4.0
million for MSIC's HPC replacement capability.
Open source analysis
The Committee acknowledges the increased emphasis that the
GDIP Program Manager has placed on open-source collection,
analysis, and production in recent years. However, the
constrained fiscal environment has forced a 50% reduction in
FY1998 to open-source processing and dissemination from the
FY1997 appropriated level. Thevalue of open-source is noted in
this line from the CBJB--``[t]he use of open-source information to
support deployed forces in Bosnia clearly attests to its status as an
essential, cost-effective complement to classified intelligence
disciplines.'' The Committee acknowledges the value of open-source
analysis and adds $1.6 million to expand the collection, flow, and
usefulness of it throughout GDIP analytical production activities.
As active duty military and full-time civilian personnel
are drawn down, utilization of open-source information has
increased in recent years with DoD reservists playing a much
greater role. In response to a question-for-the-record, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense indicated that the Joint
Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP) provides augmented support
to specific theaters' war plans and, if adequately funded,
could better harness readily available open-source information
on transnational topics. The response also suggested that
efficiency could be enhanced by connecting the Open Source
Information System (OSIS) data to JRIP units and work-at-home/
Individual Ready reservist. DoD proposed a concept centered
around the development of a hub of already qualified full-time
personnel such as that currently available at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, which is currently managing the World Basic Information
Library Program. The OSD response further suggested that
through a functional realignment of Reservists to newly
designed, developed and activated JRIP transnational hubs,
significant analytical improvements would be gained by the
Intelligence Community.
The Committee also recommends an additional $0.8 million to
activate a prototype Open-source Reserve Cell to experiment
with a transnational OSIS-connected reserve unit.
Joint collection management tools/JCMT
In early 1994, the Military Intelligence Board directed the
implementation of a single DoD, automated all-source collection
requirements management system to be approved by the
Intelligence Systems Board. Army was designated as the DoD
Intelligence Information System's executive agent to develop
JCMT as the migration system with over $24.0 million requested
over five years. In October 1996, the Program Manager asked for
a review of JCMT as a result of concerns raised by the Services
and Commands. As of late May 1997 significant Intelligence
Community concerns continue to surface over the development and
fielding of JCMT to include unevaluated customer requirements.
The Committee understands that a report is being prepared for
the Military Intelligence Board. Consequently, the Committee
believes it would be inappropriate to permit expenditure of
these funds before the results of this report are known to the
Committee.
GDIP DIA's civilian leadership
The Committee is concerned that the Program Manager has
assigned one out of four Defense Intelligence Senior Executive
Service (DISES) civilian positions to external matters. For
example, the Program Manager has assigned external DISES
positions to such outpost as London, Ottawa or Canberra Liaison
Offices. The Committee questions the return on the investment
to the Intelligence Community of these senior civilian billets.
Therefore, Committee directs the Program Manager to conduct a
review of senior-level internal (core mission areas especially)
and external billets. The review shall consider the rationale
for the high number of external billets given the fiscally
constrained GDIP resources pool. The results of the review
shall be provided to the Congressional Intelligence Committees
not later than January 31, 1998.
improving intelligence community management and operation
Last year, the Congress adopted provisions in the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 aimed at
improving the ability of the Intelligence Community to meet the
challenges of the Post-Cold War world and enhance
accountability in the wake of the Ames scandal and other
intelligence and management failures. The Committee views this
reform effort, however, as an ongoing process and continues to
examine ways to bring greater efficiency and effectiveness to
the Intelligence Community.
One of the themes of last year's efforts, for example, was
the importance of encouraging intelligence professionals to
serve in more than one office or element within the national
security field. This not only enhances the professional
satisfaction of the employee, it also improves the
effectiveness of the entire national security community. Thus,
the Committee has included in this bill expanded authority for
intelligence employees to be detailed on a reimbursable or
nonreimbursable basis as part of the Intelligence Community
Assignment Program recently established by the Acting DCI and
the Secretary of Defense.
Multi-year leasing authority
The Committee is providing authority for the Agency to
enter into multi-year leases in a timely fashion in order to
realize the savings to the government that come with such
leases. The Committee notes that agencies within the
Intelligence Community are currently required to give the
intelligence oversight committees at least two weeks' notice
prior to entering into any lease that has an expected full-
service cost for items provided by the landlord in excess of
$500,000 in any given year, or that involves more than 20,000
square feet of building space. This requirement will apply to
multi-year leases entered into pursuant to the authority
granted in this provision.
The Committee understands that in addition to the overt
multi-year leases authorized by this provision, the CIA has
entered into leases for operational purposes in which the role
of the CIA remains covert. These covert leases, many of them
for Agency proprietaries requiring limited space, are covered
by the existing reporting requirement but rarely meet the
reporting threshold; the Committee therefore receives no
notification. In order to improve its understanding of covert
leasing, the Committee requests an annual report from the DCI
listing all of the Intelligence Community's covert leases. Such
a list shall include a listing of each lease, its cost,
duration and location, the purpose for the lease, and the
controlling directorate or office.
Report on management reform within the Directorate of Administration
The CIA has also proposed a new way of doing business in
its Directorate of Administration. This would include the
establishment of a working capital fund to allow the CIA's
Directorate of Administration to manage some of its services in
a manner that encourages greater efficiency by requiring them
to compete for ``customers'' in much the same way private
industry does. It also forces elements within the Agency which
utilize those services to more accurately assess their value by
directly purchasing the services with funds from their office
budgets. The Committee applauds the kind of creative thinking
reflected in this proposal and generally supports the
objectives underlying this initiative. However, it is essential
that this fund and the management reforms accompanying it be
carefully structured so as to maximize the prospects for
success and minimize the risk of unintended consequences. While
working capital funds are not new to the executive branch, CIA
is proposing several significant variations from the way in
which existing funds operate at other agencies. The Committee,
therefore, is requesting a report on the Working Capital Fund
proposal prior to conference on this bill. This report should
include:
Projected amounts of funds needed for the Working
Capital Fund (WCF) in fiscal years 1998 and 1999;
Policies for management of the WCF, including the
criteria for release of funds to individual
``businesses'' within the Directorate of Administration
and how the WCF will be apportioned for each business;
The criteria that will be employed to select
businesses to be included in the WCF and a description
of the business plan that will be required of each;
List of businesses to be included in the Working
Capital Fund (WCF) in FY 1998 and FY 1999 and the
amounts reflected in the CIA budget and projections as
of May 1, 1997, for those businesses for FY 1998 and FY
1999, notwithstanding the WCF;
Procedures for establishing and monitoring prices set
by the WCF businesses;
Procedures for initial-year distribution of funds to
components throughout the CIA to be used to purchase
goods and services from the businesses participating in
the WCF and procedures for determining component
budgets for those purchases in subsequent years;
Training or other preparation undertaken to ensure
these component managers are prepared to manage their
budgets and make purchase decisions in light of the WCF
and the consequent new business practices;
Policies or guidance regarding what managers can do
with funds distributed for making purchases from the
participating businesses, particularly distributed
funds not used for such purposes during the fiscal
year;
Procedures for monitoring expenditures by managers of
customer elements, including plans to standardize
record keeping by managers: and
Guidelines for evaluating the success of the WCF and
of individual businesses.
Committee review of the CIA inspector general (IG)
Another issue addressed in the Committee's Reform and
Renewal review during the 104th Congress was the accountability
of the various Intelligence Community Inspectors General. While
the Committee's Audit and Program Review Group conducts
oversight through the review of IG publications such as
semiannual reports, projected IG plans, numerous IG
investigative and audit reports, and almost daily contact with
one or more IG staffs, there had been no documented review of
overall operations of the IG offices within the Community.
Thus, the Committee directed that each year one of the
Intelligence Community IGs be reviewed in detail by the Audit
and Program Review Group and that they prepare a report
summarizing the review. The CIA's Office of Inspector General
was selected for the first such in-depth review. That review
was recently completed, with an objective of gaining further
details on how the three CIA IG staffs (Audit, Inspection, and
Investigation) operate. There was particular emphasis on the
Investigations Staff because this staff had significantly
increased in size and responsibility since the IG became
statutory, and the most recent CIA IG Semiannual Report
indicated that further changes were to take place. Topics
covered included the conduct of investigations, recommendations
concerning accountability and disciplinary action, crimes
reporting, and the grievance process.
The review was strongly supported by the CIA IG and
provided the Committee a much greater understanding of the
operations of that office. The majority of the information was
collected through interviews of senior IG personnel. Also,
members of the recently created CIA IG Management Advisory
Group were interviewed to gain the perspective of the working
level members of the staff. Finally, the operational manuals of
the three staffs were reviewed in detail and other available IG
policies and procedures were obtained.
The review found that the Inspector General has taken
numerous steps to improve the operations of the office since
this position became statutory. Examples include better
training, strengthened quality controls, increased staff, and
the creation of an IG Counsel team. Some additional personnel
management and operational policy changes are being made in
response to this review. Based on the results of this review
and its other oversight activities, the Committee believes CIA
IG is producing quality products which address the issues at
hand with the appropriate amount of analysis, criticism, and
independence. In addition, the office has increased the level
of trust and respect from within the Agency, the Oversight
Committees, and the Intelligence Community.
Subpoena authority for the CIA inspector general
The Committee has included in this bill authority for the
Inspector General at the CIA to issue subpoenas to obtain
documentary evidence necessary for the performance of the IG
mission Congress established it to fulfill. The need for this
authority was examined during the Committee's CIA IG review
described above.
Until now, the IG has conducted investigations and
inquiries without the subpoena authority routinely employed by
all other statutory Inspectors General. Congress acknowledged
at the time it created the CIA IG in 1989 that it was not
providing a full complement of investigative tools, but
directed the IG to compile information in each Semiannual
report to the Director of Central Intelligence regarding any
instances where the absence of subpoena authority has been an
impediment.
In several semi-annual reports provided to the Committee,
the IG has provided the Committee with examples of cases that
illustrate the problems created by the lack of subpoena
authority. One example provided by the IG involved an
investigation into the theft of CIA credit cards. The IG
investigators initially were only able to obtain copies of cash
register and credit card receipts and videotape security
records through the voluntary cooperation of a number of
retailers. Similarly, in a series of computer thefts, the IG
noted that interviews of the primary subjects might have
produced more positive results if certain sales receipts and
financial information could have been obtained without alerting
the interviewees prior to the interviews.
Perhaps the most overriding impact of not having subpoena
authority is that the CIA IG is forced to reverse the normal
order of an investigation. Typically, an investigator will
interview the target of an investigation last, after carefully
compiling evidence with which to confront the target, so as to
maximize the prospect for gettinguseful information during the
interview. In the absence of authority to subpoena the production of
relevant documents, the CIA IG must rely on voluntary cooperation.
Thus, it often is compelled to interview the presumed target early in
the investigation in an effort to get their cooperation in providing or
authorizing access to relevant documents.
The CIA IG can, in criminal investigations, ask the
Department of Justice to convene a grand jury and obtain grand
jury subpoenas to acquire necessary records. This ultimately
was done in the credit card case referenced above. However,
this option is only available for cases that are deemed worthy
of a criminal investigation. Other Inspectors General often use
the information obtained through their subpoena authority to
help decide if a case should be pursued as a criminal, civil,
or administrative case. Also, reliance on a grand jury subpoena
limits the usefulness of the information for other purposes
because of the rules prohibiting disclosure of grand jury
information. For example, information obtained through a grand
jury subpoena cannot be used later for administrative purposes
without a formal proceeding before a federal judge. Congress
acknowledged the importance of the CIA IG's mission when it
adopted legislation providing a statutory basis for this
function. The CIA IG statute was designed to ensure that the
CIA IG was sufficiently independent from the Director of
Central Intelligence to provide effective oversight. During the
intervening years the mission of the CIA IG has become
increasingly important, particularly in support of the
oversight responsibilities of this Committee. Moreover, the
independence of the CIA IG has been consistently reflected in
the reports of investigations, audits, and inspections provided
to the Committee. The Committee is aware that granting subpoena
authority to the CIA IG may raise some concerns. However, in
light of the importance of the IG's function, the demonstrated
need for the authority to fulfill this function, and the proven
independence of the IG, the Committee believes the CIA IG
should be granted subpoena authority to the same extent it is
currently granted to other national security Inspectors
General.
ensuring flow of information to congress, policymakers, and the public
The most effective intelligence capability in the world is
worthless if the information collected is not provided to the
people who need it. Consumers of intelligence include not only
the warfighters and policymakers, but also the Congress and the
American public. A key issue in this regard is the handling of
classified information. The Committee is concerned that
insufficient priority is attached to ensuring a thorough review
of intelligence so that families concerned about the murder of
a loved one overseas and the general public receive information
the disclosure of which no longer threatens national security.
There is also a risk that over-classification or undue
restrictions on dissemination of intelligence information
within the executive branch could prevent information from
reaching the policymakers who need it to reach informed
decisions. In addition, the Committee is concerned about the
impact of classification on Congress' ability to learn from
federal employees about wrongdoing within executive agencies
and departments.
The Committee is reviewing the findings and recommendations
of the report by the Commission on Protecting and Reducing
Government Secrecy released in March 1997. The twelve person
bi-partisan Commission spent two years investigating how the
U.S. Government classifies and declassifies national security
information, grants security clearances, and protects
information on automated systems. The Committee will examine
the feasibility of implementing the Commission's
recommendations in the Intelligence Community and intends to
play an important role in the Senate's consideration of
legislation regarding this issue.
Providing information to victims and victims' families
The Committee recently heard from the families of several
Marines who were murdered in a terrorist attack in Zona Rosa,
El Salvador, in 1985. A common refrain in their testimony was
concern about how little information they received from their
government regarding the attack and its perpetrators. It was
from network television, for example, that at least one family
first learned of the attack. Several families learned, years
later from a television broadcast, that the likely mastermind
of the attack had been brought into this country through
official U.S. Government (USG) channels. The Committee has
pressed the executive branch to provide these families with as
much information as possible, but eleven years is a long time
to wait. Similar frustration was expressed when the Committee
heard during the last Congress from Americans who had lost
their loved ones to violence in Guatemala. Subsequently, the
Administration did establish a focal point on the Guatemala
issues and this proved helpful to the families trying to
negotiate through the maze of bureaucracies in search of
relevant information.
The Committee believes it is in the national interests of
the United States to provide information regarding the murder
or kidnaping of U.S. persons abroad to the families of the
victims. Moreover, given the difficulty inherent in identifying
all relevant information that might be held by disparate
elements of the government, and the likely resistance to
providing information that is currently classified, the
Committee believes this important responsibility must
ultimately be vested in a cabinet-level official.Therefore, the
Committee has adopted a provision requiring the Secretary of State to
ensure that all appropriate actions are taken within the USG to
identify promptly all relevant information and to make it available to
families to the maximum extent possible without seriously jeopardizing
sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other vital national
security interests. It is the Committee's expectation that the
Secretary of State will act as an advocate for the families in the
inevitable interagency debates regarding how much information can be
disclosed.
In order to improve the process for handling classified
information in such a way that declassification can be
accommodated efficiently, the Committee is providing additional
funds to support the CIA's Declassification Factor (CDF). The
Committee directs the DCI to review the current
declassification polices and programs within the Intelligence
Community and recommend measures to consolidate programs,
evaluate agency performance, prioritize efforts, and provide
adequate personnel and financial resources. The DCI's findings
and recommendations should be provided to the intelligence
oversight committees no later than September 1, 1997.
Standardizing information control systems and markings
The Committee commends the steps the CIA has taken to
improve classification management practices, including efforts
to make classifiers more accountable for their actions. Another
important aspect of classification policies and procedures is
information control systems and markings. Efforts to ensure
that intelligence is appropriately disseminated and that
information vital to the Nation's security is kept secure and
all other information is ultimately released to the public will
be enhanced by standardizing information control systems and
markings. The Controlled Access Program Oversight Committee
(CAPOC), as a part of the Community Management Staff, is
leading an interagency project jointly with the Security Policy
Board and the Intelligence System Secretariat to standardize
guidance for the principle Sensitive Compartmented Information
control systems and related classification and security
markings. This project should result in improved consistency of
compartmentation and classification management across
intelligence disciplines and make an important contribution to
interoperability among automated information systems in the
Intelligence Community. The Committee urges the DCI to assign
resources and priority attention to completion of updated
classification guides and a unified list of compatible
markings. In addition, the Committee encourages the DCI to
incorporate into this effort other CIA collection disciplines.
The Committee commends the efforts of the CAPOC to keep the
Committee informed of its activities. The DCI is directed to
review the activities and recommendations of the CAPOC and
notify the Congressional Intelligence Committees if legislation
is necessary to further standardization and enhance oversight
of these controlled access programs.
Disclosures of classified information to Congress
The Committee is also concerned that executive branch
policies on classified information could interfere with its
ability to learn of wrongdoing within the elements over which
it has oversight responsibility. The Committee's concern has
been heightened by its review of executive branch opinions in
this area, most recently articulated in a December 5, 1996
letter from the Director of Central Intelligence informing a
State Department employee who was accused of having revealed
sensitive classified information to a Member of Congress of the
decision to deny him access to Sensitive Compartmental
Information. The letter stated that ``[n]either a security
clearance, nor access to SCI give an individual the right or
authority to make unilateral decisions to disclose classified
information to others, including to cleared Members of
Congress.'' Without addressing the merits of that particular
decision or attempting to resolve the factual disputes in that
case, the Committee noted in a letter to the Acting DCI on
January 3, 1997, that it was troubled by the reasoning
underlying the decision because of its potential impact on the
ability of the intelligence oversight committees to ensure they
are informed of possible wrongdoing.
The Committee is particularly concerned that federal
employees may view the decision or other relevant statements by
elements of the Executive Branch, including opinions from the
Department of Justice, to mean that there are no circumstances
under which they can bring information to Congress that they
believe evidences wrongdoing if to do so requires disclosure to
Congress of classified information.
The Committee fully appreciates the need to carefully
protect national security information, particularly information
the disclosure of which might reveal sensitive intelligence
sources or methods. Indeed, the select committees for oversight
of intelligence were established in part to balance that need
for protection with the equally compelling need for Congress to
have access to information necessary for effective oversight.
Moreover the Committee has worked closely with the Intelligence
Community to establish appropriate procedures for the routine
provision of intelligence information to the committees.
However, it is essential that where these standard procedures
fail to get the necessary information to Congress, for example,
because the wrongdoing involves the very individuals who would
have to authorize the disclosure or the authorization is not
forthcoming, then employees must have an alternative.
The Committee has included in this bill a provision
designed to ensure that Congress receives information necessary
to fulfill its constitutional oversight responsibilities. The
bill directs the President to issue guidance for all executive
branch employees making it clear that disclosures of classified
information to appropriate oversight committees or the
employee's own Congressional representative is not prohibited
by any law, executive order, regulation, or policy if the
employee reasonably believes that such information evidences a
violation of any law, rule, or regulation; a false statement to
Congress on an issue of material fact; or gross mismanagement,
a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health or safety.
Disclosure to an appropriate oversight committee means
disclosure to cleared staff or a member of the committee with
responsibility for the agency involved in the wrongdoing in
their capacity as staff or committee member. Committee staff or
members who receive such information from an employee are
presumed to have received it in their capacity as members or
staff of the appropriate oversight committee and are
responsible for ensuring that the information is protected and
brought to the attention of the leadership of the committee or
its staff directors.
Executive branch opinions note that Executive Order 12356
on classification requires that classified information be
disclosed only to a person with the appropriate clearance and a
``need to know.'' Members of Congress are cleared by virtue of
the election to office. This provision recognizes that, at a
minimum, the committee with primary oversight jurisdiction over
the elements allegedly engaged in wrongdoing and the member of
Congress representing the employee have a need to know the
information and such disclosure is consistent with the
Executive Order.
Notification of Congress
To conduct effective oversight the Committee must also
receive notification of intelligence activities in a timely and
complete fashion. Section 502 of the National Security Act of
1947 requires that the Committees be informed of all
intelligence activities including any significant anticipated
intelligence activity as well as any significant intelligence
failure. In several cases the Committee has received notice
well after the fact and follow-up requests for further
information have not been responded to promptly and completely.
The Committee reaffirms the requirement that notification occur
in advance of the activity if it is anticipated or foreseeable.
Where there is not time to provide written notice in advance,
or where the event was not foreseeable, immediate verbal notice
will suffice until written notice is provided; written notice
should be provided within five business days. Follow-up
requests from the Committee for additional information and/or
supporting documentation regarding a notification must be
addressed promptly and completely.
section-by-section analysis and explanation
Title I--Intelligence activities
Section 101 lists departments, agencies, and other elements
of the United States Government for whose intelligence and
intelligence-related activities the Act authorizes
appropriations for fiscal year 1998.
Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and personnel ceilings for the
entities listed in section 101 for fiscal year 1998 are
contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the Act by this
section.
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central
Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office
of management and Budget, in fiscal year 1998 to exceed the
personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the
Intelligence Community under section 102 by an amount not to
exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings applicable
under section 102. The Director may exercise this authority
only when necessary to perform important intelligence functions
or to maintain of a stable personnel force. The Director must
report any exercise of this authority to the two intelligence
committees of the Congress.
Section 104 provides certain details concerning the amount
and composition of the Community Management Account (CMA) of
the Director of Central Intelligence.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$90,580,000 for fiscal year 1998 for the staffing and
administration of various components under the CMA. Subsection
(a) also authorizes funds identified for the Advanced Research
and Development Committee and the Environmental Intelligence
and Applications Program to remain available for two years.
Subsection (B) authorizes a total of 278 full-time
personnel for elements within the CMA for fiscal year 1998 and
provides that such personnel may be permanent employeesof the
CMA element or detailed from other elements of the United States
Government.
Subsection (c) explicitly authorizes the classified portion
of the CMA and expressly provides that the classified Schedule
of Authorizations applies to the CMA.
Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed on a
reimbursable basis except for temporary situations.
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
Authorization of Appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$196,900,000 for fiscal year 1998 for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
Title III--General Provisions
Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by the
conference report for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the conference report shall not be deemed to
constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence
activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution
or laws of the United States.
Section 303 would allow heads of Intelligence Community
(IC) entities, or officials to whom they have delegated this
authority, to authorize long-term reimbursable or
nonreimbursable details within the Intelligence Community
Assignment Program (ICAP). Nonreimbursable details would be
capped at three years. The heads of the parent and host
agencies, however, could extend such details for a period not
to exceed one year when they determine that an extension is in
the public interest. The provision also would authorize IC
elements to pay ICAP participants any benefits, allowances
(including travel allowances) or incentives otherwise provided
by their organizations to encourage participation in the ICAP.
The Acting Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy
Secretary of Defense established the ICAP in order to broaden
the perspective of Community employees and open an additional
mechanism by which employees can secure rotational assignments
within the Community. The Program will develop leaders with a
broader knowledge and appreciation of the issues facing the IC.
ICAP assignments will be for two to three years and involve GS-
13 to Senior Executive Service/Senior Intelligence Service
positions. The Program should address concerns shared by senior
IC managers, the intelligence oversight committees, and the
Brown Commission that IC employees develop a broad IC-wide
perspective. It is expected that the Program will not comprise
more than 100 people initially and 900 by 2001.
Current law could impede the effective implementation of
ICAP in two respects. First, under title 31, United States
Code, nonreimbursable details are restricted and must either
involve a matter related to the loaning agency's appropriation
and aid it in accomplishing the purpose for which the
appropriations are provided; or have a negligible impact on the
loaning agency's appropriations (generally viewed as a detail
of one year or less). This restriction would impede the ability
to establish the longer-term nonreimbursable rotations
necessary to provide adequate exposure to a broader range of IC
activities.
Second, under existing law, it is questionable whether
unique benefits, allowances, travel and/or incentives normally
payable to employees may continue to be paid to those employees
upon their detail to another IC organization. Employees may
view loss of such benefits as a penalty for participating in
ICAP and may be less willing to participate in the program.
Under this legislation, IC elements will be able to provide
special relocation bonuses and cost-of-living allowances to
their employees on detail to other agencies under the ICAP if
it is determined that the particular incentive is necessary to
fill the position. This determination will be made on a case-
by-case basis.
Without this legislation, the implementation of ICAP will
not be as flexible, and the program may not achieve its goal of
creating a more efficient and ``corporate'' Intelligence
Community.
Section 304 further extends the `delay of sanctions''
provision in current law until January 6, 2001. This provision
was first included in the Fiscal Year 1996 Intelligence
Authorization Act and was extended until January 6, 1998, in
the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act. The
provision amended the National Security Act of 1947 to give the
President statutory authority to delay imposing a sanction,
upon determining that proceeding with the sanction could
compromise an ongoing criminal investigation or an intelligence
source or method. The President would be required to lift any
stay of sanction as soon as possible. Also, the provision would
require the President to report to Congress immediately upon
imposing any stay and when any stay exceeds 120 days.
Section 305 amends section 102(e) of the National Security
Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 403 by reinserting language that
places the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence in
the CIA, for administrative purposes. This language was
inadvertently deleted when Congress enacted amendments to the
National Security Act in the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-293. Reinsertion of this
language clarifies that the CIA has the authority to provide
administrative support to entities within the Office of the
Director.
Section 306 directs the President to inform all executive
branch employees that disclosing classified information to an
appropriate oversight committee or to their Congressional
representative is not prohibited by any law, executive order,
regulation, or policy; provided, that the employee reasonably
believes that the classified information evidences a violation
of any law, rule, or regulation; a false statement to Congress
on an issue of material fact; or gross mismanagement, a gross
waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety. This provision is
intended to ensure that Congress receives information necessary
to fulfill its constitutional oversight responsibilities.
Disclosure to an appropriate oversight committee means
disclosure to cleared staff or a member of the committee with
jurisdiction over the agency involved in the wrongdoing in
their capacity as staff or a committee member. Members or
Committee staff who receive such information from an employee
are presumed to have received it in their capacity as members
or staff of the appropriate oversight committee. Members and
staff are responsible for ensuring that the information is
protected and brought to the attention of the leadership of the
committee or its staff directors.
The President, by informing executive branch employees as
directed in this provision, will make it clear that disclosure
to the appropriate oversight committee or member is authorized,
thereby recognizing that these committees and members have a
``need to know'' the information as required by current
executive branch restrictions on disclosure of classified
information.
Section 307 expresses a sense of Congress that it is in the
national interest of the United States to provide information
regarding the murder or kidnaping of United States persons
abroad to the families of the victims. Moreover, Congress
believes that the responsibility for providing such information
is sufficiently important that this provision vests it in a
cabinet-level official. This provision requires the Secretary
of State to ensure that the United States Government takes all
appropriate actions to identify promptly all relevant
unclassified and classified information in the possession of
the United States Government. The provision further requires
the Secretary of State to ensure that all unclassified
information is made available to the victims' families. With
respect to classified information, this provision directs the
Secretary of State to work with the Director of Central
Intelligence to release all relevant information that would not
jeopardize intelligence sources or methods, or vital national
security interests. If the Secretary of State and the Director
of Central Intelligence determine that intelligence sources or
methods would not be jeopardized and no vital national security
interest would be compromised by the release of classified
information, this provision directs the Secretary to release
that information to the appropriate recipient. The Committee
realizes that there will be interagency disagreement about what
should or should not be released under this provision. When
such disagreements arise, the Committee expects the Secretary
of State to act as an advocate for the families.
Section 308 addresses the Committee's concern that
intelligence reporting and analysis lacks standards for foreign
names and places. Recent reporting suggests that U.S. troops
may have received inadequate intelligence warnings in the Gulf
War because of inconsistent references to locations in Iraq.
These inconsistencies may have contributed to the possible
exposure of U.S. military forces to chemical agents released
during the destruction of Iraqi weapons caches.
Intelligence databases maintained by various entities
within the intelligence community are a critical national
resource. The Intelligence Community must standardize the names
and places in each database to allow for effective and
consistent support for war fighters and national security
policy makers. This provision calls on the DCI to conduct a
survey of standards currently in place throughout the
Intelligence Community and to issue guidelines for community-
wide standards. The DCI is further directed to report the
results of this survey, no later than 90 days after the
enactment of this Act, and provide a copy of the guidelines to
the Intelligence Committes no later than 180 days after the
enactment of this Act.
Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency
Section 401 modifies section 5 of the CIA Act of 1949 to
provide clear legislative authority for the Central
Intelligence Agency to enter into multi-year leases of not more
than 15 years' duration for the purpose of ensuring cost-
efficient acquisition of Agency facilities. This section is not
intended to modify or supersede authority granted in section 8
of the CIA Act of 1949. The multi-year least authority in this
section is subject to appropriations provided in advance for
either the full cost of the lease or the first 12 months' cost
plus estimated termination liability. In the latter case,
leases shall include a clause that conditions the lease upon
the availability of funds in any fiscal year. Additionally,
funds made available for termination liability remain available
until the costs associated with lease termination are paid.
This provision is similar to and modeled after section 1072 of
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994. In the
event a lease is not terminated early, excess termination
liability funds may be used to satisfy rental obligations in a
subsequent fiscal year. Lastly, available funds in any fiscal
year may be used to make lease payments for a maximum of 12
months beginning any time during the fiscal year. This
provision is similar to section 1073 of FASA.
With the end of the Cold War, CIA has been reorganizing to
meet new intelligence requirements. As part of this effort, CIA
has been consolidating its facilities in the Washington, D.C.
area and other locations. This process, as well as future
consolidation efforts, calls for the acquisition of new leases
that permit CIA to relocate from outdated facilities with poor
work space, communications, personal security, and safety.
Because multiyear leases are desirable to commercial landlords
and lenders, the ability to enter into multiyear leases during
this process cold result in savings to the Government, both in
money and time. Multiyear leasing authority would allow CIA to
negotiate better terms with a wider array of landlords. The
CIA's security concerns present it with unique constraints in
choosing a suitable rental property. Thus, it is often
difficult to find a replacement if a potential site is lost due
to delay. This authority will allow the Agency to conduct lease
negotiations in a more timely manner than is currently
possible.
The end of section 5(e) is deleted because the Act it
cites, section 322 of the Act of June 30, 1932 (47 Stat. 412),
was repealed by P.L. 100-678 on November 17, 1988.
Section 402 amends section 17(e) of the CIA Act of 1949, 50
U.S.C. Sec. 403q(e) to provide the CIA Inspector General (IG)
with authority to subpoena records and other documentary
information necessary in the performance of functions assigned
to the IG. This authority is the same as that provided to
Inspectors General covered by the Inspector General Act of
1978. As under the 1978 Act, enforcement of an IG subpoena
would necessitate the filing by the Department of Justice of a
request for and an order by a United States district court.
The section also directs the CIA Inspector General to
submit a biannual report to the Congressional intelligence
committees detailing the exercise of the IG's subpoena
authority during the preceding six months. The Committee
expects that these reports will include a summary of each
exercise of the IG's subpoena authority. The reports should
also include whether the IG needed to request judicial
enforcement of a subpoena and the results of such a request.
This section also amends section 17(b)(3) of the CIA Act of
1949, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 403q(b)(3), by inserting language similar
to that found in provisions of the Inspector General Act of
1978, as amended, that pertain to the Inspectors General of the
Departments of Defense, Justice, and Treasury, and of the
Postal Service. This new language authorizes the Director of
Central Intelligence to prohibit the CIA Inspector General from
issuing any subpoena after the IG has decided to issue such
subpoena, if the Director determines that such prohibition is
necessary to protect vital national security interests of the
United States.
Title V--Department of Defense
Section 501 would amend Section 2161 of title 10 of the
United States Code to show that the former Defense Intelligence
School has been renamed as the Joint Military Intelligence
College, in order to reflect the nature of the College as a
joint institution of higher learning. The amendment also
authorizes the President of the College to confer the
undergraduate degree of Bachelor of Science in Intelligence
(BSI) on graduates of the College who have fulfilled the
requirements for that degree.
The increasing complexity in the field of intelligence has
created the need for a highly educated professional work force.
Although the need to broaden the intelligence knowledge of
Intelligence Community professionals has been recognized in
degree programs such as the Master of Science in Strategic
Intelligence (MSSI), the professional development of the
Intelligence Community should not be limited to senior-level
personnel. A substantial portion of the community is composed
of intelligence personnel in the E-5 through E-9, warrant
officer, and equivalent civilian grades. The Intelligence
Community would benefit greatly by the addition of an
undergraduate degree program designed to educate junior
intelligence professionals.
The BSI is a degree completion program developed by the
Joint Military Intelligence College focusing on intelligence
collection and analysis, providing an intelligence major for
those who have completed the first three years of an
undergraduate program. This is a cost-effective means of
increasing the professional competence of a key segment of the
Community. It also serves to underpin a coherent career
development program which may include the MSSI.
In his March 1996 Annual Report to the President and the
Congress, the Secretary of Defense advised that the college was
taking the steps necessary to acquire this additional degree
granting authority. The BSI degree program enjoys wide support,
which includes the Joint Military Intelligence College Board of
Visitors, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and
each of the Service intelligence organizations. As stated in
the Department of Education report on the college's
application, the program has already received informal support
from the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, the
accreditation authority for the Joint Military Intelligence
College. The program has been fully piloted, reviewed, and
approved by the U.S. Department of Education.
Section 502 would extend through the end of FY 1999 the
authority granted the Army in the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996 for the rectification of
infrastructure and quality of life problems at Bad Aibling and
Menwith Hill Stations. With respect to Bad Aibling Station,
this authority is requested as an interim measure for
contingency maintenance pending any final decision on the
status of the Station.
The Army became the Executive Agent for Bad Aibling Station
in FY 1995 and Menwith Hill Station in FY 1996. Without
congressional action, the Army is prohibited by 31 U.S.C.
Sec. 1301 from using appropriated funds to support these field
sites, notwithstanding that the Army is the Executive Agent for
them. Language in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1996 provided the necessary flexibility to allow the Army
to transfer or reprogram relatively minor amounts of funds (up
to $2 million in FY 1996 O&M and $2 million in FY 1997 O&M
funds) for necessary maintenance at these stations. Sufficient
funding has not been available, however, to allow the Army to
meet all of the stations' needs because of financial
constraints and increasing operational tempo. Consequently, in
order to continue addressing infrastructure and quality of life
needs at Menwith Hill Station and to be able to meet
contingencies on an interim basis at Bad Aibling Station, the
Army's flexible transfer and reprogramming authority is
extended through FY 1999.
Section 503 prohibits any person from publicly using the
name, initials or seal of the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) for commercial purposes without the joint written
permission of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency and
National Imagery and Mapping Agency currently have identical
provisions prohibiting unauthorized use of their names,
initials, and seals. See Section 13 of the CIA Act, 50 U.S.C.
Sec. 403m (CIA); 10 U.S.C. Sec. 445 (NIMA).
committee action
On June 4, 1997 the Select Committee on Intelligence
approved the bill and ordered that it be favorably reported.
estimate of costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the estimated costs incurred in carrying
out the provisions of this bill, for fiscal year 1998, are set
forth in the classified annex to this bill. Estimates of the
costs incurred in carrying out this bill in the five fiscal
years thereafter are not available from the Executive branch,
and therefore, the Committee deems it impractical, pursuant to
paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the
Senate, to include such estimates in this report.
evaluation of regulatory impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing the
provisions of this legislation.
changes in existing law
In the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary to
dispense with the requirements of section 12 of rule XXVI of
the Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the
business of the Senate.