[Page: H5814]
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 468 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
[Page: H5815]
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the bill (H.R. 4299) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. After general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered by title rather than by section. Each title shall be considered as read. Points of order against the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute for failure to comply with clause 7 of rule XVI or clause 5(a) of rule XXI are waived. No amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in order unless printed in the portion of the Congressional Record designated for that purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII before its consideration. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.
[TIME: 1510]
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Serrano). The gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] is recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary one-half hour to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 468 is the rule providing for the consideration of H.R. 4299, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995.
Mr. Speaker, this is an open rule providing 1 hour of general debate, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
For the purpose of amendment, the rule makes in order the Intelligence Committee amendment in the nature of a substitute now printed in the bill as an original bill.
Under the rule, the bill shall be considered by title, with each title considered as read.
Clause 5(a) of rule XXI, prohibiting appropriations in a legislative bill, is waived against the committee substitute. The chairman of the Intelligence Committee requested this waiver for sections 601 (a) and (b) and 806(a), which give authority for the use of appropriated funds for purposes different than those for which they were appropriated and therefore may constitute a technical violation of the rule mentioned above.
In addition, the rule waives clause 7 of rule XVI, which prohibits nongermane amendments, against the committee substitute. The chairman of the committee requested this waiver of a point of order that might arise because the bill as introduced was narrow in focus and the amendment in the nature of a substitute is broader.
Mr. Speaker, the rule makes in order only those amendments printed in the Congressional Record prior to the consideration of the bill. The chairman of the Intelligence Committee based his request for this notification requirement on the need to recognize the sensitivity surrounding the components of the intelligence budget.
He testified that advance notification of amendments would give the committee a chance to help protect the security of sensitive information that could be affected by amendments modifying the authorization levels in the bill.
He asked also that the debate on such amendments be carefully structured to minimize the risk that classified information will be inadvertently disclosed, and testified that directing the debate away from classified matters can best be accomplished by an advance notification requirement.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, the rule provides one motion to recommit with or without instructions.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4299, the bill for which this rule provides reconsideration, authorizes funds for all the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States for the coming fiscal year. It also provides legislative authorities for the conduct of U.S. intelligence activities which are regularly found in an intelligence authorization bill.
The authorization levels in the bill are classified, but are available for review by Members. The amount authorized is 2.2 percent less than the President's budget request, but approximately 2.6 percent more than last year's appropriated level.
The bill contains several important provisions, some of which are in response to the Ames espionage case which caused so much concern to all of us who are interested in the successful operation of the CIA.
The bill also recognizes the necessity for the entire intelligence community to adjust to the post-cold war era. It is obvious that the intelligence agencies need to reexamine their overall roles and missions in that world and the committee has given the agencies guidance in this respect.
Mr. Speaker, the 1980's were a period of substantial growth in the budgets and personnel rolls of U.S. intelligence agencies. That growth was felt to be necessary to counter the national security threat posed by the Soviet Union.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, the primary focus of intelligence activities and the principal justification for the intelligence resource levels of the 1980's was eliminated. The intelligence community has been struggling since that time to define its mission and to properly size itself for the future.
In the last three authorization bills, the Intelligence Committee has attempted to make the intelligence budget reflect the reality of a world significantly changed from a national security standpoint, while ensuring that the United States maintains its ability to provide timely and reliable intelligence to its policymakers and military commanders. That approach is continued in this year's bill.
The committee is bringing the intelligence budget down, but in a measured way which preserves essential capabilities and encourages investment in the collection and processing systems which will be needed in the future. Personnel rolls are being trimmed as well and, as a result of actions mandated by Congress 2 years ago, by the end of fiscal year 1997, employment levels will be at least 17.5 percent less than they were in fiscal year 1992.
Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, the world clearly remains an unpredictable and dangerous place. There is need for effective intelligence, especially in light of the world-wide reduction of U.S. military personnel. That need, however, does not have to be met by an intelligence community of the size and orientation of its cold war predecessor.
The committee's bill continues to provide encouragement for intelligence agencies to review their operations, discarding those which are no longer necessary, while retaining those which remain important. Intelligence support to the military commander is emphasized. Special attention is placed as well on providing sufficient resources to respond to intelligence challenges on issues such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Spending throughout the national security establishment has been reduced in recent years, and intelligence has been no exception. This was inevitable given the significant changes which have occurred in the world. It is the Intelligence Committee's judgment that neither the reductions made in past years, nor those contained in this year's bill, will hinder the ability of the intelligence agencies to respond to essential intelligence requirements.
Mr. Speaker, the Committee on Rules believes this is a good, a fair rule, and I urge my colleagues to approve it so that we may proceed with consideration of this important bill today.
[Page: H5816]
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it is remarkable, I think, having listened closely to my colleague from California, how much in agreement we are on this subject. I think that is a very encouraging sign. I think many of the remarks that I am about to make are going to seem very similar to the remarks the gentleman from California has made, and that pleases me because I think we are facing a challenge here.
Obviously, I am pleased to be able to support an open rule. I have no objection to the reasonable requirement included in this rule that amendments offered on the intelligence authorization be preprinted in the Record. I do not feel that way about preprinting for other bills, but intelligence is a little special because of its sensitivity and confidentiality and the need to not have surprises here on the floor. I think that is an entirely reasonable request and a legitimate one, given the importance of protecting classified information.
I very much doubt if any Member is going to mind the extra review of amendments to insure that national security is not compromised in the process of this bill. I think we all understand that the national security is very significant for us and, unfortunately, we have had incidents where it has been compromised in the past.
The rule also waives certain points of order against the committee substitute, supported by the chairman, Mr. Glickman, and our ranking member, Mr. Combest.
Given the complexity of the subject in front of us, I have no objection to the technical waivers that have been made. I certainly commend the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] for their work and their interest in having as open a debate as possible without jeopardizing national security. And again, I think the comments by my colleague from California underscore that we have had a good discussion in the Committee on Rules and we have come forward with a good product today to deal with this matter.
I am, however, deeply troubled by the trend that the bill itself perpetuates. For the past several years, resources devoted to intelligence gathering have been cut repeatedly.
[TIME: 1520]
The authorization levels in this bill are 16 percent below what they were in 1992, and total intelligence spending has declined by 20 percent since 1990. Looking against the national performance review standards, I understand the cuts are about double what the target was, done on a percentage basis, and the actual dollar amount is a significantly greater cut than was actually necessary or called for.
So, some real sacrifice has been made here, and I am wondering if maybe we have not gone too far. Some people might believe that we no longer have use for intelligence because the Soviet Union is not there anymore as a monolith and because the sweeping changes that have transformed Europe are all good. But, as we know, that simply is not the case. We have in some ways more challenges for good intelligence and for good information for our decisionmakers than we have ever had before. The recent crises in North Korea, Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia probably all underscore the dangers of attempting to navigate the volatile and uncertain waters of global politics without the best possible compass and
the most accurate and up-to-date charts. I do not think we should be fooled by those who say the storm is past and it is all smooth sailing ahead. I do not think anybody really believes that. We have seen what happens when decisionmakers operate without good information delivered in a timely and useful way.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, it was not that long ago that this Nation watched in some puzzlement and embarrassment as the U.S.S. Harlan County, loaded with American service people, retreated in haste from the docks of Haiti because a band of thugs were menacing them from the port. Where was the intelligence? Why did we not have better information available to our decisionmakers at the State Department and the Pentagon to make a better policy statement and figure that one out a little bit better?
And what about the potentially deadly game of hide and seek we are still playing with North Korea over the issue of nuclear weapons? Do we really have the necessary resources in place to develop good information about the capabilities and the motivation, the motivation of the North Koreans? Does anybody really understand Kim Jong-Il, what he stands for, and where he is going?
What about Africa? Recently we read two articles in the newspaper, the first outlining how the CIA is planning to scale back its operations there by closing 15 stations as a way to absorb budget cuts. Five days later another news article quotes President Clinton decrying the `pretty low' level of understanding Americans have about Africa. So, here we have the left hand reducing our ability to get good human intelligence, good human information in Africa, while the right hand is seeking to improve our understanding of that region. It seems a little curious. No wonder people are confused.
There are some in this Chamber who see no practical use for intelligence at all. Perhaps they have watched too many old cloak and dagger movies; I do not know. Perhaps they do not understand world affairs. But despite the undercurrent of animosity for covert operations and classified information, Mr. Speaker, America should be reminded that we have for decades been the beneficiaries of constant, consistent, accurate information that has made good intelligence. Picture a hidden hand guiding decisionmakers through crucial policy options and helping to
avoid potentially deadly and costly mistakes. Of course things do not always go smoothly, and we always read about the problems every time there is a high profile policy mistake or a security breach. Just about everybody hears about it, just as we have all heard about Aldrich Ames and should have heard about Aldrich Ames. There are those clamoring to excoriate our intelligence services as a result, but we must not give in to that temptation in my view.
Mr. Speaker, we hear about the mistakes and problems. We rarely hear about the averted crises and the success stories for obvious reasons. That is the nature of the intelligence business. Those of us who are charged with oversight responsibility must remember to make a fair judgment about how well the intelligence community is doing, realizing that we are never going to be able to have an even playing field to talk about the successes.
Of course, as one who worked in the intelligence community, I agree wholeheartedly that management reforms are needed. I will say that again. I do believe we need to get at this issue of reform, and I am glad for the resolve of the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] in ensuring these matters are addressed, which was supported by the ranking member, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest]. In that process I hope we will also make some necessary changes in the classification and declassification process to ensure that the guise of, quote, national security, unquote, is not used in vain, while guaranteeing truly sensitive material is, in fact, not compromised. This is a very difficult balancing act, but it is crucial to ensuring accurate information and the protection of the human component of intelligence gathering. The people who risk their lives to provide this service do not want to risk their lives in vain, and we owe them protection of that information.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I once again call on my colleagues in the House to take the important step of requiring a secrecy oath for Members of Congress. Members are granted extraordinary access to classified material, very sensitive material I would add, and mountains of it. I hope it is understood that we have a responsibility to protect that information. Repeated, if isolated, leaks of substance from classified briefings to the front pages of morning newspapers suggest, perhaps, that some Members still do not understand our important responsibility in this area. So I will, once again, join the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], my friend, in offering an amendment to this bill to require that Members and staff seeking access to classified information sign a pledge that they will, not willfully disclose such material. I know that this will be seen as symbolic by some, but sometimes it is the symbolism that gets the point across, attracts people's attention, and ensures that they do the right thing.
[Page: H5817]
OPEN VERSUS RESTRICTIVE RULES 95TH-103D CONG.
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Congress (years) Total rules granted 1 Open rules Restrictive rules
Number Percent 2 Number Percent 3
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95th (1977-78) 211 179 85 32 15
96th (1979-80) 214 161 75 53 25
97th (1981-82) 120 90 75 30 25
98th (1983-84) 155 105 68 50 32
99th (1985-86) 115 65 57 50 43
100th (1987-88) 123 66 54 57 46
101st (1989-90) 104 47 45 57 55
102d (1991-92) 109 37 34 72 66
103d (1993-94) 75 17 23 58 77
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OPEN VERSUS RESTRICTIVE RULES: 103D CONG.
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Rule number date reported Rule type Bill number and subject Amendments submitted Amendments allowed Disposition of rule and date
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H. Res. 58, Feb. 2, 1993 MC H.R. 1: Family and medical leave 30 (D-5; R-25) 3 (D-0; R-3) PQ: 246-176. A: 259-164. (Feb. 3, 1993).
H. Res. 59, Feb. 3, 1993 MC H.R. 2: National Voter Registration Act 19 (D-1; R-18) 1 (D-0; R-1) PQ: 248-171. A: 249-170. (Feb. 4, 1993).
H. Res. 103, Feb. 23, 1993 C H.R. 920: Unemployment compensation 7 (D-2; R-5) 0 (D-0; R-0) PQ: 243-172. A: 237-178. (Feb. 24, 1993).
H. Res. 106, Mar. 2, 1993 MC H.R. 20: Hatch Act amendments 9 (D-1; R-8) 3 (D-0; R-3) PQ: 248-166. A: 249-163. (Mar. 3, 1993).
H. Res. 119, Mar. 9, 1993 MC H.R. 4: NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 13 (d-4; R-9) 8 (D-3; R-5) PQ: 247-170. A: 248-170. (Mar. 10, 1993).
H. Res. 132, Mar. 17, 1993 MC H.R. 1335: Emergency supplemental Appropriations 37 (D-8; R-29) 1(not submitted) (D-1; R-0) A: 240-185. (Mar. 18, 1993).
H. Res. 133, Mar. 17, 1993 MC H. Con. Res. 64: Budget resolution 14 (D-2; R-12) 4 (1-D not submitted) (D-2; R-2) PQ: 250-172. A: 251-172. (Mar. 18, 1993).
H. Res. 138, Mar. 23, 1993 MC H.R. 670: Family planning amendments 20 (D-8; R-12) 9 (D-4; R-5) PQ: 252-164. A: 247-169. (Mar. 24, 1993).
H. Res. 147, Mar. 31, 1993 C H.R. 1430: Increase Public debt limit 6 (D-1; R-5) 0 (D-0; R-0) PQ: 244-168. A: 242-170. (Apr. 1, 1993).
H. Res. 149 Apr. 1, 1993 MC H.R. 1578: Expedited Rescission Act of 1993 8 (D-1; R-7) 3 (D-1; R-2) A: 212-208. (Apr. 28, 1993).
H. Res. 164, May 4, 1993 O H.R. 820: Nate Competitiveness Act NA NA A: Voice Vote. (May 5, 1993).
H. Res. 171, May 18, 1993 O H.R. 873: Gallatin Range Act of 1993 NA NA A: Voice Vote. (May 20, 1993).
H. Res. 172, May 18, 1993 O H.R. 1159: Passenger Vessel Safety Act NA NA A: 308-0 (May 24, 1993).
H. Res. 173 May 18, 1993 MC S.J. Res. 45: United States forces in Somalia 6 (D-1; R-5) 6 (D-1; R-5) A: Voice Vote (May 20, 1993)
H. Res. 183, May 25, 1993 O H.R. 2244: 2d supplemental appropriations NA NA A: 251-174. (May 26, 1993).
H. Res. 186, May 27, 1993 MC H.R. 2264: Omnibus budget reconciliation 51 (D-19; R-32) 8 (D-7; R-1) PQ: 252-178. A: 236-194 (May 27, 1993).
H. Res. 192, June 9, 1993 MC H.R. 2348: Legislative branch appropriations 50 (D-6; R-44) 6 (D-3; R-3) PQ: 240-177. A: 226-185. (June 10, 1993).
H. Res. 193, June 10, 1993 O H.R. 2200: NASA authorization NA NA A: Voice Vote. (June 14, 1993).
H. Res. 195, June 14, 1993 MC H.R. 5: Striker replacement 7 (D-4; R-3) 2 (D-1; R-1) A: 244-176.. (June 15, 1993).
H. Res. 197, June 15, 1993 MO H.R. 2333: State Department. H.R. 2404: Foreign aid 53 (D-20; R-33) 27 (D-12; R-15) A: 294-129. (June 16, 1993).
H. Res. 199, June 16, 1993 C H.R. 1876: Ext. of `Fast Track' NA NA A: Voice Vote. (June 22, 1993).
H. Res. 200, June 16, 1993 MC H.R. 2295: Foreign operations appropriations 33 (D-11; R-22) 5 (D-1; R-4) A: 263-160. (June 17, 1993).
H. Res. 201, June 17, 1993 O H.R. 2403: Treasury-postal appropriations NA NA A: Voice Vote. (June 17, 1993).
H. Res. 203, June 22, 1993 MO H.R. 2445: Energy and Water appropriations NA NA A: Voice Vote. (June 23, 1993).
H. Res. 206, June 23, 1993 O H.R. 2150: Coast Guard authorization NA NA A: 401-0. (July 30, 1993).
H. Res. 217, July 14, 1993 MO H.R. 2010: National Service Trust Act NA NA A: 261-164. (July 21, 1993).
H. Res. 220, July 21, 1993 MC H.R. 2667: Disaster assistance supplemental 14 (D-8; R-6) 2 (D-2; R-0) PQ: 245-178. F: 205-216. (July 22, 1993).
H. Res. 226, July 23, 1993 MC H.R. 2667: Disaster assistance supplemental 15 (D-8; R-7) 2 (D-2; R-0) A: 224-205. (July 27, 1993).
H. Res. 229, July 28, 1993 MO H.R. 2330: Intelligence Authority Act, fiscal year 1994 NA NA A: Voice Vote. (Aug. 3, 1993).
H. Res. 230, July 28, 1993 O H.R. 1964: Maritime Administration authority NA NA A: Voice Vote. (July 29, 1993).
H. Res. 246, Aug. 6, 1993 MO H.R. 2401: National Defense authority 149 (D-109; R-40) A: 246-172. (Sept. 8, 1993).
H. Res. 248, Sept. 9, 1993 MO H.R. 2401: National defense authorization PQ: 237-169. A: 234-169. (Sept. 13, 1993).
H. Res. 250, Sept. 13, 1993 MC H.R. 1340: RTC Completion Act 12 (D-3; R-9) 1 (D-1; R-0) A: 213-191-1. (Sept. 14, 1993).
H. Res. 254, Sept. 22, 1993 MO H.R. 2401: National Defense authorization 91 (D-67; R-24) A: 241-182. (Sept. 28, 1993).
H. Res. 262, Sept. 28, 1993 O H.R. 1845: National Biological Survey Act NA NA A: 238-188 (10/06/93).
H. Res. 264, Sept. 28, 1993 MC H.R. 2351: Arts, humanities, museums 7 (D-0; R-7) 3 (D-0; R-3) PQ: 240-185. A: 225-195. (Oct. 14, 1993).
H. Res. 265, Sept. 29, 1993 MC H.R. 3167: Unemployment compensation amendments 3 (D-1; R-2) 2 (D-1; R-1) A: 239-150. (Oct. 15, 1993).
H. Res. 269, Oct. 6, 1993 MO H.R. 2739: Aviation infrastructure investment N/A N/A A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 7, 1993).
H. Res. 273, Oct. 12, 1993 MC H.R. 3167: Unemployment compensation amendments 3 (D-1; R-2) 2 (D-1; R-1) PQ: 235-187. F: 149-254. (Oct. 14, 1993).
H. Res. 274, Oct. 12, 1993 MC H.R. 1804: Goals 2000 Educate America Act 15 (D-7; R-7; I-1) 10 (D-7; R-3) A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 13, 1993).
H. Res. 282, Oct. 20, 1993 C H.J. Res. 281: Continuing appropriations through Oct. 28, 1993 N/A N/A A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 21, 1993).
H. Res. 286, Oct. 27, 1993 O H.R. 334: Lumbee Recognition Act N/A N/A A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 28, 1993).
H. Res. 287, Oct. 27, 1993 C H.J. Res. 283: Continuing appropriations resolution 1 (D-0; R-0) 0 A: 252-170. (Oct. 28, 1993).
H. Res. 289, Oct. 28, 1993 O H.R. 2151: Maritime Security Act of 1993 N/A N/A A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 3, 1993).
H. Res. 293, Nov. 4, 1993 MC H. Con. Res. 170: Troop withdrawal Somalia N/A N/A A: 390-8. (Nov. 8, 1993).
H. Res. 299, Nov. 8, 1993 MO H.R. 1036: Employee Retirement Act-1993 2 (D-1; R-1) N/A A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 9, 1993).
H. Res. 302, Nov. 9, 1993 MC H.R. 1025: Brady handgun bill 17 (D-6; R-11) 4 (D-1; R-3) A: 238-182. (Nov. 10, 1993).
H. Res. 303, Nov. 9, 1993 O H.R. 322: Mineral exploration N/A N/A A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 16, 1993).
H. Res. 304, Nov. 9, 1993 C H.J. Res. 288: Further CR, FY 1994 N/A N/A
H. Res. 312, Nov. 17, 1993 MC H.R. 3425: EPA Cabinet Status 27 (D-8; R-19) 9 (D-1; R-8) F: 191-227. (Feb. 2, 1994).
H. Res. 313, Nov. 17, 1993 MC H.R. 796: Freedom Access to Clinics 15 (D-9; R-6) 4 (D-1; R-3) A: 233-192. (Nov. 18, 1993).
H. Res. 314, Nov. 17, 1993 MC H.R. 3351: Alt Methods Young Offenders 21 (D-7; R-14) 6 (D-3; R-3) A: 238-179. (Nov. 19, 1993).
H. Res. 316, Nov. 19, 1993 C H.R. 51: D.C. statehood bill 1 (D-1; R-0) N/A A: 252-172. (Nov. 20, 1993).
H. Res. 319, Nov. 20, 1993 MC H.R. 3: Campaign Finance Reform 35 (D-6; R-29) 1 (D-0; R-1) A: 220-207. (Nov. 21, 1993).
H. Res. 320, Nov. 20, 1993 MC H.R. 3400: Reinventing Government 34 (D-15; R-19) 3 (D-3; R-0) A: 247-183. (Nov. 22, 1993).
H. Res. 336, Feb. 2, 1994 MC H.R. 3759: Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 14 (D-8; R-5; I-1) 5 (D-3; R-2) PQ: 244-168. A: 342-65. (Feb. 3, 1994).
H. Res. 352, Feb. 8, 1994 MC H.R. 811: Independent Counsel Act 27 (D-8; R-19) 10 (D-4; R-6) PQ: 249-174. A: 242-174. (Feb. 9, 1994).
H. Res. 357, Feb. 9, 1994 MC H.R. 3345: Federal Workforce Restructuring 3 (D-2; R-1) 2 (D-2; R-0) A: VV (Feb. 10, 1994).
H. Res. 366, Feb. 23, 1994 MO H.R. 6: Improving America's Schools NA NA A: VV (Feb. 24, 1994).
H. Res. 384, Mar. 9, 1994 MC H. Con. Res. 218: Budget Resolution FY 1995-99 14 (D-5; R-9) 5 (D-3; R-2) A: 245-171 (Mar. 10, 1994).
H. Res. 401, Apr. 12, 1994 MO H.R. 4092: Violent Crime Control 180 (D-98; R-82) 68 (D-47; R-21) A: 244-176 (Apr. 13, 1994).
H. Res. 410, Apr. 21, 1994 MO H.R. 3221: Iraqi Claims Act N/A N/A A: Voice Vote (Apr. 28, 1994).
H. Res. 414, Apr. 28, 1994 O H.R. 3254: NSF Auth. Act N/A N/A A: Voice Vote (May 3, 1994).
H. Res. 416, May 4, 1994 C H.R. 4296: Assault Weapons Ban Act 7 (D-5; R-2) 0 (D-0; R-0) A: 220-209 (May 5, 1994).
H. Res. 420, May 5, 1994 O H.R. 2442: EDA Reauthorization N/A N/A A: Voice Vote (May 10, 1994).
H. Res. 422, May 11, 1994 MO H.R. 518: California Desert Protection N/A N/A PQ: 245-172 A: 248-165 (May 17, 1994).
H. Res. 423, May 11, 1994 O H.R. 2473: Montana Wilderness Act N/A N/A A: Voice Vote (May 12, 1994).
H. Res. 428, May 17, 1994 MO H.R. 2108: Black Lung Benefits Act 4 (D-1; R-3) N/A A: VV (May 19, 1994).
H. Res. 429, May 17, 1994 MO H.R. 4301: Defense Auth., FY 1995 173 (D-115; R-58) A: 369-49 (May 18, 1994).
H. Res. 431, May 20, 1994 MO H.R. 4301: Defense Auth., FY 1995 100 (D-80; R-20) A: Voice Vote (May 23, 1994).
H. Res. 440, May 24, 1994 MC H.R. 4385: Natl Hiway System Designation 16 (D-10; R-6) 5 (D-5; R-0) A: Voice Vote (May 25, 1994).
H. Res. 443, May 25, 1994 MC H.R. 4426: For. Ops. Approps, FY 1995 39 (D-11; R-28) 8 (D-3; R-5) PQ: 233-191 A: 244-181 (May 25, 1994).
H. Res. 444, May 25, 1994 MC H.R. 4454: Leg Branch Approp, FY 1995 43 (D-10; R-33) 12 (D-8; R-4) A: 249-177 (May 26, 1994).
H. Res. 447, June 8, 1994 O H.R. 4539: Treasury/Postal Approps 1995 N/A N/A A: 236-177 (June 9, 1994).
H. Res. 467, June 28, 1994 MC H.R. 4600: Expedited Rescissions Act N/A N/A
H. Res. 468, June 28, 1994 MO H.R. 4299: Intelligence Auth., FY 1995 N/A N/A
H. Res. 474, July 12, 1994 MO H.R. 3937: Export Admin. Act of 1994 N/A
H. Res. 475, July 12, 1994 O H.R. 1188: Anti. Redlining in Ins N/A
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Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Utah [Mr. Hansen], a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
[Page: H5818]
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule. I want to comment Chairman Glickman and my colleague, Mr. Combest, for their leadership. We worked well in this committee this year. When disputes arose, they were quickly settled with the result being a bipartisan bill that we can all support.
As a member of both the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees, I have closely followed a number of controversial crossover issues, the most significant being intelligence support for Department of Defense drug interdiction operations. I remain very concerned that there is no one in charge of supply reduction efforts. The Defense Department has unilaterally picked a fight with the Governments of Peru and Colombia by ceasing to pass radar tracking data to these Governments that would facilitate the force-down of narcotics trafficker aircraft. At the same time that the Defense Department was driving a wedge between Peru and Colombia and our Government, it was requesting more money for radar programs in Latin America. This mismanagement has a direct impact on Americans at home because cocaine destined for the United States that would otherwise have been interdicted is now freely moving from Peru to Colombia. I have received assurances that the administration has focused on this problem and hopes to have it resolved soon. They should have thought about this before they reversed a long held policy on force-downs without prior consultation with other affected Federal agencies.
The problem I have described with the drug war is symptomatic of a larger problem: Lack of policy direction that will permit the intelligence community to efficiently allocate scarce collection assets. This has been clear throughout the year as we looked to the administration for a clear statement of its global priorities, which can best be described as constantly in flux. Barring such a vision, we will be forced to continue to provide direction. This is both unfortunate and unnecessary. Eighteen months into the Clinton administration is far too long to wait for a clear sense of policy direction. Mr. Speaker, I hope they do better next year.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], the ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] yielding this time to me. And to the gentleman from California and the gentleman from Florida I simply want to say I appreciate very much the cooperation of the Committee on Rules in granting this rule that allows a full and open debate, allows any amendments that wish to come up under the preprinted rule. And I strongly support it and would urge passage of the rule.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time and am prepared to yield back the balance of my time, if I can be assured by my colleague that he has no further requests.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, this is an open rule. The only way it could otherwise be characterized is because of the preprinting requirement, but because of the problems associated, or potential problems associated, with national security interests, that is, we believe it a reasonable requirement, one that was agreed to by the minority on the Committee on Rules.
[TIME: 1530]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence we believe has brought us a good bill which can be fully debated under this rule. I urge my colleagues to vote for this rule.
Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr. Serrano). Pursuant to House Resolution 468 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 4299.
The Chair designates the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. Slaughter] Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentlewoman from Hawaii [Mrs. Mink] to assume the chair temporarily.
[TIME: 1531]
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 4299) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for intelligence, and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mrs. Mink of Hawaii (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman].
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chairman, at the outset I want to compliment the committee's ranking Republican member, Larry Combest, for the leadership he provided in fashioning this legislation. We have not agreed on every issue, and I know he has reservations about the funding levels in the bill, but we worked together in a cooperative spirit to produce a measure which the committee could support.
The bill before the House authorizes the funds for fiscal year 1995 for all of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government. The intelligence budget is comprised chiefly of two parts, the National Foreign Intelligence Program [NFIP] and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities [TIARA] Program. The NFIP includes those activities involved in the provision of intelligence to national policymakers and includes programs administered by agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Tactical intelligence programs reside solely within the Department of Defense and are primarily, although not exclusively, concerned with the provision of intelligence to military commanders. There is not always a clear distinction between national and tactical programs and the Intelligence Committee has jurisdiction over the budgets of both. In our review of the funding requests for intelligence activities of particular concern to the Armed Services Committee and I want to acknowledge the assistance provided to us by Chairman Dellums, the members of his committee, and the committee staff.
Since so much of the Intelligence Committee's work deals with classified information, it is not possible to discuss the contents of the bill publicly except in broad terms. I am aware that this situation is frustrating to many Members and when we reach the amendments
phase of these proceedings, Bob Torricelli and I will offer an amendment which would bring a degree of openness to the consideration of the intelligence budget. Our amendment will require that, beginning with the submission of the budget for fiscal year 1996, the aggregate amount of money spent on, and requested for, intelligence will have to be disclosed.
Although their funding levels are not public, all of the programs and activities authorized by H.R. 4299 are, however, set forth in a classified schedule of authorizations which is incorporated into the bill by reference, and discussed in detail in a classified annex to the committee's report. These documents have been available for review by Members since June 10. I urge Members who have not yet done so to visit the committee's office, room H-405 in the Capitol, and familiarize themselves with these materials.
This is the third consecutive year in which the committee has reported an authorization which is below both the President's request and the amount authorized the year before. The congressional intelligence committees, much more so than the agencies they oversee, have been the agents for change in the intelligence community. Responding to the end of the cold war, it was the committees that mandated a 17.5-percent reduction in personnel to be accomplished by fiscal year 1997, and cuts in spending which have amounted to approximately 7 percent in the aggregate over the last 3 years. We have taken these actions largely as a result of a conviction that with the changes in the world arising from the demise of the Soviet Union, some alteration in the size of the intelligence community, which after all had been created to respond to the national security threat posed by the Soviets, was required.
The committee has been frustrated, however, by the inability of either this administration or its predecessor to articulate a clear vision of what the intelligence community should be doing in the post-cold-war world. Without that vision, and a well-defined implementation plan, it is difficult for the committee to effectively assess resource needs. Budget reductions are a blunt instrument for producing change in either the direction or method of operation of any agency or department of Government. Budget cuts must be reacted to, but those reactions do not always produce the efficiencies which might have resulted if the savings had been the end result of change, and not its cause. Thus far, however, the intelligence community's response has been primarily to react to the budget initiatives of Congress rather than looking to the future, attempting to define its role in it and matching its budget needs to that future role.
That is not to say that the maintenance of an effective intelligence capability will not continue to be necessary or that its maintenance will not be expensive. The world will remain an unpredictable place and intelligence will continue to be the insurance policy which will hopefully enable our leaders to deal with crises and conflicts in ways which reduce the risk to American interests and American lives. I believe, however, that the premium on that insurance should be going down because, as dangerous as the world may be, it is quite simply not as dangerous as it was when we had an enemy of the dimensions of the Soviet Union.
The committee's actions to refocus intelligence spending and activities are of necessity ad hoc. They cannot be expected to substitute for strategic planning by the executive branch. We need a strategic plan for intelligence and it is my judgment that the individuals from outside of Government need to be involved in its formulation. The planning effort must be undertaken promptly and completed expeditiously. We cannot afford another budget cycle in which the committee trims the request because of a gut feeling that it is too high.
The committee needs to be able to judge the budget by how well it allocates resources to priority intelligence activities. The identification of priorities has not been done clearly and the resulting impression is that the intelligence community is trying to do most of what it did during the cold war, in the same way as it did in the cold
war, and that is difficult because there are fewer resources. In the committee's judgment, there are intelligence priorities. They include countering the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorists, and narcotics traffickers, and ensuring that our military commanders, no mater where they are deployed, have timely access to intelligence collected by national and tactical systems. These activities need to be emphasized and if that requires terminating some things which are no longer necessary because of changes in the world, that has to be done--and much more quickly than it has thus far. That is why a strategic plan is so important.
The fiscal year 1995 budget submission requested an increase in the NFIP, a cut in TIARA, and marginal growth when the two were combined. The committee's recommendation cancels almost all of the requested increase in the national programs, deepens the reduction in the tactical programs, resulting in an authorization below the request and below the amount appropriated in fiscal year 1994. I recognize that it will be argued by some that we did not cut enough and by others that we cut too much. We are proceeding cautiously, for the reasons I have already stated. In reducing spending and personnel, our goal has been twofold. First, we have tried to keep the pressure on the intelligence community to reorient itself, a process which takes time especially when it involves systems which are complex and expensive. Second, we have sought to avoid creating gaps in intelligence coverage by a too rapid reduction in resources. We are walking a fine line in a difficult area and while I do not believe that the committee's recommendations will cause any diminishing of essential capabilities, I am concerned that substantial additional reductions would have that result. I urge the House to reject amendments which would require such reductions.
In addition to the budget recommendations, the bill contains a number of legislative proposals which will be explained in detail by the chairman of our subcommittee on legislation, Mr. Coleman. Some of these proposals involve matters within the jurisdiction of other committees and I want to acknowledge the assistance we have received from those committees in moving this legislation forward. At this point in the Record, I would like to insert an exchange of letters between Chairman Ford of the Committee on Education and Labor and myself on one such proposal.
Among the legislative recommendations in H.R. 4299 are several which comprise the committee's initial responses to the Ames espionage case. While these recommendations should be of help in deterring espionage, the Ames case was not caused by deficiencies in the law. The committee has an inquiry underway to help determine why a CIA employee could conduct espionage for 9 years, from different CIA posts in the United States and abroad, under the noses of his supervisors and coworkers, without detection. I am concerned that the Ames case reflected the continuation of a problem that the committee publicly identified in 1986 and 1987--counterintelligence has not been a high enough priority of senior management at the CIA or elsewhere in the intelligence community. Until protecting our secrets becomes as important to management as acquiring the secrets of other countries, we will continue to court disaster. No amount of legislation will correct the problems which allowed Mr. Ames to operate successfully for so long. They will be remedied only by a heightened emphasis on counterintelligence by top management and closer coordination of counterintelligence activities between intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
Madam Chairman, I urge the House to endorse the committee's judgments as reflected in H.R. 4299. Those judgments reflect a balancing of interests but I believe the bill makes progress in encouraging the community to invest in its future rather than cling to its past.
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
On Intelligence,
Washington, DC, July 12, 1994.
Hon. William D. Ford,
Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC.
[Page: H5819]
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of July 12, 1994 concerning section 501 of H.R. 4299, the fiscal year 1995 intelligence authorization bill.
As noted in your letter, section 501 amends a number of statutes to enable the Secretary of Defense to manage the civilian employees of the Central Imagery Office in the same personnel system as exists for comparable employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency. One of these statutes, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, is within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Education and Labor pursuant to Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
The Intelligence Committee appreciates your willingness not to seek the referral of H.R. 4299 to which your committee would have been entitled on the basis of its jurisdiction over section 501. Your decision has facilitated the floor consideration of H.R. 4299.
Sincerely,
Dan Glickman,
Chairman.
Committee on Education and Labor,
Washington, DC, July 12, 1994.
Chairman, Hon. Dan Glickman,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
[Page: H5820]
Dear Mr. Chairman: This week the House of Representatives will consider H.R. 4299, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995. Section 501 of the proposed legislation provides the Secretary of Defense with the statutory authority to manage the civilian employees of the Central Imagery Office in the same personnel system as the one which exists for comparable employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency. This section modifies a whole range of statutes to ensure that employees of the Central Imagery Office are subject to the same statutory provisions as employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
One provision of Section 501 amends the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 to include employees of the Central Imagery Office in the same stautory exemption as the Defense Intelligence Agency.
The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 is a statute within the Rule X jurisdiction of this Committee. The Committee does not oppose the amendment proposed in H.R. 4299 and sees no need to take action upon the bill. Our decision to forego action, however, should not be construed as a waiver of the Committee's Rule X jurisdiction. We would appreciate it if this letter and your response could be printed in the Congressional Record with the debate on H.R. 4299.
With kind regards,
Sincerely,
William D. Ford,
Chairman.
[TIME: 1540]
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. COMBEST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, as the ranking Republican member of the Intelligence Committee, let me first express my appreciation to my colleague from Kansas, Chairman Glickman, for his hard work in leading our committee through some extremely difficult deliberations. The pressure to continue cutting when common sense dictates it should cease has made preparation of the authorization bill for intelligence more difficult in each of my 6 years on this committee.
H.R. 4299 is not the bill that I or my Republican colleagues would have written. I strongly urge anyone who is concerned with this country's security to read the minority views to the unclassified report, where we discuss at some length our philosophic and practical dissent from some key elements of the authorization report. Realistically, though, we stand united in supporting the bill as the best compromise we can reach at present. I say this in the full expectation that we will in conference, on a bipartisan basis, seek compromise positions which will lessen our concern that this bill endangers some critically important and fragile intelligence capabilities, such as in the area of human intelligence.
The committee is responsible for examining, evaluating, and funding intelligence capabilities and activities, the specifics of which are largely and necessarily unknown to the public. When Congress makes an unwise cut to public works or education, the taxpayer sees the bridge left half built and the school left unfurnished. But, when we cut intelligence the taxpayer sees nothing. If we decide to gamble with public safety by cutting money for law enforcement, the public sees the results and can draw the right conclusions. But, when we gamble with national security by cutting intelligence programs the taxpayer is unaware how we may be risking his and his family's well-being. We cannot disclose publicly the extent and nature of those risks, because that would tip off those in our unsettled and dangerous world who wish us harm about where our intelligence capabilities are thinnest. In practice this often means that we will not face full public accountability until our gambles result in an open disaster.
Frankly the short-term odds are with the Members of this House who press for such irresponsible continuing cuts. After all, those who opposed strong defenses in the years before World War II could claim to be demonstrably right year after year after year. In the gamble of national preparedness they rolled straight sevens and saved the taxpayers billions of dollars--right up until December 1941 and the debacle of Pearl Harbor. Some people refuse to learn from history, but what was true then is true now: Responsible leaders of this country must fight against the short-sighted tendency to think we can safely cut corners in intelligence and national security. Those savings will be lost inevitably many times over, and they will be paid back not only in dollars but in lives. With important national security interests at stake, we must be more cautious about these continuing cuts to intelligence. We cannot afford to search for some illusory right level of intelligence resources by making cuts we later find to our regret are too deep and then working backward to restore lost capabilities.
Madam Chairman, I am not now talking about history, though. Neither am I talking about some sort of hypothetical point of decision off in the future. I am talking about this year, this budget, and what we do about it today. For, in the area of intelligence, push has come to shove. In all but one of my 6 years on this committee we have turned out an authorization bill showing cuts to intelligence in real terms. We have probed, examined, and x rayed the intelligence budget
from every angle. We have torn it down and rebuilt it. We have cut and pared and sliced away at fat. We are now cutting away muscle and sinew. Savings can now be measured only in risks taken.
There is no shortage of facts and figures I can cite to demonstrate the rather remarkable, indeed reckless, slope of decline on which we have put the intelligence community. Despite a consensus of informed opinion that intelligence cuts should be avoided or at least minimized in a period when we are cutting our defense capabilities, we are again this year cutting intelligence more than defense at large. It is downsizing at a rate twice that recommended by the President's National Performance Review for the Government. President Clinton made a campaign promise in 1992 to cut the Bush administration's proposed intelligence budget over a 5-year period by $7 billion. This was an incredibly ambitious--and many would say a foolhardy--goal. Yet, as Director Woolsey has stated publicly, this has been accomplished with 2 years to spare, and it appears the cuts over the 5 years will likely be more than $14 billion. This irrational urge to keep cutting intelligence has taken on a life of its own and it will, unless stopped, inevitably lead to disaster.
Madam Chairman, I have not talked today on the continuing need for intelligence. I did so last year at some length and, I imagine, several of our committee colleagues will discuss it some more. I will only observe that it takes an incredibly naive person to argue that the current world situation is such that our country does not have a pressing need to know the behind-the-scenes realities of: the capabilities and intentions of well-armed hostile states, terrorist organizations, weapons proliferators, and unfair trade competitors worldwide.
In 1944 Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, in his political innocence, convinced President Roosevelt to have Gen. William Donovan of the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, return to the Soviet Union a captured copy of a code book used by the Soviet intelligence services. He did, and the Soviets promptly changed their codes. A chance to follow Soviet intelligence activities in the United States and worldwide was thrown away. Fortunately, Donovan returned the code book only after making a copy--a copy which U.S. intelligence used a few years later, when political leadership was wiser to decrypt Soviet intercepts from before 1945. These messages allowed the United States to wrap up numerous Soviet agents who were still active in the United States. Those who now seek to limit intelligence capabilities are far more short-sighted, naive, and downright foolish than Secretary Stettinius. What Stettinius did was only to limit the benefit of good intelligence work. Those who cut crucial intelligence resources now are, effectively speaking, keeping the code books of today's enemies from ever reaching our hands in the first place.
I urge the House to pass this authorization without further cuts and the even greater risks to our national security interests which further cuts would entail.
I feel I should also take this occasion to comment on the Ames espionage case and the reforms that are under consideration in its wake.
First of all, reform of intelligence and counter-intelligence should not be of the ready-fire-then-aim sort.
While the Intelligence Committees have been considering various options for change, the DCI has refrained from making quick fixes and opted--I think wisely--to wait until he began getting in the results of several external and internal investigations and task forces to propose his remedies. He has taken very careful aim because he wants to fix what is broken without destroying an extraordinarily important and, despite Ames, a highly successful element of the intelligence community--the CIA's clandestine Operations Directorate.
Last week the DCI gave us on the Intelligence Committee his initial read-out of what sorts of changes he envisions. An unclassified version of that talk was given yesterday to the Center for Strategic and International Security. In it he announced `a comprehensive overhaul of a number of key structures, programs, and procedures.' It was a speech which, in the words of the New York Times, was unprecedented: `no other sitting Director of Central Intelligence has offered a public critique quite as pointed as Mr. Woolsey's.' And, as Mr. Woolsey told our committee, this is just the beginning.
I am very much encouraged by the direction the DCI is moving. He has not been misled by the distracting hue-and-cry of those claiming the main scandal is in the longevity of Ame's treachery. Parenthetically, I would note that the two potentially most damaging cold war spy cases, the Whitworth/Walker case in the Navy and the Conrad case in the Army--either one of which could have resulted in hundreds of thousands of U.S. dead if not outright U.S. military defeat in war--went on for 18 and over 12 years, respectively. While identifying factors which hamstrung the CIA and FBI efforts over 8 years to identify the spy responsible for the 1985-86 intelligence compromises, the DCI has rightly focused in on the system which allowed Rick Ames access to so many of the CIA crown jewels to begin with. This is a much more difficult problem and he is to be lauded for attacking it head-on.
Our committee, you can be sure, will be watching these developments closely. The DCI has promised he will consult with us at every step of the way. This is exactly as it should be. We are not content, however, to sit by and be consulted. We are ourselves delving into the details of Ames' espionage activities and all aspects of U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence relevant to it. It is in the interest of every member of our committee--indeed, of the American people--that we minimize the possibility of there being a repetition of Ames' treachery while maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community.
[Page: H5821]
[TIME: 1550]
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 9 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. Coleman], chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
(Mr. COLEMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. COLEMAN. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4299, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995. As chairman of the Legislation Subcommittee, I feel we have produced a good bill that makes responsible reductions in the intelligence community's budget request while maintaining essential capabilities. In the budget area, we have continued to put pressure on the community to develop innovative, cost-effective solutions to meeting the challenges of the future. More needs to be done, but progress is being made.
On the legislative side, H.R. 4299 contains a large number of substantive proposals, which I would like to summarize briefly:
Section 401 deletes certain archaic provisions of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to ensure CIA's alcohol rehabilitation program is not seen as inconsistent with the Agency's statutory authorities.
Section 501 provides the Secretary of Defense the statutory authorities to manage civilian employees of the Central Imagery Office [CIO] in the same personnel system as exists for civilian employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Providing these authorities to the Secretary of Defense should ensure there is no separate administrative structure created for the smaller CIO.
Section 502 clarifies that the notice requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974 do not apply to Department of Defense [DOD] intelligence officers conducting, outside the United States, an initial assessment contact of a U.S. person as a possible source of foreign intelligence. Section 502 is intended to permit a DOD intelligence officer one opportunity for a face-to-face meeting with the potential source without having to inform the U.S. person of the officer's affiliation with the U.S. Government.
The committee was not convinced that the notice requirements of the Privacy Act were intended to apply to situations covered by the bill, but recognized that the Department of Defense had legitimate grounds for requesting an exemption, in light of the civil penalties that attach to violations. In addition, the committee was concerned about the safety overseas of U.S. intelligence officers and U.S. persons being assessed.
The committee intends that the Privacy Act exemption contained in the bill be construed in such a way as to minimize intrusion on the privacy of the potential U.S. person. The committee believes that no personal information solicited from an individual during the initial assessment contact should be retained in a U.S. Government system of records if the individual is not informed of the intelligence officer's governmental affiliation. Furthermore, the committee expects that under no circumstances should a potential U.S. person be requested or utilized in any fashion to undertake any intelligence activity by defense intelligence officers unless the potential U.S. person is made witting that he or she is acting on behalf of the U.S. Government regardless of the status of the initial assessment contact.
Section 601 of H.R. 4299 establishes independent statutory inspectors general [IG's] for the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. These IG's would be appointed by the directors of the respective agencies, and would not be subject to Senate confirmation. The bill spells out the authorities of the statutory DIA and NSA inspectors general, qualifications for the positions, and reporting requirements to the congressional intelligence committees.
The committee has been concerned about the independence and effectiveness of the offices of the inspector general at DIA and NSA for a number of years. A statutory inspector general at each agency should ensure that important intelligence programs operated by the NSA and DIA have a high degree of specialized, professional, inspector-general oversight. Section 601 will be the subject of an amendment from Mr. Conyers at a later point in the debate. I support the adoption of this amendment: it should bring greater clarity to the interpretation of the provisions establishing the NSA and DIA IG's in the law.
Title VII of the bill includes two provisions intended to improve the management of classified information in the Federal Government. Section 701 requires larger intelligence agencies to allocate at least 2 percent of their appropriations for security, countermeasures, and related activities to certain declassification activities, including reducing classified archives. Section 702 requires the President to issue an Executive order on classification and declassification, not later than 90 days after enactment, and includes a sense of Congress on what the Executive order should provide.
Title VIII of the bill contains several measures to improve U.S. counterespionage efforts. These measures should deter U.S. Government employees--including contractors, consultants, and legislative and judicial branch staff--from engaging in espionage, facilitate the detection of espionage, and provide additional authority to prosecute and redress espionage activities.
The bill requires individuals with access to classified information to give consent to disclosure of records held by financial institutions, credit bureaus, and commercial travel entities, to authorized investigative agencies, or employing agencies, during background investigations, while granted access to classified information, and for 3 years thereafter.
Section 801 sets forth the conditions under which an authorized investigative agency may request, obtain, and disseminate this information. While H.R. 4299 requires employees to waive a certain degree of privacy as a condition of access to classified information, the bill carefully places limitations on when an investigative agency may make a request for financial records and how the information contained in the record may be disseminated. This should be less burdensome to individuals than new reporting requirements, and less intrusive on their privacy.
Title VIII also authorizes rewards for information leading to arrests or convictions for espionage; establishes venue for trials involving espionage committed outside the United States; requires post-conviction forfeiture of espionage proceeds; provides for the denial of retired pay to certain individuals convicted overseas of espionage; and authorizes provide post-employment assistance to certain Defense Department civilian employees to maintain their stability and judgment and avoid unlawful disclosure of classified information.
[Page: H5822]
[TIME: 1600]
Mr. Speaker, I would only say in closing that all of the matters that I have listed that we dealt with legislatively on this particular subcommittee and we have included in the bill are the result of the work of a lot of the members of this committee in the area of classification and declassification of items. Of course, our colleague, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs], will perhaps speak on that issue more later.
I would say that were it not for the staff on both sides of the aisle of the committee, I do not believe we could have brought a bill to the floor that has garnered the support of Republicans as well as Democrats on this most important matter, not just for its budget matter but for its authorization and change in the legislative part of the bill.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], a most valuable member of the committee.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Madam Chairman, we have had typically the last 5 years I have been a member of the committee sweetness and light at this stage, and I think I will depart from that, unfortunately. This is a time to draw a line in the sand, because I am not happy at all with this budget.
Madam Chairman, this Member would tell his colleagues he has severe reservations about the amount of cuts in the funding of the intelligence community recommended by this committee. Certainly I would strenuously oppose any further cuts from the floor or in conference.
Both Republican and Democratic administrations now have sought to avoid cutting the intelligence budget as much as the cuts in the overall DOD budget within which intelligence funds are obscured. The theory has been that intelligence is a force multiplier and also exceedingly important in an increasingly confusing and unstable world. The Defense Department itself consistently has subscribed to this theory, even though more lenient treatment of the intelligence function in budget-cutting efforts meant that DOD's core military programs had to take deeper cuts to stay within the Department's budget ceiling. However, for several years in a row now, Congress has chosen to take misguidedly higher percentage cuts in the intelligence request than in the overall Defense request.
The reasons for this tough budgetary treatment of the intelligence community budget are mostly political rather than substantive. This year our Democratic Party colleagues on the committee tell us that the committee must cut deeply because a majority of the Democratic caucus is critical of U.S. intelligence, and we might otherwise be unable to carry the bill without draconian cuts on the floor.
Madam Chairman, this member believe, and some other members of the committee believe, especially this year, that real damage is being done by the budget cuts the committee is recommending and that some of these cuts are very unwise. In making such cuts, we do not even have the consolation of contributing to deficit reduction, since the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, rather than reducing the Defense budget accordingly, routinely divert intelligence savings to other Defense programs, notably those that are not funded in the Defense request but are valued by some members for parochial or political reasons.
Let us examine some of the problems.
First, there is now a real question whether we will be able to support an adequate satellite infrastructure. Second, it seems like only yesterday that Congress itself was leading a highly publicized bandwagon of support for human intelligence collection--`HUMINT for the 90's,' it was grandly called. But we are nothing if not fickle, and in the twinkling of an eye, the mood shifted 180 degrees. CIA's Directorate of Operations now is facing severe cuts that mandate worldwide retrenchment comparable to the worst day of the Carter administration, when disastrously, Adm. Stansfield Turner was Director of Central Intelligence. Intelligence collection for whole regions of the world must be virtually written off.
Obviously, HUMINT cuts and the flagging support for satellite restructuring cripple another recent initiative to support military operations. The cry for intelligence support for military operations became as popular as HUMINT for the 90's, and gained steam after lessons learned in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, but that concern and effort now looks to be equally short-lived.
With this Member's interests being heavily focused on arms control and verification, I have watched in dismay as we have dismantled many of our technical systems for collecting intelligence on Russian weapons, on the theory that they are no longer a threat, or that they will always comply with treaty provisions, or that we will always retain access by other means.
So, Madam Chairman, I rise to tell Members of the House that in certain key areas these cuts have hurt, hurt grievously, and the damage cannot be reversed except at great expense and over long periods of time. That this pain has not even contributed to deficit reduction is insult added to the injury. That a Democratic Congress has called for such cuts even against the recommendations of a Democratic President seems especially unfathomable. That some outside the responsible committees have occasioned these defensive cuts by Democrat members of the committee by calling for percentage cuts, without knowledge of, or apparent concern about, the specific harm inflicted, and that the responsible committees have with good intentions and concern about floor cuts, succumbed to their cries of the anti-intelligence forces is very unfortunate; I believe it jeopardizes our national security.
Therefore, it is with reluctance that I support this bill but only at this stage of debate. Portions of it are unacceptable, but many of us vote for it in order to avoid further cuts. The problem is that if those of us concerned about inadequate funding vote `no' and are joined by the shortsighted or ill-informed who are simply anti-intelligence, the results could be disastrous. I vote for the bill with the hope that the Senate and the conference will restore some of the absolutely necessary funding for the intelligence community. If that is not the case I will strongly urge my colleagues to vote `no' later on the conference report.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Young].
Mr. YOUNG. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.
Madam Chairman, I want to compliment him and the chairman of the committee for the hard work that has been done to bring this bill to the floor today. I am going to vote for this bill, but in all honesty I have to say, as my colleague, the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], has just said, this bill is not adequate, it does not meet the requirements of 1994, 1995, or 1996 for intelligence and national security interests.
We have to understand, intelligence is a vital part of our national security. I think of the words of General Schwarzkopf after the tremendously successful Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He made the point that he had about everything that a field commander could have to win that war and to win it decisively and to win it without a large loss of life. He also said that the intelligence that he had was better than any field commander had ever had before.
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[TIME: 1610]
But he also said that he could have used more intelligence, more accurate intelligence and more and quicker intelligence.
We cannot separate intelligence from the national security interests of our Nation. But we have different kinds of intelligence. We have the overhead intelligence, the highly technical, highly classified overhead types of intelligence that can do amazing things. But they are limited to the extent that they cannot get into the brain, or the mind or the thought process of a hostile leader.
Obviously then, human intelligence is equally important. Human intelligence is essential to a comprehensive intelligence program. We have not done the job on human intelligence. Since Vietnam we have spent billions and billions of dollars on high-technology intelligence at the risk of losing our ability to conduct an effective human intelligence program. I am afraid the legislation presented today allows that direction to continue.
A major concern that I have is that the intelligence our policymakers are getting, and I think it is important to make the point that the
intelligence community, those who collect the intelligence, are not the policymakers but provide the information and the assessment and the analysis upon which the policymakers would make their decisions and make their determinations and establish a direction.
It worries me when I believe that our top policymakers are not paying the attention to the intelligence information they are getting that they should. I do not think they are spending nearly enough time in considering, and I do not think that they are placing the importance that the members of this committee place on this intelligence information. I would venture to say that any member of this Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence probably spends more time every week reviewing intelligence information and intelligence matters than some of the highest policymakers in the executive branch of Government, and that is dangerous, that is dangerous. They need to pay more attention to what is happening in the real world.
Madam Chairman, we need some definite direction. We need an intelligence program that meets the Nation's security requirements and not the political whims of a budget cutter. I am all for cutting most budgets. I look at the votes I have cast in this Congress and Congresses before to cut budgets and I am prepared to cut a lot more budget items but, I am not prepared to cut the budget when it threatens the security of this Nation, because without our national security we have very little else to offer the people of this great Nation of ours.
Madam Chairman, I am going to vote for this bill. As I said earlier, I compliment the leaders of the committee and the leadership of the committee, but because of these budget restraints we are not doing the job that we need to be doing. The Berlin Wall may have come down, the Iron Curtain may have melted, but the former Soviet Union's nuclear missiles are still in existence. The KGB, while it has changed its name, it is no longer called the KGB, but it is still there, and they are still collecting, and as the Director of the CIA, Jim Woolsey said, when the big target of the KGB and the Soviet Union want away, there were a hundred new ones in its place.
Madam Chairman, I will vote for this bill today, but we need to make some real serious changes in the future.
In an era of downward spiraling budgetary outlays for intelligence, we must spend every dollar even more carefully so that the Nation receives the absolute maximum in benefits from every dollar spent. I have made clear to the administration, the foreign policymakers, and the Director of Central Intelligence, that we need a strategic plan that will lay out their spending priorities for the remainder of the decade.
We cannot afford to make mistakes now. The world continues to be unstable and changing. The death of Kim Il-song last week highlights the need for continued vigilance on the Korean Peninsula. The unfolding tragedy in Haiti where thousands of Haitians are fleeing their country requires constant surveilliance. Bosnia remains unstable, and our tentative steps at forming a long-term settlement there are not guaranteed to work. Of course Russia remains unstable and armed with thousands of nuclear weapons and it continues development programs on strategic defense weapons. Although we must carefully monitor these developments, I do not see strong planning initiatives on behalf of the intelligence community and the administration. As we approach conference and the next year's budget submission, I pray that the intelligence community will perform better than it did this year. In particular, I would like to see a better synergy between the foreign policy community and the intelligence community to ensure that they are in lock step as they face the challenges that America faces.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I am delighted to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], a vigorous advocate for national defense, both in the State of Washington and throughout the United States, and chairman of the subcommittee of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
(Mr. DICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, first I want to compliment the chairman and the ranking member of our committee and the staff of the committee for an excellent job in oversight and review of this year's intelligence authorization bill and budget. Yes, I agree with my friend, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, that the members of the Intelligence Committee I think, the ones the Speaker has appointed after a lot of deliberation, are really spending a great deal of time in the committee listening to the witnesses, attending the meetings and giving the kind of oversight that I think was anticipated when this committee was created.
I will say to my colleagues on the Republican side, yes, we have made large cuts. But as someone who sits both on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and on the Defense Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, I would remind all of my colleagues that if they look at what we have done in procurement in defense, take the numbers in this year's budget and translate them back to 1985, we have taken procurement down from $135 billion to $43 billion. We have made draconian cuts in defense, so large, in fact, that the President this year right in this Chamber said we were not going to cut defense any further.
So I would urge Members in the context of this kind of draw down in force structure and in the procurement of new systems that what we have done here in the intelligence arena is acceptable, and I in my heart of hearts believe that we have given the intelligence community the money and the resources necessary to do an excellent job in gathering intelligence.
The problem is not there. The problem is that we have too many agencies with too much redundancy, doing too much of the same thing.
I want to commend the chairman. He basically said here today that we need not only the Intelligence Committee to be working on this problem, but I truly believe we need a group of outside experts, very senior people to look at the entire operation of the intelligence community and to make recommendations to the President and to the Congress about how we can restructure and simplify the intelligence community.
The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] got up and said we are not going to have as many places with CIA offices in Africa. The only thing I would say to that is we still have a State Department, and frankly, a lot of what we gather today, in my mind, can be gathered through open sources, through the State Department, through the Commerce Department who are out in these parts of the world. They are out there and they can make a contribution here, because what we are trying to do is get the best information we can to decision makers. It does not always have to come through clandestine activities.
Madam Chairman, I would also say this Director, Mr. Woolsey, and this is to his credit, has called upon us to make investments in national technical collection means. This means some money up front. In this respect I do believe that the committee has stood behind him. We have said yes, we are going to give you the money now to make the investment in improving our national technical collection means. In my view, in the future, that will simplify the architecture and allow us to spend less money on intelligence gathering. So I think we should support him on that.
The Ames case is a national scandal and disaster, there is no other way to put it. I believe the Director was a little slow at first in recognizing that the Congress and the American people want him to clean house.
We have to have a better way of doing counter intelligence and the CIA and the F.B.I. are both, in my mind, responsible.
I will give the Clinton administration a credit in this sense, that the National Security Counsel came into play and presented some very important reforms that have been adopted and put into place.
I would like to say this: Yes, we tried to help the directorate of operations. But one cannot have read the article in U.S. News and World Report without having some skepticism and concern about how well the directorate of operations has been doing its job. We may have given them a lot of money, but I must ask where has been the performance? I intend as chairman of the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee to spend some time even in this remaining year looking at those problems, because it is clear that in Cuba, and Russia and other areas, in Iran we have some very serious problems.
Madam Chairman, I want to say to the House I think we have done a responsible job. I think we should vote for this bill. I think we have cut as deeply as we should. I think the chairman is right. If we cut further, we would be in some serious trouble, and if we will work with our colleagues in the conference to try and improve the bill when we get there.
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Mr. COMBEST. Madam chairman, I yield 4 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
(Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GEKAS. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I, too, want to extend my gratitude to the chairman of the full committee, the ranking member, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislation, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Coleman], and particularly to the staff on both sides for their consistent assistance to us. As a matter of fact, the staff, if they do nothing else, in unscrambling the acronyms for me, I will be eternally grateful to them. I am going to create one called SAM, which is `Staff Assistance to Members,' which I endorse right here and now. If I have to introduce legislation to that effect, I will do it. But anyway, SAM has been good to me.
The message for this particular hour has been amply delivered by the presentations made by our colleagues on both sides of the aisle.
Two gigantic truths emerge from everything that we say here and now. One is that there is a continuing absolute need for our country to engage in intelligence activities. If the only trouble spot in the world were North Korea, that in itself would justify our continuing state of alert in the intelligence community and in the Intelligence Committee in both Chambers for monitoring of that situation.
But when you add to that the hundreds of little and bigger situations across the civilized and uncivilized world, then we say to the American people, and I reiterate this every chance I get in my home district, that notwithstanding the end of the cold war, there is this state of alertness that is absolutely necessary to our national security and that, therefore, we must continue to support an intelligence component of our national being.
And the second truth, one that has been reiterated here, is the agony that we have suffered as members of the committee and as American citizens throughout the land on the disgraceful Ames case. I am one who firmly believes that we will have other cases in the future undoubtedly, other betrayals, other individuals who will for money or for other reasons betray our country, and in my mind the death penalty ought to be considered each and every time such an event occurs.
Notwithstanding my support of the death penalty, however, it appears that some of the antipathy toward that kind of penalty is also apparent even in cases when the entire Nation is put at risk. I must tell you that it is not just wartime espionage and treason that should be punishable by death. Any kind of total sacrifice of the American prestige and the American being on the part of anybody who works for the CIA, but the Ames case definitely proves that an act of treason such as that puts at risk fellow Americans, risk of their lives wherever they may be serving across the world, and not only Americans but other nationals of other nations who work with us, who share our ideals, who share our hopes for the world, and so the death penalty is an appropriate measure for treason and espionage, and to the last day that I serve in this Congress, I will attempt to do everything I can to reinstate that penalty for betrayal of our country.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Lewis].
Mr. LEWIS of California. I appreciate my colleague yielding. I appreciate the work of not just my colleague but my chairman as well in a very difficult year in the Intelligence Committee.
I am the new kid on the block in this committee, for I am just beginning my second year of service on the committee. Up until now, I have spent most of my time in the Congress on the Appropriations Committee, where I focused on the Housing and Independent Agencies Subcommittee for a few years, now, service on the Defense Subcommittee.
I must say that I have been distressed over the last several years with the rather rapid reduction in national defense spending that was described by my colleague, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks]. Hand in hand with that, it seemed to me, as we were going about reducing money spent for national defense, it would be very appropriate to have access to the kinds of information that one has made available to them in the intelligence work, so assignment to that committee has been most timely from my perspective.
As others have suggested, we spent hours and hours behind those walls, reading material and trying to get a handle on issues that are largely based upon information that is secret intelligence information, making certain our public-policy decisions reflect those very serious American as well as worldwide needs.
I must say that I am not lightly disconcerted with the pattern of reduced spending in this subject area of recent years. During the decade of the 1990's, it would appear that we could be very well moving toward, adjusted for inflation, by the year 2000 spending 60 percent less on intelligence matters than we spent at the beginning of the decade.
It was only 2 years ago that the former chairman, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], came to the floor and urged us to cut no further a budget that then was 15 percent larger than we are curently spending in this subject area. And how can that be justified, this in view of the world we are living in, a world that is extremely dangerous? Indeed the East-West confrontation has largely been set aside, but to the rest of the world more complex and maybe even more dangerous.
How do you develop the intelligence resources you need to effectively tap that new and complex world?
Madam Chairman, it is very, very important the House recognize these needs, and I urge them to support this legislation.
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Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
Mr. COMBEST. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlemen from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs] is recognized for 4 minutes.
Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend Chairman Glickman and ranking minority member Combest for their hard and good work in bringing H.R. 4299 to the floor. This is thoughtful legislation that strikes a decent balance between the need for our Nation to engage in necessary intelligence activities with the need for fiscal restrant. This bill also continues the efforts of the Intelligence Committee to bring about reform of overall intelligence activities in a way that saves the taxpayers money and strengthens our democracy.
One thing should be clear from today's bill: While the reform efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency and related offices have begun, they need to proceed with an even greater sense of urgency. The human intelligence program still needs a better strategic plan that defines essential roles and missions in a way that makes sense in the post-cold-war world. The counterintelligence program needs special reform in light of the Aldrich Ames case. Continuing personnel reductions mandated by last year's bill also pose challenges for the intelligence community. Director Woolsey, I know, is committed to necessary changes in these areas, and we all should encourage and support his leadership.
The funding level of the bill, which is less than requested, should be interpreted as an effort to deal with the budget environment we live in and as a message to the intelligence community to recoganize and reform itself as quickly as possible to meet today's new challenges.
In trying to develop sound priorities, it's always helpful to know what is of value to people. Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess the real value of the products produced by the intelligence community. In economic parlance, intelligence products are called free goods, meaning they come with no cost to consumers such as the State Department or the Department of Defense. Because they are free goods, there is no way to determine their value to consumers analogous to the price mechanism of the marketplace. As a result, Congress and the community don't have the best kind of information we need to decide how to allocate intelligence resources according to the priorities of these consumers. To solve this problem, I have worked with Chairman Glickman to include report language requesting the Community Management Staff to develop proposals for pilot projects to test various means for measuring the value of and assigning cost to intelligence information. The committee report specifies that a pilot project should try to develop a market-type mechanism for guiding supply and demand, and as for valuing intelligence products. I believe this is the kind of innovative approach that will help us prioritize our intelligence efforts as intelligently as we can.
The reform of procedures for classifying information has consumed much of my time and attention since becoming a member of the Intelligence Committee. Language I drafted for the report on last year's intelligence authorization bill directed the intelligence community to collect information regarding the annual costs in dollars and personnel associated with the classification of information. Two months ago the Office of Management and Budget released a report documenting that the Government will spend roughly $2.28 billion on classifying information this year and will
assign classification duties to 32,400 Federal workers throughout the Government. The report estimated that another $13.8 billion will be spent to reimburse Defense, State, and intelligence contractors for compliance with security procedures. It was interesting to note that some of the agencies which classify information are those Americans would least suspect, such as the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Education. Unfortunately, the OMB report did not include data from the intelligence agencies themselves because they have thus far failed to comply. An amendment I'll offer in a few minutes will deal with this failure.
In an effort to continue the declassification process, today's bill--in language proposed by the chairman and me--requires the intelligence agencies to develop a phased plan to implement declassification guidelines, begin the process of declassification of archived classified documents, and submit reports to Congress on the declassification process. The President is also required to develop a plan to narrow the definition of information subject to classification, to reduce the time period of classification, and to provide for the automatic declassification of information when a document's period of classification expires. These measures will continue the reform process in a balanced and reasonable manner.
I have two primary reasons for pursuing the reform of the classification process. My first reason is my strong philosophical belief that the American public and American democracy are best served by an open Government. It is clearly necessary to continue to classify certain types of information to protect our national security. But keeping information from Americans which poses no security risk is just as clearly contrary to democratic principles. For example, why should we continue to spend money to store classified material regarding troop movement during World War I? Why is the department of Education spending thousands of dollars to install secure telephone lines? We all recognize that a significant portion of what is classified is likely kept from the public more for political reasons, or to avoid embarrassment, or simply from inaction, rather than to serve any defined security need.
The Founding Fathers believed an educated and informed public would serve as the best protector of our form of government and the best guarantor against tyranny. We can't expect the public to carry out its responsibilities if we allow the classification process to keep outdated information secret or to make secret information that should properly be available to the public. Reform of the classification process will place more information in the public domain and thereby strengthen our democracy.
My second reason for pursuing classification reform involves saving money for taxpayers. The OMB report stated that we spend $16 billion annually on classifying material and then storing and maintaining it, even though much of it is outdated or shouldn't have been classified in the first place. The money spent on maintaining the cloak of secrecy over outdated information or information which never had significant national security content, is simply wasted. Given the huge sum of money involved here, if we save only a fraction of the total we spend each year, we can narrow the budget deficit substantially.
In summary, H.R. 4299 is thoughtful legislation that authorizes funds for necessary intelligence activities and continues the reform of our intelligence apparatus in a way that saves money and strengthens our country. I ask all Members to give their full support to the bill.
[TIME: 1630]
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield the balance of our time to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].
Mr. DORNAN. I thank the Republican leader and thank the chairman.
Like my fellow Republican members on this committee, I also support the intelligence authorization bill.
I, however, share with many of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle and all of my Republican colleagues a great concern on the degree to which intelligence has been cut over the recent years. In fact, over the past 3 years, while the overall defense budget has been slashed precipitously, it is a mystery to me that the intelligence budget has declined to an even greater degree. I would think any administration, any Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, would want all the information they could possibly accrue for the benefit of our leaders in a most dangerous world.
Our current Secretary of Defense I think came up with the best metaphor I have heard to describe the situation in the world today. He said that we have slain the dragon--and by that he meant the massive evil force of communism, with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons pointed in our direction and we, likewise, we like to think in a defensive, deterrent mode, pointing them back at the other side.
That dragon has been slain, although the poison lies all over the landscape, that is, those nuclear missiles, even the tactical ones, thousands of those have not yet been perfectly disposed of. We now talk of crime syndicates in Russia getting their hands on missiles. But the dragon itself is down. On Christmas Day, of all days, the Communist hammer and sickle came down and we saw the white, powder blue, and red flag of the old Russia go up. But to continue Mr. Perry, our Secretary of Defense's metaphor, we now have a garden of a thousand poisonous snakes replacing that dragon. The snake is not equal to a dragon, but when there are a thousand of them, you have your hands full. Hence the need for even greater intelligence.
I believe I echo the belief of, I think, most of our colleagues in repeating that in these times of military downsizing intelligence capabilities are increasingly critical to the safety and effectiveness of our military and to the wise and effective use of those diminishing resources of the military.
With the demise of the Soviet Union, few would argue these following facts, I believe: That is, intelligent men and women would not argue that robust intelligence capabilities, strategic and tactical, are increasingly critical in this unpredictable, dynamically unpredictable world in which we live.
No longer does our planning focus chiefly on some large-scale engagement, Soviet tank divisions pouring through the gap, fighting it out in the plains of Europe; and to some this meant, `Well, let's all but bring our military down to nothing,' and as the prior speaker said, some few voices in this House wonder why we need intelligence information at all.
Despite the funding reductions that have occurred since the demise of the Soviet Union, it has been said over and over on the House floor this afternoon that Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, possibly to a greater degree we need more intelligence over and throughout North Korea, where we have almost no human intelligence.
I might add here that even in great humanitarian crises, like Rwanda, intelligence is the fastest way to find out how to save human lives by, in Rwanda's case, the tens of thousands. The French have already apparently changed sides from the Hutu to the Tutsi, and this puts them in great danger. When I took the well some months ago to point out a simple historical fact that is actually mind-numbing, that more people died in Rwanda in a 1-month period, the month of early April through early May, than died in all the German concentration camps, the six death camps designed just for death.
In closing, Madam Chairman, I might point out that that figure is now double through a million deaths in Rwanda. We need all the intelligence we can get. Let us stop cutting our intelligence authorization.
[Page: H5826]
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Let me just say, Madam Chairman, that we have very constructive members of the committee on both sides. There is general unanimity on the issue, although some difference as to the amount to be spent on intelligence. I would just point out that in the 1970's and 1980's we had very radical, sharp increases in intelligence spending to deal with the Soviet threat, particularly the nuclear threat.
While the numbers are not going up any longer, the numbers this year are essentially a freeze of last year, 2.1 percent below the President's request and 1.7 percent below last year's appropriation. So at a time when the Soviet threat is over, the numbers are not coming down in the same way that they went up in the face of the Soviet threat, because we acknowledge there remain very serious threats to this country, but they are different kinds of threats than we faced in the 1970's and 1980's.
Department of Defense,
Arlington, VA, July 15, 1994.
Hon. Ronald V. Dellums,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to express my concern over proposed legislation (H.R. 4299, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995) that appears to begin a process of creating multiple statutory Inspectors General (IG) offices with congressional reporting responsibilities within the same Federal department or agency. Internal oversight type activities are diffused throughout the DoD where they serve as the `eyes and ears' of command. The proposal to create statutory Inspectors General in subordinate combat support agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) would tend to undermine the efficacy of this office. I also believe that creation of such statutory IGs with reporting requirements to Congress will reduce their effectiveness within their agency.
I am opposed to any legislative proposal that would change the status of the Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. Those Agencies are integral parts of the Department of Defense (DOD) and need not be treated any differently than the Military Departments or the other Defense Agencies. Section 601 of H.R. 4299, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, establishes independent statutory Inspectors General for the DIA and the NSA similar to the Inspector General for the Central Intelligence Agency. Additionally, Chairman Conyers has proposed an amendment to H.R. 4299 that would not only create statutory Inspectors General for the DIA and the NSA but would also prohibit this office from conducting any activity in any matter the Secretary of Defense deems the sole responsibility of the DIA or the NSA. The latter provision conflicts with the intent of Congress, as expressed in the Inspector General Act, as amended, that the Inspector General DoD Act, be the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on the prevention and detection of fraud, waste and abuse on all DoD programs, operations and components.
It is unnecessary to create a statutory Inspector General at the DIA or the NSA to ensure a reasonable level of oversight. We have nearly 50 auditors assigned to the intelligence area. Our inspectors, investigators and other specialists also routinely cover intelligence subjects. We provided Congress with comprehensive reports of organizational inspections of the NSA and the DIA in 1992 and 1991, respectively. Further, this office has never turned down a congressional request for an audit at the DIA or the NSA; indeed, we have received very few such requests over the past several years. We have also offered to provide a classified annex to our semiannual report to provide better insight into those agencies and activities within the DoD where the bulk of the work involves classified activities.
Our relationship with the DIA and the NSA Inspectors General is consistent with the other internal oversight offices of other Defense Agencies. The relationship includes ensuring that they follow prescribed standards and policies on auditing, audit follow-up, investigations, hotline management, etc. We also rely on them to be responsive and a source of support for the senior managers of their Agencies, just as the Military Department Inspectors General serve their Chiefs of Staff and the Auditors General serve the Service Secretaries. Like other Defense Agency Inspectors General or internal review offices, they do not need or have criminal investigations capability. We provide that support.
The creation of a statutory IG for the DIA and the NSA would dramatically change this relationship and have serious adverse repercussions on our operations, especially if Chairman Conyers' proposed amendment restricting our authority were adopted. In practice that would probably result in Directors of those Agencies seeking Secretary of Defense determinations that all functions conducted by their agencies-both programmatic and administrative-are their sole responsibility, effectively eliminating any DoD IG coverage. For example, we would be unable to conduct the comprehensive review of equal employment opportunity and discrimination we recently concluded at the NSA absent the consent of the Director of the NSA. More importantly, under the proposed amendment neither the IG, DOD, nor the new statutory Inspectors General in the DIA and the NSA would have sufficient access to look at intelligence matters on a DoD-wide basis.
We have reviewed the IG organizations of the DIA and the NSA in the past and continue to monitor them. Our relationship with the Inspectors General of the DIA and the NSA is effective and working well.
I seriously hope that you will reconsider this legislation in view of the precedent it would set. If I may be of further assistance, please contact me.
Sincerely,
Derek J. Vander Schaaf,
Deputy Inspector General.
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, June 24, 1994.
Hon. Thomas S. Foley,
Speaker, the Capitol, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
[Page: H5827]
Dear Mr. Speaker: We write with respect to H.R. 4299, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, which was sequentially referred to the Committee on Armed Services until June 24, 1994.
The Committee on Armed Services will not mark-up and file a report on this legislation. We will refrain from action on the bill primarily because, although there are policies reflected in the bill with which we disagree, we believe those policies can be addressed adequately in conference. A separate mark-up and report on the bill frankly would unnecessarily complicate consideration of the measure in the House, and we no need to do that.
The one provision that does raise concern warranting mention here is section 601 of the reported bill. This section proposes to establish statutory charters for Inspector General positions within two Department of Defense agencies--the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA).
A careful reading of the Intelligence Committee's report accompanying H.R. 4299 shows that issues exist in this area that may require congressional action. However, we are not convinced that statutory charters are the most effective or appropriate solution to the identified problems. The Department of Defense already has an Inspector General with the statutory responsibility to perform this critical function across the entirety of the department. Further, section 601 appears to be patterned on legislation previously used to establish an inspector general office within the Central Intelligence Agency. Since DIA and NSA are agencies of an executive department, we believe they require significantly different treatment in statute than that afforded to independent agencies.
The Committee on Armed Services stands prepared to work with the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in properly addressing the issues by that committee's action on H.R. 4299. We look forward to reaching an appropriate solution to these issues during conference on the bill.
Sincerely,
RONALD V. DELLUMS,
Chairman.
FLOYD D. SPENCE,
Ranking Republican.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill shall be considered by titles as an original bill for the purpose of amendment, and each title is considered read.
No amendment to the substitute shall be in order except those amendments printed in that portion of the Congressional Record designated for that purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII prior to consideration of the bill.
The Clerk will designate section 1.
The text of section 1 is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995'.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute be printed in the Record, and open to amendment at any point.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, reserving the right to object, if a Member is not here now, this would not preclude him from going back to title I?
The CHAIRMAN. The whole bill would be open for amendment.
Mr. COMBEST. I thank the Chair, and I withdraw my reservation of objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?
There was no objection.
The text of the remainder of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows:
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1995 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Department of State.
(8) The Department of the Treasury.
(9) The Department of Energy.
(10) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(11) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(12) The Central Imagery Office.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings: The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1995, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4299 of the One Hundred Third Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations: The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
SEC. 103. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations: There is authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1995 the sum of $91,800,000. Within such amounts authorized, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development Committee and the Environmental Task Force shall remain available until September 30, 1996.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels: The Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized 209 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1995. Such personnel of the Community Management Account may be permanent employees of the Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Reimbursement: During fiscal year 1995, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the Community Management Staff from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
[Page: H5828]
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1995 the sum of $198,000,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. ILLNESS OR INJURY REQUIRING HOSPITALIZATION.
Section 4(a)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403(e)(a)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) by striking `, not the result of vicious habits, intemperance, or misconduct on his part,';
(B) by striking `he shall deem' and inserting `the Director deems';
(C) by striking `section 10 of the Act of March 3, 1933 (47 Stat. 1516; 5 U.S.C. 73b)' and inserting `section 5731 of title 5, United States Code';
(D) by striking `his recovery' and inserting `the recovery of such officer or employee'; and
(E) by striking `his return to his post' and inserting `the return to the post of duty of such officer or employee';
(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking `his opinion' both places it appears and inserting `the opinion of the Director'; and
(3) in subparagraph (C), by striking `, not the result of vicious habits, intemperance, or misconduct on his part,'.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.
(a) General Provisions: Chapter 83 of title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows:
(1) By amending the heading of the chapter to read as follows:
(2) In section 1601--
(A) by inserting `and the Central Imagery Office' after `Defense Intelligence Agency' in subsection (a);
(B) by inserting `or the Central Imagery Office' after `outside the Defense Intelligence Agency' and inserting `, the Central Imagery Office,' after `to the Defense Intelligence Agency' in subsection (d); and
(C) by inserting `and the Central Imagery Office' after `Defense Intelligence Agency' in subsection (e).
(3) In section 1602, by inserting `and Central Imagery Office' after `Defense Intelligence Agency'.
(4) In section 1604--
(A) by inserting `and the Central Imagery Office,' after `Defense Intelligence Agency' in subsection (a)(1);
(B) by inserting `or the Central Imagery Office' after `Defense Intelligence Agency' in both places it occurs in the second sentence of subsection (b);
(C) by inserting `or the Central Imagery Office' after `Defense Intelligence Agency' in subsection (c);
(D) by inserting `and the Central Imagery Office' after `Defense Intelligence Agency' in subsection (d);
(E) by inserting `or the Central Imagery Office' after `Defense Intelligence Agency' in subsection (e)(1); and
(F) in subsection (e)(3)--
(i) by amending the first sentence to read as follows: `The Secretary of Defense may delegate authority under this subsection only to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Central Imagery Office, or all three.'; and
(ii) by striking `either' and inserting `any'.
(b) Conforming Change to Title 10: The items relating to chapter 83 in the tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A, and at the beginning of part II of subtitle A, of title 10, United States Code, are amended to read as follows:
`83. Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Imagery Office Civilian Personnel
1601'.
(c) Chapter 23 of Title 5: Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting `the Central Imagery Office,' after `Defense Intelligence Agency,'.
(d) Chapter 31 of Title 5: Section 3132(a)(1)(B) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting `the Central Imagery Office,' after `Defense Intelligence Agency,'.
(e) Chapter 43 of Title 5: Section 4301(1)(B)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting `the Central Imagery Office,' after `Defense Intelligence Agency,'.
(f) Chapter 47 of Title 5: Section 4701(a)(1)(B) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting `the Central Imagery Office,' after `Defense Intelligence Agency,'.
(g) Chapter 51 of Title 5: Section 5102(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking `or' at the end of clause (ix);
(2) by striking the period at the end of clause (x) and inserting `; or'; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
`(xi) the Central Imagery Office, Department of Defense.'.
(h) Chapter 51 of Title 5: Section 5342(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking `or' at the end of subparagraph (J);
(2) by inserting `or' after the semicolon at the end of subparagraph (K); and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
`(L) the Central Imagery Office, Department of Defense;'.
(i) Additional Leave Transfer Programs: (1) Section 6339(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking `and' at the end of subparagraph (D);
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (F); and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new subparagraph (E):
`(E) the Central Imagery Office; and'.
(2) Section 6339(a)(2) of such title is amended--
(A) by striking `and' at the end of subparagraph (D);
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (F);
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new subparagraph (E):
`(E) with respect to the Central Imagery Office, the Director of the Central Imagery Office; and'; and
(D) in subparagraph (F), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, by striking `paragraph (1)(E)' and inserting `paragraph (1)(F)' both places it appears.
(j) Chapter 71 of Title 5: Section 7103(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking `or' at the end of subparagraph (F);
(2) by inserting `or' at the end of subparagraph (G); and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
`(H) the Central Imagery Office;'.
(k) Chapter 73 of Title 5: Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking `or' at the end of subclause (XI); and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
`(XIII) the Central Imagery Office; or'.
(l) Chapter 75 of Title 5: Section 7511(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting `the Central Imagery Office,' after `Defense Intelligence Agency,'.
(m) Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Section 105(a)(1) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by inserting `the Central Imagery Office,' after `Defense Intelligence Agency,'.
(n) Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988: Section 7(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2006(b)(2)(A)(i)) is amended by inserting `the Central Imagery Office,' after `Defense Intelligence Agency,'.
SEC. 502. DISCLOSURE OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFILIATION BY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES.
(a) General Provisions: Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
`426. Disclosure of governmental affiliation by Department of Defense intelligence personnel outside the United States
`Notwithstanding section 552a(e)(3) of title 5 or any other provision of law, Department of Defense intelligence personnel shall not be required, outside the United States, to give notice of governmental affiliation to potential United States person sources during the initial assessment contact. For the purposes of this section, the term `United States' includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any territory or possession of the United States.'.
(b) Clerical Amendment: The table of sections for subchapter I of such chapter is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
`426. Disclosure of governmental affiliation by Department of Defense intelligence personnel outside the United States.'.
TITLE VI--INSPECTORS GENERAL
SEC. 601. INSPECTORS GENERAL FOR DIA, NSA, AND CIA.
(a) DIA: (1) Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 426, as added by section 502 of this Act, the following new section:
[Page: H5829]
`427. Inspector General
`(a) Purpose; Establishment.--In order to--
`(1) create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independently inspections, investigations, and audits relating to programs and operations of the Defense Intelligence Agency;
`(2) provide leadership and recommend policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations, and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations;
`(3) provide a means for keeping the Director fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and the necessity for and the progress of corrective actions; and
`(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (hereafter in this section referred to collectively as the `intelligence committees') are kept similarly informed of significant problems and deficiencies as well as the necessity for and the progress of corrective actions,
there is hereby established in the Defense Intelligence Agency an Office of Inspector General (hereafter in this section referred to as the `Office').
`(b) Appointment; Supervision; Removal.--(1) There shall be at the head of the Office an Inspector General who shall be appointed by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. This appointment shall be made without regard to political affiliation and shall be solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the security standards of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and prior experience in the field of foreign intelligence and in a Federal office of Inspector General. Such appointment shall also be made on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or auditing.
`(2) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of the Director.
`(3) The Director may prohibit the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit, inspection, or investigation if the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States.
`(4) If the Director exercises any power under paragraph (3), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such power within seven days to the intelligence committees. The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time such report is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of any such report. In such cases, the Inspector General may submit such comments to the intelligence committees that the Director considers appropriate.
`(5) The Director shall report to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense any information, allegation, or complaint received from the Inspector General established under this section, relating to violations of Federal criminal law involving any officer or employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency, consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense. A copy of all such reports shall be furnished to the Inspector General established under this section.
`(6) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the Director. The Director shall immediately communicate in writing to the intelligence committees the reasons for any such removal.
`(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General appointed under this section--
`(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the inspections, investigations, and audits relating to the programs and operations of the Defense Intelligence Agency to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and regulations;
`(2) to keep the Director fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and regulations, fraud and other serious problems, abuses and deficiencies that may occur in such programs and operations, and to report the progress made in implementing corrective action;
`(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by the Office, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; and
`(4) in the execution of the responsibilities of the Inspector General, to comply with generally accepted government auditing standards.
`(d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems.--(1) The Inspector General shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director a classified semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office during the immediately preceding six-month period ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively. Within thirty days of receipt of such reports, the Director shall transmit such reports to the intelligence committees with any comments the Director may deem appropriate. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include a list of the title or subject of each inspection, investigation, or audit conducted during the reporting period and--
`(A) a description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations of the Defense Intelligence Agency identified by the Office during the reporting period;
`(B) a description of the recommendations for corrective action made by the Office during the reporting period with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in subparagraph (A);
`(C) a statement of whether corrective action has been completed on each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective action has been completed, a description of such corrective action;
`(D) a certification that the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector General;
`(E) a description of all cases occurring during the reporting period where the Inspector General could not obtain documentary evidence relevant to any inspection, audit, or investigation due to the lack of authority to subpoena such information; and
`(F) such recommendations as the Inspector General may wish to make concerning legislation to promote economy and efficiency in the administration of programs and operations undertaken by the Defense Intelligence Agency, and to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.
`(2) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or operations. The Director shall transmit such report to the intelligence committees within seven calendar days, together with any comments the Director considers appropriate.
`(3) In the event that--
`(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any differences with the Director affecting the execution of the Inspector General's duties or responsibilities; or
`(B) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately report such matter to the intelligence committees.
`(4) Pursuant to title V of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director shall submit to the intelligence committees any report or findings and recommendations of an inspection, investigation, or audit conducted by the Office which has been requested by the Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either committee.
`(e) Authorities of the Inspector General.--(1) The Inspector General shall have direct and prompt access to the Director when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
`(2) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee or any employee of a contractor of the Defense Intelligence Agency whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. In addition, the Inspector General shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material which relate to the programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section. Failure on the part of any employee or contractor to cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate administrative actions by the Director, to include loss of employment or the termination of an existing contractual relationship.
`(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or information has been received from an employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency--
`(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation; and
`(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency in a position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity.
`(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect as if administered or taken by or before an officer having a seal.
`(5) The Inspector General shall be provided with appropriate and adequate office space at central and field office locations, together with such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices.
`(6) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the Director, the Inspector General shall select, appoint and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector General. In making such selections, the Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively. In this regard, the Inspector General shall create within the organization of the Inspector General a career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
`(7) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from any Federal agency. Upon request of the Inspector General for such information or assistance, the head of the Federal agency involved shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of the Federal agency concerned, furnish to the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance.
`(f) Relationship With Inspector General of the Department of Defense: Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authorities and responsibilities of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense.
`(g) Separate Budget Account.--Beginning with fiscal year 1996, there shall be included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector General established pursuant to this section.
`(h) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office the office of the Defense Intelligence Agency referred to as the `Office of Inspector General'. The personnel, assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed, held, used, arising from, or available to such `Office of Inspector General' are hereby transferred to the Office established pursuant to this section.'.
(2) The table of sections of chapter 21 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 426, as added by section 502 of this Act, the following:
`427. Inspector General.'.
(b) NSA: The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following:
[Page: H5830]
`SEC. 19. INSPECTOR GENERAL.
`(a) Purpose; Establishment.--In order to--
`(1) create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independently inspections, investigations, and audits relating to programs and operations of the National Security Agency;
`(2) provide leadership and recommend policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations, and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations;
`(3) provide a means for keeping the Director fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and the necessity for and the progress of corrective actions; and
`(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (hereafter in this section referred to collectively as the `intelligence committees') are kept similarly informed of significant problems and deficiencies as well as the necessity for and the progress of corrective actions,
there is hereby established in the National Security Agency an Office of Inspector General (hereafter in this section referred to as the `Office').
`(b) Appointment; Supervision; Removal.--(1) There shall be at the head of the Office an Inspector General who shall be appointed by the Director of the National Security Agency. This appointment shall be made without regard to political affiliation and shall be solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the security standards of the National Security Agency, and prior experience in the field of foreign intelligence and in a Federal office of Inspector General. Such appointment shall also be made on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or auditing.
`(2) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of the Director.
`(3) The Director may prohibit the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit, inspection, or investigation if the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States.
`(4) If the Director exercises any power under paragraph (3), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such power within seven days to the intelligence committees. The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time such report is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of any such report. In such cases, the Inspector General may submit such comments to the intelligence committees that the Director considers appropriate.
`(5) The Director shall report to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense any information, allegation, or complaint received from the Inspector General established under this section, relating to violations of Federal criminal law involving any officer or employee of the National Security Agency, consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense. A copy of all such reports shall be furnished to the Inspector General established under this section.
`(6) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the Director. The Director shall immediately communicate in writing to the intelligence committees the reasons for any such removal.
`(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General appointed under this section--
`(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the inspections, investigations, and audits relating to the programs and operations of the National Security Agency to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and regulations;
`(2) to keep the Director fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and regulations, fraud and other serious problems, abuses and deficiencies that may occur in such programs and operations, and to report the progress made in implementing corrective action;
`(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by the Office, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; and
`(4) in the execution of the responsibilities of the Inspector General, to comply with generally accepted government auditing standards.
`(d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems.--(1) The Inspector General shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director a classified semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office during the immediately preceding six-month period ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively. Within thirty days, the Director shall transmit such reports to the intelligence committees with any comments the Director may deem appropriate. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include a list of the title or subject of each inspection, investigation, or audit conducted during the reporting period and--
`(A) a description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations of the National Security Agency identified by the Office during the reporting period;
`(B) a description of the recommendations for corrective action made by the Office during the reporting period with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in subparagraph (A);
`(C) a statement of whether corrective action has been completed on each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective action has been completed, a description of such corrective action;
`(D) a certification that the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector General;
`(E) a description of all cases occurring during the reporting period where the Inspector General could not obtain documentary evidence relevant to any inspection, audit, or investigation due to the lack of authority to subpoena such information; and
`(F) such recommendations as the Inspector General may wish to make concerning legislation to promote economy and efficiency in the administration of programs and operations undertaken by the National Security Agency, and to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.
`(2) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or operations. The Director shall transmit such report to the intelligence committees within seven calendar days, together with any comments the Director considers appropriate.
`(3) In the event that--
`(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any differences with the Director affecting the execution of the Inspector General's duties or responsibilities; or
`(B) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately report such matter to the intelligence committees.
`(4) Pursuant to title V of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director shall submit to the intelligence committees any report or findings and recommendations of an inspection, investigation, or audit conducted by the Office which has been requested by the Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either committee.
`(e) Authorities of the Inspector General.--(1) The Inspector General shall have direct and prompt access to the Director when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
`(2) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee or any employee of a contractor of the National Security Agency whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. In addition, the Inspector General shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material which relate to the programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section. Failure on the part of any employee or contractor to cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate administrative actions by the Director, to include loss of employment or the termination of an existing contractual relationship.
`(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or information has been received from an employee of the National Security Agency--
`(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation; and
`(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any employee of the National Security Agency in a position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity.
`(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect as if administered or taken by or before an officer having a seal.
`(5) The Inspector General shall be provided with appropriate and adequate office space at central and field office locations, together with such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices.
`(6) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the Director, the Inspector General shall select, appoint and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector General. In making such selections, the Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively. In this regard, the Inspector General shall create within the organization of the Inspector General a career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
`(7) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from any Federal agency. Upon request of the Inspector General for such information or assistance, the head of the Federal agency involved shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of the Federal agency concerned, furnish to the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance.
`(f) Relationship With Inspector General of the Department of Defense: Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authorities and responsibilities of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense.
`(g) Separate Budget Account.--Beginning with fiscal year 1996, there shall be included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector General established pursuant to this section.
`(h) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office the office of the National Security Agency referred to as the `Office of Inspector General'. The personnel, assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed, held, used, arising from, or available to such `Office of Inspector General' are hereby transferred to the Office established pursuant to this section.'.
(c) CIA: Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(1)--
(A) by striking `foreign intelligence.' and inserting `foreign intelligence and in a Federal office of Inspector General.';
(B) by striking `or' after `analysis,'; and
(C) by striking the period at the end thereof and inserting `, or auditing.';
(2) in subsection (c)(1), by striking `to conduct' and inserting `to plan, conduct';
(3) in subsection (d)(1)--
(A) by striking `June 30 and December 31' and inserting `January 31 and July 31';
(B) by striking `period.' at the end of the first sentence and inserting `periods ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively.'; and
(C) by inserting `of receipt of such reports' after `thirty days';
(4) in subsection (d)(3)(C), by inserting `inspection, or audit,' after `investigation,';
(5) in subsection (d)(4), by inserting `or findings and recommendations' after `report'; and
(6) in subsection (e)(6)--
(A) by striking `it is the sense of Congress that'; and
(B) by striking `should' and inserting `shall'.
[Page: H5831]
TITLE VII--CLASSIFICATION MANAGEMENT
SEC. 701. DECLASSIFICATION PLAN.
Each agency of the National Foreign Intelligence Program to which is appropriated more than $1,000,000 in the security, countermeasures, and related activities structural category for fiscal year 1995 shall allocate at least two percent of their total expenditure in this structural category for fiscal year 1995 to the classification management consolidated expenditure center, to be used for the following activities:
(1) Development of a phased plan to implement declassification guidelines contained in the executive order which replaces Executive Order 12356. Each such agency shall provide the plan to Congress within 90 days after the beginning of fiscal year 1995 or 90 days after the publication of such replacement executive order, whichever is later. This plan shall include an accounting of the amount of archived material, levels of classification, types of storage media and locations, review methods to be employed, and estimated costs of the declassification activity itself; as well as an assessment by the agency of the appropriate types and amounts of information to be maintained in the future, how it will be stored, safeguarded, and reviewed, and the projected costs of these classification management activities for the succeeding five years.
(2) Commencement of the process of declassification and reduction of the amount of archived classified documents maintained by each agency.
(3) Submission of a report to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate within 90 days after the end of fiscal year 1995 on the progress made in carrying out paragraph (2), with reference to the plan required by paragraph (1).
SEC. 702. CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION.
(a) Plan: Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall develop a plan, and issue an executive order for its implementation, which provides for the classification and declassification of information. It is the sense of Congress that the plan should provide for the following:
(1) A test for the classification of information which balances the public's right to know against identifiable harm to the national security which will result from public disclosure.
(2) A narrow definition of the categories of information subject to classification to avoid excessive classification.
(3) Classification periods of reasonably short duration, and a determination of the date when or event upon which declassification of such information shall occur, with a recognition that extension of such period may be required in certain circumstances.
(4) Automatic declassification at the expiration of the classification period.
(b) Submission to Congress; Effective Date: The plan and executive order referred to in subsection (a) may not take effect until after 30 days after the date on which such plan and proposed regulation is submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
TITLE VIII--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SEC. 801. ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) In General: The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new title:
`(1) financial records held by a financial agency or financial institution;
`(2) consumer reports held by a consumer credit reporting agency; and
`(3) records maintained by commercial entities within the United States pertaining to any travel by the person outside the United States.
`(A) the records sought pertain to a person who is or was an employee required, as a condition of access to classified information, to provide consent, during a background investigation, for such time as access to the information is maintained, and for three years thereafter, permitting access to financial records, other financial information, consumer reports, and travel records; and
`(B) there are reasonable grounds to believe, based upon specific and articulable facts available to it, that the person is, or may be, disclosing classified information in an unauthorized manner to a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, or in the course of any background investigation or reinvestigation, an issue of otherwise unexplained affluence or excessive indebtedness arises.
`(3) Each such request shall--
`(A) be accompanied by a written certification signed by the department or agency head or deputy department or agency head concerned and shall certify that--
`(i) the person concerned is an employee within the meaning of paragraph (2)(A);
`(ii) the request is being made pursuant to an authorized inquiry or investigation and is authorized under this section; and
`(iii) the records or information to be reviewed are records or information which the employee has previously agreed to make available to the authorized investigative agency for review;
`(B) contain a copy of the agreement referred to in subparagraph (A)(iii);
`(C) identify specifically or by category the records or information to be reviewed; and
`(D) inform the recipient of the request of the prohibition described in subsection (b).
`(4) The authorized investigative agency shall promptly notify the person who is the subject of a request under this section relating to a background investigation or reinvestigation for records, reports, or other information.
`(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in subsection (a)(4), no governmental or private entity, or officer, employee, or agent of such entity, may disclose to any person, other than those officers, employees, or agents of such entity necessary to satisfy a request made under this section, that such entity has received or satisfied a request made by an authorized investigative agency under this section.
`(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law except section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, an entity receiving a request for records or information under subsection (a) shall, if the request satisfies the requirements of this section, make available such records or information within 30 days for inspection or copying, as may be appropriate, by the agency requesting such records or information.
`(2) Any entity (including any officer, employee or agent thereof) that discloses records or information for inspection or copying pursuant to this section in good faith reliance upon the certifications made by an agency pursuant to this section shall not be liable for any such disclosure to any person under this title, the constitution of any State, or any law or regulation of any State or any political subdivision of any State.
`(d) Subject to the availability of appropriations therefor, any agency requesting records or information under this section may reimburse a private entity for any cost reasonably incurred by such entity in responding to such request, including the cost of identifying, reproducing, or transporting records or other data.
`(e) An agency receiving records or information pursuant to a request under this section may disseminate the records or information obtained pursuant to such request outside the agency only to the agency employing the employee who is the subject of the records or information, to the Department of Justice for law enforcement or foreign counterintelligence purposes, or, with respect to dissemination to an agency of the United States, only if such information is clearly relevant to the authorized responsibilities of such agency relating to security determinations, law enforcement, or counterintelligence.
`(f) Any agency that discloses records or information received pursuant to a request under this section in violation of subsection (e) shall be liable to the person to whom the records relate in an amount equal to the sum of--
`(1) $100, without regard to the volume of records involved;
`(2) any actual damages sustained by the person as a result of the disclosure;
`(3) if the violation is found to have been willful or intentional, such punitive damages as the court may allow; and
`(4) in the case of any successful action to enforce liability, the costs of the action, together with reasonable attorney fees, as determined by the court.
`(g) Nothing in this section shall affect the authority of an investigative agency to obtain information pursuant to the Right to Financial Privacy Act (12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq.) or the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.).
[Page: H5832]
`(1) the term `agency of the legislative branch' means the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the Botanic Garden, the General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office, the Library of Congress, the Office of Technology Assessment, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal;
`(2) the term `authorized investigative agency' means--
`(A) an agency authorized by law or regulation to conduct foreign counterintelligence investigations or investigations of persons who are proposed for access to classified information to ascertain whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such information;
`(B) in the case of the House of Representatives, an agency designated by the Speaker of the House;
`(C) in the case of the Senate, an agency designated by the President pro tempore of the Senate;
`(D) in the case of an agency of the legislative branch, an agency designated by the head of such agency; and
`(E) in the case of the judiciary, an agency designated by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, under the direction of the Chief Justice of the United States;
`(3) the term `classified information' means any information that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order No. 12356 of April 2, 1982, or successor orders, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and that is so designated;
`(4) the term `consumer credit reporting agency' has the meaning given such term in section 603 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a));
`(5) the term `employee' includes any person who receives a salary or compensation of any kind from the United States Government, is a contractor of the United States Government or an employee thereof, is an unpaid consultant of the United States Government, or otherwise acts for or on behalf of the United States Government;
`(6) the term `employee of the legislative branch' means an individual (other than a Member of, and a Resident Commissioner or Delegate to, the Congress) whose salary is paid by--
`(A) the Director of Non-legislative and Financial Services of the House of Representatives;
`(B) the Secretary of the Senate; or
`(C) an agency of the legislative branch;
`(7) the terms `financial agency' and `financial institution' have the meaning given such terms in section 5312 of title 31, United States Code; and
`(8) the term `State' means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and any territory or possession of the United States.
`Sec. 801. Rule of application.
`Sec. 802. Regulations.
`Sec. 803. Consent for access to financial information.
`Sec. 804. Requests by authorized investigative agencies.
`Sec. 805. Definitions.
`Sec. 806. Effective date.'.
SEC. 802. REWARDS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING ESPIONAGE.
(a) Rewards: Section 3071 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by inserting `(a)' before `With respect to'; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
`(b) With respect to acts of espionage involving or directed at the United States, the Attorney General may reward any individual who furnishes information--
`(1) leading to the arrest or conviction, in any country, of any individual or individuals for commission of an act of espionage against the United States;
`(2) leading to the arrest or conviction, in any country, of any individual or individuals for conspiring or attempting to commit an act of espionage against the United States; or
`(3) leading to the prevention or frustration of an act of espionage against the United States.'.
(b) Definitions: Section 3077 of such title is amended--
(1) by striking `and' at the end of paragraph (6);
(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (7) and inserting `; and'; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
`(8) `act of espionage' means an activity that is a violation of--
`(A) section 793, 794, or 798 of title 18, United States Code; or
`(B) section 4 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.'.
(c) Clerical Amendments: (1) The item relating to chapter 204 in the table of chapters for part II of such title is amended to read as follows:
`204. Rewards for information concerning terrorist acts and espionage
3071'.
(2) The heading for chapter 204 of such title is amended to read as follows:
SEC. 803. ESPIONAGE NOT COMMITTED IN ANY DISTRICT.
(a) In General: Chapter 211 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 3238 the following new section:
`3239. Espionage and related offenses not committed in any district
`The trial for any offense involving a violation of--
`(1) section 793, 794, 798, 952, or 1030(a)(1) of this title;
`(2) section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947; or
`(3) subsection (b) or (c) of section 4 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,
begun or committed upon the high seas or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, may be in the District of Columbia or in any other district authorized by law.'.
(b) Clerical Amendment: The table of sections for chapter 211 of such title is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 3238 the following:
`3239. Espionage and related offenses not committed in any district.'.
SEC. 804. CRIMINAL FORFEITURE FOR VIOLATION OF CERTAIN ESPIONAGE LAWS.
(a) In General: Section 798 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
`(d)(1) Any person convicted of a violation of this section shall forfeit to the United States irrespective of any provision of State law--
`(A) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation; and
`(B) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation.
`(2) The court, in imposing sentence on a defendant for a conviction of a violation of this section, shall order that the defendant forfeit to the United States all property described in paragraph (1).
`(3) Except as provided in paragraph (4), the provisions of subsections (b), (c), and (e) through (p) of section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853(b), (c), and (e)-(p)), shall apply to--
`(A) property subject to forfeiture under this subsection;
`(B) any seizure or disposition of such property; and
`(C) any administrative or judicial proceeding in relation to such property,
if not inconsistent with this subsection.
`(4) Notwithstanding section 524(c) of title 28, there shall be deposited in the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury all amounts from the forfeiture of property under this subsection remaining after the payment of expenses for forfeiture and sale authorized by law.
`(5) As used in this subsection, the term `State' means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and any territory or possession of the United States.'.
(b) Amendments for Consistency in Application of Forfeiture Under Title 18: (1) Section 793(h)(3) of such title is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking out `(o)' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof `(p)'.
(2) Section 794(d)(3) of such title is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking out `(o)' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof `(p)'.
(c) Subversive Activities Control Act: Section 4 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 783) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
`(e)(1) Any person convicted of a violation of this section shall forfeit to the United States irrespective of any provision of State law--
`(A) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation; and
`(B) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation.
`(2) The court, in imposing sentence on a defendant for a conviction of a violation of this section, shall order that the defendant forfeit to the United States all property described in paragraph (1).
`(3) Except as provided in paragraph (4), the provisions of subsections (b), (c), and (e) through (p) of section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853(b), (c), and (e)-(p)) shall apply to--
`(A) property subject to forfeiture under this subsection;
`(B) any seizure or disposition of such property; and
`(C) any administrative or judicial proceeding in relation to such property,
if not inconsistent with this subsection.
`(4) Notwithstanding section 524(c) of title 28, there shall be deposited in the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury all amounts from the forfeiture of property under this subsection remaining after the payment of expenses for forfeiture and sale authorized by law.
`(5) As used in this subsection, the term `State' means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and any territory or possession of the United States.'.
[Page: H5833]
SEC. 805. DENIAL OF ANNUITIES OR RETIRED PAY TO PERSONS CONVICTED OF ESPIONAGE IN FOREIGN COURTS INVOLVING UNITED STATES INFORMATION.
Section 8312 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(d)(1) For purposes of subsections (b)(1) and (c)(1), an offense within the meaning of such subsections is established if the Attorney General of the United States certifies to the agency administering the annuity or retired pay concerned--
`(A) that an individual subject to this chapter has been convicted by an impartial court of appropriate jurisdiction within a foreign country in circumstances in which the conduct violates the provisions of law enumerated in subsections (b)(1) and (c)(1), or would violate such provisions had such conduct taken place within the United States, and that such conviction is not being appealed or that final action has been taken on such appeal;
`(B) that such conviction was obtained in accordance with procedures that provided the defendant due process rights comparable to such rights provided by the United States Constitution, and such conviction was based upon evidence which would have been admissible in the courts of the United States; and
`(C) that such conviction occurred after the date of enactment of this subsection.
`(2) Any certification made pursuant to this subsection shall be subject to review by the United States Court of Claims based upon the application of the individual concerned, or his or her attorney, alleging that any of the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (A), (B), or (C) of paragraph (1), as certified by the Attorney General, have not been satisfied in his or her particular circumstances. Should the court determine that any of these conditions has not been satisfied in such case, the court shall order any annuity or retirement benefit to which the person concerned is entitled to be restored and shall order that any payments which may have been previously denied or withheld to be paid by the department or agency concerned.'.
SEC. 806. POST EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
(a) Consolidation of Authority:
(1) In general: Chapter 81 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
`1599. Post employment assistance regarding certain civilian intelligence personnel
`(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may use appropriated funds to assist a civilian employee who has been in a sensitive position in an intelligence agency or component of the Department of Defense and who is found to be ineligible for continued access to Sensitive Compartmented Information and employment with the intelligence agency or component, or whose employment with the intelligence agency or component has been terminated--
`(1) in finding and qualifying for subsequent employment;
`(2) in receiving treatment of medical or psychological disabilities; and
`(3) in providing necessary financial support during periods of unemployment.
`(b) Assistance may be provided under subsection (a) only if the Secretary determines that such assistance is essential to maintain the judgment and emotional stability of such employee and avoid circumstances that might lead to the unlawful disclosure of classified information to which such employee had access. Assistance provided under this section for an employee shall not be provided any longer than five years after the termination of the employment of the employee.
`(c) The Secretary may, to the extent and in the manner determined by the Secretary to appropriate, delegate the authority to provide assistance under this section.
`(d) The Secretary shall report annually to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives with respect to any expenditure made pursuant to this section.
`(e) For the purposes of this section, the term `intelligence agency or component' means the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Central Imagery Office, and the intelligence components of the military departments.'.
(2) The table of sections of Chapter 81 of such title is amended by adding after the item relating to section 1598 the following new item:
`1599. Post employment assistance regarding certain civilian intelligence personnel.'.
(b) Repeal of Duplicative Authority:
(1) Defense intelligence agency: Paragraph (4) of Section 1604(e) of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.
(2) National security agency: Section 17 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is repealed.
(c) Savings Provision: The repeals made by subsection (b) do not affect rights and duties that matured before the date of enactment of this section.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment, printed in the Record of July 12 at page H552. It is the open-budget amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Glickman: At the end of title I (page 4, after line 23), add the following:
SEC. 104. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INTELLIGENCE BUDGET.
(a) Amounts Expended and Amounts Requested: (1) The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end of title I the following new section:
`Sec. 109. At the time of submission of the budget of the United States Government for a fiscal year under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the Congress a separate, unclassified statement of the aggregate amount of expenditures for the fiscal year ending on September 30 of the previous calendar year, and the aggregate amount of funds requested to be appropriated for the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Government.'
(2) The table of contents at the beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 108 the following new item:
`Sec. 109. Annual report of amounts expended and amounts requested for intelligence and intelligence-related activities.'.
(b) Congressional Authorization of Intelligence Activities: Section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
`(e) A bill or joint resolution, and any amendment thereto, which authorizes the appropriation of funds for a fiscal year for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States may set forth in an unclassified statement the aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated in that bill or resolution for such fiscal year for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States.'.
(c) Effective Date: (1) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to the budget submitted for fiscal year 1996.
(2) The amendment made by subsection (b) shall take effect with respect to bills, resolutions, and amendments, authorizing the appropriation of funds for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States for fiscal year 1996.
[Page: H5834]
Mr. GLICKMAN (during the reading). Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?
There was no objection.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto be limited to 40 minutes, 20 minutes to be controlled by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], and 20 minutes controlled by myself.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] will be recognized for 20 minutes, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] will be recognized for 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman].
[TIME: 1640]
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chairman, this is the 17th authorization bill which the Intelligence Committee has brought to the House floor. Although those bills have had many differences, they have shared one common characteristic. The amounts they have authorized for intelligence and intelligence-related activities could not be discussed publicly. The intelligence budget, in almost all of its component figures and certainly in the aggregate, has been classified since the advent of the modern intelligence community immediately following World War II. It remains classified today.
Despite a constitutional requirement that there be a public accounting of the expenditure of public moneys, Congress has taken the position that, for the intelligence budget, national security concerns outweigh the taxpayer's right to know. During the cold war, this position was defensible, but we now live in a different world, and it is time for that position to be reexamined.
The amendment I am offering with the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli] would provide for the annual public disclosure of the aggregate amount spent on, and requested for, intelligence programs and activities. Only disclosure of the total amount would be required, not disclosure of the budget of any intelligence agency nor the amount spent on a particular intelligence operation.
Under existing standards, information may only be classified if its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. Earlier this year, the Intelligence Committee held 2 days of hearings on the classification of the intelligence budget. I was not persuaded that national security would be imperiled in any way by making the aggregate figure public. The Soviet Union, the only entity with an arguable capacity to profit from knowing the yearly sum of the amounts the United States spends on intelligence, no longer exists. It is difficult to imagine any potential enemy for whom possession of the aggregate U.S. intelligence budget figure would make any difference. Besides, that number is probably the worst kept secret in Washington right now.
The witnesses who argued at the hearings for continued classification did so either on the grounds that an aggregate figure would have no meaning to the average American, or that disclosure of the aggregate figure would be just the first step down a `slippery slope' which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of programmatic details. Neither of these arguments provide a grounds for classification. The utility of the information is irrelevant, and questions about whether to extend disclosure beyond the aggregate figure would have to be decided on their own merits weighing the public's right to know against national security interests.
Unless a justification on national security grounds exists, keeping the intelligence budget total secret only serves to prevent the American taxpayer from knowing how much money is spent on intelligence, and that is why the National Taxpayers Union has endorsed this amendment. I do not accept the notion that, if the public knew how much it costs to maintain a robust intelligence capability that there would be no support for it. On the contrary, a strong case can be made publicly about the essential role played by intelligence in helping policymakers respond to threats such as weapons proliferation and terrorism. As the public's understanding of why the United States must continue to possess a preeminent ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence grows, so too will support for the necessary funding. Continuing to classify the aggregate budget figure in the absence of a justifiable reason to do so only deepens the suspicion that secrecy is necessary to protect a budget which cannot otherwise be defended.
Madam Chairman, let us strike a blow for open government today by adopting this amendment. I am convinced that no damage to the national security will result. I am convinced that the American people should know in the aggregate what we spend on intelligence in the same way they know in the aggregate what we spend on defense or on the Justice Department programs. That is their right to know as a taxpayer of this great Nation of ours. Classification should be reserved for that information which truly needs to be kept secret. The aggregate intelligence budget figure is not that kind of information.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, with great respect I disagree completely with the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman], my friend. He said the cold war is over.
Madam Chairman, the bear is sleeping. The bear is not dead.
There are still, Madam Chairman, 45,000, give or take, nuclear missiles extant over there, and our former concerns about the cold war ought to be supplanted with the problem of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. We are told there will be some 20 countries with the capability by the end of this decade of delivering a nuclear missile. That ought to bother us. Our lack of information about North Korea, the Middle East, and Nagorno-Karabakh; the nature of the problems are more difficult now than if we just had the good old Soviet Union to worry about.
But the question is what good, what possible good, is served by making public a number that people continue to speculate about. There are six committees, subcommittees, of this Congress that have that information handed to them: The Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, in the House and in the Senate. Why do we need an intelligence committee? We need it to represent the rest of us, to get information that ought to remain secret. Why is the aggregate of the budget for the intelligence agency secret? Because any additions would have to be justified and explained.
Madam Chairman, any new appropriation will provoke the question, What do we need this for? More satellites? More covert resources? More people who can speak Farsi or Pushtoon? This is information that Congress receives through its appointed subcommittees, and any Member who really has a burning need to know what that aggregate figure is can go up and look at it. It is available in the classified annex.
What useful purpose is served by making it public? I will tell my colleagues what purpose is served: to let people speculate on what it is for, how much goes for this and this, how much goes to the DIA, how much goes to the CIA, how much for overseas.
It is wrong, Madam Chairman. It is mischievous, and it just is not necessary, and, recognizing my time is up, I just say that the gentleman said the utility of this information is irrelevant. I really do not think he means that because anything that is irrelevant, we ought not to waste our time on.
[Page: H5835]
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].
Mr. TORRICELLI. Madam Chairman, as the cold war entered its last decade, the CIA was estimating that the Soviet Union had an economy two-thirds the size of our own and closing fast. The decade before, they failed to notice the Egyptian preparation to invade Israel or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, only to be outdone by their failure to recognize that Iraq was invading Kuwait.
Historians may conclude that the United States won the cold war because of the strength of our culture, or our economy, or the courage of our soldiers, but the simple truth is that an American intelligence community that was not properly supervised, or restrained, or directed, failed in the intelligence war against communism.
It is now time to understand these lessons and prepare the CIA for a very different post-cold-war environment because, while the Defense Department and every component of the Pentagon is preparing for this new time, new budgets, new training, new assignments, the intelligence community is not, and that is not only a waste of resources, but it is dangerous in not preparing for new dangers in a new environment.
[TIME: 1650]
This country does indeed face new hostilities, narco-traffickers, terrorism, Third World conflicts, but with an intelligence community that is stuck in time, stuck in time like any other department of a government that was not properly and thoroughly under the scrutiny of the American people. Not an intelligence community, not 5 or 10 Members of Congress, but the American public, like every other branch of government. The simple truth is that change will never occur until this shroud of secrecy is lifted and accountability is established.
The truth is, the secrecy of the intelligence community, the hiding of their budgets, does not protect them against any foreign adversary. It protects them against the American people. It protects them against accountability for waste or fraud or mismanagement or poor leadership. These are the things that are happening.
I understand that there was once a rationale. In the cold war we made all kinds of compromises, with civil liberties, our best instincts, the things that were most important. We wiretapped, we supported dictators. We made all kinds of compromises. But at this point, those compromises are not possible, nor are they necessary.
The gentleman from Illinois argues that, indeed, the Soviets are a looming danger to return again. Russia has been invited into NATO. They are going to be doing joint exercises. They come to the Group of Seven nations with our President to plan our economic future.
But, still, we are not arguing the intelligence community should not do planning. We are not arguing that most of what they do should not be in secrecy. We are arguing that their gross budget number should be shared with the American people. That is all.
Is this the proposal of some wild group of fanatics? It has been endorsed by two former Directors of the CIA, passed twice in the sense-of-the-Senate resolution by the U.S. Senate, endorsed even by the President of the United States during his last campaign, and now by the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
No wild idea. The intelligence community itself, for almost 20 years, has had leadership that has discussed it or proposed it. These new adversaries, the Cubas, the Iraqs, the Libyas, what is it they
would gain if we were to share this information with the American people? The argument with the Soviet Union was clear. If they knew our total spending, they could duplicate it. They could understand what we were doing and dissect it.
What is it that Libya would gain, or Iraq? If the public press is to be believed, the truth is the American intelligence community today spends more money--by the popular press--than the total military establishments of all but four nations on Earth. Indeed, the popular press claims that the U.S. intelligence community is not only more than the defense establishments, but more than the gross national product of every one of the states on the terrorist lists and all those that have been cited on this floor as potential adversaries.
My colleagues, for this system to work, for efficiency, and, indeed, for our national security, only one group can be trusted with the truth for accountability and performance. It is the American people. For 42 years we have made a gross exception to the U.S. Constitution which our Founding Fathers recognized would offer protection against abuses in Government. Article 1, section 9, clause 7, we were required to give a regular statement and account of expenditures to the people of the United States. We have overlooked that, for grave national security purposes in the cold war, as we did in the war before it. We can no longer justify this constitutional exception.
I urge my colleagues to cast this vote, so that every vote you cast after it can be informed. Because without it, the amendment that will follow for a 10-percent cut, the amendment that will follow for other cuts, the vote itself on this budget, in good faith, few Members but those on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence themselves should cast.
Otherwise, you should come to this floor and cast a vote for `present,' because a 10-percent vote may be too much; it may be too little; it may be just right. The truth is, you do not know, and the American people do not know, unless we share this one number and let them know what is being done for their own security. Surely we owe them that much, to trust them with this simple information.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Young].
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Madam Chairman, not withstanding the eloquence of our previous speaker, I do not think he would want to mislead anyone into believing the President supports this amendment today. He did mention this as a candidate, when he was campaigning. But once candidate Clinton became President Clinton, he recognized that governing is a lot more different than campaigning. A statement from the Executive Office of the President dated July 19, sent to the Congress today, says: `The administration opposes any change to H.R. 4299 that would disclose or require the disclosure of the aggregate amount of funds authorized for intelligence activities.'
I think it is very clear that the President opposes this amendment today.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, I am somewhat taken aback by the antipathy demonstrated by the gentleman from New Jersey for secrecy. The secrecy that has characterized the behind closed doors meetings on the health care reform has been epidemic. The secrecy on the crime bill, the meetings among the Democrats trying to work their problems out, I have yet to be called to a meeting, and I am a conferee on the crime bill. Why they should oppose secrecy in the intelligence aggregate I can't imagine.
Now, I served on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for several years. I served under several chairmen. I can think of the gentleman from Ohio, the gentleman from California, the gentleman from Oklahoma, and the present gentleman from Kansas. Are they not doing their jobs?
As I heard the gentleman from New Jersey complain, proper oversight is not being accorded the intelligence agencies. Why, I thought that was the function and the purpose of the intelligence committees. The do their job, in the Senate and the House, not only the intelligence committees, but the Committee on Armed Services in the Senate and House, and the Committee on Appropriations in the Senate and the House, and you can get the total figure in the classified annex. There is really no pervasive secrecy, but there is no need for this to be made public.
So I just am not persuaded at all by the gentleman from New Jersey.
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Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. COMBEST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I have a statement I would include for the Record. I do not want the body to think that my not reading this statement is any indication of my concern or lack of concern about this amendment. It is not.
I would like to just point out a few things. This House had a vote last year about this time. I think maybe with two or three exceptions, every Member of the House that is a Member today was a Member at that time. A similar amendment was defeated by almost 100 votes.
I strongly oppose the gentleman's amendment. He knows it is done in good faith. It is just a difference in direction and feeling. The Director of the CIA, Mr. Woolsey, has repeatedly indicated this is a bad idea. As the gentleman from Florida pointed out, the administration's policy statement is in opposition to this amendment or the effect of this amendment.
[TIME: 1700]
Madam Chairman, do I think that it would be a disaster if this amendment passed? I mean honestly I could not say that it would be. The gentleman had indicated that this is probably the worst kept secret in town. Could be.
But any time that there is an article written and there is an assumed amount, whatever it may be, approximately X amount spent on intelligence, it is always a part of a story on some other subject. If, in fact, we do release publicly the amount that is expended on intelligence, that will become the story. And then at that point, the components of intelligence will become the other parts of the story, with endeavors to find out exactly what we are spending on the variety of component parts.
And will it lead to other disclosures about other portions of intelligence? I think it will. And I would predict that it would. I think this is one of those instances, Madam Chairman, that we should err on the side of caution. I can understand the interest in some Members in making this public for the public's standpoint, but the figure itself would do nothing to inform the public. It would only be that we would have to go into the intricate details of many highly classified programs to truly get at where the money is going.
I do not see, when I come to work every day, people lining the halls to visit their Members of Congress to suggest to them that we should make the intelligence budget public. I think people understand that there are things that have got to be kept secret, that there are things because of national security that are best not divulged as no other nation, democracy in the world that has an intelligence community does release their figure. And I think that, in prudence, that this amendment should be defeated, that we should continue on the path that we are and that if we are going to err, Madam Chairman, we err on the side of caution.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
There are other countries that do release parts or all of their intelligence budget. But part of this has to do with the general philosophy of government. What is it that we keep secret? We keep secret those things that relate directly to national security. All else the public should know. That was the Founding Fathers' argument in this great country of ours. That is why they said, we shall have a statement of account of all expenditures, receipts and expenditures, because these are hard-earned tax dollars paid by people.
Yes, they may not be lining my offices to find out what we spent on intelligence, but they want to know how their government is spending their money generally. After all, they are hard-earned tax dollars. So to justify keeping something secret has to relate to national security.
The aggregate intelligence budget does not. Yes, it is true if we break it down, it might. We are not talking about doing that here. But we are saying, just as people need to know what we spend on defense and agriculture and the Federal judiciary, so should they know in the aggregate what we spend on intelligence functions.
Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
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Mr. SKAGGS. Madam Chairman, I think the gentleman from Texas has his finger on the issue, which is, on what side do we err.
He would have us err on the side of caution, but where is caution here? Caution, it seems to me, is fulfilling, as the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] has suggested, the fundamental premise of this democracy which is trusting the people of this country with information about their government, unless, unless a real and substantial burden of proof is satisfied that the information, if disclosed, would risk our national security or our clear national interest.
The gentleman, again, rhetorically asks, what difference would it make if this information is out there? I would offer in rebuttal that it is not appropriate for us to be so paternal toward the people of this country as to prejudge what information is to be found useful to them or not about their government.
They have a right to know unless we can demonstrate clearly that disclosure would harm our national security.
And this is not without some modest risk, but I think the risk is in the next interation, not this
iteration. And the slippery slope argument that we have all heard about this, that if we disclose this number, what is next, there need not be a next. But this information, this overall aggregate number really is a significant piece of information by which the American public can judge the operations of their government, the priorities that this Congress has in its stewardship of their public tax dollars and of our public responsibility.
Absent a clear and overriding national security interest, which I do not think can be sustained here, we ought to be able to present this information to the people about how we are spending their money.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Laughlin].
(Mr. LAUGHLIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. LAUGHLIN. Madam Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the amendment by the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. While we all can read and understand the Soviet Union does not exist anymore and, therefore, some would say we no longer have a need to keep the intelligence budget figure aggregate figure secret, many of us on this committee, indeed anyone that reads very much knows there are pressures in the Russia federation, the Republic of Russia, to bring this empire back into existence and indeed much of the military capability of the Soviet Union still exists intact.
I wonder why it is necessary, after the history of our Nation of having a secret intelligence budget, why it becomes necessary in this unstable world that we have today, with hot spots throughout, to bring this intelligence budget figure public, after these many years of history of keeping its secret.
Once it is disclosed, I ask the distinguished chairman or anyone else, how do we get it secret again, when world events predictably can and probably will change that will cause us to see a need as we have done in the past to have that intelligence budget secret?
It is difficult to explain this number. What good does it do if we tell the American people what the aggregate bottom line number is without saying what it means? And then having to divide it between the civilian side of the intelligence over at the CIA and then trying to explain the military side of it. I would say to those that say it will open the slope to go down and ask more questions and those who want to reveal this figure will indeed say to justify the figure, we have to reveal more.
I would urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment and keep the budget figure secret.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].
Mr. TORRICELLI. Madam Chairman, there is, at least at this point in the debate, things upon which we can agree.
It was suggested by the gentleman from Texas that, in fact, no one has seen people lining the Halls of the Congress demanding this information. That is the point. That is exactly the point.
Speaking hypothetically, if the American people knew, if the facts sustained it, that in fact we came to a conclusion that we could reduce military spending because the Nation was secure, but not intelligence spending, if they thought in their own minds the future of the country would be decided by education and job training, but the resources were going into intelligence, they would be lining these Halls. That is the point. The people are removed from the judgment.
At the end of the day, we have to ask ourselves why. It is not only bad policy. It is against the law. The Constitution requires it and for a reason. Can anyone rise on this floor and say that if Qadhafi or Saddam Hussein had this information the Nation would be imperiled? What would they do with it? They can read in newspapers what the estimates are. They could not possibly duplicate it.
The only protection this number's withholding is given is scrutiny of the agency itself. Spies are caught but the public cannot demand cuts because they do not know what the number is from.
[TIME: 1710]
There are inefficiencies. Members are not getting information. There are the wrong priorities, but it is not justified.
Madam Chairman, this is not because we care about national security less. It is because we care about it more. The intelligence community did not adequately serve this country at a moment of great peril. There are still dangers in the world, and if it is going to serve it in the future, we need public accountability. This is a responsible vote, supported by leadership for the last 20 years of the CIA, and now the leadership of this committee. Vote for the amendment.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might consume in conclusion.
Madam Chairman, I would just say there is a dangerous slope that we are moving toward, and that is moving toward the beginning of a disclosure of very highly classified and sensitive programs. I would also mention that while it was mentioned earlier that there were, I believe, two former heads of the CIA who supported it, I might say every President since Truman has opposed it, including the current President, in both rounds, and the current DCI, for concerns of where it might lead us. I would urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment.
Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of our time.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] is recognized for 3 1/2 minutes.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I thank my colleague, the gentleman from Texas. I know we disagree on this issue, but we agree on more issues than we disagree on, and we are very agreeable even on the disagreements.
Madam Chairman, I want to repeat to my colleagues, the National Taxpayers Union has endorsed this amendment, and I want to read from their letter to me and to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli]:
The time has come to carefully direct the light of accountability to a budget area long shrouded in darkness. There is no longer any valid reason why the total annual amounts spent on the intelligence budget should remain as secret as the individual projects within the same budget.
Your amendment, in our view, reflects the proper balance between changing times and the continuing need for some secrecy. No actual or potential U.S. adversary could gain an advantage merely by knowing our Nation's overall expenditure on intelligence activities. Your amendment protects our national security because specific funding for individual intelligence missions would remain secret.
The National Taxpayers Union endorsement I think is a very important one for this bill, for this
amendment, Madam Chairman.
I want to talk for a moment, Madam Chairman, about what two prior directors of the CIA have said about this amendment. Mr. Gates, during his nomination process to be head of the Central Intelligence Agency in September 1991, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said the following:
[Page: H5838]
My own view is that at a certain point, if the Agency is to play the role that I think it needs to play, we're going to have to take some chances. And so, from my personal perspective--and it's not ultimately my decision, I suppose, but the President's--I don't have any problem with releasing the top line number of the Intelligence Community budget. I think we have to think about some other areas as well. But, as I say, it's controversial.
Later on, on February 23, 1994, I asked Director Woolsey and former Director Gates:
I want you to tell me what damage would be done to national security from the disclosure of just the aggregate intelligence figure * * *.
Here is Director Woolsey:
Setting aside the issue * * * of the so-called `slippery slope' * * * then acknowledged changes in the total year to year would become far more likely to require precise justification in the public debate * * *. Formal acknowledgement of the level would put substantial pressure on executive branch officials and those who participate in the debate in the Congress to give reasons for those changes publicly. That is a big part of my problem.
My own belief is, I respond to that kind of thing with the question, `Isn't democracy troublesome? Isn't it difficult to have to justify changes, aggregate changes, in budgets?' Yes, it is inconvenient, and potentially it is a problem, but the question is does it violate our national security to disclose the aggregate budget figure. Director Woolsey, while he does not want to do it, does not say it violates national security.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GLICKMAN. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Madam Chairman, in addition to Director Woolsey, in fact, Stansfield Turner, a former Director, Mr. Gates, Bobby Inman, the people who have been the pillars of the American intelligence community, have all come to that judgment that it would be in our interest, not against our interest.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, in all fairness, Director Woolsey does not say he is for it, but he does not give the reason that it is a national security problem.
Mr. TORRICELLI. If the gentleman will continue to yield, and the others have all come out for it.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Former Director Gates on February 23, 1994, again, 3 years later, says the following:
It seems to me that there is nothing intrinsically sensitive about the aggregate figure of the budget for the American intelligence community. A general notion of what that figure is broadly about is already public * * *. Since most people have a fairly good idea of what the aggregate number is, I then puzzle over why there is the desire to make that number official and to confirm it * * *. I think it is a mistake officially to confirm it * * *.
Madam Chairman, I would, parenthetically, say he has changed his position slightly there.
Then he goes on: `Once confirmed officially, it makes it impossible not to begin to break' it down and to explain what it is about.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I guess my point is that all this discussion is based on the idea that it is inconvenient. It is difficult to talk about this issue, because then we are going to have to explain it to the American people. Again, Madam Chairman, I say that is what democracy is about. I urge the adoption of my amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 194, noes 221, not voting 24, as follows:
[Page: H5839]
[TIME: 1735]
Mr. HOLDEN and Mr. MANZULLO changed their vote from `aye' to `no.'
Mr. ROSE and Mr. HEFNER changed their vote from `no' to `aye.'
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Conyers:
In section 601, amend subsections (a) and (b) to read as follows:
(a) DIA:
(1) Purposes: The purposes of this subsection are to--
(A) create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to the Congress, to initiate and conduct independently inspections, investigations, and audits relating to programs and operations of the Defense Intelligence Agency;
(B) provide leadership and recommend policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations, and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations;
(C) provide a means for keeping the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and the necessity for and the progress of corrective actions; and
(D) in the manner prescribed by the amendments made by this subsection, ensure that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence are kept similarly informed of significant problems and deficiencies as well as the necessity for and the progress of corrective actions.
(2) Establishment of office of inspector general: The first section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)(2) by inserting after `the United States International Trade Commission,' the following: `the Defense Intelligence Agency,'; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
`(i)(1) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall be appointed by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (in this subsection referred to as the `Director') without regard to political affiliation and on the basis of integrity, compliance with the security standards of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and prior experience in the field of foreign intelligence and in a Federal office of Inspector General.
`(2)(A) Notwithstanding the second sentence of section 8G(d), the Director may prohibit the Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit, inspection, or investigation if the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States.
`(B) If the Director exercises any power under subparagraph (A), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such power within 7 days to the intelligence committees. The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time such report is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of any such report. In such cases, the Inspector General may submit such comments to the intelligence committees that the Director considers appropriate.
`(3) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall take due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by the Office of Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods described in such reports.
`(4)(A) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director a classified semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office of Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency during the immediately preceding 6-month period ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively. Within 30 days after receipt of such reports, the Director shall transmit such reports to the intelligence committees with any comments the Director may deem appropriate. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include a list of the title or subject of each inspection, investigation, or audit conducted during the reporting period and--
`(i) a description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations of the Defense Intelligence Agency identified by the Office during the reporting period;
`(ii) a description of the recommendations for corrective action made by the Office during the reporting period with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (i);
`(iii) a statement of whether corrective action has been completed on each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective action has been completed, a description of such corrective action;
`(iv) a certification that the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector General;
`(v) a description of all cases occurring during the reporting period where the Inspector General could not obtain documentary evidence relevant to any inspection, audit, or investigation due to the lack of authority to subpoena such information; and
`(vi) such recommendations as the Inspector General may wish to make concerning legislation to promote economy and efficiency in the administration of programs and operations undertaken by the Defense Intelligence Agency, and to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.
`(B) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall report immediately to the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or operations. The Director shall transmit such report to the intelligence committees within 7 calendar days, together with any comments the Director considers appropriate.
`(C) In the event that--
`(i) the Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency is unable to resolve any differences with the Director affecting the execution of the Inspector General's duties or responsibilities; or
`(ii) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately report such matter to the intelligence committees.
`(D) Section 5 shall not apply to the Inspector General and the Office of Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
`(5) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the Director, the Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector General. In making such selections, the Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively. In this regard, the Inspector General shall create within the organization of the Inspector General a career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
`(6) Beginning with fiscal year 1996, there shall be included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
`(7) In this subsection, the term `intelligence committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.'.
(3) Implementation: The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall, by not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and in accordance with the amendments made by this subsection--
(A) establish the Office of Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency;
(B) appoint the Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and
(C) transfer to that Office the office of the Defense Intelligence Agency on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act known as the `Office of Inspector General'.
(4) Transfer of resources of existing office: The personnel, assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed, held, used, arising from, or available to the office in the Defense Intelligence Agency on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act known as `Office of Inspector General' are hereby transferred to the Office of Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency established under the amendments made by this subsection.
(5) Termination of existing office: The office in the Defense Intelligence Agency on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act known as `Office of Inspector General' is terminated effective on the date of the establishment of the Office of Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency pursuant to the amendments made by this subsection.
(6) Conforming amendment: The first section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended in subsection (c) by striking `subsection (f)' and inserting `subsections (f) and (i)'.
(7) Reports to intelligence committees:
(A) Reporting requirement: Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
[Page: H5840]
`427. Reports on activities of the Office of Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency
`(a) Reporting Requirement: The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the intelligence committees any report or findings and recommendations of an inspection, investigation, or audit conducted by the Office of Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency which has been requested by the Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either of the intelligence committees.
`(b) Intelligence Committees Defined: In this section, the term `intelligence committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.'.
(B) Clerical amendment: The analysis at the beginning of subchapter I of chapter 23 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
`427. Reports on activities of the Office of Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency.'.
(b) NSA:
(1) Purposes: The purposes of this subsection are to--
(A) create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independently inspections, investigations, and audits relating to programs and operations of the National Security Agency;
(B) provide leadership and recommend policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations, and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations;
(C) provide a means for keeping the Director of the National Security Agency fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and the necessity for and the progress of corrective actions; and
(D) in the manner prescribed by the amendments made by this subsection, ensure that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence are kept similarly informed of significant problems and deficiencies as well as the necessity for and the progress of corrective actions.
(2) Establishment of office of inspector general: The first section 8G of that Act is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)(2), as amended by subsection (a)(2) of this section, by inserting after `the Defense Intelligence Agency,' the following: `the National Security Agency,'; and
(B) by adding after subsection (i), as added by subsection (a)(2) of this section, the following:
`(j)(1) The Inspector General of the National Security Agency shall be appointed by the Director of the National Security Agency (in this subsection referred to as the `Director') without regard to political affiliation and on the basis of integrity, compliance with the security standards of the National Security Agency, and prior experience in the field of foreign intelligence and in a Federal office of Inspector General.
`(2)(A) Notwithstanding the second sentence of section 8G(d), the Director may prohibit the Inspector General of the National Security Agency from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit, inspection, or investigation if the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States.
`(B) If the Director exercises any power under subparagraph (A), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such power within 7 days to the intelligence committees. The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time such report is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of any such report. In such cases, the Inspector General may submit such comments to the intelligence committees that the Director considers appropriate.
`(3) The Inspector General of the National Security Agency shall take due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by the Office of Inspector General of the National Security Agency, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods described in such reports.
`(4)(A) The Inspector General of the National Security Agency shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director a classified semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office of Inspector General of the National Security Agency during the immediately preceding 6-month period ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively. Within 30 days after receipt of such reports, the Director shall transmit such reports to the intelligence committees with any comments the Director may deem appropriate. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include a list of the title or subject of each inspection, investigation, or audit conducted during the reporting period and--
`(i) a description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations of the National Security Agency identified by the Office during the reporting period;
`(ii) a description of the recommendations for corrective action made by the Office during the reporting period with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (i);
`(iii) a statement of whether corrective action has been completed on each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective action has been completed, a description of such corrective action;
`(iv) a certification that the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector General;
`(v) a description of all cases occurring during the reporting period where the Inspector General could not obtain documentary evidence relevant to any inspection, audit, or investigation due to the lack of authority to subpoena such information; and
`(vi) such recommendations as the Inspector General may wish to make concerning legislation to promote economy and efficiency in the administration of programs and operations undertaken by the National Security Agency, and to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.
`(B) The Inspector General of the National Security Agency shall report immediately to the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or operations. The Director shall transmit such report to the intelligence committees within 7 calendar days, together with any comments the Director considers appropriate.
`(C) In the event that--
`(i) the Inspector General of the National Security Agency is unable to resolve any differences with the Director affecting the execution of the Inspector General's duties or responsibilities; or
`(ii) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately report such matter to the intelligence committees.
`(D) Section 5 shall not apply to the Inspector General and the Office of Inspector General of the National Security Agency.
`(5) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the Director, the Inspector General of the National Security Agency shall select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector General. In making such selections, the Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively. In this regard, the Inspector General shall create within the organization of the Inspector General a career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
`(6) Beginning with fiscal year 1996, there shall be included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector General of the National Security Agency.
`(7) In this subsection, the term `intelligence committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.'.
(3) Implementation: The Director of the National Security Agency shall, by not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and in accordance with the amendments made by this subsection--
(A) establish the Office of Inspector General of the National Security Agency;
(B) appoint the Inspector General of the National Security Agency; and
(C) transfer to that Office the office of the National Security Agency on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act known as the `Office of Inspector General'.
(4) Transfer of resources of existing office: The personnel, assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed, held, used, arising from, or available to the office in the National Security Agency on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act known as `Office of Inspector General' are hereby transferred to the Office of Inspector General of the National Security Agency established under the amendments made by this subsection.
(5) Termination of existing office: The office in the National Security Agency on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act known as `Office of Inspector General' is terminated effective on the date of the establishment of the Office of Inspector General of the National Security Agency pursuant to the amendments made by this subsection.
(6) Conforming amendments: The first section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended in subsection (c), as amended by subsection (a)(6) of this section, by striking `subsections (f) and (i)' and inserting `subsections (f), (i), and (j)'.
(7) Reports to intelligence committees: The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following:
`Sec. 19. (a) The Director of the National Security Agency shall submit to the intelligence committees any report or findings and recommendations of an inspection, investigation, or audit conducted by the Office of Inspector General of the National Security Agency which has been requested by the Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either of the intelligence committees.
`(b) In this section, the term `intelligence committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.'.
(8) Relationship of inspector general of department of defense to those of dia and nsa: Section 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
`(h)(1) The Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall not have any authority to conduct any activity with respect to any matter that the Secretary of Defense determines relates solely to the Defense Intelligence Agency or the National Security Agency.
`(2) Upon request of the Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency or the National Security Agency, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense may provide to the Inspector General making the request such resources (including personnel) as are appropriate to enable that Inspector General to carry out activities authorized by this Act.'.
[Page: H5841]
Mr. CONYERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Hastings). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
(Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, the amendment I am offering with Mr. Clinger inserts substitute text for subsections (a) and (b) of section 601 of the reported bill. In summary, it amends the Inspectors General Act of 1978 by creating two new inspectors general for the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.
Let me first start by acknowledging the ranking Republican of the Government Operations Committee, Bill Clinger, for his close assistance in crafting this amendment. I would also like to thank the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Glickman, and his ranking member, Mr. Combest, for their cooperation.
The Intelligence Committee has included in H.R. 4299 a provision creating independent IG's for both DIA and NSA. The need for these offices was established in closed hearings held by the Intelligence Committee. The Government Operations Committee was not involved in those hearings. The committee's interest is simply in protecting the integrity and independence of the inspectors general, and ensuring that each inspector general has the tools to perform the job.
Unfortunately, section 601 as reported by the Intelligence Committee creates several problems. First, the IG's are not part of the Inspectors General Act, and thus would not be accorded the authorities and responsibilities of the other IG's. Our amendment places these offices within the protections of the IG Act.
Second, the new IG's duplicate the existing responsibilities of the Defense Department's inspector general. Essentially, the Defense Department IG would have the same duties as the newly created NSA and DIA IG's. We would thus have two IG's, perhaps competing with each other, responsible for each agency. Our amendment resolves this duplication by ensuring that the new IG's have sole responsibility for NSA and DIA. The existing Defense IG can assist in investigations, but does not have authority over investigations solely within those agencies.
I would also point out that the amendment requires detailed reporting by these IG's to the Intelligence Committees. Given the sensitive nature of these agencies, we believe that this is the most appropriate mechanism for oversight.
Our amendment is therefore primarily a technical one, and does not change the substance of what the Intelligence Committee has reported. The amendment will serve to clarify the responsibilities of the IG's, eliminate duplication, and provide the authorities and protections of the Inspector General Act.
I urge its adoption.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CONYERS. I am delighted to yield to the gentleman from Kansas.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have been advised informally that while the Committee on Armed Services has some concerns about the gentleman's language, that we have no objection to the amendment and we will accept it on our side. I just wanted to let the gentleman know that so he might feel perhaps delighted at my acceptance and not want to speak any longer.
[TIME: 1740]
Mr. CONYERS. I want to thank my colleague on Judiciary and the chairman of this important committee and floor manager for his cooperation. This is a perfecting amendment, and we are not going to take much time.
What we corrected are two essential problems. One, we place the I.G.'s within the Inspector General Act, and we eliminate the duplication and conflict between the new I.G.'s and the existing Defense Department I.G. by leaving any issues that cross agency lines to be dealt with by the Secretary of Defense as the arbiter. This brings us into conformance with the Inspector General Act, ensures continuing independence of the I.G.'s, and requires detailed reporting by the I.G.'s to the Intelligence Committee.
We think that that satisfies the concerns of the floor manager and many others that are on the appropriate committees that are concerned.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
(Mr. CLINGER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of this amendment offered by the chairman of the Government Operations Committee, Mr. Conyers.
Chairman Conyers and I drafted this amendment, in consultation with our colleagues on the Intelligence Committee, to modify a provision in the Intelligence authorization bill which has the unintended consequence of creating overlap and potential jurisdictional conflict between the Department of Defense office of inspector general and the newly created offices of inspector general in the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.
As reported by the Intelligence Committee, the bill would allow the Defense inspector general to continue its activities within the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, despite the presence of independent inspectors general within these agencies. The amendment offered today states explicitly that only the Defense Intelligence Agency or National Security Agency inspectors general will have jurisdiction over audits or investigations that fall solely within their respective agencies. This is a necessary modification to the Intelligence authorization bill in order to clarify the responsibility of each inspector general. The Defense Department's inspector general will be authorized to provide assistance to these new offices upon request.
The Government Operations Committee has a long tradition of working to protect the integrity and effectiveness of the Federal inspectors general. Since the Inspector General Act's inception in 1978, we have remained committed to ensuring that these guardians against waste, fruad and abuse are equipped to do their jobs with minimum interference and maximum independence. This amendment is the latest illustration of that commitment, and will ensure that the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency receive an appropriate level of oversight.
I have welcomed the opportunity to work with Mr. Conyers and our colleagues on the Intelligence Committee in a bipartisan effort to ensure the Defense Department's inspector general and the new inspectors general created by this bill can work in cooperation with each other. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this amendment.
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
(Mr. COLEMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
[Page: H5842]
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant: Page 5, after line 23, insert the following new section:
SEC. 303. PURCHASE OF AMERICAN-MADE EQUIPMENT AND PRODUCTS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that, to the greatest extent practicable, all equipment and products purchased with funds made available in this Act should be American-made.
(b) Notice Requirement.--In providing financial assistance to, or entering into any contract with, any entity using funds made available in this Act, the head of each agency of the Federal or District of Columbia government, to the greatest extent practicable, shall provide to such entity a notice describing the statement made in subsection (a) by the Congress.
Mr. TRAFICANT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?
There was no objection.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, this budget is classified. There is a lot of stuff going on. This is a stealth Buy American amendment. I do not want to know; you do not have to tell me. I would just like to see them buy, whenever possible, some American-made goods and products and keep the train coming down the track. It helps our workers.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would say that even though the budget has a stealthy flavor to it, I want you to know that the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] and I are doing our best to make sure the intelligence community buys American products, and we are inspired by your push on this issue on this bill and others, and we intend to accept this amendment.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. COMBEST. I could not have said it better myself. We certainly agree to the amendment.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I urge approval of the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Sanders: Page 4, after line 23, insert the following:
SEC. 104. LIMITATION ON AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED
(a) Limitation: Except as provided in subsection (b), notwithstanding the total amount of the individual authorizations of appropriations contained in this Act, including the amounts specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4299 of the One Hundred and Third Congress, there is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1995 to carry out this Act not more than 90 percent of the total amount authorized to be appropriated by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994.
(b) Exception: Subsection (a) does not apply to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
Mr. SANDERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Vermont?
There was no objection.
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment which I am offering together with my friend from New York, Mr. Owens, to cut the intelligence budget by 10 percent.
Mr. Chairman, the Sanders-Owens amendment is the same as the one which we offered last year, and which was supported by over 100 Members of this House. It provides for a cut of 10 percent from the level of this year--which was in turn essentially the same level as last year, and which has been publicly reported by such publications and organizations as the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Democratic Study Group, and others to be about $28 billion. After 2 years of delay, it puts us on track to fulfilling President Clinton's promise during the 1992 campaign to cut $7 billion from the intelligence budget over the 5-year period 1993-97.
We need to make this cut for reasons that people all over America--if not necessarily in Washington--recognize. We need it because we have a $200 billion deficit and a $4 billion debt. We need it because the cold war is over, the Soviet Union has disappeared, and for decades, as the New York Times noted, `spy agencies spent two-thirds of their budget dollars to track the Soviet threat.' And we need it because, as the House Appropriations Committee pointed out in its report last September, the intelligence community received over a 100-percent increase in real dollars between 1982 and 1992.
In this situation, it is absurd to keep on funding the intelligence agencies at cold war levels, and to insist on maintaining their budgets at the same level year after year. When we are already spending $100 billion a year defending Europe and Asia and when we outspend all our potential enemy nations by over 10 to 1, are we really just as insecure as when the Soviet Union existed? While we are cutting back on all the rest of the Government--including social programs, farm supports, and environmental protection as well as defense--how can the intelligence agencies claim to be exempt?
Frankly, Mr. Chairman, I get a little sick and tired when every day I hear Members of Congress rant and rave about the budget deficit, and tell us how it is imperative that we make cuts in Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, veterans' needs, funding for education--and then, having said all that, they proceed to vote no reductions for the intelligence budget. We have the highest rate of childhood poverty in the industrialized world, including 5 million children who go hungry each day--and we do not have the money to protect our kids. We have millions of senior citizens unable to afford their prescription drugs, and we don't have the money to protect our senior citizens. We have millions of working class young people unable to afford the cost of higher education--and we do not have the money to educate our young people. But somehow, just somehow, when the CIA, the NSA, the DIA, and the other intelligence agencies come asking, the money suddenly appears. It suddenly and magically appears. No problem with funding now.
Mr. Chairman, this debate is not really so much about the intelligence budget, as it is about our national priorities. The 10 percent cut proposed by this amendment--$2.8 billion--is equivalent to about one and a half spy satellites. One and a half spy satellites is what we can purchase for $2.8 billion. Now let me tell you, in the real world, what $2.8 billion could purchase. In a nation frightened of crime and overburdened with high property taxes, $2.8 billion distributed to our States would pay for 40,000 more police officers in community policing programs. In the real world, when young people clamor to get a higher education but cannot afford it, $2.8 billion would fund 200,000 more students in the President's National Service Program. At a time when millions of children enter school far behind their peers, $2.8 billion would fund Head Start participation for nearly 700,000 children. At a time when cities all over America struggle with the crisis of homelessness, $2.8 billion would provide HUD-assisted housing for nearly 3 million homeless families. In terms of our environmental needs, $2.8 billion would fund the entire hazardous waste cleanup program.
And let me repeat--for those whose primary concern is the Federal deficit--that $2.8 billion would reduce our annual budget deficit by 1 1/2 percent.
That is what we are debating today, Mr. Chairman. We are debating whether we defend our national security by pretending that the cold war is still going on, or by recognizing our country's economic crisis. We are debating whether to continue spending billions putting spy satellites into orbit to spy on a Soviet Union which has disappeared--or whether to take care of our own country. That is the basic question, my colleagues, and I ask you to choose to truly defend our national security. Vote for the Sanders-Owens amendment, and restore some common sense to our budget priorities.
[Page: H5843]
[TIME: 1750]
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get a time limit on the remaining time in this debate. The gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] has already spoken about 5 minutes. I would ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment and any amendment thereto be limited to 30 minutes, equally divided, 15 minutes to myself and 15 minutes to the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders].
Mr. COMBEST. I have no objection, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Hastings). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] will be recognized for 15 minutes, and the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] will be recognized for 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman].
Mr. GLICKMAN. I yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] for offering this amendment. I think it is an important amendment to discuss, although I think the amendment is misguided and should be defeated.
In the first place, when you come down to this floor and you listen to the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders], and then previously listened to people on the other side, you would then think that you were talking about two different bills. Folks on the Republican side of the aisle have been arguing that the intelligence budget has been cut radically in the last 10 years. Mr. Sanders, of course, comes here and said it has not been cut enough.
Here are the facts: The committee bill is 3.8 percent below the fiscal 1994 authorized level, approximately 2 percent below the fiscal 1994 appropriated level and the fiscal 1995 request. That is not taking into account inflation. So we are seeing a reduction in the intelligence community budget. The numbers of people who are employed in the intelligence community is coming down approximately 20 percent. This is the third year in a row they recommended less than requested by the President or authorized the year before.
Significant additional reductions, however, will imperil modernization programs for satellites, signals, and imagery collection systems, which are needed to keep pace with technological advances and which will ultimately save money through consolidation of activities.
Let me tell you what this stuff does so that you will have some idea. What it does is it provides information for military commanders. So, if we have a military conflict in Korea or if we have a military conflict in Haiti or if we have a military conflict in the Middle East, there is modernization of our imagery, satellites and signals intelligence going on, which accounts for one of the reasons why the numbers are not going down faster. My point is that we could find ourselves in a military conflict in Haiti or Korea or the Middle East or perhaps in humanitarian efforts in central Africa, and you have to have that kind of imagery in order to protect American troops, American people and other people who are threatened. These improvements are definitely needed.
We have activities all over the world against terrorism, against proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Some of that is human intelligence, some of that is signals intelligence, and some is satellite intelligence.
A cut of this magnitude would be extraordinarily serious dealing with those particular problems.
Just yesterday there was a bomb in Buenos Aires which dealt serious damage to the Jewish community in Argentina, which is likely to have been caused by international terrorist activities, which will require the United States and the Argentinians and people around the world to focus on as part of this international terrorist conspiracy to blow up and destroy American and freedom-loving interests around the world. This amendment would strike at the heart of the ability to try to find those particular culprits.
I am particularly worried about nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Russians still have thousands of them, thousands of weapons, any one of which could kill 15 or 20 million people in this country. You have to have the technical, satellite, signals intelligence, and the human capability to find out where those things are.
Now, can I tell you that a 10-percent cut is going to destroy the ability of the intelligence community to do everything they do? I do not know if I can tell you that they would destroy it, but I can tell you this, that it puts us at a very great degree of risk. That is exactly what we do not need right now. We think we have cut this budget as far as we can.
I am just telling you right now that I do not want to have on my hands a terrorist activity in this country or around the world which could have been prevented by modernizing our satellite capability or a release or sale of nuclear or chemical or biological weaponry or missile systems which could find themselves in the hands of a Saddam Hussein or some other ruthless dictator.
So I think while I understand the purposes of the amendment, I think an amendment of this magnitude is ill-conceived, and I urge my colleagues to defeat it.
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Owens].
(Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, this debate is an educational debate for the American people. Everybody talks about the deficit, and most people act as if the deficit was created by God. The deficit is not created by God; the deficit is made up of stupid decisions that have a Central Intelligence Agency at the same level it was during the height of the cold war. We are spending for intelligence as much as we were spending when the other superpower, the Soviet Union, existed. We always said that 50 percent--as I was saying, this is an educational debate for the American people. We will not change anybody's mind in this House. The military-industrial complex has given its orders. We know the votes will come down a certain way as a result of that. So we are talking to the American people about what makes up the deficit.
The deficit can be brought under control without cutting education programs, without cutting libraries, without cutting jobs training programs. All of these kinds of programs have been cut in the last year. We have cut $60 million out of the job training for teenagers, in order to move it over for displaced workers. We did not have to do that. We need more money to train displaced workers, we can get it out of the budget reserved for the intelligence community. The intelligence budget cannot be defended with any kind of logic or reason. Nobody is able to bring forth any logic which makes any sense. To talk about the dangers in the world of terrorism and other kinds of threats, nuclear threats from North Korea, they were always there along with the Soviet Union. Once the Soviet Union, the only superpower that has the capacity to deliver nuclear bombs from their soil to our soil, is eliminated, then we are in a different world. The Soviet Union's secret police, unlike our secret police, the CIA, the Soviet Union secret police have opened up their archives, a large portion of the archives. They demystified their intelligence community. We do not even want to disclose to the American people the total amount of money we spend on intelligence. We just voted that down.
The orders came down from the military-industrial complex, `Don't do it.' So the puppets moved in line, and they lined up to vote. Logic cannot prevail in this kind of situation. We have the Congressional Budget Office. Last year, the Congressional Budget Office suggested, recommended a 20-percent cut. A 20-percent cut in the overall intelligence budget was recommended by the Congressional Budget Office.
[Page: H5844]
[TIME: 1800]
Now, Mr. Chairman, those are the people we pay to monitor very closely the logic of what we are doing with our budget. We are only asking here for a 10-percent cut, a 10-percent cut of what the most conservative estimates put at a $30 billion budget. We do not know officially, we cannot represent it, we cannot pretend we know officially, but the New York Times and certain other sources that really know what is happening in America, always they have consistently pegged the intelligence budget at $30 billion.
Of course we should go and ask Aldrich Ames. Aldrich Ames would have told us it might take a tip, we might have to pay Aldrich Ames something, but he can tell us, probably, what the overall budget is.
Aldrich Ames was, as my colleagues all know, a highly placed official at the very top of our country's intelligence operation who for 9 years was a spy for the Soviet Union, and, in order to shut him up and not let him tell the American people about what is going on inside of the old boys network of the CIA, they gave him life imprisonment instead of death. As my colleagues know, he committed wholesale treason. If
anybody deserves the death penalty, it certainly ought to be Aldrich Ames. But Aldrich Ames walked away. A deal is being made with his wife because he knows too much. He could tell us that if the Soviet Union was paying him as a spy for them, if he was being paid $2 million, then what do we pay our spies, the ones we get from the Soviet Union? Our rate of pay is probably higher, so the CIA is probably paying Soviet spies, East German spies, all kinds of people they manufacture, they are probably paying them at a higher rate than $2 million for the work they do. Aldrich Ames got $2 million.
Aldrich Ames in his parting shot accused the CIA of being an old boys network that was obsolete, and that is what we are dealing with, my colleagues. We are dealing with an old boys network that is obsolete, and it is driving a $30 billion budget.
Thirty billion is not the total budget for the CIA, but they are the kingpin of the intelligence community. There is Army intelligence, satellites; there is a whole lot of stuff out there. But $30 billion, if we take 10 percent of that, $3 billion can fund a lot of repairs to school buildings that have lead poisoning problems, and they have asbestos problems, and $3 billion could build a lot of schools. Three billion dollars could relieve the pressure on a lot of school board budgets.
Three billion dollars could provide for a health care program that would end the kind of tuberculosis which has crept back into not just our homeless community, but there is a high school out in California where there is a large infection of tuberculosis in the high school.
Now we cannot provide the money to take care of basic health care problems and basic education problems. We tell the American people that there is a deficit, we must deal with the deficit. I agree there is a deficit. The deficit was created by irresponsible spending. Now we have an opportunity to cut the deficit, and we can cut the deficit without hurting the security of America at all.
The CIA does not have the capacity to do the job that needs to be done with respect to terrorism. They do not know enough Arabic. They do not have enough people to deal with the fundamentalist Islamic revolution. They cannot deal with that. The CIA cannot deal with the problem in Haiti. Nobody in the U.S. Government can tell us how many people are being massacred in Haiti, what the conditions are in Haiti. The CIA cannot tell us what is going on in a country which is less than 700 miles from Florida.
As my colleagues know, the CIA does not have any black agents. The CIA is not modernized. The diverse world it has to face; it has no agents to do that. It does not have any females. The females, the few of them that are there, recently brought a suit about what is going on there, so we got an obsolete operation. The head of the CIA yesterday admitted that it is a white male dominated old boys network. If the head of the CIA admits that, then my colleagues know we have got serious problems. We are spending on this white male dominated old boys network which is obsolete, we are spending at least $2 billion on that agency alone, and they have control of a $30 billion intelligence budget. The American people need to know, if we want to cut the deficit, we want to cut the deficit, at the same time provide for Federal money for libraries, we want to provide for Federal money to help take care of the problems our schools are facing, we want to take care of the health problems, and there are a lot of places where we are wasting money, and one of them is in the intelligence budget. Three billion dollars we gain by passing this 10-percent cut.
So I say to my colleagues, `Let's pass it and get a $3 billion to give to good programs.'
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
(Mr. COMBEST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, while I greatly respect the sincerity of the distinguished gentleman from Vermont, I must say that I find his amendment to limit this year's authorization for intelligence to 90 percent of last year's level to be reckless in the extreme. In my statement in support of this bill I have already talked at some length about my extreme disquiet over our committee's turning out a bill which continues the trend of making deep cuts to intelligence. At that time I cited several facts which illustrate the depth of the commulative annual cuts we have seen to intelligence this decade.
I would like to repeat a few of them here and cite some new ones. First, the repeats:
Fact No. 1. In real terms the intelligence budget has been cut in all but 1 of the last 6 years.
Fact No. 2. The intelligence community is already being downsized at twice the rate recommended by the President's National Performance Review for the Government.
Fact No. 3. The $7 billion that President Clinton proposed to cut from intelligence by 1997 has already been achieved and will, at current rates, end up being more than double that by 1997.
Fact No. 4. The authorization bill this year authorizes in real terms almost 15 percent less than our authorization 2 years ago, and that was at a level which then-Intelligence-Committee-Chairman McCurdy claimed could not be further reduced without the risk of `severe damage.' That higher level was, he said, `the outer limit on which the intelligence community can expect to reduce spending.'
And now a few more facts:
Fact No. 5. This bill already reflects in real terms a more-than-6-percent decline in intelligence spending from last year.
Fact No. 6. At the current rate of cuts, the intelligence budget in inflation-adjusted dollars will, by the end of this decade be less than 60 percent of what it was in 1989.
Fact No. 7. The budget for national programs for next year was--as submitted by the administration--already $1.3 billion less than what the administration projected just last year.
Mr. Chairman, the effect of the gentleman's amendment would be to gut intelligence and to cripple a key element of our national security and leave our Government whistling in the dark when dealing with the issues of regional stability, weapons proliferation, terrorism, global fair trade and competitiveness, and strategic and tactical military preparedness.
The intelligence community has already begun a process of closing down capabilities which we can ill afford to give up. Having, several years ago, already reduced its resources covering the former Soviet Union, the intelligence community is now in a process of eliminating coverage completely against many targets and even regions worldwide. Programs to modernize, upgrade, and save money in the out-years by revamping technical collection systems have been slowed down or shelved. On the analytic side the situation is as bad or worse. Military analysis has been left perilously thin; many arms control and weapons analysis offices have been cut back to fractions of their former size despite the growing problem with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems; other analysis are overwhelmed with the demands for more and better analysis of the multiplicity of issues which the administration faces politically and economically around the globe.
The fact that this amendment sets an arbitrary figure for cuts as opposed to making specific proposals for savings is indicative of its poor rationale. The gentleman from Vermont has presented his amendment without reading the committee's classified report showing an itemized breakout of how intelligence funds are spent. Those Members who want to cut intelligence further need, at the least, to exercise their right, indeed their duty, to make such proposals only after viewing the committee's detailed mark and identifying specific program areas to be cut. At that point, the responsible Member will realize that in a budget as lean as the one in this bill, for every supposed saving there is in reality a very clear and high cost in terms of lost national security.
[Page: H5845]
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada [Mr. Bilbray].
Mr. (BILBRAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, as my colleagues know, I think it is interesting that every year the chairman of our committee gets up and asks Member to go up to room 405, which is where the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence meets, and ask for a look at the budget. The budget is open to any Member of the Congress to go up and look at. One does not have to be a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence or a member of the leadership, but every year Members get on this floor and with good intentions ask for cuts of 10 percent, 5 percent, 2 percent, and as they never go up and look at the budget, they do not know what they are asking us to cut.
Now Members that have served on this committee for a number of years or some of us that are now in their second year on the committee have worked diligently in doing the budget. We understand where the money is being spent. We analyzed it. We had hearing after hearing to determine whether it is needed. But yet the Members ask for the cuts, and in reference to the gentleman from Vermont and the gentleman from New York, Mr. Chairman, I have talked with staff, and they have not gone up and looked at the budget. They should look at it, they should analyze it, they should go through it and see what it is all about. But to come off the top and say, `Let's just cut it, let's not look at it'; they do not know what it is for, where it is coming from, and I think it is very important to understand it. They should look at it because the world is a dangerous place. It is as dangerous as it was when the Soviet Union existed. We have more targets, we have more problems, more areas to focus on and more people to be retrained because many of our analysts were analyzing areas of the Soviet Union and trained in that area. Now we have Iran, we have North Korea, we have Iraq which we just had a war with, and I think it is so important we analyze it.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues, before they make these judgments, to go upstairs, go through the budget, look at what it is, and then make their decision whether it should be cut.
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Hawaii [Mrs. Mink].
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I want to tell the American people listening to this debate that once you look at that budget, you can no longer talk about it. You cannot disclose anything. We are forbidden from talking about the figures. So they ought to know for a fact that we do not look at it, because we do not want to be in a position of being criticized for discussing a budget we looked at. I urge full disclosure of the total amount, and we can talk to the public about the total amount.
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I take the well today to support the amendment to cut 10 percent from the budget. I do so not because I do not respect the diligent work of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in determining what our needs our, but just as an individual citizen in this great country. I understand that the circumstances in the world have changed. We do not have the same threats which generated this huge spending in the cold war situation.
Times are different. You cannot make a sensible argument by saying we have new threats, new enemies. These very same countries existed previously as threats to our security, and the intelligence community, I am sure, was embarking upon whatever strategies and investigations that those situations required in Iran and Korea and other places.
They have risen up into prominence and have become our priorities, but they are certainly not such that they overcome the spending cuts which are, I think, prompted by the changes of circumstances.
Now, if this country had resources which it could spend, I would say perhaps this debate would be a needless effort. But all of us understand the crisis of spending in this country and the enormous needs that our people experience and tell us are unmet, and we are helpless in providing them the resources to meet these needs.
I serve on the Committee on Education and Labor, and it pains me every year not to be able to fund the programs as the needs occur. We have always said that the American country needs to be able to compete globally in terms of education, in terms of our economy. Yet we are not providing funds for our young people to go on to the universities and colleges and be able to compete. We have limitations on the number of Pell grants and scholarships, and we are cutting back constantly on graduate education and resource assistance.
Now, is it possible that a country as great as ours cannot divert funds away from intelligence institutions like the CIA and recommit these moneys to the education of our young people?
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Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
(Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, this budget and these issues are a matter of intense interest to me and my constituents. I have done my homework, though not on the committee, and have been briefed on this intelligence budget, and have paid a visit to that top floor of the Capitol. My conclusion is that the Sanders amendment is not in our national interest, and I strongly oppose it.
As I said last year, intelligence funding is intelligent funding. I believe that intelligence is a crucial investment, for much the same reason that I support aid to the former Soviet Republics. It is proactive. The money we spend for these programs helps us avoid spending greater sums later, because we can identify threats early on and organize our response.
Our intelligence capabilities were a major factor in the Persian Gulf war. They improved our battle management, increased our knowledge about Iraq's capabilities, and helped pave the way for the gulf war and the liberation of Kuwait.
My district has made a major contribution to the tactical intelligence systems that are funded jointly by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services, and I think these systems are more vital than ever in these times of rapid international change.
Since 1990, more than 20,000 jobs have been eliminated at the 5 major prime contractors which develop intelligence collection systems. That represents a 75-percent reduction in the work force involved in intelligence programs. Most of that loss has occurred in southern California, and, because there were no alternative jobs, these people have left the industry and are not likely to return to work on critical national intelligence programs in the future.
Mr. Chairman, statistics like those I have just quoted are devastating to our industrial base, our intelligence industrial base, and our national security. I strongly urge a `no' vote on the Sanders amendment.
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Nadler].
(Mr. NADLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, it is difficult to debate a budget and urge or defend a cut in the budget when the budget is secret and we cannot say how much we are spending or how much the proponents or opponents of amendment propose to spend, although rumor has it, rumor from the New York Times and everywhere else, it is somewhere in the neighborhood of $30 billion. Maybe that is true.
But what one can say, however, is that in the last few years, the world has undergone an immense change. The cold war has ended. The great adversary, the evil empire, which itself spent many, many billions of dollars every year on armaments, on intelligence, on counterintelligence, which we had to spend many billions of dollars on for intelligence and counterintelligence and counter-counterintelligence, is no more. Why is it that our budgets do not recognize the world sea change, the sea change in the condition of the world?
It is true, of course, there are many things that our intelligence must do. We must know what is going on. Much of what we must know about what is going on really consists of people studying periodicals and literature in libraries to find out what is going on in cultural change and in religious change and political change around the world. Some of it is still handled through satellites and such.
But the fact is, that with the Soviet Union gone, with the cold war over, if we cannot reduce our intelligence budget by 10 or 20 percent, then we are wasting a heck of a lot of money. It is particularly true in view of the fact that the intelligence community missed the greatest political event of the last quarter-century, the collapse of the Soviet Union. So one wonders how efficiently they were spending that money in the first place.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, we ought to be able to reduce our expenditure and spend it more usefully on housing and education and things vital to national security here at home.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Cunningham].
(Mr. CUNNINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, it befuddles most of us. We talk about a strong crime bill, and the Black Caucus fights against strong crime measures. And the liberal from New York fought against registering child molesters and woman stalkers. But yet he is up here, `Let's cut intelligence; let's cut defense.'
We cut the defense of this country down to the bone marrow. During Desert Storm the intelligence agencies in defense, and I saw a lot of Members sitting around here sleeking around, wondering what the terrorist activity was. In foreign countries, the word is well, the Soviet Union is gone. It is only Russia right now. Why are they building four Typhoon-class submarines and investing in nuclear subs and subs that cut cables? Yes, our intelligence agency knows that.
So why, if the Soviet Union is gone, are they doing that? I never fought against the Soviet Union. I fought in Vietnam and I fought in Israel. I never fought against the Soviet Union. But we are looking at Somalia, we are looking at Haiti. God knows Haiti. And we do not need intelligence for that? And we are cutting ourselves to the quick.
[TIME: 1820]
And some of the rhetoric, `We want a strong crime bill, but by the way, let's cut all of our intelligence.'
I look at what kind of message are we sending when we talk about priorities in cutting. The Constitution of the United States provides for defense. We have an education budget. I serve on that committee as well. But the social welfare program has failed. It has failed. When we are trying to cut everything that we have for our own defense in this country, including our intelligence agencies, if anybody ought to be mad at the FBI and CIA, it was me.
During the Desert Storm they gave our freshman class a lecture telling about the terrorist activity. I went to my district and they left it cut off.
We need them and we need them desparately. We have the other funds for education and those kinds of things.
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Let me put this debate into some perspective. As I understand it, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli] earlier indicated that our intelligence budget, our intelligence budget is more than the entire defense budgets for all of our potential enemies combined. What we are talking about is funding the intelligence agencies at roughly the level as when the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union were in existence.
Earlier the gentleman from Nevada asked if some of us on this side had gone into the special room and looked at the intelligence budget. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Owens] gave the answer that we had not, the reason that we had not. But there is a more important reason.
I have not gone into that room, but in my State, I have talked to parents whose children are hungry. I have talked to elderly people who cannot afford prescription drugs. I have talked to senior citizens who are getting by on Social Security. As mayor of the largest city in the State of Vermont, I have seen homelessness. I have seen the social misery that
is going on all over this country.
This debate is primarily not about the intelligence budget. If we give them $28 billion, they will take it; if we give them $100 billion, they will take it. What this debate is about is national priorities. It is the hypocrisy of Members coming up here every day talking about the deficit, talking about cutting Social Security, Medicaid, education, but not wanting to cut in any significant way the intelligence budget.
What this debate is about is national security. It is whether we will tolerate having 5 million children hungry, having the highest rate of poverty among children in the industrialized world.
Do Members want to know what national security is? It is feeding hungry children. It is educating the young. It is providing jobs for the unemployed. It is not spending more money on intelligence than the entire defense budgets of all our enemies combined. That is called overkill.
It is no secret to the Members of this body that Congress is not held in high esteem by the American people. This debate indicates why. We cannot talk about being serious about deficit reduction, we cannot talk about sensible national priorities and vote to keep the intelligence budget at the same level as it was at the height of the cold war.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
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Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I urge my colleagues to vote `no.' I must say, I find it somewhat disingenuous for Members to come here and talk about the budget in such detail without actually going upstairs and reviewing that budget. I agree with my colleague from Nevada, that budget, many billions of dollars, is available for access by all Members of Congress. And while I understand the argument, those who do not want to go up there might be somehow inhibited by what they see, it still defies my imagination that Members would come here to cut that budget without going upstairs and actually seeing what is debated and what is part of the intelligence budget.
The fact of the matter is, this country is still threatened. We are threatened by Korean troops from the north. We are threatened by Iraqis and Iranians. We are threatened by perhaps American troops who may find themselves in harm's way in Haiti. We are threatened by nuclear-tipped missiles being sold around the world. We are threatened by chemical and biological warfare. We are threatened by Third World countries in the arms game and we are threatened by terrorists at home and abroad.
Intelligence is a pretty good insurance policy to protect against that threat. We hope we never have to pay the piper on that insurance, if we do not pay the premium. That is what we are doing right now. We are paying the premium on that insurance policy. It is good sense for this country. I urge my colleagues to vote down the Sanders amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Hastings). The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders].
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 106, noes 315, not voting 18, as follows:
[TIME: 1843]
Ms. SCHENK and Ms. SHEPHERD changed their vote from `aye' to `no.'
Mr. HALL of Texas and Mr. VALENTINE changed their vote from `no' to `aye.'
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I want to let Members know the schedule for the evening.
We will have two amendments that we will consider. Then the Committee will rise and finish this bill tomorrow.
We will have one suspension vote, as I understand it.
Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Skaggs:
At the end of title VII (page 39, after line 4), insert the following:
SEC. 703. REPORT CONCERNING THE COST OF CLASSIFICATION.
Not later than 7 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report (in a classified and unclassified form) which identifies the following:
(1) The cost of classifying documents and keeping information classified by each agency within the intelligence community.
(2) The number of personnel within each such agency assigned to classifying documents and keeping information classified.
(3) A plan to reduce expenditures for classifying information and for keeping information classified, which shall include specific expenditure reduction goals for fiscal year 1995 for each such agency.
[Page: H5848]
Mr. SKAGGS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Hastings). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Colorado?
There was no objection.
Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, very briefly, this amendment merely directs the Director of Central Intelligence to comply with the reporting requirement that was included in the report to last year's authorization bill, a requirement that has not yet been complied with, dealing with the costs and the personnel involved in maintaining classified information within the intelligence community.
All of the other agencies of the executive branch of government have complied with this requirement in the report that was filed by OMB back in the spring. This is an effort to further get the attention of the intelligence community that they, too, need to provide this information as previously requested by Congress.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I fully support the amendment. We were prepared to accept it with the understanding that we will reconsider the need for it in conference based on the progress made at that point in meeting the schedule promised last night by Ms. Woolsey.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, we are happy to accept the amendment with the conditions the chairman laid out.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment, and I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Gilman: At the end of the bill insert a new Title IX--INTERDICTION OF AERIAL DRUG TRAFFICKING.
SECTION 901. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.
It is the policy of the United States to provide Intelligence assistance to foreign governments to support efforts by them to interdict aerial drug trafficking. In providing such assistance, the United States seeks to facilitate efforts by foreign governments to identify, track, intercept, and capture on the ground aircraft suspected of engaging in illegal drug trafficking, and to identify the airfields from which such aircraft operate. The United States does not condone the intentional damage or destruction of aircraft in violation of international law, and provides assistance to foreign governments for purposes other than facilitating the intentional damage or destruction of aircraft in violation of international law.
SEC. 902. AUTHORIZATION.
The President is authorized to provide Intelligence assistance to foreign governments under such terms and conditions as he may determine in order to carry out the policy stated in section 901. Activities directed by the President pursuant to this title shall not give rise to any civil or criminal action against the United States or any of its officers, agents, or employees.
SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
The Congress urges the President to review in light of this title all interpretations within the Executive branch of law relevant to the provision of assistance to foreign governments for aerial drug interdiction, with an eye to affirming that continued provision by the United States of such assistance conforms fully with United States and international law.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to an agreement with the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman], I ask unanimous consent that my amendment be modified, and I offer a substitute amendment to be considered in lieu of the amendment printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment, as modified.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment, as modified, offered by Mr. Gilman: At the end of the bill insert a new Title IX--INTERDICTION OF AERIAL DRUG TRAFFICKING.
SECTION 901. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.
It is the policy of the United States to provide intelligence assistance to foreign governments to support efforts by them to interdict aerial drug trafficking. The United States does not condone the intentional damage or destruction of aircraft in violation of international law, and provides assistance to foreign governments for purposes other than facilitating the intentional damage or destruction of aircraft in violation of international law.
SEC. 902. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
The Congress urges the President to review in light of this title all interpretations within the Executive branch of law relevant to the provision of assistance to foreign governments for aerial drug interdiction, with an eye to affirming that continued provision by the United States of such assistance conforms fully with United States and international law.
Mr. GILMAN (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment, as modified, be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York that the amendment be modified?
There was no objection.
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment in response to a policy change by the administration that has jeopardized the ability of our Nation to win the war on drugs. On May 1 of this year, as a result of a legal review undertaken within the Department of Defense, the administration suspended a variety of counternarcotics assistance programs with the Governments of Colombia and Peru.
Most importantly, the administration stopped providing intelligence information to those governments for use by them in tracking and intercepting airplanes suspected of transporting narcotics toward our shores.
This policy change was adopted without any prior consultation with the Congress, or indeed, as I understand it, without any prior consultation with the Governments of Colombia and Peru.
By all accounts, the results of this policy change have been disasterous. The suspension of United States assistance has given the narcotraffickers virtual free reign over the skies of Colombia and Peru, and has resulted in a significant upsurge in the volume of cocaine headed for the United States.
This is an appalling situation, and it has to stop.
My amendment is intended to express the concern of the Congress over this situation, and to open the way for the administration to solve the problem.
The amendment clarifies that it is the policy of the United States to provide intelligence assistance to foreign governments like Colombia and Peru for use by them in interdicting aerial drug trafficking. Such assistance is provided not in order to facilitate the intentional damage or destruction of aircraft by such governments in violation of international law, but rather to assist the interdiction of aircraft by such governments by means that do not involve the damage or destruction of aircraft in violation of international law.
This does not mean that it is contrary to U.S. policy for foreign governments to use U.S. intelligence information to damage or destroy aircraft in all circumstances. To the contrary, there are circumstances in which international law permits governments to damage or destroy aircraft. For example, it is clear that governments may act in self-defense against airplanes that are endangering the lives of others. Similarly, in time of war, or if a country has declared a national emergency in accordance with article 89 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, the usual rules do not apply.
The clarification of U.S. policy set forth in my amendment should help the administration reach a different conclusion on the legality of continued provision by the United States of intelligence information to foreign governments for purposes of aerial drug interdiction than the administration reached the last time it looked at this question.
In its review earlier this year, the administration apparently assumed that Colombia and Peru are likely to use United States-provided intelligence information to shoot down aircraft in violation of international law. It is not clear to me, however, that Colombia and Peru are likely to use this information in a manner inconsistent with their obligations under international law.
If Colombia and Peru are not likely to act in violation of international law, then an additional legal concern identified by the
administration--that officials of Colombia and Peru may be violating criminal provisions of the Aircraft Sabotage Act, particularly title 18, United States Code, section 32(b)(2)--appears to have been exaggerated.
Section 32(b)(2) makes it a U.S. crime for persons to damage or destroy certain aircraft even if there is no nexus between the underlying act and the United States--that is, no involvement of U.S. citizens and no other connection to U.S. territory. Ordinarily the United States would be without jurisdiction to criminalize acts with no relationship to the United States, but section 32(b)(2) relies on the international legal principle of universal jurisdiction as a basis for applying U.S. criminal law.
Universal jurisdiction exists only with respect to certain heinous violations of international law, such as genocide and piracy. The damage or destruction of civil aircraft in flight in violation of international law is a recognized basis of universal jurisdiction, and it is upon this basis that the criminal proscriptions of section 32(b)(2) rest.
It is obvious, however, that universal jurisdiction does not exist with respect to actions that do not violate international law. It should not be hard, therefore, for the administration to interpret section 32(b)(2) as applying only to acts over which the United States has jurisdiction in accordance with international law.
It follows that if Colombia and Peru are not violating international law, their officials cannot be violating section 32(b)(2).
An additional legal concern identified by the administration is that U.S. officials providing intelligence assistance to Colombia and Peru may be violating title 18, United States Code, section 2(a) by aiding and abetting violations by officials of those Governments of section 32(b)(2). Of course, this concern is misplaced if, in fact, Colombian and Peruvian officials are not violating section 32(b)(2).
Even if Colombian and Peruvian officials were deemed to be violating section 32(b)(2), however, there can be no aiding and abetting liability on the part of United States officials unless those officials act with the specific intent to facilitate unlawful activity. The statement of U.S. policy contained in section 901 of my amendment makes clear that it is not the intent of the United States to facilitate unlawful activity. To the contrary, section 901 states that the United States does not condone the intentional damage or destruction of aircraft in violation of international law.
In any event, the Attorney General's prosecutorial discretion can be used to ensure that U.S. officials are not prosecuted for carrying out the policy of the President.
I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that the administration has proposed legislation to resolve the intelligence sharing problem that arose as a result of the administration's legal review. That proposal would have us amend section 32(b)(2) to create an exemption for the intentional damage or destruction of aircraft in certain circumstances.
I am not unalterably opposed to such an approach. I believe, however, that we must proceed cautiously in amending U.S. criminal law in this regard, not least because many other countries have criminal laws similar to section 32(b)(2), and we would not want to suggest to those countries that they may exercise their universal jurisdiction to prosecute U.S. officials for actions that we thought were prohibited by section 32(b)(2) in the first instance.
I will remain willing to discuss possible refinements of my amendment with the administration as the legislative process unfolds. In the meantime, Mr. Chairman, I urge the adoption of my amendment.
[Page: H5849]
[TIME: 1850]
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GILMAN. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Kansas.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman's amendment. I could not have supported it as originally drafted, but he has modified it to make sure there is a strong policy statement and that there is a sense of the Congress that we are helpful to the Andean nations in supporting their aerial antidrug interdiction efforts. Therefore, I support the amendment.
Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for his support.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
(Mr. COMBEST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, we certainly accept the amendment and I support the gentleman's amendment.
Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for his support.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Hastings). The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].
The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Montgomery) having assumed the chair, Mr. Hastings, Chairman pro tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4299) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.
END