1993 Congressional ReportsIntelligence and Security
1993 Congressional Reports
TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
House Republican Research Committee
(Chairman: Bill McCollum, Florida)
February 1, 1993
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The following paper is the result of several years of research
and analysis of the trends in the spread of Islamic fundamental-
ism into the Sunni Muslim world and the overlapping relationships
between the various fundamentalist terrorist groups. Because of
the extensive nature of this topic, this paper was, of necessity,
longer than is usually appropriate for business reports. There-
fore, this paper was structured to be read either in its entirety
or can be referenced by subject heading. The following is a table
of contents to allow the reader to more easily find topics of
concern.
Page 1 --- OVERVIEW - A brief discussion of the central issues to
be covered in the paper.
Page 2 --- ROOTS - Section discusses the origins of the spread of
Islamist fundamentalism into what had teen previously regarded as
the moderate Sunni sect of Islam.
Page 6 --- THE AFGHAN EXPERIENCE - Touches on the terrorist in-
frastructure in Afghanistan and Pakistan and its role as a source
of Islamist terrorism. Section points out the fundamental impli-
cations the Afghan War had in developing and spreading Islamist
doctrines.
Page 10 --- SUDAN: THE LEADERSHIP AND HIGH COMMAND - This section
discusses the key role played by the fundamentalist government
and terrorist operatives based in Sudan in the creation and
spread of the fundamentalist cause.
Page 20 --- THE TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE IN IRAN - A Study of
Iran's role in the building of a Sunni Islamist terrorist infras-
tructure. The section also discusses the ideological differences
between Iran's fundamentalist Shiites and their Sunni counter-
parts.
Page 26 --- THE TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE IN SUDAN - Analysis of
the Sudanese terrorist infrastructure and its links elsewhere in
the world.
page 34 --- SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - An overview of the Sunni Islam-
ist infrastructure and operations in Africa.
Page 37 - PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN AND THE EXPORT OF TERRORISM -
Studies the key role played by Afghan veterans in the spread of
Islamist terrorism. Section goes into fairly detailed discussion
of Pakistani intervention in Kashmir area of India.
Page 52 --- EGYPT AND ALGERIA - Discusses the Islamist threat
particularly as it relates to the domestic situation in Algeria
and Egypt. Discusses how Afghan veterans have become a source of
instability to the Algiers and Cairo governments.
Page 56 --- CHARTING NEW PATHS - Section analyzes the spread of
Sunni Islamism in the central Asian republics of the former So-
viet Union. Covers briefly the relationship between the national-
ist question and religious fundamentalism in the region.
Pg. 58 ---IRAN'S HAND - This section discusses the ways in
which-Iran has sought, not simply to align itself with Sunni fun-
damentalism, but to control it.
Pg. 64 --- A NOTE ON ISLAMIST CONNECTIONS IN JORDAN - Brief dis-
cussion of the Sunni terrorist infrastructure in JORDAN, its
development and how it actually represents a threat to the
Hashemite monarchy.
Pg. 65 --- IN THE WEST - This section touches on the growth of
the Sunni Islamist threat to the Western world.
Pg. 68 --- THE BALKANS - Discusses the pivotal role of the war in
the former Yugoslavia as it relates to a potential Muslim/Western
confrontation. Looks at how the fate of European Muslims has be-
come a rallying cry for Islamist terrorists.
Pg. 72 --- THE UNITED STATES - Briefly touches on the danger
posed to the United States and Canada by an Iranian/Sudanese ter-
rorist organization in North America. Section looks at the re-
cruitment of American convicts to serve the Islamist cause.
Pg. 74 --- THE BIG PICTURE AND BEYOND - Section looks at the
socio-political and cultural developments in the Islamic world as
they relate to the doctrines of the Islamist fundamentalist. Sec-
tion briefly discusses the anti- Western rationale of fundamen-
talist Islam.
Pg. 84 --- APPENDIX - A listing of Islamist terrorist organiza-
tions by country to assist the reader.
OVERVIEW
Since the Fall of 1992, there has been a significant increase in
Islamist terrorism, subversion and violence in such diverse coun-
tries as India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Ni-
geria, Somalia, and many others. Despite the different cir-
cumstances of these incidents, they do not appear to be isolated
events. Rather, they are the first incidents in the escalation of
an Islamic Jihad against the "Judeo-Christian world order". Thus,
the climax of this struggle could well be an increase in terror-
ism throughout the West.
However, what is most striking, and indeed alarming, about this
new campaign is that it is being carried out not by the usual
Shi'ite fundamentalist groups, but by Sunni networks affiliated
with a new Islamist International that is serving as the umbrella
organization for numerous "Jihadist" groups. Essentially con-
trolled and sponsored by Iran, and run via Sudan under the
leadership of Shaykh Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, the Islamist
International is the realization of the Ayatollah Khomeyni's ori-
ginal vision of an ecumenical "all-Islamic Revolution" that would
unite Sunnis and Shi'ites in their war against the "Great Satan."
Through the international's military branch, the Armed Islamic
Movement, (popularly known as "the International Brigade/Legion
of Islam,") the Islamist International has undertaken its terror-
ist campaign under the leadership of operatives known as "Af-
ghans." These fighters take their name from the fact that many of
them trained with the mujahideen in Afghanistan. The Islamist Le-
gion sends its fighters all over Asia, Africa and Europe to sup-
port, facilitate and perpetrate what the Islamist leadership con-
siders "Islamic liberation struggles."
This group, and its affiliated organizations, are currently ac-
tive in Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Kashmir, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia,
the Philippines, and, increasingly, Bosnia-Hercegovina. To facil-
itate their campaigns, the Islamists have bases and support fa-
cilities in Sudan, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan where they also
receive advanced military and terrorist training from an interna-
tional cadre of experts. These forces then deploy to their desti-
nations via Tehran and Khartoum.
The rise of this current wave of Islamist terrorism in its Sunni
variant is an outgrowth of the collapse of the radical leftist
Arab nationalist doctrines. With the end of the Arab revolution-
ary trend, Arab youths were diverted away from the old
socialist-nationalist movements and were drawn into the fold of
revivalist radical Islam.
This is not surprising since radical Islam provided its followers
with the same intellectual inspiration that had previously come
only from left wing Arab nationalism. However, the new doctrines
of radical Islam added something else; namely a theological di-
mension that offered young charismatic leaders "divine guidance",
and the assurance of a reward in heaven. In radical Islam, the
suffering and frustration of this world are presented as trials
on the road to martyrdom and paradise, so that the more the
beleiver suffers and sacrifices, the better his eternal reward.
Consequently, already radicalized youth have begun rallying to
the banner of Islam in un- precedented numbers and are forming
the vanguard of a new wave of anti-Western terrorism.
The following paper will explain all of the aforementioned issues
in detail and trace some of the current operations of this new
pan- Islamist effort, as well as its origins. Due to the length
of this paper, each part can be read separately, or the whole
piece can be read in its entirety. As much as possible, the au-
thor has undertaken to link each section of this paper into a
coherent whole, but due to the enormous number of groups in-
volved, it is recommended that the entire essay be kept at hand
when reading any given section to facilitate cross referencing
the individual components of the paper.
ROOTS
The rise of Islamist terrorism, and especially the Armed Islamic
Movement, is the result of the convergence of several historical
factors, including:
- The impact of the Islamic Revolution in Iran on the Sunni
Islamist movement dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and its
consequent impact on the ideology of the latter.
- The appeal and impact of the rise of the radical international
terrorist movement dominated by Iran and Syria, the most notori-
ous component of which is the HizbAllah, and the ensuing "theo-
cratization" of leftist Palestinian organizations.
- The lingering impact of the war in Afghanistan, and the pres-
ence of Arab volunteers in the ranks of the Mujahideen, particu-
larly as this has facilitated the development of a core of battle
trained veterans.
To take the first point, from the very beginning, the Islamic Re-
volution in Iran emphasized its internationalist character and
its commitment to an all-Islamic revolutionary process. Since
Islam does not recognize boundaries or the Western concept of
statehood, the export of the Islamic Revolution throughout the
Muslim World became, in Tehran's view, an internal problem of the
ummah (nation).
Thus, in the wake of their revolution, the Iran leadership early
on committed itself to leading a global Islamic Revolution, ini-
tially at least in the Near East. This strategy was given expres-
sion on 14 January 1980, when Khomeyni presented his perception
of the state of the world to a group of 120 Pakistani army off-
icers on a pilgrimage to Qom: "We are at war against infidels.
Take this message with you -- I ask all Islamic nations, all
Islamic armies and all heads of Islamic states to join the holy
war. There are many enemies to be kileld or destroyed. Jihad must
triumph."
Moreover, Tehran considered its involvement in revolutionary
struggles abroad not just as a moral obligation, but a vital step
to ensure the very existence of the regime. Thus, Ayatollah
Khomeyni emphasized and explained Iran's commitment to the spread
of the Islamic Revolution in his New Year Mesage on 21 March
1980:
"We must strive to export our revolution throughout the world,
and must abandon all idea of not doing so, for not only does
Islam refuse to recognize any difference between Muslim coun-
tries, it is the champion of all oppressed people. Moreover, all
the powers are intent on destroying us, and if we remain sur-
rounded in a closed circle, we shall certainly be defeated. We
must make plain our stance towards the powers and the superpowers
and demonstarte to them that despite the ardous problems that
burden us, our attitude to the world is dictated by our beliefs."
Initially, however, the Sunni Islamist elite, especially the
Muslim Brotherhood, with their own rich theological and ideologi-
cal heritage, were apprehensive about Khomeyni's self-declared
leadership of the Muslim world. Indeed, Egypt's theological elite
received the Iranian Revolution with a mixed reaction, while
Islamist activists adopted a wide variety of opinions about the
legality of a Shi'ite revolution as a precedent and inspiration
for a Sunni movement.
Some, like 'Umar al-Tilmisani of the Muslim Brotherhood expressed
delight with the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and
predicted that teh Islamic Regime would incite an Islamic revolu-
tionary process leading, within a short time, to the eradication
of the rule of non-Muslims over Muslims. Others were less
enthusiastic.
However, the key question in all of this became that of the in-
timacy of the ecumenical message of Khomeyni, namely the call for
a unified Islamic world. Some interpreted the ecumenical message
as a rallying cry for the rejuvination of Islam. For example, in
his introduction to Khomeyni's book, Islamic Government, Dr. Ha-
san Hanafi emphasized that the differences between the Sunni and
Shi'a "has been played with by imperialists and Zionism ... but
Khomeyni ... leads a truly Islamic revolution that surpasses
these secretarian borders. .. Its elan goes back to the first re-
volutionary achievements of the earliest phases of Islam."
However, in the early 1980s, Egyptian Islamists were preoccupied
with internal problems and their reaction to Khomeyni's call for
a world- wide export of the Islamic revolution was dictated by
their own priorities. Indeed, the sharpest opposition to the
Iranian Revolution, including even a denial of its Islamic char-
acter, came from the ranks of the militant revivalists. For exam-
ple, during their trial after the assasination of Sadat, members
of the Jihad Organization, including the followers of 'Abd al-
Salam Faraj, protested that "to compare us to Khomeyni is like
trying to discredit the authentic Islamic regime that we strive
for."
At the same time, Faraj himself endorsed Khomeyni's concept of
the supremacy of the "jurisconsult" as a leader and accepted the
centrality of the Jihad. Thus Faraj wrote in "The Absent Per-
cept", "learned men of religion today have ignored jihad as a way
of Allah, despite their knowledge that it is the only way to re-
store and raise the edifice of Islam again, and that the devils
on this earth can only be removed by the power of the sword."
Moreover, the militants of the Jihad Organization, whatever other
reservations they initially had, paid close attention to the
operational lessons that were to be derived from the Iranian ex-
perience in the period leading to the revolution, including tac-
tics, propaganda, etc. Thus, during his trial, Lt. Col. Abbud
al-Zumur explained that the Jihad Organization was determined to
incite a mass revolt by assassinating Sadat because the conspira-
tors "learned from Iran that the army and police cannot withstand
a popular rebellion."
Nevertheless, as the appeal of leftist Arab nationalsim began to
wane, Iran became a Mecca for young radical Islamists, both Sunni
and Shi'ites, and these youths began to be integrated into the
rapidly expanding international terrorist system. For example,
Sunnis from the Maghrib became active members in Iranian-led ter-
rorist groups in Western Europe. From there they supported and
led "pro-Hizballah" organizations of religious extremists and
took part in most Iranian-sponsored operations from Morocco to
Djibouti, as well as in France. The Maghribi Islamist "is con-
nected with terrorism, especially since he was molded in Iran to
aid and abet extremist terrorist organizations," concluded Mus-
tafa al-Zaanouni, a Tunisian official.
Further, wth the growing involvement of Iran in the terrorist in-
frastructure in Lebanon, numerous Islamist Sunni groups and or-
ganizations began enjoying Iranian and Syrian financing, training
and assistance to the extent that they became, de facto, an in-
tegral part of the international terrorist network controlled and
sponsored by Iran and Syria.
This in turn has led to a marked intensification of the growing
"Islamicization process" amongst extremist Palestinian terrorist
organizations who had been previously dominated by revolutionary,
leftist and even near-communist ideologies. Inspired by the com-
mitment and zeal of the Hizbollahi, growing number of Arab ter-
rorists became Islamists, initially as individuals, but later in
such numbers that the major Palestinian terrorist groups could
not help but be drawn into the fold.
Thus, slowly but surely, traditional radical Palestinian terror-
ist groups, mainly in Lebanon, began to "discover" Islam. For ex-
ample, the PFLP-GC's Ahmad Jibril began to emphasize the inevita-
bility of the rediscovery of Islam and the return to pan-Islamic
unity:
"We have reached total coviction that we, as an Arab generation
that was a victim of a false culture -- a Western culture and a
poisonous culture since the beginning of this century -- should
search for sources of power under these difficult and tough cir-
cumstances to face our enemies. In other words, we must search
for sources of power in the Arab and Islamic nation in order to
mobilize them in the battle of confrontation with the Zionits.
... We must review this issue, and Islam must be given its spir-
it, that is, politics.
It is highly significant that Jibril sees the essence of his re-
volutionary struggle as the resurrection of a pan-Islamist
super-state, the Islamic nation [umma].
Meanwhile, in the mid-1980s, Tehran tried to translate the
conversion of individuals to radical Islam into an institutional
development, and decided to establish "an expanded Islamic front"
that would include Sunni Islamists. Theran's idea was received
positively by several clergy groups and especially those affili-
ated with the Islamic Unification [Towhid] Movement. "Imam
Khomeyni insisted on forming an expanded Islamic movement in
Lebanon to consist of those who agree to join it, ignoring the
opposition group." Thus, in the afll of 1984, Shaykh Sa'id
Sha'ban travelled to Beirut and met with Iranian officials to ex-
amine "the possibile formation of an Islamic front with HizbAl-
lah" toward the formation of a united Islamic leadership."
Although Shaykh Fadallah emphasized the close relations between
the Shi'ite HizbAllah and the Sunni Islamist Towhid Movement, the
HizbAllah's Islamic Jihad commanders mistrusted the Sunnis. Thus,
Khomeyni charged Ayotollah Mehdi Karrubi, the head of the Martyrs
Foundation, with winning the support of the Shi'ite leadership.
Karrubi travelled to Lebanon where he met with Fadlallah and oth-
er leaders and "reviewed the Lebanese Muslims' situation." Karru-
bi also met Shaykh Hassan Khalid, the Sunni Mufti of Lebanon, and
Shaykh Sha'ban in an effort "to unify Shi'a and Sunni ulama in
Lebanon." Indeed, Shaykh Hossayn al-Mussawi soon stated that "our
relations with Shaykh Sha'ban are excellent and strong because he
is not only a servant of the Lord, he has also closed ranks with
Imam Khomeyni. Although he is a Sunni and we are Shi'ites, I have
to say that his goals and ambitions are the same as ours."
PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE EXPORT OF TERRORISM
Sponsoring international terrorism and separatist subversion and
insurgency is not new to Pakistan. Since the 1970s, Islamabad has
been training Sikh and other Indian separatist movements as part
of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's strategy of "forward strategic depth,"
and also as a part of his effort to gain revenge for India's sup-
port of an independent Bangladesh. Thus, when in the early-1980s
the Shironami Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee [SGPC], a Sikh ter-
rorist group, began to establish a tight control over the Sikh
economy in the Indian Punjab, and also began efforts to enforce
the imperatives of Sikh traditionalism and conservatism on Punjab
society, Pakistan was quick to exploit the opportunity.
"These trends.were viewed with growing interest by Pakistani mil-
itary strategists across the border." Islamabad was intrigued by
more than just the destabilizing effect of the struggle for Khal-
istan. From a strategic point of view, "Pakistan has not yet
given up its claims to Kashmir and may be tempted to encourage
the creation of a Sikh state of Khalistan in the Indian Punjab in
order to make the Indian defense of Kashmir difficult. Indeed,
Islamabad was determined to exploit the growing tension in Kash-
mir to destabilize India and therefore began to provide better
training and military assistance for Sikhs militants. Thus, it
was not long before the military capabilities and audacity of the
Sikh militants began to increase tremendously.
Indeed, the Sikhs began to represent such a potential threat that
India launched its assault an the Golden Temple at Amritsar in
July 1984. With that event there opened an unprecedented
bloodletting amongst Sikhs and Punjabis alike whose casualties
far exceeded in numbers the victims of Sikh terrorism by itself
to that point. Ultimately, the escalation of Sikh separatist ter-
rorism culminated with the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi. As for
Islamabad, the Gandhi assassination was proof of the strategic
value of subversion.
Thus, the further militarization and radicalization of the Sikh
armed struggle increased, as larger quantities of high quality
weapons became available. Among the novelties of the revived ter-
rorist campaign were sophisticated bomb making techniques and
better training for Sikh terrorists of the Dal Khalsa separatist
movement in the Afghan Mujahidden camps. Indeed, Sikh 'trainees'
were killed in a Soviet raid on an Afghan training camp in Pakis-
tan and their documents were seized.
Further, by 1985, the ISI (Pakistani intelligence) was completing
a vast training infrastructure for the Afghan resistance movement
that could "just as well be used for the training and support of
other regional groups. Therefore, it was not long before "Afghan
terrorists trained by .... CIA instructors had been smuggled into
India with the purpose of organizing acts of terrorism
against ..... members of the Indian Government and foreign diplo-
matic representatives."
In the meantime, there was a corresponding ideological develop-
ment in Indian Kashmir. Since 1984, virtually overnight, the pre-
vailing popular sentiment in Indian Kashmir became one of ap-
prehension that "Islam is in Danger." That sentiment, rather than
the old fashioned nationalism that had predominated in the past,
began to have a galvanizing effect on the youth of the Kashmir
region. This set the stage for a massive influx of young people
who were to form new cadres of terrorists.
In retrospect, the extent of the external, that is Pakistani and
Afghan, influence on the Islamist transformation of the Kashmiri
insurgency is quite clear. Indeed, Kashmir was the only area in
India where, as of the mid-1980s, Islamic revivalism had "taken a
radical political stance" and where "the slogans of the Islamic
state have been publicly raised" and had been received with grow-
ing popularity. The population was increasingly adopting the
leadership of Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan and Khomeynists
representing the "following of the line of imam Khomeyni" as
their own leaders. Consequently, by 1984, an Islamic radicaliza-
tion had developed that saw the rise of such movements as the
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, Mahaz-i-Azadi, and the Li-
beration League.
Later, by 1985, both the Jama'at-i-Islami and al-Jihad movements,
the latter "a clandestine organization influenced by the ideology
of the Iranian revolution," were becoming highly influential in
Kashmiri politics. Indeed, the al-Jihad movement publicly raised
the issue of an "Islamic Revolution" as the "the only way to li-
berate" Kashmir in the mid-1980s. Thus, in the space of a few
short years, "there was a marked erosion of the secular Kashmiri
personality and a Muslim identity with fundamentalist overtones
started emerging rapidly," Therefore, it also became imperative
for the emerging separatist leaders to "give the struggle a pan-
Islamic character and extra-territorial dimension."
Indeed, as noted, this transformation was assisted and reinforced
by an active ISI program. Initially, the emphasis of this program
was on using the Afghan-support infrastructure in Pakistan to
support Kashmiri militants. Indeed, during the main escalation of
Islamist violation in Indian Kashmir in mid-1988, Pakistan pro-
vided assistance in the training and arming of Kashmiri terror-
ists, as well as sanctuaries to Kashmiri insurgents across the
border. At times, the ISI's assistance to the Kashmiri Islamists
was even funneled through Afghan rebel leader Gulbaddin Hekmati-
yar's Hizb-i Islami group, thus providing Islamabad with deni-
ability.
However, as commercial considerations began to come into account,
the ISI opted to end its behind the scenes maneuvers and began to
take over direct control of the Sikh movement. This development
began when the ISI made the city of Darra, in Pakistan, the pri-
mary source of weapons for the Sikh, Tamil and Kashmiri libera-
tion movements. The escalation of terrorism by the Karachi-based
organizations, especially the MQM, rejuvenated the domestic Dar-
ran market and the Pushtan population in Karachi rapidly became
the "store-front" for the tribal arms market, taking care of
transportation throughout Pakistan as well as smuggling overseas.
The availability of weapons, primarily from supplies to the Af-
ghan resistance, turned Karachi into a center for Islamic inter-
national terrorism involving Palestinians and "a large number of
people from Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Afghanistan, Burma, Thai-
land, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Africa who live in Karachi
as 'Muslims'." All of these provide an excellent manpower pool
for the development of sabotage and terrorist operations.
However, ultimately, all of these activities were but stopgaps.
Having witnessed the initial impact of the Islamist message in
Indian Kashmir, Islamabad began to broaden its horizons and set
it sights on bigger goals. Thus, in 1986, with growing experi-
ence in training, organizing and running the Afghan mujahideen,
and with military supplies available (through US, Saudi, and oth-
er foreign assistance), Pakistan began expanding its operation to
sponsor and promote separatism and terrorism, primarily in Kash-
mir, as a strategic long-term program. Among the most crucial
activities of the ISI were the following:
* "Religious fundamentalism was propagated in small but lethal
doses to promote separatism and communal outlook."
* "Training and indoctrination of selected leaders from the Kash-
mir Valley was arranged to create militant cadres."
* "A large number of youth from the Kashmir Valley and Poonch
Sector were given extensive training in the use of automatic
weapons, sabotage and attacks on security forces. Automatic
weapons and explosives were now issued to these people."
* "Special teams were trained to organize agitations and hartals,
and to engineer incidents to damage the democratic and secular
image of India,"
Thus, the rise of Islamist ideology to predominance throughout
Indian Kashmir facilitated the emergence of a tight link between
the Kashmiri insurgents, their supporters, and Islamabad. Thus,
it was with the widespread adoption of Islamist ideologies that
Kashmiri Muslims could "now seek ideological sustenance from a
transnational Islam, while simultaneously basking in the
guaranteed patronage from across the border." Concurrently, for
the Pakistani defense establishment, the Kashmir cause consti-
tuted a combination of regional interest and commitment to the
global Islamist cause. "Muslim fundamentalists in Pakistan ..,
see the Islamic surge in Kashmir as the long awaited hour for ji-
had against Indian infidels, a holy war for which Pakistan must
funnel material and moral backing."
Moreover, the escalation in Kashmir answered some of Islamabad's
more pressing pragmatic concerns. Thus, the support of secession-
ist terrorism has become an integral part of Pakistani diplomacy.
However, there is a profound difference between support for Sikh
terrorism in Punjab, which is a matter of harassing New Delhi,
and Islamist terrorism in Kashmir, where there is a genuine whole
-hearted commitment to Jihad.
Furthermore, in the increase of support for terrorism in India,
Islamabad has teen able to find a task for the Pakistani and Af-
ghan cadres that Islamabad had developed during the Afghan War
and must now keep from meddling in Pakistani domestic politics.
Indeed, to secure that goal, Brig. (ret.) Imtiaz, head of the ISI
Political Section, has developed a long-term program called 'K-2'.
The 'K-2' program is aimed at unifying and better coordinating
the Kashmiri and Sikhs subversion efforts by "bringing under one
umbrella Sikh and Kashmiri extremists and Muslim fundamentalists
who would then intensify acts of violence in Punjab, Jammu and
Kashmir, and the Terai region of Uttar Pradesh." Indeed, the es-
calation of terrorism and subversion since the early 1990s is be-
lieved to have been a direct outgrowth of the ISI's implementa-
tion of the 'K-2' long-term program.
At the same time, since the revolution, Iran has had a special
commitment to the Islamist struggle in Kashmir because the mater-
nal branch of the family of the Ayatollah Khomeyni, the branch
through which the family derived its upper-class roots, has lived
in Kashmir since the 18th century. Even the Iran-based branch of
the Khcmeyni family was known as a-Hindi, that is, of the Indi-
ans. All this time, the Khomeyni-based branch of the family has
continued to maintain relations with their relatives in Kashmir,
and in the 20th century, the Persian Khomeynis have cared for
children of Kashmiris sent for higher religious learning in Qom
and Najaf. Thus, in the late-1990s, Ayatollah Khomeyni still re-
tained some contacts with the main branch of his Kashmiri family
and has retained emotional ties to it.
However, it was with the consolidation of the Tehran-led Islamic
Bloc that the struggle for Kashmir became a primary strategic
consideration and priority of Iran. Toward the end of 1991, IRGC
Maj. Gen. Mohsin Reza'i elaborated on the strategic ramifications
and objectives of the south Asian component of the wider Tehran-
led Islamic Bloc. He explained that:
"If there is unity among Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, this
this will strengthen Muslim solidarity and enable the peoples of
Soviet Central Asia and Kashmir to join in. China would also
welcome such a development, but I am not sure about the Indian
view, although there are a lot of people in India (i.e., 150
million Muslims) who share a similar heritage with us."
Reza'i emphasized that there should be a major mobilization of
all the Muslim Bloc's members in order to acquire the required
defense capabilities to face the US. This revived strategic im-
portance has significantly altered the extent of Tehran's support
for the Islamist subversion of Kashmir and has had a direct im-
pact on Pakistani support as well.
Thus, the extent of the growing state support for the Islamist
terrorism and insurgency in Indian Kashmir is clearly reflected
in the evolution of the various organizations operating there. By
1990, there were well over 30 militant groups in Kashmir,
representing a wide array of ideologies including secessionists,
progressive freedom fighters, nationalists and Islamic mu-
jahideen. Of these, as many as 29 Kashmiri subversive groups have
been receiving assistance and shelter in Pakistan.
Most important, however, from a security point of view, are the
small very active groups "Which create terror and spread a funda-
mentalist message," such as the Allah Tigers and al-Umar Mu-
jahideen. These groups are dedicated to imposing Islamist stan-
dards on local populations, and at least some factions are affi-
liated with the Muslim United Front and the Jamat-i-Islami (both
the Pakistani and Kashmiri) both of whom support union with Pak-
istan. The terrorist operations of these groups include raids on
liquor stores, the burning of movie theaters, etc. as well as
more overtly political violence.
However, perhaps the most dramatic indication of the growing
Islamist domination in Kashmir can be seen in the demise of the
region's first and foremost nationalist liberation front, the
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which is collapsing
under Islamic pressure. The JKLF's militants and supporters are
increasingly shifting to the Islamist struggle, leaving it bereft
of money and manpower.
Inversely, the Jammu and Kashmir Students Liberation Front
(JKSLF] has transformed into an Islamist organization, now cal-
ling itself Ikhwan al- Muslimeen [Muslim Brothers], and is rapid-
ly expanding. Its leader, Hilal Ahmad Beig, is currently at the
forefront of the struggle for "the Islamization of Kashmir." Beig
is also in command of the armed branch of the Muslim Brotherhood
of Kashmir which is increasing its involvement in terrorism.
Among the movements enjoying widespread popular support in Indian
Kashmir, the evolution of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen has taken on the
most importance. It has been supported by, and closely affiliat-
ed with, the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami, from which they receive
funding, weapons and training assistance beyond the ISI's contri-
bution. Following the organizational principles recommended by
Tehran and Khartoum, the movement has transformed into the Kash-
miri Jamaat-i-Islami, under Abdul-Majid Dar, with a quasi-legal
character emphasizing educational and social activism, with the
Hizb-ul Mujahideen as the clandestine terrorist arm.
As they have developed, the leadership of both Hizb-ul Mujahideen
and Jamaat-i Islami have so far been able to elude the Indian
security forces. Among these leaders are men like Sayed Salah-
ud-Din, the senior leader, Shamus-ul-Haq, the spiritual leader
known as "the Amir," and Ashan Dar, the military commander.
Further, in 1991, as the Hizb-ul Mujahideen was becoming more
professional, it established several clandestine subgroups such
as Nassir-ul-Islam and Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen to carry out expert
terrorist operations.
Also of crucial importance to Islamabad's long- term plans is the
availability of a highly professional and tightly controlled core
of terrorist operatives. Toward establishing just such a core,
the ISI established the Janbaz Mujahideen force "to give subver-
sive training to Kashmiri militants in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir"
and to carry out clandestine and subversive operations on behalf
of Islamabad. The ISI task force overseeing and running the Jan-
baz Mujahideen is comprised of Kashmiris and Afghans operating
out of ISI safe houses.
In order to give credibility and deniability to these operations,
the ISI did not invent an organization. Instead, in 1989/90, they
essentially took over the remnant of the Jammu-based Janbaz Mu-
jahideen organization, whose "founder," Firdous Ahmad Baba
(a.k.a. Babar Badr) was in jail. A new commander, Parvez Haider,
was installed to intensify operations following an infusion of
foreign aid. This process of manipulation and the creation of a
rational mujahideen organization is not new. Indeed, the ISI had
already perfected it with the creation and continued manipulation
of Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's Hizb-i-Islami as the spearhead of the
Afghan Jihad. As Zia-ul-Haq himself acknowledged to then ISI
chief Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rahman, "it is Pakistan who made
[Gulbaddin Hekmatiyarl] an Afghan leader."
In addition, for truly sensitive and audacious, though deniable,
operations inside India, the ISI established and runs its own
""Kashmiri" organizations." The most important among these are
the Hizb-u-lslami, which is comprised of former Kashmiri Mu-
jahideen who were trained by the ISI and then fought with Gulbad-
din Hekmatiyar's organization in Afghanistan. Also, there is
Harakat-ul-Jihad, another highly professional terrorist group
created in Pakistan. It is led by a Pakistani-born Kashmiri (not
certain) calling himself Shahid Masood. It is made up of veteran
'Afghans' from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kashmir who receive ex-
tensive ISI support.
The ISI has also established a force made up of Pakistani special
forces, dressed in Indian Army uniforms, to assist the Pakistan
trained Kashmiris in dealing with major crises. Their commander
is known as Col. Farooq. The first detachments of this ISI force
infiltrated into Indian Kashmir in July 1991. By the fall, they
had escalated their operations, as well as improved the effec-
tiveness of the local Islamist terrorists by providing on-site
training and professional support.
In any case, by early 1991, the importance of the Pakistani-
Afghan terrorist infrastructure for the international Islamist
movement further increased as a result of changes in Libya in the
aftermath of the economic sanctions that were imposed on that
country because of Qadhafi's support for international terrorism.
Although Qadhafi was fully committed to the escalation of the
terrorist struggle, he nevertheless sought ways to diminish his
culpability for terrorist acts by publicly ordering the expul-
sion of known terrorists.
However, Libyan intelligence also began transferring some of the
country's training installations into other countries, including
Sudan and Pakistan- Afghanistan, where active training of Islam-
ist terrorists was already taking place. The Libyans assisted in
the upgrading of the terrorist infrastructure in the camps of the
Afghan resistance both inside Pakistan and just across the border
in Afghanistan, because, as Qadhafi pointed cut, "Afghanistan is
open to anyone who wants to train."
By then, as the fighting in Afghanistan was grinding to a near
halt, the Islamist Mujahidden were shifting more and more atten-
tion to the training of thousands of "brethren" from all over the
Muslim world. Some 2,000- 3,000 volunteers were in the Khost area
alone in early-1991. The organized transfer of training installa-
tions to several camps in Pakistan- Afghanistan began in the sum-
mer of 1991 and still continues as terrorist teams arrive from
Libya or via other countries.
For example, some 30-35 Libyan expert terrorist trainers arrived
in Peshawar in November 1991 with the declared objective "to
train national liberation forces" in mujahideen camps, mainly
those of Gulbaddin and Sayyaf. By March 1992, now in a Sayyaf
camp in the Kana area, Nangarhar Province, these Libyans became
devout Islamists and joined the Muslim Brotherhood under the
leadership of Shaykh Nur-ad-Din.
It is noteworthy that the Armed Islamic Movement also player a
major role in the consolidation of the capabilities of the Islam-
ist terrorists. In the spring of 1991, 18 Kashmiri Islamists
were accepted for about 6 months of highly specialized terrorist
training in Sudan under the personal supervision of the Sudanese
leaders Turabi and Mustafa Uthman. By then, AIM's leader, al-
Turabi, had already visited Pakistan and Afghanistan in September
1991 to coordinate terrorist support activities.
Indeed, Jama'at-i Islami (Pakistan), Hizb-i Islami and Jamiat-i
Islami (Afghanistan) and Hizb-ul Mujahideen (Kashmir) had all be-
come members of the Turabi-led Popular International Organization
[PIO], and, in this capacity, provided assistance to, and closely
cooperated with, Islamists from Egypt, the HizbAllah in Lebanon,
FIS in Algeria, and NIF in Sudan. PIO members exchanged experts
and cooperated in joint support and training activities. Mean-
while, Turabi also worked to expand the international relations
and mutual cooperation of the terrorist infrastructure in Sudan.
Thus, by late-November 1991, Turabi had consolidated arrangements
for the exchange and dispatch of trainees to Islamist, mainly
Muslim Brotherhood, sites in Peshawar.
For the Islamist insurgency in Indian Kashmir, the Pakistani
training and support infrastructure is crucial: Altogether, some
20,000 young Kashmiris were trained and armed by and/or in Pakis-
tan in recent years and virtually all of the activities of the
Islamist groups, short of recruitment, are carried out in Pakis-
tani Kashmir. Logistical support, primarily weapons and ammuni-
tion, is brought from Pakistan. Training, organization, propagan-
da and indoctrination are carried cut in the safety of Pakistani
sanctuaries.
The weapons and materials used in Kashmir are increasingly ident-
ical to those provided by the ISI to the Afghan Mujahideen,
although the flow of weapons and explosives into Indian Kashmir
is attributed by Islamabad to their availability in the 'open'
market in Peshawar, Derra, etc. Nevertheless, weapons currently
used in Kashmir are increasingly of unique types available only
from states and, in the case of the Kashmiri Islamists, could not
have come from any other source but the ISI. Thus, it is clear
that Pakistan is the source of large quantities of weapons in
Kashmir.
Indeed, the mere size of the Pakistani training program is tel-
ling. By late-1990, an estimated 5,000 Kashmiris were receiving
training in Pakistan. They belonged to the JKLF, and militant
splinter groups such as al-Umar Mujahideen, the Muslim Janbaz
Force, and Hizb ul- Mujahideen. Further, by the spring of 1991,
there were already some 10,000 ISI-supported militants in camps
in areas adjacent to the Pakistan-Indian demarcation line in
Kashmir. Basic training is provided in several camps in Pakistani
Kashmir by Pakistani trainers. Little wonder that there has been
a dramatic escalation in subversive and insurgent activities in
Kashmir since the spring of 1991.
Further, since the summer of 1991, the ISI has further increased
its direct involvement in the training and supporting of Kash-
miri Islamist terrorists. Brig. Mohammed Salim, an ISI officer,
is in charge of training and supporting Kashmiri Islamists. Also,
as part of this effort, the Pakistani Army has increased the se-
crecy of the terrorist support operation and has upgraded the
basic training provided to the Kashmiris. The Army's drive to
quickly instill soldierly qualities to the trainees includes a
drastic effort to improve discipline and establish a military-
like regime in the main training camps. Islamist indoctrination
and other assistance is provided the Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan.
At first, the main ISI camp sites were:
- An abandoned factory in Chattar Ambore near Muzzaffarabad.
- Garhi Dupatta, 25 kms from Muzzaffarabad, near Jehlum river.
- Kucha, some 9 kms from Chinari and 20 kms from Chakothi area.
Nearly 4,000 Kashmiris were trained in these facilities in 1991
alone. However, most of them did not deploy in 1991, pending
more suitable conditions for escalation. Thus, by 1992, the ISI
was operating 13 permanent, 18 temporary, and 8 joint training
camps for Kashmiris in Pakistan Azad Kashmir alone. Some 3,700
Kashmiri fighters were located in these camps by the summer of
1992, including terrorists who cross over from Indian Kashmir for
a relatively brief training prior to returning to Kashmir.
Meanwhile, since 1990, the ISI has closely watched the 10,000
Kashmiri trainees during their training to locate candidates
suitable for recruitment and extended training. These terrorists
are sent to other camps where they undergo advanced training. By
1992 there were so many candidates that it was decided that these
"elite" recruits should get a major dedicated program of their
own.
Thus, in the spring and summer of 1992, the ISI established new
training camps for Islamist terrorists where they are trained on
the latest weapons. The director of this effort is ISI Brig.
Javed, a veteran of the Afghan support effort. The main training
camps are in Gohat, Larkana, Sangli, Sargodha, Cuttock, Murree,
Sailkot, and Lahore. A special research council of Islamabad, in-
cluding military and ISI officers, determines which groups and
individuals are eligible to receive assistance, what type, and to
what extent. Kashmiri and Punjabi groups top the list of manpower
resources for trainee recruitment. Training includes instruction
in such specialized subjects as the blowing up of bridges, secur-
ing communications, and the use of small arms and mid-size wea-
pons. Moreover, an ISI camp in Kashmir trains, with assistance
from Iran, a "suicide brigade" for exceptional operations inside
India.
The extent and impact of the Pakistani support for the Kashmiri
Islamist Jihad is clearly expressed in the unfolding of the
fighting in Indian Kashmir and India as a whole. The first phase
of Pakistan's low intensity conflict campaign was being conducted
between 1987 and 1989. It was aimed at agitating the Kashmiri
population and building popular support for the Islamist militant
cause. Therefore, only expandable, barely trained terrorists were
committed. They conducted simple, "popular" type terrorism, un-
organized and somewhat amateurish. Their operations escalated in
late-1988 and early-1989 with the arrival of the first
Pakistani-trained terrorists but they remained committed to the
incitement of mob rioting and small scale vandalism.
Thus, while these Kashmiri terrorists failed to incite a popular
war, they did establish wide and solid enough popular backing to
embark on the second phase, namely a direct and violent confron-
tation with the Indian security forces that would not have been
possible without Pakistani and other Islamist support. The-second
and more violent phase of the Pakistani-supported insurgency and
terrorism in Indian Kashmir was characterized by the escalation
and professionalization of the insurgency in 1990-91. The
widespread popular support for the Kashmiri Islamist cause sur-
faced in Indian Kashmir after the assassination of Mullah
Mirwaiz, and contributed to the vast expansion of the active sup-
port for the terrorists.
However, the escalation in the fall of 1990 was ultimately a
direct result of "the deployment of better trained militants' as
the second phase of the Pakistan-inspired insurgency in Jammu and
Kashmir." These Kashmiri terrorists received long and profession-
al training, and were provided with new weapons prior to deploy-
ment into the field. They successfully attacked government facil-
ities with growing frequency and consequently the Kashmiri masses
came out to the streets to demonstrate their support for the
Islamists:
"The spiral of hatred and violence between the security forces
and the people served the interests of the terrorists and seces-
sionists admirably. They achieved the aim of morally and physi-
cally isolating the people from the state without too much effort
on their part. Mass discontent and alienation is a critical re-
quirement and integral to the plans of any separatist movement."
With the main arena of operations conditioned, Islamabad decided
on yet another major escalation in the Jihad in Kashmir. By now,
the ISI's hold over the area's key terrorists was a primary fac-
tor in implementing Islamabad's plans. Using commanders it had
trained, ISI succeeded in the fall of 1991 in mediating and set-
tling an agreement between the military arms of the Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen, the Allah Tigers, and the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen to
launch joint and coordinated operations. Additional smaller
Islamist organizations are said to have joined the agreement so
that the islamist terrorist system in Kashmir will come "under a
common command."
This agreement is the work of ISI Maj. Haider who convened a
conference of the leaders of the three aforementioned groups in
early- December 1991 and convinced them to work closely together.
ISI promised increased and better aid in cross border operations
in return for a unified front. Maj. Haider himself had been in
Indian Kashmir since early-summer 1991, running, in effect, an
ISI forward HQ under the guise of a Kashmiri terrorist organiza-
tion in order to "help coordinate militant activity in Kashmir."
The consequent growing involvement of the 151 was immediately re-
flected in the quantity and quality of weapons caches captured by
the Indian security forces in the area.
Little wonder that New Delhi considers the situation in Jammu and
Kashmir a "proxy war" with Pakistan. India noted the vast im-
provement in the capabilities of the Kashmiri insurgents. "Ear-
lier, the terrorists adopted hit-and-run tactics, but now, armed
with sophisticated weaponry, they can engage the security forces
for long durations." Meanwhile, additional Pakistan-trained Kash-
miri terrorists, equipped with powerful explosives and additional
modern weapons, began infiltrating Indian Kashmir in the spring
of 1992, pending the anticipated escalation of the armed strug-
gle.
The inevitable escalation in the fighting in Indian Kashmir took
place in the summer of 1992. The Indian security services soon
noted that there was a high and growing percentage of Pakistani-
trained terrorists among the captured, killed, and defecting
Kashmiris. The Indians noted, for example, that professionalism
and audacity permitted a change in the tactics by the Kashmiri
terrorists. Thus, by the summer of 1992 they were conducting vir-
tually daily attacks on security forces which were professionally
conducted with the use of a larger stockpile of diversified
weapons, including small arms, rockets, mines,mortars, and
grenades.
It was estimated that there were over 20,000 AK-47s in the Kash-
mir area, and small units employed very good and tactically ma-
ture swift hit-and- run tactics. "The extraordinary tenacity of
the Kashmiri militants can be attributed to generous help from
Pakistan." The Pakistani involvement was also apparent from the
killing of several "top Pakistan-trained militants" in the ranks
of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen in a clash with Indian security forces.
An indication of things to come and the inherent strength of
Kashmiri Islamists, especially their expanding popular support,
was expressed in their ability to virtually "shut down Kashmir"
during the Indian Independence Day celebrations.
Meanwhile, the deployment of the ISI's expert terrorists into In-
dia also began in mid-1990. Highly trained terrorists of Jamiat i
Tulba, then operating in Kashmir, were sent in to establish a
country-wide support system. They developed a professional infil-
tration and exfiltration route for their operatives via Nepal and
used that nation as a site for meetings and consultations with
Pakistani and Arab terrorism and subversion experts. While in In-
dia, the terrorists relied on support from members of such organi-
zations as the Indian Student Islamic Movement. (Through the Ja-
maat-i-Islami, ISI had established close relations with the In-
dian Student Islamic Movement and used it as a vehicle for edu-
cation, identification, and the recruitment of promising Muslim
youth to the fundamentalist cause, including Islamist terrorism
in India.)
-With a support system in place, ISI-trained Kashmiri terrorists
began returning to India. Among them were experts trained and
prepared for sophisticated terrorist strikes such as the hijack-
ing of airliners or sophisticated sabotage of national-level in-
stallations. Their presence became known when a bomb exploded in
Delhi airport on 25 June 1991. Later, on 1 December 1991, bombs
were also found onboard an Air India Boeing 747 in flight from
New Delhi to London and New York. The Janbaz Force claimed
responsibility. (A few days later, in mid-January, Kashmiri ter-
rorists also tried to launch a shoulder-fired SAM at an Indian
airliner. The attempt came just after reports that the Pakistanis
had supplied the latest anti-aircraft weapons, including "rockets
and missiles," to the Islamists. ISI-trained Kashmiri militants
were also behind a series of bomb blasts in New Delhi in the
spring of 1992.)
However, the escalation of Islamist terrorism in western India
was not sufficient for Pakistan. Therefore, Islamabad decided to
begin the insertion of its own forces into the region. Soon
afterward, in the early- summer of 1992, some 200 highly-trained
and well armed Afghan Mujahideen infiltrated into Indian Kashmir
in order to assist in what was by now a full brown armed strug-
gle. They are directly responsible for the increase in violence
in Kashmir, in itself a part of concentrated effort sponsored and
backed by the ISI.
Another group of 300 Afghan in command of a larger force of
Pakistani- trained Kashmiris are waiting in Pakistani Kashmir for
the opportune conditions in order to infiltrate into Indian Kash-
mir and open a new terrorist front. Meanwhile, the Pakistani spe-
cial forces have also expanded their operations. For example, in
early-August 1992, two Pakistani operatives were captured in Vi-
jaypur, 30 kms from Madras, trying to blow up a train. it was a
professional job, for they were members of an ISI supported group
sent to assist the Kashmiri struggle.
By now, Islamabad was ready for the next phase in the ISI spon-
sored terrorist campaign, the expansion of ethnic separatist ter-
rorism all over India. For this step, the ISI would upgrade and
intensify its involvement with, and support for, non-Muslim and
faraway subversive groups. Consequently, as of 1990, several
Islamist groups, national liberation movements, terrorist and
subversive organizations throughout India increasingly gravitated
toward Pakistan, seeking assistance from Islamabad and the Afghan
Mujahideen for their armed struggle. The ISI was, to say the
least, very accommodating.
The case of the Revolutionary People's Front in Manipur valley,
northeast India, is but one example of Pakistan's growing reach.
In late-1990, Irengbam Bhorot Singh, the leader of the Revolu-
tionary People's Front, made contact with Pakistani officials in
Bangladesh to discuss ways to get support for the Front's armed
branch, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Singh approached
Islamabad with requests for weapons, training and all other as-
sistance "for a full-scale war against the Indian Government."
The PLA justified their request arguing that Pakistan was already
supporting the Kashmiris.
Although the Manipur insurgents established contacts with the
governments of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma in order to re-
ceive financial and military assistance, Pakistan's response was
the most important. Captured PLA documents state that Pakistan
"agreed to extend all possible help" which would be channeled via
Burma. "The Burmese government has agreed to patronize our Revo-
lutionary Front with all the force under their command to revolt
against the Indian government." Hiding in Bangladesh, the PLA
leader, Irengbam Bhorot Singh a.k.a. Chaoren, admitted in early-
1991 to having "already established contact with the Pakistani
Army for support to wage war against India." Indeed, the finan-
cial and military assistance provided by Pakistan via Dhaka en-
abled the Manipur insurgents to acquire such weapons as AK-47s
and RPGs.
Meanwhile, Pakistan recruited promising terrorists and brought
them over for training and indoctrination in the ISI camps. The
resultant Pakistani influence and professional assistance was im-
mediately apparent in the changes in the subversive networks of
Manipur. Most telling was the emergence, in the summer of 1992,
of the United Islamic Liberation Army as one dominant subversive
organization in north-east India, especially Manipur. Their sub-
sequent success was also an expression of growing Islamic mili-
tancy among the population of the entire region, which in turn,
greatly expedited the work of the Pakistani recruiters and opera-
tives.
Thus, by the late-1980s, the Sikhs were eager and ready to step
up their terrorist campaign against India as a primary instrument
of their quest for self-determination or independence. A group of
Sikh academics and experts was preparing a blueprint for a future
independent Khalistan, and argued that extremist terrorism was
building a popular awareness for the Khalistan issue. Consequent-
ly, the experts argued, a popular uprising was inevitable once
the Sikhs acquired sufficient military capabilities. Islamabad
was eager to test the validity of this logic, and increased its
training and military support accordingly.
However, with the ongoing development and refinement of the Jihad
in Indian Kashmir, the armed struggle in the Punjab was increas-
ingly becoming an offshoot of the former. Indeed, Sikh terrorists
in the Amristar area were increasingly smuggling their weapons
from the Jammu and Kashmir area and from Ganganagar in Rajasthan,
where the ISI had its own bases. At the same time, the ISI sup-
port for the Sikhs continued to increase and improve. Soon, the
Sikh terrorists in Punjab were receiving instructions -from Paki-
stan-based leaders and were calling for an intensification of
terrorist operations. Thus, in due course, the Sikh terrorists
received additional explosives and small arms from Pakistani
stockpiles, as well as antiaircraft guns and recoilless rifles,
sniper rifles and "the latest weapons" for special operations.
These weapons now dominate the insurgency in the Rajasthan area.
A senior Sikh terrorist described the character of the ISI sup-
port. His movement received safe houses in Lahore in order to ex-
pedite their close cooperation and consultations with ISI, Afghan
Mujahideen, mainly Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's Hizb-i Islami, jammat-
i-Islami of Pakistan, and Kashmiri Islamists. After the tighten-
ing of Indian supervision of the border in Punjab, ISI arranged
for the Sikh weapons to be smuggled into India via Kashmir. "The
ISI took over the responsibility of sending arms to terrorists in
India through its own smugglers." Joint lines of communications
for Sikhs and Kashmiris were established and Sikh terrorist
leaders, escorted by ISI agents, were sent into India in November
1991 with ISI-provided fake Pakistani passports. Their objective
was to organize a major terrorist-intelligence network, as well
as establish additional coordination between the Sikhs and Kash-
miris. Only a few of these agents were captured.
The dominant hand of the ISI was most clear in the emergence in
mid- 1992 of a comprehensive and efficient cooperation between
the Kashmiri Islamists and the Sikhs. In January 1992, ISI im-
posed an agreement on all the movements they were assisting to
streamline and make professional the smuggling of weapons to all
the terrorist forces in western India. Indeed, since the spring
of 1992, "ISI has been striving to add a sinister dimension to
Sikh terrorism by creating a nexus between Sikh, Kashmiri and
Muslim fundamentalists with a long-term plan of destabilizing the
country."
The ISI program is based on experience that was acquired while
supporting the Afghan Mujahideen. Special attention is paid to
the recruiting, training, and organizing of young Kashmiris "on
militant lines" to serve as the cadres of the "long-term intelli-
gence offensive" against India. Consequently, the ISI "has been
engaged in bringing about a strategic enlargement of the channels
of weapons supplies to terrorists through the Kashmir valley as
well as through new routes in the south Raiastan and Gujarat sec-
tors of the international border." The ISI is also behind a unit-
ed front of Punjabi militants mainly comprised of fringe extrem-
ist terrorist organizations - [Khalistan Commando Force (KCF),
Khalistan Armed Force (KAF), Babbar Khalsa International (BKI),
Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF)]. Their establishing of a joint
front was a condition for an increased flow of military support
from Pakistan, including advanced weapons and training.
-The new joint smuggling routes are extremely sophisticated and
run by Pakistani and other operatives of the new Islamist terror-
ist network. Thus, several Iranians and Bangladeshis who were
arrested near the Kutch border crossing in early-1992 are be-
lieved to have been couriers for the Pakistani ISI, smuggling
contraband out of India, as well as weapons and funds for Kash-
miri and Punjabi terrorists.
The ISI's responsibility is made manifest in the fact that the
weapons captured in the Kutch area are of Chinese, Russian and
Pakistani origin and are of the same types used by the Mujahideen
in Afghanistan. There is also evidence that a large cache of
weapons and explosives discovered in Gujarat and Ahmedabad in
July 1992 had teen smuggled from Pakistan and was to be distri-
buted to Sikh forces.
Thus, the ISI's vast and highly experienced terrorist support
infrastructure, tempered by years of assistance to such regional
armed struggles as those in Afghanistan and India, is increasing-
ly expanding its operations to include the sponsoring of global
Islamist terrorism. At present, the Armed Islamic Movement sup-
ports and trains Islamist terrorists and fighters for Jihads
throughout the world from centers in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(As was the case with the early support for Indian terrorists,
Islamabad claimed that the training and arming of the terrorists
takes place in camps of the Afghan Mujahideen rather than in ISI
facilities.)