1993 Congressional HearingsIntelligence and Security
1993 Congressional Hearings
VERIFICATION AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM FOCUS
Mr. Bevill. How has the focus of this program changed since the
breakup of the former Soviet Union?
Dr. Alessi. Since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the
focus of the Verification and Control Technology (V&CT) program has
been reoriented to reflect the increasing importance of the
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and
the means to deliver them to U.S. national security interest.
Specifically the development of arms control-related verification
technologies and systems under our Detection Technology activity has
been reoriented to include the development of technologies and systems
for enhancing U.S. and international capabilities for detecting the
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Our
Analytical Support activity has been reoriented to include
establishing a baseline technical analysis program at the national
laboratories in support of U.S. and international nonproliferation
efforts.
In addition, under our Analytical Support activity, we have been
playing an increasing role in coordinating Department of Energy
efforts in support of U.S. activities aimed at assisting Russian
and other states of the former Soviet Union, in a number of
critical areas such as nuclear warhead dismantlement and emergency
response capabilities.
Lastly, beginning in FY 1994, funding for the Office of Arms
Control and Nonproliferation's Offices of Nonproliferation Policy
and Export Control and International Safeguards is included in the
V&CT program rather than under the Departmental Administration and
Nuclear Safeguards and Security programs as in previous years. As
reflected in our FY 1994 budget request, funding for these offices
will be significantly increased to: expand our activities in support
of U.S. regional nonproliferation efforts; accelerate development and
implementation of a U.S. national and international Proliferation
Information Network System; expand other activities needed to support
U.S. and international export control regimes; expand International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and other safeguards and
physical protection support activities; and expand technology
development programs needed to enhance safeguards and IAEA special
inspection activities.
VERIFICATION & CONTROL TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Bevill. Please describe any role you have had in discussions
with Russia regarding control, storage and dismantlement of their
nuclear weapons.
Dr. Alessi. In November 1991, a Soviet Union delegation was
invited to Washington to discuss measures for cooperation and
assistance in control, storage, and dismantlement of Soviet nuclear
weapons. DOE participated in the delegation meetings, as well as in
a technical working group meeting. At this first U.S./Soviet meeting
on such technical issues, the U.S. presented an overview of how
the U.S. manages nuclear weapons, with particular emphasis on control,
storage, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. In this meeting, as
well as in all following meetings, Soviet (and subsequently, Russian)
delegations insisted that direct assistance in control, storage, and
dismantlement of their nuclear weapons was neither necessary nor
desired. The sensitivity of weapon design information, as well as
the reluctance to reveal any possible weakness with respect to
nuclear weapons issues, were believed to be the basis for this
Russian position.
The Soviet delegation informed the U.S that the most important
way in which the U.S. could help the Soviet Union achieve its goal
of dismantling tactical, INF, and START nuclear warheads by the year
2000, was to support construction of a specially designed storage
facility and procurement of containers for nuclear materials
removed from dismantled weapons. The U.S. has agreed to provide
assistance in both these areas. This assistance also includes, among
other things, a design of the system for control, accounting,
and physical protection of fissile material in the facility. Many
Department of Energy and national laboratory staff members are
working to apply the very best technical expertise to these
problems. Since November 1991, DOE has participated in frequent
U.S. delegations to Russia and technical information exchanges both
in Russia and in the U.S. to discuss issues associated with
facilitating dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons (on average
at least monthly).
In summary, we have placed emphasis on providing assistance
which is believed important to Russia in maintaining control,
safeguarding stored weapons, and performing safe and ecologically
sound dismantlement of nuclear warheads. The attached table lists
agreements in which DOE is involved in implementing or on-going
negotiations. As our technical partnership as nuclear weapon states
improves and we are able to become increasingly open with each
other in addressing these problems of mutual concern, it is realistic
to expect further initiatives in these areas.
Agreements with the states of the Former Soviet Union:
Agreements with Russia:
- Technical assistance in design of a fissile material
storage facility (now being implemented)
- Fissile material storage containers (now being
implemented)
- Flexible armor blankets (now being implemented)
- Security upgrade kits for railcars (now being
implemented)
- Accident response equipment (now being implemented)
- International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
in Moscow (awaiting Russian signature)
- Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) purchase (agreement
signed, contract being negotiated)
- Equipment for the storage facility (awaiting Russian
signature)
- Technical assistance for establishing a state system
for nuclear material control, accounting, and physical
protection (awaiting Russian signature)
- Assistance in the elimination of strategic offensive arms
(awaiting Russian signature)
Agreements with Belarus:
- Emergency response equipment (now being implemented)
- Government-to-government communication link equipment
(now being implemented)
- Assistance in export control (now being implemented)
Agreements with Ukraine:
- Emergency response equipment (awaiting Ukrainian approval)
- Government-to-government communication link equipment (awaiting
Ukrainian approval)
- Assistance in nuclear material control, accounting, and physical
protection (awaiting Ukrainian approval)
- Assistance in export control (awaiting Ukrainian approval)
- Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU) in Kiev (awaitin
Ukrainian approval)
Agreements with Kazakhstan:
- Emergency response equipment (now being negotiated)
- Government-to-government communication link equipment
(now being negotiated)
- Assistance in nuclear material control, accounting, and
physical protection (now being negotiated)
- Assistance in export control (now being negotiated)
DOE ACTIVITIES IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the activities of DOE in arms control
negotiations. What activities will be conducted in FY 1994.
Dr. Alessi. DOE serves on U.S. delegations involved in bilateral
and multilateral consultations and negotiations related to arms control.
For example:
DOE representatives served on the Nuclear Testing Talks, the START,
Defense and Space, and Chemical Weapons Convention and US/Russian
bilateral Chemical Weapons delegations and on U.S. delegations for
Review Conferences on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the
Biological Weapons Convention. DOE also provides representatives
and/or expert advisors to consultative committees associated with
the completed treaties, e.g. START, INF, and TTBT.
DOE expertise is often requested by the interagency in preparing
for negotiations and other arms control related meetings.
For instance, in preparation for international meetings on
potential verification measures which might be applied to the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), DOE was asked to prepare a
series of papers evaluating specific types of technologies. The
papers were prepared by the Laboratories, coordinated with the
interagency through DOE's Office of Arms Control and will be
presented as U.S. papers at the BWC meeting in Geneva next month.
Assistance to the Former Soviet Union
DOE is heavily involved in the U.S. effort to assist the Former
Soviet Union in activities related to Safe Secure Dismantlement (SSD)
of its nuclear weapons. DOE-laboratories are providing technical
support to production of containers for shipment and storage of
fissile materials, emergency response equipment, security upgrades
for railcars, and technical assistance in design of a secure storage
facility for special nuclear materials. Moreover, DOE weapons
laboratories have held several meetings with their Russian counterparts
and identified a series of peaceful activities on which they can
collaborate.
1994 ACTIVITIES
Treaty Negotiations DOE will provide policy and technical support,
including experts for delegations and analytical studies of policy
and technical issues as noted above for on going negotiations,
including: review of verification proposals for the Biological
Weapons Convention, the Preparatory Commission for the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the Conference on Disarmament and the Preparatory
Committee meetings for the Nonproliferation Treaty Extension Conference
to be held in 1995. In addition, the Department will continue to
prepare for expected negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban and for
the possibility of negotiations on a global ban on production of
fissile materials for weapons purposes. In that regard, the Office
of Arms Control will continue to call on Laboratory scientific and
expertise both for analytical support of technical issues and
identification and application of technologies to meet specific
treaty needs.
Treaty Implementation DOE facilities are subject to overflights under
Open Skies and to suspect site inspections under the Chemical Weapons
Convention. The Department must prepare to meet its obligations both
under the treaties and under U.S. laws protecting Secret Restricted
Data (SRD). The Office of Arms Control must play a significant role
in that effort. Among the activities which will be pursued are:
(1) analytical tools for assessing treaty requirements and SRD
vulnerabilities and,
(2) strategies for demonstrating treaty compliance without
revealing SRD
As in Fiscal Year 1993, DOE again will provide policy and technical
support for consultative commissions associated with existing treaties
such as START, INF and TTBT.
LABORATORY ROLES
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the roles performed by each DOE
laboratory or facility for arms control activities. Who has the lead
in each programmatic area?
Dr. Alessi. The Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
conducts research and development (R&D) to support national-level
arms control and proliferation policies. Detection Technology is
being developed for current and future nuclear and chemical weapons
arms reduction treaties and for proliferation detection via on-site
verification, regional effluent monitoring, and remote (satellite)
detection. Listed below are the laboratories and the major projects
currently underway. At the end of this section there is a table
addressing lead laboratories.
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL):
The major projects support warhead dismantlement and
detection of nuclear material. Technology is being developed
to track containers and treaty limited items using commercial
technology and to develop a detector which will remotely
measure emission signatures of key molecules released from
exhaust and vent stacks of a plant.
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL):
Current R&D projects will develop a Raman Spectrometry/Chemical
Analysis system to detect chemical effluent in concentrations
of less than 10 parts per million at a one kilometer range.
Also under development is a Controlled Intrusiveness
Verification Technology (CIVET) to identify, with a
high-confidence level, nuclear warheads while minimizing
intrusiveness and protecting classified information.
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL):
Major projects focus on supporting the Chemical Weapons (CW)
Bilateral Agreement and the START II requirements for on-site
inspection of re-entry vehicles. Development is underway
on-the Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy (PINS) system
as a nondestructive assay system to identify the contents of
suspected or declared CW containers or munitions. INEL is
developing an experimental system, Fission Assay Tomography,
as a passive verification tool for counting nuclear warheads
on missiles without moving the missile or shroud. In support
of proliferation detection, INEL is developing a Surface
Analysis Molecular Beam ion trap mass spectrometer for rapid
detection (<5 minutes) and chemical identification of
nonvolatile and low volatility compounds.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL):
Major projects here are in the following program areas:
- Development of technologies which will improve our ability
to detect nuclear proliferation activities from space-borne
observation platforms. Included are multi-spectral thermal
imagery, multi-spectral transient radiometry, low light-level
imagery, and others.
- Development and fabrication of satellite instrumentation
which supports nuclear detonation detection for nuclear treaty
verification, proliferation detection, and collateral military
goals.
- Development of advanced Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR)
systems for noncooperative proliferation detection scenarios.
- Development of Continuous Reflectometry for Radius versus
Time Experiment (CORRTEX) and advanced hydrodynamic yield
technologies for nuclear threshold testing treaties.
- The study of the generation and propagation of shock waves
in a geologic media surrounding underground nuclear tests.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL):
The major R&D projects support current and future treaty
verification requirements and the development of new
proliferation detection technologies. The major projects are:
- Development of a Temperature Imaging System Infrared Camera
which corrects atmospheric effects so that temperature
determinations to 0.1 degree C (absolute) and 0.01 degree C
(relative) are feasible. This system will have broad
application in analyzing thermal emission from CW and nuclear
suspect sites and possibly in detecting nuclear warheads.
- Development of an advanced seismic verification and analysis
capability to distinguish nuclear from chemical explosions.
- Development of an Advanced Forensic Science Laboratory to
advance the knowledge base for optical characterization and
mass spectrometry technologies for effluent signatures and
chemical collection/analysis.
- Development of on-site monitoring technologies for
measurements of nuclear testing sites as prescribed by a
very low-yield threshold treaty, comprehensive test ban
treaty, or an enhanced nonproliferation treaty.
- Development and commercialization of high security
electronic tags and seals for treaty applications.
Nevada Operations Field Office (NV)/Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL):
The R&D projects here support the development and engineering
of airborne applications of technologies for the experimental
collection of data for testing data/knowledge fusion concepts.
RSL also develops advanced radiometric detection technologies.
Concurrently, NV is leading the operational/logistical support
for a one kilo-ton underground chemical test experiment to
evaluate ground motion data. This test will enhance
discrimination between chemical explosions and decoupled
low-yield nuclear explosions.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL):
Major R&D supports the development of field portable
instrumentation for.future bilateral/multilateral
international inspections. Technologies include Microchip
Liquid Chromatograph and Surface Enhanced Raman Scattering
Monitors which can theoretically provide chemical resolving
power equivalent to conventional laboratory devices, but with
much less sample preparation. ORNL is also developing a
Centrifugal Concentrator for organic molecules to enhance
sample collection and analysis.
Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL):
Major projects here include:
- Development of advanced radiation detection technologies and
effluent collection and analysis for nuclear proliferation
detection.
- Leading in a tag and seal demonstration project to support
the U.S. purchase of highly enriched uranium from Russia.
- Development of a rigorous statistical assessment for both
current and future analytical methodologies to enhance
monitoring of proliferation and testing weapons of mass
destruction.
- Improving commercial technologies for arms control and
noncooperative proliferation detection scenarios. Ultrasonic
measurement and acoustic technology is investigated to verify
selected liquid properties (e.g., speed of sound, density, and
viscosity).
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL):
Major projects include:
Development of technologies which will improve our ability to
detect nuclear proliferation activities from space-borne
observation platforms. Included are multi-spectral thermal
imagery, multi-spectral transient radiometry, low light-level
imagery, and others.
- Development of detection/sensor technologies for satellite
flight systems. This program provides a number of operational
payloads supporting DOE requirements for continuously
monitoring and categorizing atmospheric nuclear events.
- Development of seismic instrumentation and analysis methods
to ensure effective monitoring of underground nuclear testing.
- The SNL Tags/Seals program is the lead developer of new
concepts for treaty and nonproliferation application.
- SNL is developing signal and image processing algorithms to
improve and augment national technical means (NTM) and
advanced remote sensing technology.
- SNL is responsible for fielding a pod mounted synthetic
aperture radar and integrating optical and hyperspectral
instruments in an accompanying airborne pod.
Savannah River Technical Center (SRTC):
The major R&D projects at SRTC are to develop systems to
support nonproliferation initiatives by improving
analytical methods. SRTC is developing a method for
chemical analysis by fiber optic spectrometry. This
technology will be designed into an automated
in-line/in-tank analytical system capable of identifying
chemical agents and measuring their concentration in disposal
incinerators and in phosphate based pesticide manufacturing
plants. Also SRTC is developing an improved Radio Frequency
Glow Discharge/Fourier Transform Mass Spectrometer with
resolving power necessary to unambiguously identify the
isotopes present in bulk and/or particulate samples.
Lead Laboratories. The lead laboratory in each programmatic area
is not in all cases discernable, but is generally reflected as
follows:
= On-site Monitoring: Lead - LANL, Second - LLNL.
= Satellite Instrumentation: Joint lead - LANL/SNL.
= Seismic Verification: Lead - LLNL, Second - LANL/SNL.
= Samples/Debris Detection and Analysis: Multilaboratory program
area with no clear programmatic leader, but the larger
laboratories dominate (LANL/LLNL/PNL/SNL).
= Nonseismic Verification: Lead - LANL.
= Directed Energy Verification: Lead - LANL.
= Technology and Advanced Concepts: Multilaboratory program
with no clear leader, but the larger laboratories dominate.
= Radiation Detection Technology: Multilaboratory program with
no clear leader, but the larger laboratories dominate.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ARMS CONTROL BUDGET
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a lead table as shown in the budget that
includes only arms control funding, excluding intelligence activities.
Dr. Alessi. [Deleted)
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITY
Mr. Bevill. In the treaty implementation activity, how many U.S.
and Soviet tests were monitored in FY 1992 and how many planned for
FY 1993 and FY 1994?
Dr. Alessi. During FY 1992, Russia monitored one U.S. underground
nuclear test. That test was named JUNCTION. No Russian (Soviet) tests
were conducted.
No decisions have yet been made about the U.S. FY 1993 and FY 1994
test programs. Because of the TTBT Protocol requirements, it is now too
late for any Russian monitoring of U.S. tests in FY 1993 and too early
to project activities for FY 1994.
Current guidance provides for the United States to exercise all of
its verification rights under the TTBT Protocol. This would mean
conducting on-site verification activities for all eligible Russian
nuclear tests.
A Russian test is in the planning stage and the United States plans
to exercise its full monitoring rights when it is executed.
TREATY VERIFICATION BUDGET ASSUMPTIONS
Mr. Bevill. What are the treaty verification assumptions on which
the budget is based?
Dr. Alessi. The Treaty Implementation activity budget request for
FY 1994 assumes: (1) that the U.S. will exercise its full spectrum of
monitoring and inspection rights on every Russian test or explosion
under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
Treaty verification protocols; (2) that the Department of Energy will
continue to be required to maintain a capability to support three
verification deployments; and (3) that the Department of Energy will
maintain a capability to support three verification efforts by the
Russians at the Nevada Test Site.
LIST OF TREATIES IN EFFECT, UNDER NEGOTIATION, AND ANTICIPATED THROUGH
THE 1990'S IN WHICH DOE WILL BE INVOLVED
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of treaties in effect; treaties
under negotiation; and anticipated treaties through the 1990's in
which DOE will be involved.
Dr. Alessi. The treaties and agreements which are in effect
include:
- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) (awaiting Ukrainian
ratification)
- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) (awaiting both U.S.
and Russian ratification)
- Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
- Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
- Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
- Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)
- Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)
- "Hot Line" Agreement
- "Hot Line" Modernization Agreement
- "Hot Line" Expansion Agreement
- "Accidents Measures" Agreement
- Incidents at Sea Agreement
- Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
- Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement
- Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement
- Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement
- U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement
- Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
- Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
- Outer Space Treaty
- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
- Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
- Bilateral U.S.-Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement
(awaiting both U.S. and Russian signature)
- Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare
- Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
- Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
- Open Skies
- Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
- Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Document
- Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD)
- Seabed Arms Control Treaty
- Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin-American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone)
- Treaty of Raratonga (South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone)
- Antarctic Treaty
The treaties which are under negotiation include:
- Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission
- Radiological Weapons Convention (RWC)
The treaties we anticipate DOE will be involved with through the 1990's
include:
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- Global Ban on the Production of Fissionable Material for
Nuclear Weapons Purposes
FUNDING AND FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THRESHOLD
TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT) AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION TREATY (PNET)
Mr. Bevill. Provide the total funding by program activity included
in the budget for implementation of the TTBT and PNET in FY 1992,
FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Dr. Alessi. The attached chart shows by major areas of activity
(maintenance of core capability, support for Russian verification
activities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and support for U.S.
verification deployments in Russia) and organization (Nevada Operations
Office contractor support, Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National
Laboratories) the budget for implementation of the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) in FY 1992,
FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Mr. Bevill. How many FTEs support each activity?
Dr. Alessi. Also, the Full Time Equivalents supporting each
activity are indicated on the chart.
FUNDING AND FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THRESHOLD
TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT) AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION TREATY (PNET)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
DOLLARS FTE DOLLARS FTE DOLLARS FTE
IN THOUSANDS IN THOUSANDS IN THOUSANDS
Nevada Oper Office
-Core Capability $4,300 30.8 $3,716 27.04 $3,400 24.74
-NTS Activities 665 4.6 - - 300 2.08
-Deployments - - 35 0.30 35 0.30
------- ----- ------ ----- ------ -----
Subtotal $4,965 35.4 $3,751 27.34 $3,735 27.12
Lawrence Livermore
-Core Capability $1,150 5.03 $1,100 4.40 $ 800 3.20
-NTS Activities 800 5.0 - - 400 2.50
-Deployments - - 250 1.07 250 1.07
------- ----- ------ ----- ----- -----
Subtotal $1,950 10.03 $1,350 5.47 $1,450 6.77
Los Alamos
-Core Capability $2,845 10.32 $2,788 10.85 $2,600 10.12
-NTS Activities 1,040 3.80 - - 515 1.88
-Deployments - - 911 3.33 500 1.83
------ ----- ------ ----- ------ -----
Subtotal $3,885 14.12 $3,699 14.18 $3,615 13.83
Total $10,800 59.55 $8,800 46.99 $8,800 47.72
FOLLOW-ON EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
Mr. Bevill. What is the Status of the Follow-on Early Warning
System?
Dr. Alessi. In light of the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the
shift in emphasis to detecting emerging proliferants, the intelligence
community has been reevaluating monitoring requirements for nuclear
tests in space. Awaiting final decisions, the Department of Energy
(DOE) has ceased almost all effort related to the Follow-on Early
Warning System, except for minimal coordination with the Air Force
and its related contractors. In the absence of a strong statement
supporting exoatmospheric monitoring requirements from the intelligence
community or the Department of Defense, DOE has no plans to continue
funding this program in FY 1994.
ONSITE MONITORING ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA
Mr. Bevill. In the absence of nuclear testing in this country and
Russia, what onsite monitoring activities are being conducted and at
what funding levels in FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Dr. Alessi. [Deleted]
As called for in the Coordinated Schedule for carrying out activities
related to verification of the Russian test that has been agreed upon
by Russia and the United States, [Deleted] Total DOE
funding in FY 1993 and FY 1994 for these monitoring activities is
estimated to be $1.2 million. Should the Russians conduct additional
tests (Deleted] similar funding would be required for DOE monitoring
activities for each test conducted. These costs are incremental costs
for actual onsite monitoring activities and do not include the costs
for maintaining a core capability for conducting such monitoring
activities. In addition, should the Russians decide to monitor any
U.S. tests conducted in FY 1993 or FY 1994, additional funding would be
required to support their monitoring activities at the Nevada Test Site.
SATELLITE INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. Please describe fully each of the activities being
conducted under the Satellite Instrumentation program including
milestones through completion, annual funding requirements, and total
estimated cost of each.
Dr. Alessi. The activities being conducted under the Satellite
Instrumentation program are described in our draft plan for that
program, which is included in the written material we are providing.
That draft plan describes a program which is undergoing a major shift
in emphasis. The draft plan will be reviewed by the Community
Nonproliferation Committee Research and Development Subcommittee
before it is implemented. The review will assure that the plan
addresses the most urgent needs of the U.S. nonproliferation community.
While we will continue to provide space-borne instrumentation to detect
and characterize atmospheric nuclear explosions, most new investment
will be directed at technologies for detecting proliferation
activities prior to the occurrence of any nuclear test.
******DRAFT (SATELLITE INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM PLAN) IS ATTACHED
TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT*****
FRAMEWORK FOR DETECTION TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Bevill. The budget request for detection technology consists of
many separate tasks to be performed by the Department. Can you discuss
the overall framework for this request; explain how the components fit
together; and discuss what the overall priorities of the program are?
Dr. Alessi. As shown in the attached chart, the Detection
Technology activities are grouped in three program areas: on-site
verification, regional measurements, and remote sensing. This
programmatic structure is organized around the primary physical arenas
in which the technologies are likely to be deployed. The program areas
cover the spectrum of our technology development programs that are
aimed at providing technologies and systems to enhance U.S. and
international capabilities that range from cooperative on-site
inspections and monitoring to remote satellite verification and
monitoring. The overall priorities of the program have shifted from
arms control verification to the development of technologies for
detecting proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction as a result of the increasing importance of weapons
proliferation to U.S. national security interest.
******DETECTION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT*****
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
AND DOE NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
Mr. Bevill. How does the international safeguards program differ
from the activities performed by the nuclear safeguards and security
program?
Mr. Alessi. The International Safeguards Program, administered by
the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, and the Nuclear
Safeguards and Security Program, under the Office of Safeguards and
Security, have unique missions and serve fundamentally different
national security goals. The two programs differ substantially in the
threats they address and the technologies they use to accomplish their
objectives. The International Safeguards Program is managed expressly
to support the international nonproliferation regime, International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and U.S. government initiatives
in bilateral and multilateral fora to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. The Program provides the DOE technical basis for
development of nonproliferation policy. It also provides the long-term
technology base for U.S. support of IAEA and other international
safeguards activities.
In addition, DOE's International Safeguards Program implements U.S.
technical exchanges and cooperation with other countries in
international safeguards, including training programs conducted in
support of IAEA objectives and as part of the U.S. Government's
ongoing nonproliferation policy objectives. International safeguards
are implemented by the IAEA to assure, through detection and deterrence,
that all declared nuclear material under safeguards is used for
peaceful purposes. International safeguards provide for independent
verification by the IAEA of a country's commitment to peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, and continuity of knowledge of peaceful nuclear
activities.
On the other hand, DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS)
implements safeguards and security measures for DOE's nuclear assets
(including the nuclear weapons complex). The OSS safeguards and security
program aims to protect DOE nuclear material and facilities against
theft or sabotage by external or internal adversaries (e.g.,
terrorists, criminals, etc.). This contrasts with the objective of
international safeguards to verify that declared nuclear material in
countries accepting safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities has
not been diverted to some non-peaceful use.
Because international safeguards objectives and philosophy differ
from the safeguards and security measures employed at DOE for its own
facilities, the technologies employed to implement the two programs
also differ. Domestic safeguards in the United States are based on
rigorous, technically intrusive control and accountability for
nuclear material, and physical protection of nuclear material and
facilities which address a specific "design basis threat." Conversely,
international safeguards rely primarily on material accounting,
complemented by methods of material containment and surveillance.
Information on the status of nuclear material is collected and analyzed
through periodic inspections by IAEA staff.
................
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
To meet responsibilities for radiological monitoring and
assessment as set forth in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response
Plan, the Department of Energy is responsible for establishing and
managing the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
(FRMAC). The FRMAC is an operational center at or near the scene of a
radiological incident, which provides a focal point for coordination
and compilation of all offsite Federal radiological monitoring and
assessment activities. All Federal, state and local agencies concerned
with the radiologic incident are represented in the Center. Information
related to offsite radiological risks resulting from
accidents/incidents is consolidated and analyzed in the FRMAC. This
information is made available to the lead Federal agency, state and/or
local official(s) to aid in formulating policy decisions and for
taking appropriate protective actions.
Field Program Management for FRMAC is performed by the Nevada
Operations Office.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT CENTER
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Operating Funding $770 $660 $1,000
Nuclear Emergency Search Team
The Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) is a group of diverse
and specially trained engineers, scientists, and technicians from the
weapons complex, along with specialized equipment providing technical
assistance in response to a malevolent nuclear threat. NEST provides
the Department with the unique capability to assess the validity of
communicated nuclear threats and to counter any attempts by terrorists
or extortionists to achieve their objectives by utilization of stolen
nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, or radioactive dispersal
devices. Within the United States and its territories, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has primary responsibility for such incidents.
In incidents involving foreign locations, the Department of State would
be the lead Federal agency for the United States. NEST assets are
located primarily at the Department's facility at Nellis AFB, Nevada,
with a smaller initial response/advanced party capability located at
Andrews AFB, Maryland.
Field Program Management for NEST is performed by the Nevada
Operations Office.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Operating Funding $23,014 $23,920 $27,477
Radiological Assistance Program
The DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) provides a Federal
emergency radiological response capability at the local level. Eight
RAP regions provide initial "first responder" assistance, as they are
located at DOE field or area offices, providing regional coordination
and serving as the point of contact for providing the initial DOE
response. RAP teams are usually staffed with certified Health
Physicists and Registered Radiation Protection Technicians, providing
an excellent resource to assist state, local and tribal governments
with expert advice and support for accidents involving radioactive
materials. A RAP Team's assistance is scenario-dependent and consists
typically of the ability to conduct localized searches with hand-held
instruments to identify nature and extent of local contamination and to
provide non-clinical advice on health affect of radiation.
Field Program Management for the RAP is performed by geographical
regions: Brookhaven Area Office (Region 1); Oak Ridge Operations
Office (Region II); Savannah River Operations Office (Region III);
Albuquerque Operations Office (Region IV); Chicago Operations Office
(Region V); Idaho Operations Office (Region VI); San Francisco
Operations Office (Region VII); and Richland Operations Office (Region
VIII).
STOCKPILE SUPPORT
RADIOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Operating Funding $1,460 $1,387 $2,000
Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS)
provides direct or consultative assistance with medical and health
physics support following radiation accidents. REAC/TS provides DOE
with a core capability for handling the medical aspects of radiation
accident/incident response, training of professional and technical
personnel in related specialty areas, and in resolving medical-legal
issues relating to alleged radiation exposure and subsequent health
issues. REAC/TS is designated by World Health Organization as the World
Collaboration Center for Radiation Accident Management. A comprehensive
medical assistance/treatment course for accidents involving radiation,
which is sponsored by DOE, is offered at the training site in Oak
Ridge, Tennessee, and is open to all government agencies as well as the
private sector.
Field Program Management for REAC/TS is performed by the Oak
Ridge Operations Office.
STOCKPILE SUPPORT
RADIATION EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE CENTER/TRAINING SITE
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Operating Funding $663 $669 $705
NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM
Mr. Bevill. What level of funding was provided for NEST in the
FY 1992, FY 1993, FY 1994? What emergencies were responded to in each
year?
Dr. Beckner. Over the past 3 fiscal years, there have been no
NEST deployments in response to malevolent nuclear threats. NEST did,
however, conduct seven threat assessments of alleged nuclear or
radiation dispersal devices and participated regularly in exercises, in
addition to its training and readiness requirements. (The information
follows:)
NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Operating $23,014 $23,920 $27,477
Capital Equipment 4,000 0 4,724
Total $27,014 $23,920 $32,201
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
Mr. Bevill. How are these programs coordinated with the Office
of Emergency Management?
Dr. Beckner. The "Emergency Management" activities funded under
Atomic Energy Defense Activities maintain the Department's seven
radiological emergency response assets or capabilities, which include:
the Accident Response Group; Aerial Measurement System; Atmospheric
Release Advisory Capability; Federal Radiological Monitoring and
Assessment Center; Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site;
and eight Radiological Assistance Program Teams.
Other "emergency management" functions within the Department are
the responsibility of the newly created Office of Intelligence and
National Security and are involved with certain aspects of all
emergencies of concern to the Department. This organization operates
the Headquarters Emergency Operations Center and ensures integration
and compatibility of all departmental Emergency Operations Centers.
The management of the Defense Programs' radiological response
program is the responsibility of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Military Application. Coordination between Defense Programs and the
Office of Intelligence and National Security takes place as required --
primarily to assure the effective functioning of the operations centers
to support radiological accidents or incidents.
.............
MISSION, ROLE, AND PRIORITIES
Mr. Bevill. Please describe how your mission, role and
priorities have hanged since the disintegration of the Soviet
Union and the significant downsizing of the U.S. weapons
production mission.
Mr. Ford. The mission of the Office of Intelligence is to provide
the Department, other U.S. Government policy makers, and the
Intelligence 30 Community with timely, accurate, high impact foreign
intelligence analyses; to deter and neutralize foreign intelligence
service actions in the U.S. to acquire classified and sensitive
unclassified information involving Departmental programs, facilities,
technology, and personnel; and provide threat assessment support to
both Headquarters and field operations. Our mission, from a
counterintelligence perspective, has been refocused from the
traditional communist and hostile intelligence service threats to
nontraditional adversaries and economic intelligence threats. Foreign
intelligence priorities have also changed. The Weapons Intelligence
Program is focusing on the safety, security, and use control of
Russian nuclear weapons, while no longer emphasizing the strategic
weapons threat. Increased attention is being focused on foreign nuclear
reactors, in view of the growing concerns about foreign nuclear reactor
accidents. The Science and Technology Intelligence Program is focusing
on economic and environmental science and technology, which is a change
from the defense science and technology emphasis of the past.
DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Mr. Bevill. Have there been any discussions within the
Intelligence Community on the appropriate size and focus of DOE's
intelligence program now that the national security needs have
changed?
Mr. Ford. Yes. The Community Management Staff has informed the
Department that its priorities and resource request for FY 1994 and
the out 30 years are consistent with its role with the Intelligence
Community. In various meetings of the Intelligence Community working
groups and committees, the role of the Department's intelligence
component and its contributions to national security has been singled
out. The Department's role in the Intelligence Community competitive
analysis of key intelligence questions and issues has been singled out
for its unique contributions. The Department's technical and analytical
expertise continues to sustain it as a major player in National
Intelligence Estimates. The Department will continue to be a major
contributor in the Intelligence Community assessments of potential
nuclear proliferant nations and contribute to their Economic Security
program activities. The Department will continue to be a lead player
in the Former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons dismantlement, including
the subsequent disposition of its component parts. In addition, the
Department will continue to be a lead player in the analysis,
assessment, and reporting of the Former Soviet Union nuclear weapons
safety, security, and control.
OTHER CABINET-LEVEL AGENCIES
Mr. Bevill. Now does the size and funding for this Department
of Energy compare to that of other Cabinet-level agencies in FY 1993
and FY 1994?
Mr. Ford. The following table provided by the Director of Central
Intelligence Community Management Staff reflects the size and funding
for the Department of Energy activities in comparison with other
Cabinet-level agencies.
FY 1994 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST
(Dollars in Thousands)
AGENCY DELETED
Dept. of Defense
Dept. of Justice (FBI)
Dept. of State DELETED
Dept. of Energy
Dept. of Treasury
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Bevill. What science and technology areas are being explored
in FY 1993 and FY 1994?
Mr. Ford. [Deleted]
STUDIES AND REPORTS
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of all studies or reports
prepared in each program area in FY 1992, FY 1993 and planned for
FY 1994. Identify whether these were anticipatory or responsive
products.
Mr. Ford. The materials that have been requested are being
prepared and will be provided to the Committee for their files.
COUNTERNARCOTICS
Mr. Bevill. Please Identify all funding in FY 1992, FY 1993, and
FY 1994, for counternarcotics activities, and describe the activities.
Mr. Ford. In FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 funds for
counternarcotics activities are $570 000; $360,000; and $200,000
respectively. The three activities being funded are the Vapor Generator,
Multiple Threat Analyzer, and Associated Particle Imaging. The Vapor
Generator provides a very precise measurement of cocaine vapor used to
calibrate detectors. The Multiple Threat Analyzer detects trace
amounts of drugs or chemicals used in the drug manufacturing process
by trapping single molecules for analysis. The current development
effort reduced the size of the instrument from room size to a two
cabinet size. The Associated Particle Imaging uses neutrons through a
special process to image and provide the element content of a closed
container. The process requires access to only one side of the target
and may be used to identify contraband inside suspect containers. No
new funding is required beyond FY 1993 for the Vapor Generator
and the Multiple Threat Analyzer.
DECLASSIFICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INFORMATION
Mr. Bevill. How has the declassification of U.S. nuclear weapons
and nuclear materials information impacted this program?
Mr. Ford. The declassification of U.S. nuclear weapons and
nuclear materials information has not impacted this program.
..........
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY THREAT POLICY
Mr. Bevill. Has the 1983 Threat Policy Statement been updated? Is
there a need to modify this guidance? Please describe the revised threat
statement.
Mr. McFadden. The Director of Security Affairs issued a "Design
Basis Threat Policy for Department of Energy Programs and Facilities,"
dated April 1992. This policy replaced the 1983 Generic Threat
Statement and was founded on a January 31, 1992, Department of Energy
(DOE)/Department of Defense (DOD) "Memorandum of Agreement on the
Security Threats to DOE and DOD Nuclear Weapons Programs and
Facilities." The Memorandum of Agreement was based on a Defense
Intelligence Agency review of worldwide threats to United States
Government interests. The 1992 Design Basis Threat Policy is undergoing
review in the Office of Security Affairs for currency. The Design
Basis Threat Policy describes a spectrum of threats to DOE Programs
and activities ranging from terrorist threats to Departmental nuclear
weapons and production programs to the threats posed by criminals,
psychotics, radical environmentalists, foreign agents, and dissident or
disgruntled insiders. The Design Basis Threat Policy, classified
Confidential, National Security Information, provides guidance on the
characteristics of the various threats types and describes the
capabilities of the adversary. The Design Basis Threat Policy also
describes Safeguards and Security Program strategies for addressing
the threat spectrum. It also requires the development of site
specific considerations in mitigating threats.
THREATS TO DOE FACILITIES
Mr. Bevill. What is the most likely threat to DOE facilities and
what is the least likely?
Mr. McFadden. Terrorist threats to DOE programs and facilities,
while potentially resulting in catastrophic consequences, are the
least likely to occur. The threat posed by cleared and authorized
insiders is perhaps the most likely and includes theft of material and
equipment, espionage and sabotage. Departmental locations have also
been targeted by anti-nuclear and/or radical environmental extremist
groups, which has resulted in demonstrations, acts of civil
disobedience and trespass.
THREAT TO DOE FACILITIES
Mr. Bevill. Have any DOE facilities experienced any threat in
the past five years that approaches the threat guidance now in effect?
Mr. McFadden. Threats to Department of Energy (DOE) facilities
are identified in the Design Basis Threat Policy for the Department of
Energy Programs and Facilities, April 1992. Based on the eight threat
categories and associated characteristics detailed in this document,
no DOE facilities have experienced terrorist threats in the past five
years. The strategy to guard against threats to facilities emphasizes
providing a high degree of assurance of a capability to detect, assess,
delay, and inhibit unauthorized access to nuclear weapons, test
devices, and completed nuclear assemblies, Category II or greater
quantities of special nuclear materials and associated facilities
while providing command and control to protective forces. Safeguards
and security measures are also designed to prevent acts of sabotage.
Safeguards and security systems are performance tested to
ascertain their effectiveness in countering threats to assets and
facilities.
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM PLANNING AND INTEGRATION
Mr. Bevill. The Office of Security Evaluations stated in response
to a question in last year's hearing that, "Noticeably absent in the
overall improvement in safeguards and security posture is an
improvement in safeguards and security management and oversight.
The system lacks an integrated approach to planning and implementation
of the total program. The lack of integration is reflected in the
inconsistent quality of the programs and the persistence of costly,
manpower-intensive solutions. The underlying cause of these weaknesses
is inadequate program management and oversight at all levels." How do
you respond to this concern?
Mr. McFadden. The Department's safeguards and security planning
process is integrated through a number of mechanisms. First and
foremost is the development of two reports: the Master Safeguards and
Security Agreements (MSSAs) and the Site Safeguards and Security Plan
(SSSP). These reports are the product of a standardized and consistent
process designed to review and evaluate the protection posture of major
facilities. Based on this review, cost-effective protection measures
are selected to safeguard vital assets against vulnerabilities
identified during the review and planning process. Such measures may
include the development of line-item construction projects to implement
cost-effective improvements over a number of years.
The planning process, as well as the periodic survey program,
also provides for a regular management review of the protection posture
of the Department's facilities and any corrective actions in progress
to improve security. As noted in the 1992 Annual Report to the
Secretary, most major DOE facilities have an overall satisfactory
rating. Only six facilities were rated marginal, and, of these, three
have been uploaded to satisfactory during 1993. In addition, the
newly developed Safeguards and Security Information Management System
(SSIMS) serves as an important management tracking system. SSIMS, which
is linked electronically between Headquarters and Operations Offices,
permits management to conduct near "real-time" analysis on the status
of their respective protection programs.
In a continuing effort to ensure that safeguards and security is
a cost-effective program, the Department recently initiated a series
of resource reviews to identify additional cost-saving possibilities
which can be implemented while, at the same time, affording appropriate
protection for DOE assets. A review of Security Evaluations inspections
for 1992 indicates that no facilities were rated unsatisfactory in the
area of Protection Program Management nor were any facilities evaluated
by the Department as unsatisfactory overall.
The Office of Security Affairs was established to ensure clearer
lines of authority, management, and accountability; correct
organizational fragmentation and provide focused management in policy,
field oversight, Headquarters operations; and provide integration of
materials control and accountability and security disciplines; and we
are committed to making this happen.
CENTRAL TRAINING ACADEMY OPERATING COSTS
Mr. Bevill. What is the total cost of operating the Central
Training Academy and the FTEs in FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994? Are
funds provided from any sources other than this budget?
Mr. McFadden. The costs for the Central Training Academy (CTA)
are as follows:
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
(In Thousands of Dollars)
Program $ 8,823 $ 7,323 $ 8,523
FTEs (5) 361* 393* 425
Total Central Training Academy $ 9,184 $ 7,716 $ 8,948
*In FY 1992 and FY 1993, these FTEs were funded from the Weapons
Production and Surveillance budget.
In addition to the above funding, CTA receives approximately
$200,000 annually to cover CTA staff travel and adjunct costs such as
freight expenses related to specially requested Mobile Training Team
activities. These Mobile Training Teams are in addition to normally
scheduled and budgeted CTA classes. These funds come from other
Departmental programs.
Since the establishment of the CTA, the Albuquerque Operations
Office has provided funding for CTA's rent, electricity, etc. (it is
estimated that approximately $500,000 is expended annually).
Also, in Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, the CTA received $2,000,000
annually in General Plant Project funding.
ACCELERATED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM (AAAP)
Mr. Bevill. How many individuals were approved using the
Accelerated Access Authorization Program in FY 1993 and FY 1994? What
activities - (including funding) are included in the Safeguards and
Security budget and the Security Investigations budget for this
program?
Mr. McFadden. For the period October 12, 1992, through
April 26, 1993, 140 individuals were approved for security clearance
on an interim basis using this program. The average processing time
under this program (from tests completion to approval) is 30 days. We
estimate that about 500 individuals will be approved under this program
in FY 1994. AAAP has been a significant factor in cost avoidance
without jeopardizing the safeguards and security of our National
Assets. Funding for this program (which will be funded solely from
the Security Investigations budget in FY 1995) is shown on a table
which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
ACCELERATED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM
(In Thousands of Dollars)
FY 1993 FY 1994
Nuclear Safeguards and Security
AAAP - Operational Activities $ 500 $ 500
AAAP - Technical Aspects - 0 210
guidance documents; research
and analysis, planning, 500 710
quality assurance, etc.
Security Investigations
AAAP - Full Implementation - 0 1,100
Initiate 5-year competitive
bid contract, and expand
number of individuals for
inclusion in program. $ 500 $1,810
PERSONNEL SECURITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. What is the Center for Human Reliability? When was it
established? What is the total budget in FY 1993 and FY 1994?
Mr. McFadden. The Center for Human Reliability Studies (CHRS) was
established in July 1989 to assist the Department of Energy (DOE) in
developing and implementing the Personnel Security Assurance Program
(PSAP) and other human reliability program initiatives. It is part
of the Medical Sciences Division of the Oak Ridge Institute for Science
and Education, a Management and Operating contractor of the DOE. It
utilizes a staff of 3 full-time employees and 18 consultants.
Through a comprehensive process of policy analysis, program
development, operational guidance, and followup program evaluation, the
CHRS supports the DOE in the PSAP and the Accelerated Access
Authorization Program. The CHRS provides expertise in the following
disciplines: personnel security; clinical psychology; human resource
management research and analysis; law, including labor and personnel
law; financial analysis; organizational and industrial psychology;
social psychology and sociology; counterintelligence; criminology,
criminal justice, and investigations; operations research and
statistics; and computer systems analysis to assist the DOE in
achieving program goals.
The total CHRS budget for FY 1993 was $485,000. The same amount
has been requested for FY 1994.
CROSSCUT OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY ESTIMATES
Mr. Bevill. Provide a crosscut by location of all Safeguards and
Security funding throughout the Department for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY
1994.
Mr. McFadden. The following information is provided:
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
FY 1994 Congressional Budget
Safeguards and Security Budget Estimates
BY FACILITY
(in thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Safeguards Safeguards Safeguards
Organization/Facility & Security & Security & Security
Albuquerque
Albuquerque Direct 102,319 93,538 96,199
Allied (Kansas City) 6,960 7,941 9,069
Los Alamos Natl. Lab. 84,108 85,721 86,888
Mound 10,887 8,837 9,804
Pantex 53,473 24,600 45,600
Pinelies 7,020 5,590 5,100
Rocky Flats 76,153 74,937 73,222
Sandia Natl. Lab. 54,370 56,103 54,709
---------- --------- --------
Total, Albuquerque 395,290 357,267 380,591
Chicago
Chicago Direct 1,593 1,493 1,445
Ames Natl. Lab, 679 405 381
Argonne Natl Lab. 7,515 11,880 12,275
Brookhaven Natl. Lab. 7,344 635 673
Fermi National Lab. 1,732 1,837 2,531
New Brunswick Lab, 4,404 4,253 4,252
Natl. Renewable Energy Lab. 530 675 731
Princeton Plasma Physics Lab, 1,109 1,089 1,243
Superconducting Super Collider 1,025 1,300 1,400
---------- ---------- ----------
Total, Chicago 25,931 23,567 24,931
Idaho 43,359 45,804 45,081
Naval Petroleum Reserves 1,097 1,097 1.077
Nevada 80,764 81,368 73,407
Oak Ridge
Oak Ridge 82,877 73,885 79,112
WMCC - FMPC 2,717 2,510 1,844
Oak Ridge Assoc. Univ. 802 851 715
Oak Ridge Natl. Lab. 7,572 7,409 7,306
Y-12 59,755 52,775 35,771
---------- ---------- ----------
Total Oak Ridge 153,723 137,430 124,748
Pittsburgh Naval Reactors 12,497 14,266 12.042
Richland 66,030 64,992 68,391
San Francisco
San Francisco 6,892 9,535 9,559
Lawrence Livermore Natl. Lab. 42,309 38,752 33,179
-------- ---------- ----------
Total, San Francisco 49,201 48,287 42,738
0
Savannah River 159,880 157,876 127,754
0
Schenectady Naval Reactors 13,522 15,689 16,141
Office of Scientific & Tech. Infor. 804 851 800
Strategic Petroleum Reserve Off. 18,572 19,390 24,650
Western Area Power Admin. 848 870 870
Morgantown Energy Tech. Ctr. 558 499 725
Pittsburgh Energy Tech. Ctr. 1,400 1,600 1,916
Headquarters 102,805 99,920 99,760
---------- ---------- ----------
Total DOE Safeguards & Security 1,126,281 1,070,773 1,045,623
PROTECTIVE FORCE STRENGTH AND EXPENDITURES
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing the size of guard
forces and expenditures for guard forces by location for FY 1992, FY
1993, and FY 1994.
Mr. McFadden. During the past six months, protective force
strength levels have been reduced by approximately 480
personnel complex-wide. At some Operations Offices, there has been a
commensurate reduction in Protective Force budgeting. At others,
budget changes have been less noticeable partly because savings
realized in personnel reductions are being rolled back into
automated protective systems. Protective requirements based on
categories of materials on hand and other unique facility concerns
are major factors influencing Protective Force strength levels and
budget considerations. The following table represents FY92-FY94
Protective Force strength levels and associated budgets.
*****PROTECTIVE FORCE LEVELS AND OPERATING BUDGETS*****
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT DETAIL
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a breakdown of the specific tasks and
funding associated with the "Additional Support" activity in FY 1992,
FY 1993, and FY 1994.
Mr. McFadden. The "Additional Support" breakdown is as follows:
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TASKS AND FUNDING
(In Thousands of Dollars)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Chicago Field Office S&S Staff $ 1,176 $ 1,445 $ 1,445
Headquarters Physical Security Upgrade
Technical Assistance 409 313 313
Technical Support to Headquarters and
Field Assistance 3,857 1,763 1,792
Support Services Contracts 7,435 7,174 10,183
AOSS Modernization 1,200
Information Security Research Center 250 400 415
Technical Security Research Center 655 662 682
Total Additional Support $13,782 $11,757 $16,030
SECURITY EVALUATIONS RESULTS
Mr. Bevill. Please characterize the results of security
evaluations conducted at DOE sites during the last year.
Mr. Podonsky. The results of Security Evaluations inspections
and assessments activities are very briefly summarized with the
following information. The Security Evaluations Annual Report for
FY 1992 provides a more detailed assessment of the inspections
conducted and the overall status of DOE protection programs.
Protection of special nuclear material was adequate at all
facilities reviewed. Many sites are in the process of reducing or
consolidating their nuclear material inventories to facilitate
remediation efforts and reduce operating costs. Some sites have made
substantial progress by consolidating security interests and have
reduced both the direct (e.g., cost of guard force operations) and
indirect costs (e.g., time spent complying with security
requirements) of safeguards and security. Although protection of the
nuclear material is adequate, many facilities rely heavily on
manpower-intensive measures to provide adequate protection.
Protection of classified matter is inconsistent. Although
physical protection of classified documents at most facilities is
consistent with DOE order requirements, several facilities have
deficiencies in document control procedures and accountability
systems. Further, computer security at DOE facilities is not
uniformly effective.
Personnel security programs have improved considerably; the
elimination of the longstanding reinvestigation backlog is particularly
notable. However, continued attention is require to assure sustained
effectiveness and reduce the timeframes required to process clearances.
Protection program management within DOE requires continued
attention. Progress has been noted in some areas and at some
facilities. For example, significant progress was made toward
updating the DOE orders (most of which had not been updated since
1988). However, protection program management at all levels of DOE
can be improved. At the Headquarters level, additional effort is
necessary to resolve longstanding safeguards and security policy
issues and provide consistent and timely direction and guidance to the
field. At the field level, efforts to implement effective and efficient
systems should be more aggressively pursued, management control and
feedback systems (e.g., the survey and self-assessment programs)
should be improved, and the required planning documents should be
completed.
TRENDS TRACKING
Mr. Bevill. How does the Office of Security Evaluations track
trends or patterns in deficiencies identified at various sites?
Mr. Podonsky. Security Evaluations has several functions
that involve tracking safeguards and security trends and patterns:
the inspection program, the assessments program, the Facility Officer
program, and information management systems. These systems combine
to provide DOE managers with a comprehensive picture of the status
of safeguards and security programs, including trends and patterns
identified at various sites.
The inspection program is specifically designed to identify
strengths and weaknesses at individual DOE sites. The findings at each
facility are tracked through resolution and, where appropriate,
reinspection or safeguards and security readiness reviews are
conducted. Security Evaluations also routinely reviews Security Affairs
Safeguards and Security Information Management System (SSIMS), which
provides information on the status of findings throughout DOE.
In the assessments program, Security Evaluations periodically
reviews the status of selected program elements, focusing on trends
and patterns across DOE facilities. Innovative technologies,
safeguards and security policy issues, and potential program
enhancements are also identified. Reports summarizing the assessment
results are distributed to all DOE Operations Offices.
Security Evaluations assigns a Facility Officer to each major DOE
facility to monitor the status of each facility. One of the Facility
Officer's responsibilities is to track findings.
Security Evaluations uses a variety of hardcopy and computerized
information management systems to facilitate tracking trends and
patterns across DOE. As an example, Security Evaluations Policy
Information Resource Management System encompasses policy issues,
Security Evaluations findings, exceptions, working groups, and
orders. Security Evaluations is also currently working on developing
additional automated data bases.
Security Evaluations disseminates the results of its analysis of
trends and patterns through its annual reports (which summarize the
overall status of safeguards and security across DOE) and assessment
reports (which provide detailed information on selected topics).
Further, Security Evaluations routinely uses its analysis of trends
and patterns across DOE as a basis for inspection planning.
DEPARTMENT'S SECURITY POSTURE
Mr. Bevill. What improvements have you seen in the Department's
security posture since your office was established?
Mr. Podonsky. In the late 1970s, safeguards and security
entered a downswing in the cycle that is at least partly attributable
to a lack of attention to operational issues during the turmoil
associated with the creation of DOE. As an example of the lack of
attention, most of DOE's safeguards and security orders were not
issued until after 1984 (several years after the Department was
created). Predictably, the effectiveness of safeguards and security
programs had degraded to unacceptable levels in the early 1980s.
Category I quantities of special nuclear material were not
consistently provided adequate physical protection, accountability
systems were inadequate, protective force personnel were not adequately
equipped or trained, and protection of classified documents and
material was inadequate. In the early days of Security Evaluations
performance testing, facilities often performed miserably.
Since Security Evaluations was created as an independent office
in 1985, the overall status of protection of special nuclear material
has improved dramatically. Most DOE facilities completed safeguards
and security upgrade programs during the mid to late 1980s, investing
approximately $500 million in new security hardware and adding
thousands of security staff. Most vulnerabilities affecting high
priority special nuclear material targets have been addressed. While
problems occasionally recur, they are generally degradations in one
layer of a multi-layer security system rather than direct threats to
special nuclear material of the type frequently noted in the early
1980s.
In recent years, DOE safeguards and security programs have become
much more effective. Many improvements have resulted from heightened
attention to protection requirements, increased allocations of both
personnel and funding, and more intensive oversight. However, the
security systems are not optimally efficient. Many DOE facilities
still rely heavily on costly, manpower intensive measures to provide
adequate protection.
SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Mr. Bevill. Describe the most significant accomplishments of
the Office in FY 1992 and FY 1993. How has the security of the
Department been improved?
Mr. Podonsky. During FY 1992 and the first half of FY 1993,
Security Evaluations was able to maintain and enhance its inspection
program, refocus its assessments efforts on DOE's current needs, and
produce and disseminate information and tools to other DOE offices
for their use in inspection programs.
Security Evaluations inspection program continues to be regarded
as one of DOE's most effective oversight programs. Although we continue
to find and report problem areas, Security Evaluations is respected by
the field and viewed as a resource by DOE managers. DOE operations
office managers have repeatedly cited Security Evaluations process and
protocols as the model for other DOE oversight activities. One of the
most significant enhancements in the inspection program in the past 2
years has been the maturation of the Safeguards and Security Readiness
Review program. Safeguards and Security Readiness Reviews are similar
to comprehensive inspections but are conducted on short notice and
are usually focused on selected aspects of a protection program. The
Safeguards and Security Readiness Review program's goal is to provide
an accurate picture of day-to-day readiness and to assure that
facilities do not relax between inspections. One of the primary
reasons Security Evaluations decided to emphasize Safeguards and
Security Readiness Reviews and conduct fewer comprehensive inspections
is cost savings. Safeguards and Security Readiness Reviews are smaller
and cheaper to conduct. More importantly, however, Security Evaluations
found that the Safeguards and Security Readiness Review program has
significantly reduced the costs associated with facilities preparing
for inspections.
Another enhancement to the inspection program has been the
increased focus on protection program management. Security Evaluations
has been focusing on the protection program management topic in an
effort to assure that management is providing the resources necessary
to support security programs and is using those resources effectively.
Security Evaluations believes this is an important initiative and that
this will become increasingly more important as DOE manages the
transition to environmental restoration and remediation.
Security Evaluations has evaluated DOE's current needs and has
shifted the focus of its assessments program. Previously, assessment
reports focused primarily on program weaknesses. Recently, Security
Evaluations has been focusing not only on what is wrong but also on
what can be done. The reports on the personnel clearance process and
the use of helicopters throughout DOE are recent examples of Security
Evaluations assessments that provided DOE managers with the information
needed to enhance their programs. For example, in the personnel
clearance special study, Security Evaluations identified potential
enhancements that should reduce the time required in the processing
of clearance requests.
Recognizing that DOE managers must identify innovative safeguards
and security technologies that hold promise for cost-effective
application without loss of protection, Security Evaluations is
currently conducting a safeguards and security technology assessment.
DOE managers indicated that they are hindered by a lack of readily
available information about safeguards and security technology that
has the potential to reduce operating costs. To meet DOE needs,
Security Evaluations objectives are to identify user needs for
safeguards and security technology applications and to identify
and describe technologies that can be appropriately applied in the
near term to help the field apply resources more cost effectively.
The expected publication date for the assessment report is
July 15, 1993. The results of that assessment will be distributed to
all operations and program offices. The intent of the assessment is
to systematically identify existing or emerging technologies that
could provide effective security while reducing costs at DOE
facilities. The study is an example of Security Evaluations effort to
provide DOE managers with the information needed to manage effectively.
One of Security Evaluations secondary missions is to promote
communications and develop inspection techniques. In FY 1992, Security
Evaluations issued a set of comprehensive inspectors guides that cover
all major safeguards and security topics. These guides are used by the
field survey staff and personnel involved in self assessments, as well
as Security Evaluations inspectors. Security Evaluations also hosted
several interagency symposiums and an internal DOE forum. In these
meetings, Security Evaluations and other agencies and offices shared
techniques and tools. By sharing techniques and tools, Security
Evaluations is promoting a gradual but steady improvement in DOE
safeguards and security programs.
In addition to the concrete accomplishments, Security Evaluations
has an important role as a leader and trend setter. As Security
Evaluations focuses on selected aspects of DOE programs, those programs
tend to get the attention of DOE management and are improved. This
trend has been evident since the mid-1980s when Security Evaluations
focused primarily on vulnerabilities in the protection of DOE's most
sensitive security interests (nuclear weapons components and strategic
quantities of special nuclear material). As those vulnerabilities were
addressed, Security Evaluations gradually expanded its emphasis on
classified information, personnel, and computer security programs,
which have been gradually improving.
Security Evaluations views today's safeguards and security
challenges as efficiently maintaining adequate protection of vital
security interests in a idly changing environment. If DOE does not
anticipate and prepare for the rap future, security could once again
degrade to unacceptable levels. Conversely, if DOE is proactive and
starts managing resources more effectively now, adequate security can
be maintained at reduced costs. Therefore, in its role as a trend
setter, Security Evaluations will be increasingly focusing on protection
program management and cost-effective issues.
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS PACKAGING CERTIFICATION
Mr. Bevill. Describe the radioactive materials packaging
certification program. Why was it established? What activities are
required of your office to perform this function?
Mr. Brush. Based on the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and the
unique nature of DOE, the Department of Transportation authorized DOE
to conduct its own radioactive materials certification program. The
program is required to be equivalent to that of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
The purpose of the radioactive materials packaging certification
program is to ensure the health and safety of the public and workers
and the protection of the environment when radioactive materials are
transported by DOE and its contractors. Principal functions of the
program include: evaluating packaging designs; maintaining a database
of certified packagings; and providing external liaison for packaging
certification matters between DOE and concerned agencies.
The evaluation of DOE packaging designs involves reviewing Safety
Analysis Reports for Packagings for compliance with DOE orders and with
the regulations of the Department of Transportation and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Evaluations are accomplished by performing
independent reviews and confirmatory analyses of structural, thermal,
containment, shielding, and criticality integrity; operating
procedures; acceptance tests; maintenance procedures; quality assurance;
and material information provided in the Safety Analysis Reports for
Packagings. On the basis of these reviews and analyses, the Department
determines that the packagings meet all applicable DOE orders and
other requirements.
MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT
Mr. Bevill. Last year you were very critical of the safeguards
and security management and oversight. Has there been noticeable
improvement in the past year?
Mr. Podonsky. Clearly, there has been improvement in safeguards
and security management in the past year at both Headquarters and in
the field. However, safeguards and security management must improve
further and adopt a more proactive stance if DOE is to resolve long
standing deficiencies and take advantage of the unparalleled
opportunities for reducing safeguards and security costs by
consolidating and, where possible, eliminating security interests.
At Headquarters, the efforts to update the DOE Orders, to
eliminate expensive but questionably effective policies (e.g.,
accountability systems for classified documents), and to eliminate
the reinvestigation backlog are examples of management's willingness
to tackle longstanding problems. However, many longstanding
deficiencies remain to be corrected. For example, as noted in the
Security Evaluations annual report and a recent General Accounting
Office study, many DOE facilities still do not have the basic planning
documents that are required to assure that the protection strategy
and objectives are current, approved, and understood by both the
facility and DOE Headquarters. Further, resolution of some issues
has been slow even when a clear course of action was identified,
as exemplified by the continued failure to document a clear and
consistent safeguards and, security policy to cover Work for Others.
At the field level, safeguards and security management has improved
but is not uniformly effective. For example, Operations Offices and
facilities have had varying levels of success in ongoing cost-reduction
efforts. Through a concerted transition effort, DOE's Hanford Site was
able to eliminate and consolidate security interests while maintaining
adequate security. This effort resulted in a dramatic reduction in the
number of security clearances (reduced by 66%) and potential longterm
cost savings, both in direct security costs and in indirect operational
costs associated with maintaining security. Other DOE offices have also
made some progress in trimming costs. However, some sites that have
experienced drastic reductions in weapons program activities have not
made corresponding progress in reducing safeguards and security costs.
PERSONNEL SECURITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. How many positions are included in the Personnel
Security Assurance Program (PSAP) in FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY 1994?
How do you measure the effectiveness of this program? What are the
benefits?
Mr. McFadden. In FY 1992, 10,493 positions in the Department of
Energy and its contractor workforce were identified as PSAP positions.
The number of identified positions has since been revised downward,
due largely to changes in the DOE mission and the consequent
consolidation of special nuclear materials at certain sites. With
material consolidated in limited locations, less individuals require
placement in the PSAP. The number of identified positions and the
number of actual positions are disparate, as the program is in its
initial implementation. By FY 1994 the number of identified positions
and the number of actual positions should be equal at about 9,000
positions. In FY 1992 there were 210 occupied PSAP positions, all
under the Idaho Operations Office. In FY 1993 there were 7,996 PSAP
positions either occupied or in the initial processing stages.
The effectiveness of the program can be measured by an evaluation
of the attitudes of the individuals taking part in the PSAP. This
evaluation is conducted in both pre- and post-orientation for the
program, with followup evaluation done 1 year after initial orientation.
Effectiveness can also be measured through increased referrals for
security concerns and the greater sharing of information between the
evaluation elements of the program.
The benefits of the program include the ongoing evaluation of
individuals in highly sensitive positions to deter and detect behaviors
or conditions which might indicate security concerns. The evaluation
includes a medical examination, psychological assessment, drug
screening, and security review. The Office of Safeguards and Security
has determined that participation in the PSAP reduces the insider
threat from the violent insider to the passive insider.
PERSONNEL SECURITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. How many individuals were relieved of their positions
in this program (PSAP) in FY 1992 and FY 1993?
Mr. McFadden. A total of 10 individuals have been removed from PSAP
duties in FY 1992 and FY 1993. Two have subsequently been returned to
those duties.
SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS
Mr. Bevill. What attempts are being made to reduce the number and
level of clearances throughout the Department?
Mr. McFadden. As a result of the general downsizing of classified
activities within the Department, particularly in the nuclear weapons
program, the number of active security clearances were reduced during
the interval of April 1992 to April 1993 from about 176,000 to about
166,000. Additional reductions will be realized this year as the
national laboratories have been directed to eliminate corporate policies
that require all employees to be cleared as a condition of employment
at a Department of Energy owned site. Instead, Department contractor
employees will be processed for a Department of Energy clearance only
when such action can be justified based upon the duties of the
employee's position. Efforts are also underway at Department contractor
sites to consolidate classified and special nuclear material
inventories, which will result in the need for fewer clearances by
their employees.
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - STATISTICS
Mr. Bevill. Provide by field office and facility the number and
types of clearances held by DOE employees, contractors, and other
Federal employees in FY 1992 and FY 1993.
Mr. McFadden. There are just under 167,000 clearances currently
held by DOE Employees, contractors, and other Federal employees.
Current information will be provided for the record.
CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1992
DOE DOE
EMPLOYEES CONTRACTORS 0GA CONGRESS TOTAL
ALBUQUERQUE
Q 1,465 34,502 138 0 36,105
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 20 546 0 0 566
SE 0 1 0 0 1
Total 1,485 35,049 138 0 36,672
CHICAGO
Q 240 1,339 6 0 1,585
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 22 690 0 0 712
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 262 2,029 6 0 2,297
HEADQUARTERS
Q 3,298 2,227 4,563 324 10,412
TS 153 47 2 0 202
L 120 275 192 1 588
SE 517 629 8 0 1,154
Total 4,088 3,178 4,765 325 12,356
IDAHO
Q 304 3,889 17 0 4,210
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 182 8,578 0 0 8,760
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 486 12,467 17 0 12,970
NEVADA
Q 386 7,278 58 0 7,722
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 1 428 1 0 430
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 387 7,706 59 0 8,152
OAKRIDGE
Q 827 20,199 143 0 21,169
TS 0 11 0 0 11
L 66 4,162 14 0 4,242
SE 4 19 0 0 23
Total 897 24,391 157 0 25,445
PITTSBURGH
Q 278 3,938 33 0 4,249
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 0 7,031 6 0 7,037
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 278 10,969 39 0 11,286
RICHLAND
Q 165 4,263 16 0 4,444
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 165 5,924 11 0 6,100
SE 1 0 0 0 1
Total 331 10,187 27 0 10,545
ROCKY FLATS
Q 204 9,830 9 0 10,043
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 0 405 0 0 405
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 204 10,235 9 0 10,448
SAN FRANCISCO
Q 212 12,886 5 0 13,103
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 0 211 0 0 211
SE 7 0 0 0 7
Total 219 13,097 5 0 13,321
SAVANNAH RIVER
Q 377 15,468 141 0 15,986
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 104 6,167 3 0 6,274
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 481 21,635 144 0 22,260
SCHENECTADY
Q 104 2,218 16 0 2,338
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 0 5,989 0 0 5,989
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 104 8,207 16 0 8,327
TOTALS
Q 7,860 118,037 5,145 324 131,366
TS 153 58 2 0 213
L 680 40,406 227 1 41,314
SE 529 649 8 0 1,186
GRAND TOTAL 9,222 159,150 5,382 325 174,079
CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1993
DOE DOE
EMPLOYEES CONTRACTORS 0GA CONGRESS TOTAL
ALBUQUERQUE
Q 1,709 35,290 72 0 37,071
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 10 504 0 0 514
SE 1 0 0 0 1
Total 1,720 35,794 72 0 37,586
CHICAGO
Q 238 1,246 8 0 1,492
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 26 653 0 0 679
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 264 1,899 8 0 2,171
HEADQUARTERS
Q 3,734 2,858 4,561 318 11,471
TS 143 17 3 0 163
L 81 274 161 1 517
SE 496 601 9 0 1,106
Total 4,454 3,750 4,734 319 13,257
IDAHO
Q 312 3,704 17 0 4,033
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 199 8,157 0 0 8,356
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 511 11,861 17 0 12,389
NEVADA
Q 409 6,419 33 0 6,861
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 0 238 1 0 239
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 409 6,657 34 0 7,100
OAK RIDGE
Q 556 16,370 114 0 17,040
TS 0 3 0 0 3
L 313 7,184 16 0 7,513
SE 0 17 0 0 17
Total 869 23,574 130 0 24,573
PITTSBURGH
Q 272 3,462 26 0 3,760
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 1 6,680 5 0 6,686
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 273 10,142 31 0 10,446
RICHLAND
Q 119 2,625 18 0 2,762
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 283 4,521 16 0 4,820
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 402 7,146 34 0 7,582
ROCKY FLATS
Q 153 7,371 4 0 7,528
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 1 222 1 0 224
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 154 7,593 5 0 7,752
SAN FRANCISCO
Q 239 13,162 4 0 13,405
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 2 198 0 0 200
SE 3 0 0 0 3
Total 244 13,360 4 0 13,608
SAVANNAH RIVER
Q 407 15,283 84 0 15,774
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 118 6,943 2 0 7,063
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 525 22,226 86 0 22,837
SCHENECTADY
Q 91 1,928 13 0 2,032
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 0 5,443 0 0 5,443
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 91 7,371 13 0 7,475
TOTALS
Q 8,239 109,718 4,954 318 123,229
TS 143 20 3 0 166
L 1,034 41,017 202 1 42,254
SE 500 618 9 0 1,127
GRAND TOTAL 9,916 151,373 5,168 319 166,776
SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS
Mr. Bevill. Now that several former nuclear materials production
sites have been deactivated and transferred to the waste cleanup
program, how has this impacted the number of security clearances?
Mr. McFadden. When a site is deactivated, the number of security
clearances associated with that site decreases. Usually, the level of
security clearances associated with a deactivated site also decreases.
At the Richland Operations Office, for example, the number of Q
clearances was reduced during the period from July 1990 through January
1993 from 10,235 to 2,753, or by 73 percent. At that same office, a
total of 2,591 security clearances were eliminated during the interval
of February 1992 through January 1993.
SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS
Mr. Bevill. What steps are being taken to reduce the number of
clearances? Are there any impediments to a quick reduction?
Mr. McFadden. As sites are deactivated, classified and special
nuclear 20 material inventories are consolidated or the sites
reconfigured as quickly as practicable. As consolidation and
reconfiguration activities proceed, security clearance levels and
numbers are also reduced in a prudent manner without endangering
National Security. The only impediment to a quick reduction will be
our limited ability to consolidate special nuclear material because
of limited storage and staging facilities.
PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. What is the Department's current security clearance
policy? When was this policy developed and when was it last updated?
Mr. McFadden. The Department's Personnel Security Program policies
and procedures are stipulated in Order 5631.2, last reissued on
September 15, 1992. The Department's security clearance policy conforms
to pertinent provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and Executive Orders
that require an individual's eligibility for access to classified
matter or special nuclear material to be based upon review and
adjudication of investigative reports provided by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or Office of Personnel Management, or other agencies or
departments provided that the scope and extent of the investigation
meets standards set by the Department of Energy. Individuals are
granted a security clearance only when access is required to classified
information or special nuclear materials and when it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to do so. When a serious question
is raised concerning an individual's eligibility for a security
clearance, the case is processed under Departmental administrative
review procedures to determine whether the security clearance should
be denied or revoked. Individuals granted a Department of Energy
security clearance are reinvestigated at 5-year intervals.
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - STATISTICS
Mr. Bevill. What is the current backlog of reinvestigations? Is it
increasing? What efforts are being taken to reduce the backlog?
Mr. McFadden. As of March 1, 1993, the number of reinvestigations
that are due to be conducted (that is, the most recent investigation
was conducted more than 5 years ago) has been reduced to 7,672. This
number includes both backlogged cases, and cases that normally will
"come of age" as part of a continuing cycle of 5-year reinvestigations.
There are less than 2,000 reinvestigations remaining from the original
"backlog" of 132,000 reinvestigations that resulted from the Department
of Energy policy change of December 1985 which mandated reinvestigations
for all levels of security clearances every 5 years. The Department
anticipates elimination of the remaining 2,000 backlogged investigations
by the end of FY 1993. (NOTE: The 7,672 also includes 2,910 clearances
that are held by employees of other Federal Government agencies,)
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
Mr. Bevill. What were the number, by type and performing agency,
of investigations and reinvestigations performed for FY 1992, FY 1993,
and FY 1994? Describe the reasons for the increases or decreases?
Mr. McFadden. The following data on investigations and
reinvestigations is inserted for the record: (The information follows:)
INVESTIGATIONS AND REINVESTIGATIONS
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
ACTUAL ESTIMATED REQUEST
FBI Initial 44 12 10
FBI Reinvestigation 10 9 8
OPM Initial
Single Scope Background 0 10,700 10,000
Background 13,488 50 60
Limited Background 0 1,220 1,217
OPM Reinvestigations
Periodic - Single Scope 0 20,025 19,976
Special Background 371 0 0
Limited Background 21,716 7,809 0
OPM National Agency Checks
Initial 8,525 3,650 4,990
Reinvestigations 12,784 5,460 8,125
TOTAL INVESTIGATIONS 56,938 48,935 44,386
FBI investigations decreased in FY 1993 as that agency is now
being used strictly for initial investigations for individuals who
occupy positions of a high degree of importance or sensitivity (150
positions have such designations within the Department).
OPM Special Background Investigations (SBI) decreased in FY 1992
and were "zeroed" out in FY 1993. The Department adopted the Single
Scope Background Investigations (SSBI) which replaced and negated the
need for the SBI. SBI's were used primarily for individuals who
require access to Sensitive Compartment Information (SCI) access
approval.
OPM Background Investigations (BI) decreased beginning in FY 1993
when the SSBI became available. BI's will only be conducted on DOE
employees who occupy critical sensitive positions, but do not require
access to classified material in order to perform their official duties.
OPM Limited Background Investigations (LBI) conducted for
reinvestigations decreased in FY 1993 and will be "zeroed" for FY 1994
as a result of the adoption of the Periodic Reinvestigation - Single
Scope Background Investigation (PRIS) in December 1992. LBI's are
currently used only for initial L and Secret clearances for DOE
employees.
OPM National Agency Checks with Credit (NACC) will increase as the
need for the number of initial Q clearances is reduced.
PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. Describe the effort to develop an electronic transfer
program for security clearances, including the timetable for completion
and cost by year.
Mr. McFadden. The current time between the DOE request for a
background investigation and when the completed product is received
from the investigative agency (Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is
approximately 90 days. However, depending on the geographic location,
it takes another 15 to 30 days in mail time to send and receive the case
papers and completed investigation.
This project is to implement an electronic transfer system
(including appropriate safeguards of data) between each of the DOE
Operations Offices and the OPM's Office of Federal Investigations in
Boyers, Pennsylvania, which will allow the DOE to electronically
transfer the paperwork requesting a background investigation (including
fingerprints) to OPM, and when the background investigation is
completed, to have it electronically transferred to the appropriate DOE
Operations Office for adjudication. This will also allow transfer of
security files between DOE Operations Offices. The electronic transfer
system will reduce the mail time between DOE and OPM from several weeks
to several hours.
The FY 1994 Security Investigations budget includes $2,950,000 for
this project, which will take 2 years to complete, and approximately
$2,200,000 will be required in FY 1995.
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
Mr. Bevill. Provide an analysis of security investigation programs
showing the funds for defense and other than defense programs.
Mr. McFadden. Approximately 65 percent of the FY 1994 Security
Investigations budget will be allocated for Defense activities, as
shown below in the table which I would like to insert into the record.
(The information follows:)
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
FY 1994
Defense $34,667,750
Other than Defense 18,667,250
Total SI Budget 53,335,000
Use of Prior-Year-Funds (8,335,000)
FY 1994 REQUEST $45,000,000
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
Mr. Bevill. What was the average cost by type and performing
agency of investigations and reinvestigations performed by FY 1992,
FY 1993, and FY 1994? What is the average completion time?
Mr. McFadden. Security investigations actual and estimated costs
for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 are shown in a table below which I
would like to insert in the record. (The information follows:)
ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED CASE COSTS
FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 Columns of the FY 1994 Congressional
Request
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
AGENCY/INVESTIGATION TYPE ACTUAL ESTIMATE ESTIMATE
FBI Background Investigation $4,089 $4,627 $4,997
OPM Single Scope Background N/A $2,850 $3,125
Investigation (SSBI) 1/
OPM Background Invest. (BI) 1/ $2,475 $2,575 $2,850
OPM Limited Background $1,250 $1,400 $1,550
Investigation (LBI) 2/
OPM Periodic Reinvest. SBI N/A $675 $750
(PRIS) 2/
OPM Special Background
Investigation (SBI) $2,575 N/A N/A
OPM National Agency Check $42 $45 $50
with Credit (NACC)
* FY 1993 and FY 1994 columns do not reflect OPM price increases
1/ For 75 day service
2/ For 120 day service
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is completing applicant cases
in 60 days and reinvestigations in 90 days. The Office of Personnel
Management is currently completing Single Scope Background
Investigations (used for the initial investigation for Q and Top
Secret clearances) in 74 days; Periodic Reinvestigations for Single
Scope Background Investigations (for reinvestigation of Q and Top
Secret clearances) in 120 days, and National Agency Checks with Credit
(used for initial and reinvestigation of L and Secret clearances) in 24
days.
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
Mr. Bevill. Provide a breakout, by activity, of.the $4.3 million
requested for Security Investigations Activities.
Mr. McFadden. The breakout of our request for Related Security
Investigations ActiVities is shown on a table which I would like to
insert in the record. (The information follows:)
RELATED SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITIES
Electronic Transfer Program $2,950,000
Implementation of Accelerated Access
Authorization Program (AAAP) 1,100,000
National Industrial Security Program
(NISP) support 250,000
Total Related SI Activities $4,300,000
...........
THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING AND OPERATIONS
Mr. Bevill. This office was established to consolidate emergency
response activities throughout the Department. Instead of creating more
efficient operations, the total cost of emergency operations has
increased substantially. Please justify this increase in funding.
General Bickford. Efficiency of operations has increased with a
slight increase in funding. This increased funding results from
breaking out common funding support from the Atomic Energy Defense
Activities Appropriation. In fiscal years 1991 and 1992, common
funding support from the Atomic Energy Defense Activities Appropriation
amounted to $6.5 million and $3.05 million, respectively. Also, for
FY 1992, $214,000 supported 3 FTEs directly funded by Departmental
Administration. The increase from FY 1991 to FY 1992 is for additional
contractor assistance for training, emergency plans review, data
analyses, and to strengthen the DOE exercise and appraisal program.
Also, the funding increase provides for state-of-the-art communications,
display, and data processing equipment necessary for full operation of
the improved Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
The FY 1993 budget increase is for continued Emergency Management
System (EMS) enhancement and the EOC. Contractor support is required
to continue, expand, and improve the EMS appraisal program; contractor
and Federal support to meet guidance and oversight requirements of the
EMS Program; and contractor support to strengthen DOE's EMS exercise
and evaluation program to ensure effective EMS planning, preparedness,
and response to emergency situations; and continued improvement of the
Department-wide emergency training and technical assistance to the
readiness assurance program and to support other exercises. Funding for
the EOC supports continued oversight and operation of the Headquarters
EOC and the departmental emergency communication system between the
Field Offices EOCs. The funding increase for capital equipment ensures
compatibility throughout the Headquarters and Field Offices EOCs.
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING AND OPERATIONS
Mr. Bevill. How are efforts of this office coordinated with
the emergency response and operations funded in the defense
programmatic areas?
General Bickford. The Office of Emergency Planning and
Operations is responsible for the development and operation of the
Department's Emergency Management System (EMS), which is the
framework for all of DOE's emergency planning, preparedness , and
readiness assurance activities. The EMS has been established to
ensure a fully coordinated and integrated emergency preparedness
program is maintained by the Department. The Office of Emergency
Planning and Operations is also responsible for ensuring that
Departmental policies and standards are appropriately applied in
emergency management programs. This is accomplished through the
review of emergency plans and procedures and periodic appraisals
of emergency management programs and evaluation of other emergency
preparedness activities.
Emergency response and operations activities funded in the
defense programmatic area include the unique radiological
emergency response assets (i.e., the Nuclear Emergency Search
Team, the Accident Response Group, the Aerial Measuring System,
the Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability, the Federal
Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, the Radiological
Assistance Program, and the Radiation Emergency Assistance
Center/Training Site) managed by the Department and the emergency
management programs for DOE's defense-related facilities,
operations, and activities. Program management responsibilities
for the response assets are solely within the defense programmatic
purview, subject to periodic review, appraisal, and evaluation by
the Office of Emergency Planning and Operations, as are the
emergency management programs for DOE's defense-related
facilities, operations, and activities.
Coordination is accomplished by the Office of Emergency
Planning and Operations through a number of mechanisms and
activities, including: chairing the Department's Emergency
Management Advisory Committee, which is comprised of
representatives of all Departmental elements with emergency
preparedness responsibilities and interests; participation in the
directives development process which sets Departmental
responsibilities, authorities, and requirements; review and
concurrence on emergency readiness assurance plans; and,
concurrence in selection of Departmental representatives to
interagency and international committees, work groups, and task
forces.
IMPORTATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PARTS
Mr. Rogers. The U.S. Customs Service has a large presence at all
US ports as well as the technology and capacity to inspect all goods
entering the U.S. Are there any joint initiatives between the
Departments of Energy and Defense and the Customs Service to detect the
importation of nuclear weapons and parts? Please describe these
initiatives including the requested funding for fiscal year 1994.
Mr. Ford. There are no joint initiatives between the Departments
of Energy and Defense and the Customs Service to detect the importation
of nuclear weapons and parts.