Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, could I interrupt for just a moment to ask unanimous consent that the privileges of the floor be extended to Max H. Della Pia in the Air Force Reserve, a Fellow in my office, during the pendency of this bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, on behalf of Senator Glenn and Senator Abraham, I offer an amendment that would place a condition on the authority of the Secretary of the Navy to transfer tugboats to the Northeast Wisconsin Railroad Transportation Commission.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Michigan (Mr. Levin), for Mr. Glenn, for himself, Mr. Abraham, and Mr. Levin, proposes an amendment numbered 4373.
The amendment is as follows:
In section 1022(a), strike out `Such transfers' and insert in lieu thereof,' if the Secretary determines that the tugboats are not needed for transfer, donation, or other disposal under title II of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 481 et seq.). A transfer made under the preceding sentence'.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, this amendment would reinstate the normal GSA review of the disposal.
I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, the amendment has been cleared on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 4373) was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. McCAIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, on behalf of Senator Cohen, I offer an amendment which would clarify the definition of `national security systems' under the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996.
I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other side.
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Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, this amendment has been cleared.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I urge that the Senate adopt this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain), for Mr. Cohen, proposes an amendment numbered 4374.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle F of title X add the following:
SEC. 1072. CLARIFICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS TO WHICH THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT REFORM ACT OF 1996 APPLIES.
Section 5142(b) of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (division E of Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 689; 40 U.S.C. 1452(b)) is amended--
(1) by striking out `(b) Limitation: ' and inserting in lieu thereof `(b) Limitations: (1)'; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
`(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or any other provision of law, for the purposes of this subtitle, a system that, in function, operation, or use, involves the storage, processing, or forwarding of classified information and is protected at all times by procedures established for the handling of classified information shall be considered as a national security system under the definition in subsection (a) only if the function, operation, or use of the system--
`(A) involves activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a);
`(B) involves equipment described in paragraph (4) of subsection (a); or
`(C) is critical to an objective described in paragraph (5) of subsection (a) and is not excluded by paragraph (1) of this subsection.'.
Mr. COHEN. Madam President, the amendment I am offering today is designed to maintain the integrity of the national security systems definition of the Information Technology Management Reform Act [ITMRA] of 1996. This act lays the foundation for real information management reform not only at the Department of Defense but at all government agencies.
The need for this amendment is to make clear that the Senate does not wish to see any significant policy changes to the ITMRA until there has been some time to assess progress in the implementation of the act. The national security systems language in the ITMRA represents a delicate compromise between Congress, DOD, and the intelligence community. But, even before the law becomes effective the House was asked to include a significant change to the ITMRA on the House-passed version of the DOD authorization bill. The House provision undermines the compromise reached last year and would have the effect of limiting oversight for a new class of information systems. The administration in its Statement of Administrative Policy opposes the House-passed provision, and I look forward to the administration's continued support for maintaining the integrity of the ITMRA in conference.
The ITMRA was based on compromise. Like most compromises, it probably will not satisfy everyone with an interest in information management issues. The ITMRA is a significant step in establishing the oversight criteria by which all information systems including national security systems will be judged. This criteria will be used by OMB, agency heads, the inspectors-general, GAO, and the Congress in holding agency officials accountable for obtaining a positive return for the taxpayers on the more than $50 billion annual Government investment in information systems. It is important to know whether we are getting our money's worth on information technology investments including, for example, the systems that process classified imagery, the software that guides a precision-guided munition to its target, the computers that control our Nation's air traffic control system, and the long distance phone bill for Federal employees in Portland, ME.
The ITMRA would accomplish meaningful reform, in part, by emphasizing up-front capital planning and the establishment of clear performance goals and investment criteria designed to improve agency operations. Once the up-front planning is complete and the performance goals are established, the procurement reforms that Congress has enacted in the last 2 years would make it simpler and faster for agencies to purchase information technology.
This management criteria applies to all systems in the Government including national security systems. Yet we have not emerged from the old Brooks Act paradigm. During the negotiations over the ITMRA, I reluctantly agreed to maintain the status quo and keep the old Brook Act national security systems definition and exemptions. But one must really ask what these systems are really exempted from? It is not from OMB oversight as OMB already has that authority in the budget process. This authority was reaffirmed in the ITMRA as Congress explicitly directed the Director of OMB to enforce accountability for sound information resources management through the budget process for all information technology including national security systems.
The Brooks Act exemptions were originally passed to exclude some DOD and intelligence systems for the procurement authority of the Administrator of the General Services Administration. It was never intended to exempt DOD and the CIA from implementing sound management practices. ITMRA frees all agencies from GSA oversight in exchange for adhering to the sound business-tested methods of capital planning, establishing investment controls, measuring performance, benchmarking, and enforcing accountability. Thus, there was never any compelling reason for keeping the Brooks Act exemption language as the ITMRA eliminated the original reason for the exemption.
The Congress did believe, however, that national security systems should be given some greater flexibility in implementing the ITMRA and agreed to keep a national security systems definition and classification. Systems classified as national security systems are exempt from select portions of the act. It perhaps can be argued that with recent problems with classified financial systems and information management at the National Reconnaissance Office, the serious cost overruns derived from poor software management in many major weapons systems, and the lack of interoperability among our command, control, communications systems that the ITMRA national security systems exemption are too broad. This is probably the case, and I considered offering an amendment to eliminate the national security systems exemption.
I have, however, decided not to pursue that amendment in order to see how the current system will work in practice. I will have to leave it to my successors to ascertain how well national security systems are conforming to the ITMRA and whether a more restricted exemption is necessary. In the coming years we will witness whether DOD is able to seize the opportunities generated from procurement and management reforms to provide cost-effective intelligence and information systems that effectively support our service men and women and maintain our technological advantage on the battlefield. I fear, however, if the culture does not change at DOD and the Pentagon continues to hide behind legalistic and metaphysical barriers to outside oversight, we will witness the continued development of shoddy systems that do not take advantage of the dynamic commercial marketplace and that will in time erode our national security in the information age.
Another of the more contentious issues in developing the ITMRA was how to treat the oversight of security standards in the Government. Recent hearings of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations reveal that information security is still a serious problem that needs to be addressed. In ITMRA, Congress attempted to maintain the status quo regarding the division of responsibilities over information security standards and oversight. Based on recent events, I have now come to the conclusion that the agencies responsible for information security are more concerned with turf battles and bureaucratic infighting than they are about securing vital Government information. I am convinced that Congress needs to readdress the Computer Security Act and its implementation, but I am also convinced that this bill is not the vehicle to address the issue.
In conclusion, the amendment I propose clarifies any ambiguity regarding the definition of national security systems, reaffirms the Senate's commitment to maintaining the application of the ITMRA, and directly counters the House provision. Unlike the amendment to the House bill, this amendment does not change the status quo with regard to information systems security and maintains the comprehensive applicability of ITMRA to classified systems that do not meet the national security systems definition.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 4374) was agreed to.
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Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, on behalf of Senators Heflin and Shelby, I offer an amendment which I believe is at the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for Mr. Heflin, for himself and Mr. Shelby, proposes an amendment numbered 4375.