43 673







                            105 th Congress



                             Rept.  105 108











                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



                               1st Session



                                 Part 5









            SECURITY AND FREEDOM THROUGH ENCRYPTION (SAFE) ACT







   September 29, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on

 the State of the Union and ordered to be printed





 Mr.  Bliley,  from the Committee on Commerce,  submitted the following



 R E P O R T



                              together with



                     DISSENTING AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS



                         [To accompany H.R. 695]



       [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]





      The Committee on Commerce, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 695)

   to amend title 18, United States Code, to affirm the rights of United

   States persons to use and sell encryption and to relax export controls

   on encryption, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with

   an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.



                               CONTENTS

         Amendment                                                        2

         Purpose and Summary                                              6

         Background and Need for Legislation                              7

         Hearings                                                         10

         Committee Consideration                                          11

         Rollcall Votes                                                   11

         Committee Oversight Findings                                     15

         Committee on Government Reform and Oversight                     15

         New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures                        15

         Committee Cost Estimate                                          15

         Congressional Budget Office Estimate                             15

         Federal Mandates Statement                                       19

         Advisory Committee Statement                                     19

         Constitutional Authority Statement                               19

         Applicability to Legislative Branch                              19

         Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation                   19

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, As Reported            23

         Dissenting and Additional Views                                  29, 42





                                         AMENDMENT



   The amendment is as follows:



      Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof

   the following:



          SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.



     This Act may be cited as the ``Security and Freedom Through

  Encryption (SAFE) Act''.

          SEC. 2. SALE AND USE OF ENCRYPTION.



     (a) In General.--Part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended

  by inserting after chapter 123 the following new chapter:

                  ``CHAPTER 125--ENCRYPTED WIRE AND ELECTRONIC INFORMATION





      ``2801. Definitions.



      ``2802. Assistance for law enforcement.



      ``2803. Freedom to sell encryption.



      ``2804. Prohibition on mandatory key escrow.



      ``2805. Unlawful use of encryption in furtherance of a criminal act.



      ``2806. Liability limitations.





          ``2801. Definitions



   ``As used in this chapter--



       ``(1) the terms `person', `State', `wire communication', `electronic

   communication', and `investigative or law enforcement officer' have the

   meanings given those terms in section 2510 of this title;

       ``(2) the terms `encrypt' and `encryption' refer to the scrambling

   of wire communications, electronic communications, or electronically

   stored information, using mathematical formulas or algorithms in order

   to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of, and

   prevent unauthorized recipients from accessing or altering, such

   communications or information;

       ``(3) the term `key' means the variable information used in a

   mathematical formula, code, or algorithm, or any component thereof, used

   to decrypt wire communications, electronic communications, or

   electronically stored information, that has been encrypted; and

    ``(4) the term `United States person' means--



    ``(A) any United States citizen;



    ``(B) any other person organized under the laws of any State; and



       ``(C) any person organized under the laws of any foreign country who

   is owned or controlled by individuals or persons described in

   subparagraphs (A) and (B).

          ``2802. Assistance for law enforcement



   ``(a)  National Electronic Technologies Center.--



       ``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the Department of

   Justice a National Electronic Technologies Center (in this subsection

   referred to as the `NET Center').

       ``(2) Director.--The NET Center shall have a Director, who shall be

   appointed by the Attorney General.

    ``(3)  Duties.--The duties of the NET Center shall be--



       ``(A) to serve as a center for Federal, State, and local law

   enforcement authorities for information and assistance regarding

   decryption and other access requirements;

       ``(B) to serve as a center for industry and government entities to

   exchange information and methodology regarding information security

   techniques and technologies;

       ``(C) to examine encryption techniques and methods to facilitate the

   ability of law enforcement to gain efficient access to plaintext of

   communications and electronic information;

       ``(D) to conduct research to develop efficient methods, and improve

   the efficiency of existing methods, of accessing plaintext of

   communications and electronic information;

       ``(E) to investigate and research new and emerging techniques and

   technologies to facilitate access to communications and electronic

   information, including--

    ``(i) reverse-steganography;



       ``(ii) decompression of information that previously has been

   compressed for transmission; and

    ``(iii) de-multiplexing; and



       ``(F) to obtain information regarding the most current hardware,

   software, telecommunications, and other capabilities to understand how

   to access information transmitted across networks.

       ``(4) Equal access.--State and local law enforcement agencies and

   authorities shall have access to information, services, resources, and

   assistance provided by the NET Center to the same extent that Federal

   law enforcement agencies and authorities have such access.

       ``(5) Personnel.--The Director may appoint such personnel as the

   Director considers appropriate to carry out the duties of the NET

   Center.

       ``(6) Assistance of other federal agencies.--Upon the request of the

   Director of the NET Center, the head of any department or agency of the

   Federal Government may, to assist the NET Center in carrying out its

   duties under this subsection--

       ``(A) detail, on a reimbursable basis, any of the personnel of such

   department or agency to the NET Center; and

       ``(B) provide to the NET Center facilities, information, and other

   non-personnel resources.

       ``(7) Private industry assistance.--The NET Center may accept, use,
   and dispose of gifts, bequests, or devises of money, services, or

   property, both real and personal, for the purpose of aiding or

   facilitating the work of the Center.



                    Gifts, bequests, or devises of money and proceeds from sales

          of other property received as gifts, bequests, or devises shall be

          deposited in the Treasury and shall be available for disbursement upon

          order of the Director of the NET Center.

    ``(8)  Advisory board.--



       ``(A) Establishment.--There is established the Advisory Board of the

   Strategic NET Center for Excellence in Information Security (in this

   paragraph referred to as the `Advisory Board'), which shall be comprised

   of members who have the qualifications described in subparagraph (B) and

   who are appointed by the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall

   appoint a chairman of the Advisory Board.

       ``(B) Qualifications.--Each member of the Advisory Board shall have

   experience or expertise in the field of encryption, decryption,

   electronic communication, information security, electronic commerce, or

   law enforcement.

       ``(C) Duties.--The duty of the Advisory Board shall be to advise the

   NET Center and the Federal Government regarding new and emerging

   technologies relating to encryption and decryption of communications and

   electronic information.

       ``(9) Implementation plan.--Within 2 months after the date of the

   enactment of the Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act, the

   Attorney General shall, in consultation and cooperation with other

   appropriate Federal agencies and appropriate industry participants,

   develop and cause to be published in the Federal Register a plan for

   establishing the NET Center. The plan shall--

       ``(A) specify the physical location of the NET Center and the

   equipment, software, and personnel resources necessary to carry out the

   duties of the NET Center under this subsection;

       ``(B) assess the amount of funding necessary to establish and

   operate the NET Center; and

       ``(C) identify sources of probable funding for the NET Center,

   including any sources of in-kind contributions from private industry.

     ``(b) Freedom of Use.--Subject to section 2805, it shall be lawful

  for any person within any State, and for any United States person in a

  foreign country, to use any encryption, regardless of the encryption

  algorithm selected, encryption key length chosen, or implementation

  technique or medium used. No Federal or State law or regulation may

  condition the issuance of certificates of authentication or certificates

  of authority for any encryption product upon any escrowing or other

  sharing of private encryption keys, whether with private agents or

  government entities, or establish a licensing, labeling, or other

  regulatory scheme for any encryption product that requires key escrow as

  a condition of licensing or regulatory approval.

          ``2803. Freedom to sell encryption



     ``Subject to section 2805, it shall be lawful for any person within

  any State to sell in interstate commerce any encryption, regardless of

  the encryption algorithm selected, encryption key length chosen, or

  implementation technique or medium used.

          ``2804. Prohibition on mandatory key escrow



     ``(a) Prohibition.--No person in lawful possession of a key to

  encrypted communications or information may be required by Federal or

  State law to relinquish to another person control of that key.

     ``(b) Exception for Access for Law Enforcement Purposes.--Subsection

  (a) shall not affect the authority of any investigative or law

  enforcement officer, or any member of the intelligence community as

  defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.

  401a), acting under any law in effect on the effective date of this

  chapter, to gain access to encrypted communications or information.

          ``2805. Unlawful use of encryption in furtherance of a criminal act



     ``Any person who, in the commission of a felony under a criminal

  statute of the United States, knowingly and willfully encrypts

  incriminating communications or information relating to that felony with

  the intent to conceal such communications or information for the purpose

  of avoiding detection by law enforcement agencies or prosecution--

       ``(1) in the case of a first offense under this section, shall be

   imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or fined in the amount set forth

   in this title, or both; and

       ``(2) in the case of a second or subsequent offense under this

   section, shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or fined in the

   amount set forth in this title, or both.

          ``2806. Liability limitations



     ``No person shall be subject to civil or criminal liability for

  providing access to the plaintext of encrypted communications or

  electronic information to any law enforcement official or authorized

  government entity, pursuant to judicial process.''.

     (b) Study.--Within 6 months after the date of the enactment of this

  Act, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration

  shall conduct a study, and prepare and submit to the Congress and the

  President a report regarding such study, that--

       (1) assesses the effect that establishment of a mandatory system for

   recovery of encryption keys for encrypted communications and information

   would have on--

    (A) electronic commerce;



    (B) data security;



    (C) privacy in interstate commerce; and



    (D) law enforcement authorities and activities; and



       (2) assesses other possible methods for providing access to

   encrypted communications and information to further law enforcement

   activities.

     (c) Conforming Amendment.--The table of chapters for part I of title

  18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating

  to chapter 123 the following new item:





         ``125. Encrypted wire and electronic information



        2801''.





          SEC. 3. EXPORTS OF ENCRYPTION.



     (a) Amendment To Export Administration Act of 1979.--Section 17 of

  the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2416) is amended

  by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

   ``(g)  Computers and Related Equipment.--



       ``(1) General rule.--Subject to paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), the

   Secretary shall have exclusive authority to control exports of all

   computer hardware, software, and technology for information security

   (including encryption), except that which is specifically designed or

   modified for military use, including command, control, and intelligence

   applications.

       ``(2) Items not requiring licenses.--No validated license may be

   required, except pursuant to the Trading With The Enemy Act or the

   International Emergency Economic Powers Act (but only to the extent that

   the authority of such Act is not exercised to extend controls imposed

   under this Act), for the export or reexport of--

    ``(A) any software, including software with encryption capabilities--



       ``(i) that is generally available, as is, and is designed for

   installation by the purchaser; or

       ``(ii) that is in the public domain for which copyright or other

   protection is not available under title 17, United States Code, or that

   is available to the public because it is generally accessible to the

   interested public in any form; or

       ``(B) any computing device solely because it incorporates or employs

   in any form software (including software with encryption capabilities)

   exempted from any requirement for a validated license under subparagraph

   (A).

       ``(3) Software with encryption capabilities.--The Secretary shall

   authorize the export or reexport of software with encryption

   capabilities for nonmilitary end uses in any country to which exports of

   software of similar capability are permitted for use by financial

   institutions not controlled in fact by United States persons, unless

   there is substantial evidence that such software will be--

       ``(A) diverted to a military end use or an end use supporting

   international terrorism;

    ``(B) modified for military or terrorist end use; or



       ``(C) reexported without any authorization by the United States that

   may be required under this Act.

       ``(4) Hardware with encryption capabilities.--The Secretary shall

   authorize the export or reexport of computer hardware with encryption

   capabilities if the Secretary determines that a product offering

   comparable security is commercially available outside the United States

   from a foreign supplier, without effective restrictions.

    ``(5)  Definitions.--As used in this subsection--



       ``(A) the term `encryption' means the scrambling of wire or

   electronic information using mathematical formulas or algorithms in

   order to preserve



                    the confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of, and

          prevent unauthorized recipients from accessing or altering, such

          information;

       ``(B) the term `generally available' means, in the case of software

   (including software with encryption capabilities), software that is

   offered for sale, license, or transfer to any person without

   restriction, whether or not for consideration, including, but not

   limited to, over-the-counter retail sales, mail order transactions,

   phone order transactions, electronic distribution, or sale on approval;

       ``(C) the term `as is' means, in the case of software (including

   software with encryption capabilities), a software program that is not

   designed, developed, or tailored by the software publisher for specific

   purchasers, except that such purchasers may supply certain installation

   parameters needed by the software program to function properly with the

   purchaser's system and may customize the software program by choosing

   among options contained in the software program;

       ``(D) the term `is designed for installation by the purchaser'

   means, in the case of software (including software with encryption

   capabilities) that--

       ``(i) the software publisher intends for the purchaser (including

   any licensee or transferee), who may not be the actual program user, to

   install the software program on a computing device and has supplied the

   necessary instructions to do so, except that the publisher may also

   provide telephone help line services for software installation,

   electronic transmission, or basic operations; and

       ``(ii) the software program is designed for installation by the

   purchaser without further substantial support by the supplier;

       ``(E) the term `computing device' means a device which incorporates

   one or more microprocessor-based central processing units that can

   accept, store, process, or provide output of data; and

       ``(F) the term `computer hardware', when used in conjunction with

   information security, includes, but is not limited to, computer systems,

   equipment, application-specific assemblies, modules, and integrated

   circuits.''.

     (b) Continuation of Export Administration Act.--For purposes of

  carrying out the amendment made by subsection (a), the Export

  Administration Act of 1979 shall be deemed to be in effect.

          SEC. 4. TREATMENT OF ENCRYPTION IN INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE.



     (a) Inquiry Regarding Impediments to Trade.--Within 180 days after

  the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce shall

  complete an inquiry to--

       (1) identify any domestic and foreign impediments to trade in

   encryption products and services and the manners in which and extent to

   which such impediments inhibit the development of interstate and foreign

   commerce; and

       (2) identify import restrictions imposed by foreign nations that

   constitute unfair trade barriers to providers of encryption products or

   services.

    The Secretary shall submit a report to the Congress regarding the

  results of such inquiry by such date.

     (b) Removal of Impediments to Trade.--Within 1 year after such date

  of enactment, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the

  Attorney General, shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary

  to reduce the impediments to trade in encryption products and services

  identified in the inquiry pursuant to subsection (a) for the purpose of

  facilitating the development of interstate and foreign commerce. Such

  regulations shall be designed to--

       (1) promote the sale and distribution in foreign commerce of

   encryption products and services manufactured in the United States; and

       (2) strengthen the competitiveness of domestic providers of

   encryption products and services in foreign commerce.

   (c)  International Agreements.--



       (1) Report to president.--Upon the completion of the inquiry under

   subsection (a), the Secretary of Commerce shall submit a report to the

   President regarding reducing any impediments to trade in encryption

   products and services that are identified by the inquiry and could, in

   the determination of the Secretary, require international negotiations

   for such reduction.

       (2) Negotiations.--The President shall take all actions necessary to

   conduct negotiations with other countries for the purposes of (A)

   concluding international agreements on the promotion of encryption

   products and services, and (B) achieving mutual recognition of

   countries' export controls, in order to meet the needs of countries to

   preserve national security, safeguard privacy, and prevent commercial

   espionage. The President may consider a country's refusal to negotiate

   such international export and mutual recognition agreements when

   considering the participation of the United States in any cooperation or

   assistance program with that country. The President shall submit a

   report to the Congress regarding the status of international efforts

   regarding cryptography not later than December 31, 2000.

     (d) Definitions.--For purposes of this section, the following

  definitions shall apply:

       (1) Communication.--The term ``communication'' includes wire

   communication and electronic communication.

       (2) Decrypt; decryption.--The terms ``decrypt'' and ``decryption''

   refer to the electronic retransformation of communications or

   electronically stored information that has been encrypted into the

   original form of the communication or information.

       (3) Electronic communication.--The term ``electronic communication''

   has the meaning given such term in section 2510 of title 18, United

   States Code.

       (4) Encrypt; encryption.--The terms ``encrypt'' and ``encryption''

   have the meanings given such terms in section 2801 of title 18, United

   States Code (as added by section 2 of this Act).

       (5) Encryption product.--The term ``encryption product'' means any

   product, software, or technology that can be used to encrypt and decrypt

   communications or electronic information and any product, software, or

   technology with encryption capabilities;

       (6) Wire communication.--The term ``wire communication'' has the

   meaning given such term in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934

   (47 U.S.C. 153).

          SEC. 5. EFFECT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.



     (a) Collection of Information by Attorney General.--The Attorney

  General shall compile, and maintain in classified form, data on the

  instances in which encryption (as defined in section 2801 of title 18,

  United States Code) has interfered with, impeded, or obstructed the

  ability of the Department of Justice to enforce the criminal laws of the

  United States.

     (b) Availability of Information to the Congress.--The information

  compiled under subsection (a), including an unclassified summary

  thereof, shall be made available, upon request, to any Member of

  Congress.



                                    PURPOSE AND SUMMARY



      The growth of electronic commerce, electronic transactions, and

   interstate and foreign communications depends ultimately upon the

   security and privacy of the information or data being transmitted.

   Encryption and the prolific use of encryption products are essential to

   facilitate this growth. Accordingly, the Committee on Commerce has an

   obligation and responsibility to ensure that the use of encryption

   technologies will have a positive impact on all electronic mediums,

   including the Internet, and all forms of existing and future electronic

   commerce. H.R. 695, the Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE)

   Act, is intended to modernize the encryption policy of the United

   States. It is also intended to address law enforcement's and national

   security's needs as strong encryption products become more widely used.

      In summary, H.R. 695, as amended by the Committee on Commerce,

   establishes a National Electronic Technologies Center (NET Center) to

   help Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies obtain access to

   encrypted communications. H.R. 695 also states that it is lawful to use

   encryption products within the United States and requires a study

   assessing the impact that a mandatory key recovery system would have on,

   inter alia, electronic commerce. In addition, H.R. 695 prohibits any

   person from relinquishing an encryption key and provides penalties for

   using encryption products to conceal incriminating evidence. With

   respect to export law, H.R. 695 relaxes U.S. export policies by

   permitting mass-market encryption products to be exported under a

   general license exception. It also permits other computer hardware and

   software products to be exported subject to approval by the Secretary of

   Commerce. Finally, H.R. 695 requires the Secretary of Commerce to study

   domestic and foreign impediments to trade with respect to encryption

   products and requires the President to undertake negotiations with other

   countries as necessary to reduce impediments to U.S. encryption exports,

   as well as requiring the Attorney General to compile information

   regarding instances when law enforcement's efforts have been stymied

   because of the use of strong encryption products.

                            BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION



      Encryption is the commonly-used term to describe the use of

   cryptography to ensure the confidentiality of messages. Encryption

   products may be computer software, computer hardware, or another piece

   of equipment that has the capability to encode or decode messages. These

   products could be used over any electronic medium (e.g., the public

   switched telephone network or the Internet). The strength of an

   encryption product, and thus the likelihood that a message will remain

   confidential as it travels through a network, is measured in terms of

   bits. For example, a two-bit code results in four possible combinations

   of messages (00, 01, 10, 11), whereas a 56-bit code results in

   quadrillions of possible combinations. While encrypting messages was

   historically the province of the military, the growing use of computers

   on both public and private networks has led to development of new

   products designed for non-military purposes.

      As commercially-available encryption products have increased in

   strength over the years, the law enforcement community, led by the

   Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and National Security Agency, has

   become increasingly concerned with the ability of criminals,

   international terrorists, and certain countries to gain access to

   encryption products. Consequently, the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton

   Administrations have prohibited the export of encryption products with

   strengths greater than 40-bit key length to limit the proliferation of

   advanced encryption products that would affect their ability to protect

   the public safety. In general, a ``key'' is a form of information that

   is used in a mathematical formula, code, or algorithm to decrypt wire

   communications, electronic communications, or electronically stored

   information that has been encrypted. The Federal Government has never

   limited the use of encryption products domestically.

      In 1996, the Administration eased the export restrictions and

   transferred control of export products from the Department of State to

   the Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce's new

   regulations, which embody the Administration's current encryption export

   policies, can be summarized as follows:

       There are no restrictions on the ability to buy, sell, manufacture,

   or distribute encryption products within the United States;



       Encryption items up to 56-bit key length strength without a ``key

   recovery system'' will be permitted for export and re-export after a

   one-time review, if the exporter makes satisfactory commitments to build

   and/or market a key recovery system. This relaxation of controls expires

   on December 31, 1998. A key recovery system permits a person to hold and

   maintain sufficient decryption information to allow for the immediate

   decryption of the encrypted data or communications of another person for

   whom that information is held;

       Weaker encryption products (40-bit key strength or less) or company

   proprietary software may be exported after a one-time review;

       Controlled encryption items (such as those items with strengths

   greater than 56-bit length) may be exported after a one-time review if

   the items contain key-recovery technology;

       Controlled encryption items used by banks and financial institutions

   are generally available for export regardless of whether key recovery is

   used; and

       In general, there is a prohibition on exporting encryption items to

   Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan.

      The Committee on Commerce has been actively following and involved in

   the encryption debate this Congress. For example, in March 1997,

   Chairman Bliley and Representative White wrote letters to government

   leaders and the business community asking a series of questions on the

   Administration's current policies and on pending legislation. The

   letters and responses highlighted the two fundamental issues regarding

   encryption debate: (1) should domestic companies be permitted to export

   encryption products of any strength, thus increasing the availability of

   such products in the global market; and (2) should the United States

   impose any domestic restrictions on the use of encryption products to

   assist law enforcement's access to encrypted communications. In general,

   sound encryption policy must balance privacy interests with society's

   interest to protect the public. To the greatest extent possible, it must

   also be based on free-market principles.

      Regarding the arguments in the debate, the business community argues

   that current U.S. encryption policy harms domestic businesses abroad

   because they are forced to export weak encryption products that compete

   with stronger foreign encryption products. Many representatives of the

   business community also argue that the security of a strong encryption

   product is jeopardized if it contains a key-recoverable feature. In

   addition, the business community generally argues that the current

   policy may impose excessive costs on the industry to the extent they may

   be forced to develop costly, new key recovery products; manufacture two

   different products (one for the U.S. (strong) and one for abroad

   (weaker)); and/or be subject to a burdensome licensing process. Instead,

   they maintain that a key-recovery system should be developed only if

   there is market demand for such products.

      Alternatively, government officials, which include Federal, State,

   and local law enforcement officials, argue that permitting the export of

   stronger encryption products without a clear mechanism to decrypt a

   communication or stored information, when necessary and lawful, will

   jeopardize public safety and national security. They believe that

   key-recovery systems must be developed, not only to facilitate lawful

   searches and seizures, but to help users or employers in the event they

   lose the ``key'' to decrypt a message. They also argue that widespread

   use of strong encryption without key recovery would end the use of

   wiretapping as a tool for fighting crime and that lifting the export

   restrictions will undermine the Administration's effort to develop a

   global key-management infrastructure. In addition, they counter that

   most foreign countries view lifting the export restrictions as America's

   attempt to dominate world markets at the expense of other nation's

   national security, thereby forcing these countries to adopt import

   restrictions to keep American products out of their countries.

      The existing encryption policy is premised upon the belief that

   minimizing the proliferation of U.S. manufactured encryption products

   worldwide will minimize the use of encryption products overall. Thus,

   current U.S. encryption policy is based upon the theory of containment

   rather than access. The Committee is not convinced that reliance on

   export restrictions provides adequate assistance to law enforcement in

   their ever increasing need to keep up with the latest technologies. In

   fact, the Committee finds that the current export rules place our

   domestic manufacturers of encryption products at a competitive

   disadvantage with our foreign counterparts without addressing the needs

   of law enforcement. Thus, at a minimum, current export law is not

   sustainable and potentially harmful to our domestic manufacturers.

      At the same time, the needs of law enforcement are not being met by

   changes in technology. The Fourth Amendment and Title III of the Omnibus

   Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 permit law enforcement

   agencies to search, seize, and intercept electronic communications and

   stored data. With the development of strong encryption technologies,

   however, law enforcement's efforts are being thwarted because even

   though they can search, seize, or intercept the information, they cannot

   understand it because it is encoded. Without the necessary tools, law

   enforcement does not have the ability to prevent and solve crimes.

      Consequently, legislation is needed to address the needs of law

   enforcement to access encrypted communications and to ease existing

   export restrictions that hamper domestic manufacturers of encryption

   products.

      As reported by the Committee on Commerce, H.R. 695 takes a

   significant step towards addressing the concerns of law enforcement. The

   legislation creates a ``National Electronic Technologies Center'' (NET

   Center) that will assemble experts on encryption technology to develop

   and advise law enforcement officials on how to access encrypted

   electronic communications or information. The NET Center also will look

   to the future and assist law enforcement with decryption techniques as

   new technologies are introduced. The Committee



                    concludes that a partnership between the industry and law

          enforcement is the best way to help law enforcement protect public

          safety.

      The bill, as reported by the Committee, also addresses the needs of

   domestic manufacturers of encryption products by granting export relief

   for certain encryption products. This change in export policy should

   place the U.S. computer industry in a position where domestic companies

   can compete on a level playing field with their competitors in a global

   market. Moreover, H.R. 695 seeks to push for further relief for our

   manufacturers by directing the Department of Commerce to reduce foreign

   impediments to trade. The Committee has an obligation, through its

   jurisdiction over export promotion, to ensure that U.S. companies are

   not harmed in any way by unnecessary or unjust trade barriers.

      Overall, the Committee finds that H.R. 695, as reported, strikes the

   appropriate balance between the needs of law enforcement and those of

   industry.

                                          HEARINGS



      The Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer

   Protection held a hearing on H.R. 695, the Security and Freedom Through

   Encryption (SAFE) Act, on September 4, 1997. The Subcommittee received

   testimony from the following witnesses: The Honorable Bob Goodlatte,

   U.S. Representative, Sixth District, Commonwealth of Virginia; The

   Honorable Zoe Lofgren, U.S. Representative, Sixteenth District, State of

   California; The Honorable William A. Reinsch, Under Secretary of

   Commerce for Export Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce; The

   Honorable Robert S. Litt, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

   Division, U.S. Department of Justice; Mr. Stephen T. Walker, President

   and CEO, Trusted Information Systems, Inc.; Mr. Tom Parenty, Director,

   Data/Communications Security, Sybase, Inc.; Mr. Jerry Berman, Executive

   Director, Center for Democracy and Technology; and Mr. George A.

   Keyworth, Chairman, Progress and Freedom Foundation. Prior to hearing

   from the witnesses, The Honorable William P. Crowell, Deputy Director of

   the National Security Agency, provided an overview on encryption and

   described some of the common terms used in the encryption debate.

                                  COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION



      On September 24, 1997, the Committee on Commerce met in an open

   markup session to consider H.R. 695, the Security and Freedom Through

   Encryption (SAFE) Act. A unanimous consent request by Mr. Bliley to

   discharge the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer

   Protection from further consideration and proceed to the immediate

   consideration of H.R. 695, as reported to the House by the Committee on

   the Judiciary, was agreed to without objection. The Committee ordered

   H.R. 695 reported to the House, amended, by a rollcall vote of 44 yeas

   to 6 nays.

                                       ROLLCALL VOTES



      Clause 2(l)(2)(B) of rule XI of the Rules of the House requires the

   Committee to list the recorded votes on the motion to report legislation

   and amendments thereto. The following are the recorded votes on the

   motion to report H.R. 695 and on amendments offered to the measure,

   including the names of those Members voting for and against.



   Offset Folios 14 to 16 insert here





            COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE--105TH CONGRESS VOICE VOTES



   Bill: H.R. 695, Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act



      Amendment: Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute by Mr. Tauzin. (A

   unanimous consent request by Mr. Tauzin to have the Amendment in the

   Nature of a Substitute considered as base text for purposes of further

   amendment was agreed to without objection.)

   Disposition: Agreed to, amended, by a voice vote.



      Amendment: Amendment to the Tauzin Amendment in the Nature of a

   Substitute by Mr. Tauzin re: add a new section to direct the Secretary

   of Commerce to reduce interstate and foreign impediments to trade of

   encryption products and services.

   Disposition: Agreed to, by a voice vote.





                                COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS



      Pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(a) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of

   Representatives, the Committee held a legislative hearing and made

   findings that are reflected in this report.

                        COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT



      Pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of

   Representatives, no oversight findings have been submitted to the

   Committee by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

                         NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES



      In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(B) of rule XI of the Rules of the

   House of Representatives, the Committee finds that H.R. 695, the

   Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act, would result in no

   new or increased budget authority or tax expenditures or revenues.

                                  COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE



      The Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the

   Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 403 of

   the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.

                            CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE



      Pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of

   Representatives, the following is the cost estimate provided by the

   Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 403 of the Congressional

   Budget Act of 1974:



       U.S. Congress,



       Congressional Budget Office,



       Washington, DC, September 29, 1997.







          Hon.  Tom Bliley,              Chairman, Committee on Commerce,



       House of Representatives, Washington, DC.



       Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the

   enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 695, the Security and Freedom Through

   Encryption (SAFE) Act.

      If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to

   provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Rachel Forward and Mark

   Grabowicz (for Federal costs), Alyssa Trzeszkowski (for revenues), and

   Pepper Santalucia (for the impact on State, local, and tribal

   governments.

   Sincerely,



         June E. O'Neill,  Director.



   Enclosure.





           H.R. 695--Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act


      Summary: H.R. 695 would allow individuals in the United States to use

   and sell any form of encryption and would prohibit states or the Federal

   Government from requiring individuals to relinquish the key to

   encryption products. The bill also would prevent the Bureau of Export

   Administration (BXA) in the Department of Commerce (DOC) from

   restricting the export of most nonmilitary encryption products. H.R. 695

   would establish a National Electronic Technologies (NET) Center in the

   Department of Justice (DOJ) to provide assistance and information on

   encryption products to law enforcement officials and would require the

   Attorney General to maintain data on the instances in which encryption

   impedes or obstructs the ability of DOJ to enforce criminal laws.

   Finally, the bill would establish criminal penalties and fines for the

   use of encryption technologies to conceal incriminating information

   related to a felony.

      Assuming the appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO estimates

   that enacting this bill would result in additional discretionary

   spending by DOC and DOJ of at least $28 million over the 1998 2002

   period. Spending by DOC and DOJ for activities required by H.R. 695

   would total at least $33 million over the next five years. By

   comparison, CBO estimates that--under current policies--spending by BXA

   for reviewing the export of nonmilitary encryption products would total

   about $4.5 million over the same period. (Spending related to encryption

   exports by DOJ is negligible under current law.)

      Enacting H.R. 695 also would affect direct spending and receipts.

   Therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply. CBO estimates, however,

   that the amounts of additional direct spending or receipts would not be

   significant.

      H.R. 695 contains no private-section mandates as defined in the

   Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA). The bill contains

   intergovernmental mandates on state governments. CBO estimates, however,

   that states would not incur any costs to comply with the mandates.

      Estimated cost to the Federal Government: Spending Subject to

   Appropriation--Under current policy, BXA would likely spend about

   $900,000 a year reviewing exports of encryption products. Assuming

   appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO estimates that enacting H.R.

   695 would lower BXA's encryption-related costs to about $500,000 a year.

   In November 1996, the Administration issued an executive order and

   memorandum that authorized BXA to control the export of all nonmilitary

   encryption products. If H.R. 695 were enacted, BXA would still be

   required to review requests to export most computer hardware with

   encryption capabilities but would not be required to review most

   requests to export computer software with encryption capabilities. Thus,

   enacting H.R. 695 would reduce the costs to BXA to control the exports

   of nonmilitary encryption products.

      H.R. 695 would require the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a number

   of studies on electronic commerce and domestic and foreign impediments

   to trade in encryption products. Based on information from the

   Department of Commerce, CBO estimates that completing the required

   studies would cost about $1 million in fiscal year 1998, assuming

   appropriation of the necessary amount.

      H.R. 695 would establish within DOJ the NET Center, which generally

   would assist Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies with

   issues involving encryption and information security. The bill would

   assign the NET Center a broad range of duties, including providing

   information and assistance, serving as an information clearinghouse, and

   conducting research. The costs to establish and operate the NET Center

   could depend on the extent to which service would be provided to the law

   enforcement community nationwide. Based on information from DOJ, we

   estimate that the minimum costs to fulfill the bill's requirements would

   be roughly $5 million annually, but the costs could be much greater. Any

   spending relating to the NET Center would be subject to the availability

   of appropriations.

      DOJ would also be required to collect and maintain data on the

   instances in which encryption impedes or obstructs the ability of the

   agency to enforce criminal laws. CBO projects that collecting and

   maintaining the data would cost DOJ between $500,000 and $1 million a

   year, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.

      Direct Spending and Revenues--Enacting H.R. 695 would affect direct

   spending and receipts by imposing criminal fines for encrypting

   incriminating information related to a felony. CBO estimates that

   collections



                    from such fines are likely to be negligible, however, because

          the federal government would probably not pursue many cases under the

          bill. Any such collections would be recorded in the budget as

          governmental receipts, or revenues. They would be deposited in the Crime

          Victims Fund and spent the following year. Because the increase in

          direct spending would be the same as the amount of fines collected with

          a one-year lag, the additional direct spending also would be negligible.

      Direct spending and revenues also could result from the provision

   that would allow the NET Center to accept donations to further the work

   of the office. CBO expects that any contributions (recorded in the

   budget as revenues) would be used in the same year as they were

   received. Therefore, we estimate that the net budgetary impact of the

   gift authority granted to the NET Center would be negligible for all

   years.

      The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 370

   (commerce and housing credit) and 750 (administration of justice).

      Pay-as-you-go-considerations: Section 252 of the Balanced Budget and

   Emergency Control Act of 1985 sets up pay-as-you-go procedures for

   legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. H.R. 695 would affect

   direct spending and receipts by imposing criminal fines and by allowing

   the new NET Center to accept donations. CBO estimates that the amounts

   of additional direct spending and receipts would not be significant.

      Estimated Impact on State, local, and tribal Governments: H.R. 695

   would prohibit states from requiring anyone in lawful possession of an

   encryption key to make that key available to another person or entity.

   The bill would also prohibit states from conditioning the issuance of

   certificates of authenticity or certificates of authority for encryption

   products on the sharing of encryption keys Finally, the bill would

   prohibit states from establishing licensing, labeling, or other

   regulatory schemes for encryption products that would require the

   sharing of encryption keys. These prohibitions would be

   intergovernmental mandates as defined in UMRA. However, states would

   bear no costs as a result of these mandates, because none currently have

   laws that would violate these provisions of the bill.

      H.R. 695 would also establish a center in the Justice Department that

   would provide information and assistance regarding decryption techniques

   to federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities.

      Estimated impact on the private sector: The bill would impose no new

   private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA.

      Previous CBO estimates: CBO provided cost estimates for H.R. 695 as

   ordered reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary on May 14,

   1997, by the House Committee on International Relations on July 22,

   1997, by the House Committee on National Security on September 9, 1997,

   and by the House Committee on Intelligence on September 11, 1997.

   Assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO estimates that

   costs over the 1998 2002 period would total between $5 million and $7

   million for the Judiciary Committee's version, about $2.2 million for

   the International Relations Committee's version, about $4.5 million for

   the National Security Committee's version, and between $9 million and

   $11.6 million for the Intelligence Committee's version. In comparison,

   CBO estimates that enacting this version of the bill would cost at least

   $33 million over the 1998 2002 period and that spending under current

   policies would total $44.5 million over the same period.

      Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Rachel Forward and Mark

   Grabowicz; Revenues: Alyssa Trzeszkowski; Impact on State, local, and

   tribal governments: Pepper Santalucia.

      Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant Director

   for Budget Analysis.



                                 FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT



      The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal mandates

   prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to

   section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.

                                ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT



      H.R. 695 creates an Advisory Board of the Strategic NET Center for

   Excellence in Information Security, which is intended to advise the

   Federal Government on new technologies relating to encryption.

                             CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT



      Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of

   Representatives, the Committee finds that the Constitutional authority

   for this legislation is provided in Article I, section 8, clause 3,

   which grants Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign

   nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.

                            APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH



      The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms

   and conditions of employment or access to public services or

   accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the

   Congressional Accountability Act.

                       SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION



                          SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE



      Section 1 provides that H.R. 695 may be cited as the ``Security and

   Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act.''

                  SECTION 2. SALE AND USE OF ENCRYPTION



      Subsection 2(a) of H.R. 695 creates a new chapter 125 in title 18 of

   the United States Code. This chapter 125 would include new sections 2801

   012.

           Section 2801. Definitions



      New section 2801 provides for definitions of terms to be used in the

   chapter. Many of the definitions used are explicitly taken from the

   definitions in the existing Federal wiretap statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510

   et seq. Several new definitions are added, however, including

   ``encrypt'' and ``encryption,'' which generally refer to the encoding of

   a communication using mathematical formulas in order to preserve the

   confidentiality of such communication.

           Section 2802. Assistance for law enforcement



      New section 2802 contains several subsections regarding domestic

   encryption issues. Subsection 2802(a) establishes within the Department

   of Justice a National Electronic Technologies Center (referred to as the

   ``NET Center''). The primary purpose of the NET Center is to provide

   technical assistance to law enforcement agencies so that they may cope

   with new technology challenges. Specifically, the NET Center will be

   responsible for serving as a national center for Federal, State, and

   local law enforcement authorities for information and assistance

   regarding decryption. It will also serve as a national center where

   industry and government can gather to exchange information regarding

   data security. In addition, the NET Center will be required to: (1)

   examine encryption techniques and methods to facilitate the ability of

   law enforcement to gain access to plaintext of communications and

   electronic information; (2) conduct research to improve law

   enforcement's means of access to encrypted communications; (3) determine

   whether other techniques can be used to help law enforcement access

   communications and electronic information; and (4) obtain information

   regarding the most current computer hardware, computer software, and

   telecommunications equipment to understand how best to access

   communications.

      Administratively, the Attorney General will appoint the Director of

   the NET Center and the Director will be responsible for hiring personnel

   that he or she determines is necessary to carry out the duties of the

   NET Center. Other Federal Government agencies may also ``loan''

   personnel to the NET Center or provide facilities, information, and

   other non-personnel resources. In addition, the NET Center may accept

   donations in the form of money, services, or property from the private

   sector to help it function. Such donations shall be deposited in the

   Treasury and shall be available for disbursement upon order of the

   Director.

      Within two months after the date of enactment of this Act, the

   Attorney General will be required to develop a plan for the

   establishment of the NET Center. The plan must be published in the

   Federal Register and must identify: the physical location of the NET

   Center; equipment, software, and personnel necessary for the NET Center

   to function; the amount of funding necessary to establish and operate

   the NET Center; and sources of probable funding for the NET Center.

      In addition, subsection 2802(a) creates an Advisory Board of the

   Strategic NET Center for Excellence in Information Security, which is

   intended to advise the government on new technologies relating to

   encryption. The Attorney General is required to appoint a chairman of

   the Advisory Board and members of the Advisory Board must have technical

   expertise in the field of encryption, decryption, electronic

   communication, information security, electronic commerce, or law

   enforcement. More specifically, the purpose of the Advisory Board is to

   advise the NET Center and the Federal Government regarding new and

   emerging technologies relating to encryption and decryption of

   communications and electronic information.



      Subsection 2802(b) clarifies that it is lawful for any person in the

   United States to use any encryption product, regardless of the

   encryption algorithm selected, key length chosen, implementation

   technique used, or medium used. This subsection also prohibits the

   adoption of Federal or State law or regulation that would condition the

   issuance of certificates of authentication for any encryption product

   upon any escrowing or other sharing of private encryption keys, whether

   the escrowing is done with private agents or government entities.

   Domestic laws or regulations also could not establish a licensing,

   labeling, or other regulatory scheme for any encryption product that

   requires key escrow as a condition of licensing or regulatory approval.

           Section 2803. Freedom to sell encryption



      New section 2803 states that it is legal for any person in the United

   States to sell in interstate commerce encryption products using any form

   of encryption regardless of the algorithm, key length, or technique

   used. The Committee intends that sections 2802 and 2803 should be read

   as limitations on government power. They should not be read as

   overriding otherwise lawful employer policies concerning employee use of

   the employer's computer system, nor as limiting the employer's otherwise

   lawful means for remedying violations of those policies.

           Section 2804. Prohibition on mandatory key escrow



      New section 2804 states that no person in lawful possession of a key

   used to encrypt or decrypt a communication or information can be

   required by Federal or State law to relinquish control of that key to

   another person. This section is meant to be consistent with subsection

   2802(b) regarding limitations on the escrowing of keys. An exception is

   provided, however, for law enforcement. That is, a law enforcement

   officer or any member of the intelligence community acting pursuant to

   lawful authority may require a party to release a key in order to gain

   access to encrypted communications or information.

                      Section 2805. Unlawful use of encryption in furtherance of a

           criminal act

      New section 2805 makes it a crime to encrypt incriminating

   communications with the intent to conceal information in order to avoid

   detection by law enforcement agencies or prosecution. A person found

   guilty of this offense may be fined, imprisoned for not more than 10

   years, or both. Second and subsequent offenses may result in a fine,

   imprisonment of not more than 20 years, or both.

           Section 2806. Liability limitations



      New section 2806 protects persons from being subject to criminal or

   civil liability if they provide access to the plaintext of an encrypted

   communications or electronic information for the benefit of any law

   enforcement official or authorized government entity, so long as these

   entities operate through the appropriate judicial process.



      Subsection 2(b) requires the National Telecommunications and

   Information Administration of the Department of Commerce to conduct a

   study and prepare and submit an encryption report to the Congress and

   the President. The report must determine what effect a mandatory key

   recovery system would have on electronic commerce, data security,

   privacy, and law enforcement activities. The report must also assess

   other possible methods for providing access to encrypted communications

   and information to further law enforcement activities.

      Subsection 2(c) of H.R. 695 provides for a conforming amendment to

   the table of chapters in title 18, United States Code.

                     SECTION 3. EXPORTS OF ENCRYPTION



      Subsection 3(a) of H.R. 695 amends the Export Administration Act of

   1979 by creating a new subsection (g) to 50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 2416. New

   subsection (g)(1) would place all encryption products, except those

   specifically designed or modified for military use, under the exclusive

   jurisdiction of the Secretary of Commerce (the Secretary).

      New subsection (g)(2) allows encryption products, such as encryption

   software and computing devices that include encryption software, that

   are generally available or in the public domain, such as mass-market

   products, to be exported pursuant to a general license exception. New

   subsections (g)(3) and (g)(4) permit the export of encryption products

   that are not generally considered mass-market products and consequently,

   require a license for export. The Secretary retains the authority to

   disapprove a license request for the export of software if there is

   substantial evidence that it will be put to military or terrorist uses

   or that it will be re-exported without U.S. authorization. New

   subsection (g)(5) provides definitions.

      Subsection 3(b) of H.R. 695 provides that for purposes of carrying

   out the amendment made by subsection 3(a), the Export Administration Act

   shall be deemed to be in effect. This statement is necessary because

   Congress allowed the Export Administration Act to lapse in 1994. To

   date, it has not been renewed, and its policies have been continued by

   Executive Order.

  SECTION 4. TREATMENT OF ENCRYPTION IN INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE



      Section 4 requires the Secretary of Commerce to undertake certain

   activities in order to promote the export of U.S. encryption products in

   the global market. Through such instruction to the Secretary of

   Commerce, the Committee on Commerce intends to promote robust

   participation by U.S. firms in the development of global electronic

   commerce.

      Subsection 4(a) requires the Secretary to complete an inquiry within

   180 days of the enactment of this Act to identity both domestic and

   foreign impediments to trade in encryption products and services. Such

   an inquiry would include the identification of import restrictions

   maintained by other countries that constitute unfair barriers. The

   inquiry would also include an examination of U.S. regulations, such as

   export restrictions, that may actually impede trade in encryption

   products and services.

      Subsection 4(b) requires the Secretary to adopt regulations within

   one year of the Act's enactment that are intended to reduce foreign and

   domestic impediments to encryption products and services. The

   regulations must be designed to promote the sale in foreign markets of

   U.S. encryption products and services, including through strengthening

   the competitiveness of U.S. providers of such products and services.

      Subsection 4(c)(1) requires that upon completion of the six-month

   inquiry into foreign and domestic impediments to trade in encryption

   products and services, the Secretary shall submit a report to the

   President on his or her findings. The report must include a

   determination by the Secretary on what impediments may require

   international negotiation to reduce.

      Subsection 4(c)(2) requires the President to negotiate with other

   countries for agreements designed to promote encryption products and

   services and to achieve mutual recognition of export controls. Export

   controls may be designed to preserve countries' national security,

   safeguard privacy interests, and prevent commercial espionage. Mutual

   recognition of export controls will promote the sale in foreign commerce

   of U.S. encryption products and services by facilitating a common

   approach by the U.S. and our trading partners. Subsection 4(c)(2) also

   enables the President to consider a country's refusal to negotiate such

   agreements when considering U.S. participation in an assistance or

   cooperation program with that country. Finally, the subsection requires

   the President to submit a report to the Congress regarding the status of

   his efforts on encryption not later than December 31, 2000.

   Subsection 4(d) provides definitions.



             SECTION 5. EFFECT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES



      Subsection 5(a) requires the Attorney General to compile information

   on instances in which encryption has interfered with, impeded, or

   obstructed the ability of the Department of Justice to enforce Federal

   criminal law and to maintain that information in classified form.

   Subsection 5(b) requires that the Attorney General shall make the

   information compiled under subsection 5(a), including an unclassified

   summary, available to Members of Congress upon request.



                   CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED



     In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of

  Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported,

  are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italics and existing law

  in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

                                TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE



         * * * * * * *



          PART I--CRIMES





 Chap.



 Sec.



         1.   General provisions



        1



         2.   Aircraft and motor vehicles



        31



         * * * * * * *





         125.  Encrypted wire and electronic information



        2801





         * * * * * * *



                   CHAPTER 125--ENCRYPTED WIRE AND ELECTRONIC INFORMATION





      2801. Definitions.



      2802. Assistance for law enforcement.



      2803. Freedom to sell encryption.



      2804. Prohibition on mandatory key escrow.



      2805. Unlawful use of encryption in furtherance of a criminal act.



      2806. Liability limitations.





          2801. Definitions



   As used in this chapter--



       (1) the terms ``person'', ``State'', ``wire communication'',

   ``electronic communication'', and ``investigative or law enforcement

   officer'' have the meanings given those terms in section 2510 of this

   title;

       (2) the terms ``encrypt'' and ``encryption'' refer to the scrambling

   of wire communications, electronic communications, or electronically

   stored information, using mathematical formulas or algorithms in order

   to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of, and

   prevent unauthorized recipients from accessing or altering, such

   communications or information;

       (3) the term ``key'' means the variable information used in a

   mathematical formula, code, or algorithm, or any component thereof, used

   to decrypt wire communications, electronic communications, or

   electronically stored information, that has been encrypted; and

    (4) the term ``United States person'' means--



    (A) any United States citizen;



    (B) any other person organized under the laws of any State; and





       (C) any person organized under the laws of any foreign country who

   is owned or controlled by individuals or persons described in

   subparagraphs (A) and (B).

          2802. Assistance for law enforcement



   (a)  National Electronic Technologies Center.--



       (1) Establishment.--There is established in the Department of

   Justice a National Electronic Technologies Center (in this subsection

   referred to as the ``NET Center'').

       (2) Director.--The NET Center shall have a Director, who shall be

   appointed by the Attorney General.

    (3)  Duties.--The duties of the NET Center shall be--



       (A) to serve as a center for Federal, State, and local law

   enforcement authorities for information and assistance regarding

   decryption and other access requirements;

       (B) to serve as a center for industry and government entities to

   exchange information and methodology regarding information security

   techniques and technologies;

       (C) to examine encryption techniques and methods to facilitate the

   ability of law enforcement to gain efficient access to plaintext of

   communications and electronic information;

       (D) to conduct research to develop efficient methods, and improve

   the efficiency of existing methods, of accessing plaintext of

   communications and electronic information;

       (E) to investigate and research new and emerging techniques and

   technologies to facilitate access to communications and electronic

   information, including--

    (i) reverse-steganography;



       (ii) decompression of information that previously has been

   compressed for transmission; and

    (iii) de-multiplexing; and



       (F) to obtain information regarding the most current hardware,

   software, telecommunications, and other capabilities to understand how

   to access information transmitted across networks.

       (4) Equal access.--State and local law enforcement agencies and

   authorities shall have access to information, services, resources, and

   assistance provided by the NET Center to the same extent that Federal

   law enforcement agencies and authorities have such access.

       (5) Personnel.--The Director may appoint such personnel as the

   Director considers appropriate to carry out the duties of the NET

   Center.

       (6) Assistance of other federal agencies.--Upon the request of the

   Director of the NET Center, the head of any department or agency of the

   Federal Government may, to assist the NET Center in carrying out its

   duties under this subsection--

       (A) detail, on a reimbursable basis, any of the personnel of such

   department or agency to the NET Center; and

       (B) provide to the NET Center facilities, information, and other

   non-personnel resources.

       (7) Private industry assistance.--The NET Center may accept, use,

   and dispose of gifts, bequests, or devises of money, services, or

   property, both real and personal, for the purpose of aiding or

   facilitating the work of the Center. Gifts, bequests, or devises of

   money and proceeds from sales of other property received as gifts,

   bequests, or devises shall be deposited in the Treasury and shall be

   available for disbursement upon order of the Director of the NET Center.

    (8)  Advisory board.--



       (A) Establishment.--There is established the Advisory Board of the

   Strategic NET Center for Excellence in Information Security (in this

   paragraph referred to as the ``Advisory Board''), which shall be

   comprised of members who have the qualifications described in

   subparagraph (B) and who are appointed by the Attorney General. The

   Attorney General shall appoint a chairman of the Advisory Board.

       (B) Qualifications.--Each member of the Advisory Board shall have

   experience or expertise in the field of encryption, decryption,

   electronic communication, information security, electronic commerce, or

   law enforcement.

       (C) Duties.--The duty of the Advisory Board shall be to advise the

   NET Center and the Federal Government regarding new and emerging

   technologies relating to encryption and decryption of communications and

   electronic information.

       (9) Implementation plan.--Within 2 months after the date of the

   enactment of the Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act, the

   Attorney General shall, in consultation and cooperation with other

   appropriate Federal agencies and appropriate industry participants,

   develop and cause to be published in the Federal Register a plan for

   establishing the NET Center. The plan shall--

       (A) specify the physical location of the NET Center and the

   equipment, software, and personnel resources necessary to carry out the

   duties of the NET Center under this subsection;

       (B) assess the amount of funding necessary to establish and operate

   the NET Center; and

       (C) identify sources of probable funding for the NET Center,

   including any sources of in-kind contributions from private industry.

     (b) Freedom of Use.--Subject to section 2805, it shall be lawful for

  any person within any State, and for any United States person in a

  foreign country, to use any encryption, regardless of the encryption

  algorithm selected, encryption key length chosen, or implementation

  technique or medium used. No Federal or State law or regulation may

  condition the issuance of certificates of authentication or certificates

  of authority for any encryption product upon any escrowing or other

  sharing of private encryption keys, whether with private agents or

  government entities, or establish a licensing, labeling, or other

  regulatory scheme for any encryption product that requires key escrow as

  a condition of licensing or regulatory approval.



          2803. Freedom to sell encryption



     Subject to section 2805, it shall be lawful for any person within any

  State to sell in interstate commerce any encryption, regardless of the

  encryption algorithm selected, encryption key length chosen, or

  implementation technique or medium used.

          2804. Prohibition on mandatory key escrow



     (a) Prohibition.--No person in lawful possession of a key to

  encrypted communications or information may be required by Federal or

  State law to relinquish to another person control of that key.

     (b) Exception for Access for Law Enforcement Purposes.--Subsection

  (a) shall not affect the authority of any investigative or law

  enforcement officer, or any member of the intelligence community as

  defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.

  401a), acting under any law in effect on the effective date of this

  chapter, to gain access to encrypted communications or information.

          2805. Unlawful use of encryption in furtherance of a criminal act



     Any person who, in the commission of a felony under a criminal

  statute of the United States, knowingly and willfully encrypts

  incriminating communications or information relating to that felony with

  the intent to conceal such communications or information for the purpose

  of avoiding detection by law enforcement agencies or prosecution--

       (1) in the case of a first offense under this section, shall be

   imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or fined in the amount set forth

   in this title, or both; and

       (2) in the case of a second or subsequent offense under this

   section, shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or fined in the

   amount set forth in this title, or both.

          2806. Liability limitations



     No person shall be subject to civil or criminal liability for

  providing access to the plaintext of encrypted communications or

  electronic information to any law enforcement official or authorized

  government entity, pursuant to judicial process.



         * * * * * * *







                     SECTION 17 OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979



                                    EFFECT ON OTHER ACTS



    Sec.  17. (a) * * *



         * * * * * * *





   (g)  Computers and Related Equipment.--



       (1) General rule.--Subject to paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), the

   Secretary shall have exclusive authority to control exports of all

   computer hardware, software, and technology for information security

   (including encryption), except that which is specifically designed or

   modified for military use, including command, control, and intelligence

   applications.

       (2) Items not requiring licenses.--No validated license may be

   required, except pursuant to the Trading With The Enemy Act or the

   International Emergency Economic Powers Act (but only to the extent that

   the authority of such Act is not exercised to extend controls imposed

   under this Act), for the export or reexport of--

    (A) any software, including software with encryption capabilities--



       (i) that is generally available, as is, and is designed for

   installation by the purchaser; or

       (ii) that is in the public domain for which copyright or other

   protection is not available under title 17, United States Code, or that

   is available to the public because it is generally accessible to the

   interested public in any form; or

       (B) any computing device solely because it incorporates or employs

   in any form software (including software with encryption capabilities)

   exempted from any requirement for a validated license under subparagraph

   (A).

       (3) Software with encryption capabilities.--The Secretary shall

   authorize the export or reexport of software with encryption

   capabilities for nonmilitary end uses in any country to which exports of

   software of similar capability are permitted for use by financial

   institutions not controlled in fact by United States persons, unless

   there is substantial evidence that such software will be--

       (A) diverted to a military end use or an end use supporting

   international terrorism;

    (B) modified for military or terrorist end use; or



       (C) reexported without any authorization by the United States that

   may be required under this Act.

       (4) Hardware with encryption capabilities.--The Secretary shall

   authorize the export or reexport of computer hardware with encryption

   capabilities if the Secretary determines that a product offering

   comparable security is commercially available outside the United States

   from a foreign supplier, without effective restrictions.

    (5)  Definitions.--As used in this subsection--



       (A) the term ``encryption'' means the scrambling of wire or

   electronic information using mathematical formulas or algorithms in

   order to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of,

   and prevent unauthorized recipients from accessing or altering, such

   information;

       (B) the term ``generally available'' means, in the case of software

   (including software with encryption capabilities), software that is

   offered for sale, license, or transfer to any person without

   restriction, whether or not for consideration, including, but not

   limited to, over-the-counter retail sales, mail order transactions,

   phone order transactions, electronic distribution, or sale on approval;

       (C) the term ``as is'' means, in the case of software (including

   software with encryption capabilities), a software program that is not

   designed, developed, or tailored by the software publisher for specific

   purchasers, except that such purchasers may supply certain installation

   parameters needed by the software program to function properly with the

   purchaser's system and may customize the software program by choosing

   among options contained in the software program;

       (D) the term ``is designed for installation by the purchaser''

   means, in the case of software (including software with encryption

   capabilities) that--

       (i) the software publisher intends for the purchaser (including any

   licensee or transferee), who may not be the actual program user, to

   install the software program on a computing device and has supplied the

   necessary instructions to do so, except that the publisher may also

   provide telephone help line services for software installation,

   electronic transmission, or basic operations; and

       (ii) the software program is designed for installation by the

   purchaser without further substantial support by the supplier;

       (E) the term ``computing device'' means a device which incorporates

   one or more microprocessor-based central processing units that can

   accept, store, process, or provide output of data; and

       (F) the term ``computer hardware'', when used in conjunction with

   information security, includes, but is not limited to, computer systems,

   equipment, application-specific assemblies, modules, and integrated

   circuits.



                                      DISSENTING VIEWS



      While we are supportive of the stated goals of H.R. 695, particularly

   with respect to the promotion of U.S. technology exports, we have

   serious reservations about the bill as reported. It is our view that the

   provisions ultimately agreed to by the Committee with regard to the

   technological requirements of law enforcement and national security

   agencies are thoroughly inadequate to the missions at hand.

      We do not question the importance of encryption technology for

   purposes of protecting electronic commerce, consumer privacy, and

   proprietary information, nor do we doubt the value of enhancing U.S.

   access to foreign markets for these products and services. We have great

   confidence in the ability of American firms to develop the most

   impenetrable encryption products in the world and market them globally.

      Indeed, it is our very faith in the technological prowess of U.S.

   companies which leads us to conclude that authentic law enforcement and

   national security safeguards must be included in this legislation. It

   must be recognized that the proliferation of advanced encryption

   technology poses a dire threat to U.S. anti-crime, anti-terrorism, and

   counter-espionage efforts. To fail to address this reality is to fail in

   or solemn responsibility to protect the lives and safety of the citizens

   of this country.

      Powerful encryption, in criminal hands or in the hands of enemies of

   the United States, can be turned to ill purposes with devastating

   consequences for members of a free society. An outlaw organization with

   the ability to communicate and store data without fear of detection is a

   significantly more dangerous entity. Organized crime syndicates, drug

   cartels, pedophile rings and terrorist organizations have already begun

   to utilize encryption technology to conceal their activities from

   investigatory agencies.

      It is our opinion that an updated U.S. encryption policy must allow

   for law enforcement and security agency access to the unscrambled text

   of encrypted communications and data, pursuant to legal authorization.

   We wish to clarify that we do not seek any additional authority for

   government agencies. We merely seek to ensure that police departments

   and security agencies will continue to have intelligible access to

   evidence to which they are legally entitled.

      In the context of H.R. 695, this means that encryption products and

   services must be made recoverable. There is no other way to ensure

   timely access to encrypted evidence. Timely recovery is crucial in the

   investigation and prevention of crime and acts of terror; the bill as

   reported will not achieve this. Claims to the contrary, unfortunately,

   are false.

      Included with these views are letters submitted by organizations and

   individuals whose sentiments on these matters comport with our own.



    Thomas J. Manton.



    J. Dennis Hastert.



    Michael G. Oxley.



    Greg Ganske.









       U.S. Department of Justice,



       Federal Bureau of Investigation,



       Washington, DC, September 24, 1997.







          Hon.  Thomas J. Bliley,  Jr.                Chairman, Committee on Commerce,



       Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC.



       Dear Mr. Chairman: We are writing you today on behalf of the entire

   law enforcement community to continue to urge you and the Members of the

   House Commerce Committee to support the Oxley/Manton Amendment to H.R.

   695 during your Committee's mark-up of the bill today.

      In addition, we are aware that Congressmen Markey and White plan to

   offer an alternative amendment to the Oxley/Manton Amendment during the

   mark-up that has been represented to meet law enforcement's decryption

   needs by creating a ``National Electronic Technologies Center'' to

   foster the ``exchange of information and expertise'' between government

   and industry. Let us assure you that the adoption of the Markey/White

   Amendment in lieu of the Oxley/Manton Amendment will not address the law

   enforcement and public safety issues we have raised and would serve to

   provide an illusion and false sense of security to the American people

   that law enforcement's public safety needs in this area have been

   effectively addressed. In reality the adoption of the Markey/White

   Amendment will actually continue to allow for the proliferation of

   unbreakable encryption products for use by the general public regardless

   of their adverse impact on public safety and national security.

      The exchange of ideas between government and industry, which is the

   purpose of the center, is already occurring and has been for some time.

   The problem remains that absent an approach like Oxley/Manton, no

   technical solution for law enforcement is foreseeable. NSA agrees with

   our assessment. Having a central point of information and expertise

   might be helpful for sharing what is known but it will not solve the

   problem. Neither will enhanced criminal penalties.

      Law enforcement continues to support the adoption of a balanced

   encryption policy, one that meets the needs of industry for robust

   encryption to protect sensitive information and the privacy of

   communications while at the same time meeting law enforcement's

   immediate decryption needs to protect public safety when such robust

   encryption products are used to protect serious criminal activity. Law

   enforcement is in unanimous agreement that the widespread availability

   and use of unbreakable robust encryption products for use in the United

   States will ultimately devastate our ability to protect American

   citizens from violent criminals, international drug lords and prevent

   acts of terrorism directed at innocent Americans. It is for this reason

   that we are calling for a balanced solution to this problem. We believe

   that the provisions of the Oxley/Manton Amendment strike that balance

   and we urge your support for its adoption during today's mark-up.

   Sincerely yours,



    Thomas Constantine,



      Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration.



    Raymond W. Kelly,



      Undersecretary for Enforcement, U.S. Department of the Treasury.



    Louis J. Freeh,



      Director.









       National Sheriffs' Association,



       Alexandria, VA, September 23, 1997.







          Hon.  Thomas J. Bliley,  Jr.                Chairman, Committee on Commerce,



       Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC.



       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to you today to urge you to support

   the Oxley Amendment to H.R. 695, the Security and Freedom Through

   Encryption Act. Without this amendment, H.R. 695 fails to protect the

   needs of law enforcement.

      As you know, the access to intercepted communications or data when

   lawful authority exists is a fundamental tool that law enforcement

   employs in the fight against crime. Representative Oxley's amendment

   preserves that tool and enables law enforcement to thwart sophisticated

   criminal intentions. Criminals working with encryption technology can

   render traditional electronic surveillance methods obsolete and

   investigations are crippled without the ability to break the code.

   Meaningful encryption legislation has to ensure that law enforcement can

   gain timely access to the plaintext of encrypted conversations and

   information by established legal procedures.

      The National Sheriffs' Association supports the actions taken by the

   Committee on National Security and the Permanent Select Committee on

   Intelligence to give authorities a tool to use against terrorists and

   other criminals who want to hide information. Without adequate

   safeguards, H.R. 695 will allow the use of powerful encryption, which

   will deprive law enforcement of the ability to ensure public safety and

   create a haven for the computer literate criminal.

      Thank you for your consideration and we look forward to working with

   you to develop sound national policy on encryption. If I can provide you

   with any additional information, please do not hesitate to call on me at

   the National Sheriffs' Association at 1 800 424 7827.

   Sincerely,



         Fred W. Scoralick,  President.









       National District Attorneys Association,



       Alexandria, VA, September 19, 1997.







          Hon.  Michael G. Oxley,                Rayburn House Office Building,



       Washington, DC.



       Dear Congressman Oxley: The National District Attorneys Association

   has, and continues to oppose H.R. 695, the ``Security and Freedom

   Through Encryption (SAFE) Act,'' as introduced and now before the

   Committee for review. As local prosecutors, we are extremely concerned

   about the serious threat posed by the use of robust encryption products

   that do not allow for court approved law enforcement access and timely

   decryption that has been encrypted to carry out criminal activity (court

   authorized wiretaps or court authorized search and seizure). We do

   support a balanced encryption policy that satisfies both the commercial

   needs of industry for robust encryption while at the same time

   satisfying law enforcement's public safety needs. The Amendment offered

   by you and Mr. Manton achieves this balance.

      At the onset, we need to make perfectly clear, both to the Congress

   and to the American people that we seek no new authorities to intrude on

   Constitutionally protected rights of privacy nor do we seek any new

   authority to search for and seize evidence. Supporters of an unfettered

   encryption policy have made much of a fear for abuse of police powers

   and have lead many to believe that a decryption requirement will lead to

   random eavesdropping by police on our communications. This is far from

   the truth. Law enforcement does not seek any new authorities; we only

   seek the technological capability to preserve the current authority.

      At Federal, State and local levels of law enforcement there are

   strictly observed sets of judicial and administrative requirements that

   must be adhered to obtain a judicial authorization to intercept a

   communication and to continue such interceptions. Among these

   requirements must be a showing that there is probable cause to believe

   that criminal enterprise is on going and that all other means of

   obtaining evidence are to no avail. When a judge does authorize an

   interception there is frequently a requirement that the authorization

   must be reviewed periodically by the judge and there is always the

   mandate that any communications pertaining to criminal activity may not

   be monitored.

      We all recognize that encryption technology can be extremely

   beneficial when used legitimately to protect commercially sensitive

   information and private communications. The potential use, however, of

   such encryption products by criminals and terrorists to conceal their

   criminal communications and information from law enforcement poses an

   extremely serious threat to the public safety of our country.

      The introduction of digitally-based telecommunications technologies,

   as well as the widespread use of computers and computer networks having

   encryption capabilities, is facilitating the development and production

   of affordable and robust encryption products for the private sector.

   American industrial concerns are not misplaced in desiring to enhance

   markets for their products, but this must never be accomplished at the

   expense of the lives and safety of the American people.

      We are obligated, in the interests of our communities to oppose any

   efforts that endanger the people we have sworn to protect. Your

   amendment is an appropriate legislative solution to this complex problem

   in addressing both the needs of industry while at the same time

   satisfying the requirements of law enforcement as they pertain to

   protecting the American people. We most strongly urge the members of the

   Commerce Committee to support the Oxley/Manton Amendment.

   Sincerely,



         William L. Murphy,  President.









                          NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION



                          resolution--encryption



    Whereas, the introduction of digitally-based telecommunications

  technologies as well as the widespread use of computers and computer

  networks having encryption capabilities are facilitating the development

  and production of strong, affordable encryption products and services

  from private sector use; and

    Whereas, on one hand the use of strong encryption products and

  services are extremely beneficial when used legitimately to protect

  commercially sensitive information and communications. On the other

  hand, the potential use of strong encryption products and services that

  do not allow for timely law enforcement decryption by a vast array of

  criminals and terrorist to conceal their criminal communications and

  information from law enforcement poses an extremely serious threat to

  public safety; and

    Whereas, the law enforcement community is extremely concerned about

  the serious threat posed by the use of these strong encryption products

  and services that do not allow for authorization (court-authorized

  wiretaps or court-authorized search and seizure); and

    Whereas, law enforcement fully supports a balanced encryption policy

  that satisfies both the commercial needs of industry for strong

  encryption while at the same tie satisfying law enforcement's public

  safety needs for the timely decryption of encrypted criminal

  communications and information; and

    Whereas, law enforcement has found that strong, key recovery

  encryption products and services are clearly the best way, and perhaps

  the only way, to achieve both the goals of industry and law enforcement;

  and

    Whereas, government representatives have been working with industry to

  encourage the voluntary development, sale, and use of key recovery

  encryption products and services in its pursuit of a balanced encryption

  policy;



       Be it resolved, that the National District Attorneys Association

   supports and encourages the development and adoption of a balanced

   encryption policy that encourages the development, sale, and use of key

   recovery encryption products and services, both domestically and abroad.

   We believe that this approach represents a policy that appropriately

   addresses both the commercial needs of industry while at the same time

   satisfying law enforcement's public safety needs.

   Adopted by the Board of Directors, November 16, 1996, Naples, Florida.







       International Association of Chiefs of Police,



       Alexandria, VA, September 22, 1997.







          Hon.  Michael G. Oxley,                 Rayburn House Office Building, House of Representatives,



       Washington, DC.



       Dear Representative Oxley: On behalf of the International

   Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), I am writing to express our

   strong support for your amendment to H.R. 695, the Security and Freedom

   though Encryption (SAFE) Act. Your amendment, by requiring that no

   encryption technology be sold unless it contains features that would

   provide for immediate access no encrypted information, protects the

   ability of law enforcement agencies to perform court authorized

   electronic surveillance and the search and seizure of information stored

   in computers.

      Throughout the debate on encryption legislation, IACP has stressed

   that need for provisions that would provide law enforcement with the

   ability to gain timely access to encrypted conversations and

   information. In its current form, II.R. 695 does not meet this standard.

   The passage of H.R. 695, without the adoption of the Oxley/Manton

   amendment, would severely weaken the ability of law enforcement to

   combat society's most dangerous criminals.

      Thank you for your leadership on this issue of vital importance to

   law enforcement. If IACP can be of further assistance on this issue,

   please call IACP's Legislative Department at 703/836 6767 ext. 211.

   Sincerely,



         Darrell L. Sanders,  President.









       International Association of Chiefs of Police,



       Alexandria, VA, September 24, 1997.



       Dear Commerce Committee Member: It is the understanding of the

   International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) that an amendment

   may be offered at today's mark-up of H.R. 695 that would call for the

   establishment of a commission to study the issue of law enforcement

   access to encrypted information. IACP is strongly opposed to any

   amendment that would delay providing law enforcement with access to

   encrypted criminal information. Any delay is a victory for those

   elements in society who wish to use encryption technology for criminal

   purposes.

      IACP believes that action must be taken immediately to prevent the

   further proliferation of inaccessible encryption technology. The

   establishment of a commission will serve no purpose other than to

   exacerbate an already troubling situation facing law enforcement.

      IACP strongly supports the Oxley/Manton Amendment. The Oxley/Manton

   Amendment, by requiring that no encryption technology be sold unless it

   contains features that provide for immediate access to information

   encrypted in the furtherance of criminal activity, protects the ability

   of law enforcement agencies to perform court authorized electronic

   surveillance and the search and seizure of information stored in

   computers.

      Throughout the debate on encryption legislation, IACP has stressed

   that need for provisions that would provide law enforcement with the

   ability to gain timely access to encrypted conversations and information

   that threaten public safety. In its current form, H.R. 695 does not meet

   this standard. The passage of H.R. 695, without the adoption of the

   Oxley/Manton amendment would severely weaken the ability of law

   enforcement to combat society's most dangerous criminals. Therefore,

   IACP urges you to support the Oxley/Manton amendment when H.R. 695 is

   considered by the House Commerce Committee.

      Once again, IACP urges you to oppose any attempt to delay law

   enforcement access to encrypted information and to support the

   Oxley/Manton Amendment

   Thank you for your support.



   Sincerely,



         Darrell L. Sanders,  President.







       Major Cities Chiefs,



       September 23, 1997.







          Hon.  Michael G. Oxley,                House of Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building,



       Washington, DC.



       Dear Congressman Oxley: The Major Cities Chiefs, an association of

   police executives representing 48 of the nation's largest jurisdictions,

   strongly supports the proposed Oxley/Manton amendments to H.R. 695.

   These amendments, which are scheduled to be considered by the Commerce

   Committee this week, would require both manufacturers of encryption

   devices and purveyors of encryption services to include features that

   would allow law enforcement access to encrypted information being used

   for illegal purposes.

      Essentially, these amendments are intended to protect the limited,

   judicially sanctioned wiretap privileges already in effect for law

   enforcement agencies. They are not intended to enlarge in any way the

   scope of these privileges. Without these amendments, a criminal suspect

   could avoid an otherwise-legal wiretap merely by using an encrypted form

   of communication. The legality of a wiretap should be based on the

   evidence against a suspect, not on the form of communication the suspect

   uses.

      Pursuant to these amendments, the Attorney General of the United

   States would be required to establish a rulemaking procedure within one

   year of their enactment. This would allow due consideration for he many

   legitimate uses of encryption. However, we must not compromise a law

   enforcement tool which has proved invaluable against major drug

   trafficking operations and other forms of organized crime.

   Sincerely,



         Matt L. Rodriguez,  Chairman.









       September 23, 1997.







          Hon.  Michael G. Oxley,                Committee on Commerce, Rayburn H.O.B.,



       Washington, DC.



       Dear Mike: As your committee considers the Goodlatte encryption bill

   I would request that you support the Oxley/Manton Amendment.

      The Goodlatte bill (H.R. 695) was drafted by and for the software

   industry at the expense of the national security and public safety needs

   of the American people.

      In order to protect national security and public safety, I would ask

   that you support the Manton/Oxley amendment which would require the

   crucial key recovery language similar to the provisions adopted by the

   Intelligence Committee. If this language is not incorporated into the

   bill, as the Chairman of the House Rules Committee I will not move the

   bill to the House floor!

      Thank your for your time and courtesy. Please contact me if you have

   any questions regarding this matter.

   Sincerely,



         Gerald B.H. Solomon,  Member of Congress.







       Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police,



       Springfield, IL, September 23, 1997.







          Hon.  J. Dennis Hastert,                U.S. Representative, 14th District--Yorkville, IL,



       Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC.



       Dear Congressman Hastert: On Thursday, September 25, 1997, the

   Committee on Commerce will hear legislation regarding encryption of

   electronically stored information. The Illinois Association of Chiefs of

   Police membership strongly urges you to vote for the Oxley/Manton

   Amendment which would allow for the manufacture of encryption products

   that include features accessible by lawful court ordered interceptions

   of wire and electronic communications. Such ability is absolutely

   necessary in this day of international and domestic terrorism, espionage

   and kidnapping.

   On behalf of the membership, I thank you in advance for your support.



   Very truly yours,



         George F. Koertge,  Executive Director.









        California Peace Officers' Association,



       Sacramento, CA, September 19, 1997.







          Hon.  Michael G. Oxley,                Member, House of Representatives,



       Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC.





        Re H.R. 695.





       Dear Congressman Oxley: The House Commerce Committee is scheduled to

   soon hold a mark-up concerning Congressman Goodlatte's Encryption Bill

   (H.R. 695). As currently drafted, this bill does not address law

   enforcement's public safety concerns and needs regarding encryption.

   Your plan to propose an amendment requiring manufacturers of encryption

   procedures in the United States to include features that would allow for

   immediate access to the plaintext of encrypted data should these

   products be used for illegal purposes is sincerely appreciated. The

   Federal Bureau of Investigation needs such a provision to fulfill their

   criminal investigative mission. Law enforcement agencies can not afford

   to allow modern technology to outdistance their ability to combat

   sophisticated criminal enterprises.

      The California Peace Officers' Association supports your proposed

   amendment. Please feel free to include this letter in any official

   record of support that you may deem appropriate.

   Very truly yours,



         Greg Cowart,  President.







       Florida Department of Law Enforcement,



       Tallahassee, FL, September 24, 1997.







          Congressman  Michael Oxley,                Rayburn House Office Building,



       Washington, DC.





        Re H.R. 695 (``Security and Freedom Through Encryption {SAFE} Act'')





       Dear Congressman Oxley: Attached is a copy of a letter I have sent

   this morning to Congressman Tom Bliley, Chairman of the House Committee

   on Commerce supporting your proposed amendment to H.R. 695. The ability

   of law enforcement to decrypt encrypted communications must be assured

   in order to help law enforcement remain effective as we deal with the

   ``age of encryption.''

      Your position statement found at your Internet site does an excellent

   job of identifying the problem and stressing law enforcement's need for

   decryption. Given the pending 3:30 p.m. ``markup'' on H.R. 695 this

   afternoon, I will not expand upon my comments as noted on the attached

   letter. Suffice it to say that if Congress does not provide for the

   decryption as needed, the scales of justice will be tilted significantly

   in favor of the criminal element.

      Please do not hesitate to contact me at (850) 488 8771 should you

   desire additional comment or information from this Department.

   Sincerely,



         James T. Moore,  Commissioner.









       Florida Department of Law Enforcement,



       Tallahassee, FL, September 24, 1997.







          Congressman  Tom Bliley,                Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC.





        Re ``Markup'' at 3:30 p.m. today and H.R. 695





       Dear Chairman Bliley: As Executive Director of the Florida

   Department of Law Enforcement, I am responsible for assuring that our

   investigations of organized criminal activity, be it drug-trafficking,

   money laundering, domestic terrorism, or predatory sexual conduct, be

   conducted legally and with effort focused upon bringing those involved

   in such conduct to justice.

      Congress, and the legislature of the State of Florida, have both

   recognized that law enforcement must have the ability to intercept

   communications of criminals in order to penetrate their criminal

   enterprises and develop the evidence essential to obtaining a

   conviction. Both federal and Florida state law currently authorize

   court-ordered interceptions of wire, oral or electronic communications.

   The process to obtain such court orders establishes a high level of law

   enforcement justification, including probable cause to believe a crime

   has been committed and that the communications will be evidence of the

   crime, as well as requiring a showing that other less-intrusive

   investigative techniques have been exhausted or will not produce the

   necessary evidence. Indeed, the current law has reached a good balance

   between privacy protections and the need for law enforcement to have the

   tools it must use to effectively fight crime.

      Unless the H.R. 695 (the ``Security and Freedom Through Encryption

   (SAFE) Act'') is modified to provide law enforcement access to encrypted

   materials when law enforcement has obtained court authorization to do

   so, the ability of law enforcement at the federal and state level to

   effectively investigate organized criminal enterprises and activity will

   be severely damaged. Encryption is readily available today. Our

   Department's own experience with encrypted computer evidence is that,

   absent having access to encryption codes to ``break'' encrypted

   material, we can decypher only a very small portion of encrypted

   material. That which remains encrypted cannot be used as evidence

   against the criminals utilizing the encryption.

      Congressmen Oxley and Manton have offered an amendment to H.R. 695

   that will be considered by your Committee today which will allow real

   time decryption of encrypted conversations when authorized by a court

   order and would require at all encryption products manufactured, sold,

   or imported into the United States be capable of providing decryption of

   communications upon the court-ordered request of law enforcement, while

   also limiting the release of the seized communications, much like

   present law provides when a wire, oral or electronic intercept has been

   made.

      The proposed amendment makes no change of Federal (or State) policy.

   Congress has wisely authorized the interception of communications by

   court order. The proposed amendment will simply assure that law

   enforcement may continue to do so in this age of electronic encryption.

      I urge you and the Committee to support this amendment. To allow law

   enforcement the real and effective access to decryption of encrypted

   communications is absolutely essential to the continued effectiveness of

   investigative efforts. Let me be clear, if decryption is not provided

   for, Federal and State law enforcement agencies will be unable to

   effectively develop the crucial evidence of conspiracies and other

   violations of law that have been instrumental in addressing organized

   crime in its various forms. I trust that the importance and the value of

   the proposed amendment will be recognized by you and the Committee

   members.

      Should you desire additional information from me, please do not

   hesitate to call me at (850) 488 8771. I ask that you share this letter

   with the Committee as it meets in ``markup'' this afternoon and whenever

   you consider H.R. 695.

   Sincerely,



         James T. Moore,  Commissioner.









       City of Cincinnati,



       Division of Police,



       September 23, 1997.







          Congressman  Michael G. Oxley,                Committee on Commerce, Rayburn House Office Bldg.,



       Washington, DC.



       Dear Congressman: I urge you to strongly consider the needs of law

   enforcement with respect to H.R. 695 when it comes before your committee

   on September 26, 1997. As it is written, H.R. 695 would permit the

   marketing of encryption products that would severely impair law

   enforcement's ability to lawfully gain access to criminal telephone

   conversations and electronically stored evidence.

      Law enforcement recognizes that encryption is necessary for

   communications security and privacy. We also understand that commercial

   interests are at stake in marketing of these products. Adequate

   legislation is the key to satisfying these needs and maintain the

   ability of law enforcement to combat serious crime. The use of non-key

   recovery encryption would severely hamper our efforts.

      The amended version of H.R. 695, offered by Congressman Oxley, Ohio

   and Congressman Manton, New York, requires manufacturers to include some

   form of recovery feature in encryption products sold in the United

   States. This would allow law enforcement the opportunity to gather

   criminal information when legally authorized to do so.

      Your consideration in this matter is of the utmost importance to the

   continued effort of maintaining public safety.

   Sincerely,



         Michael C. Snowden,  Police Chief.







       City of Phoenix,



       Office of the Police Chief,



       September 24, 1997.







          Hon.  Michael G. Oxley,                 Committee on Commerce, Rayburn House Office Building,



       Washington, DC.



       Dear Mr. Oxley: I am aware that you are presently considering a

   variety of legislative proposals concerning the encryption of electronic

   information. While I recognize the need to encrypt communications for

   reasons of personal security, privacy, and safe electronic commerce, it

   is imperative that law enforcement be provided a feature that allows us,

   upon presentation of a court order, to gain timely access to plain text

   data through decryption. It is an undeniable fact that unrestricted use

   of strong encryption will cripple law enforcement's ability to use

   wiretaps and other measures to catch criminals and terrorists. Loss of

   this essential ability at a time when international drug trafficking,

   white collar crime, and terrorist activities are on the rise, would be

   disastrous.

      It should be noted that law enforcement's current judicially

   controlled wiretap capabilities have not resulted in misuse because

   adequate checks and balances prevail.

      I believe that any attempt to adopt a voluntary key recovery system

   is unacceptable. If only one vendor of a strong encryption product opts

   not to participate, or if unrestricted foreign products are imported, it

   will take time for these products to become the products of choice for

   criminal activities.

      Other countries have, and will continue to, develop strong encryption

   software that does not allow for key recovery. Little will be gained

   from restricting U.S. vendors from marketing competitive products to

   these countries. If however, any country establishes a key recovery

   requirement, as we should in the U.S., a ban with accompanying legal

   penalties should apply to the use and import of all non-compliant

   products.

      Clearly, law enforcement must have the ability to collect and

   decipher evidence of criminal and terrorist activities. We solicit your

   support in preserving law enforcement's ability to protect the public

   from serious crime.

   Sincerely,



         Dennis A. Garrett,   Police Chief.









       The Secretary of Defense,



       Washington, DC, July 21, 1997.



       Dear Members of Congress: Recently you received a letter from the

   nation's senior law enforcement officials regarding U.S. encryption

   policies. I am writing today to express my strong support for their

   views on this important issue.

      As you know, the Department of Defense is involved on a daily basis

   in countering international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and the

   proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The spread of unbreakable

   encryption, as a standard feature of mass market communication products,

   presents a significant threat to the ability of the U.S. and its allies

   to monitor the dangerous groups and individuals involved in these

   activities. Passage of legislation which effectively decontrols

   commercial encryption exports would undermine U.S. efforts to foster the

   use of strong key recovery encryption domestically and abroad. Key

   recovery products will preserve governments' abilities to counter

   worldwide terrorism, narcotics trafficking and proliferation.

      It is also important to note that the Department of Defense relies on

   the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the apprehension and prosecution

   of spies. Sadly, there have been over 60 espionage convictions of

   federal employees over the last decade. While these individuals

   represent a tiny minority of government employees, the impact of

   espionage activities on our nation's security can be enormous. As the

   recent arrests of Nicholson, Pitts and Kim clearly indicate, espionage

   remains a very serious problem. Any policies that detract from the FBI's

   ability to perform its vital counterintelligence function, including the

   ability to perform wiretaps, inevitably detract from the security of the

   Department of Defense and the nation.

      Encryption legislation must also address the nation's domestic

   information security needs. Today, approximately 95% of DoD

   communications rely on public networks; other parts of government, and

   industry, are even more dependent on the trustworthiness of such

   networks. Clearly, we must ensure that encryption legislation addresses

   these needs. An approach such as the one contained in S. 909 can go a

   long way toward balancing the need for strong encryption with the need

   to preserve national security and public safety. I hope that you will

   work with the Administration to enact legislation that addresses these

   national security concerns as well as the rights of the American people.

   I appreciate your consideration of these views.



   Sincerely,



         Bill Cohen.





                                      ADDITIONAL VIEWS



      The stated intent of H.R. 695, the removal of barriers to the

   competitiveness of U.S. high technology exports, is a goal with which

   few Members of Congress, the business community, or our law enforcement

   organizations could disagree. As reported by the Committee on Commerce,

   however, H.R. 695 inadequately addresses the legitimate public safety

   concerns surrounding the proliferation of strong encryption technology

   within our own borders.

      The bombings this decade alone at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal

   Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and at New York's World Trade Center

   attest to the present dangers terrorist attacks pose to our citizens.

   The high tech world increasing presents the committed men and women who

   keep our nation safe with new and more daunting challenges in their

   fight against domestic and foreign criminals. The decisions Congress

   makes at the doorstep of the digital age will have serious repercussions

   lasting long past our own tenures in Congress and must be guided by more

   than economics.

      New encryption technologies have the potential to provide Americans

   with a level of security in telecommunications and electronic commerce

   never before available. At the same time, however, the widespread

   availability of such technology could render sophisticated criminals

   invisible to the lawful surveillance efforts of federal, state and local

   law enforcement.

      Congress need not provide government agencies with an increased

   ability to access the communications of suspected criminals to overcome

   the challenges posed by encryption. Congress need only ensure that the

   thoughtful and painstaking procedures law enforcement officials must

   presently abide by before commencing any surveillance operation continue

   to yield an ability to monitor the activities of those who threaten the

   safety of the American people.

      In our opinion, Congress must balance the needs of American's

   technological entrepreneurs with its fundamental duty to ensure public

   safety. We believe the goal of further promoting U.S. technology exports

   can be achieved in a version of H.R. 695 that does not threaten the

   safety of the American people. Though not entirely satisfied with H.R.

   695 as reported out of the Commerce Committee, we look forward to

   addressing the bill's deficiencies on the House floor this Congress.



    Edolphus Towns.



    Frank Pallone,  Jr.



    Rick C. Lazio.



    Bart Stupak.





                          ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL



      Historically, encryption was used almost exclusively by the military

   and intelligence communities to protect secrets of defense and national

   security. But in the Information Age, businesses and consumers need a

   way to secure valuable trade and financial information that increasingly

   flows through wires and over the air.

      H.R. 695 attempts to accomplish these important goals by bringing

   export law in line with current domestic encryption policy.

   Unfortunately, such a change in the law does not come without a cost.

   While strong encryption can make interstate and foreign commerce more

   secure, its unrestricted use can make national security and law

   enforcement less so.

      It is clear that widespread use of unbreakable encryption poses

   serious problems for law enforcement in carrying out its duty to protect

   the public. Even in the post-cold war era, the wars against

   international terrorism, drug cartels, and violations of human rights

   continue.

      The law enforcement community advocates the use of key recovery

   systems on strong encryption products. Unfortunately, these system will

   work only if everybody uses them, including sophisticated criminals. And

   we know that there will continue to be a proliferation of encryption

   products available around the would without key recovery systems,

   regardless of U.S. Government law or policy.

      I am not convinced that the law enforcement approach will solve the

   problem the authorities correctly identify. But until a better solution

   is proposed that both protects the public against terrorism and removes

   barriers to the growth of electronic commerce around the world, I

   strongly believe it is in the public interest to err on the side of

   caution.

      This bill adopts the approach preferred by business and privacy

   advocates which, unfortunately, also contains flaws. Removing all

   government controls over encryption is tantamount to sending our troops

   to war without necessary arms or protective gear. The committee

   attempted to balance the important competing interests at stake, but

   failed to find the elusive middle ground. H.R. 695, as amended by this

   committee, simply adds window dressing in the form of a technology lab.

   This begs more questions than it answers.

      The American public has no assurance that a technology lab will be

   effective in providing law enforcement with the tools necessary to

   protect them. Without possessing a key to encrypted messages, the only

   way to unlock the door is through brute force. A brute force attack on

   today's encryption products requires both enormous computing power and a

   good deal of time. Law enforcement authorities possess neither luxury

   when confronted with an imminent, real-time threat to public safety. A

   technology lab will not change that reality.

      Some producers of encryption products have offered informally to

   provide the lab with technical assistance and perhaps some amount of

   private funding. But we have no specific commitment with regard to

   either offer, nor can we be sure that any such contribution would be

   sufficient to achieve the lab's purpose. The industry has specifically

   rejected the notion of providing source code for its encryption products

   to the lab, which is arguably the best hope for giving law enforcement a

   leg up on cracking these codes without a key.

      I appreciate that these issues have been the subject of intense

   debate for more than four years of government, industry, individual

   citizens, and academia alike. To date, no effective solution has been

   found. But the difficulty of the task does not mean that we should

   conduct the legislative equivalent of a coin toss. The simple fact that

   four other committees have reported this bill in such radically

   different forms should be evidence enough that while this issue may be

   ripe, the solution certainly is not.

      In my judgment, this bill is not ready for prime time. More work

   needs to be done. I urge all committees that have reported versions of

   this bill and the bipartisan leadership to continue working with

   industry and law enforcement to find an effective and balanced solution

   before this bill reaches the floor for consideration.



         John D. Dingell.