1996 Congressional HearingsIntelligence and Security
1996 Congressional HearingsChairman Specter, Senator Kerrey. It is a privilege to join you to
present the views of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research on the current and projected worldwide threats to our national
interests. In his "State of the Union" address, President Clinton
defined seven threats to the security and national interests of the
United States: the threat of terrorism; the spread of weapons of mass
destruction; organized crime; drug trafficking; ethnic and religious
hatred; the behavior of rogue nations; and environmental degradation.
These seven threats are our highest priority. They are our most
immediate dangers, and the ones that Dr. Deutch, General Hughes, and I
will focus on today. Threats of this type involve the actions of hostile
states or groups or transnational phenomena with global consequences
(e.g., narcotrafficking and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction). Such threats are now widely recognized and reasonably well
understood. The intelligence community makes an invaluable contribution
to our national security by effectively targeting these threats for
collection and analysis.
There is a second kind of threat that often goes unrecognized, akin to
Sherlock Holmes' dog that didn't bark. Such threats derive from missed
or unexploited opportunities to advance our national agenda. If we fail
to recognize such opportunities, or pursue them with ill-founded and
misguided strategies, we can exacerbate existing dangers or create new
ones. Intelligence can play a vital role in identifying opportunities
for diplomatic intervention and provide critical support to our nation's
policymakers as they seek to resolve problems before they endanger U.S.
citizens, soldiers, or interests, and as they negotiate solutions to
festering problems. This is the essence of "intelligence in support of
diplomacy," an often ignored but vital component of our national security.
Our experiences in Bosnia and North Korea underscore the importance of
intelligence in support of diplomacy and the consequences had we failed
to exploit diplomatic opportunities when they arise. Similar
opportunities for conflict resolution exist elsewhere; it is vital that
we seize the moments to resolve problems through negotiations and thereby
prevent missed opportunities from turning into threats to our interests.
For example, early detection of the emerging crisis in the Aegean
recently and timely intelligence during the critical hours of possible
Greek-Turkish clashes proved invaluable in preventing a major eruption
among NATO allies.
Our diplomats, the military, and intelligence professionals play
critical, complementary, and mutually supportive roles in the
identification, analysis, and response to threats to U.S. security and
national interests. Believing strongly that all three are critical to
this joint effort, I must issue a warning: the threats outlined in my
testimony and in that of Dr. Deutch -and General Hughes, are being
exacerbated by actions that degrade our worldwide diplomatic presence.
Simply stated, budget cuts are forcing the closing of overseas posts, the
elimination of literally thousands of foreign service positions, the
forced retirement of foreign service professionals, and the reduction or
curtailment of several of our programs. This has already impacted our
ability to identify, interpret, and ameliorate the threats we will
discuss today.
Foreign service reporting is the lowest cost, least-risk source of
intelligence on most threats, and diplomatic intervention and well
targeted foreign assistance are the first-used, lowest-cost way to
address every one of them. What we can no longer acquire via our
diplomatic presence and foreign service reporting must be collected using
more expensive, higher-risk methods. The problem is compounded by the
loss or degradation of diplomatic platforms for collection by military
attaches, commercial officers, and other U.S. government personnel. Even
more dangerous is the erosion of our ability to ameliorate threats
through diplomacy and the consequent increase in the likelihood that they
will have to be addressed through costly and dangerous military
intervention.
The shrinking foreign affairs budget has direct and detrimental
consequences for our intelligence capabilities. When foreign service
operations contract, intelligence suffers. We lose critical types of
information and we diminish our capability to provide feedback to
analysts and collectors. We also lose the insights of foreign service
officers able to assess directly the behavior of officials in other
nations as we seek to persuade them to work with us against rogue states
and malevolent transnational actors.
I would be happy to discuss the latter types of threats in greater
detail, but will turn now to the central focus of this hearing. The
threats discussed below are grouped geographically and functionally, but
are not necessarily rank ordered; all warrant serious concern and
concerted efforts to reduce the risk to U.S. interests.
The overall list of threats discussed in this report is very similar to
the one contained in my 1995 testimony to this committee, but the nature
and intensity of specific threats has changed, often as a result of U.S.
diplomacy. For example, although North Korea continues to pose
significant collection, analytical, and military challenges, successful
implementation of the Framework Agreement has frozen Pyongyang's nuclear
program and Americans are now working at the Yongbyon nuclear complex to
ensure the safety and security of spent fuel. The US-led diplomatic
effort culminating in the Dayton Agreements has brought peace to Bosnia
but we now face the threat of attacks against U.S. personnel (including
U.S. troops) by stay-behind mujahidin and irreconcilables on all sides.
U.S. diplomacy also has transformed, and somewhat diminished, threats to
Americans and American interests in the Middle East. Progress toward a
comprehensive peace has eroded support for Hamas and other terrorist
groups while strengthening the resolve of others to do even more to
derail the peace process.
However, some of the threats noted last year have become more worrisome.
In South Asia, commentators in India and Pakistan are publicly urging
their governments to acknowledge -- and intensify-their nuclear programs,
and to develop and deploy new missile systems. China's military build-up
continues and Beijing has staged a series of threatening military
exercises to intimidate Taiwan. Both in South Asia and in the Taiwan
Straits situation the role of diplomacy may yet prove critical to a
peaceful resolution, but both require careful monitoring by the
intelligence community.
RUSSIA
The June presidential elections will be a seminal political event in
Russia. An open and fair election will mark an important step forward in
Russia's evolution toward a rule-of-law state. But Russia's
transformation into a more open society is not assured. Indeed Russia's
development since 1991 has been fraught with difficulties. These result,
in part, from the enormity of the task, but self-inflicted wounds, such
as the military intervention in Chechnya and the legacy of the Soviet
past also play a role.
A great deal has been accomplished in the last five years. Steps have
been taken both to marketize and demilitarize the economy. A free press,
open debate and political pluralism have been introduced. Russia has
said that it accepts the independence of the other former Soviet states
-- welcome words which we must see reflected in practice -- and
established cooperative relationships with Western states and
institutions.
Russia has been moving, on schedule, to meet the nuclear arms and missile
reductions agreed to in START I. On non-proliferation, though we may not
agree with every Russian undertaking -- for example, sales of nuclear
reactors to Iran -- we would generally give Russia high marks for its
support for and compliance with international proliferation norms.
The strong showing by Communist and nationalist candidates in the
December 1995 Duma elections reflects popular dissatisfaction with the
downside of the reforms -- the rise in economic and political
uncertainty, crime, economic inequality, and corruption. There is a good
deal of nostalgia for the old Soviet Union: many now remember the inertia
and stagnation of the communist system as stability and security. This
is particularly so among social groups who have suffered most in the last
five years, and among the many Russians who resent the diminution of
Russia's place in the world. A victory by staunch opponents of reform in
the June elections would mark a setback for Russia. It could hamper
Russian integration into the world economy, limit U.S. opportunities to
cooperate with Russia, and narrow the opportunities for Western business
to contribute to the rebuilding of Russia's economy. Conversely, if
Russia elects a more reform-minded President in June, the chances are
greater that we will face a more stable, more democratic, and more
outward-looking Russia.
But whatever the outcome, we are in for a period of rising nationalist
rhetoric, coupled with assertive calls for strengthening the Russian
state and Russia's role abroad, especially in the CIS states. In the
short term, we should not anticipate dramatic changes in Russian foreign
policy. The new Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, knows the outside
world and understands that Russia's global influence is enhanced more by
engagement than by isolation. Russia has far less ability to project
power beyond its borders and challenge Western interests in third
countries than did the Soviet Union. Equally important, the domestic
levers of control that harnessed the country's economic wealth for
political and military goals have eroded, regional leaders have gained
new power, and the Newly Independent States and Central European nations
the USSR once controlled are determined to keep their independence.
At the same time, the war in Chechnya has exposed serious problems within
the Russian military and unleashed brutal military operations that have
violated human rights and galvanized opposition within Russia while
failing to break the Chechen opposition. As incidents involving the
other parts of the North Caucasus widen the circle of devastation, the
risks to Moscow's authority grow.
EAST ASIA -- Despite several territorial disputes, relations among states
in the region are more extensive and more mutually beneficial than at any
time in modern history. Preserving the peace and stability that have
brought unprecedented prosperity to the region -- and to the U.S. -- is a
shared objective. Within this generally positive context, developments
on the Korean Peninsula pose the most serious potential threat to U.S.
interests.
The Korean Peninsula. The threat to American troops and to South Korea
from the large, well-equipped and forward-deployed North Korean army
remains high. But on top of long-standing concerns about North Korea's
intentions, we must now add uncertainty about the domestic situation in
the North and the possibility that domestic economic or political turmoil
could change the decision making calculus that has long prevented
conflict. Worsening economic conditions, severe food shortages, and
somewhat unusual -- though for now quite limited -- military training
patterns underscore the unprecedented stresses afflicting the regime in
Pyongyang. Pyongyang's response to its growing economic and, possibly,
political difficulties is extremely difficult to predict but will likely
have important spillover impacts on neighboring countries. North Korea's
tight security and closed society makes it one of the most difficult
intelligence challenges we face.
At the same time, we have begun to engage the North Koreans
diplomatically, gaining experience and insights as we go. We are slowly
beginning to address critical issues in direct talks aimed at
implementing the Agreed Framework. In addition to the nuclear reactor
aspects I will address later, North Korea has allowed the Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to begin monitoring with
high-technology U.S. equipment the use of heavy fuel oil provided under
the Agreed Framework. Issues such as POW/MIAs also can more effectively
be brought to the table.
Consequently, intelligence and analysis on North Korea increasingly are
being called on to go beyond their traditional Indications and Warning
focus to provide a basis for policies aimed at defusing tensions. As I
testified last year, the danger of conflict remains unacceptably high.
But, with our allies in South Korea and Japan, we are using diplomacy to
create new economic and political opportunities for ensuring peace and
stability on the peninsula.
China. The importance of a strong, stable, prosperous, and open China
working in concert with its Asian neighbors and the U.S. cannot be
overemphasized. China is seeking a global stature commensurate with its
size, population, and permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council,
participating actively in multilateral organizations like APEC and the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
At the same time, China is modernizing its armed forces, acquiring
advanced military systems, including fighter aircraft and surface-to-air
missiles, to complement indigenous weapons development programs which
have achieved only limited success. The People's Liberation Army (PLA)
is also allocating resources to support more sophisticated training and
the transition from a cumbersome ground army primarily oriented to the
Soviet threat to a more mobile, streamlined force capable of dealing with
regional conflicts, defending territorial claims in the South China Sea,
or enforcing claimed sovereignty over Taiwan. The new Chinese threat
buzzwords -- "local and limited conflicts" -- are thinly veiled reference
to the Spratly Islands and Taiwan.
In 1995, Beijing attempted to allay concerns prompted by its military
modernization by publishing its first-ever defense "white paper." This
modest step towards transparency largely repeated Chinese positions on a
range of military, security and arms control issues, but, concurrently,
Beijing pushed ahead with confidence-building measures and security
dialogues with its neighbors that ranged from low-level and modest (e.g.,
with Japan and India) to top-level and robust (e.g., with Russia and
Burma). Running counter to these efforts, however, were China's
construction of a new outpost in the disputed Spratly Islands and saber
rattling in the Taiwan Strait.
China's emergence as a major regional power affects long-time American
allies, who are unsure of China's capabilities and intentions during a
period of leadership transition. Fueled by strong economic growth,
China's neighbors are also modernizing their forces, primarily in
response to new uncertainties about regional stability.
Beijing does many things which we find objectionable or problematic
(e.g., its treatment of dissidents, strong-arm tactics in Tibet, failure
adequately to protect intellectual property rights, and cooperation with
Pakistan's and Iran's nuclear and missile programs), all of which are
widely reported. But we also have many shared interests, including
preservation of stability on Korean peninsula, narcotics control, crime
prevention, and protection of the environment.
THE BALKANS AND EUROPE
Peace and stability in the former Yugoslavia is possible only if U.S. and
other participating forces, diplomats, and humanitarian and civil
reconstruction organizations build on the achievements of American
diplomacy in the Dayton agreements. The threat of hostile action remains
high, both among the parties and on the part of foreign-origin terrorist
elements. Securing the peace will be difficult and its prospects
doubtful unless military separation and confidence-building measures are
accompanied by success in the far more difficult tasks of economic
reconstruction and societal reconciliation. These tasks will take not
one, not two, but many years.
The scale of reconstruction required is staggering. The war in Bosnia
has caused the greatest refugee flows since World War II; infrastructure
and housing stock requires major repair; warring factions must be
disarmed, elections held and public security restored. Radical
extremists from within and outside of Bosnia will try to derail this
peace process. Indicted war criminals may seek to avoid prosecution by
the International War Crimes Tribunal by fomenting discord and fanning
old animosities. It is essential that American diplomats, as well as
U.S. and allied troops, be accorded the full support of the entire
intelligence community.
Reconciliation in Croatia has taken a strong step forward with an
agreement for peaceful integration of Serb-occupied Eastern Slavonia
under the guidance of a United Nations Transitional Authority. But
again, there is a real danger that extremists and criminals will seek to
block demilitarization, the return of displaced persons, and the
protection of local minorities, all of which must be accomplished to
ensure tranquility and social justice. If the peace does not hold in
Bosnia and Croatia, there is a serious risk that the conflict will spread
by igniting latent disputes within and among the other countries of the
former Yugoslavia.
Across East Central Europe, fledgling democracies are struggling to
cement reforms, maintain the momentum of democratic evolution, and vest
authority over military forces and security services in civilian hands.
Stability is not yet assured in this region; the U.S., working with the
European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), and a host of capable partners continues to press for measures
with which to strengthen and anchor these nations into Western
institutions and patterns of cooperation.
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
The goal of U.S. policy in the Middle East is a stable, peaceful,
economically prosperous and politically open region, in which Israel is
fully accepted and secure, the flow of oil fully guaranteed, and the
impetus to acquire more deadly arms is redirected into constructive
endeavors. Completion of the Middle East peace process is key to
achieving these objectives.
Despotic regimes, faltering pursuit of economic reform, popular resort to
religious extremism, and high birth rates still threaten political and
economic stability. More to the point, Iran, Iraq, and Libya continue to
threaten their neighbors. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq mounted two
catastrophic military invasions and pursued an active program to build
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Baghdad has for several years
obstructed the work of the U.N. Commission charged with dismantling its
capacity to build such weapons. U.S. Intelligence support has assisted
UNSCOM in carrying out its WMD monitoring and verification activities in
Iraq. Iraq and Iran continue to threaten two vital U.S. interests:
regional stability and the free flow of energy resources in the Gulf.
Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Sudan continue to harbor terrorists. All
except the latter engage in or plan programs to acquire weapons of mass
destruction and missile technology. These policies are particularly
dangerous and worrisome when pursued by authoritarian regimes with proven
interest in regional destabilization. Syria, which is also on the
terrorist state sponsors list and engaged in acquisition of CW and
advanced missile technology, is also actively negotiating with Israel to
achieve a peace agreement. Reaching an agreement would obviously have an
impact on Syrian behavior in these areas.
SOUTH ASIA
The original motive for India to acquire a nuclear weapons capability --
the threat it perceived from China, which fought a war with India in 1962
-- remains salient in Delhi. India's nuclear program drove Pakistan to
acquire a matching capability to counter the perceived threat from India.
Mutual suspicions on the subcontinent, increasing acceptance in both
India and Pakistan of the idea that nuclear weapons are an essential
attribute of major power status, and reluctance of either country to rely
on an external protector make this one of the most troubling regions on
the globe.
The half-century Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir worsened with the
surge in discontent against India by Kashmir's Muslim population
beginning five years ago. India charges that Pakistan's assistance to
secessionist militants in Kashmir impedes political resolution of the
problem; Pakistan claims that it offers only moral assistance. The
Kashmir dispute is not easily susceptible to resolution and remains a
possible flash point for regional war, with the potential to escalate
into a nuclear exchange.
Another persistent and troubling regional issue is the fighting in
Afghanistan, a country riven by ethnic, tribal, ideological, and personal
differences. Despite ongoing U.N. mediation efforts, there is no end in
sight to the civil war. Afghanistan is a focus of meddling by its
neighbors, a continuing source of training and weaponry for international
terrorists, a center of narcotics trafficking, and a generator of
instability in the region.
LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA
Latin America and Africa illustrate dramatically the importance of
transnational threats to security. Although no nation on either
continent militarily threatens the U.S. directly, activities within and
across national boundaries impact U.S. society and feed regional
instabilities.
Latin America. No American or Caribbean nation threatens U.S. military
or economic security, and no regional equivalent of Iraq or North Korea
has the military might to threaten regional peace and stability.
Moreover, no regional actor is an imminent WMD proliferator or
Iranian-style sponsor of international terrorism.
Two developments in the region do threaten U.S. interests: drug
trafficking and uncontrolled migrations. The flow of cocaine out of
source countries in the Andes (Bolivia, Peru, Colombia) and into the U.S.
through a number of transit points -- especially Mexico -- poses a
continuing threat to our social fabric. Potential migration flows from
countries like Cuba and Haiti, as well as increasingly sophisticated and
persistent alien smuggling operations, tax the response capabilities of
U.S. government agencies at all levels and create the potential for
humanitarian disasters.
Cuba is in desperate economic straits, no longer a model to any Latin
nation or an active conduit for destabilization. Cuba's isolation from
the general progress made in the Americas towards democracy increases the
likelihood of rapid, destabilizing social and political change with the
potential for yet another mass migration.
In Haiti, the demobilization of the armed forces, successful deployment
of the new Haitian National Police, and recent democratic transition have
reduced the threat of a massive new wave of boat people. However, lack
of tangible economic improvement, or failure to interdict and promptly
return intending migrants to Haiti, could trigger some increased
activity. The threat to U.S. forces in Haiti will diminish as numbers
are reduced and the scope of their mission narrows: U.S. forces will
stand down to force protection mode by the end of February, and the
concluding phase of the UNMIH mission will end in early April. It is
expected that the UNMIH-II mission, which does not employ U.S. forces,
will ensure adequate security for U.S. military engineers and other
specialists that may do brief rotational stints in Haiti over the coming
months.
Africa. Africa's recurring human tragedies -- genocidal ethnic
conflicts, civil wars, massive refugee flows, starvation and
malnutrition, AIDs and other deadly diseases -- remain in the spotlight.
While these do not threaten our nation's security, they frequently
require commitment of resources, mostly for humanitarian purposes but
also military resources that are then unavailable for deployment
elsewhere. Collapsing states and humanitarian crises also threaten
attainment of the important U.S. objectives of democratization,
protection of the environment, and expansion of the global economy.
African peacekeeping initiatives in Liberia, the multinational forces in
Angola and U.S. support for the peace process in Mozambique, our
commitment to a democratic, multi-racial government in South Africa, and
efforts to change the policies of Nigeria's leadership are essential to
the attainment of lasting peace and sustainable development everywhere on
the continent.
TERRORISM
International terrorism poses one of the most alarming threats to the
security of U.S. government personnel, civilians, and such other
interests as the Middle East peace process. In 1995, terrorists killed
two U.S. officials in a shooting in Karachi and five more in a bombing in
Riyadh. Effective counterterrorism operations prevented a much higher
number of casualties by thwarting attempts by terrorists linked to the
World Trade Center conspirators to bomb several U.S. commercial airlines
in East Asia. Indeed, our security resources are constantly stretched
thin by the plethora of threats to our diplomats and facilities abroad.
Hostage takers throughout the world seek out Americans; terrorists in
Colombia and Kashmir hold Americans for ransom and/or political leverage
and Americans in several countries are targeted by terrorists. The World
Trade Center bombing is a constant reminder that Americans at home remain
vulnerable to foreign terrorists seeking bigger headlines and intent on
inflicting mass casualties.
Despite a proliferation of new, non-state terrorist groups, state
sponsorship of terrorism poses a special challenge. The most serious
offender is Iran, which provides money, training, and weapons to secular
and Islamic radicals who use violence to undermine our efforts to
facilitate peace between Arabs and Israelis. Sudan harbors many
terrorist groups, including the Egyptian Islamic Gama'at, which tried to
destabilize Egypt with its plot to kill President Mubarak in Ethiopia
last June.
Newer terrorism threats emanate from the chaos of postwar Afghanistan
where training camps continue to turn out "graduates" eager to return to
fight against conservative regimes. Ethnic conflict in Russia recently
spilled over into the international arena as Chechen separatists hijacked
a Turkish Black Sea ship. Peacekeeping in Bosnia is endangered by
potential terrorist threats from local and foreign elements.
DRUG TRAFFICKING AND INTERNATIONAL CRIME
Major drug producing and smuggling organizations continue to flood the
United States with illegal narcotics and overwhelm our demand reduction
efforts. They often exploit the vulnerability of the less advantaged
segments of our society and exacerbate existing social ills. Our
interest in strengthening the trend toward democratization in our own
hemisphere, so pronounced in the last decade, is jeopardized by the
corrosive impact of traffickers. The impunity enjoyed by many kingpins
severely undermines popular confidence in government.
Much public attention has focused on Latin America, but heroin, mainly
from Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle of Thailand, Burma and Laos,
continues to make inroads in the U.S. market. Progress in the war on
drugs has been difficult; it cannot be achieved at all without the
cooperation of producing nations. Winning that cooperation is a task for
diplomacy backed by effective programs for countries that are committed
to cooperating with us.
International organized crime knows no borders. It threatens the
operations of U.S. business, disrupts the transition to democracy and
market economies and affects the distribution and effectiveness of U.S.
assistance. Our interest in stability and democracy in the former Soviet
republics and Central Europe is threatened by criminal groups which take
advantage of privatization, corrupting government officials and using
illegally acquired wealth and intimidation to gain control of banks and
commercial enterprises. As Russian organized crime groups have gained
strength, they have reached out to form alliances with well established
criminals in Europe, South America, and Asia.
PROLIFERATION CONCERNS
The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) poses a serious and
growing threat to U.S. national interests at home and abroad and will
likely continue to do so for years to come. The U.S. has made curbing
proliferation a top priority and a key factor in our diplomatic
consultations and military preparations worldwide. The United States
will continue to lead the international effort to negotiate a
Comprehensive Test Ban treaty (CTBT), which the President has indicated
he wants to sign later this year. The CTBT, in combination with the
indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty and a future treaty
for the global cessation of fissile material production, will strengthen
significantly the global nonproliferation regime.
In addition to this multilateral approach, the U.S. will continue to
focus on key regional hot spots where proliferation is most likely to
occur or worsen. These regions include the Persian Gulf, the Korean
peninsula, and South Asia. The U.S. will work to ensure that fissile
material does not seep out of the former Soviet Union into the hands of
determined proliferators or terrorists. I would like to say a few words
about each of these concerns.
Fissile Material from the Former USSR. The newest wrinkle in the global
struggle to stop the spread of nuclear weapons is the effort to track and
safeguard fissile material in Russia and the former Soviet Republics. We
regard this as a very serious problem, even as the number of reported
incidents of fissile material smuggling from the former Soviet Union
declined sharply last year compared to cases reported in 1994. We will
need continued international vigilance from the diplomatic,
intelligence, and law enforcement communities to combat smuggling. A
keen understanding of the problem we face will help shape a diplomatic
strategy for the April nuclear summit in Moscow.
North Korea. Pursuant to the Agreed Framework, the North Korean nuclear
reactor program at Yongbyon remains frozen under IAEA observation. The
North and the US-led Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
(KEDO) recently reached agreement in principle on a light-water reactor
supply contract for the civilian power reactors that will replace the
North's gas-graphite system. Almost inconceivable two years ago, U.S.
technicians today are working with North Korean counterparts to prepare
the North's spent reactor fuel for long-term storage and eventual
shipment out of North Korea. (This fuel contains enough plutonium for a
couple of nuclear weapons.) Despite this progress, the Korean peninsula
remains the most heavily armed region in the world, and it will take
years to complete the Framework and reduce tensions on the peninsula.
Iran/Iraq. The flight of Saddam Hussein's brother-in-law Husayn
Kamal to Jordan last year led to a spate of revelations about ongoing
WMD-related activities in Iraq. We do not believe Kamal's recent return
to Iraq undercuts the value of what he told us last summer. Though we
have never been satisfied with Saddam's cooperation with U.N. weapons
inspectors, this defection produced substantial proof of Iraqi
concealment efforts. UNSCOM experts are sifting through the
documentation that Iraq has since provided, but it will be months before
a determination about Iraqi disclosures can be made. In Iran,
unfortunately we see no let-up in Tehran's efforts to try and acquire WMD
technology. Iran has developed chemical weapons and short-range
missiles, and Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons program.
Although we cannot relax our vigilance, our diplomatic efforts have
served to limit Iran's nuclear capabilities.
South Asia. Nowhere in the world are the stakes for the global
nonproliferation regime higher than in South Asia. India and Pakistan
stand at a cross-roads in their history. If they are prepared to cap
their nuclear and missile programs, they can become a force for progress
in the global effort to negotiate a CTBT and a fissile material
production ban treaty. On the other hand, if Delhi and Islamabad choose
instead to accelerate their weapons efforts, they will find themselves
increasingly isolated from the global mainstream. New Delhi's recent
efforts to attach a time-bound pledge on nuclear disarmament to the CTBT
could complicate efforts to get a treaty this year.
NATIONAL INTERESTS IN A "GLOBAL ERA"
We see and understand the immediate national security threats from
nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and drug trafficking, but there are
threats to our security and well-being that are less obvious and
therefore more difficult to target, involving humanitarian and
environmental issues. When the U.S. responds to humanitarian tragedies
or negotiates multilateral environmental accords we do so for altruistic
reasons but also because they affect the long-term safety and prosperity
of our citizens. And more often than not, we do so in cooperative
undertakings involving the United Nations and its specialized agencies,
regional organizations, and coalitions of like-minded states.
Natural and man-made disasters spill across borders, disrupt national
economies, and weaken foreign governments. Increasing population and
economic pressures and deteriorating environments -- from the Horn of
Africa to Central America -- will erode U.S. foreign policy efforts aimed
at promoting regional stability, reducing ethnic tensions, and supporting
democratization. The intelligence community's technical and analytical
capabilities cannot solve disaster-related problems, but they are being
used to better understand disaster-prone areas and to assist US-supported
relief efforts.
Forced population displacements that affect tens of millions of people
worldwide raise tensions with neighboring countries over immigration
policies and border security. The U.S. invests large sums in programs to
assist displaced people and refugees fleeing from civil war and other
crises in part to ease these tensions. Safe refugee repatriation is a
major component of restoring peace, whether in Bosnia or Rwanda. But
voluntary repatriation, whether to the West Bank or Haiti, also depends
on peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts, underscoring the point that
security and humanitarian interests are often intertwined.
This winter's record snowfall in the DC area demonstrated how vulnerable
we are to ecosystem fluctuations. Climatic disruptions in other regions
are often even more destructive, affecting each year hundreds of millions
of people. While global climate change impacts the long-term well-being
and security of us all, more localized environmental crises can have
immediate health, economic, and even political implications in such
countries as Russia and China. Transnational environmental problems,
including deforestation, decreasing biodiversity, water and air
pollution, and hazardous waste dumping also affect U.S. economic
interests. We are just beginning to understand the true, long term costs
of ecological degradation on U.S. security. The intelligence community
has only recently begun to explore the unique role it might play in
helping to assess this type of security threat.
Unfair competition and other economic issues. The success of U.S. firms
in international markets is one of the major underpinnings of this
country's economic growth during the 1990s. But a byproduct of
globalization has been increased efforts by companies and some
governments to avoid playing by the rules. U.S. firms do not shrink from
dealing with tough but essentially fair practices on the part of their
competitors, but, particularly in major aircraft, military, and
infrastructure contracts, they face unfair competition that can include
bribery, political linkage, and other illicit or unfair practices. The
impact of these practices on the well-being of our citizens can be
direct, when contracts and jobs are lost, or corrosive to democratic
institutions, as when governments are corrupted.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The threats to Americans and American interests have changed dramatically
in the last decade. The danger of deliberate -- or accidental -- nuclear
incineration has diminished greatly but the threat of harm in an act of
terrorism or drug-related crime has increased. With the end of the Cold
War, the replacement of authoritarian regimes by fledgling democracies,
and wider acceptance of open markets and shared responsibility for
threats to the global ecosystem, we should feel more secure than most of
us do.
Our heads may tell us we are safer, but our instincts -- and news
reports -- argue otherwise. Head and instinct are both right. The
threat to America's survival has diminished greatly, but threats to our
well-being continue to exist and may even be increasing.
The overview of the most prominent and easily identified threats to our
security presented here and in the other submissions for this hearing
provides a useful guide to the challenges confronting U.S. policymakers,
diplomats, military planners, and the intelligence community. But our
fellow citizens have other fears and feel threatened by dangers that are
less easily defined, let alone quantified. The intelligence community
does a good job ferreting out and interpreting information on the "big"
threats discussed above. But in all of these -- and particularly on
transnational and global issues -- we diminish our intelligence
capabilities, put our soldiers at risk, and weaken our national security
by emasculating diplomatic, foreign aid, and development assistance
levers.
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