1992 Congressional Hearings
Intelligence and Security


Basis Date:
T. Bevill
House Appropriations
Docfile Number:
Hearing Date:
DOE Lead Office:
Energy and Water Development
Hearing Subject:
Witness Name:
V. Alessi, R. Daniel, G. McFadden, G. Podonsky
Hearing Text:

                         ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
     Mr. Bevill. Describe the activities of DOE in arms control
 negotiations. Are these activities planned to increase in FY 1993?
     Dr. Czajkowski. At the policy level, DOE sits on the President's
 Nuclear Initiative Steering Group and on the Arms Control and
 Nonproliferation Policy Coordinating Committees, which oversee a
 myriad of bilateral and multilateral discussions, negotiations and
     Accordingly, at the working level, DOE provides both policy and
 technical support for the following arms control and nonproliferation
 activities, among others:
 - International Atomic Energy Agency
 -  Nuclear Suppliers Group
 -  Bilateral Nuclear Cooperative Agreements
 -  Australia Group (chemical exports)
 -  Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM)
 -  Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (START implementation)
 -  Bilateral Consultative Commission (TTBT implementation)
 -  Chemical Weapons Convention negotiations
 -  Bilateral Chemical Weapons Talks with the former Soviet Union (FSU)
 -  Special Verification Commission (INF implementation)
 -  Iraq Nuclear Inspections/UN Special Commission
 -  Biological Weapons Review Conference and follow-on technical
 -  Special Consultative Commission (ABM compliance)
 -  UN General Assembly First Committee (disarmament)
 -  NATO High Level Group
 -  NATO Disarmament Experts Group
     In view of the dynamic changes in the political and military
 environment, DOE's participation in these activities is expected to
 increase in FY 1993. This is particularly the case in those activities
 associated with U.S. nonproliferation efforts.
    In addition, DOE is deeply involved in the detailed discussions
 with the former Soviet Union on the safety, security, storage and
 dismantlement (SSD) of its nuclear weapons. These talks began pursuant
 to the President's Nuclear Initiative of September 27, 1991 and are
 among the most important bilateral efforts underway today. Once active
 assistance is agreed upon, DOE will provide most of the technical
 expertise and equipment needed to accomplish the task.,
    Finally, we are engaged in preparations for the watershed 1995 Non-
 Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference. DOE will play a major role
 in developing policy and strategy to insure that the Treaty is
 extended indefinitely or for a series of long periods. Such an outcome
 is very important for both the Department and the U.S. Government.
                         ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
     Mr. Bevill. Why are arms control negotiations needed when the
 President has unilaterally reduced nuclear weapons far beyond anything
 contemplated by arms control negotiators?
     Dr. Czajkowski. Events clearly dictate that the traditional arms
 control agenda be broadened to incorporate new approaches and new
 concerns of a changing international landscape.
     Before addressing these, it is important to note that the
 "traditional arms control" agenda has not been completed. Chemical
 weapons and CFE IA negotiations continue in Geneva and Vienna
 respectively; and the implementation commissions established for
 existing treaties (e.g., the Bilateral Consultative Commission for the
 Threshold Test Ban Treaty) continue to meet periodically. In addition,
 conferences are called to review operation of the treaties agreed to
 during the heyday of traditional arms control: the Third Review
 Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (September 1991) is the
 most recent example. Finally, 1995 is the year for the very important
 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference.
     The arms control agenda of the future is rich with possibilities
 for promoting confidence, preventing crises, and fostering
 regional/global stability. It will be characterized not by greater or
 less complexity, but by complexity of a different kind: less East-West
 centered and more multilateral; less emphasis on strict verification and
 more on monitoring and consultation; fewer prolonged negotiations and
 formal treaties and more unilateral steps and confidence building
 measures. The primary focus will be on preventing the proliferation of
 weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Hence we will
 witness increased emphasis on the NPT and IAEA, the Nuclear Suppliers
 Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group
 (chemical exports), and nuclear weapon safety, security and dismantlement
 (SSD) assistance to the former Soviet Union.
                         ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
     Mr. Bevill: How have the President's announcements on nuclear arms
 reductions impacted ongoing verification missions in FY 1992 and
 planned for FY 1993?
     Dr. Czajkowski: Two aspects of the President's recent
 announcements on nuclear arms control have significantly impacted the
 ongoing V&CT missions: 1) the unprecedented scope and pace for the
 reduction of nuclear weapons themselves, and 2) the more unilateral
 approach in accomplishing these reductions, but in ways which are
 transparent and build confidence. The use of technologies to effect
 verification is being de-emphasized, but not eliminated (for example,
 negotiated agreements for the purpose of de-MIRVing U.S. and Russian
 ICBMs may ultimately require verification procedures utilizing special
 purpose technology). Technology and methods once associated more
 closely with verification, are being made available to support
 transparency and confidence building measures being considered under
 the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991.
     Finally, the new emphasis on the detection of proliferation
 activities by weapons states, as well as non-weapon states, will
 require new technologies to improve the ability of the U.S. to detect
 and locate illicit weapons, materials production, diversion, and
 warhead manufacture and testing. In the near term, technologies developed
 under the nuclear arms reduction treaties and in support of the Chemical
 Weapon Convention and Conventional Forces in Europe treaties will be the
 technical base to respond to increasing proliferation requirements.
                         ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
    Mr. Bevill: Please describe the roles performed by each DOE
 laboratory or facility for arms control activities. Who has the lead
 in each programmatic area?
    Dr. Czajkowski: The Office of Arms Control has, with intent,
 expanded its verification technology activities outside the Defense
 Programs weapon laboratories, while still retaining the majority of
 technology activities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
 (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and Sandia National
 Laboratories (SNL). The laboratories which have been added in
 verification technologies development are Argonne National Laboratory
 (ANL), Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), Idaho National
 Engineering Laboratory (INEL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL),
 Pacific. Northwest Laboratory (PNL), and Savannah River Laboratory
    There are some programmatic activities which are shared at all of
 the laboratories such as the Radiation Detection Program, membership on
 the Laboratory Advisory Group on Effluent Research, and the Advanced
 Concepts Program. Under the Advanced Concepts Program, each laboratory
 has the opportunity to independently explore new and innovative ideas
 with relatively few restrictions. The ideas must have a verification
 technology association, have a specific length of time for proof of
 concept, and have no specific prior work performed on the concept.
 Individual projects are generally funded at the laboratory which has
 known expertise or capability, or where an advanced concept was
 originated and has passed the feasibility phase.
     Detection technology has a limited number of major programs where
 the majority of work is associated with only one or a few laboratories.
 For example:
     o     The largest fiscal program is satellite instrumentation for
           verification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. This program is
           shared by SNL and LANL.
     o     The seismic program exists almost exclusively at LLNL, while
           the Hydrodynamic Yield Measurement program is centered primarily
           at LANL.
     o     Directed Energy Weapons detection technology development is
           shared at LLNL, LANL, and SNL.
                         ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
     Mr. Bevill. Please provide a lead table as shown in the budget
 which includes only arms control funding, excluding intelligence
     Dr. Czajkowski. I would be pleased to provide a lead table which
 includes only arms control activities for the record (the information
                           ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
      Mr. Bevill. In the treaty implementation activity, how many U.S.
 and Soviet tests were monitored in FY 1992 and how many planned for FY
      Dr. Czajkowski. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) will
 exercise its monitoring rights on two U.S. tests during FY 1992. For
 planning purposes, our FY 1992 budget includes funds to monitor up to
 four CIS tests, however, given its moratorium, the CIS will not test in
 FY 1992. The 1993 budget incorporates funding to accommodate CIS
 monitoring for two U.S. tests and, for planning purposes, assumes that
 the U.S. will exercise its rights to monitor at least two CIS tests. By
 way of explanation, the TTBT Protocol allows the verifying party to
 monitor up to two tests of any yield per year, even if there are not
 two tests that exceed the "trigger" level of 35 kt.
                        ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
    Mr. Bevill: Are arms control negotiations requirements increasing
 the need for technologies? Provide examples of verification needs
 where the technology is not available.
    Dr. Czajkowski: The arms control treaty verification environment is
 in a highly dynamic state. Verification requirements range from the
 decades-old Limited Test Ban Treaty to the confidence building,
 unilateral requirements of the President's nuclear weapon initiative.
 The recent confirmation of the clandestine production of chemical
 warfare agents and the nuclear weapon program in Iraq has dramatically
 highlighted the need for verification technologies for proliferation
 detection. This has further been underscored by the concerns regarding
 the acquisition of military delivery systems (i.e., missile
 technologies) by historical adversaries. The dissolution of the Soviet
 Union with the concomitant changes in control over nuclear weapons has
 greatly exacerbated the world concern over the potential transfer of
 nuclear weapons or special nuclear material to aspiring nuclear weapon
    All of the above circumstances are strong indications of expanded
 technology requirements.         Deleted
     The above technology shortfalls for proliferation detection are by
 no means exhaustive, and can be expanded under the appropriate
 security conditions.
                         ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
     Mr. Bevill: What are the treaty verification assumptions on which
 the budget is based?
     Dr. Czajkowski: At present our treaty verification assumptions
 are: that the requirements will continue for those treaties in force;
 that additional requirements will surface with respect to the reduction
 of nuclear weapon inventories; that requirements will increase for
 bilateral and multilateral chemical weapon treaties or conventions; and
 that proliferation detection of weapons of mass destruction will
 continue to be a growing and high level international concern.
                           ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
     Mr. Bevill: Please provide a list of treaties in effect; treaties
 under negotiation; and anticipated treaties through the 1990's in
 which DOE will be involved.
     Dr. Czajkowski: Treaties and agreements in each of the categories
 in which DOE is and is likely to be involved through the 1990's are
 listed below. The level and form of DOE involvement customarily depends
 on a number of factors including the extent to which DOE equities
 (e.g., nuclear weapon production and testing, advanced concepts
 research, technical aspects of non-proliferation, potential that DOE
 facilities will be subject to on-site inspections under a prospective
 treaty, etc.) are involved, the analytical and verification technology
 research and development support that DOE and its national laboratories
 provide to the negotiation and implementation processes, etc.
      In effect:
      1963      Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
      1968      Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
      1972      Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
      1972      Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM)
      1974      Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT, ratified 1990)
      1976      Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET, ratified 1990)
      1987      Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)
      1990      Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)
      1990      US/USSR Bilateral Chemical Weapons Agreement
      1991      Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START, unratified)
 Under negotiation/prospective:
      -    Safe, secure transportation, storage, dismantlement of nuclear
           weapons (President's September 27, 1991 Nuclear Initiative and
           Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, SNTRA)
      -    Further Strategic Offensive Force limitations (mutual
           bilateral, START II)
      -    Further Conventional Force Europe limitations (CFE-IA,
           manpower; CFE II, Aerial Overflight)
      -    Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
      -    Open Skies
      -    Defense and Space Talks (DST, and/or ABM Treaty revision)
      -    Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension
                           ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
     Mr. Bevill. Provide the total funding by program activity included
 in the budget for implementation of the TTBT and PNET in FY 1992 and
 FY 1993. How many FTEs support each activity?
     Dr. Czajkowski. The following planned funding by program activity
 is provided in Treaty Implementation activities in FY 1992 and FY 1993.
 The estimated FTEs to support each activity is also provided. (The
 information follows.)
                               ($ in Millions)                FTEs
                             FY 1992      FY 1993      FY 1992      FY 1993
 Base Support
   Maintenance Capability      7.5           7.0         42          40
   Nevada Test Site            2.0           2.0         13          13
 Foreign Deployments*       $  5.5        $  6.0         33          35
                   Total      $15.0        $15.0
   This is an estimate due to uncertainty in the Russian Federation
 nuclear testing program. Deployment for at least two tests are
 planned for FY 1993 with preparation for the deployments beginning in
 the last quarter of FY 1992.
     Due to the Russian testing moratorium, the DOE had reduced
 manpower requirements in FY 1992 to monitor foreign explosions under
 the TTBT/PNET and requisite funds planned for foreign deployment were
 not required. Should the moratorium continue, portions of the treaty
 implementation funding will again be used to support other treaties and
 agreements. Included in this additional support would be: nuclear,
 missile, chemical, and biological weapons non-proliferation efforts;
 United States Security Council Resolution No. 687 (IRAQ); and the
 President's September 27, 1991 Nuclear Initiative pertaining to former
 Soviet Union weapon transportation, storage and dismantlement, as
 consistent with DOE mission responsibilities and capabilities.
                           OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE
        Mr. Bevill. Now have the President's announcements on nuclear
 arms reductions impacted your ongoing mission?
        Mr. Daniel. Since the mission of the Office of Foreign
 Intelligence is related to foreign rather than U.S. activities, the
 immediate answer is that the President's announcement on U.S. nuclear
 arms reduction does not directly influence our mission.
        On the other hand, announcements by the former Soviet Union
 (FSU), combined with the tumultuous changes taking place there, have
 affected our mission significantly. OFI and the policymakers it
 supports now find themselves confronting an array of new issues
 relating to command, control, and security of tactical and strategic
 nuclear weapons in the FSU; .,dismantlement of the nuclear weapons the
 FSU has agreed to eliminate; disposition of the nuclear materials
 removed from those weapons; and the proliferation potential of the
 former republics of the Soviet Union (the so- called "brain drain"
 issue). These new intelligence problems require us to maintain our
 technical knowledge of FSU nuclear weaponry. Moreover, we do not
 discount the possibility that problems may surface that would result in
 the  U.S. having to confront a former Soviet state that has become an
 unfriendly nuclear weapons power.
       Mr. Bevill. Have there been any discussion within the
 Intelligence Community on the appropriate size and focus of DOE's
 intelligence,program now that the national security needs have
       Mr. Daniel.     Deleted
       Mr. Bevill. Now does the size and funding for this activity
 within the Department of Energy compare to that of other Cabinet-level
 agencies in FY 1993?
       Mr. Daniel. The following table provided by the Intelligence
 Community Staff reflects the size and funding for the Department of
 Energy activities in comparison with other Cabinet-level agencies.
              FY 1993 Congressional Budget Request
                     (Dollars in Thousands)
      Mr. Bevill. Have the Department and the Intelligence Community
 agreed that economic competitiveness is a valid mission requiring DOE
 intelligence support? Please justify.
      Mr. Daniel.               Deleted
       Mr. Bevill. What DOE policy statement defines which science and
 technology areas should be explored?
        Mr. Daniel.           Deleted
      Mr. Bevill. Please justify funding for science and technology
 activities when several of the areas identified for study are
 themselves the subject of international scientific collaborations which
 include the former Soviet Union.
      Mr. Daniel.             Deleted
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe the roles performed by each DOE
 laboratory or facility for intelligence activities. Who has the lead in
 each programmatic area?
      Mr. Daniel.               Deleted
       Mr. Bevill. Now many resources (people and funding) did your
 office have examining Iraq's nuclear weapons program in FY 1990, FY
 1991, and FY 1992?
      Mr. Daniel.               Deleted
       Mr. Bevill. Please describe the Department of Energy's role in
 examining Iraq's nuclear weapons program prior to the revelations
 highlighting the extent of the program.
      Mr. Daniel.               Deleted
 Mr. Bevill. What lessons were learned from this experience?
 Mr. Daniel.
       Mr. Bevill. In FY 1991, what percent of your resources were
 focused on the Soviet threat? Has this changed in FY 1992 or FY 1993?
       Mr. Daniel.
     Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list and brief description of all
 classified work for others being performed at any DOE laboratory or
     Mr. Daniel.
 AL              Albuquerque Field Office
 CH              Chicago Field Office
 EG&G            Edgerton, Germeshausen and Greer
 INEL            Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
 LLNL            Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
 LANL            Los Alamos National Laboratory
 MM/GDP          Martin Marietta/Gaseous Diffusion Plant (OR)
 MM/NL           Martin Marietta/National Laboratory (OR)
 NV              Nevada Field Office
 OR              Oak Ridge Field Office
 PNL             Pacific Northwest Laboratory
 RL              Richland Field Office
 SNLA            Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque
 SRL             Savannah River Laboratory
    Mr. Bevill. Please identify all Special Access Required (SAR) work
 for others programs and the location within DOE where the work is being
    Mr. Daniel.
 AL              Albuquerque Field Office
 CH              Chicago Field Office
 EG&G            Edgerton, Germeshausen and Greer
 INEL            Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
 LLNL            Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
 LANL            Los Alamos National Laboratory
 MM/GDP          Martin Marietta/Gaseous Diffusion Plant (OR)
 MM/NL           Martin Marietta/National Laboratory (OR)
 NV              Nevada Field Office
 OR              Oak Ridge Field Office
 PNL             Pacific Northwest Laboratory
 RL              Richland Field Office
 SNLA            Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque
 SRL             Savannah River Laboratory
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe the process for transferring
 technical support costs to other program organizations. Why is this
 necessary? What funding is to be transferred?
      Mr. Daniel. The Office of Intelligence does not. transfer
 technical support costs to other program organizations. The technical
 support budget states, 'In an effort to more closely manage
 administrative costs, the PSO/Office Directors share of FTE-dependent
 costs for space, supplies, and telecommunications are contained in this
 budget and will be transferred during the execution year.' This
 statement is consistent with the Department's plans to transfer funds
 from all DOE organizations to Departmental Administration for
 administrative support costs.
      Traditionally, DOE's budget has been developed so that essentially
 all Headquarters FTE-dependent administrative support costs (e.g.,
 rent, telecommunications, and supplies), are centrally budgeted for all
 Headquarters staff regardless of which appropriation (e.g., Defense
 Programs, New Production Reactor, Nuclear Energy, etc.), funded the
 FTES. Over the past several years the staffing levels, driven by the
 programs, have been growing to levels that cannot be adequately
 supported with the amount of funding available for administrative
 costs. One of the solutions to this dilemma is to have each program pay
 for its fair share of these administrative costs. It forces those
 programs which are expanding to pay for additional associated costs and
 thus forces them to consider ways to minimize administrative -costs as
 part of their expansion plans.
      The FY 1993 budget was written to disclose to the Congress that
 the Department was considering this approach. We planned to submit a
 budget amendment when a final decision was made and the specific
 details developed. The Department is still assessing this option. We
 have received considerable expressions of concern from several
 Congressional Committee staffs. Given these concerns and the numerous
 other related issues, we are now considering retaining the traditional
 funding approach for FY 1993. This will allow the Department to make a
 more deliberate review of this option as well as other options and
 propose a change in a future budget if appropriate. Retaining our
 traditional approach would also require a FY 1993 budget amendment to
 provide  adequate funding to Departmental Administration. We expect a
 decision in the near future.
       Mr. Bevill. Now much funding will be provided to the
 Nonproliferation Center in FY 1992 and FY 1993?
       Mr. Daniel.
                              FERNALD AND HANFORD
     Mr. Bevill. Why do the costs for nuclear safeguards and security
 activities continue to increase when the Department has eliminated all
 production activities at Fernald and Hanford, and reduced production
 activities at several other sites?
     Maj Gen McFadden. As production activities cease or are reduced
 there is little initial impact on the amount of safeguards and security
 activities required at the affected sites. Some immediate savings will
 be realized by reducing the level and number of clearances. However,
 until the special nuclear materials (SNM) present at those sites are
 consolidated or eliminated, the present level of security is required
 to protect SNM against theft, sabotage, or terrorist activity.
     We continue to work closely  with the various program offices to
 assure that all appropriate reductions are achieved at the affected
      Mr. Bevill. The Nuclear Safeguards and Security program is now
 managed by two separate organizations. Please explain fully which
 activities and funding are associated with each.
      Maj Gen McFadden. The mission of the Nuclear Safeguards and
 Security program is to develop measures to assure effective protection
 of the DOE's nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and facilities against
 theft, sabotage, espionage, and terrorist activity and to identify
 classified and unclassified sensitive information critical to the
 national security. This portion of the mission is managed by the Office
 of Security Affairs and totals $92.2 million in Fiscal Year 1993. The
 mission also includes providing technical support to international
 activities designed to minimize the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
 and to control nuclear energy-related exports. This portion of the
 mission is managed by the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
 and  totals $12.0 million in Fiscal Year 1993.
      Current funding Information for the program will be submitted for
 the record.
     Mr. Bevill. Please describe how duplication of effort can be
 avoided with two organizations conducting similar activities.
     Maj Gen McFadden. If this question is in reference to the Office of
 Arms Control and Nonproliferation, and the Office of Security Affairs,
 there is no duplication of effort. Each organization has separate
 missions. However, we work closely to coordinate projects which
 interface within programs.
     Mr. Bevill. Is there a cost-benefit analysis performed before
 recommending new security measures? If so, please describe.
     Maj Gen McFadden. Cost-benefit analyses are performed before new
 security measures are recommended. DOE Order 5630.11, "Safeguards and
 Security Program', dated January 22, 1988, requires that safeguards
 and security programs be supported by appropriate cost/benefit analyses
 in order to reduce programmatic risks to an acceptable level.
 Furthermore, DOE Order 5632.8, 'Protection Program Operations: Systems
 Performance Tests', dated February 4, 1988 requires the evaluation of
 protection system capabilities through system performance testing, both
 initially and on an ongoing basis.
                            THREAT POLICY STATEMENT
     Mr. Bevill. Has the 1983 Threat Policy Statement been updated? Is
 there a need to modify this guidance?
      Maj Gen McFadden. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the
 Department of Defense (DOD) on January 31, 1992 completed a Joint
 Threat Polity Statement for nuclear weapons facilities. The Joint
 Threat Statement represents a new initiative.
      Based upon this Joint Statement, which was supported by
 intelligence community study and input, DOE is now in the process of
 revising the 1983 Generic Threat Guidance. Traditional threats will be
 described and additional emphasis placed on the protection of
 classified, sensitive, technological and proliferation related
 information, which may represent the gravest threat to DOE programs and
 resources in a continually changing world geo-political environment.
 The updated threat guidance will be utilized by each facility to
 evaluate the appropriateness and adequacy of current installation
 defense  posture.
      Mr. Bevill. Have any DOE facilities experienced any threat in the
 past five years that approaches the threat guidance now in effect?
      Maj Gen McFadden. There have been no cases of direct terrorist
 threats on DOE facilities possibly because the security in place makes
 our facilities difficult targets. However, evidence exists of internal
 and external sources acting against DOE programs for reasons of
 financial gain (theft of government property), entertainment (computer
 hacking), unauthorized access (computer system modification for
 convenience), and revenge/malicious mischief (disgruntled employees).
 In addition, DOE facilities are regularly subject to demonstrations,
 which may include civil disobedience.
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a breakdown by each organization of
 the elements identified in the Fiscal Year 1993 budget request and the
      Maj Gen McFadden. The information will be submitted for the
                              SECURITY CLEARANCES
      Mr. Bevill. Now that several former nuclear materials production
 sites have been deactivated and transferred to the waste cleanup
 program, how has this impacted the number of security clearances? What
 steps are being taken to reduce the numbers of clearances? Are there
 any impediments to a quick reduction?
      Maj Gen McFadden. The Department's Fiscal Year 1993 Security
 Investigations budget request of $58.3 million, a reduction of $4.3
 million below Fiscal Year 1992, reflected the Department's efforts to
 reduce the number of security clearances. The deactivation and transfer
 of nuclear materials production sites to the waste cleanup program have
 contributed to the reduced funding request. It is expected that as more
 facilities are transferred we will make further reductions to the
 levels and numbers of clearances. However, as long as nuclear material
 remains at the sites and until such time as classified document
 inventory levels are reduced or eliminated, we must ensure that
 appropriate clearances are in place.
      The DOE Hanford Field Office began over 18 months ago to
 consolidate classified data and nuclear materials into protective zones
 which resulted in reduced numbers and levels of clearances. At Hanford,
 "Q" clearances were reduced by 28 percent during Fiscal Years 1991 and
 1992 and will continue to be reduced between Fiscal Year 1991 and
 Fiscal Year 1993. We are working aggressively throughout the DOE
 complex to ensure that as older sites are reconfigured and new sites
 are constructed, that clearance levels and numbers are reduced as
 quickly as possible without endangering the National Security.
      The only impediment to a quick reduction will be our self
 assessment to ensure that in the interest of reducing levels and
 numbers of security clearances that we do not jeopardize our current
 level of protection.
      Mr. Bevill. What is the Department's current security clearance
 policy? When was this policy developed and when was it last updated?
      Maj Gen McFadden. DOE Personnel Security Program policies and
 procedures are stipulated in DOE Order 5631.2, last reissued on May 18,
 1988. This Order is currently being updated. The Department's security
 clearance policy conforms to pertinent provisions of the Atomic Energy
 Act and Executive Orders that require an individual's eligibility for
 access to classified matter or special nuclear material to be based
 upon review and adjudication of investigative reports provided by the
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or Office of Personnel Management
 (OPM). The Department may also use investigative reports completed by
 other agencies or departments provided the investigative scope and
 extent meets the standards set by the Department. Individuals
 adjudicated as acceptable security risks are granted access
 authorization. Individuals adjudicated as unacceptable security risks
 are  processed under administrative review procedures to determine
 whether access authorization should be denied or revoked. Individuals
 with DOE access authorization are reinvestigated at 5 year intervals.
                           SECURITY REINVESTIGATIONS
      Mr. Bevill. What is the current backlog of reinvestigations? Is
 it increasing? What efforts are being taken to reduce the backlog?
      Maj Gen McFadden. At the end of Calendar Year 1991, we had reduced
 the number of overdue reinvestigations from about 132,000 in 1985 to
 19,340. We anticipate meting the goal of eliminating this backlog by
 Fiscal Year 1993, and in fact several of our Field Offices -- Chicago,
 Idaho, Richland, Nevada, and Schenectady Naval Reactors Office -- have
 either already eliminated their backlogs, or will do so by the end of
 Fiscal Year 1992.
                               SECURITY CLEARANCES
     Mr. Bevill. Does DOE currently have a backlog of security
 investigations pending with any agency?
     Maj Gen McFadden. DOE does not have a backlog of security
 investigations with any agency. However, there are a number of
 investigations of various types in process with the Office of Personnel
 Management (OPM). I would like to insert into the record a breakdown of
 the current DOE caseload at OPM. (The information follows:)
                        CURRENT DOE CASES ON HAND AT OPM
                            (AS OF FEBRUARY 22, 1992)
 TYPE CASE                    NUMBER ON HAND            MEDIAN
 AGE SBI-35                          3                  63 days
 SBI-75                             42                  91  days
 SBI-120                            12                 157  days
 BI-35                             161                  38  days
 BI-75                           1,675                  55  days
 BI-120                            737                  77  days
 LBI-35                              4                  35  days
 LBI-75                            174                  71  days
 LBI-120                         3,386                  59  days
 NACC-35                           930                  14  days
 Total OPM Cases                  7124
      Mr. Bevill. What were the number, by type and performing agency,
 of investigations and reinvestigations performed for Fiscal Year 1991,
 Fiscal Year 1992, and Fiscal Year 1993? Describe the reasons for
 increases or decreases.
      Maj Gen McFadden. I would like to insert into the record relevant
 data on investigations and reinvestigations. (The information
                   FY 1991 (ACTUAL)        FY 1992 (EST)        FY
    Initial                       150                49                 49
      SBI                         776               371                  0
      BI                       10,254            13,488             12,103
      LBI                      28,442            21,716             18,031
 NACC Used for
    both Initial and
    Reinvestigations           209000            21,309             26,886
        FBI investigations decreased in Fiscal Year 1992 as that
 agency is now being used strictly for initial investigations for
 individuals who occupy positions of a high degree of importance or
 sensitivity (about 150 positions in the DOE).
        OPM SBIs decreased in Fiscal Year 1992 and will be "zeroed" out
 in Fiscal Year 1993. The DOE has adopted the Single Scope Background
 Investigation (SSBI) which negates the need for the SBI. The SBIs were
 used primarily for individuals who require Sensitive Compartmented
 Information (SCI) access approval.
       OPM background investigations decreased in Fiscal Year 1992. The
 decrease is attributable to decreased program activity at Rocky Flats,
 Richland's effort to decrease the number of "Q" clearances, the
 downgrading of classified technology in the Uranium Enrichment Program
 (from Secret to Confidential), and the general recession that has
 resulted in decreased turnover at DOE sites. The same trend is forecast
 for Fiscal Year 1993.
       OPM LBIs decreased in Fiscal Year 1992 and will continue to
 decrease in Fiscal Year 1993 as the DOE realizes its goal to eliminate
 the backlog of reinvestigations by the end of Fiscal Year 1993. Once
 the backlog has been eliminated, LBIs will be conducted as
       OPM National Agency Checks with Credit (NACCS) will increase as
 the need for the number of initial "Q" clearances is reduced. This
 increase will also be a result of using NACCs to meet reinvestigation
 program requirements.
       Mr. Bevill. Provide an analysis of security investigation
 programs showing the funds for defense and other than defense
       MaJ Gen McFadden. Approximately 69 percent of the Fiscal Year
 1993 Security Investigations budget will be allocated for Defense
 Programs activities as shown below in the table which I would like to
 insert into the record. (The information follows:)
                             SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
                                     FY 1993
                    Defense Programs Activities          $40,510,855
                    Other than Defense Programs           17,778,145
                          TOTAL                          $58,289,000
       Mr. Bevill. What was the average cost by type and performing
 agency of investigations and reinvestigations performed in Fiscal Year
 1991, Fiscal Year 1992, and Fiscal Year 1993? What is the average
 completion time?
        Maj Gen McFadden. The breakout of security investigation funding
 by performing agency is shown in the table below which I would like to
 insert in the record. (The information follows:)
                             SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
                                 FY 1991 - FY 1993
                            ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED COSTS
                                BY AGENCY AND TYPE
                            (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
                                                             FY 1992
                       FY 1991     FY 1992      FY 1993     Completion
 Agency/Investigation   Actual      Actual     Estimated    Time(Days)
 OPM Special Background  $ 2,750   $  2,725*      N/A         0
 OPM Background            2,500      2,475   $ 2,673        88
 OPM Limited Background    1,250      1,250     1,350       121
 OPM National Agency
  Check with Credit           40         42        45        34
 FBI Background            4,089      3,715     4,012        90
      *for 75 day service
      Mr. Bevill. The ending uncosted balance for the security
 investigations tripled from Fiscal Year 1990 to Fiscal Year 1991.
 Please explain.
      Maj Gen McFadden. The uncosted balance for the security
 investigations budget for the year ending September 30, 1991, reflected
 $10,511,000 of costs not billed to DOE from the Office of Personnel
 Management (OPM) until after October 1, 1991. This resulted in the
 Fiscal Year 1991 uncosted balance being inflated by the $10M late
      Uncosted balances will fluctuate from year to year due to the fact
 that OPM does not submit bills for the entire fiscal year's activities
 until after September 30th. In review of Fiscal Year 1991, it should be
 noted that all but $515,311 of the OPM portion of the Fiscal Year 1991
 security investigations budget was spent, which represents less than I
 percent carryover from Fiscal Year 1991 to Fiscal Year 1992.
       Mr. Bevill. How many security clearances by year, by federal and
 non-federal employees, are held at Fernald? How many at Hanford? Provide
 the costs in Fiscal Year 1991, Fiscal Year 1992 and Fiscal Year 1993
 associated with these clearances.
       Maj Gen McFadden. I will provide this data for the record. (The
 information follows:)
                                 SECURITY CLEARANCES
                    FY 1991 - FY 1993 FOR HANFORD AND FERNALD
                                  (Numbers of Persons)
                                 FY 1991        FY 1992      FY 1993
   Federal                           190           161            100
 Non-Federal                        5,031        3,598          1,500
 Subtotal                           5,221        3,759          1,600
   Federal                            126          202            200
 Non-Federal                        5,190        6,429          7,500
 Subtotal                           5,316        6,631          7,700
 TOTAL-HANFORD                     10,537       10,390          9,300
  Federal                              7             7              7
 Non-Federal                         135            21             21
 Subtotal                           142             28             28
   Federal                            0              0              0
 Non-Federal                        110              5              5
 Subtotal                           110              5              5
 TOTAL-FERNALD                      252             33             33
                                 10,789         10,423          9,333
                                 SECURITY CLEARANCES
                 FY 1991 - FY 1993 COSTS FOR HANFORD AND FERNALD,
                             (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
                           FY 1991            FY 1992         FY 1993
      Federal              $   368           $    312           $ 194
 Non-Federal                19,355              6,962           2,903
 Subtotal                   19,723              7,274           3,097
   Federal                       5                  8               8
 Non-Federal                   218                270             315
 Subtotal                      223                278             323
 TOTAL-HANFORD              19,946              7,552           3,420
   Federal                      14                 14              14
 Non-Federal                   261                 41              41
 Subtotal                      275                 55              55
 Federal                         0                  0               0
  Non-Federal                   -5                 .0               0
 Subtotal                        5                  0               0
 TOTAL-FERNALD                 280                 55              55
 GRAND TOTAL               $20,226             $7,607          $3,475
                        INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT WR-B-91-8
        Mr. Bevill. In a September 27, 1991 report (No. WR-8-91-8), the
 Inspector General (IG) identified 1,058 "Q" clearances which had been
 granted to employees by the Albuquerque Operations Office even though
 these employees did not need access to classified information. By each
 category identified in the report, please note the number of
 unnecessary clearances which have been terminated.
        Maj Gen McFadden. Albuquerque has done an assessment of this
 situation with the following results:
        Mason & Hanger, Pantex - Agreed that 79 of the 85 clearances
 could be downgraded to "L" based on physical separation and change of
 duties. To date about half have been accomplished.
        The Rocky Flats Office (RFO) has not tracked individual
 reductions but I understand that reductions have taken place in areas
 such as the protective force support staff and cafeteria personnel. My
 staff is working with RFO to specifically identify numbers of positions
 at this time.
        Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) - Submitted clearance
 justification forms supporting "Q" for all the positions identified by
 the IG. LANL has an "employment policy" requiring "Q" but they
 recognize the inconsistency with the DOE order. LANL management is
 reviewing its position and will internally evaluate a new plan for "L"
 clearances. A briefing to LANL senior management is scheduled for March
       Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNLA) - Submitted
 clearance Justification forms supporting "Q" for all the positions
 identified by the IG. SNLA also has an 'employment policy" requiring
 "Q". Based on physical configuration of SNLA with all employees needing
 access to Tech Area I (Secret Restricted Data access area) it will be
 very difficult to change general clearance level to "l". Albuquerque is
 actively working the problem with SNLA management.
       Further, I understand that Albuquerque Personnel will review and
 reevaluate all security clearances under the Jurisdiction of the DOE
 Field Office, AL; specifically, contractor employees located at the
 Amarillo Area Office (AAO), Kirtland Area Office (KAO) and Los Alamos
 Area Office (LAAO).
       I am fully committed to having employees cleared only at the
 level necessary to perform their duties and will work towards
 implementation of such a situation across the DOE complex.
                            U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION
       Mr. Dwyer: The Office of Arms Control and Non-proliferation is
 playing an increasing role in coordinating the Department's efforts to
 encourage scientists from Russia and other states in the commonwealth
 of Independent States (CIS) to direct their talents toward peaceful
 ends. Recently, the Department announced a $90,000 contract agreement
 for 116 scientists from the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in
 Moscow to work on magnetic fusion. How will the Russian scientists be
 able to complete our fusion research effort?
       Dr. Czajkowski:  The technical services subcontract between
 General Atomics and the Kurchatov Institute is for an investigation of
 the use of high power microwaves for magnetic fusion heating and
 current drive.   The Moscow group will be using the T-10 tokamak system
 which is in place at the Kurchatov Institute..  This group of
 scientists and technicians has been working in this area for some time
 and there have been many close working connections between these two
 groups in recent years under the auspices of the U.S.-USSR Peaceful
 Uses of Atomic Energy Agreement. The Russian group has the special
 skills and  equipment required to carry out this investigation.   This
 work will be carried out in a collaborative and interactive manner with
 the task supervisors in General Atomics. There will be exchanges of
 scientific personnel and frequent, direct communications by facsimile,
 electronic mail and telephone. The financial arrangements in the
 contract are based on fulfillment of clearly identified milestones and
 associated fixed price progress payments due upon completion of the
      Mr. Dwyer: How does this contract impact the Russian participation
 in the ITER program?
      Dr. Czajkowski: This subcontract is specifically developed to
 support ongoing, high priority tasks supporting the U.S. fusion
 research program on the Department's DIII-D tokamak facility, operated
 by its contractor, General Atomics, in La Jolla, CA. This subcontract
 does not deal with the Russian Federation's contributions or
 participation in the ITER Engineering Design Activities (EDA). All four
 ITER Parties, i.e., the European Community. Japan, the Russian
 Federation and the U.S., are expected to make equal contributions to
 the ITER EDA work program when it is approved. We understand from
 Russian  Federation officials that their domestic support of the ITER
 EDA responsibilities is a high priority within their system and is
 unrelated to this sub-contract.
       Mr. Dwyer: Were the scientists at the Kurchatov Institute engaged
 in defense-related research?
  Dr. Czajkowski: To the best of our knowledge. the answer is "no". Our
 scientists have worked with the leaders of this group for some time and
 know many of the individuals as working colleagues. This particular
 facility has been one of the mainstays in the Soviet fusion program
 and, indeed, in the world fusion program. Therefore, while we do not
 know the background of every individual member of the T-10 team, the
 overall record of the team is one of long-standing, high achievement in
 the magnetic fusion energy field, including many well respected
 publications in the open scientific literature.
                         U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION
    Mr. Dwyer. How is this agreement different from other U.S. efforts
 to redirect Russian nuclear scientists?
     Dr. Czajkowski. As I explained on the last question, we do not
 know that any of the scientists on this project have been involved in
 nuclear weapons development. It is a joint project between U.S. and
 CIS scientists which will benefit the effort of both countries to
 develop fusion energy for peaceful purposes. In addition, this will be
 funded out of an existing DOE program budget which means a clear source
 of funds is identified and available. Finally, this agreement was
 worked out directly with the CIS on the basis of an existing Agreement
 for Cooperation on Fusion Energy. It was reviewed by the interagency
 Group on Soviet Science and Technology which is led by the State
                          U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION
    Mr. Dwyer. What other national laboratories may soon have
 Department-sponsored Russian scientists working on peaceful research
    Dr. Czajkowski. That is hard to say specifically. Several national
 laboratories, have submitted ideas for joint non-weapons activities
 with former Soviet Union nuclear weapons institutes which have been
 forwarded to Amb. Gullucci's office for consideration.   In the
 meantime, the Department continues to explore opportunities for further
 peaceful joint ventures, some of which could be carried out under
 existing Agreements for Cooperation.
                         U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION
    Mr. Dwyer. When negotiating these arrangements, how does the
 Department work to insure against a "brain drain" in the former Soviet
    Dr. Czajkowski. We have had many discussions with the CIS on the
 subject of the potential for a "brain drain."  What we have heard most
 consistently, especially from CIS scientists whether involved in
 weapons development or peaceful scientific research, is that most CIS
 scientists and engineers prefer to stay in their homeland.  Their
 primary interest is in having meaningful scientific work. Thus, joint
 projects which benefit both the United States and the CIS, such as the
 fusion project with the Kurchatov Institute, are the most effective
 counter we can provide to reduce the potential "brain drain."
                          VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY
     Mr. Dwyer. In your written statement you discuss the evolution of
 the DOE national laboratories from nuclear weapons programs to
 nonproliferation verification technology development. To what do you
 attribute this successful transition?
     Dr. Czajkowski: In the written statement, we did not mean to
 suggest that the DOE National Laboratories weapons programs have
 evolved into nonproliferation verification technology development
 programs, as the question might suggest. Instead, we wished to
 emphasize the considerable technical expertise of the national
 laboratories in the nonproliferation and verification areas.
                             VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY
      Mr. Dwyer. How will efforts to modernize and reconfigure the
 weapons complex impact this transition.
      Mr. Claytor. Reconfiguration of the weapons complex will not be
 designed to affect the considerable technical expertise of the national
 laboratories in the nonproliferation and verification areas.
                          VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY
     Mr. Dwyer: Will the development of verification be assigned to one
     Dr. Czajkowski: It has been and will remain the strategy of DOE to
 develop a broad technical base among the national laboratories to
 support arms control initiations. This approach promotes a vital
 exchange of ideas and concepts between weapon and non-weapon programs.
 In some technology areas (i.e., seismic, hydrodynamic yield and
 satellite instrumentation), the investment is too costly to duplicate,
 therefore, we have maintained the expertise, skills and facilities at
 those laboratories having historically been the core programs.
                            VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY
      Mr. Dwyer. It would seem that some of the technologies  developed
 for verification may have some value to the private sector, such  as
 earthquake detection. What role does your office play in Department
 efforts to transfer technology, if that technology could be considered
 to be under the jurisdiction of national security?
      Mr. Claytor. The technologies for the verification technology
 program are developed at the Defense Programs laboratories, such as
 Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories.
 Because these laboratories are the primary responsibility of Defense
 Programs, DP, the Technology Transfer Division is the Headquarters
 office that oversees the transfer of technology from these
 laboratories, including the management of the Technology
 Commercialization program to fund dual-use technology development
 projects that are cost-shared with private sector partners. Under the
 DP Technology Commercialization program, the laboratories and
 interested  private sector partners propose cost-shared, collaborative
 research and development, R&D, designed to benefit both the weapons R&D
 program and United States economic competitiveness. The laboratories
 are required to review all such dual-use technology development
 projects to assure they are not classified and that national security
 interests are protected.
       Mr. Dwyer. In 1988, the Reagan administration released an
 unclassified version of the 'Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization
 Report," which outlines the reshaping of the weapons complex for the
 years FY 1990 through FY 2010. The report envisions $81 billion in
 cumulative additional spending. The report recommended the building of
 two new production reactors, a Special Isotope Separation plant,
 relocating operations now at Rocky Flats Plant, termination of
 materials production work at Hanford and Fernald, and the transfer of
 nuclear materials activities from the Mound Plant to other facilities.
 What  is the status of the Departments reevaluation of the
 modernization report?
       Mr. Claytor. In September 1989, Secretary Watkins ordered the
 establishment of a Modernization Review Committee, chaired by the then
 Under Secretary John Tuck, to reexamine the modernization issue. The
 Committee was directed to review the assumptions and recommendations of
 the original Modernization Report; assess the capacity and capability
 requirements of the Nuclear Weapons Complex; and to review the process
 by which the immediate and future requirements for maintaining,
 updating, and cleaning up the Complex are developed.
      In August 1990, the Secretary reviewed the progress of the study
 and issued additional guidance to focus the analysis more sharply on
 the realities of the emerging international security environment. This
 ensured flexibility to accommodate the likely range of deterrent
 contingencies and emphasized the objective of achieving a Complex which
 is smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operate than today's.
 Subsequently, the Modernization Review Committee was redesignated the
 Complex Reconfiguration Committee.  The Committee's product, the "Nuclear
 Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study" was, released to Congress in
 February 1991 and replaced the January 1989 Modernization Report.
       The Study's scope was extensive and covered all activities:
 nuclear, nonnuclear, and research, development, and testing. Among the
 options presented in the Study were two which the Secretary designated
 as "preferred options": to relocate the Rocky Flats Plant and to
 consolidate the  nonnuclear element of the Complex at a single,
 dedicated site.  A Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,
 PEIS, is now being developed for a reasonable range of options for the
 Complex including the relocation of Rocky Flats. The consolidation of
 nonnuclear  activities is being considered in a separate Environmental
 Assessment. In the announced preferred alternative for nonnuclear
 consolidation, all activities at the Mound Plant and at the Pinellas
 Plant would be transferred to other facilities.
      On November 1, 1991, Secretary Watkins directed that the
 environmental impact analyses which was being prepared for the New
 Production Reactor, NPR, be incorporated into the Reconfiguration PEIS.
 The Secretary indicated that the President's initiatives announced
 September 27, "1991, had created both an opportunity" and a necessity
 to conduct an integrated examination.  In February 1991, the Secretary had
 already directed that the NPR Project be downsized from two reactors at
 two sites to one reactor at one site. Subsequently, -in August 1991, the
 Hanford N-Reactor was terminated as a back-up  production source for
 tritium. Both the Hanford and the Fernald facilities have been
 transitioned to an environmental restoration and waste management
 mission. The Special Isotope Separation Plant has been canceled.
 As a result of the significant reductions in the nuclear weapons
 stockpile, resulting both from the President's initiative last
 September and his State of the Union Address on January 28, 1992,
 near-term tritium needs can be met with tritium recovered from returned
 weapons. Thus, the Secretary recently authorized the restart of
 Savannah River's K-Reactor to demonstrate, over an approximate I year
 period devoted to significant testing, that it is a viable contingency
 production source of tritium.  The Department then plans to shut it
 down and  place it in a low-cost standby mode until long-term tritium
 availability from a New Production Reactor or other source is assured.
       The Savannah River L- Reactor's status has been changed to a
 minimum maintenance condition so that it can be safely restarted three
 or more years after a restart decision is made. The third reactor at
 Savannah River, the P-Reactor, has be-en defueled and placed in cold
        Mr. Dwyer. When will the environmental impact statement (EIS)
 for the complex be completed?
        Mr. Claytor. As required by the National Environmental Policy
 Act, a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, PEIS, is being
 developed to analyze the consequences of alternative configuration for
 the Nuclear Weapons Complex. The PEIS is scheduled for completion in
 July 1993. After considering the analysis in the PEIS, the Department
 will decide how to configure the Complex and how to achieve that
 configuration. These decisions will be set forth in a Record of
 Decision, ROD, scheduled for August 1993 following completion of the
 PEIS. the Department anticipates that subsequent project-specific EIS's
 will be tiered from the reconfiguration PEIS for projects identified in
 the ROD.   A separate Environmental Assessment, -scheduled for
 completion prior to the end of this calendar year, is being done for
 the nonnuclear manufacturing activities.
       Mr. Dwyer.   How will the results of the EIS impact the
 Department's reevaluation?
       Mr. Claytor. The Department's reevaluation of the "Nuclear
 Weapons Complex Modernization Report.' culminated in the publication of
 the "Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study.' Based on the
 analysis in the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, PEIS, now
 under development to analyze the consequences of alternative
 configurations of the Complex, the .Record of Decision following the
 PEIS will set forth the configuration of the Complex and how to achieve
 that configuration.
      Mr. Bevill. Provide a crosscut by location of all Safeguards and
 Security funding throughout the Department for Fiscal Year 1991, Fiscal
 Year 1992, and Fiscal Year 1993.
      Maj Gen McFadden. I will provide the information for the record. (The
 information follows:)
                              SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
                      FY 1991 - FY 1993 CROSSCUT BY FACILITY
                             (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
                                  FY 1991        FY 1992       FY 1993
     Albuquerque Direct           $103,813        $98,143         $98,322
      Allied                        11,598         11,692          10,381
 Los Alamos National Laboratory     67,062         79,072          74,876
  Mound Plant                       11,532         10,408         10,319
  Pantex Plant                      43,602         57,764         31,478
 Pinellas Plant                      7,306          7,600          7,650
 Rocky Flats Plant                  126,352        81,546         85,483
 Sandia National Laboratory          46,568         51,284         54,880
 Total-Albuquerque                  417,833        388,509        373,389
      Chicago Direct                   3,962          4,108         4,260
      Ames Laboratory                    688            712           689
      Argonne National Laboratory     11,856         12,524        13,457
 Brookhaven National Laboratory        7,493          8,111         8,689
 New Brunswick Laboratory              4,033          4,246         4,289
 Renewable Energy Laboratory             396            452           620
  Superconducting Super Collider         200            589           781
 Total-Chicago                        28,628         30,742        32,785
 IDAHO OPERATIONS OFFICE              28,399         36,584         40,074
 NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVES              1,034          1,065          1,098
 NEVADA OPERATIONS OFFICE             71,374         79,348         75,504
 Oak Ridge National Laboratory         6,109          6,072          6,439
 Oak Ridge Direct                    155,090        172.466        182,942
 Total-Oak Ridge                     161,199        178,538        189,381
 TECHNICAL INFORMATION                   200            230            250
 PITTSBURGH NAVAL REACTORS            10,565         13,158         11,797
 RICHLAND OPERATIONS OFFICE           65,600         45,583         47,825
 San Francisco Direct                  5,810          7,216         7,546
 Lawrence Livermore National Lab      34,963         42,744         39,231
 Total-San Francisco                  40,773         49,960         46,777
 SAVANNAH RIVER OPERATIONS OFFICE    164,802        191,362        173,253
                              SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
                      FY 1991 - FY 1993 CROSSCUT BY FACILITY
                             (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
                                    FY 1991        FY 1992        FY 1993
 SCHENECTADY NAVAL REACTORS         13,463         17,862         20,131
      OFFICE                        35,742         27,866         36,801
 WESTERN AREA POWER ADMINISTRATION     611            715            870
      CENTER                           411            475            496
      CENTER                         1,300          1,400          1,600
 HEADQUARTERS                      101,094        100,993        102,949
 GRAND TOTAL                    $1,143,028     $1,164,390     $1,154,980
                             DOE-WIDE PROFORCE SIZE
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing the size of guard
 forces and expenditures for guard forces by location for Fiscal Year
 1991, Fiscal Year 1992, and Fiscal Year 1993.
      Maj Gen. McFadden. I will provide the information for the record.
      Mr. Bevill. How has the disintegration of the Soviet Union
 impacted the workload in the classification and technology policy
      Maj Gen McFadden. In April 1991, the Department of Energy (DOE)
 reorganized the classification and the technology policy functions.
 The latter, comprising export control and technology commercialization,
 are no longer organizationally coupled with the classification
 office's responsibilities.
      With regard to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the
 resulting effect on the workload of the Office of Classification, the
 net effect has been workload expansion due to the radical changes in
 political direction and the need to support new national security
 objectives. For example, new classification guidance is needed for
 nuclear weapons disassembly and reuse, arms control verification
 technology, and the reconfiguration of the U.S. weapons complex.
      The breakup of the Soviet Union poses many other interesting
 classification issues. An example of such an interesting issue now
 before the Office of Classification is if the DOE is to give
 denuclearization help to the former Soviet Union, the potential
 exchange of Restricted Data (RD) and Unclassified Controlled Nuclear
 information (UCNI) may be involved. Many changes are occurring in
 today's dynamic world and a vigorous reevaluation of many long
 established classification policies and procedures is necessary. This
 evaluation is underway.
      Even before the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Office of
 Classification was involved in nonproliferation matters. However,
 evidence of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program caused us to be even more
 concerned about the nonproliferation aspects of classification policy.
 For example, the need to issue new classification guidance on new
 subjects having a foundation both in nonproliferation and arms control
 policy, such as guidance for the New Production Reactor.
      In addition to making sure RD and UCNI guides are up to date, we
 are insuring that the hundreds of requests the DOE receives for
 classified information do not result in the inadvertent release of
 classified information. Requests come from a number of sources
 including Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests which have nearly
 doubled in each of the last three years. Requests under the FOIA for
 documents containing highly classified information relevant to the
 design and manufacture of nuclear weapons can come from many sources,
 including foreign nationals.
                               BONNEVILLE PROFORCE
      Mr. Bevill. Why does DOE pay for guards at the Bonneville Power
      Maj Gen McFadden. DOE does not pay for the guards at the
 Bonneville Power Administration (BPA). The BPA has 37 Security Officer
 positions located at the BPA Headquarters in Portland, OR and Ross
 station. The BPA is a self financed organization (by law) and Security
 Officer salaries are funded through consumer base rate revenues generated
 by the BPA, and not financed by DOE. However, we have chosen to show total
 protective force size at all DOE facilities-on our Protective Force Size
 and Expenditures Chart.
      Mr. Bevill. Why has the headquarters guard force contract
 increased in Fiscal Year 1993?
      Maj Gen McFadden. The projected increases are due to the
       1.  The contract will change over in Fiscal Year 1993. It is
           expected that additional costs will be required for a transition
           to a new contract.
       2.  The current contract was bid in 1987. The new estimate
           includes adjustments over five (5) years for inflation.
       3.  Wage and benefit increases were anticipated for employee
       4.  Additional requirements were implemented to improve performance.
           These new requirements increased basic security inspector
           training, enhanced safety requirements and established higher
           physical fitness standards.
      Expenditures for Fiscal Year 1993 are estimated to be $11.5
 million to include the transition cost.
                           ADDITIONAL SUPPORT BREAKDOWN
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a breakdown of the specific tasks and
 funding associated with the "Additional Support" activity in Fiscal
 Year 1991, Fiscal Year 1992 and Fiscal Year 1993.
      Maj Gen McFadden. The "Additional Support" breakdown is as
                              (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
                                      FY 91            FY 92      FY 93
 Support Services Contract             5.7              7.4        8.5
 Chicago Field Office S&S Staff        1.2              1.2        1.2
 Headquarters Physical Security
   Upgrade Technical Assistance         .4              . 4        . 3
 Technical Support to Headquarters
   and Field Assistance                4.5              3.7        2.9
 Information Security Research Center   -0-              .3         .4
 Technical Security Research Center     .6               .7         .7
                                      12.4             13.7       14.0
     Mr. Bevill. Please characterize the results of security evaluations
 conducted at DOE sites during the last year.
     Mr. Podonsky.   During FY 1991 the Office of Security Evaluations
 completed seven comprehensive inspections, six safeguards and security
 readiness reviews, and six special studies across the DOE complex.
     Noteworthy improvements were made this year in the DOE safeguards
 and security posture. Substantial progress has been made in the areas
 of personnel security, special nuclear material control and
 accountability documentation, and resolution of outstanding policy
 issues.  In other areas such as the reinvestigation program, document
 control and inventory, and overall program management and oversight,
 much progress is still required.
     While special nuclear material is being protected at all inspected
 facilities, protection is often provided by costly measures requiring
 additional protective force positions. -The degree of protection
 assurance provided for classified matter is inconsistent. Some sites
 conduct programs that fully satisfy protection requirements while other
 programs provide limited assurance that security interests are
 adequately protected.
     Noticeably absent in the overall improvement in safeguards and
 security posture is an improvement in safeguards and security
 management and oversight. The system lacks an integrated approach to
 planning and implementation of the total program. The lack of
 integration is reflected in the inconsistent quality of the programs and
 the persistence of costly, manpower-intensive solutions. The underlying
 cause of these weaknesses is inadequate program management and oversight
 at all-levels.
     In summary, some specific findings across the complex included:
 The planning required to implement and maintain comprehensive,
 cost-effective programs has not been completed. Policy issues continue
 to be identified, however, a process is in place to resolve these
 issues as they are discovered. The survey program suffers from a lack
 of technical expertise and management commitment. Excessive processing
 times still exist in the personnel security program, especially in. the
 reinvestigation area. Effective Safeguards and Security Management and
 Oversight is not consistently provided. Inspected facilities maintained
 a viable protection posture against diversion or theft of special
 nuclear material b outsiders and some have substantially improved y
 their protection against the insider. Physical security systems had
 deficiencies in quality assurance, training and maintenance. Material
 control and accountability documentation has improved, but some program
 shortcomings remain. Balanced, consistent, cost-efficient protection of
 special nuclear material is not provided at all facilities.
 Shortcomings were observed in document accountability. Computer
 security policy weaknesses have been identified, although current
 procedures are functional. Protective forces perform well in protecting
 special nuclear material from the outsider threat. Assurance that
 protection needs are met across the DOE is not provided by the current
 program for protection of classified matter.
                              SITE IMPLEMENTATION
     Mr. Bevill. What system is used to determine that sites have
 implemented the recommendations provided by the Office of Security
     Mr. Podonsky.  The Office of Security Evaluations does not make
 recommendations. We identify strengthens and weaknesses of safeguards
 and security programs at Headquarters and the various field sites.
 These findings, which are referenced to specific DOE Orders and
 Standards and Criteria, are shared with the Office of Security Affairs,
 which is responsible for safeguards and security policy promulgation
 for the Department of Energy.
     A Memorandum of Understanding exists between the Office of
 Security Evaluations and the Office of Safeguards and Security
 providing coordination of inspection activities, including the tracking
 and resolution of all deficiencies identified in our inspection results
 and assessment efforts.
     To further elaborate on our procedures to follow what is happening
 across the DOE complex, the Office of Security Evaluations, through
 utilization of various databases and the facility officer program,
 track the life-cycle and resolution of findings and policy issues.
 Where additional oversight of the resolution of findings is
 appropriate, the Office of Security Evaluations performs a Safeguards
 and Security Readiness Review (short-notice, limited scope inspection).
 This review mechanism enables complete follow-up for resolution of
 findings and issues.
     The Facility Officer Program tracks trends and patterns at specific
 DOE sites by having staff members informed of all safeguards and
 security related activities at assigned sites. Facility Officers' reports
 detail changes in the site's program, any potential problem areas, and
 significant documents or activities which would affect safeguards and
     The Office of Security Evaluations tracks trends and patterns of
 DOE-wide safeguards and security deficiencies using the Safeguards and
 Security Issues Information System. This system maintains the status of
 all our inspection findings and is utilized for the office program
 planning activities.
     The Policy Issues Tracking System is a computerized system which
 is designed to track the resolution of policy and/or management issues
 identified during inspection and evaluation activities. The system
 retains a history of resolution activities and correspondence
 concerning each policy issue. All issues are tracked through final
     As I have described, the Office of Security Evaluations has
 several mechanisms, whose functions when combined, effectively track
 trends and patterns in safeguards and security. When these trends and
 patterns are studied  and analyzed, reports are issued which
 comprehensively delineate deficiencies and/or exemplary practices
 across the Department.
                              QUANTIFYING RESULTS
     Mr. Bevill. Please quantify the number of recommendations made and
 implemented by each site investigated in FY 1990, FY 1991 and FY 1992.
     Mr. Podonsky. The Office of Security Evaluations does not make
 recommendations. We identify strengthens and weaknesses of safeguards
 and security programs at Headquarters and the various field sites.
 These findings, which are referenced to specific DOE Orders and
 Standards and Criteria, are shared with the Office of Security Affairs,
 which is responsible for safeguards and security policy promulgation
 for the Department of Energy.
     Through the various databases utilized and the facility officer
 program, findings and policy issues are tracked through to resolution.
 Where and when appropriate, the Office of Security Evaluations performs
 a Safeguard  s and Security Readiness Review (short-notice, limited
 scope inspection). This review mechanism enables complete follow-up for
 resolution of findings and issues.
     Since October 1, 1989, the Office of Security Evaluations has
 conducted nineteen comprehensive inspections, with four more planned
 this year,.eleven Safeguards and Security Readiness Reviews, with six
 more planned this year.
     Inspections during this time-frame have resulted in 588 findings in
 the following topical areas: Computer Security, 94 findings;
 Information Security, 205 findings; Material Control and
 Accountability, 73 findings; Physical Security Systems, 78 findings;
 Protective Forces, 43 findings; Personnel Security, 34 findings;
 Safeguards and Security Survey Program, 35 findings; and Protection
 Program Planning, 26 findings.
     By DOE Orders and Memoranda of Understanding, the Office of
 Security Affairs has the responsibility to ensure that recommendations
 required to address findings are brought to closure.  Follow-up on the
 closure of findings is accomplished through contractor self-assessment,
 field office surveys, and the Office of Safeguards and Security's
 program surveys. Program Secretarial Officers are also responsible for
 self-assessments; and the Office of Security Evaluations provides
 independent follow-up through Comprehensive Inspections and Safeguards
 and Security Readiness Reviews.
                          SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
     Mr. Bevill. Describe the most significant accomplishments of the
 Office in FY 1990 and FY 1991. How has the security of the Department
     Mr. Podonsky. The most significant accomplishment of Office of
 Security Evaluations is the increase in the attention the complex is
 paying to safeguards and security and not simply to "getting ready" for
 an inspection.
     With the perspective gained by studying our inspections and field
 surveys covering the-past four or five years, I believe that the
 security of the Department has improved. Under Admiral Watkins,
 managers now understand that safeguards and security need attention and
 follow through at all sites.
     However, there are many areas which still require improvement,
 especially in the overall DOE management of safeguards and security
 programs. Many of the specific findings on inspections and surveys are
 symptoms of poor management at higher levels of the program rather than
 failures of local implementation. Secretary Watkins has moved strongly
 to emphasize the responsibility of his Program Secretarial Officers for
 safeguards and security matters in SEN 6D-91. The Office of Security
 Evaluations has begun to see some of the fruit of this emphasis, and we
 believe that such efforts will produce needed improvements in
 management practices at the field offices and at DOE Headquarters.
     During FY 1990 and 1991 the Office of Security Evaluations
 completed fifteen Comprehensive Inspections and seven Safeguards and
 Security Readiness Reviews. There were six special studies which
 examined the classified Work For Others Program, radiological sabotage,
 intrusion detection systems, technical surveillance countermeasures, use
 of tamper-indicating devices, and inventory verification/confirmation
 programs. These special studies resulted in the Department of Energy
 revising existing policy and writing new policies in order to
 facilitate field implementation.
     In the case of radiological sabotage and the classified Work For
 Others Program, the Under Secretary directed the formulation of task
 groups comprised of numerous program offices in order to rapidly
 address the policy void in these areas.
     Mr. Bevill. How many positions are included in the Personnel
 Security Assurance Program? How often are these positions
     Maj Gen McFadden. Currently, 10,493 positions have been identified
 as Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP) positions. The
 reinvestigation program for these individuals consists of an Office of
 Personnel Management (OPM) Limited Background Investigation after 5
 years, a National Agency Check with Credit (NACC) after 10 and 15
 years, and a Limited Background Investigation after 20 years followed
 by an NACC conducted every 5 years thereafter. Individuals in PSAP
 positions will also complete an SF-86 and have a credit check and
 medical assessment conducted annually.
                              SECURITY CLEARANCES
     Mr. Bevill. What attempts are being made to reduce the number and
 levels of clearances throughout the Department?
     Maj Gen McFadden. We are in the process of reviewing the level of
 access to classified information that an "L" access authorization will
 allow. Under consideration is allowing such an access authorization to
 permit access up to and including Secret Restricted Data. This change
 will result in a significant reduction in the number of "Q" access
 authorizations that are required to meet program needs, with a
 concomitant reduction in the numbers of background investigations that
 will be needed.
      It is also anticipated that the decrease in funding for Defense
 Programs activities for Fiscal Year 1993 will result in lowered numbers
 of requests for security clearances. Programmatic changes that have
 taken place at the Richland Operations Office have resulted in the
 downgrading of many "Q" access authorizations to "L" access
 authorizations. This will not only reduce the number of background
 investigations required for the initial clearance, but will eliminate
 the need for Limited Background Investigation which we use for
 reinvestigations. The Limited Background Investigations will be
 substituted  by the less costly National Agency Check with Credit.
      Mr. Bevill. Provide by field office and facility the number and
 types of clearances held by DOE employees, contractors, and other
 Federal employees for Fiscal Year 1991 and Fiscal Year 1992.
      Maj Gen McFadden. There are approximately 174,000 clearances
 currently held by DOE employees, contractors, and other Federal
 employees. Current information will be provided for the record.