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The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield], for himself, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Exon, Mr. Levin, and Mr. Wellstone, proposes an amendment numbered 2833.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 82, strike out line 19 and all that follows through page 83, line 5, and insert in lieu thereof the following:
Sec. 507. (a) Hereafter, funds made available by this Act or any other Act for fiscal year 1993 or for any other fiscal year may be available for conducting a test of a nuclear explosive device only if the conduct of that test is permitted in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b) No test of a nuclear weapon may be conducted before July 1, 1993.
(c) On and after July 1, 1993, a test of a nuclear weapon may be conducted--
(1) on if--
(A) the President has submitted the annual report required under subsection (d);
(B) 90 days have elapsed after the submittal of that report in accordance with that subsection; and
(C) Congress has not agreed to a joint resolution described in subsection (d)(3) within that 90-day period; and
(2) only if the test is conducted during the period covered by the report.
(d)(1) Not later than March 1 of each year beginning after 1992, the President shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives, in classified and unclassified forms, a report containing the following matters:
(A) A schedule for resumption of the Nuclear Testing Talks with Russia.
(B) A plan for achieving a multilateral comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons on or before September 30, 1996.
(C) An assessment of the number and type of nuclear warheads that will remain in the United States stockpile of active nuclear weapons on September 30, 1996.
(D) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 1992, an assessment of the number and type of nuclear warheads that will remain in the United States stockpile of nuclear weapons and that--
(i) will not be in the United States stockpile of active nuclear weapons;
(ii) will remain under the control of the Department of Defense; and
(iii) will not be transferred to the Department of Energy for dismantlement.
(E) A description of the safety features of each warhead that is covered by an assessment referred to in subparagraph (C) or (D).
(F) A plan for installing one or more modern safety features in each warhead identified in the assessment referred to in subparagraph (C) that does not have any such feature and, as determined after an analysis of the costs and benefits of installing such feature or features in the warhead, should have one or more of such features.
(G) An assessment of the number and type of nuclear weapon tests, not to exceed 5 tests in any period covered by an annual report under this paragraph and a total of 15 tests in the 4-fiscal year period beginning with fiscal year 1993, that are necessary in order to ensure the safety of each nuclear warhead in which one or more modern safety features are installed pursuant to the plan referred to in subparagraph (F).
(H) A schedule, in accordance with subparagraph (G), for conducting at the Nevada test site, each of the tests enumerated in the assessment pursuant to subparagraph (G).
(2) The first annual report shall cover the period beginning on the date on which a resumption of testing of nuclear weapons is permitted under subsection (c) and ending on September 30, 1994. Each annual report thereafter shall cover the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted.
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1), `joint resolution' means only a joint resolution introduced after the date on which the Committees referred to in that paragraph receive the report required by that paragraph the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `The Congress disapproves the report of the President on nuclear weapons testing, dated .' (the blank space being appropriately filled in).
(4) No report is required under this subsection after 1996.
(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), during a period covered by an annual report submitted pursuant to subsection (d), nuclear weapons may be tested only as follows:
(A) Only those nuclear warheads in which a modern safety feature has been installed pursuant to the plan referred to in subsection (d)(1)(F) may be tested.
(B) Only the number and types of tests specified in the report pursuant to subsection (d)(1)(G) may be conducted.
(2)(A) One test of the reliability of a nuclear weapon other than one referred to in paragraph (1)(A) may be conducted during any period covered by an annual report, but only if--
(i) within the first 60 days after the beginning of that period, the President certifies to Congress that it is vital to the national security interests of the United States to test the reliability of such a nuclear weapon; and
(ii) within the 60-day period beginning on the date that Congress receives the certification, Congress does not agree to a joint resolution described in subparagraph (B).
(B) For the purposes of subparagraph (A), `joint resolution' means only a joint resolution introduced after the date on which the Congress receives the certification referred to in that subparagraph the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `The Congress disapproves the testing of a nuclear weapon covered by the certification of the President dated ------.' (the blank space being appropriately filled in.')
(3) The President may authorize the United Kingdom to conduct in the United States, within a period covered by an annual report, one test of a nuclear weapon if the President determines that it is in the national interests of the United States to do so. Such a test shall be considered as one of the tests within the maximum number of tests that the United States is permitted to conduct during that period under paragraph (1)(B).
(f) No underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted by the United States after September 30, 1996.
(g) In the computation of the 90-day period referred to in subsection (c)(1) and the 60-day period referred to in subsection (e)(2)(A)(ii), the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain shall be excluded.
(h) In this section, the term `modern safety feature' means any of the following features:
(1) An insensitive high explosive (IHE).
(2) Fire resistant pits (FRP).
(3) An enhanced detonation safety (ENDS) system.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, one of the chief cosponsors, Senator Exon, chairman of the Subcommittee of Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, has arrived and would like to be able to speak, and I would at this time to yield the floor. I see my comanager of the bill, Senator Johnston, also wishing to take the floor. I ask if we could give Senator Exon an idea of how much time----
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Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I would like to speak for a short period of time. I hope Senator Exon will remain here because I want to express some thoughts and concerns to which I wish he as well as the Senator from Oregon would respond. That is the reason I would like to speak before he speaks, because I would like to have him speak to that.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Johnston] is recognized.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
I would like to sharpen the issue here, if I may. The House bill contained a moratorium on any nuclear testing for this year for any purpose unless the former Soviet Union tested their weapons. That is the way the energy and water appropriations bill, which contains the nuclear testing money each year, came to us from the House. So our committee had to respond to that moratorium.
What we did in the Appropriations Committee is to provide a moratorium for any purpose save safety. The language which we used was as follows:
None of the funds made available in this act may be used for any nuclear testing unless the President certifies to Congress that it is in the national interest to conduct an explosive weapons test or tests for the purposes of safety of nuclear weapons. Such certification shall be provided in advance of each test and contain an explanation of the purposes and reasons for the test. For classified measures the certification may be transmitted in a classified annex.
Mr. President, it is my understanding that something like four or maybe five tests are planned this year and that I think I am correct in saying all are for safety save one test. So I think it is important, therefore, to zero in on this question of safety.
Why is testing of nuclear weapons so important? It is so important because nuclear weapons, even today's nuclear weapons, represent a great danger to the American public and to the world because of the lack of safety of their devices. As the sheet from the national lab, the Lawrence Livermore Lab which conducts these tests, states:
Nuclear weapons that are accident proof, that remain safe under all credible accident conditions, will be needed for the reduced stockpile envisioned for the 21st century. Most of the currently projected reduced stockpile of nuclear weapons will not have even the modern safety features available with existing technology, insensitive high explosives that is nearly impossible to detonate accidentally, and fire resistant pits to contain plutonium in a fuel fire. We need to improve the safety of the stockpile to these current standards promptly. But this requires nuclear testing of specific designs.
Further, we need to design warheads that are truly accident proof by utilizing a `binary nuclear weapons' concept, in which the high explosive and plutonium are physically separated until after launch. Only such weapons can be made impervious to all credible accidents.
So our situation now is that most of our nuclear weapons in the inventory are not safe. They do not contain the insensitive high explosives, the fire resistant pits, and they certainly do not contain the binary nuclear weapons concept that would protect them.
Why is this important? We have been very, very lucky in this country. I have here a description of 32 different nuclear weapons accidents--32. It so happens that none of these were very close.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this report printed in the Record. It makes absolutely fascinating and hair-raising reading to realize how close to absolute disaster we came.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Attahced are unclassified summaries describing the circumstances surrounding 32 accidents involving nuclear weapons. Also attached is the Department of Defense (DOD)/Department of Energy (DOE) definition of `accident' used in researching this project.
Twenty-six of these summaries were first released by the Air Force in 1977; another was prepared following the Titan II explosion in Arkansas in September 1980. These previously released summaries are marked with a figure `1'; in some cases they include new material made available as a result of more search.*
There never has been even a partial, inadvertent U.S. nuclear detonation despite the very severe stresses imposed upon the weapons involved in these accidents. All `detonations' reported in the summaries involved conventional high explosives (HE) only. Only two accidents, those at Palomares and Thule, resulted in a widespread dispersal of nuclear materials.
Nuclear weapons are never carried on training flights. Most of the aircraft accidents represented here occurred during logistic/ferry missions or airborne alert flights by Strategic Air Command (SAC) aircraft. Airborne alert was terminated in 1968 because of:
Accidents, particularly those at Palomares and Thule
The rising cost of maintaining a portion of the SAC bomber force constantly on airborne alert, and,
The advent of a responsive and survivable intercontinental ballistic missile force which relieved the manned bomber force of a part of its more time-sensitive responsibilities. (A portion of the SAC force remains on nuclear ground alert).
Although normal DOD policy is to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons or components, recently revised DOD Directive 5230.16 governing public affairs guidance allows for confirmation when required to protect public safety or as a means of reducing widespread public alarm. Therefore, in some of the events summarized here, confirmation of presence is not published. Except for Palomares and Thule, it is not possible to specify the location of the accidents that occurred overseas.
Most of the weapons systems involved in these accidents are no longer in the active inventory. Those include the B-29, B-36, B-47, B-50, B-58, C-124, F-100, and P-5M aircraft, and the Minuteman I missile.
With some early models of nuclear weapons, it was standard procedure during most operations to keep a capsule of nuclear material separate from the weapon for safety proposes. While a weapon with the capsule removed did contain a quantity of natural (not enriched) uranium with an extremely low level of radioactivity, accidental detonation of the HE element would cause neither a nuclear detonation nor contamination. Modern design incorporates improved redundant safety features to insure that a nuclear explosion does not occur as the result of an accident.
This list of accidents was compiled by DOD/DOE researchers during December 1980-January 1981. The researchers reviewed all available records of the military services and DOE, applying current definition to determine if an event warranted categorization as an accident.
For example, one event not covered by these narratives was included in a `Chronology of Nuclear Accident Statements', released by DOD in 1968:
The researchers found, however, that only a small retrorocket on the missile had accidentally fired. The missile and its warhead were not damaged. That event does not warrant inclusion in a list of accidents involving nuclear weapons.
Another event from the 1968 list, involving a U.S. Navy Terrier missile (January 1966; NAS Mayport, Florida) was not considered to be an accident, but has been categorized as a significant incident. In that incident, a nuclear warhead separated from the missile, and fell about eight feet. The warhead was dented; no other damage occurred.
The other events in this list, that were also cited in the 1968 `Chronology * * *', are identified with a figure `2'.
The events outlined in the attached narratives involved operational weapons, nuclear materials, aircraft and/or missiles under control of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, or the Atomic Energy Commission (a DOE predecessor agency). The U.S. Army has never experienced an event serious enough to warrant inclusion in a list of accidents involving nuclear weapons. The U.S. Marine Corps does not have custody of nuclear weapons in peacetime and has experienced no accidents of significant incidents involving them.
To the best of our knowledge, this list is complete. Reporting requirements varied among the Services, (particularly in the earlier period covered by these narratives) so it is possible, but not likely, that an earlier accident has gone unreported here. All later events, however, have been evaluated and are included if they fall within the established definition of an accident.
An `accident involving nuclear weapons' is defined as--
An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons components that results in any of the following:
Accidental or unauthorized launching, firing, or use, by U.S. forces or supported allied forces, of a nuclear-capable weapon system which could create the risk of an outbreak of war.
Nuclear detonation.
Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon or radioactive weapon component, including a fully assembled nuclear weapon, an unassembled nuclear weapon, or a radioactive nuclear weapon component.
Radioactive contamination.
Seizure, theft, or loss of a nuclear weapon or radioactive nuclear weapon component, including jettisoning.
Public hazard, actual or implied.
February 13, 1950/B-36/Pacific Ocean, off Coast of British Columbia:
The B-36 was enroute from Eilson AFB to Carswell AFB on a simulated combat profile mission. The weapon aboard the aircraft had a dummy capsule installed. After six hours of flight, the aircraft developed serious mechanical difficulties, making it necessary to shut down three engines. The aircraft was at 12,000 feet altitude. Icing conditions complicated the emergency and level flight could not be maintained. The aircraft headed out over the Pacific Ocean and dropped the weapon from 8,000 feet. A bright flash occurred on impact, followed by a sound and shock wave. Only the weapon's high explosive material detonated. The aircraft was then flown over Princess Royal Island where the crew bailed out. The aircraft wreckage was later found don Vancouver Island. (*1)
April 11, 1950 /B-29/ Manzano Base, New Mexico:
Aircraft departed Kirtland AFB at 9:30 p.m. and crashed into a mountain on Manzano Base approximately three minutes later, killing the crew. Detonators were installed in the bomb on board the aircraft. The bomb case was demolished and some high explosive (HE) material burned in the gasoline fire. Other pieces of unburned HE were scattered throughout the wreckage. Four spare detonators in their carrying cases were recovered undamaged. There were no contamination or recovery problems. The recovered components of the weapons were returned to the Atomic Energy Commission. Both the weapon and the capsule of the nuclear material were on board the aircraft but the capsule was not inserted for safety reasons. A nuclear detonation was not possible. (*1)
July 13, 1950 /B-50/ Lebanon Ohio:
The B-50 was on a training mission from Biggs AFB, Texas. The aircraft was flying at 7,000 feet on a clear day. Aircraft nosed down and flew into the ground killing four officers and twelve airmen. The high explosive portion of the weapon aboard detonated on impact. There was no nuclear capsule aboard the aircraft. (*1)
August 5, 1950 /B-29/ Fairfield/Suison AFB, California:
A B-29 carrying a weapon, but no capsule, experienced two runaway propellers and landing gear retraction difficulties on takeoff from Fairfield/Suison AFB (now Travis AFB). The aircraft attempted an emergency landing and crashed and burned. The fire was fought for 12-15 minutes before the weapon's high explosive material detonated. Nineteen crew members and rescue personnel were killed in the crash and/or the resulting detonation, including General Travis. (*1)
November 10, 1950 /B-50/ Over Water, outside United States:
Because of an in-flight aircraft emergency, a weapon containing no capsule of nuclear material was jettisoned over water from an altitude of 10,500 feet. A high-explosive detonation was observed.
March 10, 1956 /B-47/ Mediterranean Sea:
The aircraft was one of a flight of four scheduled for non-stop deployment from MacDill AFB to an overseas air base. Takeoff from MacDill and first refueling was normal. The second refueling point was over the Mediterranean Sea. In preparation for this, the flight penetrated solid cloud formation to descend to the refueling level of 14,000 feet. Base of the clouds was 14,000 feet and visibility was poor. The aircraft, carrying two nuclear capsules in carrying cases, never made contact with the tanker.
An extensive search failed to locate any traces of the missing aircraft or crew. No weapons were aboard the aircraft; only two capsules of nuclear weapons material in carrying cases. A nuclear detonation was not possible. (*1)
July 27, 1956 /B-47/ Overseas Base:
A B-47 aircraft with no weapons aboard was on a routine training mission making a touch and go landing when the aircraft suddenly went out of control and slid off the runway, crashing into a storage igloo containing several nuclear weapons. The bombs did not burn or detonate. There were no contamination or cleanup problems. The damaged weapons and components were returned to the Atomic Energy Commission. The weapons that were involved were in storage configuration. No capsules of nuclear materials were in the weapons or present in the building. (*1)
May 27, 1957 /B-36/ Kirtland AFB, New Mexico:
The aircraft was ferrying a weapon from Biggs AFB, Texas, to Kirtland AFB. At 11:50 a.m. MST, while approaching Kirtland at an altitude of 1,700 feet, the weapon dropped from the bomb bay taking the bomb doors with it. Weapon parachutes were deployed but apparently did not fully retard the fall because of the low altitude. The impact point was approximately 4.5 miles south of the Kirtland control tower and .3 miles west of the Sandia Base Reservation. The high explosive material detonated, completely destroying the weapon and making a crater approximately 25 feet in diameter and 12 feet deep. Fragments and debris were scattered as far as one mile from the impact point. The release mechanism locking pin was being removed at the time of release. (It was standard procedure at that time that the locking pin be removed during takeoff and landing to allow for emergency jettison of the weapon, if necessary). Recovery and cleanup operations were conducted by Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. Radiological survey of the area disclosed no radioactivity beyond the lip of the crater at which point the level was 0.5 milliroentgens. There were no health or safety problems. Both the weapon and capsule were on board the aircraft but the capsule was not inserted for safety reasons. A nuclear detonation was not possible. (*1)
July 28, 1957/C-124/Atlantic Ocean:
Two weapons were jettisoned from a C-124 aircraft on July 28 off the east coast of the United States. There were three weapons and one nuclear capsule aboard the aircraft at the time. Nuclear components were not installed in the weapons. The C-124 aircraft was enroute from Dover AFB, Delaware when a loss of power from number one and two engines was experienced. Maximum power was applied to the remaining engines; however, level flight could not be maintained. At this point, the decision was made to jettison at 4,500 feet altitude. The second weapon was jettisoned at approximately 2,500 feet altitude. No detonation occurred from either weapons. Both weapons are presumed to have been damaged from impact with the ocean surface. Both weapons are presumed to have submerged almost instantly. The ocean varies in depth in the area of the jettisonings. The C-124 landed at an airfield in the vicinity of Atlantic City, New Jersey, with the remaining weapon and the nuclear capsule aboard. A search for the weapons or debris had negative results.(*1)
October 11, 1957/B-47/Homestead AFB, Florida:
The B-47 departed Homestead AFB shortly after midnight on a deployment mission. Shortly after liftoff one of the aircrafts outrigger tires exploded. The aircraft crashed in an uninhabited area approximately 3,800 feet from the end of the runway. The aircraft was carrying one weapon in ferry configuration in the bomb bay and one nuclear capsule in a carrying case in the crew compartment. The weapon was enveloped in flames and burned and smoldered for approximately four hours after which it was cooled with water. Two low order high explosive detonations occurred during the burning. The nuclear capsule and its carrying case were recovered intact and only slightly damaged by heat. Approximately one-half of the weapon remained. All major components were damaged but were identifiable and accounted for.(*1)
January 31, 1958/B-47/Overseas Base:
A B-47 with one weapon in strike configuration was making a simulated takeoff during an exercise alert. When the aircraft reached approximately 30 knots on the runway, the left rear wheel casting failed. The tail struck the runway and a fuel tank ruptured. The aircraft caught fire and burned for seven hours. Firemen fought the fire for the allotted ten minutes fire fighting time for high explosive contents of that weapon, then evacuated the area. The high explosive did not detonate, but there was some contamination in the immediate area of the crash. After the wreckage and the asphalt beneath it were removed and the runway washed down, no contamination was detected. One fire truck and one fireman's clothing showed slight alpha contamination until washed. Following the accident, exercise alerts were temporarily suspended and MDS B-47 wheels were checked for defects.(*1)
February 5, 1958/B-47/Savannah River, Georgia:
The B-47 was on a simulated combat mission that originated at Homestead AFB, Florida. While near Savannah, Georgia, the B-47 had a mid-air collision with a F-86 aircraft at 3:30 a.m. Following the collision, the B-47 made three attempts to land at Hunter AFB, Georgia, with a weapon aboard. Because of the condition of the aircraft, its airspeed could not be reduced enough to insure a safe landing. Therefore, the decision was made to jettison the weapon rather than expose Hunter AFB to the possibility of a high explosive detonation. A nuclear detonation was not possible since the nuclear capsule was not aboard the aircraft. The weapon was jettisoned into the water several miles from the mouth of the Savannah River (Georgia) in Wassaw Sound off Tybee Beach. The precise weapon impact point is unknown. The weapon was dropped from an altitude of approximately 7,200 feet at an aircraft speed of 180-190 knots. No detonation occurred. After jettison the B-47 landed safely. A three square mile area was searched using a ship with divers and underwater demolition team technicians using Galvanic drag and handheld sonar devices. The weapon was not found. The search was terminated April 16, 1958. The weapon was considered to be irretrievably lost. (*1; **2)
March 11, 1958/B-47/Florence, South Carolina:
On March 11, 1958 at 3:58 p.m. EST, a B-47E departed Hunter AFB, Georgia, as number three aircraft in a flight of four enroute to an overseas base. After leveling off at 15,000 feet, the aircraft accidentally jettisoned an unarmed nuclear weapon which impacted in a sparsely populated area 6 1/2 miles east of Florence, South Carolina. The bomb's high explosive material exploded on impact. The detonation caused property damage and several injuries on the ground. The aircraft returned to base without further incident. No capsule of nuclear materials was aboard the B-47 or installed in the weapon. (*1; **2)
November 4, 1958/B-47/Dyess AFB, Texas:
A B-47 caught fire on takeoff. Three crew members successfully ejected; one was killed when the aircraft crashed from an altitude of 1,500 feet. One nuclear weapon was aboard when the aircraft crashed. The resultant detonation of the high explosive made a crater 35 feet in diameter and six feet deep. Nuclear materials were recovered near the crash site. (*1; **2)
November 26, 1958/B-47/ Chennault AFB, Louisiana:
A B-47 caught fire on the ground. The single nuclear weapon on board was destroyed by the fire. Contamination was limited to the immediate vicinity of the weapon residue within the aircraft wreckage. (*1; **2)
January 18, 1959/F-100/ Pacific Base:
The aircraft was parked on a reveted hardstand in ground alert configuration. The external load consisted of a weapon on the left intermediate station and three fuel tanks (both inboard stations and the right intermediate station). When the starter button was depressed during a practice alert, an explosion and fire occurred when the external fuel tanks inadvertently jettisoned. Fire trucks at the scene put out the fire in about seven minutes. The capsule was not in the vicinity of the aircraft and was not involved in the accident. There were no contamination or cleanup problems.(*1)
July 6, 1959/C-124/ Barksdale AFB, Louisiana:
A C-124 on a nuclear logistics movement mission crashed on take-off. The aircraft was destroyed by fire which also destroyed one weapon. No nuclear or high explosive detonation occurred--safety devices functioned as designed. Limited contamination was present over a very small area immediately below the destroyed weapon. This contamination did not hamper rescue or fire fighting operations.(*1; **2)
September 25, 1959 /P-5M/ Off Whidbey Island, Washington:
A U.S. Navy P-5M aircraft ditched in Puget Sound off Whidbey Island, Washington. It was carrying an unarmed nuclear antisubmarine weapon containing no nuclear material. The weapon was not recovered.
October 15, 1959 /B-S2/KC-135/ Hardinsberg, Kentucky:
The B-52 departed Columbus Air Force Base, Mississippi at 2:30 p.m. CST, October 15, 1959. This aircraft assumed the #2 position in a flight of two. The KC-135 departed Columbus Air Force Base at 5:33 p.m. CST as the #2 tanker aircraft in a flight of two scheduled to refuel the B-52s. Rendezvous for refueling was accomplished in the vicinity of Hardinsberg, Kentucky, at 32,000 feet. It was night, weather was clear, and there was no turbulence. Shortly after the B-52 began refueling from the KC-135, the two aircraft collided. The instructor pilot and pilot of the B-52 ejected, followed by the electronic warfare officer and the radar navigator. The co-pilot, navigator, instructor navigator, and tail gunner failed to leave the B-52. All four crewmembers in the KC-135 were fatally injured. The B-52's two unarmed nuclear weapons were recovered intact. One had been partially burned but this did not result in the dispersion of any nuclear material or other contamination. (*1; **2)
June 7, 1960 /BOMARC/ McGuire AFB, New Jersey:
A BOMARC air defense missile in ready storage condition (permitting launch in two minutes) was destroyed by explosion and fire after a high-pressure helium tank exploded and ruptured the missile's fuel tanks. The warhead was also destroyed by the fire although the high explosive did not detonate. Nuclear safety devices acted as designed. Contamination was restricted to an area immediately beneath the weapon and an adjacent elongated area approximately 100 feet long, caused by drainoff of firefighting water. (*1; **2)
January 24, 1961 /B-52/ Goldsboro, North Carolina:
During a B-52 airborne alert mission structural failure of the right wing resulted in two weapons separating from the aircraft during aircraft breakup at 2,000-10,000 feet altitude. One bomb parachute deployed and the weapon received little impact damage. The other bomb fell free and broke apart upon impact. No explosion occurred. Five of the eight crew members survived. A portion of one weapon, containing uranium, could not be recovered despite excavation in the water-logged farmland to a depth of 50 feet. The Air Force subsequently purchased an easement requiring permission for anyone to dig there. There is no detectable radiation and no hazard in the area. (*1; **2)
March 14, 1961/B-52/Yuba City, California:
A B-52 experienced failure of the crew compartment pressurization system forcing descent to 10,000 feet altitude. Increased fuel consumption caused fuel exhaustion before rendezvous with a tanker aircraft. The crew bailed out at 10,000 feet except for the aircraft commander who stayed with aircraft to 4,000 feet steering the plane away from a populated area. The two nuclear weapons on board were torn from the aircraft on ground impact. The high explosive did not detonate. Safety devices worked as designed, and there was no nuclear contamination.(*1; **2)
November 13, 1963/Atomic Energy Commission Storage Igloo/Medina Base, Texas:
An explosion involving 123,000 pounds of high explosive components of nuclear weapons caused minor injuries to three Atomic Energy Commission employees. There was little contamination from the nuclear components stored elsewhere in the building. The components were from obsolete weapons being disassembled.
January 13, 1964/B-52/Cumberland, Maryland:
A B-52D was enroute from Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts, to its home base at Turner Air Force Base, Georgia. The crash occurred approximately 17 miles SW of Cumberland, Maryland. The aircraft was carrying two weapons. Both weapons were in a tactical ferry configuration (no mechanical or electrical connections had been made to the aircraft and the safing switches were in the `Safe' position). Prior to the crash, the pilot had requested a change in altitude because of severe air turbulence at 29,500 feet. The aircraft was cleared to climb to 33,000 feet. During the climb, the aircraft encountered violent air turbulence and aircraft structural failure subsequently occurred. Of the five aircrew members, only the pilot and co-pilot survived. The gunner and navigator ejected but died of exposure to sub-zero temperatures after successfully reaching the ground. The radar navigator did not eject and died upon aircraft impact. The crash site was an isolated mountainous and wooded area. The site had 14 inches of new snow covering the aircraft wreckage which was scattered over an area of approximately 100 yards square. The weather during the recover and cleanup operation involved extreme cold and gusty winds. Both weapons remained in the aircraft until it crashed and were relatively intact in the approximate center of the wreckage area.(*1; **2)
December 5, 1964/LGM 30B (Minuteman ICBM)/Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota:
The LGM 30B Minuteman I missile was on strategic alert at Launch Facility (LF) L-02, Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. Two airmen were dispatched to the LF to repair the inner zone (IZ) security system. In the midst of their checkout of the IZ system, one retrorocket in the spacer below the Reentry Vehicle (RV) fired, causing the RV to fall about 75 feet to the floor of the silo. When the RV struck the bottom of the silo, the arming and fusing/altitude control subsystem containing the batteries was torn loose, thus removing all sources of power from the RV. The RV structure received considerable damage. All safety devices operated properly in that they did not sense the proper sequence of events to allow arming the warhead. There was no detonation or radioactive contamination.(*1)
December 8, 1964/B-58/Bunker Hill (Now Grissom) AFB, Indiana:
SAC aircraft were taxiing during an exercise alert. As one B-58 reached a position directly behind the aircraft on the runway ahead of it, the aircraft ahead brought advanced power. As a result of the combination of the jet blast from the aircraft ahead, the icy runway surface conditions, and the power applied to the aircraft while attempting to turn onto the runway, control was lost and the aircraft slid off the left hand side of the taxiway. The left main landing gear passed over a flush mounted taxiway light fixture and 10 feet farther along in its travel, grazed the left edge of a concrete light base. Ten feet farther, the left main landing gear struck a concrete electrical manhole box, and the aircraft caught on fire. When the aircraft came to rest, all three crew members aboard began abandoning the aircraft. The aircraft commander and defensive systems operator egressed with minor injuries. The navigator ejected in his escape capsule, which impacted 548 feet from the aircraft. He did not survive. Portions of the five nuclear weapons on board burned; contamination was limited to the immediate area of the crash and was subsequently removed.(*1)
October 11, 1965/C-124/Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio:
The aircraft was being refueled in preparation for a routine logistics mission when a fire occurred at the aft end of the refueling trailer. The fuselage of the aircraft, containing only components of nuclear weapons and a dummy training unit, was destroyed by fire. There were no casualties. The resultant radiation hazard was minimal. Minor contamination was found on the aircraft, cargo, and clothing of explosive ordnance disposal and fire fighting personnel, and was removed by normal cleaning.(*1)
December 5, 1965/A-4/At Sea, Pacific:
An A-4 aircraft loaded with one nuclear weapon rolled off the elevator of a U.S. aircraft carrier and fell into the sea. The pilot, aircraft, and weapon were lost. The incident occurred more than 500 miles from land.
January 17, 1966/B-52/KC-135/Palomares, Spain:
The B-52 and the KC-135 collided during a routine high altitude air refueling operation. Both aircraft crashed near Palomares, Spain. Four of the eleven crewmembers survived. The B-52 carried four nuclear weapons. One was recovered on the ground and on April 7, one was recovered from the sea. Explosive materials exploded on impact with the ground, releasing some radioactive materials. Approximately 1400 tons of slightly contaminated soil and vegetation were removed to the United States for storage at an approved site. Representatives of the Spanish government monitored the cleanup operation.(*1;**2)
January 21, 1968/B-52/Thule, Greenland:
A B-52 from Plattsburgh AFB, New York, crashed and burned some seven miles southwest of the runway at Thule AB, Greenland while approaching the base to land. Six of the seven crewmembers survived. The bomber carried four nuclear weapons, all of which were destroyed by fire. Some radioactive contamination occurred in the area of the crash, which was on the sea ice. Some 237,000 cubic feet of contaminated ice, snow and water, with crash debris, were removed to an approved storage site in the United States over the course of a four-month operation. Although an unknown amount of contamination was dispersed by the crash, environmental sampling showed normal readings in the area after the cleanup was completed. Representatives of the Danish government monitored the cleanup operations.(*1;**2)
Spring 1968/At Sea, Atlantic:
Details remain classified.
September 19, 1980/Titan II ICBM/Damascus, Arkansas:
During routine maintenance in a Titan II silo, an Air Force repairman dropped a heavy wrench socket, which rolled off a work platform and fell toward the bottom of the silo. The socket bounced and struck the missile, causing a leak from the pressurized fuel tank. The missile complex and the surrounding area were evacuated and a team of specialists was called in from Little Rock Air Force Base, the missile's main support base. About 8 1/2 hours after the initial puncture, fuel vapors within the silo ignited and exploded. The explosion fatally injured one member of the team. Twenty-one other USAF personnel were injured. The missile's reentry vehicle, which contained a nuclear warhead, was recovered intact. There was no radioactive contamination.(*.1)
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Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, one of these accidents was an accident at Grand Forks, ND, in 1980. This picture shows a B-52 on the runway, on a strip alert, which burned for 6 hours with nuclear weapons aboard.
These weapons on this B-52 did not contain insensitive high explosives. Or, to put it another way, they contained sensitive high explosives. Had this fire reached the high explosive part--keep in mind that the high explosive detonates the nuclear device. And the danger in this kind of accident is not from a nuclear explosion because in order to have the nuclear explosion, all of these small pieces of high explosive must detonate exactly simultaneously in order to crush the nuclear mass into a critical mass and that can happen only if it is intentionally detonated--I mean only if it receives the electrical impulse that intentionally detonates it.
The danger in this situation is that if any of these high explosives detonate, they will spew plutonium over a wide area.
As a matter of fact, this chart shows the situation. It shows what the pattern would have been in the Grand Forks case. This is the size of Grand Forks, population 44,000.
This is the possible plutonium dispersal pattern. This is what would have happened had the fire actually--had the wind been blowing in another direction, which would have spread the fire to the nuclear weapon itself--an area that big.
There are other nuclear accidents. This is a Titan II ICBM silo fire in 1980, in Arkansas. The ICBM or the warhead was actually blown out of the silo. It did not detonate.
There are other accidents. There was an accident in Palomares, Spain, where you had the weapon that hit the ground, there was a detonation of the high explosive, it spread plutonium over a very large area. There was not loss of life in that case. Luckily, it was in a rural area.
But it spread plutonium over a large area. In Thule, Greenland, the same thing happened. In Alaska, the same thing happened. Perhaps the most hair-raising of all was the accident in North Carolina where a B-52 broke up in flight. Two nuclear weapons were released. One, the parachute deployed and was recovered, and the other, the nuclear weapon went down and hit the ground. I understand that several of the safety devices on the nuclear weapon failed. Luckily at least one was successful.
In this case, the 24-megaton warhead was equipped with six interlocking safety mechanisms, all of which had to be triggered in sequence to explode the bomb. When the Air Force experts rushed to the North Carolina farm to examine the weapon after the accident, they found that five of the six interlocks had been set off by the fall. Only a single switch prevented the 24 megaton bomb from detonating and spreading fire and destruction over a large area.
Mr. President, my colleagues know that usually we deal with kilotons. For example, the new D5 nuclear warhead is 450 kilotons. This accident in North Carolina was 24 megatons, or 50 times as powerful as the D5 missile, and it was almost detonated.
Mr. President, the point is, I think as these pictures graphically show, we cannot abide not having these weapons tested for safety.
If I may show one more picture. This happens not to have been a nuclear weapon. This picture of this device is a bomb that was put into the hotel in Lake Tahoe back in 1980. It is a booby-trapped 1,000-pound bomb. They put it in the hotel and they brought in the greatest experts on bomb detonation in the world. This was also accompanied by a note that said `Do not fool with this bomb, it will blow up on you.' They were asking for $24 million, whatever the extortion threat was. But that is a picture of the bomb. We sent in our experts to try to disarm the bomb. They were up there in a helicopter with all kinds of devices. Mr. President, it did not work, as this photograph shows. This is the Lake Tahoe, the Frontier Hotel, whatever the resort
hotel. There it is going up, exploding. The purpose of this picture is to also illustrate that there is a terrorist dimension to the purpose of safety.
I am spending a lot of time on safety because the case is irrefutable that this country, indeed the former Soviet Union, all countries need to test for safety. We need fire resistant pits, we need better electrical systems, we need insensitive high explosives, we will need eventually the binary safety devices.
So what does this have to do with where we are now and what are the differences between the two bills? As we came out of the Appropriations Committee, we saved test only for safety, not for reliability, only for safety. And the President must certify in advance about what the purposes is, what he hopes to achieve, and send that to the Congress.
The Senator from Oregon proposes that we have a moratorium for 9 months, no testing for safety in the meantime. This means that we would, I am sure, have to cancel how many of those tests that are presently planned for safety.
What does that achieve, Mr. President? Why do we want to stop testing? Keep in mind, these are underground tests. They have nothing to do with pollution of the atmosphere and those other problems we used to have. It has nothing to do with the pollution of the ground. Even the Senators from Nevada have recognized that these tests are conducted with perfect safety.
I guess it has something to do with some international treaty and why that proposal gets you closer to an international treaty and what you would hope to achieve on an international treaty by delay of 9 months and the cancellation of some of these safety tests, I do not know.
In other words, Mr. President, the sooner we get to alleviating the danger of this kind of accident, the better off we are. The sooner we can get all of our nuclear facilities with safety devices, I think the better off we are.
The only thing I know of, the amendment of the Senator from Oregon goes into a plan which the President would need to file in advance, and I think that would be useful. I think it would be useful to know what he plans to do. But if the President should miscertify--and these experts will know exactly what these tests are under our amendment when he files in advance--they will know if he says we are going to test the W-88 warhead or whatever it is, and we hope to find this out, they will know if that is true or not and we will be here next year in case the President willy-nilly wants to have a large number of nuclear tests. But, Mr. President, it seems to me that we would be better off to go ahead with those planned tests that we have right now, tests for safety, and not cancel those or delay those for the 9 months involved.
Mr. President, there are almost 10,000 employees out in Nevada for these tests. It seems incredible, but this is a large staff of scientists who conduct these tests, almost 10,000 in number. It seems to me inordinately wasteful if we all recognize that tests must be done to keep a cadre of 10,000 people, or 9,000, whatever the figure is, on the payroll waiting for 9 months before you commence the tests. If these tests are necessary, then let these people, expensively employed, go ahead and do their jobs testing for safety, for no other purpose.
We cannot fire these people for 9 months and then say come back on September 30 or September 1, whenever the date is, and we will rehire you at that time. You have to keep them on the payroll twiddling their thumbs while they wait for the President to give them the directions to test for safety.
Mr. President, let me say just one final word. The Union of Concerned Scientists, which supports some form of test ban, certainly a test ban treaty and some form of moratorium, one of their leading experts was in my office recently. He affirmatively and strongly stated that, yes, we need to test for safety, for all of the reasons that I have just stated.
I am sure that there would be a difference in what he would say as to the number of tests necessary over the next number of years between him and the people at Lawrence Livermore lab. But everyone who is knowledgeable in this debate recognizes the need to test for safety. I think the question now at hand between us is whether there ought to be a moratorium for 9 months canceling those tests now planned for safety, in effect wasting that money for 9 months, while we decide what to do. It is a fairly narrow question, but I think an important one. I hope my colleagues will address that question.
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Mr. HATFIELD. I will be happy to respond to the Senator's question.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, first of all, let me reiterate again, from the testimony of the administration--bear in mind, the Senator from Louisiana has implied that somehow there is a program all ready to go, and that those scientists out there would be sitting around twiddling their fingers if he put this moratorium through. Mr. President, again, the Air Force and the Navy, in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of Energy, have evaluated the safety--and I am quoting. This is from Dr. Robert Barker, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. This is March 19, 1992.
All of these agencies have evaluated the safety of all ballistic missiles that carry nuclear warheads. It was determined that there is not now sufficient evidence to warrant our changing either warheads or propellants.
Now, there is no such plan the administration has waiting for testing.
Let me add one other document----
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. HATFIELD. Sure.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The Senator spoke of warheads and ballistic missiles. That does not include cruise missiles?
Mr. HATFIELD. Propellants.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Cruise missiles. It does not include cruise missiles and iron bombs from airplanes, does it?
Mr. HATFIELD. If the Senator will withhold just 1 minute, here is another document, Mr. President, in which it talks about warheads of all kinds--bombs, missiles, and so forth--and the grade that they give. There are three tests, as you know, three safety tests, and the military has taken each one of these, indicating the entry and the stockpile and the safety rate: A, B, or C. And not one of them is rated under C, as far as safety is concerned.
It is on this document that was based this statement by the Assistant Secretary of Defense that we have no plans at this moment to upgrade the safety of this arsenal.
Does the Senator have any other information that would indicate the administration has a plan ready to go, or that would be somehow unduly restricted for a 9-month delay? I have searched. I have asked the questions. I have not found any answer to that.
If the administration started today to develop a plan for safety testing, I would say to the Senator from Louisiana, it will take a major part of that 9 months, probably, with all the other activities that are ongoing. And also the 9 months overlaps the expiration of the moratorium of the Russians. I would think this is all the more reason, from a nonproliferation point, and stability of the world, that we ought to push on this. But the safety factor, we provide for that after the 9-month moratorium.
The Senator showed a demonstration of a B-52 and explosion. Let us bear in mind, B-52's are no longer flying around with those bombs for 24 hours a day.
And let me also say----
Mr. JOHNSTON. The Senator is correct; they are no longer on alert.
Mr. HATFIELD. That is right.
Mr. JOHNSTON. But the bombs are available to put on the planes.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, let me go back again to the fact that the Assistant Secretary of Defense says the Air Force, which is in charge of those B-52's, has no plans to upgrade its current arsenal for safety purposes--the Air Force. So I think that type of exhibit is without validity as to this issue.
I would say to the Senator from Louisiana, 53 Senators out of the Senate would like a 1-year moratorium--1-year moratorium. We are suggesting on this modification 9 months, with these outyears. And beyond the moratorium, nonproliferation conferences and safety device definitions, and having the Congress come back and take the President's recommendation seriously and reevaluate the whole testing question.
So I think here we have a pretty clear case, Mr. President, that we have attempted to not only cooperate with the administration and those who have felt we should not limit tests, or we would go on and test and test and test and test. We want to modify, of course, to satisfy the Senator from Maine on the matter of the end of 1996; we have no problems with that.
So we are trying to develop the consensus where we can have the moratorium. That is first out--the moratorium. That is as much domestic as it is international.
I would say to the Senator, down in Nevada there are many of those fine scientists, and so forth, who could be engaged in nonnuclear safety programs. We are not going to lose them. Where are they going, with Russia being on a moratorium, France on a moratorium. The world market, with that kind of science expertise, is not that readily available. I am for keeping them in place. I do not want to lose that scientific community.
But by the same token, I must say, there are many other things besides the testing. Or they can be planning for the tests. They can be doing a lot of things. In a 9-month period, a simple gestation period for human life, we cannot utilize that time with these scientists for all the related activities to safety and the reduction of the arsenals that are all part of the grand design, hopefully, to lead us to a save world?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I yield however many minutes the Senator from Nebraska wishes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Exon].
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield 1 minute, I would like to add the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin] as an original cosponsor of this modification.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Oregon for yielding.
I have listened with great interest to my colleague from Louisiana, who has put in a lot of effort on the concern that is before the Senate right now. As a member of the Armed Services Committee and chairman of the committee of jurisdiction, we have looked very long and hard at that. We have made two trips to the Nevada test site to get some firsthand knowledge as best we could. We have had thorough briefings from the scientists there with regard to the potential safety problems.
Let me say that I have some of the same concerns so well expressed by the Senator from Louisiana during the remarks he just made on the floor, and I congratulate him for those remarks. I think testing for safety purposes is something with which we should proceed.
The concern that I an other Senators have had--the concern we had with the original proposal, to be offered by the Senator from Oregon, joined by the majority leader, the Senator from Maine, which essentially was the same position taken by several committees and the House of Representatives by a very large vote, was that there would be a moratorium, period, for 1 year. That, in essence, was the thrust of all of the proposals that had been advanced.
That proposal had not only passed the House of Representatives by a substantial majority, but 52 or 53 Members of the Senate evidently had signed on to such a proposal in the form of a letter to the Secretary of Defense.
I oppose those measures. I oppose those measures now. I congratulate the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Maine, the majority leader, and others who I think have been convinced by the lengthy discussions in which we have been involved that, indeed, there should be a window--a reasonable window, if you will--for proper testing, with a strong emphasis on safety testing, as has just been brought out and talked about by the Senator from Louisiana.
Indeed, I agree, not with the degree but that there is a potential problem with safety with regard to our intercontinental ballistic missiles.
I would simply like to say, Mr. President, the Senator from Louisiana said that our inventory of such weapons today is `not safe,' as I heard the Senator from Louisiana. I think that is not a totally accurate statement. I think it would be far better to say--and put this in a proper perspective by so saying--those weapons are not as safe as we would like them to be; or they can be made safer, and should be, through testing, if that is possible. And I think it is.
That is why, if the Senator will take a very close look at the amendment offered by the Senator from Oregon and other cosponsors, including this Senator, I believe that most, if not all, of the legitimate concerns he has brought up are addressed.
With regard to cruise missiles, my interpretation of the Drell report--I stand corrected if there is evidence that I am not accurate--was that the Drell Commission, which made a very in-depth study of this, indicated that there was no reason for concern about the safety of cruise missiles. Therefore, I think we can downgrade that somewhat as a matter of concern.
Simply stated, the Senator from Oregon and those associated with him have come a long way, a very long way, Mr. President, from their proposal to eliminate all testing for a 1-year period, period.
What is wrong with that? What is wrong with that is, I am sure, is that the signal would be clearly sent to all of the very talented people that we have at the Nevada test site that this is simply a forerunner to closing that facility within a matter of months. If that would happen, I am concerned--from signals, and contacts, and conversations that I have had with people very close to that situation--that an outright 1-month moratorium period without any consideration for what we are going to do in the future would cause us to lose a great deal of the expertise that we have now to get on with the business of safety and the safety from the spread of plutonium, as has been addressed by the Senator from Louisiana.
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Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. EXON. Certainly.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I think there is a fairly narrow but important difference between the Hatfield amendment and the Appropriations Committee amendment. The Hatfield amendment as of now has a moratorium for any purpose for 9 months. That is that you cannot test for safety or any other purpose during that 9 months.
Am I not correct that, of the tests planned for the coming year, three or four of those tests were for safety purposes?
Mr. EXON. I think the Senator from Louisiana is correct.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Is there any good reason to have those 10,000-odd people out there sort of twiddling their thumbs when we need to move forward with this test for safety? Is it really the reason that the Senator is for that, to sort of avoid the total moratorium? Should we not proceed for that 9 months?
Mr. EXON. I suspect, in answer to my friend from
Louisiana very directly, if you could have that option, it might be the best of all worlds. It has been my concern, I say to my friend from Louisiana, which I take it has been one of his concerns and why he got into this matter, that he was not in support of the action taken by the House of Representatives nor was he in support of what 52 or 53, over half of our colleagues in the Senate, have expressed in letter form to the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The Senator is correct.
Mr. EXON. Therefore, it comes back to the situation of how do we best solve this problem? It seems to me that the people out there would not be twiddling their thumbs if the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell-Nunn, et al., amendment is passed. They would indeed be planning for the safety tests that would be made in the future. It takes a long time to adequately and correctly plan these tests.
Mr. President, the Senator is so right. Let me emphasize once again, we had an accident with a nuclear warhead in Missouri. We had an accident with a nuclear warhead in North Dakota. We have had other accidents.
So far, Mr. President, we have been successful with the safety means in place, or crossing your fingers, you might say. Maybe there was some degree of luck in the fact that we did not have an explosion of plutonium. However, it did not happen, which partially proves that the system that we have now cannot be adequately, or properly, or honestly described as `not safe.' Nevertheless, there are binary--which is another way of saying separating-type--features that can very likely be put into our ICBM inventory that have to be properly tested, which is one of the reasons that this Senator, at least, feels that we should not be talking about or enacting any piece of legislation here, as the House of Representatives already has, that would send a signal to those people out there that we are not going to do any more testing at all for whatever reason.
So, I believe that the Senator from Louisiana and this Senator are on exactly the same track. I just would like to have the opportunity, as I have now done, to try to take back some of those statements that were made that our nuclear ICBM inventory is `not safe.' It simply is not as safe as it could be, and, if we are going to make it safer, we are going to have to have some tests, which are clearly allowed under reasonable conditions by the amendment offered by the Senator from Oregon.
I think the Senator from Oregon, once again, would
agree that indeed he and his colleagues have come a long, long way to try to accommodate many of the concerns that have been raised by the Senator from Oregon and others in this particular area.
Mr. President, if I might go into a little bit of the details on why I support and join with the Senator from Oregon. After a great deal of conversations, talk back and forth, we made some proposals that I thought were very reasonable. I felt, though, that maybe they would be rejected out of hand. They were not rejected out of hand.
Friday afternoon we came to a basic agreement that I think has encompassed the real need with regard to the future. And the fact that, as the Senator from Oregon just indicated, my close friend and colleague, Senator Levin, from Michigan, has now come on our bill as a cosponsor indicates to me what I thought about the attitude of Senator Levin when the Senator and I discussed this in my office on Friday last.
Senator Levin was one of those, by the way, who signed a letter to the President, but I think that the arrangements, and the compromise, and--above all else--the consensus position, is best represented in the amendment that is now before the body. A lot of hard work and compromise has gone into that.
Mr. President, as an original cosponsor of the Hatfield-Mitchell-Exxon, et al., amendment, I rise to urge my colleagues to support this position, which represents a balanced, sound approach to bringing our nuclear testing program in line with recent arms control progress between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The cold war adversarial relationship between the United States and Russia has transformed into a positive alliance where newfound trust and cooperation has yielded revolutionary agreements sharply slashing our respective nuclear stockpiles.
To be sure, the world of 1992 bears little, if any, resemblance to the world of 1972. The Russians have stopped nuclear testing. The French have stopped nuclear testing. Even the Chinese, who have a limited testing program, are making encouraging comments about joining a testing moratorium. The prospect of reaching an international court whereby nuclear nations agree to halt all testing and in the process slam shut, maybe just slam it down, the atomic Pandora's box is no longer simply a pipe dream. It is real, Mr. President, and it is within our grasp, but only achievable if the United States, the most powerful nation in the world, nuclearwise and otherwise, begins to show leadership and fulfills its pledge--I say again, Mr. President--fulfills its pledge for a comprehensive test ban, a pledge made in the United States-signed treaty, a pledge made by both the Reagan and the Bush administration.
Without a comprehensive test ban, the chance of halting the spread of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear nations is greatly diminished. Without a rudimentary testing program, a new member to the nuclear arms club will not have the confidence in its arsenal necessary for full operational effectiveness and deterrent capability.
A comprehensive test ban is the key to nuclear nonproliferation. It is in this context that the United States must view the justification for future nuclear tests, for it is in this context, in light of the Russian and French pledges, that the world is judging us. The issue comes down to a simple question: Is or is not the United States serious about nuclear nonproliferation?
As chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, I made two trips to our nuclear testing range at the Nevada test site. A have been briefed at length by Department of Energy officials and national laboratory scientists in highly classified sessions. The amendment before the Senate is the product of my conclusions reached as a result of these visits and other considerations.
My first conclusion is that there are needed upgrades to our nuclear weapons stockpile that should be pursued in order to improve weapons safety. Though no new weapons are planned for the U.S. arsenal, three specific upgrades identified by the congressionally created Drell panel--fire-resistant pits, insensitive high explosives and enhanced nuclear detonation safety systems--should be retrofitted into our weapons so as to significantly reduce the possibility of a catastrophic peacetime accident occurring. Our amendment allows for no more than five safety tests a year for a period of 3 years--15 total--a sufficient number to properly test out these much needed improvements.
My second conclusion is that after over 820 nuclear detonations, the United States has no compelling need to test for warhead reliability extensively. Even so, the amendment allows for reliability testing--no more than one per year--so long as it is counted against the five tests per year limit and only if Congress does not disapprove the substitution after notification by the President. This latitude to use 3 of the 15 allowable tests for purposes of reliability testing is designed to accommodate unforeseen testing needs, though I believe it will not be needed.
My third conclusion is that a comprehensive test ban is in the national security interests of the United States. Once the testing for the previously mentioned safety improvements is complete, our Nation can match the Russian and French initiative and end its program of testing with the knowledge that its nuclear arsenal is a safe, thoroughly tested deterrent which will continue
to be the mainstay of our Nation's superpower status. Without American participation there can be no true comprehensive test ban treaty. And without a comprehensive test ban treaty, the spread of nuclear weapons technology into the Third World--a legitimate threat to the future security of our country--cannot be stemmed. For this reason, the amendment sets September 30, 1996, as the end date of the U.S. nuclear testing program, provided Russia does not test beyond this date as well. If Russia does test after this date, the ban would be lifted.
My fourth conclusion is that the United States cannot let the push for a temporary superpower moratorium on nuclear testing go unanswered. For this reason, our provision enacts a 9 month moratorium on testing while the President is directed to submit a report to Congress detailing the nuclear weapons inventory, modifications needed to incorporate all necessary safety upgrades, the tests, not to exceed five, to be performed in the next fiscal year, and a proposed plan to achieve a comprehensive test ban by 1996. Most importantly, after so many years of stalling and unfulfilled promises, the United States would be on the path toward a multilateral test ban, joined by Russia and, hopefully, the nations of the world.
In certain ways, this amendment is similar to the administration's present testing policy.
The administration's plan calls for six tests a year; this amendment authorizes no more than five, which is not a significant difference, most would agree.
The administration wants to test for safety and reliability; this amendment authorizes needed safety tests and a handful of reliability tests provided Congress affirms the need for such a nonsafety test.
The administration wants to permit the United Kingdom to conduct one test a year at the Nevada test site; this amendment allows for such a test.
The reluctance of the executive branch, however, to take advantage of a defining moment in the history of the nuclear age necessitates that the Congress act in order to fill the void in leadership and, in the process, move the world closer to effectively halting the spread of nuclear weapons. While the need for superpower testing has lessened, the need to stem the tide of nuclear proliferation in the Third World becomes more urgent.
In reining in the testing of these weapons, significant progress will be made toward closing the atomic Pandora's box destabilizing our future security. By enacting an interim moratorium that has been outlined and then completing what remains of justified safety testing, our country can move toward a test ban with Russia and lead the rest of the world through example, not just hollow, ineffective words.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
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Mr. JOHNSTON. Will the Senator yield for a question on my time.
Mr. EXON. I yield.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, as the Senator knows, this is not just a moratorium for this year but is permanent legislation on an appropriations bill.
I was just talking to the White House people out in the cloakroom about what it all means. Is the Senator supporting this as permanent legislation without having the Armed Services Committee take a look at the permanent legislation?
We have to deal with this as a moratorium for this year; it is in the House bill. No funds may be used for testing for this year. But this, of course, is permanent legislation. Is that the position of the Armed Services Committee that they want the Appropriations Committee to or that we want to legislate on this matter on the floor?
Mr. EXON. The Armed Services Committee, as the Senator knows, has just completed our authorization bill, and we had a very lengthy debate and study on that matter and could not reach an agreement in committee. Therefore, it was the recommendation of the chairman, and it was the recommendation of I guess most of the people on the Committee on both sides of the aisle, that we had best let this matter ride until we get to the floor.
We knew very well and talked about the various proposals that the Senator had put into this bill in the appropriations measure. We knew full well of the proposed amendment to be offered on this bill by the Senator from Oregon. We knew full well of the 53 Members of the Senate who had written to the Secretary of Defense indicating that we should just have a moratorium for a year, period. We knew all of those things. I simply am saying that we have worked very hard to try and come up with a compromise.
The Senator is absolutely correct. This is a 1-year appropriations bill and cannot carry beyond that?
Mr. JOHNSTON. No. This amendment does carry on beyond that.
Mr. EXON. It carries for how long?
Mr. JOHNSTON. 1996; it is permanent law.
Mr. EXON. That might well be, but the Senator knows that whatever we do here on an appropriations bill, or authorization bill, or anything else cannot bind future Congresses.
I simply say then that what we were attempting to do, what this Senator is attempting to do with this particular amendment, is maybe to set this down on this particular measure and have this or something very close to it be the hallmark of other types of legislation where it would be proper and very much in order to bring it up for debate or amendment. That is the best answer that I can give to my friend from Louisiana.
I want to make sure that he understands where we are coming from. I do not really believe that the Senator from Louisiana and the Senator from Nebraska are coming from far distances on this particular matter. Does that answer the question from the Senator?
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Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I had not seen this amendment before today, in fact before this afternoon. The amendment which I proposed and which is the position of the Appropriations Committee is to have a moratorium for this year's testing except for safety.
It was our position that we needed safety. Everyone recognizes the need for those tests. There are safety tests planned for this year. I am in the process of getting information from the White House as to the nature of those they can give to us.
I think there is an important difference again between what this legislation does and our position. This legislation does not permit any tests--even those planned tests which are planned within the next 3 months for safety must be
canceled under this legislation and no safety test or for any reason after 1996 may be taken.
I just wonder if we want to make the decision now to have no test for safety after September 30, 1996. Maybe we want to.
But I do not think the problem is we are worried about the Soviet Union building new weapons. I think the greater worry is both our weapons and the Soviet weapons are not sufficiently safe and endanger mankind by some kind of premature explosion.
The Senator says that the cruise missiles are OK. It is my understanding that the SRAM missile which is still in the inventory and not on alert----
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, whose time is this?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Robb). The Chair advises the Senator the current time is being charged against the Senator from Louisiana.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The SRAM does not have a sensitive high explosive and there is a new version of the air launch cruise missile which will have a sensitive high explosive. I do not know that will go in the inventory. If so, it will have to be tested. The D-5 if put into the inventory needs to be tested.
It is the position of Lawrence Livermore that I earlier read that almost none of our present weapons in the inventory contained the kind of safety devices that we need, and we need those tests.
As I mentioned earlier, the Union of Concerned Scientists say we need safety tests.
I would say that it would be better to have the kind of moratorium which we have in the appropriations bill, which limits for this year any test except for safety which the President must certify and gives the Armed Services Committee and other committees of jurisdiction the chance to look at long-term permanent law, because this is permanent law as opposed to Appropriations Committee language. I think those are differences but important differences.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 2 minutes to try to respond to the Senator?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HATFIELD. I am happy to yield time.
The majority leader has asked for time and has been waiting.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, will the majority leader allow me 2 minutes to try to respond directly to the points raised by the Senator from Oregon?
Mr. HATFIELD. I am happy to yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Nebraska.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized for up to 3 minutes.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I am fearful that the Senator from Louisiana, while I am sure it is not his intention, is trying to throw cold water on a concept that we have advanced in that it would destroy safety testing. That is not the correct description of what we had done.
I think it would be legitimate to say that about the original proposal offered by the Senator from Oregon. The lab experts tell us, and we have in contact with them, that 10 to 15 safety testings as authorized and could be approved in the legislation offered by the amendment from the Senator from Oregon would be more than is necessary to prove up on these safety matters. So that is not an issue.
If you want to argue, as you might, that under this amendment we would not test as quickly as we would under the Johnston proposal, I might say, yes. Although I think that is a matter of degree. I would simply say that let us not try and use the same arguments against this proposal that the Senator from Oregon has offered as what he intended to offer.
This proposal, I think the Senator from Louisiana would agree, is far, far better with regard to the ability to test for safety purposes than was the original proposal offered by the Senator from Oregon and certainly that authored and passed in the House of Representatives.
I thank my friend from Oregon, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the majority leader such time as he may consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader, Senator Mitchell, is recognized accordingly.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I am pleased that for the first time since 1988 the Senate today has an opportunity to consider a measure to limit nuclear testing.
Much has changed since 1988. This provision, and I trust the vote today, reflects that change in a positive and appropriate way.
Like the distinguished former chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Senator Hatfield, I have been a longtime supporter of limits on nuclear tests.
I commend the Senator for his efforts on this issue and I know that he shares my gratification that a total of 53 Senators agree on the need for an immediate testing moratorium and have cosponsored S. 2064 to express their support for a testing pause.
I am particularly pleased that the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, Senator Exon, has joined me and Senator Hatfield to craft a comprehensive nuclear testing policy.
Our amendment combines the concept of the moratorium bill with the basic elements of a testing phaseout provision that Senator Exon included in his subcommittee mark--a provision which I understand had the support of all the Democrats on the Armed Services Committee.
This approach merges the immediate political demand to alter our testing practice with a longer term strategy to eliminate the need for nuclear testing altogether.
The amendment imposes a 9-month moratorium on nuclear testing.
The moratorium can be followed by a testing program to implement all necessary safety features on stockpiled weapons. Five tests can be conducted each year for 3 years. One exception per year may be made for a reliability test if Congress does not disapprove the test within 60 days. One exception may also be made to conduct a test for the United Kingdom. But in no case can the total number of tests exceed 5 tests per year or a total of 15 tests through September 30, 1996.
And then, as of September 30, 1996, the U.S. nuclear testing program will end.
This amendment truly reflects post-cold war thinking.
Five years ago, who would have predicted that the Presidents of the United States and a newly independent State of Russia would each offer proposals for massive arms reductions, many to be carried out unilaterally?
Who would have thought the START negotiations would have been completely and immediately overshadowed by a new strategic arms agreement that cut far deeper into the heart of both sides' arsenals?
Who would have believed that the race for strategic superiority would end so suddenly, and that the most immediate military threat to our security would be the efforts of countries other than the Soviet Union to acquire nuclear technology and the means to deliver it?
It is in this context--the end of the superpower arms race and the urgent need to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation--that this amendment is so important and timely.
There are many important reasons to enact a temporary moratorium now.
First, a United States moratorium is an appropriate response to the Russian and French testing moratoriums.
We all know the long history of Soviet, and then Russian, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing: They were ignored by the Reagan and Bush administrations.
The most recent action was the renewal of a 1-year moratorium announced by President Yeltsin in October.
If there were ever an opportunity to help buttress Yeltsin against the military men who would resurrect the Russian nuclear arsenal, the moratorium provides one.
Yeltsin reportedly already has agreed that--in the absence of a United States response to the Russian moratorium--the Russian military can renew nuclear testing at the end of the year.
That would be an unfortunate development, representing an increased role for the military establishment and a diminution of the civilian authority's ability to press for continuing arms control measures.
Yeltsin's initiative subsequently was joined by the French.
In April, France initiated its own testing moratorium through the end of the year, and it finally agreed to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
France and Russia have called for the United States to join and to negotiate a comprehensive testing ban. The Presidents of Canada, Kazakhstan and many other nations also have urged the United States to halt tests.
The only other nuclear powers, the United Kingdom and China, could well follow suit. Since the United States conducts nuclear tests on behalf of the United Kingdom, those tests would automatically stop. The Chinese would either join or be isolated in the world community. So a U.S. moratorium would make it possible that, for the first time ever, all nuclear powers stop nuclear testing.
This would be an historic acknowledgement of the transformation of international politics.
It also would provide a much-needed opportunity for the nuclear establishment of each nation to reevaluate the purposes of their nuclear testing program.
This is the second reason to implement a moratorium.
A hard look at our testing program would reveal that there is only one reason to resume nuclear testing--to ensure the operability of the two or three warheads that could be fitted with new safety devices. And then testing could stop altogether.
A testing pause would provide the political momentum for all nuclear nations to negotiate a multilateral, comprehensive test ban.
This is a third reason for joining the Russian and French moratorium.
It is regrettable that the Bush administration has such a poor record on this issue.
For decades, the United States had sought to negotiate an end to nuclear testing. Every American President from Eisenhower through Carter, Republican and Democrat, sought a comprehensive test ban. In treaties signed by the United States in 1963, 1969, and 1974 the United States solemnly and formally committed itself to continue negotiations to end such testing.
President Reagan pledged that he would continue this policy.
In 1986, President Reagan wrote to Congress that he would:
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This promise was used to induce the House of Representatives to end its insistence on a nuclear testing moratorium in conference on the fiscal year 1987 DOD authorization bill.
But, as we all know, this has not been upheld by the Bush administration.
In fact, the Bush administration has taken just the opposite position.
In response to a letter from the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, and Senators Gore and Simon, the President's National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, rule out the possibility of seeking an end to testing, even though that had been the objective of every American President since Eisenhower, and an objective to which the United States committed itself in three treaties signed previously.
It is time to face the facts: This administration will not willingly pursue further limits on testing. It must be required to take a pause, reassess its testing program, and understand how serious Congress--and the rest of the world--is about ending nuclear testing. The moratorium will do this.
Finally, a U.S. commitment to ending testing is a critical tool in the effort against nuclear proliferation. The Bush administration says it cares about halting the spread of nuclear technology. I believe it does. But it ignores the fact that nuclear testing gravely undermines U.S. nonproliferation objectives.
The 1969 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT] offered an implicit quid pro quo to induce nonnuclear states to sign on: The nuclear powers would work to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.
For nonnuclear states, the sign of seriousness that the nuclear powers are upholding their end of the bargain is whether they are moving to end nuclear testing. No one can dispute the inconsistency of the administration telling other countries that they have no right to nuclear weapons, while insisting that we have the continuing right to build and test nuclear weapons.
Ending nuclear testing is the obvious first step toward nonproliferation. This is why other nations have been trying to get the superpowers to end testing for years. Consistent U.S. objections to testing limits has prevented progress in strengthening the Treaty on Nonproliferation.
At the last review conference in 1990, there was no progress on strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency procedures in two different areas because Mexico and other nations wanted to ban further nuclear tests.
The stronger agency procedures on which there was no action would have allowed special inspections of undeclared sites and required full scope safeguards for nuclear exports to nonnuclear states. These are important measures. They would have been useful regarding Iraq's nuclear program prior to the war. It is foolhardy to forestall strengthening international nuclear safeguards simply because we will not end an unnecessary nuclear test program.
In 1995, the treaty will again come up for review. This time, the treaty itself could be jeopardized. Joining the Russian and French moratorium would demonstrate America's good faith in improving efforts to achieve nonproliferation; to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.
The administration argues that America's choices about nuclear weapons have no relationship to the policies of other nations. Showing restraint on testing, they say, cannot help in the effort against nonproliferation.
Yet North Korea and other would-be nuclear nations frequently point to United States testing to defend their policies. At the very least, we give them an excuse behind which to hide.
Moreover, the administration itself--in another clear inconsistency--has claimed that U.S. nuclear restraint can aid nonproliferation efforts. President Bush explained that the United States formally ended nuclear material production `to show leadership on critical issues [and] to encourage countries in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia to take similar actions.' Those very words apply to this very issue. Ending testing does matter.
The United States should demonstrate that it takes its commitment to nonproliferation seriously and uphold its end of the Nonproliferation Treaty's bargain. Of course, a testing moratorium also will save hundreds of millions of dollars each year and save the environment from the effects of nuclear explosions.
But other critical reasons to pause in our nuclear test program are to readjust the U.S. testing program and to jumpstart progress toward a comprehensive test ban. That is why these are the other elements of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell provision.
The administration will be required to submit a report during the moratorium. In addition to outlining the nuclear arsenal, the need for any additional safety tests, and other technical details, the report must include a plan to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. The moratorium itself will encourage the other nuclear powers to join in such a ban. Russia, which has long sought a treaty banning nuclear tests, will obviously be eager to help achieve this goal.
Because the amendment mandates an end to U.S. tests by 1996, I am confident that the United States will do all it can to make this a multilateral achievement. Achieving a comprehensive test ban would be perhaps the clearest proof that what was once derided pie-in-the-sky thinking is now eminently practical.
The administration's arguments against this amendment are without merit. The administration would have us believe that a temporary moratorium will prevent tests ever again. The administration also would have us believe that continued testing remains necessary. Neither contention is true.
Because this amendment concerns only a temporary moratorium, the first objections are irrelevant. The legislation itself provides that tests can resume. In terms of the need for continued testing, ad infinitum--their arguments don't hold up to scrutiny.
First, the United States now has no plans to develop or design new warheads, and we have no nuclear warheads in production. So we obviously do not need tests to produce new warheads.
Second, testing for reliability is not necessary. Warhead design flaws that can be cited to scare people are flaws that were not revealed by nuclear testing, but by designers who realized that they had neglected some factors in their work.
The reliability of our nuclear stockpile can be monitored without tests almost indefinitely. We are talking about percentages of reliability or declining confidence that are very small. Furthermore, it is the missile, not the warhead, that is the least reliable part of the weapons system.
Finally, from 1964 to 1981, not a single nuclear test was conducted for reliability reasons. The sudden interest in the warhead reliability arises out of desperation for a rationale for continued testing.
Safety is a different matter. According to the March testimony of Robert Barker, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, the Air Force, the Navy, DOD, and DOE concluded `that there is not now sufficient evidence to warrant our changing either warheads or propellants.' Thus, no retrofits for safety have even been ordered by the administration. So a moratorium sure is not going to affect our safety program.
But there is a rational for limited tests to ensure that every weapon that we keep in the stockpile will incorporate up-to-date safety features. Because two, or possibly three warheads that will be kept need additional safety features, we will need to conduct a limited number of tests on an example of each reconfigured weapon. Ray Kidder from Lawrence-Livermore National Laboratory has testified that only four tests would put insensitive high explosives on both the W-88 and W-76 warhead.
The regime set out by this amendment--15 tests over 3 years--ensures sufficient testing to successfully upgrade those weapons.
The administration has tried to defuse the growing congressional support for limits on nuclear testing by proposing its own so-called new policy. But the new policy is really the old policy. It is just more of the same. It barely affected the previously planned testing schedule. It did nothing to respond to the Russian and French moratoriums. And it remained sullen silent on the question of negotiating further testing limits--each of which is critical to any new policy.
Other have suggested other equally unsatisfying alternatives to the comprehensive policy presented by this measure that Senator Hatfield, Senator Exon, and I have agreed upon. This bill, for example, contains a pseudomoratorium--a moratorium with waiver authority so broad that the President already has indicated he would use it. The provision in this bill would let the President conduct any nuclear tests for safety that he deems to be in the national interest.
Well, President Bush already has said that continued testing is in the national interest. So, the provision in the bill is not a moratorium at all. It is a green light to more testing. Another proposal is to put in law the President's so-called new policy--the one that's really the same as the old policy and does not really change anything. The proposal would include language urging the President to negotiate a comprehensive test ban.
The Senate already has passed such language and we already know that the administration will ignore it. So this alternative offers nothing new, either. The time has come for the United States to stop dragging its heels on progress toward a nonnuclear world. Dozens of Nobel laureates who helped develop nuclear weapons say the time is right to end testing.
Admiral Crowe endorsed a moratorium, saying that a United States moratorium should last as long as Russia and France suspend their tests. `The [U.S.] needs to take some steps toward a pause in nuclear testing,' he said, `We need to do something on this issue.'
The House of Representatives agrees. It included a moratorium provision in its energy and water bill, passed overwhelmingly. It voted 237-167 for the Kopetski-Green nuclear moratorium amendment to the DOD authorization bill. The American people also know that the time has come to pass this amendment. An overwhelming majority of Americans want to halt testing now.
In a recent poll conducted by ICR Survey Research Group, 72 percent of Americans wanted the United States to stop nuclear testing, either without conditions or temporarily wile seeking a multilateral test ban. Only 7 percent of those Americans polled supported continued testing regardless of the actions of other nations. That is the policy of the Bush administration.
Americans are ahead of their Government on this issue. They know that the world has changed and that we have an unprecedented opportunity to put the arms race behind us. They want us to start by ending nuclear testing.
The Russian moratorium expires in October. The French moratorium expires in January. Both nations will resume testing if the United States fails to join their moratorium. As the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy said: `The United States has the last word [on nuclear testing], and the whole world awaits this step.' Let us speak clearly and forcefully, and take this step today.
I urge my colleagues to support the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment and vote against all weakening amendments offered today.
I thank my colleague for his courtesy in extending this time to me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Johnston].
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Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, when we put together the unanimous-consent request on this matter last Friday, the Senator from Texas was out of town. He has since called and asked me for 10 minutes to speak on the SSC. I told him I would give it to him out of my nuclear testing time.
At this time, I yield 10 minutes to the junior Senator from Texas to speak about SSC, or whatever else he wants to speak about.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Energy Committee.
Testing is about safety and reliability, and as long as we want safety and reliability, we have to test. I am opposed to the test ban amendment that is pending.
But we are debating today two issues. We will first vote on funding for the superconducting super collider, and then we will vote on nuclear testing. I want to direct my remarks this afternoon to the SSC.
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Mr. GRAMM. I want to begin by reminding my colleagues of the process we used to get to this point on the SSC.
On February 10, 1987, the Secretary of Energy announced that we were going to move ahead with building the superconducting super collider, the world's largest and most important scientific project to be built anywhere in the world in the last quarter of the 20th century.
States were asked to submit proposals for the site location. Forty-three proposals were received from 25 States and, as a matter of fact, a guy named Paul Jablonka proposed it be built on the Moon. That proposal, as far as I know, was immediately rejected.
But the Secretary of Energy set out a process whereby the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering, as a joint project, would look at each of the proposals, evaluate them, and choose the best site on technical merit. They immediately reduced down the 43 proposals to 36 sites in 25 States. After a comprehensive study, the final list came out. There were seven States on the list. When that study was completed on November 9, 1989, Texas was chosen.
I want to remind my colleagues--those from 25 States--States that submitted proposals for the SSC site--that their proposal was considered not by the administration; not by a political appointee; but by the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. And a selection was made to build the SSC in Texas, as the best site from a technical viewpoint.
I also want to remind my colleagues that in competing for this $8 billion project, the State of Texas, offered and the Federal Government accepted, $1 billion of funds from the State. No other State made a similar gesture.
We now have come down to the moment of truth, Mr. President, as to what we are going to do about building the SSC. We have heard many arguments about funding. I would like to address two of them.
First of all, I would like to address the deficit argument. I remind my colleagues that we are operating under a spending ceiling. Nobody doubts that we are going to spend right up to the spending ceiling. So if we reduce funding for the SSC, the money is going to be spent somewhere else.
There are those who say: Well, this is a good place to start deficit reduction. I could respond by saying that when we voted to increase by 50-percent funding for the Public Broadcasting Service, that that was a good opportunity to begin deficit reduction. But the bottom line is we decided deficit reduction in the budget. We set out a spending limit. So the debate is not about deficit reduction; the debate is about priorities. That is the major argument, I think, for the superconducting super collider.
Twenty-five years ago, in 1967, the Federal Government spent over 5 percent of the nondefense budget on research in science and technology. Today, 25 years later, if we fund and build the SSC, we are going to be spending 1.8 percent of the Federal budget on science and technology in the future. In short, as a proportion of the budget, we have reduced by more than half the amount of money spent on science and technology.
I think we are basically down to a decision, and we all know what the decision boils down to: Do we want to spend money on science and technology in a long-term investment in the future of the country, or do we want to take the money from science and technology and spend it on something else?
The disadvantage that science has always had in debate on the floor of the Senate and on the floor of the House is that there is a limited constituency for the future. As a result, we consistently underfunded the future. We consistently invest more in the next election than we do in the next generation.
I doubt if there is a Member of the Senate who really understands to any degree what the SSC is about. We have all learned our little pat statements as to what it does, but it is an investment in high-energy physics. That is an area that the United States has been the world leader ever since the Manhattan project.
Between 20 and 30 percent of the gross national product of the United States today comes from high-energy physics that the United States of America was the pioneer in research on. Everything from the computer to the television has come as a result of high-energy physics research undertaken in this country. It is an area that we have been a leader in; it is an area that we are a leader in today; and the decision on this project is a decision as to whether we are going to stay the leader in this important area.
I believe that we are talking about an investment that will yield hundreds of thousands of jobs after the turn of the century, jobs in new technology and new techniques. I think it is important that we make the decision to invest not in the next election, but in the next generation.
So I want to ask my colleagues to look at the SSC, to look at what research and development has done for America in the past, to look at the high return we have gotten on
the research we have undertaken. I hope that after taking that look that we decide to build the most important scientific project to be built anywhere in the last quarter of the 20th century.
I hope we build the SSC so America can stay No. 1 in science and technology because, in the longrun, the only way we can maintain the highest standard of living in the world, the only way we can pay the highest wages in the world, is to have the best technology and the best tools in the world. And the SSC is a sound, long-term investment in the future of America. I hope today we make that investment.
I yield back the reminder of my time.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the Senator from Oregon indicated to me that he would yield me 10 minutes from his time, but he is not on the floor to do it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], is recognized for up to 10 minutes, with the time charged to the Senator from Oregon.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first, I want to congratulate the Senator from Oregon, the Senator from Nebraska, and the majority leader for working out this amendment on testing. It is a very important step forward towards a comprehensive test ban, I does it in a way which will allow for the completion of safety testing on the two to three warheads which can still arguably use some safety testing.
This initiative will finally, after years and years and years of commitment to a comprehensive test ban, put us on the road to a global ban on nuclear explosion. Most important, it will take a major step on the road to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
What is important is that those two goals are inextricably linked. Moving toward a comprehensive test ban and limiting proliferation of nuclear weapons are inextricably linked. They cannot be separated. We cannot have nonproliferation without finally agreeing to a comprehensive test ban, because other nations will not agree not to proliferate, not to produce nuclear weapons, not to have tests, unless we also finally agree to end the testing of nuclear weapons.
This administration has made some notable progress in the area of nuclear weapons policy. But, on the question of continued explosive testing of nuclear warheads, it is frozen into cold war priorities. Instead of halting testing and leading a global effort to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States is insisting on exploding nuclear warheads in the desert for as long as we have a nuclear arsenal.
That is the administration's position. And so we continue to test despite the Russian suspension of nuclear testing that began last October and the French suspension of testing that began in April. Both nations have called on the United States to join their moratorium in negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty. But the administration has failed to show the slightest interest in negotiations on nuclear testing despite the cessation of testing in other countries, despite existing U.S. treaty obligations, and despite commitments from the Bush administration to negotiate further limits on testing.
Every President from President Eisenhower through President Carter pursued the goal of a comprehensive test ban treaty. In the Limited Test Ban Treaty signed by President Kennedy in 1963, the United States and other signatories pledged to achieve `the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to that end.' That is the Limited Test Ban Treaty which has been approved by this country. We are a party to that treaty.
In 1969, President Johnson negotiated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that was subsequently supported by President Nixon. It repeated that pledge verbatim in its preamble. Article VI of that treaty is viewed by nonnuclear states as an agreement by the United States and other nuclear states to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. Every 5 years the parties to the nonproliferation treaty meet to review the treaty.
If anyone doubts that article VI and the achievement of a comprehensive test ban is crucial to the extension of the nonproliferation treaty in 1995, the next time it comes up for its 5-year review, they should read the record of the 1990 review conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty. At that conference the participants agreed to the following statement. We were one of the participants. We agreed to this statement in 1990. And every one of us should be aware of what we have pledged as recently as 1990:
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The conference noted that no multilateral negotiations had taken place between 1985 and 1990 toward the achievement of an agreement banning all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. Mindful that the extension of the treaty will be considered in 5 years--
That is 1995--
the conference expressed its belief that a comprehensive test ban treaty would significantly enhance the universality and durability of the nonproliferation treaty beyond 1995. The conference reaffirmed
that a comprehensive test ban treaty adhered to by all states would make the single most important contribution toward strengthening and extending international barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and would contribute greatly to the limitation of the grave threat to the environment and human health represented by continued nuclear testing. The conference once again emphasizes the critical importance of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and calls for early action towards that objective.
We approved that. We subscribed to those statements as late as 1990.
Now, the Nonproliferation Treaty is not the only treaty commitment we have made to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. In 1974, President Nixon signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Article I said: `The parties shall continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapons test.' That commitment was shared by the Senate. In 1990 we voted to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty containing that commitment, 98-0.
Although President Carter continued comprehensive test ban negotiations and made extensive progress, President Reagan halted those talks. Congress then took the initiative with both the House and the Senate voting several times to urge resumption of negotiations. In 1986, the House voted for the United States to join a Soviet moratorium. President Reagan then threatened a veto. The distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, then became personally involved in obtaining a commitment from President Reagan to resume talks on limiting test explosions.
In a 1986 October 10 letter to the Congress, President Reagan pledged to `immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program--in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons--of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.'
That is his commitment. That is President Reagan's commitment. In exchange for that commitment, the House of Representatives dropped its insistence on a nuclear testing moratorium for the fiscal year 1987 Department of Defense authorization bill.
The progress since then has just not occurred on comprehensive test ban negotiations. We have seen none from the Reagan administration or the Bush administration.
And now the Congress again must act, not just because we made a solemn commitment to act but because we have seen through the statement of a number of other countries, including France, that unless we live up to our solemn obligations, they will begin testing, and we clearly see before us that unless we live up to our commitment to stop the testing of nuclear weapons, we will lost the battle against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We cannot have nonproliferation and endless testing of nuclear weapons. We must finally do what we have committed ourselves over and over again to do, which is to negotiate an end to the testing of nuclear weapons, if we are, in fact, going to achieve the greatest single goal for our own security, which is the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
On September 17, 1990, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Ronald Lehman promised in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that the delay in resuming nuclear testing talks would not be lengthy. He said, `We are not talking about years.' That was almost 2 years ago.
The chairman of the Armed Services Committee, along with Senators Simon and Gore, wrote to the President's National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, on March 31 of this year, citing many of these facts and seeking to know from the administration when further steps toward a CTB Treaty would be forthcoming. That letter noted:
When Congress reached its compromise agreement on nuclear testing with President Reagan on the eve of the Reykjavik Summit in 1986, it believed that it had received a solemn commitment from the President to pursue in good faith a step-by-step series of negotiations resulting in progressively more stringent limitations on underground nuclear tests.
But the response from General Scowcroft contained no commitment to work toward a CTB, no plans or schedule for resumption of negotiations. General Scowcroft ruled out any limits on nuclear testing beyond current United States plans and practices, and reaffirmed the U.S. intention to continue testing as long as we retain nuclear weapons, regardless of other nations' efforts to seek a mutual halt to explosive nuclear weapons tests. The administration's new policy on nuclear testing merely formalizes a previous decision to test up to six times a year. That policy flies in the face of logic. It violates treaty commitments which are the law of the land, and it violates Presidential commitments made to Congress.
Now there are several reasons we have conducted nuclear weapons tests. The main reason is to perfect new weapons designs. But the United States has no nuclear warheads in production, and no new warheads being developed or designed.
Another reason is to confirm that safety devices on warheads work as intended. Although safety questions have been raised about some warheads and missiles in the stockpile, no retrofits of warheads for safety reasons have actually been ordered at this time. The Air Force, Navy, DOD and DOE have concluded `that there is not now sufficient evidence to warrant our changing either warheads or propellants,' according to March testimony from then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Robert Barker before the House Armed Services Committee Defense Nuclear Facilities Panel.
But this amendment allows for safety tests that would permit three kinds of safety devices to be installed in all warheads that will remain in the arsenal. Insensitive high explosives, fire resistant pits and enhanced detonation safety systems can be installed in warheads that will remain in the arsenal but lack these features, if the President reports to Congress that those safety features are required, and if the tests to support those retrofits are completed by September 1996.
Could there be any value to conducting some limited number of nuclear tests to support the addition of those safety features to warheads that lack them? The answer may be `yes.'
But the costs of continuing to test nuclear weapons with no end in sight, developing a whole new set of safety features with totally redesigned warheads, or for so-called weapons effects tests, or to keep thousands of weapons designers employed--those costs are very high. Continuing testing for those purposes would actually promote nuclear proliferation, a far greater potential danger to our national security than the threat of accidental detonation of nuclear warheads, which is extraordinarily low and can be further reduced through greater care in transportation and other operational procedures.
Make no mistake--when we insist on testing without end, we are promoting proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other nations that
have currently suspended their nuclear tests will begin testing again. `France will resume testing in the South Pacific if other nuclear powers fail to join its moratorium,' said President Mitterand on July 15. And Victor Mikailov, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy and Power, said last month `If the United States doesn't stop testing, we will be forced to resume testing next year.' So Russia and France have stopped testing--but the actions the Bush administration proposes could actually lead them to start again.
Even the Chinese, who recently conducted a large test, are--`serious about preparing for a comprehensive test ban. The other nuclear weapons states should be prepared for that'--says Shen Dingli, a Chinese physicist and arms control expert. `The test related to China's preparation for a test ban. It may be the last on a big scale,' said Shen.
The whole world is concerned about nuclear proliferation, but the United States is promoting that dreaded result when we are a major obstacle to a worldwide comprehensive test ban. Our nuclear testing policy puts at risk the existing nonproliferation regime and jeopardizes chances to build a stronger regime. Weigh the value of effective nonproliferation against the value of continued testing, and the conclusion is clear.
The administration's policy cannot and should not stand. First, we need a moratorium, one that least matches the Russians and the French. Second, we need negotiations to complete a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This amendment sets a target date of 1996 for achieving a CTB, and toward that end allows up to 15 tests to incorporate warhead safety features, even though we probably would not need all 15. Those tests--if the President orders them--must be completed and a final end to all testing secured as soon as possible.
And finally, we need a strategy to strengthen and extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1995. The United States should be leading efforts to stop proliferation, not posing the greatest threat to the NPT regime we have.
I urge my colleagues to reject the current administration policy and approve this amendment to put the United States on course to end nuclear explosive testing in all nuclear weapons states as quickly as possible. That is one way we can begin addressing the foremost security threat--not warhead safety but nuclear proliferation.
Mr. President, again, I congratulate the sponsors of this amendment, and I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor, if I am not already listed as one.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Who yields time?
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Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 15 minutes? I think I have it under the UC.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized for 15 minutes.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I thought the issues before the Senate this afternoon would be a 1-year full moratorium or a moratorium with the exception of permitting safety testing upon certification by the President. When I thought that was the issue, I felt very comfortable that we would understand what we are doing on the floor and we would choose one or the other.
But what has happened is, over the last 72 hours, a 1-year moratorium has turned into a permanent multiyear program for all nuclear testing. The Chair has heard it explained. Senators have heard it explained.
Mr. President, on plain, simple grounds, are we sure we know what we are doing? It seems to me that if ever there was a situation when we should not, on an appropriation bill, over the last 72 hours, devise a permanent, total program for the nuclear testing of American nuclear weapons, it is this one.
Now, frankly, it is very difficult to try to get the point across that nuclear testing for safety is serious business. Let me just show this chart.
This is a Minuteman III MK-12 reentry vehicle. This is it exposed to safety and reliability testing. It was down in the ground as one of America's nuclear weapons that could be there waiting to be used, and it would not have worked.
You see what happened? You could not simulate this. That is what nuclear testing is about. You take the weapons, and you test them to make sure that you do not have unsafe weapons.
Before I show you a couple more, let me tell you what we are supposed to do with our nuclear weapons system during the next 8 or 10 years, whether or not everything works out with the Soviet Union, whether or not we have the much-spoken-of nonproliferation treaty, we are going to make seven safety modifications to our current system. Not that anybody understands what they are, but just so we know they
are real--the B-61, the W-62, the W-69, W-76, W-78, W-80, and W-88. These are all nuclear weapons. And we are going to do safety modifications on them because we already know that science and technology cries out for safety modifications.
In each of these we are going to implement things like enhanced nuclear detonation safety, insensitive high explosives, and fire resistant pits. All of these are things we are going to do to these weapons to make them safer, so we will not have that happening when they are sitting down there in the silo waiting around ready to be used, God willing never, but nonetheless ready.
I am told--and this is one group of experts--that if we are going to make these changes, these safety modifications--and I say to my friend Senator Bennett Johnston, we are told if we are going to make those needed safety modifications that approximately five tests are needed for each of those particular safety enhancements so that we will end up knowing that the needed safety modifications as planned are safe.
I do not know if five is right. I am told it is right. What if it is four? What if it is three? There are eight different warheads we are going to modernize, and from what I understand that modernization and needed safety enhancement is going to occur even within the small numbers of nuclear weapons that are contemplated under the new agreements with the Soviet Union.
In other words, we are going to have these weapons, they are going to be part of our arsenal, and I wonder why we would not want to be sure that they are safe and that the needed safety modifications had taken place. Why would we not do that? Does that have anything to do with the Soviet Union? Does it have anything whatsoever to do with nuclear proliferation? It seems to me that it has everything to do with whether you want safe nuclear weapons in the arsenal.
Having said that, it seems to me that Senator Hatfield's proposed multiyear program for nuclear testing that originally was to be a moratorium--all of a sudden it sprang wings and from a moratorium it is a 5-year program. It seems to me that every one of us on the floor today agrees that modifications to enhance safety should be pursued, and being told that about five tests are needed to implement each new technology on each type of warhead, how could we be agreeing to 15? It seems to me we might not even know what we are talking
about. Maybe we pick three a year, or four a year and say that sounds right. Maybe we could get something good out of the world on some other program, some other treaty. But what does it have to do with a valid, appropriate, American safety program?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. DOMENICI. Yes.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The information I have is that after all the strategic weapon reductions that are planned there will be nine weapons in the inventory. Of those, seven need safety modifications; the B-61 needs two, the B-62 needs three; that is insensitive high explosive, fire resistant pit and enhanced nuclear detonation safety; that normally there is no way to certify a warhead without six or more tests; and that to install all safety modifications will take at least 40 tests unless they cut corners.
I do not know whether that is correct or not. That is the information given to me by the testers, by the Department of Energy.
The information they also gave me is that originally they had five safety tests planned for 1933. I can give you the information on it. The GABBS test, or ultra safe pit plutonium involved test, the counter bore test, optimized safety design with pit reused. There are two others, without going into detail of them.
It just seems to me that if we do not know enough about this to go beyond saying no test except for safety, that is an understandable, clear rule. Yet, this amendment would give us a long-time, permanent law which cancels safety tests, and has no safety test after 1996. It seems to me that is not connected to nuclear proliferation. That is connected to nuclear safety on the wrong side of nuclear safety.
Does the Senator agree with that?
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Mr. DOMENICI. I agree. Since I have the exact same information regarding the same warheads that are going to be enhanced, they will be in the inventory and enhanced as described, I ask unanimous consent that the entire list be made a part of the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
After all the strategic weapon reductions, there will still be eight or nine weapon types in the stockpile: B-61, W-62, W-69, W-76, W-78, W-83, W-87, W-88, W-80.
Of these, seven need safety modifications: B-61 IHE, FRP; W-62 ENDS, IHE, FRP; W-69 ENDS, IHE, FRP; W-76 IHE, FRP; W-78 IHE, FRP; W-80 FRP; W-88 IHE, FRP.
ENDS=Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety.
IHE=Insensitive High Explosive.
FRP=Fire Resistant Pit.
Normally there is no way to certify a warhead without five or more tests.
To install all safety modifications will take at least forty tests, unless we cut corners.
Mr. DOMENICI. I said that we have been advised that there are about an average of 5 tests for each. If there are 8, that is 40. That sounds much different than 15, and it really is.
Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator yield? I do not think it is quite 15. The amendment as written allows for 5 per year for 3 years; minus 1 for reliability, if the administration chooses one for reliability, and minus 1 for the British test. It is basically 3 per year for 3 years, or a total of 9 tests for safety.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator. He is more right than I am.
The point is, when you are talking about this kind of event in our history, we have gone through building this arsenal. It is here. If anybody thinks that we do not get very much out of these underground tests and these tests for safety, let us look at this one real quick.
I do not need to cite the missiles down the side here, but every system except one had unpredicted failures discovered on nuclear tests. There they are, with the little red checks, `major system test, unexpected results.' That is why we do tests. We do not do these tests because we like to do underground nuclear tests. I think America would be delighted to never do them again. I am certain that our friends from Nevada in whose State much of this occurs--I mean if they knew that America never needed to do these, they will not be here on the floor. They are concerned because they have manpower, they have facilities. We are going to put them all up in some kind of state of confusion because on the floor of the United States Senate we are going to come up with an ill advised multiyear plan for about three tests a year.
If I were on the Armed Services Committee, far be it from me to advise anyone, but I would be here asking that you do nothing for more than 1 year on this bill, and give it back to those who delve into this in great detail to see if we are right about the 8 systems, to see if we are right about how many tests you have to do, and to see if that jibes up with the 3 that are in here for each of the next 3 years.
So I urge--although it seems to me that the die is sort of cast, and unless we hear from additional members of the Armed Services Committee on our side and some additional Democrats on the other side, other than Senator Exon and Levin--if we do not hear from any, the die is cast on the floor of the Senate, in spite of what we are being told about the 8 systems, we are going to cavalierly decide that enough is enough, these are not very good things, and it is going to help some other program of negotiating on proliferation, which is going to get a big positive boost out of this. Frankly, it seems to me that we should be sure if we have 2,000, or 18,000 or 12,000 nuclear weapons, and whether we have an agreement to lower it more than it is today, we ought to do the safety experiments to make sure that what we have are safe.
I yield back any time that I have to the chairman, Senator Johnston.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, under the order entered, it is my understanding that I control 1 hour; is that true?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senators from Nevada are going to control 1 hour.
Mr. REID. Senator Bryan has asked me to request that 10 minutes of his time be extended to Senator Cohen.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, it has been stated by several members that we have come a long way on this issue, and indeed I think we have come a very long way. Last week, the committee was talking about an amendment that would have established a 1-year moratorium period--nothing about safety and reliability, simply a 1-year moratorium. I think that the committee members--certainly the Senator from Oregon and others--tried to negotiate in good faith to come up with some acceptable compromise. They have come down from a year to 9 months. They have, in fact, recognized that safety is a critically important issue in this entire debate. That safety is not something to be dismissed lightly, or to be denigrated, saying, `oh, there they go again with their safety considerations, another ruse foisted on the American people by the Bush administration.' They have also recognized that there are issues dealing with reliability and nonproliferation and the nuclear testing talks.
I might say, for the information of my colleagues, I raised these issues about this linkage, and there is a linkage between our testing practices and our ability to encourage other nations to join in the nonproliferation regime. There is linkage between our testing policies and reestablishing nuclear test talks with Moscow. There is linkage between all of this.
So I think we were right to raise these issues in the Armed Services Committee. As the Senator from Nebraska pointed out, we did not reach any conclusion. I raised this linkage in the Armed Services Committee markup in response to questions raised by Senator Nunn--he is not here just yet, but he will be soon--about the failure of the administration to really aggressively pursue the nuclear testing talks during the past several years. I think that was a legitimate complaint, and we tried to address that during the Armed Services Committee's mark-up and we were unable to reach a consensus.
The Senator from Oregon said this is a simple issue. I would like to take issue with that statement. This is not a simple issue. This is a very complex and complicated issue. I go back to the mid 1980's, when we had something comparable to this in terms of its popularity. It was called the nuclear freeze movement in this country, which was very, very popular at that time. It was something deeply held by well-meaning people, as far as the need to establish a nuclear freeze immediately. It come right on the heels of the Soviet Union--at that time the Soviet Union--deploying SS-20's in Eastern Europe. Had a nuclear freeze been endorsed by the Senate and the House and embraced by the President, that would have meant that the United States could not have deployed the Pershing II missile in West Germany and the cruise missile in other countries. And by rejecting the freeze's popularity and the apparent simplicity--not unlike what has been suggested here that a test ban is a simple issue--by rejecting that, we were able to deploy our Pershing II, and re-enter negotiations with the Soviet Union. We were able to eliminate the threat of the SS-20. We were able to pull back our Pershing II's.
We did all of that because we had to engage in a somewhat paradoxical situation of having to deploy a system in order to get real reductions. I say to my friend that we have that sort of complexity involved in this issue as well. It is not simply simple. It is quite complicated.
It has been suggested that 72 percent of the American people want an end to nuclear testing. As we all know, in this business, it depends on how you ask the question. Do you want an end to nuclear testing? Answer, yes. Do you want an end to nuclear testing if it means that a substantial portion of our residual nuclear weapons are going to remain inherently unsafe? Ask that question and find out what the results would be. Do you want an end to the Federal deficit? Well, 75 percent of the people would say, obviously, yes. Do you want an end to the Federal deficit if it means increasing your taxes; or if it means cutting Social Security; if it means cutting veterans benefits; if it means putting a means test to all of our entitlement programs?
So how you ask the question, or phrase the question, depends very much on what kind of an answer you are going to get. I do not doubt that 72 percent of the American people want an end to nuclear testing. The real issue is whether or not we are going to have remaining something that is safe and indeed reliable.
The Senator from Louisiana has pointed out--and I think very effectively, as has the Senator from New Mexico--that there are serious safety issues that have been raised--not by politicians or bureaucrats at the White House or down at the Pentagon. These issues have been raised by a panel put together at the behest of Congress 2 years ago. The so-called Drell panel was created at the request of a House committee. The Drell panel was the one that came to the conclusion that a substantial portion of our inventory still has major safety problems.
The Senator from Louisiana started to deal with that, and he showed a photograph, which I did not see at the time, but perhaps it was that accident we had at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota, in 1980 with a B-52 bomber. That bomber was loaded with SRAM-A missiles, and the W-69 warhead on that SRAM-A missile is not equipped with insensitive high explosives, or with a fire resistant pit, or with the enhanced nuclear detonation safety systems. It has none of those safety systems. We were lucky in this particular tragedy. As I recall, it was Dan Rowen who used the expression `the fickle finger of fate.' We were spared a major catastrophe by that fickle finger of fate, because the wind was blowing the wrong way that day.
Let me read to you what an expert witness said in testimony taken before the Appropriations Committee:
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The wind happened to be blowing down the axis of the aircraft. Had the wind be blowing across, rather than parallel to the fuselage, the whole system could have been engulfed in flames (including the SRAM-A missiles). There is a real world out there, and those kinds of accidents happen. You are talking about something that in one respect could probably have been worse than Chernobyl, because you had plutonium in the soil and on the soil, which you have to clean up.
So here we have a situation in which one accident could have been a major catastrophe of Chernobyl proportions, had the wind been blowing across the aircraft rather than along its axis. Those are the kinds of issues we are dealing with. Safety is so important because the SRAM-A missiles simply do not have the safety devices necessary to protect the American people.
Mr. President, it was suggested that we are spending a half-billion dollars to test our weapons. I do not know if that is the accurate figure, but let's assume it is. That is a substantial amount of money. I also point to the Drell Commission, which pointed out that had we had an accident that dispersed plutonium, one accident could in fact involve not only the personal tragedy of thousands of people being affected by the plutonium, but we could spend at least a half-billion dollars cleaning up the nuclear contamination. At least a half-billion dollars. Now we are talking about having thousands of nuclear weapons in our arsenal for the indefinite future. As long as we have them, they should be safer and they surely ought to be reliable.
The amendment as originally proposed last week, or passed by the House, simply said let us have a 12-month moratorium. It had no nexus, no connection with efforts to encourage nonproliferation; no connection with how we are going to get the nuclear test talks underway again with Moscow; no ultimate strategy for trying to get this genie at least under control, if not back in the bottle, which is probably impossible.
I looked at the amendment that has been offered by the Senator from Oregon and my colleague, Senator Mitchell from Maine, and Senator Exon. I want to call to their attention, and that of my colleagues, to page 6 where I find some major difficulties with the language as it has been written.
By setting a date of 1996 and fixing that as a deadline after which there will be no more testing whatsoever, it seems to me that does several things. Most importantly, it fully takes away leverage we might have or might need at that point to exert over those nations we are trying to encourage to comply with this nonproliferation regime. If you fix it----
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Wofford). The time yielded to the Senator has expired.
Mr. COHEN. May I have an additional 3 minutes?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator yielded an additional 3 minutes?
Mr. BRYAN. Yes; the Senator from Nevada yields 3 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is yielded an additional 3 minutes.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I will try to be brief as I can on this issue.
If we fix a time certain after which there will be no further testing under any circumstances, it seems to me we lose the leverage to encourage the very objective we all want, that it, to get other Nations not to engage in proliferation.
In addition to that concern, on page 3, it seems to me the way the language of paragraph (F) as written would, in fact, preclude a safety device being installed if a weapon already has one safety device. If a warhead already has the enhanced nuclear detonation safety [ENDS] system, paragraph (F) would preclude adding the two other safety features. That is contrary to what the Drell panel recommended: We should have all three safety devices, not just one. So the way in which the language reads, it would preclude the testing of any system if you already had one safety device. In fact, you may need all three.
Second, I think it was suggested by the Senator from Oregon that safety tests might be used for multiple purposes. The difficulty with that is that we want to test some systems for survivability against weapon effects. Our communications system, for example, are tested under the subkiloton level for this purpose and that would not be allowed under this particular language because safety tests are conducted at much higher yields.
Mr. President, no greater responsibility has been placed upon our shoulders than to protect the American people against the almost unimaginable threat posed by nuclear weapons. For decades, the aspect of this threat that has required our greatest attention has been the prospect of a Soviet attack on the United States.
With the fading away of the cold war in recent years, we have suddenly become much more aware of other aspects of the threat that were previously all but ignored. We have only recently faced up to the negligence with which the Department of Energy's nuclear weapon complex has been operated for decades, endangering large parts of America. This matter has acquired such urgency that the Armed Services Committee has told DOE that henceforth priority will be given to bringing its facilities into compliance with environmental laws and to cleaning up decades of waste, rather than on modernizing the complex.
Another aspect of the nuclear threat that has received inadequate attention until recent years is the danger associated with accidents involving nuclear weapons. While this issue has certainly not been ignored, reviews conducted in recent years have shown that the dangers are worse than had generally been assumed and that much more can, and should, be done to reduce these dangers.
Two years ago, the House of Representatives appointed a special panel on nuclear weapons safety to review the extent of this danger and make recommendations regarding it. This group, commonly referred to as the Drell panel after its chairman, Prof. Sydney Drell, delivered an extremely sobering message in its December 1990 report.
In a finding that should cause us to pause, the Drell panel reported that the tremendous progress in supercomputer capabilities in recent years had led to the `realization that unintended nuclear detonations present a greater risk than previously estimated (and believed) for some of the warheads in the stockpile.'
In assessing the overall weapon safety situation, the Drell panel quoted an earlier, 1988, DOE Nuclear Weapons Safety Review Group that concluded:
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We still have risks from weapons that will remain in the stockpile for years. The potential for a nuclear weapons accident will remain unacceptably high until the issues that have been raised are resolved.
The Drell panel found that `although many things have been, or are being fixed, still more remains to be addressed' and that `there remains room for substantial improvement in nuclear weapons safety.'
Far from being uniformly negative, however, the panel found that `safety standards can be raised if we take advantage of important new technical advances.' Principal among these advances identified by the panel are:
Insensitive high explosive [IHE] to replace the conventional high explosive that compress the fissile material to produce a nuclear yield. In the panel's words `In certain violent accidents * * * (ordinary) high explosive has a high probability of detonating * * * causing dispersal of plutonium from the weapon's pit.' In contrast, insensitive high explosive has very little likelihood of detonating in any plausible scenario.
According to the panel, use of `IHE is a very effective way--perhaps now the most important step--for improving the safety of the weapons stockpile against the danger of scattering plutonium.'
Yet, even though IHE is viewed as the most important step to improve the safety of the stockpile, the Drell panel found that as of 1990 `only 25 percent of the stockpile is equipped with IHE.'
Halting nuclear testing would prevent us from putting IHE into the warheads that will form the bulk of the stockpile for the indefinite future. Let me repeat, if proposals to halt testing are adopted, the majority of the nuclear stockpile remaining after the START II reductions will contain unsafe high explosive rather than the much safer IHE.
A second necessary safety feature is the enhanced nuclear detonation safety [ENDS] system, which isolates the electrical arming components from energy sources, such as lightning or other electrical disturbances, that could cause accidental detonation. The Drell Panel noted that barely half of the stockpile has the ENDS system, and that the others `do not meet the established stockpile safety criteria.' Proposals to halt nuclear testing would prevent the incorporation of the ENDS system to these other weapons. This would raise unacceptable safety concerns.
A third safety feature is the fire-resistant pit, which is specially designed to prevent the release of plutonium even when the weapon is exposed to high temperatures for long periods, as might happen in a aircraft fuel fire. Proposals to halt nuclear testing would also prevent the incorporation of fire-resistant pits into the weapons we will retain.
Mr. President, safety features such as these are not luxuries. The simple fact is that our weapons today do not meet our existing safety critera, and, as the Drell Panel concluded, `the majority of the weapons in the current stockpile will have to be modified to meet' existing safety criteria.
This is even acknowledged by the specialists who are often quoted by those who favor a halt to nuclear testing.
Dr. Ray Kidder is routinely cited as an authority by test ban advocates. At a seminar sponsored by the Congressional Research Service in May, he unequivocally stated that `IHE provides a major improvement in safety.'
And yet the other person most frequently cited as an authority by test ban advocates, Prof. Frank von Hippel, acknowledged at a Foreign Relations Committee hearing 2 weeks ago that `after the implementation of the reductions that are underway, three warhead designs will not contain insensitive high explosive [IHE].' And, I would note, these three warhead designs will make up the majority of the weapon stockpile.
A vote to halt nuclear testing today is a vote to condemn the American people to live with unsafe nuclear weapons in their midst for years and years--indeed, until nuclear weapons are eliminated. Not just a few unsafe nuclear weapons, but a nuclear stockpile in which most of the weapons do not have critical safety features.
Anyone who believes that this is acceptable should review the consequences that could result from an accident involving a nuclear weapon.
Senators may recall an accident in 1980 in which a B-52 caught fire at Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota. That bomber was loaded with short-range attack missiles, known as SRAM-A's. The W-69 warhead in the SRAM-A missile is not equipped with insensitive high explosive. It is not equipped with a fire-resistant pit. It is not equipped with the enhanced nuclear detonation safety system. It does not have any of the safety features highlighted as especially important by the Drell Panel.
Testimony to the Appropriations Committee several years ago revealed that we were spared a catastrophe only by what comedian Dan Rowen used to refer to as the `fickle finger of fate.' According to that testimony:
The wind happened to be blowing down the axis of the aircraft. Had the wind been blowing across, rather than parallel to the fuselage, the whole system could have been engulfed in flames (including the SRAM-A
missiles.) There is a real world out there and those kind of accidents do happen. You are talking about something that in one respect could be probably worse than Chernobyl * * * because you have plutonium in the soil and on the soil, which you have to clean up.
In the Grand Forks accident, we were very lucky. The SRAM-A warheads on that bomber were not damaged by the fire. Next time, we might not be as lucky. This chart shows what could have happened. Had the warheads been damaged, plutonium could have been spread over a very large area, exposing a large number of people to this extremely dangerous, cancer-causing substance.
But this is not even the worst case--not by a long shot. As discussed in the Drell panel report, a fire aboard an aircraft loaded with the SRAM-A could result in a nuclear detonation. It goes without saying that the public health hazard represented on this chart would pale in comparison to that resulting from the immediate nuclear effects and the radioactive fallout produced by a nuclear detonation.
Only in the last 2 years have we finally faced up to the danger associated with this unsafe weapon system. In 1990, Secretary Cheney ordered that SRAM-A missiles be taken off alert aircraft.
But the Drell panel was categorical in stating that `It is not sufficient to pull such weapons off the alert ALPHA force but retain them in the war reserve stockpile * * *.'
Moreover, the Drell panel stressed that `the SRAM-A is one such example, but not the only one.'
The Drell panel also focused its attention on the Trident II D-5 missile. Neither of the warheads carried by the Trident missile have insensitive high explosive. The Navy has recently altered its missile handling procedures, greatly reducing the chances of the type of accident most often discussed. But so long as these warheads contain ordinary high explosive rather than IHE, there remains the danger of an accident.
Professor von Hippel, whom test ban advocates so frequently quote, testified to the Foreign Relations Committee earlier this month regarding the potential consequences of an accident at the Bangor, WA, Trident facility in which detonation of the high explosive in Trident warheads dispersed plutonium. According to Professor von Hippel, such an accident could cause thousands of additional cancer deaths. [`* * * anywhere from 20 to 2,000 additional cancer deaths.']
Beyond the public health hazards of this type of accident, the Drell panel estimated that such an accident would cost upwards of half a billion dollars to clean up.
Mr. President, these are not just abstract, hypothetical possibilities to me, and they should not be to other Senators. The SRAM-A was originally deployed in 1972 at Loring Air Force Base in my State of Maine, back at a time when the safety problems of the SRAM-A were not known. While Loring was subsequently converted to a non-nuclear base, the grave dangers associated with the SRAM-A that used to be deployed there lead me to be especially concerned about weapon safety issues. Even though my own constituents are no longer faced with the serious risk of a nuclear weapon accident, that does not mean that I can turn my back on other Americans who might be faced with similar risks today and in the future.
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Some might respond that we can just retire the SRAM-A. A few will even cite testimony to Congress that DOE plans to retire the SRAM-A and replace it with the SRAM-II, which would have these various safety features. Senators might recall, however, that just last fall Congress and the administration decided to terminate the SRAM-II, both because of technical problems with the missile and as part of the arms control initiative adopted after the failed Soviet coup.
So we are stuck with the SRAM-A. And unless we want the American public held hostage to the `fickle finger of fate,' we must act to make the SRAM-A safer. To do so, we could try to fix the unsafe W-69 warhead now in it. Or we could switch warheads, equipping the SRAM-A with the much safer W-89 warhead developed for the SRAM-II. In either case, however, testing would be necessary.
And, as the Drell panel emphasized, the SRAM-A is only one example of currently unsafe weapons we will retain in our inventory for the indefinite future.
Mr. President, we have been very fortunate in that the accidents that have occurred to date have not resulted in catastrophic consequences. But that does mean that we should do nothing more than hope that our luck continues. As the Drell panel summed up the matter:
No matter how successful--and lucky--a system has been, it must not be allowed to breed complacency or justify the status quo. When one considers the potential for tragedy should a serious accident occur and considers the consequence of such an accident for our national security, it is clear that no reasonable effort should be spared to retain full vigor and care in the safety assurance process and to prevent any such accident from occurring.
Mr. President, there are other provisions of the amendment besides those I have discussed, which I think are objectionable in terms of the way they are written. I would be happy to discuss those with the Senator from Oregon or his staff. But I think the way in which it was written today, as it currently stands, I could not support that amendment.
I believe we have to be fully committed to the Drell panel's objective that no reasonable effort be spared to assure safety and prevent any accident. I do not believe that the amendment as currently drafted comes close to assuring that. At this point in time I would vote against the amendment as written.
I thank the Senators for yielding.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I yield myself 20 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, the President has put forward a new nuclear testing policy that takes safety into consideration. In fact, a nuclear test scheduled for September of this year at the Nevada test site has already been canceled as a result of this policy. The test did not primarily concern safety, and it was stopped.
The problem is not nuclear testing; it is nuclear weapons: There are too many of them, and there are too many of them in the wrong hands. The number of third world countries with nuclear capabilities seems to grow daily. Saddam Hussein's near success with developing a nuclear weapon should be an eye-opener for us all.
In addition to the United States, three Republics of the former Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China, four countries are believed to have nuclear weapons, or have the ability to assemble them in short order; namely, Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Africa. Several more nations are in pursuit of the bomb: Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Iran, Argentina, Brazil, Algeria, and, some say, Syria. Not all of these countries are exactly friends of the United States.
Some argue that if the United States stops testing, other countries will follow suit. Can anybody here say that Saddam Hussein would not have pursued his nuclear weapons program if the United States had ceased testing? The hypothesis is ridiculous and dangerous. Neither will Pakistan or India halt its nuclear development just because the United States stops testing. They fear one another, and they fear China, which recently tested a one megaton bomb. This is the type of test that is destabilizing, not the less than 20-kiloton explosions in the Nevada desert. If cutting off aid to Pakistan has not stopped their nuclear weapons program, setting an example by not testing certainly isn't going to do anything. The United States cannot afford such a symbolic and I submit, Mr. President, a useless gesture.
Though former President Gorbachev declared a 1-year testing moratorium, President Yeltsin has ordered his Ministry of Nuclear Energy and the military high command to ready the former Soviet test site at Novaya Zemblya for testing. The decree calls for tunnels to be prepared for a resumption of testing at the rate of two to four explosions a year. The Russians and the French will begin testing again. They will have to ensure the safety of their stockpile.
How could we object to the former Soviet Union, the Russian Republic, testing their weapons for safety purposes?
The events of the last few years show that test bans have nothing to do with ending the arms race. Our strategic stockpile will decline to 3,500 warheads by the turn of the century. United States-Soviet/Russian arms reductions demonstrate that eliminating testing is not necessary to achieve arms control. A halt to nuclear testing would not eliminate one nuclear weapon, nor would it increase international security. If anything, ending testing would decrease international security by sending a message of complacency to Third World countries.
It is essential that we test nuclear weapons to ensure their safety. Although they are among the most complex weapons in the U.S. arsenal, nuclear weapons are tested only a small fraction as much as other weapons systems adopted by our military forces.
Some proponents of a nuclear test ban say that the stockpile is already safe. But one of the arguments against nuclear testing is: `Isn't a safe weapon an oxymoron?' It's a silly statement, but I have heard it several times, even among those who should know better. Ask our military men and women in the field about the importance of safe weapons. It is no oxymoron to them. To them a safe weapon means survival. Ask civilians who live near bases where nuclear weapons are stored. It's no oxymoron to them.
In May of 1990, Defense Secretary Cheney acknowledged a safety problem with U.S. nuclear artillery shells in Europe. The defects had been found in hundreds of W79 short-range nuclear artillery shells based in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. These are shells that can deliver a 10-kiloton nuclear blast.
The safety problems were confirmed through testing at the Nevada test site in 1988. Because problems were identified through testing, they were fixed, and accidents were prevented.
Over the last 32 years, there have been 32 accidents involving nuclear weapons, almost a third of which involved the dispersal of radioactivity. These contaminating accidents occurred throughout the United States at bases in New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana, New Jersey, Indiana, and Ohio. In addition, radiation contaminating accidents have occurred in Palomares, Spain, where there was a mid-air collision; Thule, Greenland, where there was a crash, and there was a radioactivity dispersing accident at a SAC base overseas, the site of which is still classified.
These are just the accidents that have dispersed radioactivity. Other accidents involving nuclear weapons have occurred in the States of Washington, California, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Kentucky, North Carolina, Missouri, South Dakota, and Arkansas. In addition, accidents have occurred at sea and at U.S. bases overseas.
I ask unanimous consent that the details of these accidents be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
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TABLE I: SUMMARY OF ACCIDENTS INVOLVING U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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Accident No. Date Location Weapon configuration Type of accident Nuclear weapon response
Assembled weapons Unassembled weapons Component only HE response Contamination
HE burn HE detonate
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1 02/13/50 Puget Sound, WA X Jettison, 8000 X
2 04/11/50 Manzano Base, NM X Crash into mountain X
3 07/13/50 Lebanon, OH X Crash in dive X
4 08/05/50 Fairfield-AFB, CA X Emergency landing, fire X
5 11/10/50 Over water, outside US X Jettison X
6 03/10/56 At sea (Mediterranean) X Aircraft lost
7 07/27/56 SAC X B-47 crashed into bunker
8 05/22/57 Kirtland AFB, NM X Inadvertent jettison X X
9 07/28/57 At sea (Atlantic) X Jettisons, 4500 & 2500
10 10/11/57 Homestead AFB, FL X Crash on takeoff, fire X X (low order)
11 01/31/58 SAC base overseas X Taxi exercise, fire X X
12 02/05/58 Savannah, GA X Midair collision, jettison
13 03/11/58 Florence SC X Accidental jettison X
14 11/06/58 Dyess AFB, TX X Crash on takeoff X X
15 11/26/58 Chenault AFB, LA X Fire on ground X
16 01/08/59 US Base, Pacific X Ground alert, fuel tanks on fire
17 07/06/59 Barksdale AFB, LA X Crash on takeoff, fire X (1/5) X (1/3)
18 09/25/59 Off Whidbey Is., WA X Navy aircraft ditched
19 10/15/59 Hardinsburg, KY X Midair collision, impact X (2/2)
20 06/07/60 McGuire AFB, NJ X Missile fire X X
21 01/24/61 Goldsboro, NC X Midair breakup
22 03/14/61 Yuba City, CA X Crash after abandonment
23 11/13/63 Medina Base, TX X Storage igloo at AEC plant X X X
24 01/11/64 Cumberland, MO X Midair breakup, crash
25 12/05/64 Ellsworth AFB, SD X Missile reentry vehicle fell
26 12/08/64 Bunker Hill AFB, IN X Taxi crash, fire X (3/5) X (1/5)
27 10/11/65 Wright-Patterson AFB, OH X Transport a/c fire on ground X
28 12/05/65 At sea, Pacific X Aircraft rolled off elevator
29 01/17/66 Palomares, Spain X Midair collision, crash X (2/4) X (2/4)
30 01/21/68 Thule, Greenland X Crash after abandonment X (4/4) X (4/4)
31 Spng, 68 At sea, Atlantic X Lost weapons
32 09/19/80 Damascas, AK X Missile fuel explosion
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Mr. REID. The accident that occurred in South Dakota which has been talked about here and has been illustrated, as it was before the full Appropriations Committee, involved a fire which, I repeat, if the wind had shifted--the fire burned for 5 hours--would have carried a plume of radioactive plutonium which would have left the State essentially unlivable.
How many Members of this body, especially those from States and regions where accidents have occurred--and I read off those 32 accidents--are willing to go home and tell their constituents they are not willing to take every step to keep the nuclear stockpile safe?
Every Senator should carefully consider how many nuclear weapons are stored in his or her State before deciding that testing for safety is unnecessary.
As Senator Cohen so eloquently stated, an independent congressionally appointed panel, the Drell Panel, has recommended that the United States give greater emphasis to designs that would make nuclear weapons `as safe as practically achievable.' To develop such designs will require some further testing.
These safety improvements include the use of insensitive high explosives, that is, explosives that are virtually impossible to detonate in a great majority of violent accidents. Other safety improvements include electrical systems that incorporate enhanced nuclear detonation safety for a nuclear warhead. Such electrical systems would, for example, protect a weapon from the effects of spurious electrical signals such as lightning.
Without nuclear testing our confidence in our nuclear deterrent would erode with time. In the future, we will rely on only a small fraction of the nuclear systems that we had in the past. We cannot afford to allow one of these systems to become unsafe or unstable.
Currently, selected nuclear weapons are withdrawn at periodic intervals from the stockpile for examination. Unexpected deterioration in certain components of a warhead, or unforeseen conditions to which the warhead may have been exposed, can cause varying degrees of uncertainty about its performance.
For example, the warhead for the Polaris submarine ballistic missile
was discovered to have undergone some corrosion several years after its deployment. A nuclear test of the Polaris warhead showed that the corrosion was seriously affecting the warhead. This defect, if left uncorrected, would have caused a major portion of our sea-launched ballistic missile deterrent force to be inoperable and unsafe. This could only have been determined through nuclear testing.
In the future we will most likely have only one nuclear warhead for our sea-launched ballistic missiles. If problems occur with it--a very possible event--we will not have a reliable and safe submarine-based nuclear deterrent. One of the legs of the triad would, in effect, be crushed.
Acquisition regulations for nuclear survivable systems require that nuclear survivability must be demonstrated through a combination of underground testing and above-ground simulation. Potential downsizing of nuclear arsenals and military forces in the United States and the former Soviet Union does not negate the need for nuclear survivable systems.
In fact, it can be argued that the nuclear survivability of the remaining weapons systems in the United States will be more important, since we will have to do more with less. The Desert Storm experience should serve as a warning that future regional conflicts could involve nuclear-capable adversaries. What would have happened if Saddam Hussein had exploded a nuclear device over the battlefield? What would have happened to our tanks, aircraft, missiles, communications systems, and other systems? No one knows. We need to know.
We must be sure that every potential adversary knows we are prepared to survive attack. If deterrence is to work, U.S. forces must not present easy targets for preemptive attack in a crisis. Our retaliatory forces, as well as the warning sensors and command-and-control systems that alert and provide direction to them, must be capable of performing critical functions during and after exposure to nuclear effects.
The value of our deterrent is strongly dependent on being confident that our aircraft, our tanks,
as well as other military systems, will operate as designed. Nuclear testing is the only way to ensure that such confidence is achieved. Changes to existing military systems, such as guidance upgrades, safety modifications, and new fuzes, must be validated to ensure that they do not compromise the systems' survivability.
The United States must maintain its capabilities in nuclear weapons safety design. As long as nuclear weapons remain on the world scene, the United States needs to maintain a competent cadre of nuclear weapons scientists. The nuclear weapons business is a highly specialized and relatively small community. It we stop nuclear testing for 9 months, we will lose these experts, or a lot of them. If we decide after that time to begin testing again, or if 3 months from now when the Russian moratorium ends and they decide to start testing again, will we be ready? The answer is probably, no. The Third World proliferators are dedicating their best and brightest scientists to this pursuit. It is incumbent on the United States to maintain its nuclear expertise.
One of the arguments against further testing is that it is bad for the environment. When a nuclear device is exploded beneath the Nevada desert, the surrounding rock is vaporized and quickly cools to a glass-like substance. This vitrified rock very efficiently contains the radionuclides, preventing them from spreading. The radionuclides are locked into the crystals.
An Office of Technology Assessment [OTA] report called the Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions came to the conclusion that, since the accidental venting in 1970 during the Baneberry test, nuclear testing has been safe: `If the same person had been standing at the boundary of the Nevada test site in the area of maximum concentration of radioactivity for every test since 1970, that person's total exposure would be equivalent to 32 extra minutes of normal background exposure or the equivalent of 1/1,000 of a single chest x ray.'
If you were to walk across the Nevada test site today, you would pick up less radiation than if you walked through the city of New York.
With regard to ground water, the EPA has been sampling
ground water around the Nevada test site since 1972. To date, no radioactivity has been detected. The Nevada test site has an active ground water monitoring program called the hydrology and radionuclide migration program. This is a DOE Program with participants from Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories, as well as the Desert Research Institute and the U.S. Geological Survey.
Again, from the OTA report:
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No analysis of groundwater has ever found tritium [the most mobile of the radioactive material] at a distance greater than a few hundred meters from some of the old test sites. None of the water samples collected outside the boundary of the test site has ever had detectable levels of radioactivity attributable to the nuclear testing program. An independent test of water samples from around the test site was conducted by Citizen Alert at 14 locations. [Citizen Alert is an environmental community action group in Nevada.] Citizen Alert found no detectable levels of tritium or fission products in any of their samples.
The environmental vote today is a vote to continue testing for safety. It is a vote against the Hatfield amendment. Accidents involving the dispersal of radiation could be disastrous.
There are also those who say we should rely on computer modeling rather than actually exploding a nuclear device. Even tests done today using the most sophisticated computers available cannot accurately predict results. We still get plenty of surprises.
Of the 14 fiscal years 1991 and 1992 tests conducted to date, one had a yield nearly a factor of 10 below expected, two had primary yields half that expected, and one had a total yield about 16 percent below expected. You may say, `So what? They'll still do damage.' But that is not the point. All test predictions were based on experienced judgment, the best computers and models, and the best nonnuclear tests. All were wrong, which indicates we still have an incomplete understanding of how a nuclear device will work. Without nuclear testing, there will be little confidence in our calculations if future safety issues are raised.
Most of the progress we have made in the safety of nuclear warheads is a direct result of nuclear testing. Recently, computer calculations of several nuclear weapons systems suggested that the weapons did not meet their safety requirements. It was impossible to determined the accuracy of the new calculations without conducting nuclear tests that isolated the predicted deficiencies. Subsequent nuclear tests confirmed the basic validity of these new computer codes, and established new limits in our design capabilities.
Our history of nuclear warhead development makes it abundantly clear that computer calculations could hardly substitute for a nuclear test to confirm that a warhead has been safely designed. These tests provide us with the only means we have to guarantee that the nuclear stockpile remains safe.
Between 1958 and 1961, the United States entered into a nuclear test moratorium. Let us take a look at what happened as a result.
What happened is one of the most dangerous results of the 1958-61 moratorium was that designers, in the absence of test data, began to believe their own theoretical calculations. An example is the W52 warhead for the Sergeant missile. During the test moratorium, a fatal production accident prompted scientists to change the high explosives in the warhead. Based on calculations and many non-nuclear tests, the lab had high confidence in its change of high explosives. The weapon, therefore, was stockpiled with the new explosives.
The scientists were so confident in their calculations that they did not test the W52 for 2 years after the moratorium was over. When they finally did conduct a nuclear test, they discovered it was a dud--it did not work. Fortunately, as a result of nuclear testing, we were able to fix the problem. What if the W52 had continued to have a safety problem as we stockpiled it? Without a test, we do not know what would have happened.
When the test moratorium ended, it was very difficult to get started again. We had lost our scientists and our testing capabilities had degraded to an unacceptable level. When testing finally did resume, there were surprises with nearly every test. The last thing a captain of a submarine carrying nuclear weapons needs on board his boat is a surprise.
A test ban will reduce our ability to make safety upgrades, and we will lose our technical capabilities, including experienced designers and test site capabilities.
John Curran once said: `Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.' As long as the United States maintains a nuclear deterrent as a fundamental element of defense strategy, some amount of nuclear testing will be required.
I ask my colleagues, whether they are cosponsors of the Hatfield amendment or not, to not let politics rule reason.
This modified amendment is not a good amendment. It is fallacious. It does not solve the problems that it seeks to solve. And we will rue the day we do not test for safety of our nuclear arsenal.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? If not one yields time, time will be deducted proportionately.
The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, unless one of my other colleagues desire to speak at this point I would like to use 10 minutes of the time which is under my control, and that of Senator Reid, at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada [Mr. Bryan].
Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Chair. None of us today would fail to acknowledge that winds of change have blown across the international landscape; that relations between east and west are measurably better than they were just a few years ago; that the collapse of the Soviet Union and a step back from the nuclear Armageddon that gripped America for the past four decades, is welcome news. Men and women throughout the world have rejoiced in these developments and I think it is a propitious moment for us to look to the century ahead, that perhaps we can indeed embark upon a future which provides greater peace and security for all of our citizens.
We ought not in that moment of flush euphoria, let this excitement about these dramatic international events of just the past few years cloud our judgment and our decisions regarding the issue of continued nuclear testing.
As long as the United States maintains a nuclear stockpile, we need to assure the capability to test our remaining weapons, and we must continue those necessary tests.
The Nevada testing facility is a unique resource, and the Nation's investment in it must be protected even if the frequency of testing is reduced due to the smaller number of nuclear weapons in the stockpile and the absence of new warhead designs.
An appropriate level of testing needs to be maintained in order to upgrade our current weapons stockpile to the highest standards of safety, and to maintain confidence in the existing stockpile as the weapons age, and as weapons components are renewed and recycled.
The administration has modified American nuclear testing policy in response to the rapidly evolving international situation to which I have just alluded.
In a recent policy change, the Department of Defense stated that the United States will conduct only the minimum number of nuclear tests necessary to evaluate and improve the safety and reliability of our shrinking nuclear stockpile.
To limit testing beyond these parameters is not only unnecessary but irresponsible.
A nuclear weapon is not a static, inert commodity.
As weapons age, they need to be maintained and modified.
Nuclear components such as tritium need to be replenished.
As our stockpile shrinks and ages, some testing will be essential to assure both the safety and the reliability of the remaining weapons.
Indeed, it would be irresponsible to abandon our capability to test the stockpile as it ages.
Underground testing is the cornerstone of ensuring the safety of our aging nuclear weapons stockpile.
The Department of Defense has committed itself to making our nuclear weapons as safe as modern technology permits.
Mr. President, that ought to be the goal of all of us, to make sure that existing nuclear stockpile is as safe as modern technology permits. That cannot be achieved without continued testing.
An independent, congressionally appointed panel chaired by Dr. Sydney Drell also recommended that the United States should give a greater emphasis to nuclear weapons designs, that would make these weapons `as safe as practically achievable.' A moratorium directly threatens these important goals.
During the nuclear age, there have been several accidents involving nuclear weapons. The distinguished senior Senator from Louisiana has alluded to some of those. The distinguished senior Senator from New Mexico has alluded to others. The Senator from Maine, earlier this afternoon, mentioned others. And my distinguished senior colleague from Nevada, Senator Reid, has mentioned others.
They have ranged from ones that did not disperse nuclear material, such as the Titan missile accident in Damascus, AR, to a few accidents in which explosives in the weapons detonated, dispersing nuclear material but not resulting in a nuclear explosion.
Future safety needs and changing safety designs should not be foreclosed by a testing moratorium.
For instance, an important safety feature, the development of insensitive high explosives [IHE's], required a substantial number of nuclear tests in the 1970's.
Nuclear weapons equipped with insensitive high explosives have extra protection from potential chemical explosions, if the warhead were dropped or pierced.
Only through additional testing will all our nuclear weapons meet this safety standard.
Research is currently being conducted on nuclear warheads that can withstand the intense temperature of an aircraft fire.
A moratorium on nuclear testing would threaten this research, and seriously limit future safety upgrades.
As our stockpile of nuclear weapons is reduced, the reliability of each nuclear weapon becomes absolutely critical to an effective deterrence.
Only through testing can we have adequate assurance that our nuclear weapons will function as expected in a time of crisis.
Stockpile surveillance, above ground experiments, and modeling often uncover flaws that cannot be resolved without the use of a nuclear test.
Almost one-half of the nuclear weapons systems developed since 1970 have needed nuclear testing to correct or evaluate defects.
Clearly, a testing moratorium would seriously hamper our confidence in our nuclear weapons stockpile.
Some of America's greatest technological resources have been devoted to design, production, and testing of our nuclear weapons.
Personnel at the Nevada test site in my own State are a small community of highly specialized workers, with expertise found nowhere else in the world.
If a testing moratorium is enacted, many skilled researchers and testing technicians will leave the program, threatening the viability of this vital national resource.
New military systems in areas critical to American security such as surveillance and communications are
constantly being developed.
Nuclear testing is vital to ensuring the survivability of these systems.
Computer simulation techniques are continually being developed to limit the number of nuclear tests needed, but for the foreseeable future, simulation cannot replace the need for limited actual nuclear testing in this area.
Since 1958 the United States has deployed 41 different nuclear weapons systems.
Of these, 14 needed corrective modifications after they were ready for deployment.
These deficiencies were either discovered or corrective measures evaluated in subsequent nuclear tests.
Many may try to argue that our nuclear stockpile is safe enough.
However, safe enough is a dangerous concept when dealing with accidents involving nuclear weapons.
My senior colleague alluded to the W-79 warhead, a warhead that was believed to be unsafe. It went through a series of computer modelings and simulations, but only after testing at the Nevada test site was it determined that this nuclear artillery shell was indeed dangerous and could have detonated as a result of simply being dropped.
The tests that were used to confirm these results were conducted at the Nevada test site as part of the safety evaluation program.
Mr. President, this did not occur in the dawn of the nuclear age. This occurred just 4 years ago. I ask unanimous consent that an article in the Washington Post dated May 23, 1990, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
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In a series of secret moves, the U.S. government discovered--and is repairing--defective nuclear artillery shells that could have exploded accidentally while stored in Europe, and has started urgent studies of the designs of two other atomic warheads whose safety is suspect, according to senior U.S. officials and weapons scientists.
In the most serious incident, the government in 1988 belatedly discovered a defect in the W-79 short-range artillery shell after it had been deployed in Europe. Urgent orders were issued not to move the warheads, and repair teams hurried to the nuclear ammunition depots to disable the several hundred shells so they could not be accidentally detonated, the officials and scientists said.
The artillery shells, which are deployed in at least three West European countries and in U.S. stockpiles, are being modified so they will detonate only after being fired in battle, the officials said.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a separate nuclear weapons safety incident, last year secretly imposed special restrictions on the handling and deployment of a short-range missile carried by U.S. strategic aircraft in order to avoid accidental explosions that could disperse cancer-causing, radioactive plutonium from the missile warhead, these sources said.
The Department of Energy, in a third case, last week agreed to a secret congressional request for an independent scientific inquiry into the possibility that a nuclear warhead now being deployed aboard Trident strategic submarines could be detonated in a possible missile-handling accident in port, according to the sources.
The problems with the three weapons have raised serious questions on Capitol Hill and in the Bush administration about U.S. nuclear weapons safety. Some experts forecast that additional problems may be uncovered by special scientific inquiries at the nuclear weapons laboratories ordered recently by Secretary of Energy James D. Watkins.
The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for the design and production of all nuclear warheads. The Department of Defense (DOD) determines warhead requirements and develops the weapons on which the warheads are deployed.
Watkins, while declining to discuss difficulties with specific weapons, said in an interview this week that `we're not all that comfortable' with the government's past approach to several safety issues, and that `we need to focus a lot more' on measures to diminish the risk of accidentally dispersing plutonium in warheads.
Watkins also emphasized that when weapons safety problems are uncovered, `we take the operational steps necessary to minimize those risks, take the weapons out of service if necessary and then look for some mid-term and long-term fixes. We're in that process right now.'
He added in response to questions that `fortunately, we don't have many (weapons) that fall into that category, but I can tell you that we're serious about those things and we do what's necessary to make sure that we don't have any situation . . . where we can't meet our (safety) specifications.'
In contrast to the wide attention recently given to environmental and scientific problems of nuclear weapons production, safety questions about individual weapons have scarcely been scrutinized outside the tight-knit community of weapons designers and the defense officials to whom they answer.
Some high-level Bush administration officials say they believe that safety issues traditionally have had a much lower priority than military concerns such as increasing a nuclear weapon's explosive power, efficiency or reliability.
But Watkins, who says he came into office in 1989 with a `very significant sense of laxity in the safety practices of DOE,' has ordered what other officials say is the first comprehensive assessment of the probability of an accident involving any of the more than 20,000 nuclear warheads deployed with U.S. forces-around the globe.
No nuclear weapon ever has been known to detonate accidentally and produce a nuclear yield. However, there have been unexpected detonations of the volatile chemical explosives surrounding the nuclear materials in warheads, including several incidents that resulted in considerable radioactive contamination.
Officials say that Watkins's safety concern about the Short-Range Attack Missile-A, or SRAM-A, carried by strategic bombers led to establishment of a special committee on nuclear weapons safety last year that includes senior DOD and DOE officials.
Although it will report simultaneously to Watkins and Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, the two departments, in a conflict indicating diverging priorities on weapons issues, fought a heated battle over who would chair the committee. The dispute eventually was won by DOE.
`I felt it was necessary that we have a somewhat independent committee . . . that could stand off from military requirements, military demands and focus heavily on the safety issue,' Watkins said. `I just felt that conflict of interest ought to be separated out.'
The information about recent nuclear weapons safety problems in this article is derived from interviews with more than two dozen U.S. military and civilian officials and nuclear weapons scientists. None was willing to be quoted by name, because everything about the episodes is highly classified.
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Officials say the most dangerous and politically sensitive incident was the surprise discovery in early 1988 that W-79 artillery shells deployed in West Germany, Italy and the Netherlands could accidentally explode if they were struck forcefully at a sensitive spot, perhaps by a stray bullet or impact from a nearby battlefield explosion in wartime.
A single, elliptical reference to the problem appeared in an unclassified report issued by Watkins three months ago. The report mentioned that a warhead developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under DOE supervision, identified only as `WXX,' had recently caused `one-point safety concerns' that were confirmed by underground nuclear testing.
U.S. officials subsequently confirmed that the `WXX' was the W-79.
`Nobody was blase about it, but nobody was panicky either,' said a senior military official of the government's reaction. `We did not foresee an imminent catastrophe. But when it comes to nuclear safety, we treat everything as potentially serious.'
Computer calculations and underground tests before the start of production in 1981 had indicated no safety problems. But a new safety analysis at Livermore in 1988 raised concerns that were confirmed by secret underground nuclear tests in December 1988 and February 1989, officials said.
The tests indicated that the W-79 did not meet a secret government safety standard requiring that with any warhead design, under any circumstances, there be less than a one-in-a-million chance of an accidental nuclear explosion with a yield as powerful as a blast from about four pounds of TNT, enough to destroy a small room.
Several officials said an inadvertent explosion of the material surrounding the nuclear core was particularly likely to produce a nuclear yield if it occurred while the shells were loaded inside the 8-inch howitzers from which they are fired, an unusual circumstance in peacetime. But a senior military official said, `For a while, we were also worried that these things might go off if they fell off the back of a truck and landed in a certain way.'
The officials did not say how big an accidental explosion a W-79 shell might have caused. The warhead is designed to explode in battle with up to a 10-kiloton nuclear yield, about two-thirds the force of the 1945 Hiroshima bomb.
A highly-placed foreign official said that after the confirming nuclear test, a small group in the West German government was told in a general way that `there was a chance of technical failure leading to an explosion' of the shells and that `some adjustments' to their design were needed to prevent any accident.
Senior West German officials `were not informed explicitly' how an accidental nuclear blast might occur, the official said. `but I do not rule out that a more detailed briefing was given to specialists' in the German ministry of defense, he added.
Officials said the information was kept otherwise secret to avoid panicking citizens or calling into question the viability of the U.S. nuclear force in Europe, which includes dozens of nuclear-tipped missiles, more than 1,000 nuclear bombs and hundreds of older, nuclear-tipped artillery shells.
`It was obviously a politically hot potato,' a U.S. official said.
Another senior military official said the episode alarmed the Pentagon and induced tensions with DOE. `It was the sort of problem that never should have occurred,' the official said. `There simply was no good excuse for it.'
After ordering that all W-79 warheads be immobilized at their storage sites, the government sent teams of experts in early 1989 to install special `safing mechanisms' to block any detonation of the shells, several officials said.
Some of the warheads have been returned to the Pantex warhead production plant in Amarillo, Tex., so the `safing mechanisms' can be disabled and additional steel plating installed inside the skin of the shells at particularly sensitive spots.
Of the W-79 problem, Watkins said only, `Without any question, safety has been preserved.' Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams said last night that `the point is: the weapon is safe.' He added that `changes were made to the W-79, but I can't discuss the details of that.'
The shells are in special U.S. storage bunkers overseas and at the Seneca Army weapons depot in New York state, including some that are still inoperative. Asked why, a senior official said, `it has to do with politics within the (Western) alliance.'
But the Nuclear Weapons Council, three senior DOE and DOD officials who decide nuclear warhead production matters, was sufficiently concerned about the W-79 to decide early this year that its design would not be replicated in a slightly smaller artillery shell, the W-82.
`If one of these shells had a problem, then by definition the other one
would certainly have it, too, in terms of the basic physics,' one official said. `They basically have the same `primary', or nuclear core, he explained.
The decision forced at least a two-year suspension of W-82 production, which had been scheduled to begin last February. Several sources said the delay was partly at the urging of Congress, which voted secretly last year to block W-82 spending until the Bush administration certified that it was safe.
President Bush announced on May 3 that he wanted to halt the W-82 deployment program in response to the declining military threat in Eastern Europe. A senior U.S. military official said the design defects, which Bush did not mention, played no role in the decision.
Discovery of safety defect in the W-79 artillery shell prompted a more extensive review by the weapons laboratories of other warheads, which soon cast a shadow over the thermonuclear weapon now being deployed atop D-5 missiles in Trident submarines, the W-88.
Some U.S. weapons scientists have alleged, based on computer modeling of accident scenarios, that the W-88 could be detonated accidentally if the propellant fuel in D-5 missiles catches fire due to mishandling during loading operations at the Trident bases in Bangor, Wash., and Kings Bay, Ga.
A powerful nuclear blast or widespread dispersal of cancer-causing plutonium dust would result, these scientists say. They add that, in years past, the latter possibility has been taken so seriously that Livermore experts prepared maps of potential plutonium fallout over Spokane, Wash., near the Trident base at Bangor.
The allegations are the subject of a bitter scientific dispute at the highest levels of the Pentagon and DOE, according to some of the officials involved. The stakes are enormous, because the Trident missile system is expected to be at the heart of America's strategic deterrent force for the next three decades.
Although senior DOE and DOD officials say the risks are small, Watkins last week agreed to a secret, bipartisan congressional request that the issue be adjudicated by a special panel of three independent scientists cleared to review the nation's most sensitive nuclear weapons information.
Watkins said, `I have viewed all of the analysis, time and time again' on the W-88, as have the directors of the three U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories and I'm satisfied . . . that we can continue to do the analysis we have to do on that weapon without undue concern.' He said it now meets all nuclear explosive and weapons system safety standards.
At the same time, Watkins said that `had I been intimately involved in this process' during key deliberations in the early 1980s, `I would not have' made the decision to use the warhead's current design. `I don't think that kind of decision will ever be made again, and certainly won't be made while I'm here, and I believe with the kind of discussions that we've had with DOD it's not going to be made again.'
At issue is the use of volatile explosive materials in the W-88 warhead that scientists say would explode in a missile fire, producing forces that could compress the nuclear core in each bomb and begin a nuclear chain reaction. The Trident missile is considered particularly vulnerable to such an accident because its multiple warheads are arranged in a circle around the propellant fuel in the missile's third stage.
The warheads on most other U.S. ballistic missiles are arrayed on a platform that sits atop the final stage, allowing for the use of some form of insulating material to protect them from a missile fire.
Scientists at Livermore strongly protested the decision to use the volatile materials, but W-88 designers at Los Alamos National Laboratory said that using a less volatile material would not have substantially diminished the risk of an accident. The Navy also opposed the idea because the added weight of the alternate materials would have reduced the missiles' range or required the deployment of fewer warheads on each missile.
Watkins said he would have `accepted the very modest penalties' associated with using the less volatile materials. He said `a special task team' has been formed to `see what can be done' about W-88 modifications.
The congressional request for an independent inquiry was initiated by Rep. John M. Spratt Jr. (D-S.C.), who chairs the House Armed Services Committee's panel on DOE defense nuclear facilities. He was joined by Rep. Les Aspin (D Wis.), the House Armed Services Committee chairman; Rep. William L. Dickinson (Ala.), the committee's senior Republican; and Rep. Jon L. Kyl (Ariz.), the senior Republican on the committee's defense nuclear facilities panel.
Details of the Trident safety problem described in this article were not obtained from congressional sources.
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Watkins said that in early 1989 he told senior aides to ask the directors of the nation's three nuclear weapons laboratories whether they were `satisfied' with the agency's handling of safety issues. `The answer was no,' he said, and one lab director used the opportunity to raise strong concerns about a particular weapon that `needed to have some aggressive attention.'
Watkins declined to say what the weapon was, but officials at another agency identified it as the SRAM-A, a 1970s-vintage weapon carrying a warhead that uses the same volatile material as the W-88 Trident warhead. Roughly 14 feet in length, the weapon can be slung below the wings of B-52, B-1B or FB-111 bombers or carried in the internal bomb bay. `It's basically a fuel tank with wings,' one official said.
They said longstanding safety concerns about the weapons are partly based on an intense B-52 engine fire on the runway at Grand Forks, N.D., in September 1980 that injured a crewman and came close to causing an electrical short in the SRAM. The short might have caused the volatile material to explode, dispersing the plutonium in the weapon's core, several officials said.
Acting at Watkins's initiative, DOE officials sought to mention several safety problems involving the SRAM-A warhead in a routine report to Bush last year about the overall safety of the nuclear weapons stockpile. But DOD officials rebelled, causing submission of the report to the White House to be held up for more than three months, according to officials at both agencies.
Watkins said he used the dispute to win DOD's approval for a new weapons safety review committee under DOE's control. He also said the safety matters at issue were explained to Bush by national security adviser Brent Scowcroft with Cheney's concurrence.
`I would have just moved unilaterally (with Bush) had I not been satisfied that the thing was being well aired,' Watkins said. Other officials said Watkins and Cheney agreed on the need to control aircraft operations involving the SRAM-A tightly while further analysis is being done.
DOD spokesman Williams said `the Joint Staff did approve modifications to procedures involving the SRAM-A,' but declined to say what they were.
Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, incorporating the best available safety technology into our remaining weapons, including such features as insensitive high explosives and fire-resistant pits will require further testing.
Let me, in the few moments I have left, evaluate the amendment that the distinguished Senator from Oregon and a number of our colleagues have offered.
First, Mr. President, it is clear it provides for a 9-month temporary, as it is referred to, moratorium. The nuclear testing program is not like turning your lights off in the evening and then the next morning when you have occasion to need them to flip them back on. This very skilled group of professionals, not all of whom are nuclear physicists, many have technical skills that are absolutely essential to support this program, these people will be thrown into chaos and the program, in my judgment, will be compromised. These people will understandably need to move to find new employment for themselves and we will lose this vital testing resource.
The 1996 cutoff, as contemplated by the amendment also, Mr. President, seems to me to be particularly ill-advised.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has used 10 minutes. Any other Senator can yield additional time.
Mr. BRYAN. I yield myself an additional 3 minutes, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for the additional time.
Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, the 1996 cutoff seems to me particularly ill-advised because if our purpose is to impose leverage on those countries which either are or may embark upon nuclear testing, to impose a self-imposed restraint to me makes no sense in achieving that objective.
Let me invite my colleagues' attention to page 3, subparagraph f. Under the proposed amendment, a plan for installing--that is the test itself--the safety test, could only be conducted if the nuclear device did not have any safety feature. So the standard, Mr. President, would not be can we devise the safest possible techniques--and we basically today are talking about three such safety measures--but if a nuclear warhead had any one of the three, it could not be further tested to determine whether the additional devices could be added to it.
In terms of achieving the safest possible nuclear arsenal, it makes no sense at all to impose that type of a limitation on the program. As we know, there are three types of safety systems: The enhanced detonation safety system, the fire-resistant pit, and the insensitive high explosives. Even with the proposals advanced by the President, approximately two-thirds of our nuclear arsenal that will be in existence a decade from now in the year 2002 will not have all three of these safety systems provided as part of it. I should think it is in everybody's best interest that all three of these safety systems be added.
Moreover, Mr. President, I note that in defining what a modern safety feature is, the amendment would seem to limit us to the state of the art or the technology today. Perhaps next year or the year thereafter, or in a very short period of time, new safety procedures and devices will be discovered and those, too, ought to be added to the nuclear devices as part of the arsenal. It seems to me that the definition on page 7 of modern safety features may, indeed, limit the technology in terms of adding additional safety.
Mr. President, it seems to me that we share a common goal, and that is to have the safest nuclear arsenal possible. The amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Oregon, although well intentioned, it seems to me is counterproductive to that objective. I urge my colleagues to defeat the amendment, and I reserve the remainder of my time.
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Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the senior Senator from South Carolina desires 6 1/2 minutes. Senator Bryan and I yield 3 1/2 minutes to the Senator.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I yield 3 minutes of my time.
Mr. THURMOND. I think maybe I can finish in 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized for 6 1/2 minutes.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the current debate on nuclear testing is one of the most critical defense issues the Senate will consider this year. During the debate, the primary question that we should ask ourselves is: Do we want this Nation to have a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent force?
In his testimony before the Armed Services Committee on July 28, Secretary Cheney eloquently touched on the importance of nuclear testing. He stated:
Both the Congress and the Administration share the goal of assuring the safety of our nuclear stockpile. Continued nuclear testing is critical to this end. As both the Administration and respected experts have testified, continued testing is essential both for incorporating additional safety features into our weapons and for identifying, assessing, and correcting aging, safety, and other problems that may arise. There is simply no effective and reliable alternative to nuclear testing.
Mr. President, the Nation's nuclear testing program has changed significantly over the years. We have gone form a high of 96 tests in 1962 to a low of six in 1992.
The President's announced testing policy will further reduce that number. More importantly, however, it limits the purposes of these few tests to specific areas, namely: First, to evaluate and improve safety; second, to maintain reliability; and finally, to ensure that our forces can function despite possible exposure to nuclear effects.
Mr. President, regardless of how small our nuclear stockpile is--and let me add that I support the reductions agreed upon by President Yeltsin and President Bush--we must ensure that these weapons are safe and reliable. As the size of the stockpile and the number of weapons types decrease, it is also increasingly important to ensure that the remaining weapons meet their performance specifications and that our military forces--including satellites, communications systems, and weapons support systems--can function despite exposure to nuclear effects.
Despite the increased use of computers in weapons design and our scientists' knowledge of nuclear physics, we can never be sure how a nuclear device will function. For example, of the six tests conducted in fiscal year 1992, one produced a yield nearly a factor of 10 below that predicted.
Mr. President, we should also remember that we are constantly developing new combat systems. Unless these systems are tested in a nuclear environment, which is almost impossible to simulate, we may be sending our forces into combat with communications and weapons systems that cannot withstand exposure to a nuclear explosion--including one caused by a crude device developed by a Third World nation.
Mr. President, today we are faced with two options:
The Hatfield amendment, which allows 15 tests between July 1993 and September 1996 and then imposes a total ban on nuclear testing; and,
The Johnston position, endorsed by the committee, which permits safety testing provided the President certifies that it is in the national interest.
Mr. President, I am opposed to any absolute nuclear testing moratorium and will vote against the Hatfield, Mitchell, Exon
amendment. The 1996 total test ban will not guarantee the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty, nor will it guarantee the safety or reliability of our nuclear deterrent forces.
Mr. President, in closing, I want to urge my colleagues to vote against the Hatfield amendment. The nuclear arms race will not stop because we are not testing; it will end through negotiations. Meanwhile, the Nation must be assured that its aging nuclear weapons are safe and reliable in the hands of our forces.
I wish to thank the distinguished Senator for yielding me this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will the Chair notify me when there is 1 1/2 minutes remaining.
Mr. President, first of all, I commend Senator Hatfield, Senator Exon, and Senator Mitchell for again raising this issue in a way which I am very hopeful the majority of the Members of the Senate can support.
I ask unanimous consent to be a cosponsor of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the Berlin Wall is down. The Soviet Union has collapsed. The cold war is over. The time has come for the United States to halt nuclear testing.
We no longer need such tests, because we no longer need to develop more powerful or more accurate weapons to deter the Soviet Union. In the post-cold war world, the greater danger comes from the continuation of the arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
We need to take all the steps we can to reduce these basic threats to our future security.
The danger was demonstrated vividly 2 months ago, when China conducted its largest underground nuclear test ever. What right does the United States have to criticize China's test, when we insist on continuing our own tests? The best way to restrain China and other nations is to halt our own testing.
With the Nonproliferation Treaty up for renewal in 1995, it is crucial that we act now to ban nuclear testing. We have been preaching nonproliferation to other nations for years.
But the signers of the Nonproliferation Treaty deserve to know that we are prepared to practice what we preach or else our preaching will be to no avail.
Negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty is the single most effective step that the United States can take to halt the nuclear arms race and restrain the spread of nuclear weapons.
Until we end our own testing, other nations will have a credible `everybody does it' excuse to test their own nuclear weapons and defy international antiproliferation efforts.
Only six nations have ever admitted to testing nuclear devices--the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, and India. A handful of other countries are known to be at various stages in the development of nuclear weapons, but none of them has ever announced nuclear tests.
Time is critical. The end of the cold war gives us the opportunity to take an effective and immediate step toward halting the arms race. A worldwide ban on nuclear tests would create an additional barrier to any nation, including any terrorist nation, contemplating a nuclear capability,
but a worldwide ban can be achieved only if the United States leads the way.
The amendment before us establishes a logical step-by-step program to establish a permanent ban on nuclear weapons testing after a short moratorium and a handful of safety-related tests.
A mortatorium is needed to demonstrate a renewed U.S. commitment to seeking an end to nuclear testing. Russia and France have already announced moratoriums on nuclear testing through the end of the year. By joining this moratorium, the United States will give new momentum to the worldwide drive for a comprehensive test ban.
It is necessary for Congress to initiate this moratorium because the administration has not carried out its promises to begin negotiations to achieve a comprehensive test ban.
In 1986, President Reagan wrote to the Congress pledging to begin negotiation to limit and ultimately end nuclear testing, once the verification protocols to the two 1970's nuclear testing treaties were achieved and the treaties were ratified.
This commitment was made in exchange for an agreement by the House of Representatives to drop a provision in the 1987 Defense authorization bill that would have mandated negotiations of a comprehensive test ban.
In June 1990 President Bush and President Gorbachev signed the verification protocols to the two treaties--the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty--and the treaties went into effect in December 1990.
In testimony supporting ratification of these treaties, Ambassador Ronald Lehman, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, specifically restated the administration's commitment to a step-by-step process to limit and ultimately end nuclear testing.
At that time, he indicated that the delay in the start of these talks would not be lengthy--specifically that the delay would not be measured in years.
Despite this commitment, it has now been more than 2 years since the verification protocols were signed. Yet the negotiations on a CTB still have not begun.
In fact, the administration has simply ignored an amendment that Senator Simon and I sponsored on the 1992 Defense Authorization bill that directed the President to submit by February 1992 a report to Congress containing a proposed schedule for the negotiations and identifying the objectives.
Now it is up to Congress to take stronger measures. By enacting the pending amendment on nuclear testing, Congress can ensure that the administration initiates the long-promised negotiations for a comprehensive test ban.
Contrary to claims by the administration, a test ban will not undermine the reliability or the safety of our nuclear arsenal. Reliability is a concern that deals primarily with new weapons--warheads that are under development or have been recently introduced into the stockpile. But the United States has no new nuclear warheads in development.
The reliability of the existing weapons in the U.S. stockpile can be maintained without nuclear weapons tests. According to the conclusion of an independent review of nuclear stockpile issues by Lawrence Livermore physicist Dr. Ray Kidder:
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A high degree of confidence in the reliability of the existing stockpile is justified * * * in the absence of nuclear explosive tests.
This conclusion confirmed expert views previously expressed by Dr. Hans Bethe, Dr. Richard Garwin, Dr. Carons Mark, and Dr. Herbert York.
Nor are safety concerns an obstacle to a test ban. Pursuant to recent arms reduction initiatives, the accelerated retirement of older weapons has eliminated the least safe weapons designs.
With the remaining weapons in the stockpile, there are two types of safety concerns--avoiding an accidental nuclear detonation and averting any scattering of plutonium in the environment.
The first of these concerns--accidential detonation--can be resolved with safety tests with an explosive power equivalent to a few pounds or less of TNT. Such tests need not be limited under a comprehensive test ban, because they are extremely small and would be almost impossible to verify.
The second safety concern--avoiding the accidental release of plutonium--has already been addressed by installing modern safety and security features, such as insensitive high explosive and fire-resistant pits, on nuclear weapons.
It may be cost-effective to ensure that all of these features are incorporated on all nuclear warheads that will remain in the arsenal. But this would require only a handful of additional nuclear tests that could easily be accomplished before a CTB goes into effect.
The amendment thus specifically provides for a limited number of safety-related tests prior to negotiation of a CTB.
But, we must avoid allowing safety testing to be the Trojan horse that defeats a comprehensive test ban
for 40 years, the Department of Energy and the Pentagon have assured the American people that U.S. nuclear weapons are safe. But now that all other reasons for conducting nuclear tests have been swept away by the end of the cold war, they suddenly want us to believe that our most modern weapons are not safe.
It is like running the marathon in the Olympics only to find in the final stretch a few more miles have been added to the race.
The bottom line is that a comprehensive test ban is essential to sustain progress in nonproliferation efforts, and it will not make our nuclear stockpile less reliable or less safe.
Given the administration's refusal to begin the long-promised CTB negotiations, Congress must press the issue by enacting a moratorium in nuclear testing to match those of the Russians and the French by limiting future tests to the handful needed to make the last safety improvement to the nuclear arsenal.
The nuclear weapons policy of the United States must change with the changing world. Cold war levels of military spending full-speed ahead on star wars, too many B-2 bombers, vast numbers of United States troops in Europe to defend against a nonexistent Soviet threat--too often we continue to act like a nuclear-armed ostrich with its head still buried in the cold war sand.
The amendment before the Senate is an important step toward the change we know must come. I urge its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kerrey). The Senator from Oregon is recognized.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I want to modify my amendment in an effort to continually seek consensus and to develop the broadest possible base of support.
Senator Cohen of Maine had raised two questions on the floor during the earlier period of the debate. One was what would happen at the end of 1996 in which the current wording of the amendment would bring to a halt the testing, without equivocation, without any contingency. And so I have proposed, in order to meet the concern expressed by not only Senator Cohen but other persons, that we would add a provision allowing for resumption of United States testing after September 30, 1996, if Russia conducts a nuclear test after that date, at which time the prohibition on the United States nuclear testing is lifted.
I think that should go a ways at least, if not completely, to satisfy that issue.
Senator Cohen, also on page 5, line 7, spoke of the wording of the bill, the fact that nuclear warheads are not used in testing--`Only those nuclear explosive devices' in lieu of the word `warhead,' and instead of making it singular like `in which a modern safety feature,' we would make that plural in case we wanted more than one safety feature test.
So Mr. President, I send that modification on those two points of the amendment to the desk and ask for their adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the modification?
If not, without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment, as modified, is as follows:
On page 82, strike out line 19 and all that follows through page 83, line 5, and insert in lieu thereof the following:
Sec. 507. (a) Hereafter, funds made available by this Act or any other Act for fiscal year 1993 or for any other fiscal year may be available for conducting a test of a nuclear explosive device only if the conduct of that test is permitted in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b) No test of a nuclear weapon may be conducted before July 1, 1993.
(c) On and after July 1, 1993, a test of a nuclear weapon may be conducted--
(1) only if--
(A) the President has submitted the annual report required under subsection (d);
(B) 90 days have elapsed after the submittal of that report in accordance with that subsection; and
(C) Congress has not agreed to a joint resolution described in subsection (d)(3) within that 90-day period; and
(2) only if the test is conducted during the period covered by the report.
(d)(1) Not later than March 1 of each year beginning after 1992, the President shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives, in classified and unclassified forms, a report containing the following matters:
(A) A schedule for resumption of the Nuclear Testing Talks with Russia.
(B) A plan for achieving a multilateral comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons on or before September 30, 1996.
(C) An assessment of the number and type of nuclear warheads that will remain in the United States stockpile of active nuclear weapons on September 30, 1996.
(D) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 1992, an assessment of the number and type of nuclear warheads that will remain in the United States stockpile of nuclear weapons and that--
(i) will not be in the United States stockpile of active nuclear weapons;
(ii) will remain under the control of the Department of Defense; and
(iii) will not be transferred to the Department of Energy for dismantlement.
(E) A description of the safety features of each warhead that is covered by an assessment referred to in subparagraph (C) or (D).
(F) A plan for installing one or more modern safety features in each warhead identified in the assessment referred to in subparagraph (C) that does not have any such feature and, as determined after an analysis of the costs and benefits of installing such feature or features in the warhead, should have one or more of such features.
(G) An assessment of the number and type of nuclear weapon tests, not to exceed 5 tests in any period covered by an annual report under this paragraph and a total of 15 tests in the 4-fiscal year period beginning with fiscal year 1993, that are necessary in order to ensure the safety of each nuclear warhead in which one or more modern safety features are installed pursuant to the plan referred to in subparagraph (F).
(H) A schedule, in accordance with subparagraph (G), for conducting at the Nevada test site, each of the tests enumerated in the assessment pursuant to subparagraph (G).
(2) The first annual report shall cover the period beginning on the date on which a resumption of testing of nuclear weapons is permitted under subsection (c) and ending on September 30, 1994. Each annual report thereafter shall cover the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted.
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1), `joint eresolution' means only a joint resolution introduced after the date on which the Committees referred to in that paragraph receive the report required by that paragraph the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `The Congress disapproves the report of the President on nuclear weapons testing, dated .' (the blank space being appropriately in.).
(4) No report is required under this subsection after 1996.
(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), during a period covered by an annual report submitted pursuant to subsection (d), nuclear weapons may be tested only as follows:
(A) Only those nuclear explosive devices in which modern safety features have been installed pursuant to the plan referred to in subsection (d)(1)(F) may be tested.
(B) Only the number and types of tests specified in the report pursuant to subsection (d)(1)(G) may be conducted.
(2)(A) One test of the reliability of a nuclear weapon other than one referred to in paragraph (1)(A) may be conducted during any period covered by an annual report, but only if--
(i) within the first 60 days after the beginning of that period, the President certifies to Congress that it is vital to the national security interests of the United States to test the reliability of such a nuclear weapon; and
(ii) within the 60-day period beginning on the date that Congress receives the certification, Congress does not agree to a joint resolution described in subparagraph (B).
(B) For the purposes of subparagraph (A), `joint resolution' means only a joint resolution introduced after the date on which the Congress receives the certification referred to in that subparagraph the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `The Congress disapproves the testing of a nuclear weapon covered by the certification of the President dated ----------------.' (the blank space being appropriately filled in).
(3) The President may authorize the United Kingdom to conduct in the United States, within a period covered by an annual report, one test of a nuclear weapon if the President determines that it is in the national interests of the United States to do so. Such a test shall be considered as one of the tests within the maximum number of tests that the United States is permitted to conduct during that period under paragraph (1)(B).
(f) No underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted by the United States after September 30, 1996, unless Russia conducts a nuclear test after this date, at which time the prohibition on United States nuclear testing is lifted.
(g) In the computation of the 90-day period referred to in subsection (c)(1) and the 60-day period referred to in subsection (e)(2)(A)(ii), the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain shall be excluded.
(h) In this section, the term `modern safety feature' means any of the following features:
(1) An insensitive high explosive (IHE).
(2) Fire resistant pits (FRP).
(3) An enhanced detonation safety (ENDS) system.
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Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, could I inquire as to the remaining time I have in my control?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Sixteen minutes thirty-six seconds.
Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, may I inquire as to the amount of time under the control of the opponents?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-three minutes and thirty seconds.
The Chair modifies that. The Senator has 11 1/2 minutes remaining.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time elapsing now be charged against Senator Johnston and Senator Bryan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. BRYAN. Will the Chair restate the proposal?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon asked the time to be charged against the Senator from Nevada and the Senator from Louisiana.
Mr. BRYAN. I object.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, as a substitute unanimous consent, I ask that it be charged equally.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the unanimous-consent agreement for the full bill reserves time for the distinguished Senator from North Dakota, and I now have an amendment which can obviate the need to consider that amendment.
So, while we have a little down time here, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order to present an amendment dealing with the North Dakota project which is called the Garrison diversion project.
I ask unanimous consent that it be in order for me at this time to offer and consider an amendment, and that it be taken out of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Johnston], for Mr. Burdick, proposes an amendment numbered 2834.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 52, after line 15, add the following:
`Sec. . Utilizing processes required under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Secretary of the Interior is directed to conduct a formal analysis, by no later than March 31, 1994, of alternatives for the design, construction, and operation of the Sykeston Canal as a functional replacement for Lonetree Reservoir, pursuant to section 8(a)(1) of Public Law 89-108, as amended by the Garrison Diversion Reformulation Act of 1986, Public Law 99-294. The resulting Definite Plan Report/Environmental Impact Statement shall be utilized by the Secretary for the development of a Record of Decision which is to contain the Secretary's recommendation for proceeding with the final design and construction of the Sykeston Canal, consistent with the provisions of the Garrison Diversion Reformulation Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, and the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. For purposes of this section, the Secretary shall take into account the results of studies conducted by the Secretary of the Army with respect to the stabilization of Devils Lake, North Dakota.'.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, this is a very highly contentious subject, a subject of the Garrison Diversion Dam project. But this particular amendment had been worked out after a long time of negotiation between Senator Burdick and environmental organizations, the Canadians, and others. And it will obviate the necessity of having to consider the Conrad amendment.
So I ask that we adopt it at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 2834) was agreed to.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.
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Mr. HATFIELD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unanimous-consent agreement governing this bill now delete the necessity for the amendment from Senator Conrad.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, as under the previous agreement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Illinois 4 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.
Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I am pleased to rise in support of the amendment offered by my colleague from Oregon. I think it is extremely important that we move in a responsible way here.
On the fiscal year 1992 defense authorization bill, I introduced an amendment cosponsored by Senators Pell and Kennedy that called for a return to the nuclear testing talks, a report detailing the goal for these talks, and a schedule for resuming the negotiations. They were to report in February.
In March, Senator Gore asked Robert Barker, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, about the report required by my amendment, and Mr. Barker said that the administration could not see `a next step which does not have adverse security implications.'
I think it is very clear that there are security implications from escalating, testing, and continued arms multiplication. And I also believe there is a moral factor here. It is very difficult for the United States to say to other countries: You cannot be testing; you should not be testing. And then they say to us: Why are you testing?
That puts us in a very untenable situation. In 1987, Dr. Ray Kidder, a nuclear weapons scientist at the Lawrence Livermore lab, one of the two national nuclear weapons labs, reported in an unclassified report:
A detailed review of the problems encountered with the 14 weapon designs since 1958 that have been frequently and prominently cited as evidence that a low threshold or comprehensive test ban would preclude the possibility of maintaining a reliable stockpile shows that this experience has little, if any, relevance to the question of maintaining the reliability of the stockpile of nuclear weapons that exists in 1987.
Just recently, he was asked by the Foreign Relations Committee whether that is still valid. He said:
The conclusion stated is no less valid today than it was 5 years ago in 1987
Why go testing if other nations are not testing? It is very difficult to come up with any reason for doing it. We have had testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee that China, which is the only other nation testing right now, would be willing to stop testing if we did.
Maybe that is not valid. But let us try this moratorium. Let us see if we can build a safer world for our children in generations to come.
Next, I believe that there are environmental factors here, even with underground testing. This is pure instinct. I am not a scientist. I am not an environmental scientist, as everybody knows. I have very little scientific knowledge. But my instinct tells me that there are environmental hazards that we do not know about here.
We do know one thing. When you have underground tests--and I respect my colleagues from Nevada, who are trying to protect some jobs in Nevada out there, but there are environmental factors for Nevada that have to be considered also; and one is that when you have these tests, there is a huge residue of nuclear radiation.
Second, while there is no evidence at this point that these huge explosions underground cause any damage elsewhere, my instinct tells me that for every cause, there is an effect; and that somewhere, some damage is taking place--maybe earthquakes elsewhere; I do not know. But I think the fact that we cannot prove environmental damage at this point should not lead us to conclude that there is no environmental damage.
Finally, we have to make priorities here. I see the Senator from Oregon here, and I see the Senator from Louisiana here. Both of them serve on the Appropriations Committee. At the request of the administration, we are going to spend $500 million this next fiscal year on nuclear tests; $500 million happens to be what we spend in education and health care for American Indians in a year. What if we spend $250 million on Indian education and health care, and another $250 million to reduce the deficit. Would we be a better country, a more secure country? I believe we would.
I believe the Hatfield amendment should be adopted.
I yield the floor.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, How much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 16 minutes, 56 seconds.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. President, I am very skeptical about this amendment. Let me make the basis of my skepticism clear at this point.
The basic difference between the underlying appropriations language, which prohibits all tests except for safety, in the language of the Senate from Oregon, is that he has a 9-month moratorium where no tests for any purpose may take place. And, thereafter, reports are submitted, which I think are a good idea. And some tests, which are limited--I think none--over a period of 3 years, are permitted for safety, and I believe one for reliability.
So the basic difference between the underlying appropriations language and the language of the Senator from Oregon is in the number of tests. He tells me it is 15 tests in 3 years, 5 per year: 1 for reliability; 1 for the British--and in any event, theirs is limited--and there is a 9-month moratorium.
In one sense, it is not a huge difference. But it is very clear. Every single expert and every single participant in this debate agrees, and says we need tests for safety. I made the case earlier about how dire that need for safety is; about how populations are threatened by possible explosions of nuclear bombs and warheads. I think everyone agrees to that.
If that is so, the question is: Why do we have a 9-month moratorium? There are, as I understand it, three tests planned for safety--one per quarter in the next three quarters--which would be affected by that. That is the information given to me by the White House. I could be wrong.
But if we have three tests for safety planned--one a quarter in the next three quarters during this period of time--why should we cancel those tests? Keep in mind that the budget provides, I believe, $475 million. I think the budget request was $475 million. Our bill provides $383 million. Obviously, this is considered by all to be a high priority.
Why do we pay $383 million for only one quarter of testing? You say: We ought to be able to save three-quarters of that $383 million. You cannot do it, Mr. President. In effect, what you have to do is have all of these employees out there in Nevada waiting for 9 months--maybe they can do some paper reports, or whatever before their first test is eligible to be done in the last quarter.
It seems to me that if safety is important, as I think it is, we ought to do it sooner rather than later, and we should not, in effect, waste three-quarters of the $383 million budget.
With respect to the moratorium in 1996, we simply do not have a basis to determine that. Everyone wants a nonproliferation treaty, I think. The Soviet Union surely is not the problem there. We are not trying to talk Boris Yeltsin into being less hostile to us.
The nations we are worried about with nonproliferation are those that are not likely to be affected, certainly, by the difference between the amendment of the Senator from Oregon and the underlying appropriations amendment.
For example, we do not want Pakistan to test. Are they going to say, well, you cannot test for the first 9 months and therefore we can sign a proliferation treaty? It seems to me they are not going to be affected by that. That is true as to the People's Republic of China or other countries that we are really concerned about.
If you are trying to talk people into a nuclear moratorium, it is not going to be affected by a 9-month delay or, indeed, by a 1996 final moratorium.
So, Mr. President, I very much appreciate the efforts of the Senator from Oregon in ameliorating the harsh effects of the total House moratorium and the effects of the amendment which he originally proposed. This is clearly better than that in the eyes of those of us who think that testing for safety is very vital. But I am very skeptical about why we have the 9-month moratorium.
Mr. President, there are a huge number of unanswered questions posed by this amendment. It is not my inclination at this time, even though I have a great deal of skepticism about this, to make an active opposition to the amendment. I say that because the distinguished Senator from Nebraska who is head of the Armed Services Subcommittee on this matter, and the distinguished Senator from Michigan, who is a member of the Armed Services Committee, are cosponsors of this amendment.
I am inclined to be benign in my approach to this so that we may take this to conference, get the views of the administration, determine what the precise nature is of the three tests to be conducted in the next three quarters, and determine whether there is a meeting of the minds as to whether those three tests are important. I think we may
well find out that the three tests would pass muster in the judgment of anyone as needing to be tested or, on the other hand, the administration may tell us that they can delay for 9 months and that that delay would do no harm to the program.
We have been trying to talk to the representatives of the White House in the few hours since this amendment has been pending and the answers we get from them are not definitive because it takes time to secure this information.
So, my inclination is at this point, Mr. President, to, in effect, take this to conference, not with a view to dropping it in conference, but with a view to finding out the answers to these questions, and in the meantime, working in good faith for those on both sides of this question, including the White House, to determine what we may prudently do in going in the direction of a moratorium. Indeed, the appropriations language went in the direction of a moratorium, more moratorium on everything but safety, and yet at the same time, preserve our flexibility for safety.
Mr. President, I see the distinguished Senator from Georgia is just coming in and the distinguished Senator from Maine is here. I wonder what the attitude of the Senator from Maine would be toward taking this matter to conference and working on these issues in the meantime.
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Mr. COHEN. The Senator from Maine will yield to find out what the chairman of the Armed Services Committee thinks about this going to conference. I did want to take a couple minutes to address several questions to the Senator from Oregon, but I would do that on the time of the Senator from Nevada if he would like.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
The Senator from Maine.
Mr. BRYAN. I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Maine from time under my control.
Before yielding, if I might inquire and ask my friend and colleague, the Senator from Louisiana, one additional question with respect to this analysis of this amendment.
The Senator from Nevada would like to ask the Senator from Louisiana one additional question.
I agree with his analysis of the amendment and where he believes it is flawed. But I find one additional concern. I do not know whether the Senator shares that view as well. That is at page 3, subparagraph (F) of the amendment offered by Senator Hatfield. I view that language from lines 16 to 22 as a limitation of the type of weapon that can be tested.
It would seem to me that is an abandonment or a retreat from developing the safest possible nuclear arsenal, one that would include all three of the modern safety features defined on page 7, namely, the sensitive high explosive, the fire-resistant pits, and the enhanced detonation safety system.
If I am reading that language correctly, the test plan could only contemplate test with respect to a weapons system that had no such feature. And if that is true, it seems to me that that is clearly not the kind of policy that we ought to pursue. I think he would agree with me that we ought to have the safest possible arsenal.
I would inquire of my friend as to whether he reads the language as I do.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I think the Senator points out what could be an ambiguity. That is one of the problems with trying to legislate on a very complicated issue with a floor amendment, and we must, of necessity, do that all the time. I know the Senator from Oregon has been working very diligently to bring the parties together on this matter.
Nevertheless, the meaning of that language in subparagraph (F) of page 3 is not entirely clear. I mean, it seems to talk about a plan. The President shall submit to the committee a report containing the following matters and then `A plan for installing one or more,' and so forth.
The question is, is this something the President submits as a report, or is this a limitation on what the Nation may do?
It is not entirely clear at all to me, and the actual effect upon weapons in the inventory upon the safety devices that they may contain, is also not very clear. That is why I think my attitude at this point at least--and I wanted to hear from the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee--is to, at this point, say let us take it to conference with a view to going over this language very carefully, to resolving the ambiguities, to maximizing safety, keeping in mind that everybody that I know anything about, wants more safety in our weapons as soon as we can get it and to determine, in light of that, whether or not this language matches up to those things and to modify it in such a way that it does match up to those requirements.
I am quite sure that this language ought to be very carefully studied to see if we can improve it.
Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Senator for his response. I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. I thank the Senator for yielding.
Let me respond quickly to the Senator from Louisiana. I think in view of the complexity of the amendment, it continues to evolve in these waning moments that the more appropriate course of conduct for us would be to defer the matter until next week when the Senate Armed Services Committee brings the DOD authorization bill to the floor. That way, at least, we would have a better grasp of the nuances involved. That would be my preference.
The Senator from Georgia has just arrived. He is in the cloakroom negotiating with the Senator from Oregon. Perhaps we will hear his opinion on this.
Mr. JOHNSTON. If the Senator will yield, we had to deal with the moratorium in the House bill.
Mr. COHEN. I understand. In terms of coming to grips with the issues, I think it would be preferable from my perspective to deal with this issue next week after having a chance to go through this.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I understand the Senator.
Mr. COHEN. Then, I say, second, the Senator from Illinois, who was briefly on the floor, indicated $500 million was going to be spent for safety tests that could be spent for education.
It struck me to be something of an irony. The Senator from Illinois may recall that there was a minor accident in the city of Chicago. As I recall, some local engineer apparently penetrated one of the underground tunnels in the water system and suddenly we had a major flood in Chicago which cost the Federal taxpayer millions of dollars to help rectify.
We have the experts saying that one nuclear accident of the magnitude of Chernobyl would take at least a half billion dollars, $500 million. We are going to have several thousand nuclear weapons in our arsenal for the foreseeable future. All we need is one catastrophe, and that eats up that $500 million.
I want to emphasize to my colleagues not to dismiss the notion of safety or deride how much money is being spent. As long as we have nuclear weapons, we have to spend the money to make sure they are safe, in order to protect the American people.
There is a third point I would like to raise--and he is not here now, but let me just raise it for the Record.
Under the amendment by the Senator from Oregon, under subsection (F) regarding the cutoff date of 1996, there is now an exception or exemption in the event that Russia resumes testing. It would seem to me a more comprehensive statement has to be given here. It should read that we cannot test after that point unless the President certifies to the Congress that another country has conducted a nuclear test, and that such test is inimical to the security interests of the United States, or threatens the nonproliferation objectives of the United States, or unless the President certifies that additional nuclear explosive testing is required in order to install a modern safety feature in the weapons cited in subparagraph (d)(1)(c).
Could I have 1 additional minute?
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Mr. JOHNSTON. I yield 1 minute to the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 1 additional minute.
Mr. COHEN. I thank the Senator for yielding me the 1 additional minute.
In addition, as I pointed out in my earlier remarks, the way in which the Senator from Oregon's amendment is constructed, all three safety devices could be precluded from being installed in these weapon systems. The way it is written, it would allow no further testing to add safety features to a weapon if it has one such safety system already.
There have been changes made by the Senator from Oregon, but they still leave a good deal of ambiguity. And I think one way to fix that is on page 3, lines 17 to 19, we should strike the words `that does not have any such feature.' Deleting those words in lines 17 and 19 would make it clearer that in the weapons systems that we retain we want all three safety features that have been identified by the Drell Panel to be included.
Let me just reiterate my own feeling on this Mr. President. I believe that we need additional time in which to refine the amendment of the Senator from Oregon. I hope that we can achieve some kind of a compromise by the time the Armed Services Committee comes to the floor with the DOD authorization bill.
I know the Senator from Louisiana is compelled to go forward with some response, in view of the House's action. I think a better solution for us would be to take a bit more time to develop this.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I would point out that our bill does not deal with permanent legislation. It simply states no testing except for safety this year. That is what we ought to do on this appropriation bill, deal with this year and not permanent legislation, and let you all deal with permanent legislation when your bill comes up.
Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from New Mexico.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair and I thank Senator Johnston.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article in the Washington Times on July 31, written by Paul Nitze and Siegfried Hecker, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
The issue of nuclear testing is once again being brought into the public spotlight with the U.S. Senate set to consider a moratorium on all such tests.
The need for nuclear testing remains controversial and not well understood, especially since the end of the Cold War. In the eyes of many people, nuclear testing is a powerful symbol of the evil of nuclear weapons. Since testing is often associated with the development of increasingly destructive bombs, a halt in testing is associated with a safer and better world.
However, from our combined experiences in arms control, as well as maintenance of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, we see a different side.
As if any other high-technology venture, testing is imperative to ensure safety and reliability. Underground nuclear testing offers the only opportunity to conduct realistic, relevant experiments that help to ensure the safety, security and reliability of nuclear weapons. Such experiments help preserve the competence and judgment of the scientists and engineers who must maintain our remaining nuclear arsenals, who will help dismantle weapons and whose skills will be required in case of accidental damage to a weapon or to evaluate or disable a terrorist bomb.
Arguments about preserving technical competence are not politically fashionable. But the tragic accidents of the Challenger, Chernobyl and Bhopal are stark reminders of inadequate testing and questionable technical judgment. Why give up nuclear tests when the consequences of a nuclear-weapons accident overshadow those of any other technology on Earth?
The fact that the arms race with the former Soviet Union is over does not alter the necessity of testing. Indeed, the decision by Russian President Boris Yeltsin at the recent U.S.-Russia summit to no longer seek parity when the two arsenals are dramatically reduced by the end of the decade reinforces the nuclear deterrent role of the United States as the global guarantor of peace.
That role makes the safety and reliability of U.S. weapons even more important. At the same time, Mr. Yeltsin's decision makes the notion that testing drives the arms race or upsets strategic stability as obsolete as the Cold War itself.
The end of the Cold War will speed up removal of some of the older weapons, those with few modern safety features. However, there will be a tendency to leave weapons in the stockpile still not fully modernized in safety terms.
Since it is now less important (because of less reliance on strategic missiles) to pack more explosive power into smaller packages, weapons designers can make weapons safer to prevent the unlikely event of an accident, or to make them more tamper-proof against terrorists. They may also be able to build them with greater longevity so they last for 50 years. But such weapons cannot be developed without nuclear testing.
Some nations such as Mexico have objected to U.S. nuclear testing in conjunction with the Non-Proliferation Treaty discussions. Their objections are obsolete now that the arms race with the former Soviet Union is over and the principal purpose of U.S. nuclear tests is to ensure the safety, security and reliability of weapons.
Realistically, the post-Cold War peace should not lure us into adopting some notion of the `end of history' and the end of conflict or threats in our national security strategy. U.S. nuclear weapons provide a hedge against the possible resurgence of a nuclear threat from Russia or other successor states to the former Soviet Union, which will retain thousands of strategic and tactical nuclear warheads. It is also important for the sake of international tranquility that neither Germany nor Japan are tempted to develop their own nuclear forces for self-protection--a temptation which might arise were the United States to withdraw its nuclear umbrella.
Further, U.S. nuclear weapons are needed to dissuade rogue leaders from using weapons of mass destruction and to prevent nuclear blackmail.
In the post-Cold War era, a smaller but safe and reliable U.S. nuclear arsenal will serve to discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The nuclear ambitions of countries such as Iraq, Libya and Algeria are not driven by the U.S. arsenal, nor the fact that we test, but by strong political motives or regional security concerns.
As long as U.S. security interests are served by nuclear weapons, we should ensure their safety, security and reliability as well as maintain a competent scientific work force to oversee them. A small number of tests will be necessary to serve these continuing needs. As a matter of fact, the number of tests in recent years has already declined sharply to only six this year.
That seems a very small price to pay if it helps ensure that the end of the Cold War does indeed result in a safer world.
(Paul H. Nitze served as U.S. ambassador to Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty negotiations and as a special adviser to President Reagan on arms-control matters. Siegfried S. Hecker is director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which, along with the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in California, is responsible for the design and testing of all weapons in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.)
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I am going to read one paragraph of it, which I think summarizes what the good Senator from Maine has said and what Senator Johnston has been saying:
Arguments about preserving technical competence are not politically fashionable. But the tragic accidents of the Challenger, Chernobyl and Bhopal, are stark reminders of inadequate testing and questionable technical judgments. Why give up nuclear tests when the consequences of a nuclear-weapons accident overshadow those of any other technology on Earth?
I think that is the issue. And frankly, as we have been trying to say, why should we fashion, over the last 72 hours from a 1-year moratorium which Senator Hatfield had in mind--we had a 1-year moratorium except for safety--why should we fashion a permanent 5-year program on testing with specific numbers of tests when we already know that we need to upgrade a number of weapons in our arsenal? And clearly you cannot upgrade them as to safety on the tests provided in this long-term so-called complete testing program that is now offered on an appropriations bill.
I believe we ought to either table that or reduce it to a 1-year event and get on with letting the Armed Services Committee draw up legislation for the long-term needs in nuclear testing.
I thank the Senator for yielding and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
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Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, how much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Seven minutes, seventeen seconds for the Senator from Oregon; 4 minutes and 25 seconds for the Senator from Louisiana, and 1 minute for the Senators from Nevada.
Mr. JOHNSTON. One minute for the Senators from Nevada, 4 minutes for the Senator from Louisiana, and 7 minutes to the Senator from Oregon?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. HATFIELD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I do ask to modify my amendment on page 3. There has been a question raised as to the number of tests that might be made relating to numbers of safety features. And on page 3, line 18, following the capital C, cross out the words `that does not have any such feature and', delete those words, so then I think it would clarify that objection. I so modify my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, the amendment is so modified.
The amendment (No. 2833), as further modified, is as follows:
(F) A plan for installing one or more modern safety features in each warhead identified in the assessment referred to in subparagraph (C), as determined after an analysis of the costs and benefits of installing such feature or features in the warhead, should have one or more of such features.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I rise today to lend my strong support to the Hatfield amendment currently under consideration. A 9-month moratorium is the appropriate reply to the Russian moratorium. A plan to achieve a multilateral comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons before September 30, 1996, provides the necessary response to our new opportunities for peace.
Every American President from Eisenhower until Reagan supported the ultimate objective of a comprehensive test ban. The Reagan administration, though, in its frenzied arms buildup, abandoned this objective in the short term. Instead, it declared that `for the foreseeable future, nuclear testing will continue to be indispensible to our security.'
The future has finally rounded beyond the foreseeable circumstances of the Reagan era. Events no one could have predicted just 10 years ago confounded and inspired us all. The cold war is over. The Soviet Union has disintegrated. The race to develop the most modern strategic nuclear weapons has ended, and we have won.
The Soviets declared two unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing in the last 5 years. In 1986, Soviet President Gorbachev halted nuclear testing for 18 months. On October 5, 1991, Mr. Gorbachev again initiated a 12 month moratorium on testing in the U.S.S.R. He challenged the United States to join in pursuing the complete cessation of all nuclear tests.
President Yeltsin of Russia has upheld that ban. President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan has also issued a call for peace. He closed down the nuclear reactor in Semipalatinsk, and encouraged the United States to join the comprehensive test ban.
France, too, declared a moratorium on testing in April of this year.
The United States, however, continues to test as if this were 1982, and the Soviet Union and the United States were still trapped in the deadly race to develop new and improved warheads every 6 months. This is a cold war mentality. Testing is a step toward intensifying proliferation. Today, we are making great efforts to curb proliferation. In fact, we are creating no new weapons. We are downsizing our military. We are taking our missiles off alert. We no longer need to threaten our enemy with repeated nuclear tests to demonstrate we are ready to do nuclear battle at any moment.
The administration argues that the United States must test in order to maintain our strategic deterrent. Mr. President, the fact that our arsenal is loaded with hundreds of nuclear missiles is a deterrent in itself.
Take the Persian Gulf war as an example. Israel has never tested or even confirmed that it possesses a nuclear bomb. Throughout the Persian Gulf war, Sadaam Hussein threatened to attack Israel with chemical weapons. But, as we all now know, he has used chemical gas only on the Kurds in Iraq; he never lobbed any chemical missiles against Israel. I believe that the threat that Israel would retaliate with a nuclear attack--a threat never tested in an underground cavern--deterred him. I believe that Syria and Iran, two more of Israel's historic enemies, have been deterred by Israel's potential nuclear capability.
The administration has also claimed it must test for safety, reliability, and survivability of our nuclear stockpile. But Dr. Robert Barker, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, testified before the House Armed Services Committee in March 1992, that the Air Force and the Navy, in conjunction with the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, reviewed the safety of the ballistic missiles which carry the nuclear warheads. They concluded that no changes were needed for safety reasons.
If we don't need to change anything for safety reasons, then we don't need to test for safety reasons.
Mr. President, most of the brightest and experienced weapons designers in this country advocate a test ban. Two weeks ago at a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rear Adm. Eugene J. Carroll of the Center for Defense Information; Dr. Ray Kidder of the Lawrence-Livermore Laboratory in California; and Dr. Frank Von Hippel of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs at Princeton University all testified that the United States possesses the best tested weapons in the world.
Rear Admiral Carroll reported that in safety that, nuclear material could not be detonated. Moreover, many of the warheads deemed unsafe will be retired under recent arms control agreements. Furthermore, as our weapons are placed off alert status, the risk of accident is greatly reduced, as is the consequential need for safety improvements.
Our thinking on arms control should be fundamentally different today than it was 5 years ago. The debate on a moratorium should no longer revolve around whether the United States will test six times a year, three times a year, or halt completely for all of 1 year. Rather, this is our chance to consider how a moratorium can serve the strategic, long-term American global aims.
While I compliment President Bush and Secretary of State Baker on their successful negotiations with Russia, Kazakhstan, Byelarus, and Ukraine on the START Treaty, its protocols, and the upcoming so-called START II Treaty, I am wondering how much further this administration is willing to go in the pursuit of peace. We have a window of opportunity today to restructure the world's security balance. Quite frankly, merely reducing the number of tests, is, at this point in history, a rather paltry and unimaginative offering.
I want to address the compelling reasons for why we should pursue, at the very least, a 9-month moratorium on nuclear testing.
A moratorium on testing by the United States would shift the concerns about nuclear proliferation in a more constructive direction. It would allow us to take the time to evaluate the purpose of testing in the new world.
At the same time, it would demonstrate our sincere effort to reduce global nuclear arsenals to the minimal necessary level of post-cold-war nuclear deterrence, and underscore our commitment to containing nuclear proliferation.
It would lend credibility to negotiations on a long-term extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which expires in 1995.
It would signal U.S. cooperation toward advancing negotiations on the comprehensive test ban treaty we have thus far only dreamed of.
It would strengthen the positions of reformers in the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union, such as Boris Yeltsin, who are struggling to turn their nations' focus from military defense to domestic restructuring.
A halt to nuclear testing would also reduce the environmental damage created by the uncontrolled high-level radioactive waste which tests produce.
And it would save American taxpayers just under half a billion dollars in fiscal year 1993 alone.
The United States House of Representatives passed a resolution by a margin of 236 to 167 calling for a 1-year United States testing moratorium, conditional on the continuation of the Russian moratorium. Fifty-two Senators have cosponsored S. 2064, which does the same. Thirty-two Nobel laureates, including Hans Bethe and Kenneth Arrow, as well as several of the most sophisticated and experienced weapons designers, have given their full support to the prompt cessation of nuclear weapons testing.
Mr. President, eventually, either every nation will stop testing, or no nation will. If the United States doesn't stop, no one else will either.
I urge my colleagues to make a sensible investment in peace. Support a short-term moratorium on nuclear testing. Support efforts to conclude a comprehensive test ban by 1996. It will give us an opportunity to reevaluate the advantages of testing, while at the same time witness the benefits of a moratorium. What do we have to lose?
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Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Cranston be added as an original cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, how much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon has 5 minutes, 25 seconds, the Senator from Louisiana has 4 minutes, and the Senator from Nevada has 1 minute.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I think we can wind this matter up with the few moments we have left. Let me just reiterate that the amendment which we have presented here today, the so-called Hatfield-Mitchell-Exon amendment, allows for safety testing after 9 months moratorium in order that the United States may pursue any changes necessary to include safety features in our arsenal.
Bear in mind, again, that there is no stated administration definitive position except the March 2, 1992, statement made by the Assistant Secretary of Defense before the House authorization committee.
Whatever the administration may have fed into the debate this afternoon, I still go back to that one point of reference. Again, I want to remind this body that our arsenal is safer than ever before, and every weapon in the arsenal has been tested with an A, B, C, D, E, F test judgment or measurement. Most of them averaged out A, B, or C, with C having the largest number.
Remember this, that some of these matters that have been raised today about possible accidents--again, I emphasized our arsenal is not constantly deployed on planes and ships and therefore we have another safety factor.
The science of this issue is complex, but the task before the Senate today is complex. This amendment requires the most comprehensive evaluation ever requested, to my knowledge, of the administration. The 9-month pause not only provides for urgent response to Boris Yeltsin's moratorium and the action of the French, but also support for this amendment's adoption comes from the most prominent people in our scientific community, six scientists who worked on the Manhattan project, who now believe a moratorium is vital, and 30 Nobel laureates who seek passage of a moratorium, and other groups such as the Federation of American Scientists, Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Union of Concerned Scientists.
Given these considerations, I urge the Senate not to lose this historic opportunity. This amendment offers cooperation between a great many interests, and I believe that cooperation is unprecedented here today. So, too, is this opportunity to change our nuclear testing policy for the good. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment and defeat any tabling motion that might be offered.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Louisiana is recognized.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I was just handed a copy of the letter from the Secretary of Defense to Senator Mitchell, who says as follows:
The Department of Defense strongly opposes the Hatfield Amendment for the following reasons:
(1) It imposes a comprehensive test moratorium after 30 September 1996. However, all Administration studies and reviews have concluded that, as long as we will retain a nuclear deterrent--regardless of its size--we will need to test for safety and reliability. We will retain a nuclear deterrent past 30 September 1996.
(2) The amendment assumes that we will solve all safety problems by 30 September 1996, within a finite number of tests. This is irresponsible. Worse, it assumes that we will never have a safety--or a reliability problem--after 30 September 1996. No one can ensure this; indeed, as history has shown us, the odds are very much against it.
(3) The amendment requires that Congress review the President's certification on the need for testing. This creates yet another roadblock. In effect, given the reporting and certification requirements and the possibility of further Congressional blockage, the amendment is a de facto moratorium.
(4) Finally, a nine month moratorium in testing means that the staff at the Nevada Test Site will be paid for doing essentially nothing. This is a waste of taxpayers' funds and could lead to a loss of expertise.
Best regards,
Dick Cheney.
And written in handwriting at the bottom is: `If a moratorium is passed, I will recommend the President veto the bill.'
And then there is a further statement by the Secretary of Energy, essentially to the same effect, which I will not read because I think I would otherwise run out of time.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that copies of these letters be printed in the Record at this point as if read in full.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
The Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, August 3, 1992.
Hon. George J. Mitchell,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Mitchell: The Department of Defense strongly opposes the Hatfield Amendment for the following reasons:
(1) It imposes a comprehensive test moratorium after 30 September 1996. However, all Administration studies and reviews have concluded that, as long as we will retain a nuclear deterrent--regardless of its size--we will need to test for safety and reliability. We will retain a nuclear deterrent past 30 September 1996.
(2) The amendment assumes that we will solve all safety problems by 30 September 1996, within a finite number of tests. This is irresponsible. Worse, it assumes that we will never have a safety--or a reliability problem--after 30 September 1996. No one can ensure this; indeed, as history has shown us, the odds are very much against it.
(3) The amendment requires that Congress review the President's certification on the need for testing. This creates yet another roadblock. In effect, given the reporting and certification requirements and the possibility of further Congressional blockage, the amendment is a de facto moratorium.
(4) Finally, a nine month moratorium in testing means that the staff at the Nevada Test Site will be paid for doing essentially nothing. This is a waste of taxpayers' funds and could lead to a loss of expertise.
Best regards,
Dick Cheney.
P.S: If a moratorium is passed I will recommend the President veto the bill!
The Hatfield, Mitchell, and Exon amendment to H.R. 5373 is unacceptable, and I will recommend to the President that it be vetoed for the following reasons:
1. The restriction that no underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted by the United States after September 30, 1996, is unacceptable because the testing cutoff would mean that new features could not be incorporated into our deterrent at a later date and that an unpredicted safety or reliability problem could not be resolved; in addition, this approach makes no allowance for testing activities in other countries;
2. The planned safety tests by the Department of Energy should not be postponed until a date later than June 1, 1993, as required by the amendment; this restriction will result in delays in planned safety tests which will provide us with vital information for potential modifications to stockpile weapons;
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3. The disruption to the planned test program and reduction in scope of the program will result in loss of employees at the test site and thus make it difficult to resume testing; and
4. The restriction under paragraph (e)(1)(a), which limits testing to `only those nuclear warheads in which a modern safety feature has been installed,' is unacceptably restrictive to our need to develop and install improved safety technologies in the stockpile. Also, this language is too restrictive in that it does not allow for testing should a safety problem be discovered in a stockpile weapon
The White House,
Washington.
Hon. J. Bennett Johnston,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Johnston: The amendment to the Energy and Water Appropriations Bill proposed by Senators Hatfield, Mitchell, and Exon should be seen for what it is--a clear path to a comprehensive nuclear test ban. It would prevent us from conducting underground nuclear tests that are necessary to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent. Further, it would be an inefficient use of scarce fiscal resources, and includes the possibility of Congressional disapproval of the entire test program or of individual tests--seriously interfering with the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief. In total, this amendment could endanger the national security of the United States. For these reasons, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy and I would recommend veto of the legislation.
The amendment does not envisage testing of special advanced technologies including:
The ability to incorporate entirely new safety technologies into the stockpile--technologies which will not be mature before the proposed testing cut off;
The effects of nuclear explosions on U.S. forces, including, importantly, the ability of space-based sensors and ground-based defensive interceptors to be tested in a nuclear environment;
The ability to evaluate techniques to destroy warheads of unknown or uncertain design (a proliferation problem).
The amendment imposes an absolute limit on the number of tests the U.S. could conduct over the next several years. The number proposed is not adequate to incorporate new safety features into the stockpile. As importantly, the testing cut off would mean that new features could not be incorporated into our deterrent at a later date and that an unpredicted safety or reliability problem could not be resolved.
The imposed nine-month moratorium is a waste of scarce resources. The costs of maintaining the nuclear testing infrastructure would have to be paid while we simply delayed needed tests (there are six nuclear tests scheduled from now through July 1993).
The planned end to testing would apply to the United Kingdom as well as to the United States.
The President has adopted a sound nuclear testing policy responding to the changed international security environment, the reduced threats, the need to reduce defense spending, and the need to maintain a safe and reliable, but much smaller, nuclear deterrent. The President's policy limits the number, yield and purpose of U.S. nuclear tests while allowing for the minimum necessary to meet his national security responsibilities.
Sincerely,
Brent Scowcroft.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, given my statement earlier about my skepticism--and I want to be in complete good faith with the Senator from Oregon--would the Senator from Oregon agree with me, in view of the unanswered questions, if we took this to conference we would have the ability to respond to these questions of safety and the nature of the tests to be competed in the next 9 months? In other words, I do not want to go into conference thinking if we accept the amendment we have no ability to respond to what I see as very important issues here.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, as I understand the situation the Senator poses, if we go to conference, there is a moratorium already on the House side, which is a 12-month moratorium, which we offered originally. We can go from the Senate side with no reference to this issue, with the language now in the bill, or with the amendment that I am proposing today. We still have a conferenceable item, and as far as saying today how it is going to turn out in that conference, I am not in a position to say. I do not know. I think certainly the whole issue would be reviewed carefully in that conference. If the Senator has new information or updated information, certainly the conference should consider the best information. I would see no problem.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Would we have the ability, in my colleague's judgment, in good faith--I know we have the technical ability under the rules to do virtually what we want--but to respond to some of these concerns of the Secretary of Defense?
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I will respond. I think the fact we have moved from a 12-month House version and attempted to include as many people as possible--the Senators from Nevada with great concerns, the Senator from Maine, and others who have participated in this--indicates we have demonstrated the best of good faith, trying to be sensitive to the best of information and to the problems. We have modified our language three times because the Senator from Maine pointed out technicalities--problems we certainly did not intend to present to this body.
So I say, obviously we are going to be openminded on all
of these matters.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Frankly, the decision I have to make as the floor manager is whether to simply move to table at the appropriate time, have that vote, and put the matter off until tomorrow or days after that, or whether simply to--I cannot accept the amendment for the whole Senate, but I can recommend that and take the amendment to conference.
In the meantime, the armed services bill will be coming along, and they could accommodate. This is permanent legislation. If we have that flexibility in good faith to deal in conference, I would be inclined to do that and let the Armed Services Committee in their bill deal further with the matter.
I wonder if the Senator from Maine would have any advice?
Mr. COHEN. If the Senator will yield, what I intend to do is spend a little more time with this amendment--I believe a bargain has made, in fact a good-faith effort to meet the objections I have--and then when the defense authorization bill comes to the floor next week, offer an amendment quite similar but perhaps with a few changes that I would recommend.
So I intend to offer something similar to this but with changes that would reflect my own concerns about it next week when the defense bill comes to the floor.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President I think it is fairly obvious----
Mr. JOHNSTON. Is the Senator saying he would offer that next week on the armed services bill?
Mr. COHEN. That is right. That is what I intend to do.
Mr. JOHNSTON. So, would the Senator concur that perhaps the best action right now would be, with some skepticism but with good faith, to take this amendment to conference and let the Armed Services Committee deal with the matter more fully when their bill comes up?
Mr. COHEN. I think that would be the better course.
Mr. REID. Will the Senator yield for a question?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Louisiana has expired. The Senator from Oregon has 7 seconds.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. REID. The Senator from Nevada will yield to the Senator from Georgia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am not going to make a speech. I, unfortunately, could not be here and have not been part of the negotiations and have not yet decided how I will vote myself. But I would just point out to the authors, I think I would agree with the Senator from Maine in his statement that this amendment has come a long way and is much more, I think, practical now than it was in the original form.
The problem I have now is that we have a 9-month moratorium, as I understand it, and a 1996 date for a comprehensive test ban. One or the other of those, it seems to me, is out of place. If you are going to have a 1996 date, you need to get started right now, although you would have to have a plan first and that might take 4 months, 5 months. I do not know how long it would take the administration to have a plan.
If you want a 9-month moratorium for purposes which I know are important in terms of world perception, then it seems to me that the 1996 date ought to be slipped to 1997 or 1998, because what we have done with the combination of that is basically said we want a comprehensive test ban by 1996 and yet we are not going to start doing anything about the safety testing, which everyone now acknowledges is absolutely essential, for the next 9 months, or 9 months from the date of enactment.
Those would be my only observations. There are some technical language examinations that I think need to be made but that can be done in conference, relating to whether inadvertently--and having talked to the author, the Senator from Oregon, I know it would have been inadvertent--whether we have really corrected the language that appears to say if you have one safety feature on a weapon, another one cannot be added. That one needs to be looked at carefully.
Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for the time.
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Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the drafters of this amendment say that this is really not a moratorium. Sure there are steps the administration has to take and studies it has to
provide. But, then after all that, the United States can test. Well, the drafters forgot to add a line in their amendment, wishing the administration good luck--since luck is exactly what it will take to maneuver through all these requirements while trying to conduct a responsible testing program--which, by the way, can only be done until September 1996.
What lies under the mounds and mounds of reporting requirements and preconditions is a moratorium, plain and simple. No amount of obfuscation--which the Congress is so good at--can hide that fact.
The bottom line is that when the cloaks and veils are lifted, this amendment is a nuclear testing ban.
Well, those who support this amendment point to the dramatic strides made in START and the followup agreement reached at the summit with Boris Yeltsin and say the United States should have gone further and halted all nuclear testing.
Mr. President, even when these agreements are fully implemented, 11 years from now--in the year 2003--the United States will still have 3,500 nuclear weapons.
Well, this is one Senator who wants to make sure these 3,500 nuclear weapons are safe and that they are reliable.
Mr. President, the basic problem with sponsoring this nuclear test ban amendment is that you have to make certain assumptions about the future:
First, you have to assume that there will not be any safety problems in our
stockpile after 1996, or that if there are, we will be able to detect and correct potential safety problems without nuclear tests.
Second, you have to assume that the United States won't need to rely on its nuclear deterrent after 1996--because without a testing capability you can't be sure about the reliability of our nuclear forces.
Mr. President, I cannot predict the future--nor do I think, with all due respect, that my colleagues can.
Moreover, I am not a nuclear weapons design or testing expert, and neither are any of my colleagues.
Finally, I am not the commander in chief--and neither are Members of Congress. Not one of us here has the constitutional and moral responsibility for the safety of our nuclear weapons, the safety of those who handle our nuclear weapons, or the safety of the American people--which may one day rely on a credible nuclear deterrent.
Is there a Senator here prepared to face his or her constituents, some of whom may be working on nuclear stockpiles, and say, `Don't worry about safety--don't worry about reliability. Trust me.'? We've all heard that line before.
Let's face it. Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous weapons we possess--and as long as they are an integral part of our defense, as long as we rely on them, the United States will need some capability to test for safety and reliability.
It's nice to think of a world without nuclear weapons and a United States without nuclear weapons. But, the fact is, we are not there yet. A nuclear free world is not a reality.
So, let's get back to reality and vote against the Hatfield amendment.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I am pleased to join with the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] and the distinguished majority leader, Mr. Mitchell, in supporting their amendment to impose a one-year moratorium on nuclear testing. As a cosponsor of the original bill from which this amendment is drawn, I firmly believe that the United States can afford to take a slight risk for peace.
Regrettably, we are not leading the world on this issue. We have lost the moral high ground to France and Russia which have already pledged to stop nuclear weapons testing. Maintenance of our moral leadership of the world requires us to do no less.
The Bush administration recently announced that it planned to reduce U.S. nuclear tests significantly by cutting them to no more than six per year. However, the administration is significantly behind the curve of United States and world public opinion when it comes to nuclear testing.
The reasons for a testing moratorium are numerous. Many people view the elimination of nuclear weapons testing as a moral obligation, but there are a number of technical reasons for a moratorium as well.
The first and most obvious reason is the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Any threat from what remains of the Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact has now been dramatically reduced. Indeed, the President would have this Nation provide foreign aid to the former Soviet behemoth. CIA Director Robert Gates has endorsed the view of the changed world environment. He stated on January 23, 1992, `The threat to the United States of deliberate attack from [the former Soviet Union] has all but disappeared for the foreseeable future.'
We are now in the process of working together with the nations of the former Soviet Union on many issues. We are even providing aid and technical assistance to dismantle and destroy the nuclear weapons which were once trained upon U.S. cities. I believe that it is important that we step forward and demonstrate to our former enemy, as well as the rest of the world, that we are committed to peaceful cooperation with the fellow members of the nuclear fraternity. The United States remains one of the last nuclear-capable nations which continues to conduct nuclear weapons testing. What message are we sending to the world's nuclear haves and have nots when we continue to test in the face of Russian and French moratoria?
A second reason for banning nuclear testing is nuclear proliferation. The United States advocates a position of nuclear nonproliferation. We are a proud signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] and our export policies against proliferation of any nuclear capability are among the strongest in the world. But how can we expect anyone to believe our words when our actions belie them. The continuing hypocrisy of the Bush administration threatens to undermine our principled position. If we continue to develop and test our nuclear weapons, I am concerned that the United States will lose its global leadership in the advocacy of nonproliferation. Many signatories to the NPT have threatened to reconsider their position at the NPT review conference in 1995 if the United States continues to stubbornly cling to its testing as usual position. Former President Carter stated recently that `the world is concerned about nuclear proliferation. Here again, the United States is the major obstacle to a worldwide comprehensive test ban. Our threats against Pakistan, North Korea, Iraq, and Libya have a somewhat hollow ring when our deserts still shake with nuclear explosions.'
The Bush administration now states that it needs to continue testing because of national security and weapons safety. While this may be a perfectly legitimate issue, I have to ask if our weapons are unsafe. If they are unsafe, have we been conducting safety tests all along, or have we merely been conducting tests of new warheads and new weapons? Safety was not a concern of Secretary Cheney who stated earlier that the United States planned no safety upgrades in 1992. Now, however, he is chanting the safety mantra because that appears to be the only message that will sell with American public opinion.
Finally, a pause in testing will allow experts to determine the extent of the environmental impact of continued testing at our national test sites.
In closing, it is clear to this Senator that a nuclear testing moratorium is an idea whose time has come. We have endured and triumphed during an age of war and hostility in which arms testing was a necessary evil. That time, however, has passed. We must now lead the world toward the new era of peace.
I ask unanimous consent that a July 22, 1992, editorial from the Arizona Daily Star, entitled `Stop Blasting: Moratorium on Nuclear Tests Makes Sense' be printed in the Record at this point.
There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
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Congress is working faster than George Bush's brain again. This time lawmakers are pushing to formalize a nuclear issue that ought to be just a housekeeping item in the post-Cold War era--a moratorium on nuclear testing.
The House overwhelmingly passed a one-year stop on these expensive, dangerous underground explosions under the Nevada desert. Now 52 senators, including Arizona's Dennis DeConcini, are sponsoring a similar bill, but Bush is still holding out for a `modest nuclear testing program' despite all evidence that it's unneeded, unwise policy. The administration wants probably no more than six tests a year over the next five years, or more than three tests per year in excess of 35 kilotons.
That's only a token reduction. Experts say more than half of all U.S. tests already have an explosive force of less than 35 kilotons, or the equivalent of about 35,000 tons of TNT.
Even the Pentagon says `safety' upgrades of the existing arsenal, which is the usual excuse for nuclear testing now, is not necessary.
Each test costs $30 million to $60 million or more, much of it wasted on weapons that will never be deployed, such as a Star Wars X-ray laser-weapon program that has been canceled.
Those millions would buy a lot of drug-prevention efforts and recreation programs for troubled youths in urban centers.
As long as the United States keeps up this pretense of need for nuclear testing, the danger of proliferation grows. The U.S. lack of restraint leaves no incentive for other countries to refrain from testing deadly weapons.
With no superpower arms race anymore, there's obviously no need to develop new nuclear weapons in this country, especially since our current arsenal alone is enough to destroy most of the planet.
Whatever and whoever remains of communist hardline resistance in the former Soviet Union can exploit U.S. continued testing as a reason to continue an oversized military budget. Russia's two-year unilateral moratorium on testing will end in October, and Moscow officials say they'll be forced to start testing again if Washington doesn't stop.
Underground blasts are not without their side effects, either. High levels of radiation left in the soil could be absorbed by plants and animals.
If the administration can't understand the logic of a test-ban moratorium, Congress ought to drive the point home. Americans want something better for their money than expensive blasts under the Nevada desert.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise in strong opposition to the amendment offered by the Senator from Oregon, as well as the underlying bill language regarding nuclear testing.
Mr. President, from the outset, let us be clear about what we are debating here today. This discussion is not just about modifying our nuclear test regime, or curtailing weapons development, it is about whether or not the United States will remain a nuclear power. It is that simple. Because without adequate testing, we simply cannot ensure the safety, reliability, or survivability of our nuclear forces.
Proponents of the Hatfield amendment argue that the world has changed and that the United States no longer needs to maintain a nuclear test regime. The Soviet threat has disappeared, further arms reductions are imminent, the world has become safe and benign. Well, Mr. President, this is a very optimistic viewpoint and it misses the point completely.
As long as we have any nuclear weapons, whether it is 3,000 or 300, it is essential that we test these weapons to ensure safety and credibility. In fact, as the size of our arsenal and number of weapons types decrease, it becomes increasingly important to ensure that the remaining weapons meet their performance specifications, and that our military forces, including satellites, communication systems, and weapons support systems, are capable of functioning in a nuclear environment. Nuclear testing is essential in this area.
From a safety standpoint, we test to gain absolute assurance that in the event of an accident, our nuclear weapons will not deliver a yield. Clearly, there can be no compromise in ensuring the safety of our nuclear weapons, and we must test to do so.
From a reliability standpoint, we test to ensure that our weapons will perform as they are designed to. This hardly seems unreasonable, since we have invested tens of billions of dollars on our nuclear deterrent force. At the very least, we should ensure that they are capable of doing what they are supposed to do. I would say to my colleagues who support testing only for safety; there is little consolation or security gained by knowing that a weapon won't detonate on our own territory if we cannot be sure that it would detonate, as designed, in time of war.
To better place this issue in perspective, I would ask my colleagues to consider some of the surprises which have resulted from nuclear testing. Since 1958, one-third of U.S. nuclear weapons have required postdevelopmental testing. Some problems were discovered in surveillance activities but others were only
discovered during the conduct of nuclear tests. All these problems required subsequent testing to assure that fixes were effective. Additionally, nearly half of the nuclear weapon types introduced into the stockpile since 1970 have required postdevelopment nuclear testing to verify or fix problems, and to resolve questions of safety and reliability.
Mr. President, of the eight tests conducted in fiscal year 1991, several exhibited performance that differed significantly from that predicted. Two tests had yields in which the primary performance was approximately half of that expected. The total yield of another test was low by about 16 percent. Furthermore, of the 6 tests conducted so far in fiscal year 1992, 1 produced a yield of nearly a factor of 10 below the level predicted. The reasons for these deviations vary and, in some cases, remain unknown.
I would say to my colleagues, these deviations indicate an incomplete understanding of the detailed physics of nuclear weapon performance. And if design changes are needed to correct problems in future stockpile inspections or to make future safety improvements, we must test to retain confidence in the safety and reliability of such changes.
Mr. President, I have heard some of my colleagues who support this amendment argue that by halting our testing, the United States will be setting an example that will help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to the developing nations. Again, this is an extremely optimistic yet, frankly, naive assertion. Let us be honest, Saddam Hussein and Kim il-Sung are not glued to their seats wondering whether the United States will continue to conduct nuclear tests. And does anyone in this chamber actually believe that either of these two barbarians, or their terrorist cohorts, would halt the quest to acquire nuclear weapons purely because the United States has stopped testing? Not a chance. They have done, and will continue to do, whatever it takes to satisfy their perverse appetites for power.
I have also heard my colleagues complain that the administration has failed to adapt our test regime to changes in the international security environment and in the size and nature of our nuclear deterrent. This is also untrue. The United States has already significantly reduced the number of nuclear tests that we conduct. In fact, we now conduct only about one third as many tests as we did in the early 1980's and about one quarter the average level of the 1970's.
The President's revised testing policy states that the purpose of all U.S. underground nuclear testing of its weapons is to evaluate and improve the safety of our smaller nuclear deterrent and to maintain the reliability of U.S. forces. In doing so, the United States will conduct only six tests per year over the next 5 years. Of these six annual tests, no more than three can exceed 35 kilotons. In my view, the President's testing initiative represents a legitimate and responsible approach given the ongoing changes in the world.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to carefully consider their vote on this issue. It is, perhaps, the most fundamental and far reaching which we will cast this year. At issue is whether nuclear weapons will continue to play a role in our national security or not. Because unless we continue to test our deterrent force, we simply cannot ensure its safety and reliability.
I would caution my colleagues not to be swayed by partisan political or idealistic arguments. Where the defense and security of our Nation is concerned, we must be resolute. If the Senate believes that the United States should continue to rely on nuclear weapons, whether it be 3,000 or 300, then the only responsible course of action is to continue testing. To do otherwise would be dangerous and destabilizing.
I urge my colleagues to vote against the Hatfield amendment, and I yield the floor.
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Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of this amendment. And I want to commend the distinguished majority leader, Senator Hatfield and Senator Exon, for putting together this important provision. I hope this amendment will be supported by a large majority of my colleagues.
Mr. President, I am a cosponsor of S. 2064, first put forth by Senators Hatfield and Mitchell, that would impose a 1-year moratorium of United States nuclear testing unless Russia tests a nuclear weapon during that time. The amendment before us today represents a modified version of that provision.
This modification would impose a 9-month moratorium on nuclear testing, instead of the 1-year moratorium called for in S. 2064. However, the amendment would then go a step further to address what happens in the period after the moratorium.
The amendment would restrict nuclear tests to the purposes of safety or reliability only, and would place strict reporting requirements on the President should he wish to conduct reliability tests. It would require that no more the 5 tests be conducted in any given fiscal year, with a total of no more than 15 through fiscal year 1996.
The amendment would also require that for every fiscal year in which testing has been planned, the President must submit an annual report describing the precise need for safety testing, a cost/benefit analysis of that testing, a description of progress being made on the resumption of the nuclear testing talks with Russia and a plan for achieving a comprehensive testing ban by September 30, 1996. In addition, the amendment states that no test shall be conducted after 1996, unless Russia continues to test after that period.
Finally, Mr. President, and most important, the amendment includes a provision allowing Congress the opportunity to enact a joint resolution disapproving of any of the annual reports submitted by the President, and thereby prohibiting nuclear testing during the next fiscal year. This is an important assertion of the proper role of congressional oversight.
Mr. President, let me take a moment to expand on this provision. If there is one concern that I have over this bill, it is the fact that it could be construed to acknowledge the need for safety testing over the next few years. While I yield to no one in my concern for a safe and reliable nuclear arsenal, I share the belief of many in this body that the need for safety testing has been dramatically overstated by testing proponents.
And so I want to make clear my hope that Congress will not hesitate to use its authority under the joint resolution procedure to closely evaluate each proposed set of safety tests. And I hope there is nobody in the Chamber who believes that by voting for this amendment, we are in any way surrendering our right to use the joint resolution procedure to prohibit further tests of any kind.
Mr. President, over the next few years, there are few challenges that loom more important on the international sphere than the issue of nuclear proliferation. The examples throughout the world are numerous. Third world nations like Syria, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Algeria, Pakistan, and numerous others, all have acquired or are attempting to acquire nuclear technology.
A comprehensive testing ban would help to limit proliferation by limiting the ability of a nation to develop and improve nuclear weapons. But the United States has refused to take the lead on this important issue--just when U.S. leadership has been needed the most.
The Soviet Union and its successor states have had a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing since October 1990. France, too, has sworn off nuclear testing. Even China has said it would consider not testing if the other four permanent members of the Security Council were to make the same commitment.
But the United States still clings steadfastly to its nuclear tests, stubbornly refusing to budge. How can we ask other nations to adopt a testing moratorium if we refuse to consider one ourselves?
Mr. President, the U.S. refusal to give up its nuclear testing has simply not been worth the cost. Today we have a chance to do something about it. I hope we can pass this amendment by a large margin, and reassert U.S. leadership on this very important issue.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I am pleased to support the nuclear testing amendment to H.R. 5373 offered by the distinguished majority leader Mr. Mitchell, the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield], and the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Exon].
This amendment has two very important and compelling benefits. First, it provides for a moratorium on nuclear testing. Second, it provides for a test cessation in 4 fiscal years. The combination of a moratorium and an end to testing at a certain date should at last demonstrate to other nations that we are serious about controlling ourselves and curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
At present, the Russians and the French have imposed unilateral moritoria on their own testing. Approval of this legislation will encourage both nations to continue that moratorium. The British would be bound to us in a moratorium, since they test exclusively at our test site. The Chinese would thus be isolated if they were to continue to test.
Time and again the former Soviets have tried to interest the United States in a comprehensive test ban. President Gorbachev refrained from testing nuclear weapons for more than a year during 1987-88. On October 5, 1991, President Gorbachev stated that the Soviets would not test for 1 year, and asked the United States to join a comprehensive test ban. Because the United States was not responsive, President Yeltsin stated in February 1992 that he would begin preparation for testing at Novoya Zemlya if the United States did not stop testing. In May 1992, the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, Victor Mikhailov put this in perspective by stating:
Following our example, in April France declared a moratorium on nuclear tests until the end of 1992. The United States has the last word and the whole world awaits this step.
Mikhailov stated that Russia would begin testing in 1993 at the rate of two to four times a year if the United States does not join in the testing moratorium.
On April 8, 1992, President Mitterrand of France suspended its 32-year-old testing program. President Mitterrand wrote the leaders of the other nuclear weapons states to encourage them to make the moratorium universal. He stated that France would retain its independent nuclear deterrent as `the keystone of our defense policy,' but that he would press for global arms reductions. President Mitterrand suggested that France would continue its moratorium if the other nuclear weapons states joined the moratorium. Mitterrand stated: `In 1993, we will see if our example is followed, and if common sense has advanced.'
This amendment could stop the Chinese from further testing. There have been recent reports that suggest that China may accede to ban nuclear testing if the other four nuclear weapons states stopped testing. Reportedly the Chinese officials have stated that China will not be the only outsiders in a test ban regime. It stands to reason that China's one test a year is not greatly significant to them, and they might be encouraged to join the moratorium. China acceded to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in March and is slowly trying to move away from its isolated position in the world.
Thus, this amendment gives us an almost certain opportunity to have four or five of the five nuclear weapons states refrain from testing for a period.
The approach taken in this amendment would also encourage progress on nuclear nonproliferation in the Indian subcontinent. It is well known that the Indian explosion of 1974 provoked Pakistan to follow India's lead and move toward nuclear weapons. The United States has proposed a five-nation conference of India, Pakistan, China, Russia, and the United States to address the proliferation problems of the subcontinent. India has stated that they will not participate in their process as long as Russia, China, and the United States test nuclear weapons, produce new nuclear weapons and refrain from a `no-first-use pledge.'
This legislation would help control nuclear weapons in the rest of the world. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] creates two classes of nations: those who had manufactured and tested nuclear weapons prior to January 1, 1967, known as nuclear-weapon states and all others, the non-nuclear-weapon states. Of the five nuclear-weapon states, only France is not a state party to the NPT, while Britain, Russia, China, and the United States are states parties to the NPT. In the preamble to the NPT, the parties recall that the determination of the three nuclear-weapons states parties to the NPT in the Limited Test Ban Treaty `to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end.' In the ensuing years, the issue of continued nuclear testing by the superpowers has been a bone of contention for the nonnuclear weapons states and the non-NPT members.
The U.S. position on nuclear testing was the subject of controversy at the NPT Review Conference of 1990 and at the Limited Test Ban Amendment Conference of January, 1991. The 1990 NPT Review Conference did not move ahead on strengthening IAEA procedures in two areas because Mexico and other nations wanted to ban further nuclear tests. This deadlock stopped the adoption of first, `special IAEA inspections' of undeclared sites which would have been useful in Iraq prior to the 1991 gulf war; and second, the requirement of full scope safeguards for nuclear exports to nonnuclear weapons states. The Limited Test Ban Amendment Conference was called to consider amending the LTB to complete test ban. The amendment conference voted 75 to 2, with 19 abstentions, to continue to meet on this issue.
Mr. President, I must tell you that I am somewhat uncomfortable with the allowance for a realtively high number of safety tests, as well as reliability tests upon a presidential certification. In connection with its consideration of S. 2064, a bill providing for a nuclear moratorium, the Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing in July 23 with representatives of the Department of Defense and Energy, as well as nongovernmental experts. At that
hearing, we explored safety and reliability issues in some depth.
The reliability of a nuclear system depends on the reliability of the warhead, the reliability of guidance system, and the reliability of the missile or aircraft. Efforts to improve guidance and delivery systems would not by affected at all by limits on nuclear testing.
Reliability of nuclear warheads can be measured by various electrical and other nondestructive tests, as well as by actually exploding the nuclear weapon to see if it works and how well. Testimony before the committee indicated that nuclear weapons that have been deployed for several years remain reliable. It is only during the early years of new nuclear systems that reliability can be a problem. Now that our nuclear arsenal is not being redesigned, all of our systems should have the necessary maturity.
For a nuclear deterrent to be effective, the other party must perceive that the nuclear weapons of his adversary are reliable. If a nation wishes to attack the other side first, in a preemptive attack, it is clear that the entire nuclear system must be very reliable and that the first strike will be disabling. Reliability is less important for deterrence since it is only necessary to have sufficient survivable forces to deter or to impose unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike. Since the United States will have about 8,000 strategic nuclear weapons under START, and some 3,500 nuclear weapons under the prospective de-MIRV'ing treaty, the United States clearly will have a surfeit of reliable weapons for deterrence.
The U.S. criteria for safety is to virtually eliminate the possibility of an accident releasing a nuclear yield of more than the equivalent of 4 pounds of high explosive. Over the years, the United States has added: First, special safety configurations to prevent detonations when warheads are dropped or bashed; second, insensitive high explosives to reduce the risk of accidental detonations of the nonnuclear explosives surrounding the nuclear heart of each device; third, fire-resistant pits to prevent detonations of nuclear weapons when bombers crash and burn or missiles catch fire; and fourth, enhanced nuclear detonation safety equipment.
After U.S. forces are adapted to the START and de-MIRV'ing treaties, all these safety features will be on most of the warheads, depending on whether the executive branch substitutes fully safe warheads for warheads that lack certain safety features because of earlier decisions. For example, Trident missile warheads lack insensitive high explosive because the Navy decided that the safety risk was so small that it did not justify burdening the Trident warheads and shortening their range through the installation of much heavier and more bulky insensitive high explosive.
Propelling these safety improvements were such incidents some years ago as the crash of a bomber carrying nuclear weapons at Thule, Greenland, and the mid-air crash of a bomber near Palomares, Spain, causing weapons to be dropped on land
and sea. After that time, the bombers no longer took routine flights with nuclear weapons aboard. More recently, all U.S. bombers have been taken off alert. The Navy now loads the Trident SLBM's without warheads, and then places the warheads into the SLBM's. This two-step procedure reduces the risk of accidents involving these warheads.
In December 1990 a panel chaired by Prof. Sidney Drell, of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, released a report on `Nuclear Weapons Safety.' The report cited a number of safety problems. Many of the problems cited in that report have been addressed by removing the older weapons systems. The main remaining issues raised by the Drell panel that could lead to further nuclear testing are: First, the absence of insensitive high explosive on the Trident W76 and W88 warheads. Second, the lack of fire-resistant pits on gravity bombs and cruise missiles on heavy bombers. The administration has not chosen to rebuild these systems because of the expense and because the safety level of these systems has been thought acceptable.
The administration has testified that the present arsenal is safe. Dr. Robert Barker, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense--Atomic Energy stated in March 1992 before the House Armed Services Committee:
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The Air Force and Navy, in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of Energy, evaluated the safety of all ballistic missiles that carry nuclear warheads. It was determined that there is not now sufficient evidence to warrant our changing either warheads or propellants.
Mr. President, Dr. Raymond Kidder of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory described to the Committee on Foreign Relations a program involving changes in our systems that would eliminate any requirement for a large number of safety tests. Dr. Kidder told the committee:
If further investigation should indicate a need to upgrade these missiles to include all modern safety features (they lack Insensitive High Explosive (IHE), and Fire Resistant Pits (FRP)), this could be accomplished as follows:
The W78 warheads could be replaced with existing W87 MX warheads (no nuclear tests).
The W88 warheads could be replaced with W89 warheads whose development tests for use in the now-cancelled SRAM II have been completed. We estimate that not more than four nuclear tests would be needed to adapt the W89 for use in the W88 Mark 5 re-entry body, a different delivery vehicle than that used in the SRAM II.
The W76 warheads could be replaced with a smaller number of W89 warheads modified for use on the Trident II D5 missile. No nuclear tests would be required beyond those conducted to accomplish the W88 warhead replacement.
Some improvement in the safety of the Trident I, II C4 missile could be achieved by changing the missile design to accommodate four warheads instead of eight and replacing, with suitably designed blast/debris deflectors and barriers, the four alternate missile stations that would be removed. (No nuclear tests).
The numbers of tests listed above assume that the Rocky Flats plant in Colorado is not operating, requiring the use of pits salvaged from weapons being retired.
I would hope very much that the Congress and the executive branch will work closely together in deciding upon a program that will keep safety testing to a minimum. I agree with Dr. Kidder that the substitution of safer warheads already available in the existing arsenal, if deemed advisable, is preferable to a further reworking and testing of warheads.
Mr. President, I would hope very much that this amendment, if enacted into law, will spur the administration to reopen talks on a comprehensive test ban. There are many compelling reasons to have a comprehensive ban and no compelling reasons against such a ban.
The Reagan and Bush administrations were essentially unwilling to take steps toward a multilateral ban. We have paid a price for our failure to take a leadership role in this area. A correct decision today will put us solidly on the right path.
Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
The Senator from Oregon has 35 seconds remaining.
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Mr. HATFIELD. I yield back my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time for debate on the pending amendment has expired.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will rescue consideration of Amendment No. 2832 offered by the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] to the committee amendment on page 5 of the bill. Debate on the amendment is limited to 30 minutes equally divided and controlled between Senators Bumpers and Johnston.
Who yields time? The Senator from Arkansas is recognized.
Mr. BUMPERS. I yield the Senator from Minnesota 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, sometimes when we are asked to vote on a particular project or funding for a particular project it is an easy vote. This has not been the case for me when it comes to the superconducting super collider.
I once had a conversation with the majority leader, Senator Mitchell, in which I said to Senator Mitchell--oh, it must have been a month ago--`Sometimes it is just difficult to know how to vote.' He turned to me and quoted Lyndon Baines Johnson who once said, `Doing the right thing is easy, knowing the right thing is hard.' On this particular question, knowing the right thing is very difficult.
Mr. President, over the past month or so, many people have called me and have talked with me; Nobel laureates, project scientists, physicists from the University of Minnesota, many good friends. And they have told me that the super collider represents real frontier science and research. Mr. President, I am quite convinced that they have said that in good faith. But the question before us tonight on this vote is not whether the super collider is a project with scientific merit. I think we all agree. The question is as follows: Many meritorious projects come before us. Many people ask us for help. There are competing claims, and that is what makes this such a difficult decision.
Last week, Mr. President, the Senate Appropriations Committee marked up the Interior appropriations bill. The committee cut funding for low-income weatherization. For thousands of families who will not receive this funding for
low-income weatherization, this is the difference between having housing and maybe being homeless. Or it is the difference between being able to have heat or being able to eat.
Mr. President, if we cannot find funds for low-income weatherization, how can we justify spending $550 million for the super collider?
I was a teacher before I came to the Senate. I insist on the floor of the Senate tonight that the most important education program is to make sure every woman expecting a child has a diet rich in vitamins, minerals, and protein. But, Mr. President, we do not fully fund prenatal programs, we have cut Medicaid Programs. Is not an investment in prenatal care an investment in our future? Is not investing in healthy children an investment in our future? When we cannot find the funds for prenatal care, how do we justify spending $550 million for the super collider?
Mr. President, we talk about preventive health care, but our public health care system is in shambles in our country. Just look at the state of childhood immunization. We are seeing diseases reappear: Measles, whooping cough, polio. Where are the funds for childhood immunization? How can we, when we say we do not have the funds for childhood immunization to protect our children in our own country, justify spending $550 million on the super collider?
For me, today's vote is a question of conscience. I cannot vote for the funding of the super collider when we do not meet basic human and community needs in our own country. And under the budget agreement that we labor under, this is the tradeoff.
Many times I voted to waive that budget agreement, but we have not done so. My vote tonight is not a vote against science funding. We have a significant amount of spending that goes to science funding, $20 billion or thereabout, and this is not a no-never vote on the super collider. I have had many close friends and many people convince me that this is important research. I hope that we will be able to fund this research in the future. But the choice tonight is not a choice for the future, it is our vote now, and in good conscience I am going to support the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Akaka). Who yields time?
Mr. Johnston. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Idaho.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. One minute is yielded to the Senator from Idaho, [Mr. Craig].
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, let me suggest the vote tonight is in fact a vote for the future. If this country can only fund its day-to-day operations, its day-to-day concerns and it cannot look forward into the future, whether it is a humanitarian future or a scientific future, if we do not have the wisdom to invest for tomorrow, we will not be able to provide tomorrow the kinds of jobs and a dynamic economy that spell a successful Nation. That is really the bottom line of the debate on the superconducting super collider.
I remember when I was in high school, it was the space program. This country was investing in a program, that spinoff is now in the hundreds of billions of dollars, not to science.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Wellstone). The Senator's minute has expired.
Mr. CRAIG. Might I have 1 more minute?
Mr. JOHNSTON. I yield 1 more minute.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, that investment in the space program was not just to science, it was to everyday work and application, from the household to the service station, of course, to military application. That is ultimately the debate on the superconducting super collider. It is again this Nation investing in its scientific future, building a base and understanding and pushing that envelope of knowledge that we have, as a Nation, led the world in decade after decade.
As we vote tonight, let us remember that is the primary issue which we are debating and why it is so fundamentally important for our Nation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. CRAIG. I thank my chairman for yielding.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. JOHNSTON. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, let me just address the whether-we-can-afford-this-or-not argument. One of the most disturbing things about America today, and it does not only apply to the way we budget things, but actually what is going on in our country, is that we have the kind of the idea that if we do not get everything today, the world is gone. It is a kind of a society of let us spend everything we can on what we need today and not worry about the future. That is catching on in America. We do not save anymore. We do not worry about the future. We just complain about it.
Let me suggest that we are not going to pay for this $8.3 billion super collider in 1 year. We are going to pay for it over 7 years. So let me just do some arithmetic with the Members of the Senate to see if we can afford the other things that are being indicated are of higher concern, including those that the occupant of the Chair has.
Let me just assume the budget of the United States does not go up one nickel. It is $1.5 trillion this year. I think it is fair to assume it will be that at least for the next 7 years. Do the arithmetic with me. That is $10.5 trillion, $10 trillion, $500 billion that we are going to spend on what everyone thinks we need.
Is anyone suggesting over that period of time we cannot afford $8.3 billion? $10.5 trillion is what we are spending for all the things that Senators like the occupant of the Chair and many others are concerned about. That is what we are spending. I do not believe the argument that we cannot afford it in the broad budget sense comes anywhere close to reality. If we cannot put that small amount on the real future of America, then what are we here for?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
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Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana is recognized.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Minnesota in his speech a moment ago said that he was strongly for this project but that we ought to do this sometime in the future; that we ought to scrub the project now and do it sometime in the future.
Mr. President, let us not kid ourselves. It is virtually now or never on this project. What we have done as a Nation is created a long-term plan. Based upon that plan, the State of Texas has floated bonds in the hundreds of millions of dollars. I think their total commitment is $1 billion. We have expropriated land. We have moved people out of homes. We have a team of thousands of the finest scientists in the United States who have been assembled for the purposes of building the superconducting super collider.
Mr. President, anyone who says that we can tell all those folks to go home, wait a few years, and do not call us, we will call you if we change our mind, it is not going to happen.
I listened, Mr. President, not only to the distinguished Senator from Minnesota but others talk about the state of anxiety and disquiet in this country, and nobody knows that more keenly than I, coming from a State that has been heavily impacted. But if there was ever a time in the history of this country when we cannot afford to abandon science, to abandon our quest for technology, it is today of all days.
When we are being outdistanced in so many fields by the Japanese, by the Swedes, by the Germans, by the French, by other competitors around the world, to take a field in which we are preeminent, high energy physics, when we are on the verge of breaking the code of the universe--breaking the code of the universe, that is what it is--to determine what are the elementary particles and forces and how they fit together and how they determine the whole cosmos down to the smallest thing, the smallest bits of matter, we cannot walk away from that and say go home, people on this team, scientists on this team, thousands of you, go home; we will do it another day.
Senator Bumpers says the information will be there 50 years from now, 100 years from now. I wonder what would have happened if they said that to Einstein when he was on the edge of discovering the relativity theory, or if they had said that to Faraday as he was ready to discover the secrets of electricity and electromagneticism, or if they had said that to Maxwell when he was discovering the secrets of the atom, or Geiger or Madam Curie, or a whole host of people from the Greeks down to modern day. Mr. President, the quest for science, the quest for knowledge, the quest for breaking that code is here today.
We are told, Mr. President, we do not have the money to do it. I know money is tight. But this budget this year, Mr. President, the SSC contains Forty-three/one thousands of 1 percent of this budget. It contains six-tenths of 1 percent of the R&D budget.
Mr. President, I have used this chart before, but this is Federal R&D funding. Look at how it compares to NIH, which is 19.4 percent, $15 billion, or SDI, which is 6.2 percent, or on down with the space station, NASA research, National Science Foundation, basic energy
research, and down here is the superconducting super collider at six-tenths of 1 percent of the R&D budget.
Mr. President, to say this is going to be the PacMan that ate up all this other budget research is simply absurd. Or to say that this is going to be the straw that broke the fiscal back of the United States is simply absurd.
If we are going to balance the budget, it has to be because we address the question of medical care and entitlements, and everybody knows that, Mr. President. That is the fast-growing part of the budget. Domestic discretionary, of which this is a part, or scientific research is not growing but contracting. And this small part for the superconducting super collider is not changing that.
Mr. President, I think the words of Dr. Lederman, distinguished Nobel Laureate, bear repeating. He says as follows:
Now we have reached what many, a consensus, believe is the bottom line. We are looking at nature through a new and as yet hypothetical force field that in a sense makes a simple overarching symmetrical world look complicated.
The synergy of inner space--particle physics--and outer space--cosmology--is one of the most dramatic events in the history of science, and so that is why physicists from Fermilab in Illinois and SLAC in California and Brookhaven and Cornell in New York, disgruntled as we all are at the loss of the SSC in our own State, and fearful as we are about the long-term funding of our own institutions, are nevertheless joining together to support this project.
I could not say it as well in 100 years, Mr. President. The distinguished Nobel laureate says science has come together for this project.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, there has never been a more compelling case before this body which gave us the opportunity to tell the American people we are going to take charge of our spending. I think every single Member of the Senate before he or she votes tonight ought to ask himself or herself this question: how high would the deficit have to be to make me vote no? Is there some figure out there--$400 billion is the deficit this year. If it went to $800 billion, a trillion, would I vote to cut spending?
The most intense lobbying I have ever seen in my life since the Panama Canal Treaty has just taken place in the last 2 weeks on this amendment. The physicists of the country have lobbied. Dr. Lederman, whom the distinguished Senator from Louisiana just quoted, a Nobel laureate, said, `We are not building this for spinoffs. It would be,' to use his words, crazy to build it for spinoffs. We build it because we are curious.'
This morning I quoted Dr. Trivelpiece, who in 1987 was Director of the Office of Energy Research, who said, `We believe that $4.4 billion is not only accurate, within 10 percent, it is conservative.' And he goes on to say that `Never before has a projected cost figure been as accurately assessed and will never change.' And this morning he said Senator Bumpers misquotes me or something. `I am still hot for it. I still stand by what I said.' What he said in 1987 was $4.4 billion, would be the cost. In 1989, Secretary Watkins comes before the Energy Committee and said: I am sorry, the cost is $5.9 billion.
But if it goes a dime higher, count me out. Two years later, they say it is $8.25 billion. We are already twice the original projection, and, the Secretary of Energy says if it goes any higher, we should not build it.
The Energy Department's internal audits say the cost is going to be $11.8 billion, and the lifetime cost even at today's figure is $20 billion.
I have never seen a project with as many broken promises. The people here who are relying on all of these physicists will come in here, soon and vote for the space station, which almost every single physicist in America opposes, and the people who favor the space station will come in here and renounce the very people that they are honoring so highly today, the American physicists, because they favor this.
Where are all the budget balancers? Less than 3 weeks ago on the floor of this body, I have never heard as many unctuous, pontificating statements in my life about excessive spending and a constitutional amendment to balance the budget. `Put a few words in the Constitution,' they said. `That will solve the problem.'
When the junior Senator from Texas said `I am going to make sure--I do not care if the House has killed it--I am going to make every Member of the U.S. Senate vote'--that was an obvious political threat.
Where are all the people who delivered all the lectures about constitutional amendments to balance the budget?
Where are the people who said why do we not cut all that spending out? We do not need a constitutional amendment. Let us cut the space station. Let us cut SDI. Let us cut the super collider.
I will tell you what happened. It has been 3 weeks, and memories are very short around here. You have all these broken promises. GAO says there are no cost controls, and no procedures in place to determine the cost controls according to performance as this contract goes forward.
Last year, the debate was that all the countries were going to kick in. We could count on the Japanese for at least $1 billion. The Japanese sent word, `Do not call us. We will call you.'
Right now, we have a $10 million contribution from India on a $20 billion project; not forthcoming. The cost now is $11.8 billion, and headed north.
Mr. President, if every Senator would ask himself this question: What is the most honest threat to the future of this Nation? It is the deficit. There is absolutely no controversy about that.
Then ask yourself this question: Is going forward with a $20 billion project, every single penny of which must be borrowed--and with compounded interest, during the life of this thing it comes to $53 billion, not $20 billion--$53 billion, taking the interest rate on 30-year Treasury notes today; no inflation. Put inflation in it, it goes to $80 billion. You will have to borrow every dime.
Do you know what this reminds me of, Mr. President? It reminds me of a guy who just lost his job, his car has been repossessed, he is 3 months behind on his house payments, and he is about to be foreclosed.
And his daughter comes home from school and says, `Dad, I just found this beautiful $400 dress to wear to the senior prom.'
He says, `Darling, you know I would do anything to buy that dress for you for the senior prom but here are the facts.' And he lays the facts out for her.
She says, `But, daddy, it is such a pretty dress.'
That is exactly what U.S. Senate is getting ready to say tonight, `It is just so pretty, I cannot resist it.' The country is $4 trillion in debt. The Japanese are holding a $52 billion trade deficit against us, and if they thought there was one single thing in this program that would help them technologically, they would be in it with both feet.
Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Iowa.
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Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I would like to inquire of the President. Earlier today I said I needed several more minutes. The chairman gave me 4 minutes. I hoped to get some time on the debate on the testing which the chairman said I might be able to do. That was all taken up.
I know that by unanimous consent agreement debate would be cut off at 6:30. It is a very important debate, Mr. President, I have about 7 or 8 minutes of remarks left that I would like to make here tonight. I would like to ask unanimous consent for about 8 more minutes.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, my friend from Iowa knows of my high regard for him. But, Mr. President, we have had over 4 hours I think on this. Senators have been alerted to a 6:30 vote.
With reluctance, I would object, Mr. President, because this is not the last matter we have to tend to today. I am afraid if we get into extending time, we will do so for a number of Senators for whom we would have to cut off. I apologize.
Mr. HARKIN. I understand. I do not understand fully. This is a very important debate, but I will accept 1 minute if I can.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Iowa has expired.
Mr. BUMPERS. I yield the Senator from Iowa 1 minute, Mr. President.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, earlier the chairman talked about Madam Curie, Einstein, and everybody else. The Research Society in America asked where we should spend our money. No 1, in untargeted individual research awards; dead last, superconducting super collider. That is where we ought to be putting our money, in the Einsteins and the Madam Curies, into the individual awards, the small sciences, but not this.
I just want to end my remarks, Mr. President, by taking the Senators back to April 29, 1986. During that debate, a Senator on the floor argued against Federal investment in science and technology. Here is what that Senator said.
The truth is, in the last 30 years, we have invested in science and technology. We have invested in resource development and in education and training. The result has been economic stagnation.
This Senator went on to say that American industry is in a much better position to make investments in science and technology, primarily because they invest in products and processes that are useful to society:
American business in investing in science and technology, in the development of new products and new techniques and in the development of new plant and equipment. How are we to assume that we in Congress know more about technology and science and resource development than all the hundreds of thousands of American corporations that are investing in these areas?
Who was this Senator who railed against the Federal Government investing in science and technology, who noted that investments in products and new techniques were preferred? None other than the Senator from Texas [Mr. Gramm].
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 1/2 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana is recognized.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, my distinguished friend from Arkansas has build a series of inaccuracies to expand a project which is $5.4 billion to complete from this point on to one that is $53 billion in scope, which is absolutely absurd.
Mr. President, what this project is right now, when you take away sunk costs, the Texas contribution, termination costs, and outyear inflation, is $5.4 billion. It is not $20 billion.
How does the Senator from Arkansas use the figure of $20 billion? He takes the highest estimate, which is not the current estimate, for this project. He adds on to that all of the interest in the meantime. He adds on to that the operating costs, and all the other expenses. It is as if when you bought a house you would add on the cost of mowing the lawn, heating the house, painting the house, paying the insurance, all of those expenses that go on in the meantime.
The actual cost, Mr. President, is $5.4 billion, and that this is no longer an escalating project.
Have costs escalated in the past? Yes. Why? Because they had to redesign the magnet, redesign the circumference. That is done now. The magnets are redesigned. They are manufactured. They are tested in sufficient quantity to assure cost control. We can assure cost control on the contracts that are let for the
excavating of the project, as well as the construction of the project.
Mr. President, there may be reasons to be against this. But escalating cost is not one of them. The basic question facing us, Mr. President, is whether or not this country believes it is important to go into the most basic science that there is, the science of determining what we are made of and what the basic forces of nature are.
As Dr. Lederman says: `It is one of the most dramatic events in the history of science.'
Mr. President, we cannot afford to walk away from this project, being that far into it and being this close to a solution to the project. You cannot do it through the CERN super collider in Switzerland. It does not have--we are told by the scientists--the requisite powers to break apart the nucleus of the atom and determine what those forces and parts are.
Mr. President, I quoted earlier from Dr. Paul Froyne, the distinguished legal scholar and philosopher, who said that `the thing that unites civilized people everywhere is their profound ignorance about the most important questions of the universe--whither, whence, and why. This helps answer that question at least scientifically.
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Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I want all of the Members of the Senate to look at the names of all the people who voted for cloture on a constitutional amendment to balance the budget and said this is the only way to save this body. We are out of control. You are going to have to put words in the Constitution. Look at the names of all of those people who voted for cloture, and then before we adjourn, look and see how they voted on the super collider, the space station, SDI, intelligence, the Trident missile, those five things, to save $10 billion in 1993, over the life of them $350 billion, and with interest compounded, over the life of those, $900 billion, because every dime of it is borrowed.
I ask the Members of this body to do your duty, and start tonight exercising the responsibility you told the Chamber of Commerce and the Rotary Club you would.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise this evening in support of the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers].
The Superconducting Super Collider Program has received national attention as a project clearly seeking a mission. The research has been touted as fundamental toward the understanding of the universe and critical in our search for the origins of matter.
Mr. President, I do not necessarily disagree with the ideals and aspirations of those who would seek to continue this program. In fact, I have supported the more modest funding levels approved last year. But the world has changed, Mr. President, and the priorities must change as well.
Like so many other issues before this body, this vote is a vote on priorities; and I cannot in good conscience vote to continue this program.
When first designed, the super- conducting super collider promised to bring international funding and backing from a host of other nations. The list of contributors appeared long and the commitment firm. But since that time the contributions have not materialized and new commitments have been even harder to obtain.
Mr. President, tonight's difficult decision pits the desire to support research against the fiscal realities of our expanding Federal deficit. The research is desired, but we simply cannot afford it. This is a decision that really cuts to the heart of what is happening to this Nation--we are simply unable to fund all of our desired programs with the limited resources available to us.
As I studied this issue I carefully weighed the evidence on both sides of the argument. As I considered the facts, the merits of the project quickly faded in the light of fiscal reality. Perhaps the questions being asked and hopefully answered may someday provide insights into the origin of our very being. But on balance, Mr. President, this project does not have the funding nor the full support of the scientific community.
Mr. President, the superconducting super collider is not on budget and it is not on time. Documents provided from the Department of Energy clearly admit this fact. Additionally, the GAO as recently as last April concluded that the SSC project was badly managed and cost overruns could bring the total cost to well over $11 billion. The question quickly became, should we continue along on this program or cut our losses now and join with the other efforts already underway abroad.
Mr. President, this is also a question of responsibilities. As a body, we have a responsibility to weigh the facts and offer decisions on priorities for our Nation. As a Member, I have a responsibility to the constituents of Connecticut who stand to pay almost $117 million in taxes over the next few years to complete this program. Mr. President, I must fulfill my responsibility to those constituents and to this body by voting with the distinguished Senator from Arkansas to cut the funding for this project.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the amendment offered by my distinguished colleague from Arkansas, Senator Bumpers to restrict funding for the superconducting super collider--the SSC.
My position on this matter has been arrived at with great reluctance because I have supported the SSC in the past, and recognize it has considerable scientific merit in broadening our understanding of matter and energy.
I have always been supportive of the mission of basic science research and other activities sponsored by the Federal Government that attempt to address fundamental scientific questions: What is the structure of matter? How did the universe begin and will it end?
But, Mr. President, Federal spending is out of control and we must take every opportunity to cut spending and restore fiscal responsibility.
The projections provided by the Department of Energy indicate that the cost to complete construction of the SSC will be $8.2 billion, but it certainly may be closer to $10 billion. This construction cost is also only a partial investment in the SSC because there will be significant annual operating costs which the Federal Government must finance.
We simply cannot afford it. The most serious problem facing our Nation today is the Federal deficit, and we simply must tackle it.
Federal spending is out of control, and we must take every opportunity to cut spending and restore fiscal responsibility.
The projected Federal deficit for this fiscal year is $396 billion. the Federal debt for fiscal year 1992 is $425 billion compared to $59.2 billion when I was first elected to office.
Individuals are beginning to realize that a huge budget deficit is something that affects them and the future of their children. An ever growing amount of their tax dollars are being spent on servicing, paying interest, on the national debt. This is money that, in many ways, does not move America forward. It does not provide housing, cancer research funding, or better education for our youth.
Nobody can deny that we absolutely must come to grips with our Federal deficit, and make the extremely tough choices necessary to do so. We must cancel big dollar Federal projects such as the SSC.
Mr. President, no program can be safe from cuts. We must consider each program on its merits, and determine if it can be justified within our tight budget constraints.
I have reluctantly concluded that the SSC cannot be justified in this austere budget, and I support the Bumpers amendment. I do so recognizing there are many interests in my State strongly supporting the SSC I respect their view as I hope they do mine.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I move to table the Bumpers amendment, and I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays are ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Burdick], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Dixon], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Gore], are necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Dixon] would vote `yea.'
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. Hatch] and, the Senator from California [Mr. Seymour], are necessarily absent.
I further announce that the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms], is absent due to illness.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Utah [Mr. Hatch] and the Senator from California [Mr. Seymour], would each vote `yea.'
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 62, nays 32, as follows:
[Page: S11211]
So the motion to table the amendment (No. 2832) was agreed to.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. INOUYE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, we now will move to the Hatfield amendment. Senator Nunn has only recently come in from a trip, and I ask unanimous consent that Senator Nunn be allowed 3 minutes within which to talk about the Hatfield amendment.
After that, I do not know whether we will need a record vote or not, but one has been ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will be order in the Chamber. There will be order in the Chamber. The Senator may proceed.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, before I put that unanimous-consent request, the only other matter in order, other than the Hatfield amendment--and if we take the Hatfield amendment, I think then that will be the last amendment on nuclear testing, I believe; certainly the last one that would require a vote--then the only other amendments in order are the Bumpers amendments. I wonder if the Senator from Arkansas intends to pursue other amendments.
Mr. BUMPERS. I do, I say to the Senator.
Mr. JOHNSTON. There may be other record votes after that.
So now I ask unanimous consent that Senator Nunn be allowed to proceed for 3 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will be order in the Chamber.
Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request? Without objection, the Senator from Georgia is recognized.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, could we have order? I cannot hear myself.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will Senators please take their discussions out of the Chamber? There will be order in the Chamber.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank the Senator from Louisiana.
First, I want to congratulate the Senator from Oregon, the Senator from Louisiana, the Senator from Nebraska, the Senator from Maine, and others who worked so diligently for so many days on this testing matter, which is enormously important.
I plan to vote for this compromise that has been worked out, but I do want to put down a marker as to matters that need to be considered, certainly, before this conference is concluded on this bill, and I also anticipate this matter will be addressed on the armed services authorization bill.
I am concerned that we have a moratorium combined with a 1996 date for a comprehensive test ban. I understand the purpose of both of those. But those tend to be in tension and work against each other because, if we are going to have a 1996 test ban date, we need to get on with the safety testing, which now I think everyone agrees has to take place. So one or the other of those dates needs to be, I think, adjusted.
I am also concerned that there may not be enough tests here to complete the safety regime that has been advocated by the Drell Commission and others, and I think that number of tests needs another look.
I believe that we need to clarify what I believe to be the intent of the authors of this amendment that weapons reliability includes weapons effects, that is, effects on things like satellites and other important security measures.
I also believe we need to clarify that a weapon with one or more safety features can be modified to add additional safety features. Right now the language is not completely clear on that. We do not want to block additional safety features being put on weapons that already have a safety feature. And we also need, I believe, to look carefully at adding a provision that would abrogate the cessation of tests, which is 1996 under this amendment, if Russia resumes testing, or if China has not agreed to a moratorium by 1998.
Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for this additional time. I will vote for the amendment with these markers down for further work.
I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rockefeller). The question is on the amendment of the Senator from Oregon.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the committee is willing to take the amendment, considering the discussions we have had.
I think we may need a vote anyway, is that correct? Does anyone desire a vote on the matter?
I believe Senator Hatfield does desire a vote. We urge all Senators to vote yes on this.
I think we will have one more vote that we know about on a Bumpers amendment after this.
Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes.
Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator make clear that next week the Armed Services Committee does intend to bring a measure to the floor that will clarify many of the items that were outlined by Senator Nunn? Those of us that feel they have not been adequately addressed intend to bring a measure to the floor that will provide further clarification.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Indeed, Mr. President, that is the basis upon which we would take it; that and the fact that in our own conference we would be able to address these same concerns and draw upon the work of the Armed Services Committee, if you are able to get consensus by that time.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, is there a time agreement on the next amendment of the Senator from Arkansas?
Mr. BUMPERS. I have two amendments, one of which I think the distinguished floor managers will accept and another one that we can dispose of in 10 minutes and then vote.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I have seen one which we are willing to take. The other one I had not seen.
My guess is the Senator from Arkansas is correct about his time estimates. But we do want to finish the bill tonight.
Mr. BUMPERS. It is so innocuous, I am sure you will accept it.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Will the Senator yield? Mr. President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
If the Senator will suspend?
The previous Presiding Officer tried very hard to get attention of the floor. We will wait until there is silence in the Senate.
The Senator from Arizona may proceed.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, is it possible to discuss a time agreement with the Senator from Arkansas for 10 minutes?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, we are not ready for a time agreement at this time. I do not believe it will take a great amount of time. We will move to table. After that, if the tabling motion is not successful, and I believe it would be, it may take some additional time.
But I hope the time for the next vote would not be extremely long.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
[Page: S11212]
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, may I suggest that we now have the vote on the Hatfield amendment; that during that vote we attempt to reach an agreement limiting the time for the amendment to 10 minutes, as the Senator from Arkansas has suggested, or as short a time as desired by the managers? And then, immediately after this vote we could get the agreement and then finish this bill, hopefully in very short time so we could complete action on it this evening.
Mr. COHEN. If the majority leader will yield, let me indicate to my colleagues that whatever the outcome of the vote on the Hatfield amendment, that I do not intend to offer any additional amendments to the bill, so there will be no further amendments by the Senator from Maine.
Mr. MITCHELL. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment (No. 2833), as further modified. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD: I announce that the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Burdick], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Dixon], and the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Gore] are necessarily absent.
I further announce that if present and voting the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Dixon] would vote `yea.'
Mr. Simpson: I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. Hatch] and the Senator from California [Mr. Seymour] are necessarily absent.
I further announce that the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms] is absent due to illness.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Utah [Mr. Hatch] would vote `nay.'
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber who desire to vote?
The result was announced, yeas 68, nays 26, as follows:
So the amendment (No. 2833), as further modified, was agreed to.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment, as further modified, was agreed to.
Mr. HATFIELD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I want to command the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Nebraska and other Senators involved for their role in the truly historic vote which has just occurred. This is the first time in history that the Senate has ever voted in support of any limits on nuclear testing, let alone expressed an overwhelming desire to end all nuclear testing. The margin of 68 to 26 is overwhelming. It reflects the truly enormous scope of change that has occurred in the world in the past few years. The man who has done the most to lead the effort in this direction has been the Senator from Oregon, Senator Hatfield. He deserves the gratitude of all Americans and people around the world and the recognition which this historic vote signifies. I congratulate the Senator.
Mr. President, I am now advised that Senator Bumpers is prepared to accept a 10-minute time limitation equally divided on this amendment, and that Senator Johnston will propound the agreement, and that he will move to table it so that there will possibly be just this one more vote on this measure.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, Senator Bumpers has 2 amendments. The first provides that in the acquisition of necessary components that to the extent we purchase those that are manufactured outside of the United States, that contractors in this country be able to bid for those. And while we do not know all the details about what the different collaborations are, the groups that might join together for this, we are willing to take it to conference and in good faith try to make it work.
And so if the Senator will send up his amendment at this time, we can accept that.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I have not offered the amendment. I do so at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] proposes an amendment numbered 2835.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the amendment, insert the following: `Except in the acquisition of components necessary for the Solenoidal Detector Collaboration (SDC) or the Gammas, Electrons, and Muons Detector Collaboration (GEM), no Federal funds appropriated to the Department of Energy for fiscal year 1993 or thereafter may be used, directly or indirectly, to purchase components for the superconducting super collider that are manufactured outside the United States, except pursuant to a contract that was open to competitive bidding.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, the amendment is very simple. It simply says that except in the acquisition of components necessary for certain technical aspects of this, no Federal funds appropriated in the Department of Energy for the year 1993 and thereafter may be used directly or indirectly to purchase components for the superconducting super collider that are manufactured outside the United States except pursuant to a contract that was open to competitive bidding.
Mr. President, I do not mind telling my colleagues there is some sole source contracting going on. It is costing American jobs. This amendment is designed to correct that.
Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. DOMENICI. Could I ask a question of the Senator?
If a foreign country is going to supply any of the components, the amendment says they will do so only if there are competitive bids and they win it. Is that essentially it?
Mr. BUMPERS. Yes.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further discussion on the amendment?
If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2835) was agreed to.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. EXON. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on the next Bumpers amendment, when offered, if offered, which provides for the $650 million foreign contributions, there be a limit of 10 minutes equally divided, with no second-degree amendment; that I then be recognized on a motion to table.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
[Page: S11213]
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I might tell my colleagues, if this matter is tabled, I understand we could then go directly to final passage and that a Record vote has not been requested on either side on final passage.
So if this is tabled, I believe I am safe to say this would be the last vote of the day.
Mr. BUMPERS. Can I ask the Senator a question?
Would it be fair to say if it is not tabled, it would still be the last vote of the evening?
Mr. JOHNSTON. That depends.
Mr. BUMPERS. The Senator is not suggesting to the people standing around this body if they vote to table, they can go home, and if they do not, they cannot?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes. In other words, we regard this as a killer amendment which would take some additional time and thought to explain. That is exactly what I am saying, yes. Absolutely.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, we already have a 10-minute time agreement. There is something that just does not sound quite right about that. We have a 10-minute agreement to that. I agreed to that so Senators can get home to their families, and now the Senator is saying in sort of a threatening way if they do not vote, they cannot go home?
Mr. JOHNSTON. No. It is up to the majority leader to do that tonight or do that tomorrow. What I am saying, we cannot accept this amendment based on the motion to table. This is a killer amendment. I am not trying to be cutesy about this. I am telling it like it is. I believe this would be a very bad amendment in all sincerity and, therefore, if we fail to table, we could not turn around then and accept the amendment.
Mr. BUMPERS. I do not understand for the life of me why this is a bad amendment. Last year this Senate was assured this collider was not going to be built unless we had $1.7 billion in foreign participation. I am saying there ought to be $650 million, and the Senator is saying it is a killer amendment.
Mr. JOHNSTON. If the Senator will introduce his amendment, I will tell the Senate why I believe that.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I do not have any delusions about whether or not my amendment is going to be tabled. But I do think it is passing strange in two ways: Number one, that if you vote to table, you can go home and spend the evening with your family. If you do not, you cannot. Last year we were told there would certainly be $1.7 billion in foreign participation. I am only asking for a third of that to see this thing go forward and the Senator is calling it a killer amendment.
Mr. President, what is the parliamentary situation?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The parliamentary situation is that a 10-minute time limit has been agreed to if the Senator chooses to offer his amendment.
Mr. BUMPERS. Has the time agreement been agreed to?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this colloquy not count against the time agreement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Since the amendment has not been offered, there cannot be time running in any event.
Mr. JOHNSTON. If my colleague from Arkansas will permit----
Mr. BUMPERS. I do not want to hold on to this amendment all night. Do not make me stand here and hold it.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I want to clarify it. The Senator made it sound as if I was not being quite fair. The situation is this: If we have a 10-minute time agreement followed by a motion to table, if the matter is tabled, and we
do not--this is the last matter that is eligible to be brought up on this bill, we would then go to final passage without a record vote, and so Senators are thereby released.
If it is not tabled, then we would need to discuss it further and perhaps amend it in the second degree.
I am not sure about that. I did not mean to threaten Senators if they would stay here all night. I did mean to say I know we could go home at the end of 10 minutes if a matter cuts off debate and then you go to final passage without a record vote. That is all I was saying, and I hope that does not sound unfair, but it is factual.
Mr. BUMPERS. There is a second part of this amendment which I think is also very important and a part which I think we would certainly agree to. If you were not opposed to the requirement that there be $650 million in foreign participation on this project, we also state in the amendment that no components for the collider purchased with U.S. tax dollars manufactured outside the United States shall be counted as a contribution from international sources toward that goal.
The Senator would agree with that part of it, would he not?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, in the first place, the Appropriations Committee has long believed that if this project was worth doing, it is worth doing with American dollars.
If I can read to the Senator, as far back as 1990, our report said this:
The committee believes that the benefits to be gained by magnet industrialization, especially manufacturing technology in the U.S. industry, outweigh the budgetary requirements that appear to require foreign participation.
So, Mr. President, we do not believe we ought to make this requirement, and particularly we do not believe we ought to make the requirement in such way as to give foreigners a veto, because the amendment says you cannot go forward after June 1, 1993 unless you have foreign participation in place.
What this would mean is that if the Japanese came to see us on May 1, 1993, and you do not otherwise have the foreign participation in place, they could say, `Here is $650 million, and we want the cream of your technology.' And we would either have to say yea, in which event they get the cream of our technology, or say nay, in which event you stop the super conductor in place.
We should not give foreigners a veto on this project. That is all it is.
Mr. BUMPERS. I am not so concerned about giving foreigners a veto as I am about the representation that has been made to the United States Senate time and time again about foreign participation.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Not by this Senator.
Mr. BUMPERS. Maybe not by that Senator, maybe not by the committee report language, but I can show you. Look at the debate last year in the Congressional Record. You will see time after time a Senator got up and said our foreign partners will think we are reneging on them if we do not go forward with this. They are in. They are committed.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I think the Senator is referring to the House debate. I think I am correct--
Mr. BUMPERS. I want to correct it to this extent. The Senator from Louisiana did not do that. But there were other Senators in his position who did.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Maybe, maybe not. Let us look at that Record.
Mr. BUMPERS. I read the Record this weekend.
Mr. DOLE. Can we offer the amendment? Can we start the clock?
Mr. BUMPERS. I am having a lot of fun. This is a good amendment. I do not want anybody to vote willy-nilly on it without knowing what they are voting on. That would be a terrible thing to happen around here.
Mr. PRESIDENT, since we only had 10 minutes, I thought we ought to clarify what we are talking about here; that is, there ought to be some foreign participation but, on these sole source contracts, which the project is now busily engaged in with foreign companies, sole sources, no competition, they ought not be doing that, and we provided in the other amendment that they not do it. In this one I am saying that any contracts they give to foreigners shall not be counted as a foreign participation. Nobody can disagree with that, can they?
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
[Page: S11214]
The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] proposes an amendment numbered 2836.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the amendment, insert the following: `None of the funds made available by this Act shall be obligated for the superconducting super collider after June 1, 1993, unless the President has certified to the Congress that commitments for contributions from international sources meet or exceed a total of $650,000,000 for fiscal years 1993, 1994, and 1995. No components for the superconducting super collider purchased with United States tax dollars and manufactured outside the United States shall be counted as a contribution from international sources for the purpose of meeting the $650 million foreign contribution requirement.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, to the distinguished floor manager, I would also like to make an additional point to carry out the colloquy a little further.
I remember very well in 1989 when Secretary Watkins came before the Energy Committee and said `I am sorry about that $4 billion projection. It is now at $5.9. But I want to tell you for sure, that if it is a dime more than that, it should not be built.' I am quoting the Secretary of Energy who is today the cheerleader for this project at $11.8 billion, just twice what it was when he told the committee in 1989 that it ought not to be built if it exceeded $5.9 billion. But he says the cushion of this is $5.9. Texas is going to contribute $900 million and, in addition to that, we feel certain that the Japanese, who are very enthusiastic about this project, will come in for somewhere between $500 million and $1 billion.
Mr. President, I am offering this amendment not to needle the proponents of this project, not to be an obstructionist, but to say at some point people ought to be held accountable for their representations. If you want to say come in here and lie to us, tell us anything you want to, we do not care, we are going to spend the money anyway, that is one thing. But if you expect the Secretary of Energy, for example, to be a man of integrity, and a man of good representation, a man whom you want to rely on, if you want to rely on him, then you ought to vote for this amendment.
I did not suggest that Japan was coming in for a half a billion to $1 billion. I did not even know they were anticipating $1.7 billion in foreign participation. Nobody suggested that this was a good project, whether they came in or not. The suggestion was it was so good they could not resist it. We now know that it `ain't' good enough for anybody.
Japan has said that if you wait for the year 2000 there is a technology that may make this obsolete, that would be much less expensive. The Congressional Research Service says the British think it is utter waste of money because they know the technology will change by the year 2000 and be much less expensive.
Mr. HAWKIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. BUMPERS. I am happy to yield.
Mr. HARKIN. I have here a Chronicle of Higher Education, March 1992, a report that says the Department of Energy said that much of the overseas work will be done by contracting work to foreign countries, without receiving competitive bids from American companies, and also that the contributions will come mainly in the savings achieved by constructing sophisticated magnets and other technical hardware with low-cost overseas labor. The Department's plans was revealed here in the scientific meeting on the super collider by the project manager, and other agency officials. They estimated that the agency would receive about $400 million in assistance from the four countries in this way.
I wonder if the Senator could elaborate. Is he telling me they are going to have sole source contracting for some of these components in low-wage countries from overseas and the difference between what they would charge for that and what we would have to pay for it here would----
Mr. BUMPERS. As a contribution. The Senator answered his own question.
Mr. HARKIN. That would be a contribution.
Mr. BUMPERS. Absolutely.
Mr. HARKIN. I do not think that is right.
Mr. BUMPERS. I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, as I said earlier, the Appropriations Committee of the Senate has long believed and has put in our report each year that we believe that if the super conductor is worth doing, it is worth doing in the United States. Frankly, we have discouraged the penchant of some of those in the Department of Energy to get foreign participation on the ground, that if foreigners participate they want the best of the manufacturing technology. The Japanese are ahead of us now in automobiles, not because they invented these devices for automobiles but because of their manufacturing technology; or at least they have been ahead of us, and I understand now that we are moving right on ahead and turning that around.
In any event, I would hope that we would keep the cream of this technology for ourselves.
But beyond that, Mr. President, to put us in the position where we must get $650 million before June 1, 1993, or else the cutoff ax falls--I mean what this says is on June 1, 1993, if you do not have the $650 million in place, you cannot proceed to spend another dollar; you have to fire all of your employees. And what does that mean for contracting? It means that any contract you let between now and then must be subject to the provision that all funding may stop on June 1, 1993. What is that going to do to a contract? They have a built in termination cost in the contract which is going to up the cost of the contracts.
It effectively gives a veto to the Japanese or anybody else who can submit whatever it is they want to submit, and we have to take it or leave it or not proceed with the project. I mean they can say here is $650 million, and we want all the rights to all of the manufacturing technology, right on down the list. So that they would get the cream of the project for $650 million, and it is put to us `Take it or leave it.'
I know that is not what the Senator from Arkansas has in mind, but I think that is the inevitable result of this.
I hope we build it ourselves. Most of the cost is already sunk and is there. Let us develop this technology in America. The science is worth finding out. We ought to do it here. We clearly should not give a veto to a foreign power, and put our contracting provisions in limbo so that we do not know whether we are a reliable contracting party. That will only run up the cost.
So, Mr. President, while I understand what the Senator from Arkansas wants to do, I do not think this accomplishes it.
One final word: That is, the Senator from Iowa talked about these noncompetitive bids from foreigners with low wage scales.
I believe we have fixed that problem with a previous amendment, which we have accepted.
mr. BUMPERS. I just explained that.
Mr. HARKIN. That is what the Senator informed me of.
In reading this further it seems like Mr. Cipriani is going on saying they are going to discuss the possibility of awarding contracts to South Korea to build medium energy booster magnets, and to China for components on the accelerator. My question comes back to, are we going to be using taxpayer dollars to contract with low-wage countries like China and places like that to build components for this?
Mr. JOHNSTON. The answer is no.
Mr. HARKIN. How about buying the components here and spending the taxpayers' dollars here?
Mr. JOHNSTON. The Senator is right in his concern. Under the amendment accepted, that cannot be done.
Mr. HARKIN. What if China bids competitively on building a magnet, and they underbid us, then they can get the contract; is that not right?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, as a practical matter that cannot be done. We are the only country in the world right now that can build these magnets. They have taken a long time to design.
Mr. BUMPERS. Louisiana is the only State where they can be built; is that correct?
[Page: S11215]
Mr. JOHNSTON. No. They are actually being built at the Fermi Lab.
Mr. HARKIN. If these other countries put in bids that are lower than what they are here, then obviously the contracts can be awarded overseas; is that true?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Well, with the magnets, which is the biggest component part, only Westinghouse and General Dynamics are capable of doing this anyway. We are way down the road on that.
Mr. HARKIN. Can they sub-contract----
Mr. JOHNSTON. I understand the Senator's concern. I do not think it is a real one.
Mr. HARKIN. My concern is a real one
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the proponent has expired. The Senator from Arkansas has 1 minute 9 seconds remaining.
Mr. BUMPERS. Would the Senator from Louisiana agree with me, so that the record is painfully clear on this, that if we enter into a competitive contract, and South Korea and the United States each bid on the contract and the South Koreans bid $100 million, and the United States company bids $150 million, the contract goes to South Korea, because they are $50 million under the American company? Would the Senator agree with me that under no circumstances should that difference of $50 million be counted as a foreign participation by Korea?
Mr. JOHNSTON. That is correct.
Mr. BUMPERS. The Senator from Louisiana would not tolerate that?
Mr. JOHNSTON. That is correct.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, this amendment simply says that the foreign participation ought to be $650 million, and it also says--I want to be clear so that everybody understands it--no components purchased with U.S. tax dollars and manufactured out of the United States shall be counted as a contribution for purposes of meeting this limit.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I move to table the amendment and ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays are ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Burdick], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Dixon], and the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Gore] are necessarily absent.
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. Hatch], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Rudman], and the Senator from California [Mr. Seymour] are necessarily absent.
I further announce that the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms] is absent due to illness.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Utah [Mr. Hatch] would vote `yea.'
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Conrad). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 62, nays 31, as follows:
So the motion to table the amendment (No. 2836) was agreed to.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the motion was agreed to.
Mr. HATFIELD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is the first excepted committee amendment.
The question is on agreeing to the first excepted committee amendment.
The first excepted committee amendment was agreed to.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. HATFIELD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is now on the second committee amendment, as amended.
The second committee amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. HATFIELD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I would like to make a brief statement in support of a provision in the 1993 Energy and Water development appropriations bill which will assist our country as it makes the difficult economic transition brought on by lower defense spending. The provision I am speaking of is an appropriation of $141 million to fund technology cooperation and technology transfer activities between the Department of Energy weapons labs and industry.
The appropriation contained in this bill represents a $91 million increase in funding for this purpose over fiscal year 1992 levels. As reported out of committee, the bill originally appropriated $116 million for this purpose, and on Friday an amendment increasing the appropriation to $141 million was offered to the bill by the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Bennett Johnston, on behalf of Senators Jeff Bingaman and Pete Domenici of New Mexico.
As most of my colleagues know by now, the Senate Democratic Task Force on Defense/Economic Transition made recommendations to the majority leader on May 21 of ways the Federal Government can help workers, communities, and industry make the adjustment to a lower defense spending environment. Senator Bingaman was one of the members of the task force and he contributed mightily and unselfishly to its work. One of the recommendations the task force made was a proposal that the country's defense labs reorient themselves to perform more cooperative work with the private sector. Primary among these labs are the DOE's large weapons labs which represent one of the greatest resources in our Nation's entire R&D infrastructure.
With the end of the cold war and the concurrent decline in our defense expenditures, weapons development will fade in importance. These labs can continue to serve a valuable purpose, however, by turning their tremendous technical resources toward the challenges faced by U.S. manufacturers trying to compete in the world market.
One of the primary mechanisms for promoting greater lab industry cooperation is the DOE's cooperative research and development agreements, or CRADA's. Under the CRADA process, individual companies submit competitive proposals for cooperative research projects to the labs. Once a proposal is selected, the industry participant must put up some of its own money to match the government contribution to the project. In this way, only the highest quality projects, with true market potential are funded.
There is a substantial body of opinion which believes we need to do more to promote greater cooperation between the labs and industry. The DOE should cut down on the red tape and bureaucracy which currently slows the CRADA approval process. The labs should use their regular programmatic funds for cooperative projects with industry and not limit this type of work just to CRADA's. Alternatively, the Congress and the DOE should investigate the possibility of giving the individual labs direct control over an amount of money in their budgets for cooperative project with industry, in addition to the CRADA money which is currently controlled by DOE headquarters.
We must try new ways to unlock the tremendous potential offered by these labs. According to reports I have heard, industry interest in working cooperatively with the labs is at an all time high, and the competitive pressures U.S. industry is facing is at or near an all time high as well. Now that their importance in the cold war is fading, these labs can be a potent weapon in the economic war we are embroiled in, and the Energy and Water appropriations bill before us provides the ammunition the labs need.
Mr. President, in closing, I want to mention that in addition to the Senate Democratic Task Force on Defense/Economic Transition, President Bush also recommended an increase in funding for CRADA's. I believe this recommendation displayed some of the greatest initiative of all the defense transition recommendations made by President Bush, and I commend him for it.
I urge my colleagues to support this provision of the bill.
[Page: S11216]
Mr. RIEGLE. Mr President, I rise today in support of Children's Hospital of Michigan's positron emission tomography [PET] scanner project. Completion of this project is of great importance to Michigan and the pediatric community nationwide.
The PET scan is state-of-the-art imaging technology which enables clinicians to detect and treat diseases such as epilepsy, brain tumors, and AIDS by assessing the biochemical and physiological functioning of vital organs which cannot be detected by traditional forms of imaging. While the Department of Energy played a pivotal role in the development of this technology, and contributed to the establishment of many of the PET scanners operating in an adult setting there is no PET scan machine in the Nation dedicated solely to the treatment of children. Yet, children under 15 years of age comprise 25 percent of the U.S. population.
Children's Hospital of Michigan's demonstration pediatric PET scanner project will, for the first time, make this advanced energy-related medical technology available to children. In addition, this demonstration project will contribute significantly to the transfer of this technology throughout the entire pediatric medical community.
Children's Hospital of Michigan needs an additional $8 million to complete this project. Children's Hospital has already provided $29 million, more than 60 percent of the total cost associated with the project. The funds we are seeking will allow the hospital to complete implementation of this innovative project.
Last year, the PET scanner project, with the support of the distinguished chairman and ranking member, Senators Johnston and Hatfield, as well as Senator Levin and myself, received $8 million in the fiscal year 1991 Energy and Water appropriations bill. These funds were used for construction and renovation of the facility that will house the PET scanner. I believe this initiative, which will demonstrate the benefit of this technology while serving a new population of patients, deserves continued Federal assistance.
Mr. President, it is my understanding that, while there are no demonstration projects in the House Energy and Water appropriations measure, the Senate version of the bill does make some funding available for demonstration projects. On behalf of the entire Michigan House delegation, which has expressed its support for this project and Senator Levin who shares my commitment to the PET scanner initiative, I urge the members of the Senate Appropriations Committee to provide funding the PET scanner project when the bill is taken up in a conference so that Children's Hospital of Michigan can complete this important project.
Mr. President, I commend Senators Johnston and Hatfield for their commitment to this project in the past and for their leadership in the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, our national laboratories and U.S. industries have enthusiastically welcomed the opportunity to team together to pursue research in areas critical to our national competitiveness. For the Department of Energy's Defense Laboratories, technology transfer is a relatively new endeavor. However, industry has recognized the scientific and engineering resources within the laboratories and is participating in cooperative research and development agreements [CRADA's] with the labs as quickly as the CRADA's can be approved by the Department.
I am pleased with the recent progress the Department has made toward streamlining the CRADA approval process and look forward to continued improvements.
Technology transfer is now benefiting all levels of U.S. industry; from small entrepreneurial businesses to corporate giants such as General Motors. I would like to include in the Record a brief listing of some of the most recent CRADA's that labs in my State of New Mexico have signed; the first list from Sandia National Laboratories, and the second from Los Alamos National Laboratories. These lists clearly demonstrate our labs are proving to be a valuable resource to industry interested in pursuing cutting-edge technologies.
The appropriations bill before us today includes $141 million for technology transfer programs at the Department of Energy. I am very pleased the Senate has seen fit to provide the full amount of the President's request.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES CRADAS
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CRADA No. and company name Technology title Signed
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1010--Vindicator Corp Physical Security Technology Yes.
1011--BPLW Architects and Engineers, Inc ......do Yes.
1014--Stellar Systems ......do Yes.
1018--United Technologies/Pratt & Whitney Intelligent Processing Thin Section Welded Assemblles Yes.
1020--LSI Logic Microelectronics Quality Reliability Center (MQRC) Yes.
1021--Signetics Company ......do Yes.
1023--National Semiconductor ......do Yes.
1026--Motorola, Inc. Solvent Reduction Through Use of Self-Cleaning Soldering Process Yes.
1027--Permacharge, Inc Microcellular Foam Filtration Media Fabrication and Evaluation Yes.
1028--Dow Corning Corp Microengineered Materials Development Project Yes.
1029--Watkins Johnson Chemical Vapor Deposition of Copper for Integrated Circuits Yes.
1029B--Schumacher Inc ......do Yes.
1030B--NCMS Printed Wiring Board--Interconnect Systems Program Yes (ceremonial signing)
1032--Rocketdyne Intelligent Process Control for Automated Welding, Machining, and Assembly Yes.
1033--United Technologies/Pratt & Whitney Intelligent Machining of Castings Yes.
1034--City of Albuquerque Volatile organic monitor for industrial effluents Yes.
1035B--AT&T Projection X-ray Lithography using a Laser Plasma Source Yes (ceremonial signing).
1042--Carpenter Technology Joining Technology for Advanced Borated Stainless Steel Yes.
1044--General Electric Synthetic Diamond Substrates for Electronic Multi-Chip Packaging Yes.
1045--Oregon Cutting Systems Diamond Chainsaw Rock Cutting System Technology Development Yes.
1046B--Fluid Dynamics International, Inc Sandia MESH Generation Computer Software Yes.
1046C--MacNeal-Schwendler Corp ......do Yes.
1047--Olin-Hunt Corp Microelectronics Quality Reliability Center (MQRC) Yes.
1053--Shell Development Company Reduction of Energy Consumption & Water Streams with Hydrous Metal Oxide Catalysts for the Synthesis of Oxygenate Product Yes.
1055--Schlumberger Technologies Development of a Structured Failure Analysis Expert System Yes.
1057--Cray Research Inc Cleaning Related Processes for Printed Wiring Boards Yes.
1058--Sematech Microelectronics Technology Phase 1 Yes.
1063--Kaehr Plating Electroplating Process Control Yes.
1072--Mechanical Technology Inc Robotic Sensor End Effector Yes.
1075--Radiant Technologies Nonvolatile Forroelectric Random Access Memories Yes.
1077--Sematech Semiconductor Equipment Reliability Modeling and Design Yes.
1078--BIOSYM Technologies, Inc Molecular Design of Polymer Alloys No, not until after Aug. 24, 1992.
1085--Conductus, Inc Confocal Resonator Imaging Systems No, until after Aug. 16, 1992.
1091A--Digital Instruments, Inc Non-contact Atomic Level Interface Force Microscope No, not signed by Participant.
1092--AT&T Bell Laboratories Fabrication of Microelectronic Structuring Using Gold-Subfile Electroplating No, not until Aug. 29, 1992.
1108--NCMS NCMS Umbrella CRADA Yes (ceremonial signing).
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[Page: S11217]
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY
[Cooperative research and development agreements (CRADA) executed as of July 31, 1992]
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CRADA No. and company Technology description Effective date/duration
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LC910003--United Technologies Corp, Pratt & Whitney, Manufacturing Science Corp Advanced Beryllium Processing Apr. 30, 1992--3 yr.
LC9110006--Motorola, Inc Dataflow Computer Apr. 8, 1992--1 yr.
LC110007--Hughes Aircraft Co SCCO2 Cleaning of Particulates Mar. 27, 1992--25 mo.
LC10009--DICO Corp FB-CVD of Diamond Jan. 29, 1992--30 mo.
LC9110010--Schlumberger-Doll Research Downhole Oilwell Tool Modeling Mar. 30, 1992--3 yr.
LC9110011--Life Technologies, Inc DNA Sequencing Mar. 21, 1991--3 yr.
LC9110012--Canberra Industries, Inc Continuous Air Monitor June 5, 1991--2 yr.
LC9110014--Cray Research, Inc Computational Electromagnetics Mar. 30, 1992--18 mo.
LC9110016--Cray Research, Inc Global Climate Modeling Mar. 30, 1992--12 mo.
LC9110017--Cray Research Inc Computational Chemistry Mar. 30, 1992--3 yr.
LC9110020--AWC/Lockheed Corp Soil Remediation Feb. 18, 1992--2 yr.
LC9210028--Neocera, Inc Pulsed Laser Deposition--High Temperature Superconducting Films June 30, 1992--2 yr.
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Mr. SANFORD. I would like to discuss with the distinguished Senator from Louisiana a project of extreme importance to me and to the economic well-being of my State of North Carolina. Would the Senator allow me to speak for a moment on the need for the Corps of Engineers to remain engaged in the project to deepen and widen the harbor at Morehead City, NC?
Mr. JOHNSTON. I would be glad to entertain any remarks by my good friend from North Carolina.
Mr. SANFORD. Congress began action on the proposal to deepen Morehead City Harbor in 1984, and you know how slow the preliminary stages of these projects can be, Mr. President. The corps is, however, now preparing to put the dredges in the water. Unfortunately, it looks like I may have to tell my friends in eastern North Carolina that the project will have to wait a little longer.
I do understand the severe constraints placed upon the chairman's this year, and I am grateful for his support of that funding which will ensure that the project does not die. While the corps will almost certainly not be able to remain on schedule for the Morehead City dredging program, the $100,000 which the committee has recommended for this initiative in the corps general construction account is absolutely essential to ensure that the corps does not fall hopelessly behind.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I respect the Senator's remarks and I understand the importance of the Morehead City Harbor to North Carolina. I pledge to the Senator from North Carolina that I will do my best to maintain at least the modest appropriation of $100,000 for deepening this port as the Energy appropriations bill is reviewed by the conferees. The committee recommendation is the full amount requested in the President's fiscal year 1993 budget by the Corps of Engineers.
Mr. SANFORD. I am grateful to the distinguished chairman of the Energy and Water Subcommittee for his words of support. I would, however, like to let the Senator from Louisiana know of the commitments made by State legislators in North Carolina to fund their portion of the cost-share for the Morehead City dredging project. After much debate, and in the midst of very tough financial times for our State
government, North Carolina lawmakers recently approved the expenditure of more than $3.5 million for Morehead City dredging this year. Unfortunately, these funds may be lost without a sufficient Federal commitment.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Again, I want the Senator from North Carolina to know that I will make every effort to retain the $100,000 in conference, thereby ensuring that Congress can consider further funding of this program again next year. I am sure the Senator is aware that the Morehead City project is among those waiting to be authorized by the Water Resources Development Act of 1992.
Mr. SANFORD. I thank the Senator for mentioning this additional relevant piece of legislation. I am acutely aware of the status of S. 2734, the Water Resources Development Act of 1992, and of the fact that the Morehead City project, and a worthy storm damage reduction project benefitting Topsail Beach, NC, are among those initiatives that the act would authorize. As I have indicated to the chairman personally and in a recent letter, I am disappointed that S. 2734 has been obstructed from coming to the floor, and I am hopeful that many of the corps' priority programs, which will certainly strengthen this Nation's economic security, will soon receive full Senate consideration in this bill.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I am glad that the senator from North Carolina has taken this opportunity to discuss these issues with me, and I am certainly aware of the role that the Corps of Engineers must play in meeting the needs of his state.
Mr. SANFORD. I am grateful to the senior Senator from Louisiana for his indulgence.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise in support of the energy and water development appropriations bill reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee.
By CBO's scoring, this bill provides $22.1 billion in new budget authority and $12.4 billion in new outlays for the Department of Energy, the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and for other selected independent agencies. By CBO's scoring the bill is within its section 602(b) allocation and the discretionary spending caps.
Mr. President, the committee would restore funding for the superconducting super collider [SSC]. This project represents an investment in our future, an investment that will allow us to maintain and strengthen our lead in science and technology development.
The committee also imposes a responsible moratorium on nuclear weapons testing--one that prohibits any tests except those needed for safety purposes.
I want to thank the distinguished chairman and ranking member for including funding for a number of projects and programs important to my home State of New Mexico.
In particular, I want to thank the managers for maintaining funding for the core research and development programs of the Nation's defense laboratories and providing funding for technology transfer initiatives.
The bill also includes funding for the Los Alamos Meson physics facility [LAMPF]. This facility and other dependent operations provide increasingly valuable educational, technology transfer, health, and environmental benefits.
I am concerned by the bill's funding of LAMPF and the Office of Nuclear Safety with defense funds. The administration's preliminary assessment is that these transfers should be scored against the domestic discretionary cap.
During the committee's consideration of the bill, I stated my hope that in conference a portion of the LAMPF funding will be continued through DOE's civilian energy budget.
There are several other matters in this bill that I will address as we proceed with the bill.
I commend the subcommittee chairman, the Senator from Louisiana, and the ranking minority member, the Senator from Oregon, for their hard work to meet continuing program requirements and important priorities and their efforts to keep the bill within its section 602(b) allocation.
Mr. SEYMOUR. I would like to engage in a colloquy with Chairman Johnston and the ranking Republican member, Senator Hatfield regarding appropriations for several projects important to California.
Senator Johnston, as the chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, and Senator Hatfield, also a member of that committee, are aware that I have been working with them for the past year to resolve critical fish and wildlife problems in the State of California.
While I realize Chairman Johnston and Senator Hatfield have had to make some difficult decisions this year regarding appropriations levels, I would like to bring to their attention several worthy projects which would provide for the restoration of sensitive fish and wildlife habitat, and begin the process of resolving some of these problems.
The House bill provides $300,000 for a conjunctive use study to determine the viability of using private Sacramento Valley rice fields as seasonal wetlands. This funding would allow the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to participate with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, appropriate State agencies and private organizations to work together on this study.
California's Sacramento Valley has perhaps the best soil and climate for rice production in the United States. While California's almost 400,000 acres of rice land ranks third in acreage, our farmers rank second in yields due to the excellent climate. In addition to the tremendous economic benefits provided by the rice industry to the Sacramento Valley and to the State, these fields provide additional benefits not known to many people outside the rice industry and the conservation community.
Rice fields, flooded with several inches of water for part of the year are actually seasonal wetlands, providing excellent habitat for hundreds of species of wildlife. Each year after harvest approximately 400 pounds of rice per acre is leftover in the fields. This grain is a remarkably rich food source for ducks, geese, and other waterfowl migrating through the Pacific flyway. In fact, California's rice fields are one of the North America's largest, most significant wildlife habitats.
This study would provide the necessary research to determine how to better utilize Sacramento Valley rice fields for seasonal wetlands and for offstream water storage.
Additionally, the House bill provides $300,000 to provide for the completion of feasibility reports and documentation to determine the necessary measures to provide reliable water supplies to Central Valley wetlands and wildlife refuges. Currently, there are 15 National Wildlife Refuges and Management areas in the Central Valley. Unfortunately, it has only recently become clear that additional facilities will be necessary in order to provide them with the water requirements outlined in the Bureau of Reclamations 1989 Report on Refuge Water Supply Investigations. This funding will allow the Bureau of Reclamation to complete the necessary reports required to determine what facilities are needed.
Finally, the House bill provides $800,000 for the Bureau of Reclamation to continue design work on the temperature control device at Shasta dam. This device will allow the bureau to provide cold water for outmigrating and spawning salmon, including the winter-run salmon now listed as an endangered species, when it is most needed during the hot summer months. I would like to thank both Chairman Johnston and Senator Hatfield for their assistance last year to include in the drought bill, signed by the President in March, a provision to begin design and specification work on this device.
I ask Chairman Johnston and Senator Hatfield if there will be an opportunity to recede to the House position on these projects during conference?
[Page: S11218]
Mr. JOHNSTON. I appreciate Senator Seymour's bringing these issues to the Subcommittee's attention. Having worked with the Senator in the Energy and Natural Resources Committee on these matters, I am familiar with them. I assure the Senator I will give these matters careful consideration.
Mr. HATFIELD. Senator Seymour has worked diligently during the past year to resolve these issues he has brought to our attention today. As the Senator from the State bordering California, I am very aware of the conflict that has emerged in California during the ongoing water debate. The projects Senator Seymour has supported are important, particularly because they are creative, rather than divisive solutions to restore fish and wildlife habitat. There is no question these are worthy projects, and I will work with my colleagues in conference to insure they are thoroughly considered and evaluated on their merits and benefits.
Mr. SASSER. I would like to discuss with the manager of the bill an issue of vital importance regarding the appropriation for advanced reactor research and development. For several years now, I have supported and the Senator from Louisiana has recommended funding in the energy and water appropriations bill for the university research program in robotics for advanced reactors. Unfortunately, because of the severe budgetary constraints faced by the committee this year, the bill and report before us do not include the $3.5 million in funding earmarked in the House report for the Robotics Program.
The Robotics program is conducted by teams of graduate students and faculty members at the Universities of Tennessee, Texas, Florida, and Michigan, along with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. They have worked tirelessly with the money appropriated in prior years to establish a comprehensive research agenda for developing advanced robotic technology. These efforts have resulted in important accomplishments in a broad variety of technical areas such as sensor based robotics, advanced manipulators and mobile robots.
For these reasons, I strongly support continued congressional support for the university research program in robotics for advanced reactors. I know that the Senator from Louisiana has done his best to balance the many demands placed on the committee during this difficult fiscal year, but I am hopeful that in conference negotiations he will give strong consideration to adopting the House position on funding for the Robotics Program.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The Senator from Tennessee is correct in stating that our committee has supported funding for the Robotics program for several years. Our inability to make the same recommendation this year was based on budgetary constraints, not doubts about the effectiveness of the program. I can assure the Senator from Tennessee that I will give careful consideration in conference negotiations to adopting the House position on funding for the Robotics Program.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, during the Senate's consideration of H.R. 5373, the energy and water development appropriations bill for fiscal year 1993, I would like to bring to my colleagues' attention a major energy initiative by the Navajo Nation in New Mexico and Arizona. That initiative is the proposed Navajo transmission project that would install a 500,000 volt transmission line that could move much needed electricity to the Southwestern and Western United States.
The Congress has spent a significant part of this session debating a national energy strategy for the United States. I am proud to say that the State of New Mexico has done its share in providing abundant, competitively priced electrical energy to the growing Southwest. The majority of this electrical energy is produced from clean, economical powerplants that utilize regional coal as a fuel, and many of these plants are located on reservation lands belonging to the Navajo people in New Mexico and Arizona. It is the growing interdependence of the electrical energy supply in the Southwest, and a recent major energy initiative of the Navajo Nation that I would like to discuss today.
Mr. President, the report accompanying the fiscal year 1993 energy and water development appropriations bill, discusses the Navajo transmission project as part of the funding recommendations of the Western Area Power Administration [WAPA]. Although the Appropriations Committee was unable to accommodate the request I made on behalf of the Navajo Nation for and fiscal year 1993 appropriation of $6.2 million to allow the tribe to proceed with an environmental impact statement on the proposed transmission project, the committee does request that WAPA work with the Navajo Nation in the development of this project and that it provide such assistance as is possible. In fact, the Navajo Nation is working on an agreement with WAPA for $1.2 million to be provided for preliminary work on the Navajo transmission project within its fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1993 budgets.
Last January, the Navajo Nation, under the leadership of Navajo president Peterson Zah and vice president Marshall Plummer, issued an important policy statement on energy development on Navajo lands. The President's energy policy for the Navajo Nation provides a comprehensive strategy for future energy development for the tribe, while setting out important
goals that support the implementation of the strategy. The Navajo Nation is to be commended for this initiative to establish a formal energy policy for the tribe.
A major underpinning of the strategy is Navajo ownership in energy projects constructed and operated on and over Navajo reservation lands. The Navajo Nation no longer wants to limit its role in these projects to that of a lessor of land, water and other resources. Rather, through cooperative efforts with entities seeking the opportunity to develop energy projects on Navajo lands, this ownership objective can be met. Indeed, with over 40 percent of Navajo general fund revenues coming from energy production, this next step seems all the more fair and reasonable.
As a measure of the tribe's commitment, over the past 2 years it has pursued the development of a strategic regional power transmission project that would substantially improve the deliverability of existing electrical generation in the four corners area of New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado and Utah to various Western electricity markets. The proposed Navajo transmission project is planned as a 500,000 volt transmission line that would be capable of moving up to 1,200 million watts of electrical energy and capacity from `source to sink.' As long ago as the mid-1960's, a power transmission capacity deficit has been growing in this region of our national electrical grid. It is through the single initiative of the Navajo Nation in this project that our Nation's resources can be more efficiently and effectively utilized.
As such, I believe the Navajo transmission project to be of a national interest.
This 400-mile long line will originate in the four corners area of northwestern New Mexico and span the breadth of Arizona, terminating at a station in southern Nevada. Construction is expected to begin after an approximately 24-month licensing and permitting period, with the transmission facility going into commercial operation in late 1996.
The Navajo Nation, through its tribal energy enterprise, the Dine' Power Authority, has recently entered into an agreement with the Western Area Power Administration of the Department of Energy, that will create a partnership to make this needed project a reality. Western has had a need for additional transmission capacity over the Navajo reservation in this region for years. Indeed, Western has received congressional approval in past budgets to construct a very similar facility over the reservation.
This new cooperative approach, while serving the needs of Western and its customers, preserves an ownership in the finished project that is vital to the long-term energy interests of the Navajo Nation. Western's efforts in working closely with the Navajo Nation on the project have not gone unnoticed by the Senate, and Western Administrator Clagett deserves our appreciation for his leadership.
The preconstruction costs of the project have been estimated at $13.7 million. The vast majority of this cost is for an environmental impact statement that will be required of the Navajo Nation and Western; this, in spite of the fact that over 75 percent of the project will be restricted to lands of the Navajo Nation. These costs do not include several million dollars already expended by the Navajo Tribe to bring the Navajo transmission project to its current level of planning and development.
I am pleased to acknowledge that the Western Area Power Administration has already agreed to commit $1.2 million from its fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1993 budgets toward these preconstruction costs. The Navajo Nation approached Congress for assistance with the balance of this necessary preconstruction funding during fiscal year 1993 and fiscal year 1994. The construction cost for the project attributable to Navajo ownership is planned to be raised in the financial markets. Western's pro rata share of construction costs is anticipated to be appropriated by Congress, as is the case with all projects.
Because additional transmission capacity out of the Four Corners areas is a precondition to moving existing resources to market, and because of the potential for clean, inexpensive electrical generation using abundant supplies of natural gas in New Mexico, the support for the Navajo project is widespread among my Senate and House colleagues from the West.
The Navajo Transmission Project is an important energy initiative by a native American tribe. It will allow much better utilization of existing energy resources throughout the West, creating both a transmission capability that will be needed in the future as existing facilities reach their useful life, and a supply of power as demand grows in the Southwest. I will join my colleagues from the West in urging the Western Area Power Administration to provide the maximum support possible to the Navajo Nation on the proposed Navajo transmission project in fiscal year 1993. I ask my Senate colleagues to join me in supporting the Navajo Nation in its strategic energy initiative and in this most important Navajo transmission project.
[Page: S11219]
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, as many of my colleagues know, it is becoming increasingly difficult to move electricity around existing transmission grids to meet growing energy demands. In many ways, our inability to do so creates conditions of both surplus and shortages which results in an inefficient use of our Nation's resources. There are few areas of the country in which this transmission deficit is more acute than in the four corners area in the Southwest.
Since the 1960's, several large powerplants have been built in this area of the country. These generating stations provide electricity to millions of people in California, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, and Nevada. Fueled mainly by abundant supplies of competitively priced coal, the pace of construction of these large-scale power plants has far exceeded the construction of adequate transmission facilities. Consequently, since the early sixties, the transmission deficit has grown to the point where there is a bottleneck in this critical power production region of the country.
Many of these powerplants and transmission lines exist on the Navajo Nation's Reservation in northwestern New Mexico and northern Arizona. Since these facilities were first constructed, the Navajo Nation has failed to enjoy the privilege of ownership, remaining instead of the role of lessor of their lands. In every case, compensation for use of Navajo lands came in the form of small one-time payments for lease durations that in some instances are perpetual. These terms were then, and remain today, commercially unfair to the Navajo People.
Over the last 2 years, at the tribe's own expense, the Navajo Nation has investigated the feasibility of constructing a large power transmission line from four corners, across Arizona, to southern Nevada, that would go far toward alleviating the transmission bottleneck of which I spoke earlier. Called the Navajo transmission project, this 400 mile, 500,000-volt line would transfer about 1,200 million watts of power from existing and potential generation sources to growing electrical load centers in the Western United States. By virtue of its strategic power interconnection in southern Nevada to a number of existing and planned transmission lines, the Navajo transmission project will allow for the seasonal exchange of energy between hydroelectric resources in the Pacific Northwest, and coal-based resources in the Southwest.
Such diversity encourages the strategic management of our existing electric generation resources in the West, avoiding the overbuilding of hydro or thermal generation in any one region. Such overbuilding often results from the absence of power transmission facilities necessary to move power around on our
Nation's utility grid. Thus, the Navajo transmission project will contribute to a more efficient utilization of resources in America.
The Navajo Nation has been working closely with the Western Area Power Administration to pursue joint development and ownership of this project. Doing so will assist WAPA in meeting some of its transmission capacity needs in this region of the West for WAPA's customers. With WAPA participating in the project with the Navajos, an estimated saving of up to $79 million will be realized over an alternate transmission project, the Northern Arizona Project, that has been pursued by WAPA for the last 5 years at a cost of over $14 million.
Preconstruction costs necessary to bring this strategic energy project to construction has been estimated at $13.7 million, with over half these funds going to the environmental impact statement required under the National Environmental Policy Act. This requirement exists despite the fact that up to 75 percent of the right-of-way for the project is through Navajo-controlled lands.
The Navajo Nation has approached Congress for assistance with this needed preconstruction funding. WAPA and the tribe have negotiated the underlying joint development agreement necessary for describing the ultimate coownership structure for the project.
For too many years the Federal Government's policies toward Native Americans have discouraged entrepreneurship and encouraged dependence. In the case of the Navajo transmission project, Congress has been presented an opportunity to reverse this trend. Once this project is at the point of construction, the Navajos intend to raise the approximately $200 million in construction funds in the private financial markets. All that is being requested of Congress is the startup funding to allow for Navajo ownership in a major energy project. This will be a grand and glorious step toward self-determination and enhance credibility for the Navajo People. Congress should reward their initiative with its enthusiastic support and encouragement for success.
Mr. President, I appreciate the committee chairman and ranking member for their efforts in including language in the committee report accompanying the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water appropriations bill indicating the committee's support for the Navajo transmission project. I intend to continue working with them to secure adequate funding to ensure that this worthy project becomes a reality.
Mr. President, I ask that a number of letters I have received in support of this project be included in the Record.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Salt River Project,
Phoenix, AZ, July 20, 1992.
Hon. Dennis DeConcini,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
[Page: S11220]
Dear Senator DeConcini: A power transmission project across our state is being developed jointly by the Navajo Nation and the Western Area Power Administration. Called the `Navajo Transmission Project' (NTP), as proposed, it could provide a beneficial electrical link between the Four Corners and both Southern Arizona and Nevada and, therefore, relieve a power transmission constraint west and south of the Four Corners.
We understand you are sponsoring an appropriation for FY '93 in the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee for preconstruction activity for the NTP, Salt River Project supports your efforts on this appropriation.
Sincerely,
John R. Lassen,
President.
The Navajo Nation,
Window Rock, AZ, June 5, 1992.
Hon. Dennis DeConcini,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator DeConcini: On behalf of the Navajo Nation, thank you for including the Navajo Transmission Project preconstruction costs ($6,195,000), in your appropriation's request to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development. We are heartened by your personal intervention on our behalf. I am pleased to share with you a copy of a letter I received from William H. Clagett, Administrator of the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). WAPA states that it is willing to explore with the Navajo Nation a joint participation project to alleviate the bottleneck in the Four Corners area.
Although WAPA still has on its books the Northern Arizona Project, WAPA states if Congress decides to spend appropriated funds for the Navajo Transmission Project it will spend it on `planning, design, and environmental activities to develop a viable project that is economically competitive with other transmission projects in the Southwest'. The Navajo Transmission Project is much more commercially attractive to the Navajo Nation than the Northern Arizona Project. Further, WAPA is open to redirecting FY '92 funds and their FY '93 budget request `for a project across Navajo lands without further congressional approval'. The Navajo Nation is encouraged that WAPA is willing to redirect such funds but asks that Congress state expressly that such funds will go to the Navajo Transmission Project to avoid any ambiguity.
Currently, the Navajo Nation is working with WAPA on a participation agreement that we hope will be completed this summer. All that remains is securing the essential preconstruction funding, as initiated by you, to move the Navajo Transmission Project toward reality. As we have described to you previously, the Navajo Nation proposes that the FY '93 funds will go to the Dine' Power Authority, that will fund preconstruction activities, notably the Environmental Impact Statement, project management, engineering, and other required development efforts. Of the total request ($6,195,000), $2,060,000 would be appropriated to WAPA to be made available to the Dine' Power Authority in return for a credit toward one-third ownership in the Project by WAPA, and $4,135,000 to the Dine' Power Authority on behalf of the Navajo Nation.
The development of this Project marks a major departure from the way the Navajo Nation has looked at energy development in the past. We have come to realize that it is to our benefit, economically and environmentally, that we become owners in the projects developed on or over our lands. It is time that we take a leadership role for our people in this regard.
Again, we appreciate all your work on our behalf. Please contact me or our Washington Office if you have any need for further information or assistance.
Sincerely,
Marshall Plummer,
Vice President.
Western Area Power Administration,
Golden, CO, May 28, 1992.
Mr. Marshall Plummer,
Vice President, Navajo Nation, Window Rock, AZ.
Dear Mr. Plummer: Mr. Lloyd Greiner (of my staff) and Mr. Tom Wray (of Groves Wray Associates) have had several discussions concerning the FY 1993 appropriations process and the Navajo Transmission Project. This letter summarizes the Western Area Power Administration's (Western) position on this topic. You may use the content of this letter in any way that you wish to facilitate the Project.
Western is willing to explore with Navajo Nation (Nation), and others, a joint participation transmission project to provide additional capacity to alleviate a bottleneck in transmitting hydro and coal-fired generation from the Rocky Mountain region to Southwest load centers. Either the Navajo Transmission Project or the Northern Arizona Project (formulated by Western) can be configured to meet the needs of the Nation, Western, and other participants.
Western supports the Nation in its effort to solicit other utilities' participation in a project which will alleviate the bottleneck in the Four Corners area. In FY 1992, Western has $527,000 available; and Western's FY 1993 budget request includes $633,000 for the Northern Arizona Project. These funds can be utilized for planning and preconstruction activities for a project across Navajo lands without further congressional approval. Western needs to have a signed letter agreement with the Nation in place before funds can be spent.
It is our understanding that the Nation is attempting to obtain a $6.2 million add-on to Western's FY 1993 Construction, Rehabilitation, Operation, and Maintenance appropriation. If Congress decides to appropriate additional funds to Western for the Navajo Transmission Project, Western could spend these funds on planning, design, and environmental activities to develop a viable project that is economically competitive with other transmission projects in the Southwest. Western anticipates recovering through power rates only those costs related to the portion of the project that it owns.
Please contact me if I can be of further assistance in this matter.
Sincerely,
William H. Clagett,
Administrator.
Western U.S. Mining,
Farmington, NM, June 17, 1992.
Hon. Dennis DeConcini,
U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator DeConcini, BHP Minerals operates the Navajo, San Juan and La Plata Mines in New Mexico and is the exclusive fuel supplier to the Four Corners Power Plant (operated by Arizona Public Service Company) and the San Juan Generating Station (operated by Public Service Company of New Mexico). BHP's New Mexico mines produce approximately 14 million tons of coal annually and employ about 900 workers. Members of the Navajo Tribe of Indians account for over 70% of the work force. The $45 million annual payroll and approximately $105 million in taxes and royalties provide a substantial economic base for the Navajo Nation, the State of New Mexico and the Four Corners region.
Representatives of the Dine' Power Authority, a Navajo Tribal Enterprise, have recently advised our company that they have contacted your office seeking legislative support and financial appropriations for the Navajo Transmission Project. This project could address future energy development transmission requirements in addition to providing immediate capacity for current electric generation facilities and production.
For the past several years, BHP Minerals has examined the feasibility of developing large uncommitted coal reserves which are leased from the Navajo Nation. The Navajo South Project contemplates the establishment of a mine-mouth electric generating station together with the necessary transmission facilities. A project of this magnitude would provide substantial economic benefits for the Navajo Nation.
The Navajo South Project, if viable, would require the meaningful participation and involvement of the Navajo Nation. Specifically, the Navajo Nation would be asked to provide the necessary transmission corridors to transmit the electricity to market as well as other natural resource project components.
The Navajo Transmission Project could very well accommodate much of the transmission capacity requirements of BHP Minerals' Navajo South Project if structured appropriately. We believe that coal development on the Navajo Reservation represents a significant economic development alternative for the Navajo Nation. For these reasons, BHP Minerals supports the development of the Navajo Transmission Project and your efforts to assist the Navajo Nation in this regard.
Very truly yours,
JAMES R. ROTHWELL,
Vice President and General Manager,
Western U.S. Mining.
PacifiCorp.,
Portland, OR, July 17, 1992.
Hon. Dennis DeConcini,
U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
[Page: S11221]
Dear Senator DeConcini: PacifiCorp is a major electric utility with significant operations in seven western states. Recent business arrangements have brought us into contact with the Navajo Nation, with whom we hope to establish a long-term, mutually beneficial commercial relationship.
The Navajo Nation has taken major strides in the development of a sound economy, and we are aware of the continuing efforts of the Navajo Nation to expand opportunities through active participation at all levels of development of their energy resorces. In furtherance of its economic efforts, the Navajo Nation has conducted preliminary planning and feasibility studies of the Navajo Transmission Project, a proposed electric transmission project that would connect electric generation facilities on the Navajo Reservation. Whether the Navajo Transmission Project is feasible, both from an environmental and economic perspective, cannot be finally determined by the Navajo Nation and others without further study and review.
It is our understanding that the Navajo Nation has requested federal appropriations for preconstruction development activities and continued planning of the Navajo Transmission Project. Although our organization does not currently intend to participate in the Navajo Transmission Project, we nonetheless request that you give favorable consideration to the Navajo Nation's request.
Sincerely,
Al Gleason.
(At the request of Mr. Dole, the following statement was ordered to be printed in the Record:
We all know that California, in its sixth consecutive year of drought, is confronted with very serious water supply and conservation decisions. Undoubtedly, the 1990's promise to be a challenging decade for California as it attempts to manage its water resource to meet a growing population which will soon surpass 30 million. I appreciate the thoughtful attention members of the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee have given to the needs and concerns of Californians.
Specifically, two projects included in the Senate Energy and Water appropriations bill will help meet the future protection and assistance needs of Californians.
In February of this year, we all witnessed the devastation of flooding when unusually heavy rains hit Southern California. Currently under construction is the Santa Ana River mainstem project. This project, which consists of seven interdependent features, is designed to protect over 2 million residents in San Bernardino, Riverside, and Orange Counties, who live in the Santa Ana River flood plain. In fact, the Corps of Engineers has determined flooding of this river could result in significant loss of life and an estimated $12 billion in property damage. The Santa Ana River mainstem project will provide needed flood protection through the construction and enlargement of dams, levees, and channels. This funding is vitally needed to protect residents in the flood plain as well as protect against future costs associated with a devastating flood. I am truly pleased the committee was able to provide $90.8 million for this critical project.
Also authorized by this bill is the Southern California comprehensive water reclamation and reuse study. This authorization allows the Secretary of the Interior to undertake a comprehensive study to determine the feasibility of a reclamation and reuse program in Southern California. As Californians endure continued drought, the importance of conservation and reclamation programs becomes increasingly important. Alternative methods of conservation are needed to meet increasing water demands for both environmental and urban uses. This is an important first step toward increasing awareness as well as beginning much needed research into alternative modes of water conservation.
I again thank the chairman and Senator Hatfield for their leadership and assistance with this bill and urge the adoption of this important legislation.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I want to take this opportunity to thank the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee, the Senator from Louisiana, Senator Johnston, and the distinguished Senator from Oregon, the ranking member, Senator Hatfield, for their good work in managing this very complex piece of legislation.
As we all know, this bill has many contentious issues but the fact that these two Senators work so well together and have such intimate knowledge of each and every detail of the bill is invaluable to shepherding this bill through in a timely manner. In addition, the bill as reported by the Senate is within its 602(b) subcommittee allocation.
Both Senators should be congratulated for their outstanding efforts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment of the amendments and third reading of the bill.
The amendments were ordered to be engrossed, and the bill to be read a third time.
The bill was read a third time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Shall the bill pass?
So the bill (H.R. 5373), as amended, was passed.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill passed.
Mr. HATFIELD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I move that the Senate insist on its amendments and request a conference with the House of Representatives on the disagreeing votes thereon, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees on behalf of the Senate.
The motion was agreed to and the Presiding Officer [Mr. Conrad] appointed Mr. Johnston, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Burdick, Mr. Sasser, Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Reid, Mr. Hatfield, Mr. Garn, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Specter, and Mr. Nickles conferees on behalf of the Senate.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I want to reiterate my thanks to the distinguished Senator from Oregon. He is a pleasure to work with. He is competent and courteous and effective. It is a pleasure to work with him.
I would like to thank my staff, Proctor Jones and David Gwaltney. We are especially mindful about the loss within our staff of Gloria Butland, the loss of her husband. She worked very hard on this bill.
With thanks to all Senators, I yield the floor.
Mr. HATFIELD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
[Page: S11222]
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I would like to respond to the chairman of our committee, Senator Johnston, in acknowledging the excellent cooperation that has existed for many years now between the ranking member and the chairman of the committee.
Mr. President, this bill is within the 602(b). I think it is a good bill. We can go to the conference with great pride to represent the Senate's interest.
I too would like to make my appreciation known to our staff, both the majority staff, who have been enumerated, as well as to Mark Walker, Keith Kennedy, and Dorothy Pastis. And on the amendment relating to the test treaty, I would like to especially thank Julie McGregor of my staff, who is a real extraordinary young lady who has helped a great deal to bring this to pass.
So I am grateful to be working with Senator Johnston on this question.
Mr. JOHNSTON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.
END