IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century

Staff Study
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
One Hundred Fourth Congress

XI. Intelligence Support to Military Operations

                       Executive Summary

     Support to military operations (SMO) is one of the major roles
of intelligence.  Some argue that it is the major role of
intelligence.  The Clinton administration -- both policy makers and
senior intelligence managers -- has stated that SMO is the top
priority for intelligence.  Critics question why this statement is
necessary, given that much of the Intelligence Community's (IC's)
effort has always been shaped around this specific intelligence
role and that, in the post-Cold War world, U.S. national security
is actually less threatened than at any time since 1940.

     This debate over SMO is important as it goes to the heart of
both requirements and resources.  Intelligence is not an easily
expanded resource.  As noted in the discussion on the IC's ability
to surge (See the Intelligence Community "Surge" Capability staff
study), covering current requirements and taking steps to address
unexpected ones is difficult at best.  The more resources devoted
to any one area, the fewer there are left to address others.  The
issue is not whether the IC should devote resources to SMO, but
rather how much SMO is reasonable given other, competing demands on
a fiscally constrained IC.

     SMO is, to some extent, a contingent need.  At least through
the Cold War, U.S. defense policy had been shaped around the idea
of deterring combat, of using force as a last resort.  Other, non-SMO,
policy needs are current -- diplomacy, narcotics, terrorism,
proliferation.  Thus, a balance needs to be struck.  Urging an
increased emphasis on SMO without looking across the board at all
IC requirements runs the risk of leaving many other ongoing policy
needs partially or completely unfulfilled.

     The IC has, in most cases, performed admirably regarding SMO. 
But the significance of the changes in our nation's national
security "threats" and our responses to them, in how the nation
employs its military forces, in the advances of technology on
information processing, in the possible new paradigm in military
strategies for combat, etc., that are either here or are on the
horizon, suggests that extensive planning and operational,
structural and management changes will be required for the IC to
meet its overall national security needs, including SMO.  Some of
the findings and recommendations in this and other IC21 studies go
toward this end and need to be addressed soon if the IC is to be
ready for the 21st century.



     At the beginning of the IC21 process, the Study Team was
overwhelmed with the emphasis that was being placed on the issue of
Support to Military Operations (SMO).  This Intelligence Community
(IC) "call to arms" was somewhat disturbing in that the vehemence
that was expressed suggested that there was a crisis immediately at
hand -- which was difficult to understand given the fact that our
nation is less threatened, at least from a military perspective,
than at any other time in the last 50 years.  Were someone outside
of the IC to hear the emphasis placed on SMO, they would likely
come to one of three conclusions:  that SMO was the top priority
issue for intelligence, but that the IC had strayed too far into
other areas and, now, needed to refocus; that the IC had
experienced a critical failure in supporting the military and that
extra efforts were required to fix the problems; or that, in a less
threatening environment, intelligence demands had somehow
dramatically increased for the military.

     As there was at least marginal evidence that suggested that
any of the aforementioned conclusions could be correct, we decided
to specifically concentrate on current and future SMO as a separate
study in IC21.  The primary focus, however, was not on specific or
detailed SMO requirements, but on how those requirements fit into
the overall question of the roles and functions of a 21st century
IC.  Thus, this study centered on the following questions, at a
macro level:

          Should SMO be the highest priority issue for IC resources
          now and in the future?

          Is the IC properly addressing SMO today?

          Are there indications that SMO requirements either have
          changed or will change in the future?  If so, to what
          degree might this effect the priority for SMO in IC

Consequently, this study did not focus on evaluating specific
programs or assessing whether specific theater collectors were
valuable investments.  We did intend, however, to discuss some of
the relationships between intelligence assets within the military,
at all levels, and national intelligence assets, and how that
relationship might change over time.


     This study looks across the spectrum of issues facing the IC
in SMO in the 21st century.  The SMO Study Team conducted several
interviews and panel discussions with retired and active
intelligence professionals and military officers.  These included
"operators," some of the Commanders in Chief (CINC) of U.S.
Combatant Commands and some military "theorists," such as Admiral
William Owens, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
who foresee very different types of military tactics and strategies
than those that maintain our nation's defense posture today.

     Along with the issues and questions raised above, the effect
of the trends coming out of Desert Storm and the historical
evolution of SMO, especially in terms of budgets, programs,
operations and service equities, were studied as we assessed the
IC's future challenges in this area.

What is SMO?

     One of the questions from the beginning of the study was the
definition of SMO.  The role of SMO and, thus, defense intelligence
is defined with variance, depending upon the forum.  For some, it
is solely an issue of support for the operational commander in a
tactical wartime setting.  Certainly, most of the discussions
related to SMO since DESERT STORM (and, arguably, most of the
emphasis) are aimed at improving our capabilities to support a
similar effort in the future.  In fact, some believe that the
priority for reorganization of our intelligence capabilities should
be to plan for capabilities that would support the military
requirement to be able to engage in two, near-simultaneous "major
regional contingencies" (MRCs).  However, the continued growth of
so-called "other military operations" (OMO) -- peacekeeping,
peacemaking, humanitarian efforts, etc. -- that are putting U.S.
personnel into harms way much as if they were in combat, call for
different intelligence priorities overall and clearly indicates
that the two MRCs concept is not an adequate planning tool for the

     Analytic and production elements of the military intelligence
complex define their responsibilities by discussing the three
"pillars" of support:  support to the defense policy maker; support
to force modernization and planning; and support to the warfighter. 
The individuals that make up these "pillars" would be,
respectively: the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and other
Department of Defense (DoD) policy makers; the Secretaries and
staffs of the military departments charged with organizing,
training and equipping the armed forces; and military commanders,
planners and operators planning for or engaged in military
operations.  Although much broader than some definitions, this
approach to the needs of the military by the IC is probably the
most valid.  Regarding support to the Secretary of Defense, since
the end of the Cold War, the DoD clearly has become more prominent
in U.S. foreign policy initiatives, even over the Department of
State in some cases.  From implementation of Nunn-Lugar programs to
promote Russian defense conversion to the deployment of troops into
Bosnia to implement the Dayton Agreement, the DoD is the active arm
of policy development and implementation.  In part, this is due to
changes in the stability of many regions and relationships that
tend to involve armed entities and are a byproduct of a less
polarized but more unstable world.  For this reason, it is easy to
see why much of the emphasis within the IC on SMO and "support to
the warfighter" currently carries the day in terms of resource
priority and focus.  However, although DoD may be the active arm of
many of the Nation's policy initiatives today, most if not all of
these initiatives began with some level of diplomatic effort,
calling into question whether "support to the diplomat" might be a
more critical pursuit.

     Support to force modernization and planning is also critical. 
Although some argue that this is less significant now that the
Soviet Union no longer exists and strategic nuclear systems are
being produced and deployed at a rate less than at the height of
the Cold War, the facts are that Russia (and China) continue to
produce strategic nuclear weapons and, most importantly, advanced
conventional weaponry and defensive systems that will have an
effect on U.S. force planning for years to come.  Moreover, the
sales of such systems to countries throughout the world by many
countries, including Russia, underscore the importance of this type
of intelligence to our weapon designers for protection of U.S.
forces in the future.  Another reason for emphasis on this type of
intelligence area is opportunity -- more and more systems and
technologies are available for purchase at arms sales throughout
the world.  Consequently, dedicated efforts by U.S. intelligence
and defense to acquire previously hard to get equipment are
especially important for the next 10-15 years.  The Study Team
believes that today's efforts in the Foreign Materials Acquisition
and Exploitation (FMA/FME) areas -- currently managed under Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) -- are not as effective as they could be in order to
assure that we capitalize on upcoming opportunities.  The current
FMA and FME programs tend to be piecemeal -- especially in terms of
funding -- an issue that the Committee will continue to monitor
with the FY97 budget submission.

     "Support to the warfighter" is the area of main interest for
DoD and the IC at present, and tends to be used interchangeably or
as synonymous with SMO.  The use of the term "support to the
warfighter" is extremely problematic.  It is misused to self-justify
programs and budgets, and misunderstood, or defined so
broadly as to encompass everything that the military does.  It is
also self-limiting, in that it promotes the immediate needs of a
soldier, sailor, airman, marine or weapons system, making
intelligence only a reactive function rather than a predictive one
-- at a time when predictive analysis is becoming increasingly
significant for the military commander as well as the policy maker. 
Moreover, the term suggests that the primary focus of intelligence
should be on the actual need to use force (i.e., "fight a war"),
when we continue to believe that successful foreign and national
security policy is designed to preclude such an event if at all
possible.  This is not to say that the IC and the military should
not prepare for military conflict.  But this cannot be the sole
focus, to the detriment of diplomacy, deterrence and force
preponderance -- all of which also require IC support.

     Additionally, the current emphasis on "support to the
warfighter" is primarily technologically oriented.  In this
burgeoning age of information, there seems to be a growing belief
that technology will fix everything.  "System compatibility,"
"interoperability" and "it's all bandwidth" appear to be the
approaches that have become the focus for a majority of those --
including the services themselves -- who are bent on solving the
"intelligence" problems for the military.  Although clearly very
important, having the ability to transmit volumes of data in near-real
time has greatly overshadowed (in terms of interest and
expenditures) the importance of the utility and availability of the
information being passed.  While striving to attain technical
solutions, we must also address the intelligence data/analysis
itself, as it, too, is critical to a commander's success.  The
current trends in priorities, however, suggest that the IC, and the
military services, could go down the path, once again, that results
in significant technological capabilities -- especially in
collection assets -- with limited utility based on a lack of
attention to processing, analysis and production capabilities. 
There is also the issue of the IC's ability to ensure that its
information can be received by operational units and other
intelligence entities.  Dissemination, especially within a military
theater, was a key intelligence issue in DESERT STORM.  Whether
this is a legitimate responsibility of the IC or of the military is
a topic of discussion in a separate IC21 Intelligence
Communications staff study.

     This study, then, focuses on SMO mostly in terms that are
associated with the third of the three "pillars."  The Study Team
believes that the issues of supporting the defense policy makers
and force modernization and planning are as important as "support
to the warfighter."  This last "pillar," however, is likely to have
the most dramatic effect in the future in terms of budgets,
personnel, organization and priorities.  In this study, given the
limitations and misuse of the term "support to the warfighter," the
issue of SMO is defined as those intelligence needs that support
deployed forces.  The Study Team believes that this support clearly
should begin well before actual deployment and is not limited to
traditional combat -- taking into account OMO and recognizing that
a new paradigm in combat engagement is beginning to be realized. 
Likewise, as we need to consider new situations for the use of
military forces, we must also review the "traditional" aspects of
the intelligence information that is required for SMO.

     Traditional SMO-related intelligence requirements -- that are
still in use -- would include information on the size, capabilities
and locations of a country's military forces, and physical details
about a country's topography.  This information is deemed necessary
based on the possibility that U.S. forces may have to operate in a
particular country in the future.  Given the increased use of the
military in OMO since the end of the Cold War, however, the needs
of the operational commander appear to be changing in a way that
tends to blur the distinction between SMO and "support to
diplomacy."  As Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, Director,
DIA, testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(SSCI), "Threat ... is no longer a self-evident term.  The defense
intelligence community has traditionally focused on a primary
element of the threat -- enemy forces and weapons systems; clearly
that aspect remains.  But as military activity extends to missions
involving the use of military forces in non-traditional roles, we
must adapt our intelligence focus to meet new requirements."

SMO vs. Support to the Policy Maker

     As stated earlier, SMO is one of the major roles of
intelligence.  Some argue that it is the major role of
intelligence.  The Clinton Administration -- both policy makers and
senior intelligence managers -- has stated that SMO is a top
priority for intelligence.  Critics question why this statement is
necessary, given that much of the IC's effort has always been
shaped around this specific intelligence role and that, in the
post-Cold War world, U.S. national security is actually less
threatened than at any time since 1940.

     This debate over SMO is important as it goes to the heart of
both requirements and resources.  Intelligence is not an easily
expanded resource.  As noted in the discussion on the IC's ability
to surge (see the Intelligence Community Surge Capability staff
study), covering current requirements and taking steps to address
unexpected ones is difficult at best.  The more resources devoted
to any one area, the fewer there are left to address others.  The
issue is not whether the IC should devote resources to SMO, but
rather how much SMO is reasonable given other, competing demands.

     Therefore, it is difficult to rationalize comments from senior
IC officials (who also believe that a two MRCs defense strategy is
sufficient for intelligence planning) who state that, "If you solve
all of the military's requirements for intelligence, you will have
solved 80 percent of overall intelligence requirements," as an
acceptable blueprint for the IC today, let alone in the 21st
century.  Indeed, it is becoming obvious that, on any given day,
the remaining 20 percent of the requirements could be more vital to
the President and his policy advisors in areas that directly go to
this Administration's stated principals of its national security
strategy of enhancing security, promoting prosperity at home and
promoting democracy.

     Much of today's emphasis on SMO is directly related to
supporting tactical combat situations.  If one assumes that, on any
given day, all of the other issues requiring intelligence support
are more likely to be active than is the probability that U.S.
forces will be in combat, then many aspects of SMO become an
insurance capability.  Like all insurance, intelligence support for
warfighting is something you do not wish to be without, but is
something you also work very hard never to have to use.  When
viewed in this light, there is a greater desire to put some sort of
limit on the degree to which the warfighting function calls
unremittingly upon intelligence resources.  Again, the insurance
analogy is apt:  how do you decide how much insurance is enough
without short-changing other needs, all of which place real demands
on resources.

     Further complicating the issue is the fact that military
commanders are now becoming more aware and interested in thoroughly
understanding the issues within their theater in terms that go
beyond preparing for combat engagement.  The continued use of the
military as an active participant of U.S. peacetime foreign policy
by engaging in OMO, has bolstered this interest.  Again, as Lt.
Gen. Hughes explained to the SSCI, "'Warning,' traditionally
focused on Clausewitzian warning of attack, is becoming an
increasingly complicated process.  We must build and employ a
flexible and adaptive military intelligence support system in order
to meet the needs of large-scale military threats, while at the
same time meeting the military requirements of non-traditional
warfare and the new missions the U.S. military has assumed." 
Consequently, it can be argued that in the near future, the
requirements that encompassed the "other 20 percent" will be as
critical to the commander as it is to the policy maker, in order
for the commander to identify the key "centers of gravity" within
each country's infrastructure as they develop.

     There are already examples whereby commanders' interests
conflict with SMO requirements -- the IC reaction to Presidential
Decision Directive - 35 (PDD-35).  PDD-35 is designed to present
the Administration's highest national security priorities, thereby
providing the IC guidance for resource allocations, by establishing
a "tier" structure.  Unfortunately, but predictably, the IC is
using PDD-35 to ensure that resources are being placed on the
highest-tier issues, in many cases having little or no resources
left for lower-tier issues.  One example of the effect is, in fact,
in the area of SMO.  In many cases, SMO is the top collection
priority (and in many cases the only collection priority) for
lower-tier countries, based on the possibility that U.S. forces
could, some day, deploy to that area.  Other non-military
requirements for these lower-tier countries, however, such as a
country's political climate, economic structure and internal
stability, are of much lower priority or not reflected as having
priority.  Moreover, the growing number of SMO requirements
threaten to consume resources that could be used to address non-
military requirements.  (Additional discussion of requirements can
be found in the IC21 staff study entitled Intelligence Requirements
Process.)  As a result, the Community may spend more time gathering
intelligence for potential SMO than for monitoring other
developments that might aid in supporting diplomatic efforts to
prevent a situation where deployment of forces would be necessary. 
Ironically, several of the CINCs expressed the desire to have the
type of non-military information that was traditionally important
only to civilian policy makers.

     SMO -- certainly in the traditional sense -- is, to some
extent, a contingent need.  At least through the Cold War, U.S.
defense policy had been shaped around the idea of deterring combat,
or using force as a last resort.  Other, non-SMO, policy needs are
current -- diplomacy, narcotics, terrorism, proliferation.  Thus,
a balance needs to be struck.  Urging an increased emphasis on SMO
without looking across the board at all IC requirements runs the
risk of leaving many other ongoing policy needs partially or
completely unfulfilled.

     The extent to which intelligence priorities must be balanced
was suggested by Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research, Ms. Toby T. Gati, again to the SSCI.  In describing what
she called a second kind of threat to our national security -- the
first kind being made up of issues such as terrorism, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, drug trafficking
ethnic and religious hatred, the behavior of rogue nations and
environmental degradation -- she stated that, "Such threats [the
second kind] derive from missed or unexploited opportunities to
advance our national agenda.  If we fail to recognize such
opportunities, or pursue them with ill-founded and misguided
strategies, we can exacerbate existing dangers or create new ones. 
Intelligence can play a vital role in identifying opportunities for
diplomatic intervention and provide critical support to our
nation's policy makers as they seek to resolve problems before they
endanger U.S. citizens, soldiers, or interests, and as they
negotiate solutions to festering problems.  This is the essence of
'intelligence in support of diplomacy,' an often ignored but vital
component of our national security."

     Clearly, then, striking the balance between SMO and other
requirements is critical.  Understanding how an administration
views the use of the military and of the IC becomes a significant
factor in the equation.  In this Administration's national security
strategy documentation (A National Security Strategy of Engagement
and Enlargement), several points relating to these issues are
addressed.  On the issue of the use of military forces, the
strategy begins by pointing out that, "Our strategy calls for the
preparation and deployment of American military forces in the
United States and abroad to support U.S. diplomacy in responding to
key dangers -- those posed by weapons of mass destruction, regional
aggression and threats to the stability of states."  There is also
a description of three basic categories of national interests that
can merit the use of our armed forces:

     "The first involves America's vital interests, that is,
     interests that are of broad, overriding importance to the
     survival, security and vitality of our national entity -- the
     defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies and our economic

     "The second category includes cases in which important, but
     not vital, U.S. interests are threatened.  That is, the
     interests at stake do not affect our national survival, but
     they do affect importantly our national well-being and the
     character of the world in which we live."

     "The third category involves primarily humanitarian
     interests.  Here, our decisions focus on the resources we
     can bring to bear by using unique capabilities of our
     military rather than on the combat power of military force."

Such guidance provides a broad flexibility in the use of military
forces -- each requiring both varied and specific types of
intelligence support.

     Providing a view toward the importance and needs for
intelligence, this same strategy calls for strong intelligence
capabilities that protect our national security by "providing
warning of threats to U.S. national security, by providing support
to the policy and military communities to prevail over these
threats and by identifying opportunities for advancing our national
interests through support to diplomacy."  Additional comments from
this strategy include:

     "Because of the change in the security environment since the
     end of the Cold War, intelligence must address a wider range
     of threats and policy needs."

     "... its [the IC's] analytic effort must provide a coherent
     framework to help senior U.S. officials manage a complex range
     of military, political and economic issues."

     "U.S. intelligence must not only monitor traditional threats
     but also assist the policy community to forestall new and
     emerging threats..."

     "The collection and analysis of economic intelligence will
     play an increasingly important role in helping policy makers
     understand economic trends."

     "In order to forecast adequately dangers to democracy abroad,
     the intelligence community and policy departments must track
     political, economic, social and military developments..."

     "Finally, to enhance the study and support of worldwide
     environmental, humanitarian and disaster relief activities,
     technical intelligence assets -- especially imagery -- must be
     directed to a greater degree toward collection of data on
     these subjects."

     Although no one will disagree with the concept, also in the
strategy, that "Whenever U.S. forces are deployed, the highest
priority is to ensure that our military commanders receive the
timely information required to execute successfully their
mission...," some  balance needs to be considered.  With the
proliferation of military deployment throughout the world, mostly
for OMO, a sole emphasis on SMO threatens to consume entirely IC
resources to the point that the IC is only accomplishing SMO, thus,
leading to a foreign policy that is almost totally reactive, with
its primary response being the deployment of troops.  This is a
direction that the Study Team believes is ill-conceived, short-sighted
and not necessarily a path that this, or any, President
should go down.

     Clearly it is envisioned that the focus of the IC today needs
to be on predictive analysis on a wide variety of issues of
importance to the policy maker.  As President Clinton stated when
visiting the CIA in July 1995, "Unique intelligence makes it less
likely that our forces will be sent into battle, less likely that
American lives will have to be put at risk.  It gives us the chance
to prevent crises rather than forcing us to manage them."  We would
argue therefore that, although there will always be changes on the
margins regarding details and descriptions of "threats," the
premise that the IC needs to focus on the ability to provide
"warning" on a variety of issues to the policy maker is an enduring
top priority into the 21st century, one that must be addressed
regardless of an immediate crisis, including military deployments. 
To accomplish the task of providing such warning, the IC will need
to develop and maintain an extensive intelligence "base" of
knowledge that is worldwide.  Such an intelligence "base" should
cover all aspects of a country, issue, or entity, with an eye
toward being able to supply trends and warning data to the policy
maker before a crisis occurs.  (An intelligence "base" is also
discussed in the IC21 staff study on Intelligence Community "Surge"

     Finally, although the debate is often framed in terms of
competing requirements -- SMO vs. support to the policy maker --
the trends indicate that priority toward the policy makers' needs
is complementary to the needs of the operational commander in the
21st century.  Again, evoking the words of Lt. Gen. Hughes,
"Understanding military threat is a direct function of intelligence
of all types:  economic, political, environmental and,
specifically, military, brought together in a dynamic all-source
portrayal of overall conditions and circumstances.  Understanding
the military threat paradigm of the future will include not only
traditional intelligence practices, but also a new approach to the
threat including a recognition of the changing nature of the
operational environment."  To the extent that the "operational
environment" is more than just the battlefield, and given the uses
of the military for OMO since 1989, we would suggest that it is, we
would concur with Lt. Gen. Hughes' outlook.

          FINDING:  The current demands being placed on the IC to
          support military operations will make it difficult for
          the IC to meet the broader national security challenges
          of the 21st century.

          FINDING:  Currently, SMO demands are being satisfied at
          the expense of maintaining the necessary intelligence
          "base" that will be critical to the IC in addressing
          future national security needs.

          FINDING:  Maintaining both the "base" and SMO represent
          valid concerns.  SMO requirements must not stand alone,
          apart from other intelligence requirements.

          FINDING:  The IC must develop and maintain a balanced
          approach in satisfying these concerns.  The IC must
          ensure that the "base" is maintained even during periods
          of crisis, when IC resources can easily be overwhelmed by
          all consuming SMO requirements.

Is the IC Properly Addressing SMO Today?

     Assessing whether the IC is properly responding to the
military's needs is a difficult question to answer, as there are
varying levels of support that can be addressed.  As the previous
section of this study pointed out, the Study Team does not believe
that the current direction of intelligence priorities, and the
resulting management of IC resources, will adequately support the
policy maker nor the military commander in the future.  Other areas
to consider would include whether the structure and operations of
the IC, especially within Defense, properly support the military's
needs in peacetime, during OMO and during combat operations.

     Intelligence activities by the United States have a history
that is closely linked to the military, sometimes exclusively. 
Indeed, the reasoning behind the founding of the CIA was to collate
the disparate pieces of information that the individual military
services, primarily, and other agencies (such as the Department of
State) collected, and guarded zealously, so that the information
could be useful to the policy makers as well as the government as
a whole.  But, guarding service equities has always been a key
component of defense intelligence -- a component that has not
changed even with internal military moves toward "joint" operations
brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986.

     Although the Study Team did not intend to evaluate existing IC
agencies regarding how they were performing, we could not help but
notice that continued protection of individual services' equities
and the lack of a strong defense intelligence focal point for
policy and execution is causing the creation of a myriad of task
forces, working groups, boards and committees that tend to try and
attack new challenges while defending the structural status quo. 
Moreover, in order to make the existing rigid, vertical bureaucracy
of the IC more responsive to the military, legions of
representatives from intelligence agencies and program offices, and
intelligence support teams now deploy to the theaters to provide
SMO while, in essence, protecting structures.  We certainly believe
that, at the lowest operational level, a thorough understanding of
and experience with the requirements of an individual service unit
in the field must be part of the process of assessing needs, and,
in some cases, having tactical intelligence assets controlled and
operated in support of military operations is a requirement.  This
should not, however, be translated into "ownership" of assets in
every case, and the "band-aid" structure that has been developed
does not allow for the type of end-to-end, "corporate" approach
that we believe will be needed.

     This is not to say that improvements have not been made or
that intelligence cannot support current military operations. 
Clearly, the overall status of SMO since DESERT STORM has improved
in many areas.  The successful management of delegated intelligence
production by DIA, the establishment and operations of Joint
Intelligence Centers (JICs), especially in the Pacific Command, to
consolidate collection and analysis for the theater, the successful
deployment and integration of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into
theater operations to compensate for limitations of national
collectors, the myriad of types of products produced by DIA
specifically in response to operational needs and the establishment
of the INTELINK system and the ability to access products on
INTELINK via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
(JWICS) and the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
(JDISS), are but a few examples where the IC, especially in
defense, are responding to the call of new challenges in SMO.  The
old specter of redundancy and duplication have also been
significantly reduced, and, although there may be additional areas
where further attention to this issue is warranted, the redundancy
that remains appears to be valid and healthy, as one all-source
product cannot always serve all of the customer needs and requires
some tailoring.

     But the fact that the IC is coping with the challenges of
Somalia, for example, and, now, Bosnia, does not indicate that
current operations and structures are adequate for future SMO
requirements.  Several points in this regard were obtained through
the research for this paper and can be further expanded upon.

     The significance of military deployments for OMO, such as in
Somalia, is that, in many ways, this type of support is more
difficult and demanding than the traditional force-on-force
analysis.  This is because the military's requirements in this
setting often call for more information on the immediate
"environment" to which U.S. forces are engaged.  Issues such as a
population's dialects, religion, ethnicity and physical environment
quickly become important for completion of the mission and for
protection of our forces -- especially smaller ones.   The types of
arms and militia structure, if any, involved, that often do not
conform to traditional force structures, are also vitally
important.  Likewise, understanding the more traditional military
capabilities and operations of lower-priority countries continues
to be important -- especially given the proliferation of weapons of
all types -- and requires analysis before a crisis emerges.  This
was made painfully clear during DESERT STORM when assessing the
IC's inability to locate and target Iraqi SCUD missiles and
launchers -- an issue that was generally listed as an "intelligence
failure."  The truth is, however, that prior to DESERT STORM, the
IC and the U.S. government did not consider the indigenous
production of SCUD missiles to be a priority issue -- certainly not
of enough priority to focus the required amount of attention and
resources that would have provided a full understanding of SCUD
operational deployment strategies.  These factors specifically
point to the growing importance of developing and maintaining an
worldwide intelligence "base" of knowledge.  This type of
information is best supplied as the U.S. is approaching the
decision to deploy troops -- indeed, it should be factored into the
decision-making process.  As stated in the previous section,
maintaining this "base" of knowledge must continue regardless of a
crisis at hand.  This "base" of knowledge need not be in the
Defense intelligence area -- many of the types of information may
be better analyzed in CIA, for example -- as long as Defense has
ready access when needed.  (Also see the discussion of the
intelligence "base" in the Intelligence Community "Surge"
Capability staff study.)

     The establishment of JICs addressed the realization that the
operational commander did not understand, nor had the time to deal
with tasking national collectors.  One of the often heard comments
to the Study Team was that the collection "stovepipes" forced a
commander to place multiple requests for information, each uniquely
structured so as to fit into the specific collection discipline. 
Moreover, the development and employment of National Intelligence
Support Teams (of which there are at least four supporting Bosnian
SMO), JICs and Joint Analysis Centers (JACs) and the Defense
Collection Coordination Center (DCCC), further indicate that better
"horizontal" and synergistic management and operations of national
collection assets is required. (See the Intelligence Community
Management staff study and the Collection Synergy staff study for
further discussion and for recommendation to create a Tactical
Collection Agency.)

     A growing concern about the concept of "sensor-to-shooter" was
also expressed.  Although some types of information need to be sent
directly to a weapons system, inundating and overwhelming the
"warrior" is a decided possibility.  Some saw the eventual solution
to this data overload problem in enhancing the capabilities and
responsibilities of the JICs and JACs for data/analysis fusion. 
Others were still concerned that the prospect of turning the
"warrior" into an analyst, and, thus, reducing his operational
effectiveness, were real and not necessarily good.

          FINDING:  Emphasis on concepts such as "sensor-to-shooter"
          have promoted the dissemination of intelligence
          data and products to the lowest level of military
          operations, without full consideration of the effect on
          the "warfighter."

     The issue of interoperability of information systems between
the IC and the military and between individual services is still an
issue.  A comment from a study of Bosnian operations last year by
the Defense Science Board summarized the issue, "The multitude of
separate, stovepipe, stand alone systems has proliferated in the
theater by well meaning providers."  This has caused, "unnecessary
overlap and has overcomplicated fusion."  (See the Intelligence
Community Management staff study for a recommendation to establish
an Infrastructure Support Office.)

     The concept of Command, Control, Communication, Computers and
Intelligence (C4I) is, at best, an artificial construct. 
Intelligence is a user of communications and is, in fact, becoming
more closely integrated with operations.  Tasking, collecting,
analyzing, fusing and disseminating intelligence useful to the
commander and the "warrior," and providing the mechanisms
(communications), especially within theater, that allows for the
necessary dissemination in the time required are two different and
daunting tasks.  Realization that the integration of national and
tactical collectors will also be key to future SMO has caused the
military to add emphasis on integration of collectors for
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) to enhance
battlefield information.  The difficulty in developing inter-theater
and cross-service compatibility with enough available
bandwidth to support operations is a difficult task; one that has
been the primary focus of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD)
for C4I.  Integration of ISR components and ISR with operations is,
in many respects, no less difficult, requiring more focused senior-
level attention than it is currently given by the ASD (C4I).  (See
the Intelligence Community Management staff study and the
Intelligence Communications staff study for a recommendation for an
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.)

     The advent of information technologies is having an impact on
intelligence reporting and dissemination that bring about
significant management challenges.  Although DIA has taken great
strides in managing analytical and production responsibilities
within DoD, technology that allows for more collaborative
production will further blur the "lanes of the road," and will
likely result in significant challenges ahead.  Some of these
challenges from a system perspective are being addressed in the
development of INTELINK and the Joint Intelligence Virtual
Architecture (JIVA).  From an intelligence analysis and production
perspective, however, there is a growing concern that single-source
(collection discipline) publications are increasingly using
collateral information to help put their information into context,
thus, appearing more like all-source publications.  As a result,
users may well incorporate a piece of analysis into a tailored
report for the commander that is believed to be a product of
analysis when it is not.  As technology allows for easier
publication possibilities by more and more users of INTELINK, the
problem can be exacerbated.  The IC as a whole, but, specifically,
DIA will need to take a more prominent management role.

     Finally, given the disparate responsibilities and activities
of intelligence throughout the defense establishment and the fact
that intelligence can take only a small portion of the SECDEF's
time, there needs to be a senior military officer responsible for
military intelligence management; someone who can look at defense
intelligence from "end-to-end," and also allow the DCI to obtain
the "corporate" view of the IC that will be required.  (See the
Intelligence Community Management staff study for a recommendation
of establishment of a Director of Military Intelligence.)

Future Requirements for SMO

     Perhaps one of the more interesting dynamics that will
significantly affect SMO for the future is the explosion of new
technologies across a wide range of disciplines and the emergence
of truer "joint" warfighting resulting from the Goldwater-Nichols
Act. The culmination of these points, observable in some limited
fashion during DESERT STORM, has some within the military
discussing new concepts in warfighting that could redefine SMO 10-15
years from now.  Such concepts envision an information-reliant
battlefield environment in which intelligence plays not only a
significant role, but a dominant and directive one.  An example of
this is the concept of providing a commander with "Dominant
Battlespace Awareness (DBA)."  As defined in the Annual Strategic
Intelligence Review on SMO, this concept is:

     "... the capability to achieve real-time, all-weather,
     continuous surveillance in and over a large geographical area. 
     This capability should be sufficient to determine the presence
     of most objects, emissions, activities or events of military
     interest.  The awareness portion of the concept is not limited
     to enemy activities -- it includes awareness of friendly
     forces, weather, terrain and the electromagnetic spectrum. 
     The battlespace over which the Joint Force Commander
     establishes DBA includes the geographical area (surface,
     subsurface, atmosphere, and space above it) where the most
     intense conflict will take place.  DBA is not solely an
     intelligence function."

Such goals, combined with the new challenges being contemplated in
the area of Information Warfare, pose daunting challenges for the
IC -- from both a technological and analytical standpoint -- and
there are only few who likely fully understand the ramification for
the IC and for the military.  Moreover, the excitement associated
with these concepts could easily overwhelm the intelligence
planning and support process so that development is concentrated in
these areas to the detriment of other national security needs. 
Some would argue that this "militarization" of intelligence is
already underway with the current leadership in the IC.

     What is true, however, is that in DESERT STORM, the
introduction of advanced, precision strike weaponry, the
identification of critical "centers of gravity" within the Iraqi
infrastructure and the tactical requirements for information
throughout the conflict pointed to a shift from intelligence as a
contributor to intelligence as a participant.  Lt. Gen. Kenneth
Minihan describes this shift as akin to the roles of a chicken and
a hog in a ham and eggs breakfast.  In such a meal, the chicken is
a contributor, while the hog is a participant.  Although mired in
traditional force-on-force strategies and operations, DESERT STORM
represented the beginning of a shift for the military in how future
wars will be fought.  It also deftly portrayed the all-consuming
nature of conflict on intelligence, especially as a participant.

     To effectively provide SMO in the 21st Century, the IC will
likely have to develop a concept of "Dominant Awareness."  The
ability to be active in collection and analysis -- ahead of
immediate requirements -- will make the IC our first line of
defense.  The ability to maintain a knowledge "base" on an
extremely diverse set of countries and issues will not only help
protect broad national security objectives, but in OMO, it could
well save lives.  In tactical, combat situations, taken to the
logical extremes projected by concepts such as DBA, intelligence
must somewhat take the lead rather than only providing a more
traditional supporting function that is often reactive.  To the
extent that the military moves in the direction of DBA, specific
cultural changes must be made, by the military and by the IC, in
how intelligence is collected, analyzed, disseminated and used.

     Support for the type of battlefield, or battlespace, that the
military is planning to operate within will take significant steps,
especially in automation, to achieve.  Put simply, a  capability
must be developed that provides continuous, near-real-time, sensor-to-
shooter data on all targets and all weapons.  Such a capability
begins with collection capabilities.  The ability to operate
"national" and "tactical" collectors in near-real-time and in a
synergistic fashion that does not waste resources, based on
redundancy or system limitations, is critical.  The speed at which
these systems must react suggests that not only an integrated
tasking mechanism must be developed, but that at least some
significant portions of such a system needs to automated --
operating without the burden of human intervention.  Likewise, the
experience already gained from Bosnia, indicates that extensive,
quick-reaction theater collectors and innovative "national"
collection capabilities must be developed to meet many of our
future needs.  Finally, a robust HUMINT and clandestine SIGINT
program is also of key importance.  Having the "person on the
ground" will continue to be the best way to assess an enemy's
intentions.  This type of collection support must begin well before
troops are deployed and the battle begins.  Waiting until the U.S.
establishes military "presence" will not provide the information
and advantages needed.

     Analysis and dissemination in this type of SMO environment
must provide the capability to identify the "centers of gravity" of
an enemy's infrastructure, and to have a thorough understanding of
the enemy's "environment" prior to the beginning of a conflict. 
The ability to fuse intelligence data -- not only the "raw" data
from collectors, but also disparate analysis from theater and
"national" entities becomes especially important so that the
tactical field commanders are not inundated to the point where
their efficiency and effectiveness are diminished.  On the
battlefield, the ability to fuse intelligence data and provide a
real-time picture of legitimate targets is a necessity.  Such a
capability may not be obtainable without significant advances in
automation to assist in areas such as bomb damage assessment.

     Today, systems development in the areas of ISR are primarily
in the hands of collection program managers in the NRO and the
acquisition components of each individual service and OSD.  If the
IC is to meet the needs of the military in the future, a more
"corporate," end-to-end outlook and management structure for the IC
as a whole will be needed.  In the 21st Century, the IC must attain
a "dominant awareness" of worldwide activities, without waiting to
be asked, if it is to provide the predictive and proactive type of
intelligence that will make it relevant to the policy maker and the
military commander.

          FINDING:  The new operational strategy, Dominant
          Battlefield Awareness, will require significant advances
          in technology, development of consolidated requirements,
          coherent tasking management and synergistic intelligence
          collection capabilities.  It is necessary to give serious
          thought to the amount of IC resources likely to be
          available to support such strategies.

     The Study Team firmly believes that SMO is a vital part of the
intelligence role and mission.  The IC has, in most cases,
performed admirably in this regard.  But the significance of the
changes in our nation's national security "threats" and our
responses to them, in how the nation employs its military forces,
in the advances of technology on information processing, in the
possible new paradigm in military strategies for combat, etc., that
are either here or are on the horizon, suggests that extensive
planning and operational, structural and management changes will be
required for the IC to meet its overall national security needs,
including SMO.  Some of the findings and recommendations in this
and other IC21 studies go toward this end and need to be addressed
soon if the IC is to be ready for the 21st century.