IC21: The Intelligence Community in the
21st Century
Staff Study
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
One Hundred Fourth Congress
X. Intelligence Community "Surge" Capability
Executive Summary
The Intelligence Community (IC) in the 21st Century will face
a world that presents different, more diverse national security
challenges than those presented during the Cold War. At the same
time, many of the issues and intelligence problems that were
spawned from the Cold War remain, and the IC is expected to address
the new and the old challenges with resources that have decreased
significantly since the end of the Cold War. Ambassador Robert
Kimmitt, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, in
testimony to the Committee, suggested that whether the IC remains
relevant and effective may well depend on its ability to be an
"inch deep" in everything, with the ability to have a "miles worth
of depth" on a specific subject at a moments notice. Creating such
a responsive IC will require increased internal operating
efficiencies; a more collective, corporate approach toward
utilization of resources; and structured programs that provide
continuous resource augmentation and "surge" capability.
This "surge" capability needs to be flexible, dynamic and
well-planned -- one that can be relied upon both day-to-day and
during crises. "Surge" can be defined very broadly, including the
ability to: move resources quickly to address immediate, usually
ad hoc, needs; augment existing resources from outside the IC; and,
improve responsiveness of resources by building in more flexible
options for collection and analysis. Taken together, these
capabilities should provide for the development and maintenance of
some level of knowledge on all countries/issues -- an intelligence
"base." This "base" of knowledge is critical for providing
predictive, timely and relevant analytical support to policy
makers, particularly prior to and during fast-breaking crisis
situations. As Representative Dicks, the Committee's Ranking
Minority Member, has stated, "intelligence must provide early
warning of potential crises or assist in developing sound policy
responses to national security threats."
In order to provide crisis warning and aid in policy
formulation, the IC's ability to maintain an intelligence "base"
cannot be sacrificed in order to focus entirely on other, more
immediate concerns. Maintaining its "base" will be an ongoing
challenge for the IC as it faces increasingly diverse intelligence
requirements based on policy makers' immediate national security
concerns and a voracious military customer that sees intelligence
becoming even a more integral part of the modern battlefield.
To address the need for "surge" capability, we make the
following recommendations:
The development of more flexible collection capabilities
that not only include moving to smaller satellites but
also
to developing and incorporating "tactical" satellites and
other assets, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, that would
allow for a "surge" in collection capability for a
specific
crisis. Such capabilities should respond to both tactical
and national requirements.
Provide the DCI with the ability to transfer personnel and
resources rapidly throughout the IC, and to have the
capability to bring "surge" resources into the IC from
other areas. The DCI must have the ability to establish
IC
Centers and Task Forces quickly and with full Community
participation.
An IC-wide Civilian Reserve Program should be established
that can be utilized to provide both "trends" and
"warning"
information and can be used to "surge," thus augmenting
existing IC assets, especially during crisis.
Better utilization of existing military intelligence
reserve units is also required. This should include more
focused, corporate management and tasking of these assets
during peacetime, with oversight responsibilities by the
Director of Military Intelligence.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY "SURGE" CAPABILITY
Scope
Throughout the review of the Intelligence Community (IC)
during the 104th Congress, a wide spectrum of intelligence
producers and consumers have consistently voiced concerns about the
need for a change in the skills mix of the analytical population
and the need for additional analysts. Those in the intelligence
collection areas would argue that, based on problems identified in
DESERT STORM and on the potential demands for intelligence support
to military operations (SMO), a similar problem exists for
collection assets. Yet, the IC is continuing to undertake
significant, Congressionally-directed reductions in personnel as a
response to the end of the Cold War. Indeed, given the amount of
intelligence resources devoted to the Soviet Union, it seemed
logical that without this threat the IC would only need a fraction
of the resources it had during the Cold War.
Most would argue that the "downsizing" was necessary and will
be good for the IC in the long run. Many who have to deal with the
IC, especially from the "outside," would agree that the bureaucracy
tends to impede the efficiency of intelligence operations. Under
the current system, evaluations of the success of national-level
collection is primarily left up to those who operate the collectors
and base their judgements on the amount of information collected by
a particular system and in what time period the information was
collected, rather than on whether the intelligence questions were
answered.
Since the end of the Cold War, the IC has had to deal with
increasingly diverse policy maker requirements. At the same time,
its resources have shrunk considerably. Unfortunately for the IC,
it cannot take the position that it "can't do everything," because
policy makers simply expect the IC to be able to respond to a
variety of requirements regardless of resource constraints. The
dilemma facing the IC was summed up well during an IC21 hearing by
Ambassador Robert Kimmitt, former Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs. Ambassador Kimmitt testified that the challenge
for the IC in the future is that it has to be an "inch deep" in a
thousand things all the time while also being able, when a
particular issue arises, to have a "mile's worth of depth" on that
subject. If true, and apparently borne out since 1989, the ability
to build extensive data bases and conduct more "predictive" and
"warning" analysis for all areas of the world will be key to IC
effectiveness in the future, as will be the ability to redirect
assets -- collectors and analysts -- very quickly to new and in
some cases, unanticipated problem areas.
A principal reason for this study, then, is to examine the
dichotomy between growing requirements (i.e., increasing requests
for IC involvement in military operations and in the policy
process) and the reduction of IC resources. If the IC is to
continue to be relevant, its ability to "surge" resources to meet
demands must be improved. Such "surge" capability can be defined
very broadly, including the ability to: move resources quickly to
address immediate, usually ad hoc, needs; augment existing
resources from outside the IC; and, improve responsiveness of
resources by building in more flexible options for collection. As
important, improving the efficiency of the existing IC by
restructuring or reorganizing resources can also have a significant
effect on the ability of the IC to meet future challenges. The
importance of having or developing "surge" capabilities is quite
clear -- the IC will likely never be as large as it was in the
1980s even though the demands on the IC will continue to grow.
Approach
The "Surge" Study Team approached this study by looking at the
breadth that the IC must acquire in order to be effective in the
future. The Team conducted panels and interviews that included
individuals both inside and outside of the IC. Several questions
were asked of those interviewed, including:
What are the core capabilities that are "generic" to
collection, analysis and dissemination resources that
would form a "21st Century baseline" for the IC?
What are ways that the IC could "surge" to meet
unexpected challenges?
Does the DCI have the necessary authorities to quickly
move resources -- collectors, analysts and funds --
within the IC to fully address ad hoc "surge"
requirements. What administrative hurdles must be
addressed in order to achieve "portability" of
intelligence resources (i.e., resources that can be
moved
and utilized throughout the IC)?
Because of developments in areas such as information
technologies and communications, can some "portability"
be achieved without physically moving resources? Should
the IC consider "specialty nodes" whose expertise can be
"tapped" when needed for certain specialties? Does this
benefit either tactical or strategic analysis?
In the present day IC, managers tend to feel threatened
by the loss of personnel dedicated exclusively to their
workload. How can supervisory fiefdoms be made more
"Community" in outlook? How can contributions to
"Community" needs become a positive factor in the
overall
assessment of employee and unit performance?
What type of substantive "surge" capability should
exist?
How does the IC "tap" into resources within academia or
industry? Is this sufficient? Is a Civilian
Intelligence
Reserve Program a viable option?
Should portions of the current or future IC function be
privatized in order to utilize scarce resources in other
areas? What areas might be subject to privatization?
What effect, if any, does DoD's focus on being able to
respond to two Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) have
on
how the IC should be structured, particularly in terms
of
its ability to "surge?"
In order to assess likely "surge" requirements for the
future,
the study also examined recent events where some "surge" capability
was required for support to "other military operations" (OMO).
Meeting Challenges Today
Showing responsiveness to civilian and defense policy makers'
concerns is clearly a desire of any intelligence organization. As
a result, today's IC tends to respond (either in actions or in
budgetary requests) by lurching to the issue du jour or crisis of
the moment. This suggests that, in the future, without a dedicated
effort to develop and maintain an intelligence "base," a growing
imbalance in knowledge can develop in lower-priority areas.
Consequently, without a dedicated effort to develop and maintain
some sort of "surge" capability, the IC may have difficulty meeting
near-term challenges and may not be able to meet military and
policy maker needs in the future. We have already seen some
evidence to justify this concern. For example, the IC has
responded to Presidential Decision Directive-35 (PDD-35), by
focusing resources on the highest priority issues at the expense of
maintaining basic coverage on "lower" tier issues. PDD-35 is an
important document in that it presents the Administration's highest
national security policy priorities, thereby providing the IC
guidance for resource allocations. In a recent IC study of the
capabilities of existing resources to meet PDD-35 requirements, the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence directed that the study,
"Review the Community's core capabilities mapped against the
highest policy priorities in order to determine the most cost
effective allocation of resources." Although this effort is
laudable, the Study Team is concerned that in the rush to fulfill
top PDD-35 requirements, the IC may be creating intelligence gaps
in other areas.
Indeed, the IC is responding to PDD-35 in a predictable
fashion eager to show the Administration that it is responsive to
these priorities. However, the IC over-emphasis on the "top-Tier"
issues could be harmful to the IC's future capabilities. For
example, when considering that four of the last five deployments of
U.S. military forces for OMO were to countries/regions that were,
at best, "lower-Tier," the ability of the IC to provide
intelligence support to OMO in the future is called into question
if the preponderance of resources is almost entirely on "top-Tier"
issues.
Likewise, emphasis on "higher-Tier" issues focuses attention
(and resources) to areas that already have been identified as being
national security "threats." But what about those "threats" and
situations that have not yet been identified? As Assistant
Secretary of State Toby Gati recently told the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, "Intelligence can play a vital role in
identifying opportunities for diplomatic intervention and provide
critical support to our Nation's policy makers as they seek to
resolve problems before they endanger U.S. citizens, soldiers or
interests, and as they negotiate solutions to festering problems.
This is the essence of 'intelligence in support of diplomacy,' an
often ignored but vital component of our national security."
Again, issues such as those described by Assistant Secretary Gati
are likely not to be at the highest "tier" on a day-to-day basis.
The PDD-35 priority structure has had an effect on
intelligence requirements for "lower-Tier" countries. For example,
SMO, which is PDD-35's top national intelligence priority, is a top
collection priority for many "lower-Tier" countries. SMO-related
intelligence requirements would include information on the size,
capabilities and locations of a country's military forces, and
physical details about a country's topography. This information is
deemed necessary based on the possibility that U.S. forces may have
to operate in a particular country in the future. Other
"non-military"
requirements for these "lower-Tier" countries, however,
such as a country's political climate, economic structure and
internal stability, are of much lower priority or not reflected as
having any priority. Moreover, the growing number of SMO
requirements threaten to consume resources that could be used to
address non-military requirements. As a result, the Community may
spend more time gathering intelligence for potential SMO than for
monitoring other developments that might aid in supporting
diplomatic efforts to prevent a situation where deployment of
forces would be necessary. Ironically, several of the Commanders-in-
Chief (CINCs), expressed the desire to have the type of non-military
information that was traditionally important only to
civilian policy makers. Changes in world events and in the demands
being placed on the military for OMO are making the need for this
type of information as important as the need for the more
traditional military-related information -- a situation that many
of the CINCs believe will continue to increase in importance.
Yet another concern regarding reliance on the "tier"
structure
is the assumption by many that other government resources,
especially diplomatic resources, will supply the necessary
intelligence for the "lower-tier" countries. Unfortunately, U.S.
diplomatic resources are undergoing the same downsizing and
concurrent reduction in diplomatic reporting capabilities as is the
IC, and in the same areas. (See the Intelligence Requirements
Process staff study for additional information regarding PDD-35 and
the Tier structure.)
As stated above, the IC recently conducted an assessment of
the effectiveness of its current capabilities when mapped against
the Administration's highest policy priorities. This study proved
interesting to the Study Team in terms of how the IC can address
today's issues, and whether it is suited to meet the challenges of
the future effectively. We believe that this study, which was well
done, suggests that even with recent resource reductions, the IC
can respond to many tasks levied by the policy makers. The study
also highlights, however, several points that should be
disconcerting to those concerned about the IC's future ability to
address national security challenges. An important area is what
the parameters do not include, which tends to portray a utopian
national security "environment."
The fact that the study did not account for
tasking conflicts bases the analysis on a premise
that there is only one primary issue of national
security at a time, or that multiple areas of
focus are geographically separated so that there
is no competition for resources. An environment
in which there is only one high-level policy
concern at a time does not exist today and seems
highly unlikely in the future, given the track
record that the world has witnessed since the end
of the Cold War.
By not including warfighting needs, the assessment
side-steps what is one of the major priorities of current IC
leadership: SMO. The amount of resources used in DESERT
STORM were significant; the vast majority of intelligence
effort, in fact, was redirected to that region. The
tendency of the IC to focus on the crisis of the moment,
though understandable, can diminish effort in other areas.
The parameters state that the study may not represent
"current daily performance." Thus, the ability of the
IC to "surge" to meet requirements was of extreme
importance. A logical extension of this is that, on
any given day, a question may be difficult to respond
to without "surging" resources.
Finally, by not including a survey of customer
satisfaction, the IC has deliberately studied a point in
time, somewhat ignoring the likelihood that requirements
will grow. So, legitimately, this study reflects where we
are today, not how the IC is prepared for the future.
As a result, the overall effectiveness of the IC in terms of
meeting future needs and challenges appears somewhat fragile, thus
warranting the development of a stable, reliable, dynamic "surge"
capability for crisis and non-crisis periods.
The IC has begun to realize that there is a flaw in the
PDD-35
philosophy, or certainly in how the Community is responding. A
Strategic Resources Planning Task Force has been established and is
working to address the philosophic and resource shortfalls that
PDD-35 is creating.
"Surge" in Today's IC
There are many recent examples where a "surge" capability has
been used by the IC. Clearly, the military intelligence
organizations have practical experience at "surging" resources
between theaters to support specific crisis situations. There are
also other, more technical examples where "surge" has been
successful. The development and use in Bosnia of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) and the emergence of IC Centers are both variations
on the "surge" theme. But today, the concept of "surge" tends to
be viewed more as an emergency stop-gap measure for crises in
places like Rwanda and Somalia, than as a well-planned capability
to be consistently relied upon. Given the frequency in which the
U.S. is engaging, and likely will continue to engage in OMO, a
continued reliance on ad hoc measures seems inadequate.
The concept of "surge" has applications in the areas of
collection, exploitation and analysis and production.
Collection
U.S. involvement in Bosnia and other places, has indicated
that "national" collection assets that were the bedrock of our
collection efforts against the Soviet Union may not readily answer
the needs of the future.
In Bosnia, the IC has "surged" to meet some additional
requirements by employing UAVs. These vehicles have proven to be
flexible in terms of tasking and in operating under difficult
weather and terrain conditions. Although not a replacement for
"national" assets in terms of the overall collection requirements,
UAVs are proving to be viable "surge" assets, especially for
tactical situations. The use of UAVs on a high priority national
issue like Bosnia, however, has raised complications about handling
ostensibly tactical collection and keeping national-level leaders
informed. As information technologies and "surge" capabilities
continue to evolve, the policy issue of theater-to-national
dissemination of intelligence will become extremely important to
the effectiveness of the IC, especially in the all-source area.
Tasking/Exploitation
Various examples of surge capability are available in this
area. One example is the deployment of National Intelligence
Support Teams (NIST) to "forward" areas in order to augment
military capabilities, as well as to assist theater commanders in
understanding what "national" systems can provide and how they can
be tasked. The response to NIST deployments has been
overwhelmingly positive. That NIST in essence provides a type of
synergistic, horizontal approach to collection, suggests that such
an approach could be beneficial on a larger, Community scale.
Analysis and Production
Providing "surge" capability in the area of analysis is
currently not as dynamic a process as it is in other areas. The
National Intelligence Council (NIC) has made an effort to hire
individuals working outside of the IC as National Intelligence
Officers (NIOs). Not only can these NIOs bring differing
perspectives to an area of concern, they can also utilize their
contacts, usually in academia, to "tap" into noted expert resources
that the IC does not have internally. In many cases, it can be
useful for the IC to have access to noted non-IC experts from
academia and industry because of their access to various forums and
other experts who would not ordinarily avail themselves to
government employees. Another example of "surge" capability can be
found in a small program within the CIA called "when actually
employed" or WAE. WAE, which is more of an employment status than
a program, is utilized by individuals who are former employees or
spouses of Agency employees. WAEs are asked to maintain a level of
expertise in a specific area, sometimes by utilizing open source
research, so that if a crisis develops, he or she can bring his or
her expertise to CIA Headquarters to augment an office or task
force throughout the crisis period.
To a point, current IC Centers represent a longer-term
"surge"
capability in which the IC has brought together its assets to focus
on a specific issue or area. It is possible that such a structure
may prove the most effective mechanism for concentrating IC efforts
against specific issues. See the separate staff study on
Intelligence Centers for more details.
Clearly another area of "surge" is found within DoD in the
military services' reserve programs. This structured program has
provided invaluable force augmentation to active duty units and,
although the results vary with various units and areas of
expertise, the program may serve as a model for developing similar
capabilities in the area of civilian intelligence. Unfortunately,
military intelligence reserve units continue to be thought of in
terms of "mobilization" resources only, without much consideration
or desire to more actively engage these resources in day-to-day
activities.
There are signs of changing attitudes, however, that could
have significant pay-off for the military and the IC in the future,
although these efforts are the exception rather than the rule. One
example is found at the Joint Intelligence Center in the Pacific
Command (JICPAC). In this case, the JICPAC J-2 has involved
military reserve resources within his theater to assist in JICPAC's
delegated production responsibilities. This effort has provided
the J-2 with additional resources to combat shortfalls, and has
added theater-specific expertise to the DoD production operation --
expertise that is likely not found readily at DIA or CIA. Another
example is the use of the Joint Intelligence Reserve Unit to
support operations in the National Military Joint Intelligence
Center (NMJIC) at the Pentagon. This reserve unit takes over the
weekend operations of the NMJIC and has the capability to augment
the NMJIC during crisis periods. Such activity not only greatly
benefits the active duty military by relieving them of staffing
responsibilities on weekends, it also greatly enhances the
military's augmentation capabilities by having individuals who are
trained, up to date substantively, and can be relied upon at a
moment's notice.
Advances in information technologies and communications
capabilities are forecasting an era by which "surge" capability
will also be enhanced through collaborative analytical efforts
within existing IC assets. Efforts such as INTELINK, that provides
more advanced, multi-media dissemination capabilities for the
recipient to utilize in his or her timeframe, go a long way in
recognizing what technology is bringing to the intelligence
analyst.
Additional efforts are underway throughout the Community to
construct systems tailored to the analyst's or recipient's
environment. A "white board" capability on INTELINK will
undoubtedly prove useful in asking questions and working through
answers in a "virtual" environment. The Study Team found these
efforts most encouraging, although there are some reservations
regarding infrastructure standards and information/production
management. Standards are extremely important in a "virtual
analytic environment," and they need to be set and enforced at a
Community level to be successful. (See the Intelligence Community
Management study regarding an Infrastructure Support Office.)
Management of information is a more difficult issue. As the
Committee stated in the FY96 Authorization Bill, there is concern
about competition developing within the Community in terms of
publication of products. It would indeed be unfortunate and,
ultimately damaging for the IC should a "competition for market
share" develop. This is one reason why the DDCI heading the CIA
must have management authorities for all-source analysis and
production, with close cooperation of the Director of Military
Intelligence (DMI), to assure "lanes of the road" are being heeded.
The Study Team believes that the direction taken by DIA in
developing a Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA) is
correct in terms of standards and development of a "virtual
analytic environment." The Team believes that this effort should
be not only strongly supported but also used as a basis for a
Community-wide program.
Surge Capabilities for the Future: Conclusions and Recommendations
Unpredictability is one of the facts of life affecting all
intelligence systems. No requirements process will be able to
predict all of the issues that are likely to be of paramount
interest to policy makers in the course of any given year. Indeed,
flexibility of all resources -- technical and personnel -- are
necessary in order to respond quickly to new events. During an
IC21 hearing, Representative Dicks, the Committee's Ranking
Minority Member, explained the uncertainty of future intelligence
challenges by stating that: intelligence must provide early
warning of potential crises or assist in developing sound policy
responses to national security threats; it may not be as important
for the IC to be able to identify, with specificity, future
intelligence targets as it is for the IC to ensure that it has the
flexibility necessary to respond quickly and competently to those
targets, whatever they may be; and, now and in the future, events
will unfold quickly and unpredictably, and the IC will have to
figure out how it can make information more readily available to
those who can help U.S. interests, while still protecting sources
and methods.
The problem of requirements and resources has been made
increasingly difficult in the post-Cold War world. The end of the
Cold War not only removed the single overwhelming focus of the IC,
but also contributed to a breakdown of international order in
specific regions, which contributed to the growth of ethnic warfare
and exacerbated a number of transnational issues. A rapid
succession of disparate but not wholly dissimilar issues --
Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda -- have put added stress on the IC. Before
these crises arose, most of these were areas of little, if any,
interest to policy makers and, thus, to the IC. Consequently, the
ability of the IC to "surge" resources -- i.e., to focus collection
and analysis, and sometimes operational capabilities -- on these
suddenly important areas, is of increasing importance.
As stated earlier, one of the witnesses at an IC21 hearing,
Ambassador Robert Kimmitt, put it succinctly when he said that IC
coverage must be an "inch deep" and a "mile wide," with the ability
to go a "mile deep" on any given issue.
FINDING: The IC must be able to surge. As Ambassador
Robert Kimmitt put it succinctly, IC coverage must be
an "inch deep" and a "mile wide," with the ability to
go a "mile deep" on any given issue.
As long as we are a nation with global interests and global
commitments, we will need some level of global knowledge -- an
intelligence "base." However, in a nation as rich as the United
States is in information and experts, it is not necessary that this
knowledge base be contained only in the IC.
FINDING: The IC will be required to maintain some
level of knowledge on all nations/issues at some level
of detail -- an intelligence base. The capability to
support this base or to "go a mile deep" need not be
self-contained within the IC.
The ability to surge means, in effect, the ability to marshal
and move resources flexibly and quickly, without undue concerns
about who "owns" the assets. As the IC moves to a more corporate
approach, all components and all personnel must focus on performing
the tasks at hand and not battle over which component gets the most
resources or credit. Internecine competition undercuts efforts to
meet intelligence needs. The ability to surge also requires
planning in advance of the need.
FINDING: The ability to meet future challenges
effectively will require: increased internal
operating efficiencies; a more collective, corporate
approach toward utilization of resources; and
structured programs that provide continuous force
augmentation and "surge" capability.
If done correctly, a surge capability should serve both the
day-to-day needs of the IC, as resources are constantly readjusted
to meet international conditions and shifts in policy maker needs,
and allow for making larger reallocations of resources during
crises.
FINDING: A flexible, dynamic and well-planned surge
capability must be developed that can be relied upon
both day-to-day and during crises.
Reorganization of Existing Collection Resources
Some specific changes should be adopted to increase
efficiency
for the IC and the customer in the area of collection. Fully
adopting a more synergistic approach to collection resources in
terms of requirements and tasking management as well as operations
will likely improve IC capabilities to solve the diverse
intelligence problems of the future. For example, consideration
should be given to a single "Technical Collection Agency" that
consolidates IMINT, SIGINT and MASINT resources in order to realize
the substantive advantages of synergistic collection in solving
intelligence issues. Such an organization should eliminate the
administrative and substantive barriers of existing "stovepipes,"
allow for easier, more effective tasking mechanisms for the
customer, reduce some of the redundancy in collection between
"INTs" and allow for better planning mechanisms for future systems
by placing emphasis on intelligence needs, not the ability of
program managers to "sell" their programs.
Developing the capability to "surge" national collection
assets should go beyond the requirements and tasking mechanism.
Further development of other collection assets for use in
augmenting national resources, such as UAVs, will prove to be
useful in closing some collection gaps efficiently and effectively,
but only if considered as part of an overall architecture of
collection resources. To address these areas further,
consideration of a more consolidated IC approach for development of
collectors such as UAVs is warranted. Such an approach should not
overlook the uses of these collectors for other IC requirements not
necessarily associated with the military.
As noted in the Collection Synergy study, the ability to do
"all source" collection and analysis is a key to U.S. intelligence
philosophy. There is an ongoing debate within the technical
collection community and the Congress about future directions for
satellites, revolving around the issues of size, capabilities and
numbers. Although the smaller satellites that some are advocating
-- including the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on an
exploratory basis -- might not match the current large satellites
in terms of the number of tasks that could be carried out, they do
offer a number of advantages that might be of tremendous importance
to our ability to "surge" collection assets. They would be cheaper
to build and to launch and could provide an extremely useful "on
the shelf" reserve to increase collection during a specific crisis.
RECOMMENDATION: Development of more flexible
collection capabilities should not only include moving
to smaller satellites, but also to developing and
incorporating "tactical" satellites that would allow
for a "surge" in collection capability for specific
crises.
IC Centers and Task Forces
The utility of Centers include the capability to pull
together
quickly the disparate resources of the IC into a concentrated,
synergistic effort on a specific issue or area. Because this
structure can benefit the IC overall, a better ability to develop
and operate Centers at a Community level should be developed.
Centers will never be fully considered as "Community" assets as
long as individual agencies believe that Centers are just a means
of sacrificing resources with little or no specific benefit to the
agency itself. Thus, a means of allowing the DCI to address
personnel, budget and management issues for Centers, and shift
resources accordingly, would benefit the Centers' effectiveness.
The enhanced IC-wide personnel authorities given to the DCI (see
Intelligence Community Management study) should increase the
ability of the senior IC managers to use their personnel better to
meet unexpected needs. This enhanced authority should be expanded
so that he can go outside of the IC when necessary and should be
used in conjunction with the DCI's authority to establish IC
Centers and Task Forces quickly as a means of coordinating IC-wide
resources for these needs.
RECOMMENDATION: The DCI's ability to establish IC
Centers and Task Forces quickly (including the rapid
transfer of personnel and resources throughout the IC)
must be enhanced and should include the ability to
bring "surge" resources into the IC from other areas.
As important, the DCI must have the ability to quickly
disestablish a Center or Task Force when its existence is no longer
warranted and to guarantee that the contributing offices recover
their assets. A review and evaluation process is needed to
periodically assess whether a Center or Task Force is still a
viable component.
Analytic Tools
The means for improving analytic capabilities will come with
continued development of computer and information technologies and
communications capabilities that foster better, more accessible
relations among analysts. The ability to "surge" analytic
resources through "virtual" means will be critical.
FINDING: Current efforts to create a Joint
Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA) within DoD
show potential, and should be fully pursued and
expanded upon to create a "virtual analytic
environment" within the IC.
Civilian Reserve Program
The development of a Civilian Reserve Program may be the most
important aspect of preparing the IC for the future, especially in
terms of linguistic and analytic capabilities. Fully developing a
relationship with linguists, especially those in "exotic"
languages, could fill significant gaps that are developing in the
SIGINT and all-source areas of the IC.
The CIA already has in place procedures whereby it can
increase its capabilities by using former employees on a temporary
basis. This capability should be augmented into an IC civilian
reserve program, to include experts not in the IC (in academia,
business, etc.) who can be kept on retainer both to provide ongoing
information on warning and trends and to be utilized during crises
to augment IC assets. Such a program has several advantages.
First, it allows the IC to concentrate on the current areas of
concern while knowing that someone who is attuned to IC needs is
also keeping an eye on areas that are quiescent. Second, the
ability to bring in experts who understand local politics and
players in a region is especially important during the early phase
of a crisis, when the IC is often scrambling to come up to speed.
Many of these experts can be kept on retainer and be asked to do
unclassified work, which, in effect, will provide the IC with more
knowledgeable access to the open sources. If the "reservists" are
asked to work within the IC for extended periods, then some thought
has to be given to the issue of clearances and polygraph
requirements. A flexible approach to these issues would best serve
the overall interests of the IC and the nation.
There are many ways a civilian reserve program could be run.
To be successful, however, such a program would probably have to be
developed and managed at the Community level, so as to properly
address administrative concerns (security, pay, etc.) as well as
substantive concerns -- assuring that duplicative expertise is
minimized and agencies do not compete for resources to support
individual reserve programs. Some developmental work on a reserve
program is being done at this time in the National Intelligence
Council (NIC). This work should continue and a pilot program
should be enacted in the near term.
RECOMMENDATION: An IC-wide civilian reserve program
should be established, whose participants can provide
ongoing trends and warning information and can be
utilized to "surge" as part of the IC, thus augmenting
existing IC assets, especially during crises.
Military Intelligence Reserve Resources
Similarly, better use should be made of military intelligence
reserve components. Currently, reserve units are under the control
of military service reserve chiefs who are responsible for ensuring
necessary units are available for mobilization. By treating
intelligence units strictly as mobilization assets, these units
have been subjected to resource cuts and constraints as are any
other reserve units. Additionally, any consideration of utilizing
intelligence reserve units during non-crisis periods has evoked
cries of Title 10 authorities and endangerment of military
readiness. But intelligence is most effective for national
security when it can deliver predictive analysis and warning well
ahead of a crisis. Thus, it seems somewhat short-sighted to hoard
capability that might be used to both prevent a crisis and
certainly to prepare for a crisis, for the sake of ownership or
control. Consequently, the Study Team believes that the SECDEF
should capitalize on those efforts that are mentioned in this paper
to craft an arrangement between the service reserve chiefs and the
Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) to better utilize military
intelligence reserve resources. This would result in allowing the
DMI and DoD to make better use of intelligence reserves in non-crisis
situations, thus adding an additional "surge" capability to
the Intelligence Community.
RECOMMENDATION: Better utilization of existing
military reserve components is also required.
Consideration should be given to placing some of these
components under the DMI for better utilization during
time of need.