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The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Mr. DeCONCINI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mathews). The question is on the DeConcini amendment No. 2557.
The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I want to talk about the amendment.
I first want to say the purpose of the amendment offered by the Senator from Virginia and myself is to place certain limits upon the funds authorized by the bill for the National Reconnaissance Office of the Department of Defense. The amendment provides that of the funds being authorized for the NRO, $50 million from the miscellaneous support category, may not be expended until the executive branch review of the NRO headquarters project is completed.
It also caps total spending for the NRO complex at $310 million. And how did we come to that figure? We came to that figure through a thorough staff review initiated by this committee. The result of that review was that our audit team found that the budget for the NRO project was $347 million.
Now, when we looked back, we got into this discussion: Did we know or did we not know?
In November 1992, a NRO briefing to staff included their plan to proceed with construction of four office towers and that the cost would be $175 per square foot. This meant that they estimated a cost of $186 million for the construction project excluding utilities, taxes, communication equipment, furniture, office supplies and a margin.
When our staff went to the NRO several months ago, we got an estimate of $347 million for the project. Now, all of a sudden, since that was exposed and declassified, at the credit of the President of the United States himself, the cost has come down to $310 million.
That is what this amendment says. `Fine, Mr. NRO; we hope that that is what you really want to live by,' and that is exactly what the amendment does.
The recent controversy over the NRO building project has been fierce, and I want to make sure we stay focused on the real problem. The NRO slid incrementally into a major project in a manner that never made the true dimensions, most importantly the cost, clear to the Congress of the United States. Maybe the NRO made this information known to the House; maybe the House knew that this was a $347 million project and just signed off on it. Maybe the Members said, `Have a grand project. Do what you want.' We did not know.
The only clear indication was the November 1992 NRO briefing which indicated that the project cost was $186 million, and now we know the project budget is actually $347 million. In the few days since that we disclosed this information, the NRO suddenly reports that the budget is down to $310 million.
This construction project is a major initiative. One would be quite cynical to say that a $347 million complex is not a major initiative. It was a major initiative. Even today, the budget is a moving target. We do not know what it is. There has been no accountability here, and we are trying to put it in this amendment.
In today's austere budget environment, with Government facilities being closed around the country, it is especially troubling for this organization and the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Woolsey, to attempt to justify this by saying, `Well, times have changed. In those days, it was OK--in 1990, 1991. We didn't have to tell anybody. Because this was a classified operation, we did not need to tell anybody.'
That is what the oversight committees are for. They have cleared staff to work with and protect classified information. Our staff and Members were cleared to be briefed and they were not thoroughly briefed on this project.
And Mr. Faga, the former NRO Director, was recently quoted in the press as saying, `I know the Senate committee was briefed.' Well, between 1991, 1992, and 1993, Mr. Faga never once mentioned it before the Senate Intelligence Committee in closed briefings. His deputy, Mr. Hill, mentioned it once in 1992, with two lines. And those two lines do not mention even the amount. The only insight into this project's cost came from a few questions that were asked by astute Senators and staff in 1991 and 1992. Yet the answers came back in one sentence or two sentences.
The House apparently agrees with the NRO and the DCI concluding, `Oh, it's OK.' The former CIA Director, Mr. Gates, came up one time and mentioned the project. Four lines in 1991, that is all we had.
Now, if that is adequate notice, believe me, something had better change in the intelligence community or the American public is not going to support even this reduced expenditure.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of critical events and selected statements that were made at our recent Senate hearing on this matter, as well as the House hearing, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
The overriding concern that was raised by our review of the NRO headquarters project was accountability. Accountability refers to the fact that the NRO, like all government agencies, has an obligation to be answerable, and to justify the expenditures of taxpayer dollars. The oversight committees in this case were the only ones to whom the NRO was accountable. Because the NRO used overt procurement procedures rather than established government facility procurement procedures--MILCON or GSA procedures--no body else was looking--not the DCI, not the CIA, not DOD, certainly not the internal NRO IG, no one but the oversight committees. The information they provided to us fell far short of a complete picture, particularly in terms of the project's cost.
Our committee never knew, at any time, in any form, that as of 1992 when the NRO adopted a total collocation plan, the project price tag would be upwards to $347 million. The bits and pieces of cost information that we had was piece-mill, and, at times, contradictory.
The NRO submitted a narrative description of the construction project, beginning in the fiscal year 1993 budget submission, but at no time, did the NRO submit for our approval a comprehensive budget for this project. Instead, the project's budget was included in what is known as the base budget. The base budget is a consolidation of all funds required to `maintain current capabilities.' Funding for any new project or capabilities are supposed to be segregated so that they may be considered and separately approved.
Our Committee knew that the NRO was reorganizing. We encouraged that reorganization.
We knew that the NRO was building a permanent facility in Northern, VA. They told us.
We knew, based on the NRO's Fiscal Year 1993 budget request, that the NRO was planning to build 800,000 square feet of office space for the collocation.
We knew, based on the NRO's Fiscal Year 1994 budget request, that they had decided on total collocation and planned to build 4 buildings, with about 1 million square feet, which they were constructing in western Fairfax County, Va.
In fact, we thought we knew the project's price tag. In November of 1992, about 2 months after the construction project's construction contracts were let, the NRO came forward to request some additional money for this construction project. At that time they briefed our staff on the scope and cost of the complex. They told us that they had decided that it was necessary to build 4 towers to implement the total collocation option recommended by the most recent studies. And they told us that the Westfields Porject cost would be $175 per square feet. That would have made the project cost $186 million. That cost, they told us, covered everything except taxes, utilities, communication equipment, furniture, office supplies, and margin.
The $186 million cost was the last cost information we had until we raised concerns in October 1993 about the lack of information on certain projects in the NRO's base budget. To that end, in our Fiscal Year 1994 Intelligence Authorization Act we pointed out our dissatisfaction, and asked the intelligence community display project-related costs in the base budget.
In fact, we had so many concerns about many of the Intelligence Community's facilities, and facility projects that we did a special review in November 1993 in which we asked every intelligence organization to report on its facilities. It was that review that prompted us in April of 1994 to launch a specific review of the new NRO headquarters project.
What would have happened in this case, to ensure effective NRO accountability, is simple. In September of 1990 when the NRO decided that the best collocation option was to build a facility in Fairfax County VA they should have come forward with a plan. The plan should have included the options considered, the costs of the options, the option selected with justification. For example:
They should have told us how much that plan would cost and how long it would take.
In addition, since they wanted to `protect the option of total collocation' they should have told us that total collocation would mean approximately 1 million square feet, which would house X number of NRO employees and X number of NRO contractors. That plan should have included a projected cost and schedule.
With that information in hand, we would have had something on which to hold the NRO accountable. And we could have made an informed decision and provided approval prior to the project's initiation. If at a later time the cost went up, the schedule changed, or the scope or design changed, the NRO should have come back to us, justified the proposed change, identified the cost, and once again sought approval.
To have had this level of information is not micromanagement. It is good government, and the right and responsibility of the Congressional oversight committees. We should have had this type of information if this had been a $3 million facility, and we certainly should have had this level of information in this case, for a $347 million facility.
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Senate Aug. 10 hearing, Mr. Roger Marsh, the NRO Headquarters Project director stated: `We have been negligent, clearly negligent, for not showing the budget breakout for this project.'
Senate Aug. 10 hearing, Mr. Jeffrey Harris, the current director of the NRO stated: `In hindsight, [the costs buried in the NRO's operation's budget] should have been broken out specifically. It [carrying a construction project in an operation's budget] won't be done in the future.'
Senate hearing, according to DCI Woolsey, `If this (building) were begun today, . . . there's no question it would be done differently.'
The DCI, in Thursday's House hearing, acknowledged that the 4 buildings were more space than the NRO required. He stated that the 4 buildings could effectively be used with other agencies, and that the NRO planned to bring more people in from other agencies to utilize the extra space.
The Deputy Director of the NRO, in our hearing on Wednesday, said that while the NRO needed some additional space beyond 3 towers, they knew they did not need the amount of space they provided when they built the forth tower.
Senate Aug 10 hearing, Deputy NRO director Jimmy Hill stated, `We have tried to respond every time the committee has asked a question . . . clearly in this case there was a lack of communication.'
Senate Aug 10 hearing, Mr. Marsh, NRO project director, ` . . . We clearly have missed the mark for your expectations for how we break this specific project budget out.'
In Thursday's House hearing, Rep. Combest stated: `[Senate]
Members and staff need to do their homework.' We don't disagree. In this case, based on the information provided to us, we thought we knew the total project cost. In fact, we thought we knew the project's price tag. In November of 1992, about 2 months after the construction project's construction contracts were let, the NRO came forward to request some additional money for this construction project. At that time they briefed our staff on the scope and cost of the complex. They told us that they had decided that it was necessary to build 4 towers to implement the total collocation option recommended by the most recent studies. And they told us that the Westfields Project cost would be $175 per square feet. That would have made the project cost $186 million. That cost, they told us, covered everything except taxes, utilities, communication equipment, furniture, office supplies, and margin.
In Wednesday's Senate hearing Secretary Deutch stated: `Whenever there is an identifiable project, I think it should be separately identified in a budget account and defended in front of this and other committees straight forwardly. Regardless of its intelligence character I think it should be separately identified.
Sen. DeConcini asked him specifically if that would apply to this kind of project. He replied, `yes.' In response to Senator Baucus's questions during our hearing, and regarding what our committee was told about this project in 1992 and 1993, Director Woolsey said, `As the costs were refined, some of the other costs I believe were not provided in a fashion that was readily available for the committee to get at the detail * * *'
Mr. DeCONCINI. This amendment goes further and removes the authority of the Director of Intelligence to authorize such buildings.
Mr. Woolsey did not authorize these buildings. This did not happen on his watch. He is not responsible.
What he is responsible for, in my judgment, is trying to defend such an operation at either $347 million or $310 million.
Let me just point out, there were roughly 68 acres that were purchased by the NRO back in 1991. They told us the other day, when Senator Warner and I were out there, that they decided to buy an additional 4 acres. We said, `Oh, that is nice. Are you going to build a fifth or sixth building?' No, but it so happens the plan they submitted to the planning and zoning people of Fairfax County includes the option for two more buildings, and there may be an explanation.
Why did they buy the 4 acres? They did not want a neighbor. They did not want a motel sitting on the corner. By this time, this is a declassified operation. You mean to tell me they could not provide security for that motel? So they went out and bought 4 additional acres, averaging $8.13 per square foot. That is roughly over $300,000 per acre for land they are not going to use. This is the taxpayers' money being spent.
The CIA Director wants to defend that as a proper notification to the committee.
There was no notification. Senator Boren, the past chairman, said he never was notified of it. As a matter of fact, Senator Boren had a reprogramming request for $22 million that was signed, and he told me just the other day that it is not his signature on it.
I make no accusations that anybody did anything improper, but I point out that never did Senator Boren admit that he had any notice of this.
And I know that Senator Warner--at least I believe--and myself had no notice that there was a $347 million project going on out there until we found it out through the very astute auditors on our committee. These auditors were commissioned by Senator Warner and myself to go out to the CIA and the other intelligence communities and assess what all their facilities were. You would think that would be pretty easy. It is not easy. It is very classified as to where they are and how many there are. It is a difficult task to get information on these facilities.
When we finally got out there to review this facility, they did answer our questions. But they knew we were on to something and they started to be defensive. To the credit of Mr. Harris, when he came before our committee he said, `We made a mistake. We are not going to do that again.' And Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Deutch, to his credit, said, `It should not have happened. We should have had notice and it will not happen again.' And the President deserves credit as well. When this was brought to his attention, within 1 week he declassified the whole project because he believes, as I believe, that the American public deserve to know where their taxpayer dollars are going to go. And we in the Congress have a right to say yes or no. We are the ones who appropriate the money. We are the ones who authorize these projects. And this was not authorized in any specific form whatsoever, at least not by the Senate Intelligence Committee.
If it was done in the House, well and good. Apparently the House Members are happy about spending $347 million on this project with no specific funding authorization, and they are saying this is simply an effort by the Senate to be derogatory towards the director--that is nonsense. My colleagues over there know that.
I hope the Members of the Senate will pass this bill. I hope if anything comes out of this, there is truly the commitment from NRO, that we got from Mr. Harris, that in the base budget they will not have such an initiative for any infrastructure spending without being specific. Mr. Deutch and Mr. Woolsey confirmed their commitment to that procedure.
Why was this project declassified? It was declassified because the President of the United States--not Mr. Woolsey--the President of the United States insisted it be declassified. As a matter of fact, Mr. Woolsey advocated to the White House, to the Hill staff members, as well as one Senator that it be classified for another 18 months. Fortunately, that Senator, I am told, said, `You have 18 hours, as far as I am concerned, to get this project declassified.' And the President went ahead and ordered the declassification so we could talk about this and prevent this kind of expenditure without thorough information and congressional approval.
People ask me today how many more buildings are out there? I hope there are none, and I do not want to leave any inferences that there are. But, frankly, when you disguise this kind of elephant in the middle of a football field, and no authority to do it, it makes me wonder. No wonder the American public is sick and tired of the agencies that deal with our national security spending money in such a manner without authority of the U.S. Congress.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
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Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me go back and recite once again certain procedures, steps which I think, certainly for this Senator, help to bring this situation into proper focus. The chairman and I periodically meet with our audit staff. Those meetings of course are available for all members of the committee but, quite understandably, committees leave to their chair and cochair--ranking--the responsibility for daily activities. We had charged, the chairman and I, the audit staff--we charged them to go out and make an audit.
I remember it well. I was the only Senator in the room. Others had not arrived. I received this briefing. I then turned to staff present and the audit staff and said, `In my judgment there are some serious questions raised. No. 1, why is there nothing in our record to reflect total cost? No. 2, why nothing to reflect total size?'
On the point of size, there is a million square feet in this conglomerate of four rather large buildings. Having had some recollection of the size of the Pentagon--I served in that building for over 5 years--I ascertained the Pentagon is 5 million square feet, usable square feet. All of a sudden we are building, for one relatively small segment of our overall intelligence community, an entity which is roughly, approximately one-fifth the size of the Pentagon.
That I found very troubling. So I recommended to Chairman DeConcini we promptly write the executive branch, DOD, CIA, and get those facts which we felt necessary to determine this project in terms of its full size and scope. That letter went out on July 29.
I then joined the chairman in a second letter to the executive branch, suggesting this matter be declassified.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have those two letters printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
U.S. SENATE,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, August 4, 1994.
Hon. R. James Woolsey,
Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC
Dear Director Woolsey: The Select Committee on Intelligence will convene a closed hearing on Wednesday, August 10, 1994 at 10:30 a.m. in Room 219, Senate Hart Office Building, to review the process utilized by the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO] to notify Congress, secure the necessary funding, and initiate construction of its new headquarters complex in Chantilly, Virginia. The Committee also intends to examine how remaining construction and future use of the facility can be managed for maximum cost-effectiveness. We would like to invite you to testify at the hearing, and also request your assistance in making available as witnesses Mr. Jeffrey Harris, Director of the NRO; Mr. Jimmie Hill, Deputy Director of the NRO; and Mr. Roger Marsh, Chief of the NRO's Mission Support Organization. We have also invited the Honorable John M. Deutch, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to appear as a witness.
We plan to conduct the hearing in two panels. The first panel, consisting of Mr. Harris, Mr. Hill, and Mr. Marsh, will be asked to review the history of and rationale for the project, including decisions regarding project size and the process by which Congress was informed of the project. The second panel, consisting of yourself and Secretary Deutch, will discuss what options are available to reduce the project's cost and increase its usefulness, including the colocation of other Intelligence Community functions at this site. Members will also want to hear testimony addressing the issue of whether or not the Intelligence Community should retain the special authority which is being utilized to construct this facility.
We believe that prompt public disclosure of this project is in the best interest of the Intelligence Community. We urge you to quickly declassify the essential facts--the location, organization, size, and cost of this project--by the time of the hearing.
Thank you for your attention to our request.
Sincerely,
DENNIS DECONCINI,
Chairman.
JOHN W. WARNER,
Vice Chairman.
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, August 4, 1994.
Hon. John M. Deutch,
Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Pentagon, Washington, DC
Dear Mr. Secretary: The Select Committee on Intelligence will convene a closed hearing on Wednesday, August 10, 1994, at 10:30 A.M. in Room 219, Senate Hart Office Building, to review the process utilized by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to notify Congress, secure the necessary funding, and initiate construction of its new headquarters complex in Chantilly, Virginia. The Committee intends to examine how remaining construction and future use of the facility can be managed for maximum cost-effectiveness. We would like to invite you to testify at the hearing. We are also inviting the Honorable R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Jeffrey Harris, Director of the NRO; Mr. Jimmie Hill, Deputy Director of the NRO; and Mr. Roger Marsh, Chief of the NRO's Mission Support Organization; to appear as witnesses.
We plan to conduct the hearing in two panels. The first panel, consisting of Mr. Harris, Mr. Hill, and Mr. Marsh, will be asked to review the history of and rationale for the project, including decisions regarding project size and the process by which Congress was informed of the project. The second panel, consisting of yourself and Director Woolsey, will discuss what options are available to reduce the project's cost and increase its usefulness, including the colocation of other Intelligence Community functions at this site. Members will also want to hear testimony addressing the issue of whether or not the Intelligence Community should retain the special authority which is being utilized to construct this facility.
We believe that prompt public disclosure of this project is in the best interest of the Intelligence Community. We urge you to quickly declassify the essential facts--the location, organization, size, and cost of this project--by the time of the hearing.
Thank you for your attention to our request.
Sincerely,
DENNIS DECONCINI,
Chairman.
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JOHN W. WARNER,
Vice Chairman.
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, July 29, 1994.
Hon. R. James Woolsey,
Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC.
Gentleman: We recently asked our Committee's Audit Team to review the National Reconnaissance Office's headquarters construction initiative, known as the Westfields project. The Audit Team spent two months working with NRO officials examining the project's requirements, cost, schedule, management procedures and internal controls, and has recently reported their conclusions to us.
We were shocked and dismayed to learn that the facility cost for the new NRO headquarters at Westfields may reach $350 million by completion, nearly double the amount most recently briefed to the Committee. In fact the total anticipated cost of this project, under its current configuration, was never effectively disclosed to our Committee, either in the annual budget submissions or in related briefings. We consider the NRO's failure to coordinate and communicate with this Committee on this large, sensitive and very expensive project to reflect disregard for this Committee's oversight responsibilities for intelligence operations and funding.
In order to address these concerns and further explain the NRO's actions with regard to the new Westfields complex, we request that you provide us with the following information:
1. An explanation of why the Committee was not fully informed of the scope and cost of this project, consistent with facility construction requirements for other intelligence organizations such as CIA and NSA.
2. Reasons why the NRO failed to use either Military Construction or General Services Administration support for the Westfields construction project.
3. Reasons why the NRO included this activity in the base budget rather than presenting it as a new initiative, as the CIA had done for its new headquarters project at Langley.
4. Steps which can be taken immediately to reduce the costs of this project, consistent with the NRO reorganization and Intelligence Community's overall budget reduction initiatives.
5. Ways to efficiently utilize the excess space and unused land which will be available upon completion of the Westfields complex, so as to realize cost savings for the U.S. Government.
6. Reasons why the new NRO headquarters project remains a covert procurement operation, and your plans to manage inadvertent or directed disclosure of the NRO's ownership of this facility.
Please provide your written answers to our committee within 7 days of your receipt of this letter. You may direct your response to Ms. Pat Hanback, who can be reached at 202-224-1700 if you have any questions.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
DENNIS DECONCINI,
Chairman.
JOHN WARNER,
Vice Chairman.
Mr. WARNER. By declassifying this project what I wanted to do was make an assessment of the executive branch response before we went out in public with this project. I joined the chairman on a Monday morning on-site inspection. Then that afternoon I was notified by committee staff that certain members of our committee desired to have a press conference. I had hoped we would not get into the public domain with this until we had a chance to assess the executive branch responses, for the reason we could have narrowed whatever gap existed at that time--and which still remains, regrettably--between our analysis of the facts and the executive branch analysis of the facts. Nevertheless, we are where we are today.
The bottom line is as follows. I think this committee quite properly has addressed this project in the context that we did not have the information that the Senate required.
Second, this is a valuable project and it will be completed along the exterior lines as envisioned. And it will be utilized in an efficient and cost-effective manner by the Federal Government. We, as Senators, have to provide for the construction for public employees and we do so in a manner to try to bring about a certain quality of the working spaces and working conditions, but not to give preferential treatment to some employees.
Again drawing on my experience in the Department of Defense, when I, as Secretary of the Navy, had cognizance over the naval portion of the NRO--and the naval portions and other portions have now been consolidated--I remember it to be a comparatively small group, in terms of number of people and in terms of budget. True, it has grown through the years. My first reaction is this was more than was necessary--and that has now been confirmed in the testimony--the new headquarters larger than necessary to house the NRO.
A certain colocation of contractors--that, too, is important. But again, this is a project that our committee, as correctly stated by Chairman DeConcini--our committee did not possess the full details necessary to keep not only ourselves informed but to fulfill our responsibility to other Senators.
So we now have quick reaction by the executive branch, under the leadership of the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary, to put together an executive branch team to analyze the facts. I urge all to withhold judgment on this--withhold judgment until that report is completed. And I anticipate that report will corroborate many of the assertions made by myself and the distinguished chairman of this committee, as to the failure to have adequate communications between various segments of the intelligence community and this committee regarding the relevant facts.
Mr. President, the House yesterday had a hearing. It has been contrasted in some ways to the hearing that we held. Certain assertions were made about their level of knowledge.
I join with the chairman. I do not presume to have knowledge about what the House knows, but I do point out to the chairman that we had no conference item in the last several years on this subject with the House, at which time we would have had an exchange of views if our views were different. This is the first time that the matter has come up. The House is free to assert its views; we assert ours.
Also, Mr. President, I think that this amendment should in no way be interpreted as an attempt to delay completion of the envisioned project. To the contrary. It is solely for completing the project in a cost-effective, efficient manner, and to assure the American taxpayers that should the NRO, as they have now testified, not require all this space, the balance of the space will be occupied by individuals performing necessary contractor support and/or by other defense-related or intelligence-related entities, so that the project one day will be complete.
I want to assure the local community, I am proud of the fact that it is in the State of Virginia. I knew it was there. I worked on the colocation of all of these entities in our State and, indeed, on this site. I have not been told the specifics. Again, I did not have knowledge of the full cost. I had been relying on the 1992 figures of less than $200 million in terms of the whole project.
Nevertheless, this amendment is a constructive effort to make sure that it is cost-effective, that it is utilized fully by the Government in a proper manner and also that those persons enjoying this very attractive site will do so in a manner commensurate with other Government employees, wherever they are throughout the Federal Government.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator from Arizona have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has 4 minutes remaining.
Mr. DeCONCINI. And on the bill, how much time does the Senator have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 14 minutes on the bill.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes from the Senator's time on the bill to the Senator from Montana [Mr. Baucus].
Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona very much for his generosity.
I support the amendment being offered by the committee chairman and vice chairman. On Wednesday of this week, the committee held what I regard to be a very revealing hearing. At that hearing, the public was presented with a very sorry picture of the intelligence community hiding from the Congress the costs of a huge construction project. I believe this amendment ensures that the cost of the project will not grow any larger than it now already has.
In 1989, the National Reconnaissance Office started a very worthwhile project. They decided to bring together many of their activities which were spread throughout the United States and consolidate them in the Washington, DC area. The intent was clear and the goal was wise: Consolidation would eliminate waste and streamline many of the operations. Unfortunately, the intent and the goal became lost in the desire to build a huge modern, spacious, and extremely well-equipped headquarters complex.
This complex, as has already been stated, is located in the Westfields area, along Route 28, in Northern Virginia. In order to get an idea of the size and the impact of this new headquarters, you do not need to have a security clearance. You only have to stand outside of the security fence and see that the National Reconnaissance Office will be working in an office complex that will be unrivaled throughout the entire Federal Government.
Mr. President, not only does it have a great deal of space for every worker, it originally had a sauna and it originally had a fountain. Thankfully, these at least have been dropped from the project. This office complex is large, it is modern, and it is costly.
In my opinion, excessive secrecy has led to the costliness of this project. As the Director of Central Intelligence admitted to me in the hearing on Wednesday, the intelligence community still--to this day--has not specifically identified to the Congress in any of its budget requests the total cost or budget for this project. Since 1989, during briefings or in letters they have mentioned many different numbers--some as high as $195 million, but only as a result of our committee's special audit did we find out that the National Reconnaissance Office has budgeted $350 million for this 1 million square feet of office space.
Let me give you some perspective on this. The vice chairman reminded everyone on Wednesday that the Pentagon has 5 million square feet. The NRO's office complex, on the other hand, is 1 million square feet. How many people work in the Pentagon? Twenty-eight thousand. But how many will work in the NRO's new headquarters? 3,000. This gives you some idea of how large and spacious a complex is being built by the taxpayers for a cost of $350 million.
I fully support the chairman's and vice chairman's amendment. It very simply says, enough is enough. It says quite simply that $310 million may be spent on the total project. This is only $40 million less than the NRO has budgeted. It requires that, if for some reason $310 million is not enough to build an office for 3,000 people, the intelligence community must come to the Congress and ask and justify its needs quite specifically.
I commend the chairman and I commend the vice chairman for the speed with which they have responded to the information that has come to their attention and the actions they are taking to bring this costly project under control.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Arizona.
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Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I want to thank the Senator from Montana for his participation in the hearings the other day and also for his interest in joining as a member of the committee to get some kind of handle on the cost of intelligence projects.
The Senator from Montana makes an extremely good point about the square footage of offices. Our review shows that almost 50 percent of the offices are going to be single-occupied with the most common office size at 165 square feet--165 square feet--per office. The General Services Administration's recommended square foot per person for Federal Government employees is 125 square feet per person.
Mr. Marsh, the NRO Project Director, said it may be a little bit off and they will supply us with more information if necessary.
The Senator from Montana points out very astutely how many people are going to be here versus how many are in the Pentagon. I do not know if the Senator realized that 1,000 of the 2,900 people moving into the new facility are contractors, not employees of the NRO. So they are building space out here for other people to come in and use.
What right does any agency have to step forward and spend money, build an excess building for a thousand contractors without coming to the Congress, making justification for the expenditure, and seeking our authority? Maybe we would have approved it. The Senator from Montana pointed the other way. It has been his experience in dealing with buildings in the 15 years he has been here that if you come to the committee and make a good case, the committee is pretty receptive.
Mr. BAUCUS. If the chairman will yield, what struck me--and I would like the chairman's reaction to this--was the most common office size for over 40 percent of the building occupants is about 165 square feet per person.
Mr. DeCONCINI. That is right.
Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I ask the chairman, do we have any sense of what, say, 20 percent or 30 percent of the personnel will have as office space? If 165 square feet is the most common office size, I have to think that there are an awful lot of offices there that are spacious, luxurious beyond any comprehension. I wonder if we have a sense yet about that.
Mr. DeCONCINI. If the Senator will yield, we do not, we do not have the total picture, but we do know there are some offices that are going to have 500 square feet--the office for directors, for example. That is a lot of space. That is more than the Senator has in his office or I have in my office.
Mr. BAUCUS. Much more.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Our audit team is still going through that information. When we get it, we will put it in the Record.
Mr. BAUCUS. Why does a person need 500 square feet in their office?
Mr. DeCONCINI. I think that is a question we should present to the NRO when they come back with the explanation of just how this office space is broken down. We asked them, as the Senator may recall if he was there, how many other facilities do they have, how many are going to be put in here, and what amount do they project will be saved by this consolidation, collocation, that the Congress asked them to do. I am not sure they ever even determined it. And they are going to come and tell us, but they say it may be classified.
Mr. BAUCUS. I thank the Senator.
Mr. DeCONCINI. I thank the Senator.
Mr. CONRAD. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. DeCONCINI. I will be glad to yield to the Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. CONRAD. The Senator made mention of the fact that of the 2,900 employees that were going to be in this facility, 1,000 would be contractors; that is, I assume he meant by that people who are working on NRO business but that are operating as private contractors.
Mr. DeCONCINI. The Senator is correct. That is my understanding.
Mr. CONRAD. What would be the justification for out of 2,900 employees, 1,000 would be private contractors? Why are they not employees of NRO? What is the purpose for that? And what is the cost, if the Senator might know it, of those people operating as private contractors?
Mr. DeCONCINI. Well, the Senator raises a question that I cannot answer because the NRO has not answered what the cost is. Their answer is that if they contract for some specialty service that the NRO cannot do inhouse--and they do have that legitimate requirement--then, when they contract, those people rent space if they come back here to do the work, and they charge a commission that may be as much as 20 to 25 percent on top of whatever the rent is. So their justification is, put them in here, and then we do not charge them rent, but we do not pay the commission.
But my question is, I would like to know a better argument, and I would like to know, as the Senator from North Dakota just asked, how much is that costing us? They are spending money out there, more than $175 a square foot, to build that building, probably more now than $310 million, for which, believe me, I think you could rent space and even pay a 25 percent premium for a lot less than paying $175 per square foot for office space for contractors.
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Mr. CONRAD. If I might just further inquire, it strikes me that we have something here that really begs for further investigation. Why would there be 1,000 contractors out of 2,900 employees? What is the tax effect? Are those people getting favored tax treatment because they are being treated as contractors? Are those people working full-time for the NRO? If so, why are they not on the permanent payroll of NRO? Is this being used as a way to get around certain restrictions with respect to the number of personnel? Is it being used to get around certain restrictions with respect to Federal employees? Is it being used to give them tax-favored treatment?
All of those questions present themselves. I must say when I hear we are building public space for 2,900 people and 1,000 of them are private contractors, that sets off a lot of alarm bells in this Senator's head.
Mr. DeCONCINI. I thank the Senator for his questions, and I am going to take them out of the Record and send them to the special task force headed by Deputy Secretary Deutch and ask that they be included in its review of this project. I think the Senator raises profoundly important questions that need to be answered. We need to know that. Maybe there is a justifiable reason. But I am like the Senator; the alarms go off.
Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair does indicate to the Senator from Arizona that the time on the amendment has expired.
The Senator from Arizona has 7 minutes 40 seconds remaining on the bill.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, is there any time remaining to the Senator from Virginia?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 6 minutes 35 seconds.
Mr. DeCONCINI. How much?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Six minutes.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I will suggest the absence of a quorum, and as soon as the Senator comes back, I am prepared to yield back the time.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. In the meantime, the time will be charged equally against each side.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to pose a couple of questions. I had reserved a couple of amendments on this bill under a time agreement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Arizona yield time?
Mr. DeCONCINI. I yield whatever time I have left. I yield 4 minutes off the bill, from the time reserved for the manager of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have met with the Senator from Arizona and the Senator from Virginia, Senator Warner, about my concerns on this bill as it was originally drafted. I had reserved a couple of spaces for amendments, but our staffs have been working out the matters I was interested in. It is my understanding that each of the matters that I was concerned about has been dealt with in the managers' amendment that has been adopted. But I would like to make sure that is the case. I would like to therefore pose two or three questions to the Senator from Arizona and the Senator from Virginia.
I have a section, insert section, 3(c) here which deals with the coordination of counterintelligence matters in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. And it says:
Except as provided in paragraph 3 below, the head of each department or agency within the executive branch shall ensure that--
And this is the key paragraph.
the Federal Bureau of Investigation is advised immediately of any information, regardless of its source, which indicates that classified information is being, or may have been, deliberately disclosed in an unauthorized manner to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
I believe the word `deliberately' was added after our meeting. I believe that achieves my major concern so that there is a certain threshold here of intent so that we do not have simply piles of complaints going over to the FBI on any matters that would not raise concern by any reasonable person.
I believe that has been taken care.
Mr. DeCONCINI. If the Senator will yield, I can confirm that is exactly what was suggested by the Senator and his staff. And the word `deliberately' was included in the managers' amendment that we submitted and have agreed to here so as to do away with too much paper, to raise the threshold, as the Senator from Georgia pointed out.
I think the Senator from Virginia has something to say on this as well.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, before the distinguished Senator from Georgia came in to consult with the chairman and me, I had discussed this with the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He, likewise, felt two things should be achieved in this paragraph. One is an affirmative duty on both the FBI and the CIA; that those affirmative duties be parallel in nature; and that there be some limitation of the materials sent back and forth, not in the sense to hide anything, but just to eliminate a lot of the material which might have been caught by more general phraseology, to that material which was essential in the promulgation of their respective responsibilities in counterintelligence
and that drafting was incorporated at his recommendation as well as that of the Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. I thank my friends from Arizona and Virginia.
A couple more questions. The other concern I had--referring to the bill language here--I had a concern that the FBI was going to be consulted by the CIA in the event there was any kind of deliberate informational breach of classified information, but that this was not a two-way street. In other words, once the FBI started the investigation, there was not a corresponding duty of the FBI to keep the appropriate officials of the CIA informed of their activities. It seems to me there has to be a two-way street in terms of coordination.
I believe that the Senators have addressed that concern in this managers' amendment, also; have they not?
Mr. DeCONCINI. If the Senator will yield, the Senator from Georgia raised that issue, as did the national security advisers that we met with, and that is section 2, below the (c) on the page the Senator has before him. I believe it does exactly what the Senator suggested we do and what the national security advisers also requested.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from Arizona.
The third concern, I believe, has also been dealt with. That is, making sure that if there were extraordinary circumstances that perhaps none of us can foresee here on the floor of the Senate, but they nevertheless could occur, when the President of the United States believes that there could be an endangered national security interest, vital national security interests, if this information is immediately turned over to the FBI, and it could be a matter of life or death, or could be a matter of war or peace, for some reason we may not foresee, I was hoping the President would get some waiver authority here for these extraordinary circumstances.
I believe that has also been provided for.
Mr. DeCONCINI. It is indicated in paragraph 3, and it gives the President authority to waive on a case-by-case basis. He must only advise the committee that he has exercised that authority--but not the particular matters, until later when he feels he can do so.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senators. I think all of the concerns that I had raised with the two Senators and their staffs have been taken care of. I will have no amendment. I am not sure if I have one or two amendments on the list. But I will not be intending to bring those up.
I thank the Senators for their help and leadership.
Mr. DeCONCINI. I thank the Senator from Georgia for his constructive discussion here. It has been a great pleasure to work with him as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, which is part of this whole important procession. I appreciate immensely his participation and willingness to work to get this legislation, and the Senator from Virginia and I feel it really is necessary that we do some legislation in this area.
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Mr. WARNER. I join the distinguished chairman, and I thank Senator Nunn in his capacity as chairman of the Armed Services Committee. There is a sequential referring of the entire budget that comes up--that is, most of it--and, as such, I have seen, through the years, in working with him, that he exercises his responsibilities. It is not a simple pass-through. It is reviewed by the chairman and members of the Armed Services Committee with care.
Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend that our committee reviews their work carefully on everything--except building and construction.
Mr. WARNER. The Senator's point is not well conceded.
Mr. DeCONCINI. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Nevada, Senator Bryan, be included as an original sponsor of the pending amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I am prepared to yield back any remaining time this Senator has.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I likewise yield back whatever time the Senator from Virginia has remaining.
I ask unanimous consent that Senator Specter be added as a cosponsor to the amendment of the Senator from Virginia on the Commission.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, on Wednesday evening I expressed my displeasure on this floor over the way the Intelligence Committee has handled the publicity over the headquarters building that is being constructed for the National Reconnaissance Office. I said then, and I repeat now, that if the committee or individual Senators seek only to assign blame rather than looking at how the committee and the Congress may share that blame we are sure to perpetuate rather than solve existing oversight problems.
The committee has been aware of this construction project since its inception, indeed it was largely responsible for the consolidation of the NRO which made this project necessary. At any time over the last several years, the committee could have examined this project in detail. Only recently did the committee bother to take such a look. And when it discovered apparent problems it immediately transformed them into a major public issue. I believe that this approach was highly irresponsible and counterproductive.
Mr. President, as I stated the other night, this will come back to bite the committee. Well, today's Washington Times provides just such a bite. I ask unanimous consent that this editorial be included in the Record at the conclusion of my statement.
Mr. President, I do not say that the NRO is without blame or that the committee is not justified in its concern over this issue. But the way it has been handled is nothing short of irresponsible. If the committee seeks only to assign blame, it will surely never correct its own oversight shortcomings.
There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Even in a city that thrives on hues and cries, it sure was a mighty one that was raised by President Clinton's revelation on Monday that an innocent looking office complex in Westfields, Va., is really going to house a super-secret spy agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, which is in charge of our spy satellite operations.
In fact, so secret is the NRO that even its name was hush-hush until two years ago, when the agency's existence was first officially acknowledged. Not since the Department of Energy revealed that Americans have been unknowingly zapped by government scientists with atomic radiation for 50 years have we seen such an uproar over Cold Warriors conniving and conspiring to hoodwink the American people. Why, this project was so secret that even the president of the United States didn't know about it. How `bout that?
At Senate Intelligence Committee hearings on the $310 million construction project on Wednesday, members could barely contain their outrage. Sputtered Sen. Richard Byran: `I don't think it can be underestimated the extent or magnitude of the damage done to the intelligence community in terms of its credibility with the Congress and the American people.' Chairman Dennis DeConcini intimated that the CIA had been employing the purloined letter technique, hiding the massive complex in plain view (just like the CIA, isn't?). And the always charming Sen. Howard Metzenbaum snarled that perhaps CIA Director James Woolsey's successor would be more forthcoming with information. `Where were you?' he demanded of Mr. Woolsey.
Well, where was the Senate Intelligence Committee, you might ask? Where was Mr. DeConcini? Where was Sen. John Warner, ranking minority member of the committee, in whose state the complex is being built? Where was former committee chairman David Boren, who has released a statement saying that he was `never made personally aware that a construction project of this magnitude was being contemplated.' Indeed where was George Tenet, staff director for the Intelligence Committee under Mr. Boren and now in charge of intelligence for the National Security Council staff--the man who ought to have been able to spare Mr. Clinton this enormous surprise? Why didn't any of these people know?
The truth, of course, is that they did know. They know very well that the intelligence services are being reorganized and some of their functions consolidated. The NRO complex in Westfields is a part of that process. But no one saw this as an issue until the president decided to declare it a scandal.
Just how much they knew is evident from the ample documentation that Mr. Woolsey and NRO Director Jeffrey Harris brought with them to the hearing.
A few samples:
Back in 1989, a Senate Supplemental to Report No. 101-78 stated that the reorganization plan, combining a number of functions of the CIA, the Air Force, and the NRO in a northern Virginia facility was `feasible' and `should be pursued' and authorized $30 million in fiscal 1990 and $27 million in fiscal 1991 for this purpose.
On Feb. 26, 1990, William Webster, Director of Central Intelligence, and Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, wrote to Mr. Boren regarding the NRO headquarters collocation, describing `a phased, incremental facility strategy,' and outlined the funding needed for a partial collocation, a total cost of $195.4 million.
On Sept. 17, 1990, then-director of the NRO, Martin Faga, wrote to Mr. Boren giving him `formal notification of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) intent to purchase a parcel of land in support of the permanent facility collocation activities of the NRO restructure efforts.' The letter describes `a parcel of land approximately 68 acres' and a `current master plan [providing] for the development of approximately 1.3 million square feet on the site. . . . Phase one provides for the construction of approximately 500,000 square feet. . . . Phase two would add an additional 400,000 square feet. Phase three would provide an additional 400,000 square feet. Flexibility is inherent in the master plan to allow phase two and three to be sized differently as the need arises.'
In 1992, the FY 1993 Congressional Budget Justification Book, submitted to all appropriate authorization and appropriation subcommittees, stated that `in FY 1991, the NRO acquired a parcel of land sufficient to protect for the option of full collocation. The final NRO facility headquarters will be located in western Fairfax. Virginia on approximately 70 acres. The facility master plan allows for a six-building complex, structured parking, emergency generator building, warehouse, conference facility, and cafeteria. The current construction plan and budget provide for three buildings. . . . occupancy in late 1995. The total construction is approximately 800,000 square feet.'
On Nov. 10, 1992, the staff of the Senate Intelligence Staff was briefed on the details of the project. The plan had grown from three to four buildings, a total of 1 million square feet, (with an option to build two more should the need arise).
On Nov. 13, 1992, Mr. Faga wrote to David Boren and Frank Murkowski, committee vice chairman, requesting permission to reallocate $22 million to accelerate the NRO's consolidation plan. He was told, `The Committee does not object to the expenditure of funds for the purpose specified.'
In addition, there is report upon report of estimated costs for the three- and four-building options five years' worth of intelligence authorization bills, appropriations bills, conference reports and on an on, in which the project has been specifically mentioned, and, of course, funded.
It's a pity, Mr. Woolsey only has the truth on his side. Apparently, that doesn't count for much when there's posturing and intelligence-bashing to be done.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today as a cosponsor of the DeConcini-Warner amendment concerning the construction of a National Reconnaissance Office [NRO] headquarters building.
Frankly, I was extremely troubled to learn that more then $300 million is being spent to secretly construct an NRO facility in northern Virginia to consolidate personnel located in California and throughout the country.
Apparently, construction of the NRO facility was begun in 1990 and undertaken without the full knowledge and approval of Congress. This raises serious concerns about congressional oversight of this project and the entire NRO Organization. In my opinion, the credibility of the NRO has been damaged, and Congress will be forced to more closely scrutinize its budget and activities.
I am trying to get answers about this project and consolidation, but am concerned about the level of cooperation the NRO is giving my office
Last week, my staff contacted Pentagon officials to inquire about speculation that NRO personnel were moving from offices at Los Angeles Air Force Base [AFB] in California to a new NRO headquarters building near Dulles International Airport. The Air Force denied all knowledge of such a proposed consolidation, and inquiries to the NRO went unanswered. The way these inquiries were handled leads me to believe that the intelligence community was trying to deceive Congress or, at a minimum, me. This is simply unacceptable.
Still today, after Pentagon officials testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee, the NRO has not provided me or my office any information, expect a joint statement that was released to the press.
Apparently, construction of the NRO facility was originally planned for a partial consolidation of headquarters personnel that are scattered throughout the Washington area. This would have allowed for construction of a building with two office towers at substantially less cost than current estimates.
However, sometime in 1992, after the fall of the Soviet Union--the primary target of NRO activities--the intelligence community decided to proceed with a full consolidation of NRO personnel nationwide. This decision caused the estimated cost for the new facility to near $350 million as two additional office towers were added,
for a total of four huge towers. This new structure will be far larger than necessary to house NRO and support personnel. I am unclear why additional funds were allocated for this new structure at a time when defense and intelligence budgets were declining.
My staff still has not been able to determine exactly what type of consolidation is being proposed or the details of the approval process. Specifically:
When and how was the decision made to shift from only partial consolidation to full consolidation?
How many military, civilian, and contractor personnel are being affected, and what type of work are they performing?
Where are these personnel currently located?
When is the proposed consolidation occurring?
What implications does the proposed consolidation have on the base realignment and closure [BRAC] process?
Because NRO is partly a Defense Department agency, is it subject to the BRAC process?
Was a true cost-benefit analysis completed to determine whether the associated cost of the NRO facility and full consolidation justified any national security or fiscal gain?
I have already written to Defense Secretary Perry expressing my concern over this matter and submitted some of these questions to him. I expect answers to these questions as soon as possible. I also expect the review currently being undertaken by the Director of the CIA and Deputy Secretary of Defense to address these and other issues.
In addition to my concerns regarding general congressional oversight of the project, I am particularly troubled that, though the consolidation was approved years ago and the Intelligence Committee was notified, I was never made aware that jobs would be moved out of California. Also, I am concerned that the consolidation of personnel from Los Angeles AFB may have an adverse impact--direct or indirect--on the upcoming 1995 base closure process, especially considering that this is just one of a number of planned consolidations out of Los Angeles AFB.
As many of my colleagues know, the Space and Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles AFB is a center of excellence for the design and acquisition of satellites and
other space systems. It would seem reasonable and practical that those working on satellites, such as the NRO, would want to be located at or near Los Angeles AFB. This is where the program offices are, this is where the acquisition personnel are, this is where the Aerospace Corporation, a support FFRDC is, and this is where the contractors are.
But, the NRO apparently decided to move its personnel from this center of excellence to a headquarters building near Washington, DC. I believe the decision making process for proceeding to a full consolidation also needs to be examined closely.
Mr. President, this matter needs to be thoroughly looked into and I hope that much of the information surrounding the project can be declassified so the public and taxpayers will have full knowledge of what is being built near Dulles International Airport.
I fully support this amendment and urge its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on amendment No. 2557, offered by the Senator from Arizona.
The yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
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Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] is necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] would vote `yea.'
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 99, nays 0, as follows:
So the amendment (No. 2557) was agreed to.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question now occurs on agreeing to amendment No. 2556, offered by the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner].
The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] is necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] would vote `yea.'
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber who desire to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 99, nays 0, as follows:
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So the amendment (No. 2556) was agreed to.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Boren be added as a cosponsor to the DeConcini-Warner amendment, and that Senator Leahy be added as a cosponsor to the Warner-DeConcini amendment that has already been adopted.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read the third time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the immediate consideration of H.R. 4299, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (H.R. 4299) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, all after the enacting clause of H.R. 4299 is stricken, the text of S. 2082, as amended, is inserted in lieu thereof, and the bill is considered read for a third time.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this vote be restricted to 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The question is, Shall the bill, as amended, pass? The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] is necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] would vote `yea.'
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 97, nays 2, as follows:
So the bill (H.R. 4299), as amended, was passed.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate insists on its amendments and requests a conference with the House of Representatives thereon, and the Chair appoints conferees on the part of the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham) appointed Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Metzenbaum, Mr. Glenn, Mr. Kerrey of Nebraska, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Graham, Mr. Kerry of Massachussetts, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Johnston, Mr. Warner, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Danforth, Mr. Gorton, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Lugar, and Mr. Wallop; and, from the Committee on Armed Services, Mr. Nunn and Mr. Thurmond.
END