1996 Congressional Hearings
Intelligence and Security

03/21/96

UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT: CIA DIRECTOR'S SENATE TESTIMONY 3/20

(Begin transcript)

SEN. SAM NUNN (D-GA): (Strikes gavel.) Senator Roth has been

delayed this morning and he has got conflicts also. And Senator

Lugar was going to be here, but has Agriculture Committee business

he has to attend to, so we'll have other senators -- Senator Levin

and others will be coming in. I think Senator Lugar has an opening

statement that I would ask unanimous consent be put in the record,

and without objection, it will be.

Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, we had a defense

strategy that proved to be successful and made a great deal of

sense. We knew who our enemy was. We knew where he was located

and, to a great extent, what type of weapons he had. He knew the

same about us. We assumed the Soviet Union was sane and interested

in survival. They assumed the same about us. The result was a

very dangerous but relatively stable balance that avoided not only

world war, but avoided for over 45 years the use of any nuclear

weapon.

Now, with the emergence of democracy in Europe, sovereignty of a

number of states that were part of the Soviet Union, and the

breakup of the Soviet empire, we are less preoccupied with a Cold

War or the threat of an all-out nuclear war, but we have new

challenges, new threats, and increasingly unpredictable

adversaries.

As we discussed last week and throughout this series of hearings,

the loss of the command structures of the Soviet Union seriously

affected that region's ability to protect and secure its huge

arsenal of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, chemical, as

well as biological, as well as the delivery means, including

missiles and including other delivery means.

Economic dislocation has added to that and has caused great concern

that weapons scientists and their lethal technology may also be for

sale around the world.

Today we look at who is trying to obtain these weapons, these

materials, and this know-how, how they're going about it, and our

efforts to deal with it.

As our distinguished panelists discuss these challenges to our

national security, I believe that a few conclusions will become

clear. Our new adversaries are, in some way, more dangerous than

the Cold War threats we faced. Today we have to face the

possibility that weapons of mass destruction may become accessible

to a group willing to do the unthinkable. The director of the

Central Intelligence Agency, John Deutch, will review the present

state of the threat in the Middle East and elsewhere, and discuss

the weaponization of these regions.

Much of the technology that is critical to the weapons program is

available from an emerging black market or through dual-use market.

Experts David Kay and Gary Milhollin will discuss their concerns

that weapons technology and material is becoming increasingly

available for the right price.

Efforts to prevent these groups and nations from obtaining

destructive power are difficult and require both extreme and

constant vigilance. Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, executive director of

the U.N. special commission that is conducting investigations of

the Iraqi weapons buildup, will explain the difficulties he's

confronted, including the pattern of deception that Iraq

continually employs, that makes his job so difficult and so

challenging.

Our hearings this month are part of a larger effort by this

subcommittee that began in 1994 and will continue throughout this

year.

This Friday, we will convene the subcommittee to hear the

subcommittee staff explain some of their recommendations, as well

as the recommendations of many experts and observers who have

testified before the subcommittee over the last year. Then we will

hear from a panel of representatives from government agencies

discuss these issues with a look toward the future.

On Wednesday, March the 27th, the subcommittee will turn to our

domestic preparedness; how well are we equipped to respond to a

chemical, biological or nuclear terrorist incident in the United

States? We will examine efforts by our government to prepare for

the unthinkable moment, which we hope and pray will never arrive,

when we receive a credible threat of deployment of a weapon of mass

destruction here at home. How will we react? Will we have thought

about it in advance? Will we have coordinated in advance with our

own agencies and with certain governments around the world?

Witnesses will include local and federal government representatives

responsible for responding to such incidents.

Finally, I would note that last October, this subcommittee

presented its first investigative report on the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction. That report was an extensive review

of the Sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system last year, which

killed 12 and injured over 5,000 and would have killed, literally,

thousands more if the delivery system had been more sophisticated.

The attack by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo is believed to be the

first terrorist deployment of a chemical weapon of mass destruction

on a civilian population. Coincidentally, that tragic attack

occurred on March 20th, 1995. One year to the day later, I can say

that we have left the realm of the unthinkable; these are no longer

theoretical concerns.

Our nation must provide thoughtful and determined leadership in the

international community as we deal with this threat. I hope these

hearings help provide a broader understanding of this challenge.

And I also hope these hearings will produce recommendations that

help provide a framework for our nation as we provide the world

leadership, which is absolutely essential.

Dr. Deutch, we're delighted to have you hear today. And, as we do

with all witnesses before this subcommittee, if you'll rise, we'll

give you the oath.

(Witness is sworn.)

SEN. NUNN: Thank you.

Dr. Deutch will start off today's discussion on what countries may

be developing nuclear weapon programs and how they're getting the

materials and know-how, and I also understand he will discuss the

potential for countries to use the former Soviet Union as a weapons

supermarket.

Dr. Deutch, we're pleased to have you. We appreciate you being

here and we look forward to your testimony and the questioning.

DEUTCH: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

With your permission, I would like to submit my rather extensive

prepared testimony for the record. I think it includes a very

thorough discussion of the points that you and this committee are

interested in, including a chronology of past events in the

diversion of nuclear materials. If that's suitable, sir.

SEN. NUNN: That will be fine. It will be part of the record,

without objection. I've read your entire statement and it is very

helpful, and I don't want you to feel you have to cut it too short.

We would appreciate some summary, but you take the time you feel

you need.

DEUTCH: Thank you very much. I am pleased to appear here on the

important subject of the potential for diversion of strategic

nuclear material, plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, suitable

for making nuclear explosive devices.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to start off briefly with each one of these

points in turn.

What is the diversion threat from Russia? The Russians have made

a number of efforts to control their nuclear weapons and nuclear

material stockpile which grew so large in the former Soviet Union.

Let me give you some examples of positive steps that have been

taken. Most of the nuclear weapons located in Eastern Europe,

Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan have been returned to Russia. Some

progress has been made in improving the security facilities in the

Russian nuclear weapons complex. Construction of state storage

facilities for nuclear materials is proceeding, although slowly, at

a location near Ozurk (sp). Much of the progress is due to the

assistance provided and the encouragement provided by the United

States, primarily the Department of Defense and the Department of

Energy, through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program funded

with Nunn-Lugar funds.

However, due to severe resource shortages, the Russian nuclear

weapons complex is deteriorating, and it continues to be a serious

threat for diversion of nuclear technology and materials to other

proliferating countries in the world. First of all, the Russians

simply do not have the resources allocated to maintaining security

at their weapons complex or facilities to provide adequate material

accountability. Secondly, personnel have been told by MINATOM, the

Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, that they cannot rely solely on

government funds to support their activities at the Russian nuclear

weapons complex.

These circumstances invite the diversion of material from the

weapons complex to other locations. Up to the present, we have

seen numerous reports, most of them bogus, of strategic nuclear

materials from the Russian stockpile being offered for sale, mostly

in Western Europe. However, a few of these cases have involved

weapons usable material in small quantities that are significantly

less than what is required for a nuclear explosive device.

However, these few cases show what can happen and serve as a

warning to us. As I mentioned, we have included in my testimony,

attached to it, a chronology of all of these reports that we follow

for the last three years.

Next, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to who are the customers for this

strategic nuclear material. Obtaining strategic nuclear materials

adequate for making a nuclear explosive device is the central

hurdle for those who are seeking a nuclear capability. We know

that enormous efforts have been made by Iraq and North Korea to

produce indigenously adequate amounts of strategic nuclear

materials for weapons.

Without going into detail in open session, we believe that several

nations at one time or another have explored the possibility of

purchasing strategic nuclear materials as the simplest and quickest

and cheapest way to acquiring nuclear weapons capability.

Prominent examples include Iran and Iraq, to a lesser extent North

Korea and Libya. Clearly, for terrorists or sub-national groups,

the only practical way to acquire nuclear weapons is either to

steal or purchase a device, or to purchase the strategic nuclear

materials and then address the much simpler problem of constructing

a device from the highly enriched uranium or plutonium.

Third, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to what can be done to reduce the

threat. First, this threat is real and we should not deny its

existence. Second, if a significant act of diversion occurs,

either the sale of some nuclear device or a meaningful amount of

strategic nuclear materials from the Russian complex, we will face

a crisis of enormous proportions, and we will devote energy and

resources greatly in excess of the cost a reasonable cooperative

threat reduction program would impose on us today. In some sense,

making these efforts today is insurance about having to make much

larger and much more dangerous resource commitments in the future.

What would be the elements of a prudent and effective cooperative

threat reduction program that would reduce the threat from

diversion of materials or devices from the Russian complex?

Although this is not entirely an intelligence judgment, my previous

experience tells me the following measures are most important.

We must do everything we can to reduce the strategic nuclear

material inventory productive capacity for producing these

materials in Russia. For example, we should consider converting

the plutonium production reactor, the one I believe at Krasnoyarsk,

to a mixed oxide plutonium burner. This will at the same time

reduce the Russian plutonium inventory and the production

capability of Russian plutonium reactors.

Second, we should continue the existing program of Russian weapon

dismantlement and the construction of a safe plutonium storage

facility.

Third, we should take all steps to improve material protection,

control, and accountability systems at Russian nuclear facilities

through a program designed to minimize the risk of diversion from

those facilities that are most a threat or loss of material or

technology or facility.

Both the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy have

the mission and the technical capability to carry out such threat

reduction programs.

Closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to say that I agree with members of

this committee, with you, with Senator Lugar, Graham Allison,

others who have -- experts who have testified before you: the

prospects of nuclear diversion from Russia is a major national

security threat to the United States. I commend this committee and

all of its members for addressing this issue so forthrightly.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. NUNN: Thank you, Dr. Deutch. First question, on chemical and

biological weapons, you mentioned the nuclear threat and the threat

coming out of the former Soviet Union of leaking materials,

know-how, and so forth. What about chemical and biological from

the same source, and what is the demand for chemical and biological

in the world?

DEUTCH: Mr. Chairman, I thought my remarks were requested to be

restricted to nuclear, but let me say a word about chemical and

biological.

First of all, the demand for chemical and biological is broader in

the terrorist world and in the world of rogue nations.

Secondly, the technology required to make chemical agents or

biological agents is a great deal simpler because one does not have

to pass that very high hurdle of getting strategic nuclear

materials, the highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

Thirdly, a lot of the equipment and technology needed to make these

chemical agents or biological agents can be obtained from dual use

equipment or dual use technology so that the -- for a nation or a

group that is trying to make this material, like you mentioned the

Japanese terrorist group making sarin, it can be obtained and done

without recourse to diverting equipment or technology from Russian

sources. So it can be done more simply and cheaply just using dual

use, widely available equipment and technology.

SEN. NUNN: If you had to list the dangers in terms of a terrorist

group carrying out mass destruction or attempt to carry out mass

destruction in this country or in our allied countries, which would

you link -- list as the highest threat? Would it be nuclear -- the

use of nuclear, would it be chemical, or would it be biological?

Which is the most likely?

DEUTCH: For a terrorist group, I think the judgment of all experts

would be chemical, first; biological, second; and nuclear, third.

That would be, I think, the order. None of them are happy

prospects, let me say. But I think, from the point of view of

threat, it would be in that order, sir.

SEN. NUNN: Is that because it's easier for a terrorist group to

get chemical weapons and then, second, biological and nuclear would

be more difficult for them -- easier for them to transport that

material?

DEUTCH: The chemicals are the weapon of choice for a terrorist

group. Biological requires greater care of the material until it's

used and has some, in my judgment, some greater problems of --

well, basically, care, before it's used. Nuclear -- the reason

that that is -- I would mark it third is because of the issue of

having to acquire, illegally or surreptitiously, a device or

nuclear material.

SEN. NUNN: You mentioned the Iranians. Can you confirm that Iran

is surreptitiously trying to buy weapons from the former Soviet

Union, weapons as such, or is it more likely to be materials?

DEUTCH: Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't want to go beyond the remarks

that I've made here and in my statement, in open session, on that

subject. I think that what I would -- I (want ?) to say is (just

?) that we -- we do know that the Iranians have, from time to time,

been interested in acquiring materials and devices from, basically,

surreptitious sources.

SEN. NUNN: Any other countries you could list this morning in open

session that --

DEUTCH: I -- I --

SEN. NUNN: -- would fall into that category of trying to acquire

nuclear materials or devices?

DEUTCH: Iran and Iraq and, to a lesser degree, Libya and North

Korea.

SEN. NUNN: What about Syria? Is that -- are they on that list?

DEUTCH: They're not on the list that I have mentioned to you this

morning. No, sir. (Laughter.)

SEN. NUNN: What list are they on? (Laughter.)

You don't have -- you're not prepared to say anything about any

other countries this morning?

DEUTCH: I -- I'm not prepared to go further at this point, sir.

SEN. NUNN: To what extent are we equipped to deal with the

sub-national threat -- I guess you would call it group threat or

terrorist threat: that is, a small group that is able to obtain

weapons, technology, material? And this -- these groups are less

likely to be using these weapons as a deterrent and much more

likely to actually put them to use or threatened use in terms of

blackmail. How well equipped are we to deal with this kind of

threat now, in your evaluation?

DEUTCH: Very poorly, sir. The ability for our country or, I might

say, any other country in the developed world to protect their

infrastructure from a terrorist attack based on nuclear, chemical,

or biological weapons is very, very small indeed.

I must say, Mr. Chairman, that that vulnerability of the

infrastructure has always been true. That is not something which

has recently changed. What is entirely different today is the fact

that we see a growth in international terrorism, most recently

exhibited, of course, in these terrorist bombing events in Israel.

But throughout the world, as I have testified on numerous

occasions, we see a growth in -- as you've just mentioned,

terrorist organizations willing to take on acts against civilian

populations and against countries throughout the world that make

this issue of vulnerability, infrastructure vulnerability much more

serious.

SEN. NUNN: To what extent do this -- do these kind of groups --

for instance, the groups in Israel or the groups that carried out

the attack in New York on the World Trade Center -- to what extent

do the groups like that need to have national support -- that is,

support from a sovereign state -- in order to be able to work? Can

they operate on their own, or do they require support from a state?

DEUTCH: I think it -- to one degree or another they all require

some support from sovereign states. They require that because they

need sanctuaries for their training, their headquarters and their

planning activities. They require that to get the resources and

the locations where they can undertake and plan their operations.

SEN. NUNN: But actually, Aum Shinrikyo did not --

DEUTCH: Well that was a national group, it was a national group

operating in that case within Japan, although we know that they

have activities elsewhere in the world.

The point I'm saying is the Islamic organizations, the Islamic

terrorist organization Hezbollah, the Gama'at, Hamas, have

organizations spread in many countries and they do find -- get

assistance and sanctuary from a variety of different countries.

SEN. NUNN: You mentioned in your full statement that what we know

you mentioned certainly is alarming, but you also mentioned -- and

I don't remember the exact words -- what we don't know. If you

looked at the spectrum of intelligence now of what we actually know

about what's going on in this area, and I'm talking about the

demand side, the people trying to purchase the materials, weapons

of mass destruction, and then you looked at the unknown, how

confident are you that we are anywhere near knowing what's going on

out there in terms of what's really happening in trying to -- in

groups trying to get a hold of this kind of material and weapons?

DEUTCH: Well, let me say that --

SEN. NUNN: In other words, how big is the world that we don't know

about?

DEUTCH: Always a hard question to answer. Let me try and say two

things, that this issue of the spread of weapons of mass

destruction to both national and sub-national groups is a matter of

extraordinarily high priority in our collection efforts and our

analytic efforts, but especially in our collection effort. I would

say to you that there is not a place in the world where we have a

presence, speaking about the intelligence community broadly now,

where this question is not on the minds of our men and women who

are serving or on our collection system. So this is certainly a

subject that we are very -- placing enormously high priority to get

whatever information we can.

Having said that, it is not the kind of subject where I would want

to give you or any other person categorical assurance that we know

everything that's going on. As you just mentioned in your opening

statement, in a curious way it makes you wish for the old Cold War

where you knew the kind of target you were dealing with and the

problem you had in penetrating it and issues you were facing.

Today, to learn what the intentions are of possibly very determined

although small terrorist groups, is extremely difficult and

requires great ingenuity, and I might say courage by our officers.

So I would say to you, we are certainly placing tremendously high

priority on this subject, but I cannot with confidence say that we

know all that's going on.

SEN. NUNN: One of the areas that's come to our attention, where it

seems to me, at this point, at least, we're most deficient would be

in the Central Asia area or the Caucasus countries, Southern

Russia, those areas where we have not had the kind of presence --

economically, politically, or otherwise -- that we've had on the

western side. Would you share that, or are we working that problem

in a more diligent way than is apparent to me at this --

MR. DEUTCH: Well, I would say to you, sir, I'll put in a plug for

Secretary Christopher. I think that you also want to look at our

diplomatic presence and our open presence there, as well as

whatever small efforts we may have. There's also a very important

open press, broadcasts which come out of these parts of the world.

Quite frankly, we regard these parts of the world as being

extremely important for preserving security not only from the point

of view of the issue we're discussing here today, but all of those

central republics, Central Asian republics, are moving towards

democracy, trying to move towards democracy, trying to improve

their economies. So these are important countries for our

government to interact with, engage with, and we're certainly

trying to do that in our collaborative effort with them.

SEN. NUNN: I guess my question is: Are we doing as much there as

we are doing in other parts on the -- of Russia and the other parts

of the former Soviet Union --

DEUTCH: Well, I --

SEN. NUNN: -- or the Soviet empire?

DEUTCH: -- I would be -- let me say, again, I want to make very

clear that I think --

SEN. NUNN: I'm speaking --

DEUTCH: -- that we ought to start with our diplomatic presence

there --

SEN. NUNN: Right.

DEUTCH: -- which I do worry about. And that's an important part

for what we do, because we need their policy guidance --

SEN. NUNN: Yeah.

DEUTCH: -- and presence there. But I would say to you that if we

could in private review our efforts there, I think you would see

that our collaborative efforts there are quite strong and that we

do see it as a -- an important area, compared to many.

SEN. NUNN: Let me switch to Senator Glenn here, and then I'll have

a few more questions before we wrap it up.

Senator Glenn?

SEN. JOHN GLENN (D-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. NUNN: I know you've done a great deal of work in this area,

and we appreciate your leadership.

SEN. GLENN: You've been following this a long time. Thank you.

(Chuckles.)

Dr. Deutch, the administration appears to have made up its mind to

send $368 million worth of military equipment to Pakistan. This is

quoted in the morning paper from a high administration official, in

the Washington Post this morning, I understand, despite clear

evidence that Pakistan has once again violated U.S.

non-proliferation laws, this time by purchasing ring magnets from

China for their nuclear weapons material production facility. I

don't think there's any doubt this is against our own non-

proliferation laws. What's the CIA's or your own analysis of the

likely impact of the administration decision on India and

specifically on the forthcoming Indian elections? Any opinion on

that?

DEUTCH: I have not -- I have not come here this morning prepared

with a assessment of Indian reaction to the policy move that you

mentioned. I can certainly provide that for you, Senator.

SEN. GLENN: If you would, I'd appreciate it, if we could have it

for the record. Thank you. I'm very concerned about this.

Followed this for long time, and I think that some of the

reactions going on now or decisions being made, as, quoting a high

administration official, quoting that they've made up their mind on

this. I just think this violates our laws, and I think it's the

wrong direction. But we've fought this out on the Senate floor and

lost on the Brown amendment, and a number of other things, which I

know you have followed.

Do we know in the Soviet Union -- do we know where all the weapons

are that were former Soviet weapons that might now be in

independent states, former Soviet -- members of the Soviet Union?

MR. DEUTCH: I think that we have a fairly good -- fairly good

confidence that the Russians and we do know where these weapons are

and where they're located and where they're planned to go to. I

think that that's one of the positive steps that have happened as

a result of cooperative threat reduction program.

SEN. GLENN: Okay.

DEUTCH: The Nunn-Lugar program. I do think that we have a fairly

good fix on that.

SEN. GLENN: Not only ballistic missiles but shorter-range,

tactical missiles?

DEUTCH: I've talked --

SEN. GLENN: I mean tactical weapons. I'm sorry, not missiles.

DEUTCH: I was thinking of nuclear devices. That's what I was

thinking of. And the answer to that, I would say, is largely yes,

but not entirely. I also want to mention that in the production

complex, there are always devices that are in partial state of

fabrication or rework and so on. So there's a whole lot of

piece-part issues that you have to worry about too.

But with respect to the location of weapons that were formerly in

military units, the answer to that, I would say, is we're fairly

confident of it, and we believe the Russians have a fairly good

handle on it.

SEN. GLENN: In times past, we were very concerned about Pakistan

or others developing what, at that time, we termed an "Islamic

bomb." We used to refer -- to it that way. And it was referred to

it -- internationally, at some of the meetings that way.

Is there any indication that Iraq is working with others to spread

nuclear weaponry to other countries, or giving them nuclear

information or technology that would let other countries or groups

develop a weapon?

DEUTCH: Iraq?

SEN. GLENN: Iraq.

DEUTCH: I think at the present time, Iraq is mostly trying to

preserve whatever capability it can, in light of the U.N.

sanctions. You will be hearing more from a witness who is more

directly involved in that.

But I think, right now, I would have to say no, we don't know of

efforts for Iraq to export technology or materials elsewhere.

SEN. GLENN: One of the things that disturbed me in your statement

also -- I think it's really a red flag for us, and it -- you said

that the Russians, quote, "may not know where all their material is

located."

DEUTCH: Yes, I think that that refers, especially, to -- within

the complex, as the complex deteriorates, in terms of its

performance. In terms of its operations and support for

operations, the accountability will eventually suffer. It may

never have been as good as it is in our complex.

SEN. GLENN: It's one thing to -- for us to be using the Nunn-

Lugar money, which I support -- I voted for that -- and then

support that concept of helping them to take their weapons down and

dismantle them.

But this made me wonder whether we -- if we don't even -- if they

don't even know where all their material is located -- whether

maybe we wouldn't be well-advised to take some of that Nunn-Lugar

money and, instead of putting it just on weapons' dismantlement --

bringing them off, the missiles and so on -- helping Russia somehow

find out where all their material is.

That's really -- we got loose nukes all over the place if we -- if

they don't know where all their material may be; or potential loose

nukes, that is, if they haven't been put into weapons yet.

DEUTCH: Senator Glenn, I -- in my comments, I explicitly said that

I think that expenditures on materials' protection, accountability

and control in Russia makes tremendous sense if it's on a

risk-based basis. Don't do it for every place, but in those places

where you think there's a serious problem. I think that that is a

very cost-effective way to reduce this threat.

SEN. GLENN: We have -- we have the Nunn-Lugar money right there.

It's there, now, being used. Without having to go try and get a

new -- a new appropriation for that, do you think it would be good

to take some of that money and use it for this purpose?

DEUTCH: Well -- (I ?) -- this is, wildly, fields from an

intelligence question. But having -- being both a loyal ex-member

of both the Department of Energy or the Department of Defense --

(audience chuckles) -- I would say that either agency could carry

this out very, very well. My point is it's something the country

should do. That's as far as I should go.

SEN. GLENN: Okay.

DEUTCH: I can't give you off-bets right here -- (laughter) --

SEN. GLENN: (That's all right ?).

DEUTCH: -- maybe privately, Senator.

SEN. GLENN: One of the other things I think you had in your

statement was you -- there was a Russian source who said that they

-- it would be possible for them to substitute a dummy warhead,

dummy bomb and avoid detection for probably up to six months.

That's disturbing also.

DEUTCH: That depends on the precise control system that they have

in place.

SEN. GLENN: What is the danger as you see it if somebody came into

some -- now, it takes a large industrial complex to put a weapon

together. And there's a lot of things that have to be done -- the

facets on the bomb -- and there's a lot of experimenting. It's a

big industrial operation. Even if you have the plutonium, it's

still a big industrial operation to get the thing done. What is

the danger of people having plutonium unless they -- having

plutonium that could be put into a dust or a powder of some kind of

-- if that was spread around Times Square or something like that?

Is this a danger that we should be looking into? Is it really a

hazard?

DEUTCH: Well, on a per gram or per cubic centimeter basis it's not

-- I wouldn't think it would be as lethal as chemical or biological

in the same circumstances. But let me say to you building a

sophisticated nuclear device requires a tremendous amount of

ingenuity, a tremendous amount of engineering capability. Building

less sophisticated devices which don't give you the optimum yield

to weight ratio is not all that impossible. Designs are known, and

-- so while I would say to you yes, it does take some engineering

talent and some facilities and some milling and some dealing with

knowing how to deal with plutonium that we should not think that

this requires the kind of caliber that our weapons laboratories or

Russian weapons laboratories have to produce a crude nuclear

device. I would not want to -- don't say it's trivial, but I

wouldn't want to overestimate its difficulty.

SEN. GLENN: No, and I agree with you. And I was just recalling

when you said that about eight years ago, I guess it's been, Mr.

Chairman, maybe 12 or 13, maybe 14 years ago we had a student from

Princeton (who) came in and had some plans. And he talked to Dr.

Weiss (sp), our committee staff director at that time, and he had

a plan for a nuclear weapon. The only thing -- it was what we

called the ashcan device at that time, but we had -- and Len looked

at it, and he thought, well, it looked -- it looked like it might

work to him, although he's not a bomb designer. So we had Taylor

(sp) come down, Dr. Taylor (sp), who was a bomb designer, and he

said yeah, this probably would have worked. He's --

DEUTCH: The only --

SEN. GLENN: -- a student, so it just backs up what you're saying.

And we had that -- I wanted the Department of Energy to hire the

kid at that time, put him under some control -- (laughter) -- so he

wasn't out loose. But they -- they didn't do it.

And then we had -- we had a second time when he came up where he'd

-- and that, we found a lot of stuff out at Los Alamos in the

library that was open -- in the open stacks in the library. You may

recall some of those times, too, when this came out, what we came

to know on the committee as Rotow I, Rotow II was this fellow's

name. But it backs up what you're saying about they can design a

device, it might not be as sophisticated, might not make as

efficient use of the fissile material, but it still would go off.

DEUTCH: Exactly.

SEN. GLENN: Yeah. So --

DEUTCH: The only thing which surprises me about your story is that

the student came from Princeton and not MIT! (Laughter.)

SEN. GLENN: Yeah! I was -- when I said Princeton I thought maybe

I was -- there was a mistake here!

Into how you keep up with these things -- and I don't know whether

we can get into this in open session or not -- it seems to me a lot

of the stuff we're into now is not things that you get by overhead

satellite and by SAGANT (sp) and things like that. Much of this

has to be developed by information sources that are human, human

(end ?), and that takes a long time to develop and to check out and

all that sort of things. Is that a major problem?

DEUTCH: I would say, I mentioned in response to an earlier

question, that I'm thoroughly satisfied, and I believe you would be

thoroughly satisfied about the awareness of this problem in the

human collection tasking system and actually what's going on in the

field. I don't believe that there's anywhere in the world where

there isn't -- where one of our men or women officers aren't aware

of the severity of this problem.

I would also say this is something which is not recent. This has

been put into the community for some number of years now. I would

also say that our development of a nonproliferation center has

assured an all-source, multi-agency approach to the analysis of

questions and the tasking on these kinds of issues. So I think a

tremendous amount of progress has been done, since the time really

of Mr. Gates as director, to build a real serious, post-Cold War,

nonproliferation intelligence capability on both the collection and

the analysis side, including all agencies, not just Central

Intelligence.

SEN. GLENN: Yeah. I've come to the conclusion over the last few

years that bad as nuclear weapons are, though, that we're gradually

coming to the point where the chemical weapons may be our biggest

danger that we've run into in the near future. We can keep up a

lot easier with nuclear weapons than we can with -- and nuclear

developments than we can with chemical weapons.

Judge Webster, one of your predecessors out there, sat right where

you're sitting back a few years ago, testified that a very credible

chemical weapons factory -- and he was testifying as to how

difficult it is to keep up with some of the chemical weapons

development all over the world. And he testified that a very

credible chemical weapons factory for a terrorist group, or even

for a larger group than that, even a nation, could be set up in a

space about the size of this hearing room right here. Would you

concur with that, that they're that small and that easy to set up?

DEUTCH: Yes.

SEN. GLENN: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. NUNN: Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Senator Levin, I'll yield to you in a just a minute. Let me ask a

couple of other questions, and I'll let you wind up the questions

with Dr. Deutch.

Dr. Deutch, the presidential commission chaired by Harold Brown

and, first, our departed friend and colleague Les Aspin, and then

Warren Rudman succeeded in that role -- they -- their job was to

appraise the roles and capabilities of the U.S. intelligence

community. And they recently released a report that recommends

more cooperation is needed between law enforcement and intelligence

communities. Do you agree with this?

DEUTCH: Yes.

SEN. NUNN: What legislative changes, if any, would be needed to

develop of the kind of cooperation the Brown Commission recommends?

Do you need anything in the way of legislation, or is this

primarily a management, an executive branch --

DEUTCH: First of all, I don't think that this is a problem which

can be solved by legislation. There has been a long history, going

way back to the times of J. Edgar Hoover and Dulles, about problems

between the FBI and the CIA in particular.

I think that they have gotten tremendously better. They've gotten

a great deal better in recent years, and I would say that today we

have important mechanisms in place. I regularly meet with Louis

Freeh. I regularly meet with Janet Reno. My deputy, George Tenet,

meets every other week with Jamie Gorelick. We've had a very

important and, I might say, positive, extremely positive meeting in

Rome for the first time of some of our -- of agency personnel and

legal -- FBI persons abroad.

All indications that I have on the tremendously important issues

that we are discussing here -- infrastructure, vulnerability to

terrorist attack, terrorism against the United States in any form,

counterintelligence -- I would say that the cooperation is moving

smartly. We are assigning FBI officers in CIA, CIA officers in FBI

in this area. I'm quite positive about it, and I cannot imagine a

person who has been more cooperative in this matter than Louis

Freeh has been with me, or than Janet Reno (or ?) -- and, of

course, my beloved Jamie have been in these matters. So I'm quite

optimistic about it, and I regard serving law enforcement as being

one of the important post-cold war objectives in the intelligence

community. And we are looking to them as being an important

customer for foreign intelligence that we can provide.

SEN. NUNN: I'm told there are currently over 100 organizations,

offices, and government agencies that are involved in one way or

the other in the weapons of mass destruction proliferation effort

-- counter-proliferation effort of the U.S. government. Is it

feasible (transcript garbled) -- on proliferation with so many

players involved?

DEUTCH: It's -- I don't -- it's certainly something we have to do.

We have to make sure that we have in place an efficient, an

effective, serious policy apparatus for doing that, and that, I

think, is an absolute requirement.

SEN. NUNN: The commission, the Brown-Rudman commission has

recommended that a global crime committee chaired by the

president's national security advisor be formed that would, among

other things, oversee U.S. government efforts to combat weapons of

mass destruction and proliferation that involves criminal activity.

(transcript garbled)

DEUTCH: I don't have any thoughts on this proposal this morning,

but I think that the direction -- this is one of three committees

that were recommended by the Aspin-Brown commission.

One of the (transcript garbled) to do with a chaired group -- a

group (garbled transcript) priorities on the national security

arealigencecol te dat thatbattainly endorse myself as director of

Central Intelligence. Another was a consumer (transcript garbled)

run by the deputies, which I also endorse in the national security

area. There are several -- something is needed to coordinate

better foreign intelligence as it relates to global crime and

terrorism, and how that is organized I would want to await, talking

with the attorney general, but I have not done before reaching a

position myself. But the proposal made by the Brown commission is

entirely reasonable. Something like that is needed.

SEN. NUNN: On Monday the Washington Post published an article on

coordination among the CIA, FBI, and State Department. It

mentioned regular meetings between you and Director Freeh and

between representatives from the CIA and the Justice Department.

Was -- was that reasonably accurate in terms of the description of

the coordination (garbled) going on, or what else can you tell us

about the coordination, particularly between CIA and FBI where

there's been so much history of -- of problems?

DEUTCH: I hope this doesn't get me into trouble, Mr. Chairman: I

have not read that article. So -- but I do think we have a very

solid coordination at all levels and participation of officers at

all levels. I'd be happy to provide you a thorough -- a thorough

description of all that.

But as I say, I do meet, to the extent that you just read it -- as

I mentioned to you, that is accurate -- I meet with Louis Freeh

regularly. I talk to him all the time. I meet with Janet Reno

with high frequency. My deputy, George Tenet, meets biweekly with

Jamie Gorelick. We have a committee called the joint law

enforcement -- I forget the name of it -- some initials -- which

meets on a regular basis at the working level. We have people in

each other's counterterrorism centers, and efforts like that.

I think that this is something which is getting better, fast. So

I'm real -- I am -- I am optimistic about it. And I do think it's

important for the intelligence community to see that law

enforcement is the kind of important policy customer we're so

accustomed to dealing with in the national security (arena ?).

SEN. NUNN: Can you say anything in open session -- if you rather

reserve this, I certainly understand -- but can you say anything

about cooperation between our intelligence community and the

Russian intelligence community, your counterparts, regarding

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; chemical, biological

and nuclear?

DEUTCH: No.

SEN. NUNN: Thank you. (Laughter.) I assume that's something you

pursue, though, in general.

Could you put -- take off your intelligence hat and answer one

policy question, based on your memory when you were in the arena --

(laughter) -- where you could have opinions on policy? And I know

you --

DEUTCH: (Laughs.) You make me blush. (Laughter.)

SEN. NUNN: -- compartmentalize those opinions now and put them in

the deep resources of your brilliant mind. (Laughter.)

But the whole question of HEU -- purchasing HEU -- that is a focal

point; (it ?) has been. It was, I thought, an extraordinary

accomplishment to get the Ukraine to basically make the HEU

agreement with Russia. That helped get Ukraine out of the nuclear

business; a tremendous breakthrough that I don't think the

administration has gotten enough credit for.

But it all depends now on the HEU being purchased and that -- the

revenue flowing and the materials flowing. And we have this U.S.

Enrichment -- cooperation -- or corporation -- Corporation now

involved. Can you comment on that?

It doesn't appear to be working well. And it seems to me, this

needs some real attention at very high levels, because if this one

falls through; if this one collapses, the chances of getting this

kind of cooperation, and getting people out of the nuclear

business, and keeping some confidence in terms of the U.S. economic

commitments -- seems to me it'd be -- (we'd ?) be setting ourselves

up for a real bad blow. Would you comment on that?

DEUTCH: Well, I think the first point is, anything we can do to

blend down highly enriched uranium and burn it in nuclear reactors

around the world is something which reduces this threat and is

important to do, and I believe that it's also economically

attractive. Just as I mentioned in the case of plutonium, if there

is raw plutonium around in the world, using mixed oxide fuel and

burning it in reactors I believe is important from the point of

view of nonproliferation, and I believe it can be economically

advantageous, especially with respect to Russian plutonium. So I

greatly favor both these efforts, both efforts.

I have not checked into the precise circumstances where we are

today on the United States Enrichment Corporation's efforts, Mr.

Timber's efforts, to actually realize that. I believe that there

are a couple of problems still in the way of having that happen

which are involved.

The last person I've spoken to about this in detail is Senator

Domenici. So I think that those can be managed, and they are

important to be managed, because that deal has both got

nonproliferation benefits and economic benefits and security

benefits. It's a triple win, so we should make that happen as best

we can.

SEN. NUNN: But the United States cannot simply turn it over to a

private corporation and assume market forces are going to take care

of it. It has too much of a governmental purpose to be able to do

that. I mean, it seems to me we ought to use the market as much as

we possibly can. But I get the impression that we're allowing the

market to dictate some of this when we should be looking at it in

a much broader sense.

DEUTCH: Mr. Chairman, I have to go and refresh myself on this, but

I don't think -- I think that if -- the issue is -- it's a trade

issue, that is are you -- is it a fair trade practice to take in

highly enriched Russian uranium and introduce it to the market

without having any cost associated.

SEN. NUNN: Yeah, that's one important issue.

DEUTCH: If you want to talk about this, let me -- let me --

SEN. NUNN: I'll get back with you.

DEUTCH: And we can -- let me get myself refreshed on that.

SEN. NUNN: Okay. Okay.

Senator Levin?

SEN. LEVIN: I yield to Senator Glenn.

SEN. GLENN: Let me ask Senator Levin just for one question,

because I had another commitment I had to go to and I wanted to

follow up on a previous question. I asked about the U.S. reported

decision to sell $368 million worth of military equipment, transfer

that to Pakistan, and the impact that might have on India. Was

your answer to indicate that you just didn't have in possession

today a CIA analysis of the impact on India or that such a study

has not been done?

DEUTCH: I don't have it available to me today, and I will --

SEN. GLENN: Has such a study been done?

DEUTCH: I think the answer is yes, but I just am not informed on

it, I'll have to get back to you briefly. Certainly, the

assessment of Indian reaction has been done; I just don't know what

state it's in.

SEN. GLENN: Has that been given to the administration?

DEUTCH: Well, if it's been done it's certainly been given to the

administration, yes.

SEN. GLENN: Okay, it isn't just -- it's been passed along, they're

fully aware of your opinion then of what the impact on India would

be?

DEUTCH: I have to reserve until I can give you an accurate answer

to that, Senator. I don't know what document exists and what

document has been given. If there has been a document it's been

distributed. But I'll be happy to do that, I can do that in an

hour's time.

SEN. GLENN: I would appreciate it. I'd like to know whether they

are aware of what your opinion is of what the Indian reaction might

be on this. If you can provide that for us, either classified or

unclassified, why, I'd appreciate it.

DEUTCH: Well, I must say, the (community ?) has been very, very

closely involved in providing information to policymakers on this

subject, so I'm confident that there is something -- that there's

a piece on the Indian reaction. I'll get back to you on it, sir.

SEN. GLENN: Okay, all right. Well, I presumed something like that

had been done. I couldn't see how they could possibly go ahead

without that kind of a CIA analysis in hand at least. If it hadn't

been done and given to them, it certainly should be.

DEUTCH: I'm not just not informed at the moment, sir. And I will

be back to you before the end of the day.

SEN. GLENN: Okay, fine. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Senator Levin.

SEN. LEVIN: Welcome.

DEUTCH: How are you?

SEN. LEVIN: Good.

The -- I want to follow up on Senator Nunn's question about

cooperation with Russian intelligence, because there has been

public statements that we have started cooperation with the Russian

government and I think the statement also said including law

enforcement relative to nuclear smuggling. Is that not true, that

we have indeed begun cooperative measures with the Russian

government, said so publicly?

DEUTCH: There's no question about the fact that we've had

discussions and cooperative efforts, certainly in the law

enforcement area, with the Russian government on this issue. They

are also concerned about questions of the kind we've been

discussing here this morning.

SEN. LEVIN: Now, can you just -- without answering the question

you don't want to answer, is there any reason if in fact we are

cooperating with Russian intelligence that that general statement

cannot be made publicly, without getting into the details of it?

I see you're uncomfortable, which is --

DEUTCH: Well, I mean, yeah, it's not the kind of subject that I

would want to open up.

SEN. LEVIN: Even a -- well, let me go to Israel. Are we

cooperating with Israeli intelligence?

DEUTCH: Yes, yes.

SEN. LEVIN: Because there was an article recently that said that

-- according to some sources at least, that some in the U.S now see

Israeli intelligence as a rival. There was a Los Angeles Times

article -- I sent you a copy of this -- and some U.S. sources,

without identifying them, are saying that the Mossad has done

recently to help U.S. efforts to track down international

terrorists. Are we indeed cooperating with Israeli intelligence,

the Mossad?

DEUTCH: We certainly are, and I think that it's known that I've

just come back from Israel to work out with them a more robust and

more effective counter-terrorism program, for example.

SEN. LEVIN: And was that successful?

DEUTCH: It was a very successful (meeting ?), yes.

SEN. LEVIN: And are we satisfied with the level of Israeli

cooperation in this area?

DEUTCH: Counter-terrorism? Absolutely.

SEN. LEVIN: And now let me go back to Russia.

DEUTCH: Yes.

SEN. LEVIN: Is there -- what is the reason that -- if in fact

there is a joint effort with the Russian government, including

their intelligence people, that that cannot be just confirmed

without getting into details? I want to follow up on Senator

Nunn's point there.

DEUTCH: Because my judgment is that that's not a subject that I

would want to discuss in open session.

SEN. LEVIN: Will you give us for the record, then, what in fact is

going on, if any, with Russian intelligence and in terms of a joint

effort against -- a joint counter-terrorist effort and a joint

nuclear smuggling --

DEUTCH: Absolutely. I'd be happy to do that. We will give you,

for the record, what is going on with -- between intelligence

services on cooperation on terrorism, counter-terrorism, or

counter- smuggling -- nuclear smuggling efforts.

SEN. LEVIN: Okay.

You've indicated in your testimony that there's -- of the numerous

reports describing diversion of weapons-usable material, that only

a few actually have involved weapons-usable material, and the

quantities have been significantly less than that needed for a

weapon.

First of all, on that issue, we had testimony. Senator Nunn showed

some pictures the other day as to what quantities would be

necessary for a weapon, and it was some small multiple of that

little hockey puck.

DEUTCH: That's probably a plutonium device that he has in mind,

and I think that we all agree that this is small in volume and

weighs, you know, a few tens of pounds.

SEN. LEVIN: All right. So we're literally talking about a

relatively small number of hockey-puck-sized items. Is that

correct?

DEUTCH: Yes, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: Now would they be relatively easy to smuggle across a

border -- something that small and easily transportable?

DEUTCH: You could take a briefcase and put in a couple of them and

pass through a border. Unless there was specific detection

equipment and devices, or some other inspection schemes, I would

think it would be pretty easy, yes, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: Or there could be 100 different briefcases with one,

right? You don't need to put a dozen in one briefcase; you could

have 100 different people with one per briefcase.

DEUTCH: Correct.

SEN. LEVIN: And if a small number of those even crossed the border

relatively easily, then would you agree you have enough there for

a nuclear weapon, relatively small number?

DEUTCH: You could have enough for a nuclear weapon in one

suitcase, one briefcase.

SEN. LEVIN: Now, you indicated that in the past 2-1/2 years, there

was some material stolen from Russian facilities to outside

countries in Germany, there was a seizure of six grams of

plutonium, Czech police seized under three kilos of highly-enriched

uranium in December of '94. Where were those items going to? Do

we know? What was their --

DEUTCH: I don't know at this time. Each one of them had a

different destination and a different degree of planning for who

the customer was. And I can find that information out. Let me say

to you that the general picture that this should convey, it seems

to me, is how lucky we are and how great this threat is.

SEN. LEVIN: Well, that was my next question. If in fact it's so

easy to transport something like that in a suitcase, we can presume

that if we caught a few, that there's a number that we haven't

caught. Would that be safe to say? Is that a fair assumption? Do

you assume it?

DEUTCH: Oh, I would not go that far. I would say that it -- I

would not be prepared to say -- in other circumstances I see your

point, that you might say, well, if we've only -- there have been

a lot of bogus cases, some, a few cases, which actually involved

enriched material, is it possible that some significant quantity

has gotten through, enough to make a device or so? I would not

reach that conclusion today. Again, I would focus on, boy, is this

ever a warning that we've got real troubles here, and that it's

worthwhile making investments in the materials protection and

accountability system, control system inside Russia.

SEN. LEVIN: You have not reached a personal conclusion as to

whether or not it's likely that a half-dozen hockey pucks by now

have been crossing borders illegally, if we've captured two of

them, three of them?

DEUTCH: We haven't -- one of them was grams. That's not that

size. Grams is --

SEN. LEVIN: Okay.

DEUTCH: And I think only one of these, the Czech case that you

mentioned, was what I would call, you know, a quantity that begins

to be the size of a hockey puck, less -- much smaller than that

yet. But I do not -- my own personal conviction, although I don't

have certainty on this, I don't have absolute -- you can't bank it,

I would say we have not yet gotten -- I can say to you that we

don't have a confirmed case.

SEN. LEVIN: I mean your own belief.

DEUTCH: I would say no. But that I regard as good luck, and

that's what I'm worried about.

SEN. LEVIN: No, and I -- I think we all agree here that to prevent

that is what the major focus must be; but I also was interested as

to whether or not you think it's likely that that has already

occurred. Your answer is no.

DEUTCH: No.

SEN. LEVIN: That's fine, and we've got to keep it that way if in

fact your assumption is correct.

SEN. NUNN: I think the biggest problem in that area is that we

don't believe there's an accurate inventory, so if some were

missing, there is no inventory that would give anyone confidence

that the alert system would really work, that you would know what

was missing.

DEUTCH: And I'd agree with that.

SEN. NUNN: Yeah.

DEUTCH: I would be looking for this on the recipient side, not on

the (law ?) side.

SEN. NUNN: Yeah.

SEN. LEVIN: And whatever we can do to achieve that inventory I

take it would be highly desirable.

DEUTCH: On a risk-based basis. To do it for the whole Russian

complex would be out of the question. But to do it with the high

risk areas would not be.

SEN. LEVIN: In your prepared statement you say that you -- the

intelligence community is taking measures to aggressively support

U.S. government efforts to ensure the security of nuclear materials

and technologies. But then you near the end of your statement say

that more can and must be done. Would you give us specific --

DEUTCH: Could I --

SEN. LEVIN: -- specific suggestions on page 13, I believe?

DEUTCH: Thank you. Just give me one second. I did mention two or

three items in my --

SEN. LEVIN: Specifically as to what more we can do.

DEUTCH: More money and more support for material protection,

control, and accountability efforts; consideration of assistance to

the Russians if they will do it in converting their plutonium

production reactors to burning plutonium. So I do have specific

considerations that policy makers might consider.

SEN. LEVIN: Would that be part of Nunn-Lugar? The second piece,

particularly? Do you know if Nunn-Lugar funds would be eligible to

do that offhand? I could ask the master here as to whether --

DEUTCH: I'm going to get myself in tremendous trouble, Senator

Levin, if I begin commenting on DOD programs and money.

SEN. LEVIN: All right.

SEN. NUNN: I think -- I think it would be eligible. I don't think

there's any question about it being eligible. It's a matter of

reaching an agreement with the Russians and making sure that it is

financially feasible and that the plan is technically feasible,

too.

DEUTCH: Well, it is technically feasible. The issue is whether

the Russians will be willing it through to completion and make sure

that it happens so that it happens.

SEN. NUNN: Yeah. What I mean by that is technically feasible in

terms of the plan they laid down --

DEUTCH: Right.

SEN. NUNN: -- where they want us to furnish the money. Sometimes

things are technically feasible, but the plan doesn't --

DEUTCH: That's --

SEN. NUNN: -- appear to be either effective or efficient.

DEUTCH: And that's the part where you have to tie down.

SEN. NUNN: Right.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. And thanks -- thanks for your good work.

Good seeing you, sir.

SEN. NUNN: Dr. Deutch, thank you for being here. We appreciate it

very much and we look forward to continuing to work with you. And

I will follow up on those meetings that we discussed.

DEUTCH: Yes, sir. Nice to see you. Thank you.

SEN. NUNN: Thank you.

(End transcript)