The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the bill?
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Brownback: At the end of title III insert the following new section:
SEC. 306. RESTRICTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end of title I the following new section:
`Sec. 110. (a) Provision of Intelligence Information to the United Nations.--(1) No United States intelligence information may be provided to the United Nations or any organization affiliated with the United Nations, or to any official or employee thereof, unless the President certifies to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives that the Director of Central Intelligence
(in this section referred to as the `DCT'), in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has required, and such organization has established and implemented, procedures for protecting intelligence sources and methods (including protection from release to nations and foreign nationals that are otherwise not eligible to receive such information) no less stringent than procedures maintained by nations with which the United States regularly shares similar types of intelligence information. Such certification shall include a description of the procedures in effect at such organization.
`(2) Paragraph (1) may be waived upon written certification by the President to the appropriate committees of Congress that providing such information to the United Nations or an organization affiliated with the United Nations, or to any official or employee thereof, is in the national security interest of the United States and that all possible measures protecting such information has been taken, except that such waiver must be made for each instance such information is provided, or for each such document provided.
`(b) Periodic and Special Reports.--(1) The President shall periodically report but not less frequently than quarterly, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives on the types and volume of intelligence provided to the United Nations and the purposes for which it was provided during the period covered by the report. Such periodic reports shall be submitted to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives with an annex containing a counterintelligence and security assessment of all risks, including an evaluation of any potential adverse impact on national collection systems, of providing intelligence to the United Nations, together with the information on how such risks have been addressed.
`(2) The President shall submit a special report to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House or Representatives within 15 days after the United States Government becomes aware of any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence provided to the United Nations by the United States.
`(c) Limitation.--The restrictions of subsection (a) and the requirement for periodic reports under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) shall not apply to the provision of intelligence that is provided only to, and for the use of, appropriately cleared United States Government personnel serving with the United Nations.
`(d) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or assign the duties of the President under subsection (a).
`(e) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to--
`(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); or
`(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).'.
(b) Clinical Amendment.--The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 109 the following:
`Sec. 110. Restrictions on intelligence sharing with the United Nations.'.
Mr. BROWNBACK (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?
There was no objection.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in an attempt to restore sanity to our policy of sharing intelligence information with the United Nations.
My amendment would amend the 1974 National Security Act to prohibit the sharing of U.S. intelligence information with the United Nations or any of its affiliated organizations unless the President certifies to Congress that the organization has implemented CIA, Defense, and State Department procedures to protect U.S. intelligence sources and methods.
This provision is not intended to end U.S. intelligence sharing with the United Nations, nor does it mean to set unreasonable or impossible standards for the protection of critical U.S. sources and methods of intelligence gathering.
The only purpose of this provision is to restore basic rationality to the administration's imprudent sharing of sensitive intelligence information with the United Nations.
My provision establishes logical and reasonable standards for sharing intelligence information with the United Nations. All it says is that the United States should require the same level of protection of U.S. intelligence information from the United Nations that we require in our intelligence sharing arrangements with other states.
If for some reason the United Nations is unwilling or incapable of providing that level of protections, my provision will still permit the sharing of U.S. intelligence with the United Nations on a case-by-case basis. In each of these cases, all that is required is a certification that the information shared advances U.S. national security interests.
Protecting our sources and methods of intelligence gathering is not an academic subject. It is a matter of national security. It is a matter of protecting lives. It is a matter of protecting billions of dollars of investments that the American people have made in our country's vital national security interests.
Mr. Chairman, the United Nations has acted like a sieve when it comes to safeguarding intelligence information to the same degree as the United States.
Senator Olympia Snowe of Maine has identified four instances in which the United Nations has breached the security of classified documents provided by the United States. The most egregious violation occurred in Somalia where sensitive data was almost compromised due to the United Nation's carelessness.
In addition, Senator Snowe has discovered that no agreement has been in place that requires the United Nations to provide for the protection of intelligence supplied by the United States.
As a result of her findings, Senator Snowe drafted a provision included in the conference report of the State Department Authorization Act that mirrors the amendment I am offering today. The House has passed this provision twice. I simply ask now that my colleagues now act on it again.
Mr. Chairman, the administration has failed to implement the safeguards needed to protect U.S. intelligence information from unauthorized disclosure.
In fact, rather than further safeguarding our intelligence information, CIA Director Deutch has tried to institutionalize the widespread sharing of sensitive U.S. intelligence material by making it easier for foreign consumers to register complaints about the use of security markings, which protect the national security of the United States.
Mr. Chairman, if my colleagues have any misgivings about this amendment, I simply want to point out to them that U.N. General Secretary Boutros-Ghali has appointed an Iraqi national, Ismat Kittani, to be the head of the United Nations' Department of Peacekeeping Operations. It is truly disturbing that a national from a country with which the United States has no diplomatic relations, which is on the U.S. State Department list of terrorist states, and with which the United States recently went to war could be appointed to such a sensitive position in the United Nations.
This is wrong, and this is indicative of the recklessness with which the United Nations treats sensitive matters and sensitive information. The United States should not share our intelligence information with the United Nations unless it adopts the standards to which we hold our own agencies accountable.
[Page: H5411]
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise I opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, the Brownback amendment places new, unworkable restrictions on the United States sharing information with the United Nations--even when it is in the national interest to do so. It would make it extremely difficult to provide intelligence support to those U.N. activities which are supportive of U.S. foreign policy goals.
The administration is opposed to the Brownback amendment. This amendment is identical to language contained in the conference report on H.R. 1561, the Overseas Interests Act, which was vetoed by the President. As the President noted in his veto message, this amendment would unconstitutionally infringe on the President's power to conduct diplomatic relations and limit Presidential control over the use of state secrets.
The DCI has already established guidelines to protect intelligence sources and methods, when it is determined to be in the interest of the United States to provide information derived from U.S. intelligence to the United Nations. Furthermore, the United Nations is working with a senior delegation of State, Defense, and CIA officials to implement a number of improvements to its internal security procedures.
The DCI's guidelines ensure that information is carefully reviewed and sanitized so that the least sensitive intelligence that satisfies a U.N. requirement is provided. Even if information that is provided to the United Nations fell into the wrong hands, it will have been sanitized so that it will not compromise U.S. intelligence sources and methods.
The Brownback amendment would impede the ability of the United States to maintain a flexible and efficient information sharing arrangement with the United Nations, and may adversely impact the ability of the United States to achieve foreign policy successes.
The waiver provided in the amendment is too burdensome to be effective. It requires the President to issue a waiver for each instance that information derived from intelligence is provided to the United Nations, or for each document that is provided. Furthermore, the President may not delegate this authority.
The amendment also requires the President to personally report, at least quarterly, to Congress on the types and volume of intelligence provided to the United Nations and the purposes for which it was provided, and report to Congress within 15 days of any unauthorized disclosure. The President ought to be able to delegate this authority to the DCI.
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence , the committee of this Chamber with the greatest concern over the protection of sources and methods, considered legislation similar to the Brownback amendment at the beginning of the 104th Congress and rejected it on a bipartisan basis.
The committee found several instances where the current intelligence sharing arrangement with the United Nations has yielded specific foreign policy successes. Information was shared with Security Council members on Iraqi troop build-ups, in support of a multilateral effort to prevent a repeat of Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait. Intelligence has also assisted United Nations Special Commission in Iraq [UNSCOM] inspectors in their attempts to enforce U.N. sanctions calling for the dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. U.S. imagery has helped U.N. relief agencies determine the magnitude and direction or refugee flows within and from Rwanda. Timely intelligence sharing has also helped save the lives of the United States Protection Force [UNPROFOR] peacekeeping troops in Bosnia.
While I do not believe it is necessary to legislate in this area to restrict the President's ability to share intelligence information to promote U.S. foreign policy, a compromise amendment worked out by the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees adopted by the Senate last year would be clearly preferable.
I urge a no vote on the Brownback amendment.