1996 Congressional Hearings
Intelligence and Security

  
Bosnia
Army Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes

Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Senate Armed Services Committee 

1 August 1996 



I am pleased to provide the military intelligence perspective on
developments in Bosnia and the challenges that face the military
intelligence community.  In my testimony before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence in February, I stated that the situation in
Bosnia was likely to become more complex as the implementation of the
Dayton Accords moved from the military phase into the civil phase. 
This has indeed been the case with economic revitalization, freedom of
movement, refugee repatriation, handling of indicted war criminals,
and elections taking center stage.

The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) has been a success.  Through
its execution of the military aspects of the Dayton Accord, IFOR is
helping to establish viable conditions for the further implementation
of the accord.  The former warring factions have generally complied
with the ceasefire provisions and other elements of the peace
settlement.  Indeed, no significant military activity has been
conducted by any of the parties since IFOR's arrival in December 1995. 
The implementation of the military provisions of the accord, along
with IFOR's presence, have effectively rendered the forces of the
former warring factions incapable of conducting significant military
operations without considerable lead time.  Essentially, IFOR has
overseen the withdrawal of Bosnian Federation and Bosnian Serb forces
along the zone of separation and the demobilization of those forces to
nearly half of their wartime strength.  All former warring faction air
defense radars have been shut down.  There has been no significant air
activity.  Most prisoners of war have been released.  IFOR has
overseen the movement of forces and heavy weapons into designated
cantonment areas.  Some resistance, including attempts to hide weapons
and other equipment, have been detected.  When faced with a determined
IFOR resolve, the FWF's have complied.  However, compliance has become
more selective, and foot-dragging by the FWF's has become more
pronounced.  This has required constant vigilance and a firm hand by
IFOR.

The main hazards facing IFOR remain:  land mines, accidents and random
acts of violence, and the threat of terrorism.  The force must also
guard against attacks by indirect fire weapons, such as mortars.  Such
attacks remain a possibility.  Since my testimony before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence in February, the threat environment
for IFOR has increased slightly primarily due to the steps taken to
implement the civil aspects of the Dayton Accord.  Pressure to remove
indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic from power has succeeded in
securing his resignation from both the Presidency of the Republika
Srpska and the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party.
Nonetheless, the overall effect of Karadzic's withdrawal on Bosnian
Serb policy may be limited since he has been replaced by
Karadzic-loyalist, Dr. Biljana Plavsic.  In addition, Karadzic and
Bosnian Serb Army commander General Ratko Mladic, remain popular
figures among the Bosnian Serb population, and discussions about the
use of IFOR to arrest them have resulted in direct and public threats
being made against the NATO-led force by the Bosnian Serbs.

The status of indicted war criminals is but one of several key issues
affecting IFOR.  The run-up to the country-wide elections scheduled
for 14 September shows the primary nationalists parties which
currently head their respective ethnic communities: the Muslim-led
Party of Democratic Action (SDA -- President Izetbegovic's party), the
Serbian Democratic Party (SDS -- Radovan Karadzic's former party), and
the Bosnian Croat, Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ -- Kresimir Zubak's
party), are likely to hold sway.  Complicating matters has been the
issue of the participation of the SDS in the election, with the SDS
leadership likely to impede implementation of the Dayton Accords or
engineer a popular Serb boycott of the elections should it be banned
from the ballot.

The Muslim-Croat Federation remains a tenuous arrangement of grudging
accommodation.  As I stated in February, it was our belief that the
Bosnian Croats would continue to work toward "de facto" integration
with Zagreb. Bosnian Croat moves to retain their self-proclaimed state
of "Herzeg-Bosna" in violation of the Dayton Accord is indicative of
the Bosnian Croat reluctance to cede real authority to the Federation. 
For their part, the Muslims have insisted on maintaining separate
civilian control of the Bosnian Government Army and not subordinate it
to the President of the Federation.  In addition, some key functions
remain dual-hatted between the Bosnian Government and the Federation.

The city of Brcko, in northeast Bosnia, the status of which was
deferred at Dayton, remains a significant flashpoint.  As you recall,
retaining control of the Posovina corridor was and remains the key
strategic objective of the Bosnian Serbs.  The corridor serves as the
link between the eastern and western halves of the Republika Srpska
and maintaining full control of Brcko, which straddles the corridor,
and its environs, is key to that objective.  The Bosnian government
would at the very least like to ensure the return of refugees and
economic transit rights through Brcko -- both of which may be resisted
by the Bosnian Serb side.  There appears to be some, but precious
little maneuver room between the demands of both sides. 
Dissatisfaction on this key territorial issue could sow the seeds for
future conflict in the area.

Under the freedom of movement provisions of the accord, the desire of
Bosnian Muslim refugees to return to their home regions, either to
visit relatives and grave sites or to permanently relocate, has
resulted in clashes between local Serbs and returning Muslims.  On
occasion, IFOR troops have had to intervene to prevent serious
violence.  To date, movement of displaced persons across the
Inter-entity boundary line has been minimal, and few refugees have
resettled in areas controlled by the other ethnic groups.

These examples illustrate the continuing challenge facing the
international community and point to a trend toward de facto partition
of Bosnia into at least two, if not three parts.  This trend has
represented a "slide" rather than a "rush" toward partition, the
results of which could potentially be confirmed by the upcoming
election unless more moderate political elements, which are currently
weak and fragmented, are given a fair chance at challenging the three
main political parties.  Even this, however, may not be enough to
avoid practical partition.

Given the fact that the strategic goals of the main political
protagonists have not changed, continued international engagement and
pressure, over some period of time, will be required to proceed with
the work of trying to establish a viable Bosnian state.  Without such
continued engagement, it is, in my opinion, likely the former warring
factions will turn once again to violent conflict in an attempt to
achieve their goals.

On the subject of intelligence challenges relating to Bosnia, it is
difficult to discuss specific aspects of this issue in this open
forum.  In general, the military intelligence community has adopted an
approach that differs significantly from our normal doctrine, which
was designed for a high-intensity, mobile battlefield supporting
conventional warfighting.  Peace implementation missions such as the
one in Bosnia require a different allocation and use of resources. 
IFOR has brought together a unique coalition of NATO and non-NATO
forces, which demand a "common view of the situation."  This has
ushered in significant changes in how the military intelligence
community supports the force.  This is especially true in the area of
releasability and dissemination of intelligence and in the level of
cooperation, especially among NATO intelligence elements.  The use of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), the application of many other sensors
and sources to the unusual circumstances in Bosnia and the surrounding
region, and the use of advanced automation and telepresence to ensure
connectivity from the operational to the strategic level, are
indicative of some of the many changes in military intelligence
support.  We have begun to discuss and plan for post-IFOR intelligence
support, but a firm plan will not be in place until we discuss the
issue with our allies this fall.  Specific intelligence challenges
that IFOR and the United States will face in the future require a more
in-depth treatment in closed session.  I will be pleased to return to
discuss this issue in such a forum at your convenience.

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