1996 Congressional Hearings
Intelligence and Security

S. HRG. 104-510

U-60,332/PSC

Honorable Arlen Specter
Select Committee
on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

6 MAY 1996

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed is DIA's response to a number of questions for the record provided as a result of the 22 February 1996 hearing on the Worldwide Threat to the US National Security Interests. If you have any additional questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. I look forward to working with you and the SSCI during the coming year.

1 Enclosure
Answers to SSCI
Questions

Sincerely,

PATRICK M. HUGHES
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

Question 2. Russia: Proliferation of Chemical Weapon-Related Chemicals and Technology, What is the status of Russia's offensive chemical weapon (CW) program in terms of research, development, testing, evaluation, production, weaponization, stockpile size, composition, location and destruction capability? What factors best explain Russia's actions regarding its CW program and arms control commitments? What is the likely future course of Russia's CW program, and how will it affect Moscow's behavior with respect to the various arms control agreements to which it is a signatory, especially the Chemical Weapons Convention? What implications do the foregoing have for the U.S.? Do you have any information that Russia is assisting nations attempting to enhance their offensive chemical warfare (CW) capability? Please explain.

Q: What is the status of Russia's offensive chemical weapons (CW) program in terms of research, development, testing, evaluation, production, weaponization, stockpile size, composition, location and destruction capability?

A: Russia has the world's largest CW program. The Russian stockpile includes over 40,000 tons of chemical agent, most of which is in weapons including artillery, rockets, bombs, and missiles. Russia may also have CW stocks in excess of those declared.

The former Soviet Union committed to destruction of its chemical weapons in 1987, but to date destruction has been stalled. The delay in the destruction program has been attributed to problems with finance, political resistance, and technology. Internal bickering within the Russian bureaucracy has probably delayed the beginning of meaningful destruction.

While some parts of the infrastructure of the Soviet/Russian CW program have been downsized and restructured, a core capability may be retained. The fature Russian CW program will rely more on the technology to rapidly mobilize production and less on the manufacturing and retention of large quantities of war material.

Q: What factors best explain Russia's actions regarding its CW program and arms control commitments?

A: There are several factors affecting Russia's actions regarding its CW programs and arms control commitments. Russian officials probably believe they need a CW capability to deter other nations from chemical warfare. They cite a potential threat from purported CW programs in the U.S., other Western nations, and several countries on or near Russia's borders.

In addition, Russian officials believe that dismantling the CW program would waste their resources and rob them of valuable production assets. They maintain that the CW production facilities showd not be destroyed but be used to produce commercial products.

Moreover, these officials do not want to see their life's work destroyed, their jobs eliminated, and their influence diminished.

Q: What is the likely future course of Russials CW program, and how will it affect Moscow's behavior with respect to the various arms control agreements to which it is a signatory, especiak the Chemical Weapons Convention?

A: According to the Russian whistleblowers, new agents in development, such as the "Novichok" chemicals, will allow Moscow to quickly reconstitute a CW capability. Reportedly, some components for these new agents are not on the CWC's Schedule of Chemicals, and they can be produced in commercial chemical plants. Moreover, since Moscow has a large CW stockpile, and its destruction program has been seriously delayed, any meaningful reduction of existing stocks will not occur for a decade or more.

Russia is likely to eventually ratify the CWC. Ratification could be delayed while the Duma is preoccupied with domestic matters unrelated to the CWC. In the interim Russia wfll remain an active participant in the CWC's implementation process, attempting to shape the CWC's verification regime to its advantage by limiting the capability of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Q: What implications do the foregoing have for the U.S.?

A: Russia's actions will have an effect on a number of states. Many nations are withholding action on ratification of the CWC pending Russian and U.S. ratification. Further Russian procrastination in approving the CWC and beginning their destruction prograrn will give reluctant states further cause for delaying their full acceptance of the CWC regime.

Q: Do you have any information that Russia is assisting nations attempting to enhance their offensive cbemical warfare (CW) capabhity? Please explain.

A: Russian help to foreign CW programs has been either largely absent or exceptionally discreet. There is some information that former prominent figures in the Russian CW program such as acemician Anatoliy Kuntsevich have assisted states in the Middle East in obtaining precursor chemicals. The dual-use nature of chemicals makes it difficult to assign these actions to a CW program. However, given Russia's weak export controls, there is reason for concem about Russia as a potential source of CW proliferation.

Question 3. Transfer of Technology from the Former Soviet Union. What general trends has the Intelligence Community noticed of scientists, technology, and conventional and unconventional military sales to other nations? What trends have you detected that Soviet nuclear materials, BW, CW, or ballistic missile-related materials or technology, have found their way to the international black market? What are the implications of these trends for U.S. national security?

Q: What general trends bas the Intelligence Community noticed of scientists, technology, and conventional and unconventional military sales to other nations [by the FSU]?

A: - Russia: The value of Moscow's arms exports doubled lastt year to over $3 billion after declining steadily for almost 7 years. Russia has achieved some success in its effort to expand its customer base by signing arms contracts with several first-time customers, including Malaysia, Kuwait, and South Korea. Moscow received over $10 billion in new arms orders in the last 2 years. The surge in new agreements, however, will not be followed by a corresponding large increase in annual arms deliveries because the transfers will occur over several years. Some agreements, such as the transfer of Su-27/FLANKER production technology to China, could take up to 10 years to complete. Moreover, the surge in military trade will not produce windfall hard currency eamings for Moscow, as 35 to 40 percent of the deals are debt swaps or barter arrangements, primarily with former Warsaw Pact states, as well as China. This could change should intemal pressure from nationalistic politicians or defense industrialists lead Moscow to relax the restraint it has shown regarding conventional weapons sales to Iran and Iraq, two major traditional customers who have paid in cash. Internal pressure to increase arms exports has already led to decentralization of the arms export apparatus, creating numerous new players. For example, Moscow recently gmnted 10 defense plants arms export authority. Rampant corruption and decentralized control have also increased the potential for illegal arms exports since Soviet military trade was consolidated under the Foreign Economic Relations Ministry. In addition, many Russian scientists and engineers are known to be working in/for several non-FSU countries. These individuals were directly involved in defensive missile system research and development programs in the FSU and, more recently, in the successor states.

- Other Soviet Successor States: Russia is the only state that has the capability to produce and export major weapon systems independently; however, Ukraine is attempting to lessen its dependence on Russia. Kiev recently announced that it had developed a new surface-to-air missile system known as the S-400 that it developed indigenously without reliance on foreign producers for components. The other states of the FSU produce minor weapons or components with varying degrees of dependence on Russia or other countries for inputs. For the most part, weapons exports from the non-Russian states have been limited to sales of equipment from existing military stocks. However, the non-Russian states have had to develop arms export organizations from scratch. In many cases, these

states lack the institutional oversight and control mechanisms to prevent illegal or undesirable arms transfers. Therefore, arms exports are frequently made to areas of Third World instability or conflict and which are low tier or no tier in terms of intelligence priorities, making them very difficult to routinely identify.

Q: What trends have you detected that Soviet nuclear materials, BW, CW, or ballistic missile-related materials or technology, have found their way to the international black market? What are the implications of these trends for U.S. national security?

- Nuclear: Incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials increased following the breakup of the former Soviet Union. This increase can be attributed primarily to worsening economic conditions and the breakup itself. The majority of the incidents have not involved weapons-useable material. Press reports tend to overstate the quality of illicit material; however the fact that illicit trafficking is occurring is alarming.

The first incidents involving weapons-useable material outside the FSU occurred in 1994. The largest seizure of weapons-useable uranium, 2.7 kilograms, was in Prague in December of that year. The largest seizure of weapons-useable plutonium outside the FSU occurred in Munich in August 1994, carried on a Lufthansa flight from Moscow. All seizures of weapons-useable material have been in small quantities insufficient for nuclear weapons construction by themselves.

In 1995, a large number of incidents did occur involving illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, but there were no reported cases involving weapons-useable material. The fact that no weapons-useable cases were noted does not necessarily mean that none occurred.

Because of pervasive crime and corruption as well as continued poor economic conditions in the countries of the former Soviet Union, illicit trafficking of nuclear materials continues to be of concem for U.S. national security.

- Chemical Warfare: Regarding chemical weapons proliferation, reports indicate that Russian officials and organizations have attempted to sell chemical weapons-related technology and chemicals. For instance, the Russian official selected by Yeltsin to implement chemical weapons arms control, Anatoli Kuntsevich, was implicated in a prograin to sell chemical weapons-related chemicals to Syria. Yeltsin removed Kimtsevich from his position in 1994, but it is unclear whether this was due to his proliferation activities. As he probably influenced the hiring of personnel who have since replaced him, illicit activities in organizations he once controlled may still continue. Unconfirmed reports indicate that he was involved in the proliferation of other technology into the region. Concerns about proliferation are not limited to this one man; others are likely to be involved in similar activities.

Russia has taken some very disturbing positions regarding CW arms control that might increase the danger of chemical weapons proliferation. For instance, the country has implied that it need not declare all production facilities designed, constructed, or used at any time, since 1 January 1946, for making chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These facilities should be declared and be subject to international inspection and destroyed, or converted in a manner consistent with the provisions of the CWC. Reports have suggested that Russia produced more chemical weapons than publicly declared and that a binary program was initiated to circumvent the verification provisions of the CWC. Each of these adds to the danger that Russia will become a source of chemical weapons and chemical weapons know-how.

- Biological Warfare: All Third World BW proliferants are apparently seeking BW- enabling technologies and expertise wherever it can be found. Common methods for acquiring such technologies include intelligence operations, cooperative scientific agreements, Internet scientific and technical data bases, and outright overt or covert purchases. All BW proliferants are of concern, but the possibility of BW expertise and technology flow from Russia to Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya is of particular interest. Any movement of BW agent production technologies, BW defense technology, or BW weapons fabrication, testing, and modeling technologies would significantly increase the pace of BW proliferation in those countries seeking those technologies.

Russia's offensive BW program is a source of both personnel and technologies for a would- be BW proliferant. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, there was a massive scientific brain-drain from Russia. Technologies became widely available through numerous sources. There has been an overall slowing of the scientific personnel bleed in recent years, primarily because those who could leave Russia, have. Last year, reportedly 25-50 percent of scientists younger that 45 years old left, from one Russian BW institute alone.

Contrasted with the slowing trend of the brain-drain, equipment and specialized technologies with dual-use applications are routinely available on the open market. For example, one of the Russian offensive BW facilities has a catalog of nutrient media for sale. Some of these media are specific for growth of bacteria that can be used as offensive BW agents, They can also be used in a hospital laboratory for medical diagnostics. Another Russian BW facility advertises aerosol chambers for sale. These likewise have legitimate research applications. Although the evidence is sparse, the possibility that weapons technologies, such as delivery systems and sub-munitions, are being made available through other sources cannot be ruled out.

- Ballistic Missiles: Russia is known to be marketing worldwide dual-use technology, which may enhance a purchasing country's ballistic missile program. Some of the dual-use technology is most likely covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex. Another possible conduit for the transfer of ballistic missile-applicable

technology is through aerospace-related joint ventures. Both Russia and Ukraine are pursuing such cooperation.

Question 4. North Korea's Military Capabilities. The economic situation in North Korea has continued to deteriorate with severe food shortages occurring this winter.

a) What is the likelihood that North Korea will invade the south in the next year? Under what circumstances would a war be likely?

b) What is the likelihood that North Korea will comply with the nuclear agreement and reallocate resources away from the military?

c) How strong is Kim Jong-il's hold on power? What is the likelihood that he will still be in power one year from now?

d) What is your assessment of the likelihood that the nation of North Korea will continue to exist in its current state 15 years from now?

Q4.a: The economic situation in North Korea has continued to deteriorate with severe food shortages occurring this winter. What is the likelihood that North Korea will invade the south in the next year? Under what circumstances would a war be likely?

A: The threat posed by the North Korean military is real. However, analysis of the present situation suggests that the probability of conflict is, at present, fairly low.

The North is facing enormous economic and political challenges that it is trying to address through a multi-faceted approach emphasizing engagement with the United States and maintenance of substantial military capabilities beyond those needed for defense. However, overall military readiness and combat capabilities of the military have begun to decline due to a lack of resources and decreases in field training.

• Worsening food shortages and discipline problems are degrading the North Korean Army's capabilities.
• Most of the noticeable North Korean military activity has been directed at enhancing internal control at the expense of field training. We judge North Korea's capability to conduct large-scale combat operations required for an integrated warfighting campaign will continue to erode if this trend is not reversed. The North Korean leadership wants to maintain its existing military capabilities. The two objectives are not mutually exclusive and can be pursued simultaneously. Some of the military moves we have seen in the past few months, such as air force restructuring in the fall, have no direct connection with internal problems. In monitoring the North Korean military, we are trying to avoid becoming fixated on single-issue explanations for its military activities.

Apart from a full-scale offensive, the North has the capacity to increase tensions on the peninsula if pressed too hard by internal or external forces. These range from actions

similar to those in the Joint Security Area in early April to large-scale exercises, to actual use of force.

The present low risk of war also could increase during periods of uncertainty, such as regime change or internal instability. The risks of major conflict would be higher because of increased potential for miscalculation and escalation.

Q4.b: What is the likelihood that North Korea will comply with the nuclear agreement and reallocate resources away from the military?

A: There is every indication that the North is complying with the nuclear agreement. The freeze remains in place on all covered nuclear facilities. The processes of stabilizing the spent fuel pond and canning the spent fuel rods for long-term storage are on track.

We have not seen any significant indications, however, that North Korea will fundamentally reallocate resources away from the military. Short of significant regime change, it is unlikely that North Korea will shift significant resources from the military. The military -- both regime guardian and the greatest latent institutional rival to the Korean Workers Party -- potentially has tremendous leverage and should be able to protect its pride of place under most circumstances.

Q4.c: How strong is Kim Chong-il's hold on power? What is the likelihood that he will still be in power one year from now?

A: We assess that Kim Chong-il remains firmly in charge and we do not see signs of near-term political disintegration, imminent economic and social collapse, or challenges to Kim Chong-il's leadership. We have no simple answer to why Kim has failed to date to assume the formal positions of power his father held -- the office of President and General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party. However, we have not detected any significant weakening of central control, references to alternative centers of power, or any convincing evidence of increasing factional splits within the elite. The relationship between Kim Chong-il and the military is symbiotic, and we see no reason to believe either party would act to hurt the other when their collective survival is at stake. Evidence for social unrest is extremely thin and suggests the early stages of a fraying of the edges of the "social fabric" rather than imminent collapse.

However, the economic problems facing North Korea are severe and are likely to increase in the next few months. We do not see signs of imminent collapse, although some critical junctures are looming nearer. Kim is faced with pressing food, raw material, and energy shortages. In tightly controlled North Korea however, neither a declining standard of living nor food shortages should be presumed to spark uprisings against the government, much less its overthrow. Detcriorating economic conditions are a potential catalyst for upheaval, but only in concert with political, social, or military changes. Without more indicators of a combination of economic and other factors converging, assessments of

near-term worsening threats to internal stability are highly speculative. The economic situation may not be regime threatening in the near term due to the ability of the leadership to control internal dissent, the historical resourcefulness of the regime, and a submissive population long inured to deprivations.

Q4.d: What is your assessment of the likelihood that the nation of North Korea will continue to exist in its current state 15 years from now?

A: The likelihood that North Korea will continue to exist in its current state 15 years from now is low to moderate. Unless solutions to the North's economic problems are found, the regime will not be able to survive. It will have to adapt, slide into irrelevance, or collapse/implode. This has led many analysts to believe a process of political self-destruction has begun with potential for system collapse within 3 years. While North Korea's future looks grim, Kim Chong-il does not appear ready to surrender or negotiate unification. North Korea's leaders are committed to avoiding concessions which would undermine their rule. They give every impression of intending to keep North Korea a going concern indefinitely. The North could be successful in staying the course and riding out bad harvests and weather, right itself, and continuing to maintain a separate system from the South. The economic situation may improve enough to enable the leadership to control internal dissent and continue to rule a compliant population acclimated to deprivations.

Alternatively, if through regime change and/or growing concems, the North's leaders accept the inevitability of unification, accommodations with the South could be achieved, which would produce necessary assistance and support to North Korea to improve living conditions to allow for a "soft landing."

Question 5. India and Pakistan Nuclear Programs. Press reports have indicated that India has made preparations to test a nuclear weapon. What is the likelihood that India will test a nuclear weapon this year? If it did so, what is the likelihood that Pakistan would respond with a nuclear test of its own? Would these nuclear tests lead to war between the two nations? Q: Press reports have indicated that India has made preparations to test a nuclear weapon. What is the likelihood that India will test a nuclear weapon this year?

A: DIA does not believe the likelihood of an Indian nuclear detonation this year is high. India has little to gain by a single test and much to lose from international sanctions. Since 1974 it has had a weapon that can serve as a deterrent against Pakistan. Should India decide to develop a suite of nuclear weapons, it would plan a series of tests, for which extensive preparation -- both political and engineering -- would be required.

Q: If it did so, what is the likelihood that Pakistan would respond with a nuclear test of its own?

A: DIA believes that the likelihood is high that Pakistan would make every effort to respond, as soon as possible, to an Indian test with a test of its own. The leadership in Islamabad would feel a strong necessity to demonstrate an ability to counter an Indian nuclear capability with a capability of their own. This attitude would stem from both a genuine fear of the dominant power of India and deep public demand.

Q: Would these nuclear tests lead to war between the two nations?

A: Despite the great underlying hostility between the two nations, a mutual demonstration of nuclear capability would not immediately result in war between them. DIA believes that in this case deterrence would be effective -- at least for the time being. Pakistan probably believes it would lose any such war and India, at this time, would not endanger its economic growth by an adventure that would be sure to severely weaken its chances for continued development for years to come.

Question 6. China-Israel Relationship. Does the China-Israel relationship include the sharing of technology related to weapons of mass destruction and missile technology? Does the China-brael relationship mise concems that U.S. state-of-the-art technology provided to brael may be transferred to China through Israel?

A: In December 1991, a former Chinese senior missile scientist claimed that "Israel sold the PRC cruise missile technology and was of great help in developing the Chinese ballistic missile program." The information, though not yet confirmed, was revealed at an international symposium on arms proliferation held at the University of Wisconsin. In addition, the U.S. government has alleged publicly that Israel had transferred missile weapon systems to China containing U.S. technology. Among the systems cited were the Patriot and Python missiles.

Question 7. Iran's Nuclear Weapon Capability. What is the current status of Iran's nuclear weapon program? What kind of assistance is Russia providing to Iran's nuclear weapon program? What is the likelihood that Israel will conduct a military attack against Iran if Iran successfully develops a nuclear weapon? What is the status of Iran's BW and CW programs?

Q: What is the current status of Iran's nuclear weapon program?

A: Since the end of the war with Iraq, the government of Iran has initiated both civilian and weapons-related nuclear efforts, despite having signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Moreover, Iran has mounted a concerted effort to obtain both fissile material and nuclear technology to support nuclear weapons development. These efforts, unfortunately, continue. Iran has also unsuccessfully sought heavy water research reactors even though such technology has no use or value in its light water reactor-based civil nuclear power program. Iran's interest in uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, activities with no economic justification in Iran's civil nuclear energy plans, further indicate Iran's desire for the capability to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons. We generally agree with previously published estimates that Iran is 8-10 years away from having a nuclear weapons capability.

Q: What kind of assistance is Russia providing to Iran's nuclear weapon program?

A: Russia has become a major supplier of nuclear technology to Iran. A bilateral contract, signed in January 1995, will provide Iran with a light-water reactor located at Bushehr by the year 2000. This contract, valued in excess of $800 million dollars, will also include the training of Iranian nuclear scientists. This comprehensive agreement will greatly facilitate Iran's understanding and handling of nuclear materials and technology. Moreover, such cooperation will also serve as a conduit for further nuclear-related agreements in other areas.

Q: What is the likehhood that Israel will conduct a military attack against Iran if Iran successfully develops a nuclear weapon?

A: We believe Israel would likely view with great concern developments leading to such a capability. Were Iran to successfully develop nuclear weapons, the negative impact upon regional stability would be significant and run counter to the security interests of numerous countries in the Middle East region.

Q: What is the status of Iran's BW and CW programs?

A: Iran has maintained an offensive BW program since the mid-1980s, with the intent of developing BW weapons. Iran has the requisite scientific and technical infrastructure needed to dcvelop and field BW weapons. Like other BW proliferants in the region and elsewhere, Iran has been successful in acquiring necessary dual-use equipment for

biological agent R&D and production. Efforts are underway to conceal the location(s), pace, and direction of the offensive program. Iran's BW program has the momentum to mature into a weapons capability and to pose a regional threat during the next decade.

Iran has an active chemical warfare program. It produces a variety of agents and may have as much as 2,000 tons of agent in its stockpile. It has continued to upgrade and expand its chcmical production infrastructure and chemical munitions arsenal since signing the CWC in 1993. As part of this expansion, Iran is making long-term capital improvements to its CW program, suggesting that it intcnds to maintain a CW capability well into the future.

Question 8. Iran's Conventional Weapon Build-up. On page 19 of your prepared testimony, you state: "Iran's conventional build-up is focused primarily on its capability to control access to the Arabian (Persian) Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. Two KILO submarines, Chinese antiship cruise missiles, and improved aerial refueling capability all attest to that interest." To what extent do these activities pose a threat to U.S. interests?

A: Iran has stated publicly that it intends to be able to control access to the Arabian Gulf through the Strait of Hortnuz, and has worked to improve its military capability to do so. Acquisition of KILO submarines, Chinese C802 antiship cruise missiles and C802-capable guided missile patrol craft, and indigenous advances in aerial refueling capability add significantly to Tehran's ability to project a layered coverage of the Strait.

Tehran's layered coverage of the Strait of Horinuz will likely include KILO submarines working in conjunction with ship-launched antiship cruise missiles from guided missile patrol craft, naval mines, coastal defense antiship cruise missiles, coastal artillery, surface- to-air missiles, and surface ships. KILO submarines operating in the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz could threaten shipping and warships in a period of heightened tensions. C802 missiles fired from ships, and possibly.in the future from shore-based batteries, could pose a significant threat to ships in the constricted waters of the Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Gulf. Since a large percentage of the world's oil awsits the region, even the threat of Iranian action could affect the price of oil and shipping insurance rates worldwide.

Iran has had an air refueling capability for many years with its U.S. fighter aircraft and U.S.-supplied tankers. Tehran has probably begun to adapt its Russian-supplied aircraft to maintain the tactical flexibility provided by air refueling. Through air refueling, fighters can maintain combat air patrols longer, can carry larger bomb loads, and in the case of attack missions, will be able to fly longer distances to attack targets.

Question 11. Russia-Cuba Relationship. Please describe the current Russian-Cuban military relationship, with a particular focus on the Russian listening post at Lourdes.

a) What intelligence are the Russians collecting through Lourdes? In what ways, if any, is Russia assisting the Cuban military?

b) What is the construction status of the Soviet-designed nuclear reactor at Juragua? What threat, if any, does completion of this reactor pose to the United States?

Qll.a: What intelligence are the Russians collecting through Lourdes?

A: The Lourdes signals intelligence (SIGINT) facility near Havana, Cuba is the largest Russian SIGINT site abroad. The strategic location of Lourdes makes it ideal for gathering intelligence on the United States.

Russia's SIGINT effort at Lourdes is carried out by Russian military intelligence (GRU) and the Federal Agency for Goverrunent Conununications (FAPSI). The FAPSI evolved in the early 1990's from the former KGB's SIGINT service. According to Russian press sources, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) also has a communications center at the facility for its agent network in North and South America.

From this key facility, first the Soviet Union and now Russia have historically monitored U.S. commercial satellites, and sensitive communications dealing with U.S. military, merchant shipping, and Florida-based NASA space programs. According to a 1993 statement by Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro, Russia is said to obtain 75 percent of its military strategic information from Lourdes.

The Lourdes facility enables Russia to eavesdrop on U.S. telephone communications. U.S. voice and data telephone transmissions relayed by satellites visible to the facility are vulnerable to Russian intercept. Although sensitive U.S. goverrunent conununications are encrypted to prevent this intercept, most other unprotected telephone communications in the United States are systematically intercepted.

In addition to its military strategic value, Lourdes will increasingly be used to support the Russian economy, a current FAPSI priority. In addition to unprotected commercial information, personal information about U.S. citizens in the private and goverrunent sectors also can be snatched from the airwaves and used by Russian intelligence to identity promising espionage recruits in these sectors.

In October 1995, Cuba and Russia produced an agreement on the continued functioning of the site until the year 2000. Although the amount of Russian compensation for the site is unclear, a 1994 agreement called for Russia to provide Cuba approximately $200 million worth of fuel, timber and spare parts for various equipment, including military, for the operation of the facility during that year.

Question 12. Threat of Terrorists Biological, Chemical, or Radiological Weapons. The sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway last year highlighted the danger of a terrorist attack using chemical, biological or radiological weapons.

a) Do we have any indications of terrorist organizations developing a capability to use any of these weapons? What are the prospects of a state sponsor providing such a weapon to a terrorist group? b) The Aum Shinrikyo attack proved that deadly chemical weapons could be manufactured easily in small laboratories. What is the likelihood that the U.S. Intelligence Community could detect such an effort by a terrorist organization either in the United States or abroad?

Q12.a: The sarin gas aftack in the Tokyo subway list year highlighted the danger of a terrorist attack using chemical, biological or radiological weapons. Do we have any indications of terrorist organizations developing a capability to use any of these weapons? What are the prospects of a state sponsor providing such a weapon to a terrorist group?

A: We have no conclusive information that any of the terrorist organizations that we monitor are developing chemical, biological or radiological weapons. Most of the state sponsors have chemical or biological or radioactive material in their stockpiles and therefore have the ability to provide such weapons to terrorists if they wish. However, we have no conclusive information that any sponsor has the intention to provide these weapons to terrorists.

hampered by poor command and control, fuel shortages, logistics constraints and mutual mistrust.

• Some foreign forces, most notably members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and foreign Mujahedin, remain in Bosnia.

  With regard to civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement:

• Bosnian Muslims and Croats have not implemented agreements to establish functioning Federation institutions.
• The law on defense, creating a unified Muslim-Croat Federation army, has not yet been enacted by the Bosnian parliament.
• Bosnian Croats have not completely disestablished the separate Bosnian Croat government for Bosnia-Hercegovina
• Slow deployment of the international police force has raised anxieties on all sides, a fact that contributes to low confidence in the Dayton Accords; this increases the pressure for IFOR to implement civilian aspects of the agreement
• continued lack of cooperation with IPTF from local Federation police.
• Slow progress in identifying and allocating economic support for reconstruction projects also threatens to undermine support for the Dayton Agreement; for example, Bosnian Serbs believe the Federation is receiving a disproportionate share of the planned reconstruction funds
• Lack of planning for elections, slated to be held before the IFOR mandate ends, is a serious gap between civilian and military implementation

Q: In the longer term, what are the key determinants in establishing stability in Bosnia and the region?

A: 1) The prospects for establishing long-term stability in Bosnia are grim. The key to establishing long-term stability in Bosnia is the ability to strengthen and integrate the political and economic institutions of the country. Massive foreign aid is required to rebuild the economy and create a viable, integrated state. The transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy will be difficult due to the destruction of significant portions of Bosnia's infrastructure. In addition, Bosnia's shattered economy cannot absorb the tens of thousands of soldiers that must be demobilized. Moreover, large numbers of refugees will have to be supported by international aid agencies because they will not be able to return to their homes. The ability to grow economically will also have an impact on the establishment of democratic institutions because the populace will not be eager to take part in a free democratic system that cannot support them.

2) Other issues that will affect the stability of the country are the ability of the FWF to solve territorial and ethnic issues which caused the conflict in the first place, These issues

include resolution of FWF access to Brcko, the building of a road to Gorazde and making adjustments to the inter-entity boundary line.

Question 14. Ballistic Missile Threat to the U.S. On pages 21-22 of your prepared statement, you state: "The Intelligence Community has concluded that no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states; only a North Korean missile in development, the Taepo Dong 2, could conceivably have sufficient range to strike portions of Alaska or the far western Hawaiian Islands."

a) Does the Defense Intelligence Agency share this view?

b) Some individuals have questioned whether intelligence on the long-range missile threat to the United States has been politicized-particularly regarding the status of North Korea's Taepo Dong 2 long-range missile. In your opinion, has DIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community been consistent over the list several years regarding its assessment of the long-range ballistic missile threat to the continental United States? Please explain.

Q14.a: On pages 21-22 of your prepared statement, you state: "The IC has concluded that no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states; only a North Korean missile in development, the TD-2, could conceivably have sufficient range to strike portions of Alaska or the far western Hawaiian Islands." Does the DIA share this view?

A: Yes. The DIA analysts responsible for the detection of possiblc indicators of ballistic missile developments (including indicators of interest in ballistic missiles) believe that North Korea is the only country that possibly combines the necessary resources and motivation required for a serious attempt to develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten any portion of the United States.

Q14.b: Some individuals have questioned whether intelligence on the long-range missile threat to the U.S. has been politicized - particularly regarding the status of North Korea's TD-2 long-range missile. In your opinion, has DIA and the rest of the IC been consistent over the last several years regarding its assessment of the long range missile threat to the CONUS? Please explain.

A: Yes. The IC has for decades believed that the missile threat to CONUS (i.e., to the contiguous 48 states) was exclusively a threat from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and China. The IC has for the past decade wamed that several nations hostile -- or potentially hostile -- to the U.S. were fielding missile forces able to target U.S. allies and regionally deployed U.S. forces, but not CONUS.

In the IC's view, Russia and China are the industrialized countries with intent to target CONUS. Although other industrialized countries with missile and space programs have the capacity to develop intercontinental missiles, the IC has never judged that they would do so. For the emerging, Third World countries, the tremendous economic and technical demands associated with producing an ICBM havc made it very difficult to proceed with anything more than a token program.

The possibility of a Third World country acquiring an ICBM from one of the acknowledged nuclear powers has been evaluated repeatedly. It is judged that the acknowledged nuclear powers are unlikely to sell a missile that, potentially, could be used against them. Also, the costs and difficulties associated with acquiring an entire missile system and the training and facilities necessary to maintain, target, and launch the missile successfully pose formidable obstacles to potential Third World attempts to do so.