By Mr. BOREN:
S. 2198. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to reorganize the United States Intelligence Community to provide for the improved management and execution of United States intelligence activities, and for other purposes; to the Select Committee on Intelligence.
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Unfortunately, this effort was sidetracked by the Gates' nomination and by the complications which developed on last year's intelligence authorization bill, and we were unable to carry through on our plans where reorganization is concerned.
This delay may, however, prove somewhat fortuitous. In the intervening period, we have had momentous developments in what had been the Soviet Union, and the future, while far from certain, appears to be a bit clearer at least where the former Soviet Union is concerned. We have also had an opportunity to digest the results of the Persian Gulf war from an intelligence standpoint. The passage of time has, in my view, improved our perspective on this event.
It is my hope that in this session of Congress, which will be my last as chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee will be able to devote its attention to rethinking the management structure of the intelligence community.
The time could not be more ripe for such a review. The concerns which motivated the creation of the intelligence community after the Second World War have now dramatically changed, but have been replaced by new challenges and new uncertainties. Indeed, it is difficult to recall any point in the last 40 years where such uncertainty exists with respect to the international situation. Far from being a period where we can do without intelligence, the need for intelligence has never been greater.
We have an intelligence structure, however, that evolved over the last 40 years to cope with a world which is now past, and that structure is in need of considerable recalibration and streamlining. At the same time, funding for intelligence must inevitably decline, and, indeed, can decline, in my view, without damaging our national security interests.
President Bush, as we know, has already set in motion a comprehensive review of the intelligence structure within the executive branch. The administration's goal is to have specific legislative proposals to the Congress in time to be considered in this year's budget cycle. I applaud this initiative, and look forward to working with the administration in a spirit of cooperation and common purpose to craft changes which will lead to a stronger intelligence capability, albeit in a time of shrinking resources. I am convinced this can and should be done.
At the same time, I think our process will be better served by several reform proposals being offered, rather than our simply reacting to a single proposal offered by the administration.
I am, therefore, Mr. President, today introducing a bill to restructure the U.S. Intelligence community, the Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992. This bill was developed as a result of, and reflects, the work done last year by the committee and its staff.
Before highlighting its key provisions, I want to make several preliminary points.
First, I am introducing this legislation now to prompt discussion of the issues involved. I am not wedded to any particular proposal at this stage, and will await the results of the legislative process before making up my mind as to their desirability.
Second, I realize that several provisions of this bill could be implemented by the executive branch without enabling legislation. We may ultimately wish to leave them to the Executive without making them law, but I think it is useful to have them as part of this proposal in order to spark discussion of the issues which they pose.
Third, I recognize that some areas of the bill overlap the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services. I look forward to working with that committee and its distinguished chairman, Senator Nunn, to arrive at something that ultimately makes sense to both committees.
Finally, in introducing this bill now, I have no intent to preempt other reorganization proposals, either from Members of this body, from the House of Representatives, or the administration itself. Indeed, the distinguished chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Mr. McCurdy, is today introducing similar legislation today in the House of Representatives. While it differs in some respects from the bill I am introducing, it deals with most of the same issues. I see it as a welcome contribution to the debate, providing us with a number of additional ideas to consider in the course of our hearings on this subject.
The bill I am introducing today, Mr. President, represents a comprehensive restructuring of the U.S. intelligence community. It has several broad purposes.
The first and most important is to strengthen the management of the intelligence community at all levels. In the past, where there was a clear target for most intelligence collection and analysis, and in an era of rising resources, the need for effective, streamlined management was less critical. Now we need to get the most out of shrinking resources, concentrating them where we need them. We also need better integration of national and tactical intelligence activities. We can no longer afford to manage these areas independent of one another.
A second purpose is to make existing institutions work more effectively. We need to create a structure that elevates and institutionalizes the analytical function. We need a structure that attracts the brightest and the best and ensures they have a part in the policy process.
A third purpose is to clarify by law the responsibilities of agencies within the intelligence community and to create new management structures where they are needed. In some cases, notably, with respect to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the lack of clear statutory authority has impeded the ability of intelligence agencies to get the job done. In areas such as imagery, the lack of unified management structure has lead to duplication, lack of uniformity, and less than an optimum use of resources.
A fourth purpose is to institutionalize certain relationships within the intelligence community. I am particularly concerned that the organizational links between the intelligence community and the White House be stronger. While I share the view that the head of the intelligence community should not be a policy advocate, the intelligence community must be a player in the policy debates at the White House--not simply within the National Security Council apparatus, but also in support of other offices within the Executive Office of the President which have responsibilities with international implications. And while the intelligence community is not in the business of making policy, it cannot be isolated from the policy community it was established to serve.
A fifth purpose is to improve the congressional oversight of these activities. This bill would provide for the confirmation of additional key officials within the intelligence community, and would give the two intelligence committees similar ability to oversee both national and tactical intelligence activities.
Again, Mr. President, I do not pretend that this
bill has all the answers. Nor do I pretend that it is free of problems. Few would accept it as written. But I think it poses the issues involved reasonably well and is a credible beginning point for discussion.
Let me now highlight the key features of this proposal, starting with proposals for change at the top.
The bill would create a new director of national intelligence to coordinate U.S. intelligence activities, to serve as the President's principal intelligence adviser, and to provide operational supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The bill would make the Director of National Intelligence a nonvoting participant in the National Security Council. Existing law does not provide any such role for the DCI.
The bill would also create as a committee of the National Security Council a Committee on Foreign Intelligence, chaired by the President's National Security Adviser, with membership composed of the DNI, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce, and such other officials as the President may designate. It would be the responsibility of this NSC Committee to set the overall course for the intelligence community; to ensure that the overall goals, policies, and resource decisions of a particular administration are translated into goals, priorities, and resource allocations for the intelligence community; and to assess, on behalf of the President, how the intelligence community performs. Although there have been such mechanisms attempted in previous administrations, none is provided for in existing law, and none exists today. I believe it is essential that this type of mechanism exist, otherwise the intelligence community may find itself on its own, out of touch with what it is particular administrations expect of it.
The bill would restate the existing duties and authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence, and transfer them to the new Director of National Intelligence. It also calls for the appointment of two new Deputy Directors, confirmed by the Senate, to assist the Director in carrying out these responsibilities.
The bill would create two Deputy Directors of National Intelligence to assist the DNI in carrying out both of his coordinating roles. Thus, the bill provides for a Deputy Director for Estimates and Analysis, to carry out the DNI's responsibilities to provide intelligence to the President and other senior officials of the Government; and a Deputy Director of National Intelligence for the intelligence community, to carry out the DNI's community coordination role.
The bill goes on to elaborate the Director's responsibilities in each of these areas. While generally these provisions reflect the DCI's existing responsibilities as assigned by Executive order, there are important differences to be noted. The bill also expressly provides for a number of mechanisms under the two Deputy Directors to address particular areas of responsibility.
The Deputy DNI for estimates and analysis, for example, is given responsibility for producing estimates, current intelligence, and other national level analysis. Provision is made for analysts from CIA and other agencies in the intelligence community to be transferred to this office. Indeed, it is contemplated that most analysts currently assigned to the CIA's Directorate for Intelligence would be shifted to the new Deputy DNI, leaving a much reduced analytical capability to support the operations of the CIA itself. This arrangement may also make similar reductions possible in the analytical components of other agencies.
The DNI's responsibilities for the intelligence community itself remain similar to those under the existing executive order, but with a few significant additions. For example, the bill would make the DNI expressly responsible for approving the acquisition of overhead reconnaissance systems to support both signals intelligence and imagery collection. The bill would also require the DNI to establish an independent office to evaluate the performance of the intelligence community, as well as require him to establish a permanent office to provide warning to policymakers and support in crises. Under this bill, the existing intelligence community staff would be formally abolished and its functions assumed by the new deputy or otherwise be apportioned pursuant to the bill.
The bill also provides for the appointment of a separate Director for the Central Intelligence Agency, who will report directly to the DNI, and be subject to his supervision and operational control. While this would create a measure of separation for CIA from the DNI himself, it would leave the DNI with direct responsibility for agency operations.
The bill also contemplates new functions for the CIA. For the first time, CIA would be made responsible for coordinating all intelligence collection by human agents, both overt and clandestine, to ensure that all U.S. requirements for this type of collection are being satisfied in the most efficacious, risk-free manner. No agency performs this function under existing operational arrangements. This is not intended to mean that the CIA will take over the humint operations of other agencies. We are talking here only of making the overall system more effective.
The bill also would considerably enhance the DNI's authorities with respect to the intelligence community, particularly in terms of giving him authority to make overall policy and resource decisions, and to shift personnel and resources to deal with crises.
Under the bill, the National Foreign Intelligence Program would become a separate line item in the President's budget, rather than being a part of the Defense Department budget. It would be appropriated to the DNI, who would allocate funds to recipients within the intelligence community, rather than having these funds come through the Department of Defense or be appropriated to other departments or agencies within the intelligence community.
The bill also provides for streamlining and strengthening the organizational arrangements for intelligence within the Department of Defense. It calls for the designation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, consolidating the functions currently carried out by five separate offices within the office of the Secretary of Defense. It also would clarify the role of the Secretary of Defense vis-a-vis the DCI, and provide for DOD management of a new tactical intelligence program, consolidating, for purposes of policy and resource management, the tactical intelligence activities of the military departments. This is key, I believe, to getting control of tactical intelligence activities and making them consistent and complementary of national intelligence activities.
The bill would also provide statutory authority for several intelligence components within DOD.
The National Security Agency, created by order of President Truman in 1952, would be established pursuant to law. Its functions would be similar to those under existing arrangements, with the exception that it would
have sole responsibility within the intelligence community, subject to the approval of the DNI, for the procurement and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems to support signals intelligence collection. Under existing arrangements, this function is performed by a separate office within the intelligence community.
There would be a new defense agency created under the bill, called the National Imagery Agency. The bill contemplates the new agency performing for imagery collection and analysis, a role similar to that which NSA plays for signals intelligence. While it is not contemplated that the new agency will itself carry out all such activities, it would be responsible for coordinating and synchronizing such activities in satisfaction of the requirements of the Government as a whole for imagery collection. It, too, would have sole responsibility within the intelligence community, subject to the approval of the DNI, for the procurement and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems to support imagery collection. The bill leaves it to the DCI and Secretary of Defense jointly to determine precisely which elements of the Intelligence community will be transferred to the new agency.
The Defense Intelligence Agency is also given a statutory charter by the bill. While its principal responsibilities under the bill are similar to its existing responsibilities, the bill gives DIA new authorities to carry out these functions within DOD and the intelligence community.
The bill also mandates that the military departments themselves continue to maintain sufficient collection and analytical capabilities to satisfy national and departmental requirements. It is abundantly clear that the intelligence community depends heavily upon the military services to carry out its mission. Indeed, it could not be done without them. Thus, in streamlining and enhancing the authorities of the management structure above the military departments, it is absolutely essential that each of them continue to provide sufficient manpower and resources to the intelligence business, not only to satisfy their own service-unique requirements, but those of the entire government.
Finally, Mr. President, the bill would amend the Senate Resolution establishing the Select Committee on Intelligence to give it jurisdiction over tactical intelligence activities. Our House counterpart committee has had this jurisdiction since its inception while the Senate Intelligence Committee has not. As a practical matter, it is simply impossible for us to carry out our responsibilities for national intelligence programs without considering how tactical intelligence programs interact with and complement national programs. I think it is time that the jurisdictions of the two intelligence committees be made consistent on this point.
In conclusion, I recognize that this bill deals with an area where there is necessarily little public awareness. There is relatively little appreciation of the existing framework for intelligence activities among the American people, much less an appreciation of where the problem areas are, and which solutions should be adopted to fix them. And yet we have to legislate in public and can do so only if we are able to achieve a consensus within the two Houses of Congress and with the administration.
This bill is an attempt to provide a focus for this public debate. It is a starting point for discussion. It raises a number of serious, complicated issues; indeed, some are far more complicated than my statement today suggests. I recognize that. There will be opportunities in the months ahead to discuss them in the depth, and with the seriousness they deserve. We are not going to act precipitously, and we are going to keep an open mind.
Before I yield the floor, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill and a section-by-section explanation of the bill's provisions be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title: This Act may be cited as the `Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992'.
(b) Table of Contents: The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings and purposes.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
Sec. 101. Participation of the Director of National Intelligence in the National Security Council.
Sec. 102. Establishment of a Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
Sec. 201. Appointment of Director and Deputy Directors of National Intelligence.
Sec. 202. Responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 203. Submission of a separate budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
Sec. 301. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Sec. 302. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense pertaining to the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
Sec. 303. Resource management for Defense intelligence programs.
Sec. 311. Establishment of National Security Agency.
Sec. 321. Establishment of National Imagery Agency.
Sec. 331. Establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 332. Responsibilities of the Agency.
Sec. 333. Authorities of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 341. Intelligence capabilities of the military departments.
Sec. 401. Inclusion of tactical military intelligence activities within jurisdiction of Select Committee on Intelligence.
Sec. 501. Definitions.
Sec. 502. Transfer of functions.
Sec. 503. Determinations of certain functions by the Office of Management and Budget.
Sec. 504. Personnel provisions.
Sec. 505. Delegation and assignment.
Sec. 506. Reorganization.
Sec. 507. Rules.
Sec. 508. Transfer and allocations of appropriations and personnel.
Sec. 509. Incidental transfers.
Sec. 510. Effect on personnel.
Sec. 511. Savings provisions.
Sec. 512. Separability.
Sec. 513. Transition.
Sec. 514. References.
Sec. 601. Effective date.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) Findings: The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The principal threat to the United States which prompted the Congress to establish a permanent, peacetime intelligence capability at the end of World War II, namely the threat posed to the United States and its allies by the hostile actions of the Soviet Union and other Communist States, has now considerably diminished.
(2) At the same time it is clear that the United States must maintain an intelligence capability, in its own national interests, to collect and analyze information concerning world events which may threaten its security, to be in a position to anticipate and respond to such events in an effective and timely manner.
(3) The existing framework for the conduct of United States intelligence activities, established by the National Security Act of 1947, has evolved largely without changes to the original statutory framework, but rather as a matter of Executive order or directive. In large part, this evolution has been prompted by advances in technology or by ad hoc developments in mission and circumstance, rather than reflecting an overall scheme, design, or purpose.
(4) While the Director of Central Intelligence has had an overall, coordinating role for United States intelligence activities, under existing law and by Executive order, in fact, the Director has lacked sufficient authorities to exercise this responsibility effectively, leaving control largely decentralized within elements of the Intelligence Community. Similarly, the Secretary of Defense has historically played a relatively weak role in coordinating intelligence activities within the Department of Defense.
(5) While a decentralized management system may have served United States interests during a period of rising resources, and where the principal targets for United States intelligence gathering and analysis were clear, the need of strengthened centralized management is greater in a period of declining resources and where United States interests around the world are less clear.
(6) It is also apparent that while, on balance, the Intelligence Community has well served United States security interests over the four decades of its existence, it has not, for various reasons, performed as well as it might. Civilian and military intelligence are not well integrated; unwarranted duplication remains a problem; and intelligence remains too isolated from the governmental process it was created to serve.
(b) Purposes: The purposes of this Act are--
(1) to provide a framework for the improved management of United States intelligence activities at all levels and within all intelligence disciplines;
(2) to provide an institutional structure that will better ensure that the Intelligence Community serves the needs of the Government as a whole in an effective and timely manner;
(3) to clarify by law the responsibilities of United States intelligence agencies; and
(4) to improve the congressional oversight of intelligence activities.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 2 the following new section:
`SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
`As used in this Act--
`(1) the term `commissioned officer of the Armed Forces' does not include a commissioned warrant officer;
`(2) the term `Intelligence Community' includes--
`(A) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Office of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, and the Office of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Estimates and Analysis (as established under section 102);
`(B) the Central Intelligence Agency (as established by section 102 of this Act);
`(C) the National Security Agency (as established by section 208 of this Act);
`(D the Defense Intelligence Agency;
`(E) the National Imagery Agency (as established by section 209 of this Act);
`(F) the offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
`(G) the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy and the Drug Enforcement Administration; and
`(H) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State;
`(3) the term `intelligence' means information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons;
`(4) the terms `national intelligence' and `intelligence related to the national security'--
`(A) each refer to intelligence which pertains to the interests of the Government generally, rather than to the interests of a single department or agency of Government, or to a component of such department or agency; and
`(B) do not refer to intelligence necessary to plan or conduct tactical military operations by United States armed forces; and
`(5) the term `National Foreign Intelligence Program' refers to all programs, projects, and activities of the Intelligence Community which are intended to produce national intelligence; and
`(6) the term `overhead reconnaissance systems' includes satellite and airborne reconnaissance systems.'.
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TITLE I--THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SEC. 101. PARTICIPATION OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(h) The Director of National Intelligence (or, in his absence, a Deputy Director of National Intelligence) may, in his role as principal intelligence adviser to the National Security Council and subject to the direction of the President, attend and participate in meetings of the National Security Council. The Director (or, in his absence, the Deputy Director) shall not be entitled to vote on any policy matter before the National Security Council.'.
SEC. 102. ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.
Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402), as amended by section 101 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(i)(1)(A) There is established within the National Security Council the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (hereafter in this subsection referred to as the `Committee') which shall be composed of the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, or their respective deputies, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and such other members as the President may designate.
`(B) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall serve as chairman of the Committee.
`(2) The function of the Committee shall be to establish, consistent with the policy and objectives of the President, the overall requirements and priorities for the Intelligence Community and, regularly, to assess, on behalf of the President, how effectively the Intelligence Community has performed its responsibilities under this Act.'.
TITLE II--THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
SEC. 201. APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTORS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General: Section 102(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)) is amended--
(1) by inserting `(1)' immediately after `(a)';
(2) in the first sentence--
(A) by striking `under the National Security Council'; and
(B) by striking `with a Director' and all that follows through `disability'; and
(3) by striking the second sentence and subsections (b) through (f) and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
`(2)(A) There shall be a Director of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate--
`(i) who shall serve as head of the United States Intelligence Community and shall act as the principal intelligence adviser to the President; and
`(ii) who shall exercise authority, direction, and control over the Central Intelligence Agency.
`(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall be subject to the policy directives of the President and the National Security Council.
`(b) To assist the Director of National Intelligence in carrying out his responsibilities under this Act, there shall be--
`(1) a Deputy Director of National Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall carry out such duties as the Director may assign with respect to the administration of the United States Intelligence Community; and
`(2) a Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Estimates and Analysis, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall carry out such duties as the Director may assign with respect to his responsibilities as described in section 103(a).
`(c) At any one time, either the Director of National Intelligence or the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, but not both, shall be drawn from among the commissioned officers of the Armed Forces, whether in an active or retired status. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Estimates and Analysis shall be individuals who are not such officers. An individual appointed from among the commissioned officers of the Armed Forces shall be a general or flag officer in the grade of General or Admiral, or shall be promoted into such grade upon appointment, or shall, if retired, have previously attained such grade.
`(d)(1) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces appointed pursuant to subsection (c), while serving in such position--
`(A) shall not be subject to supervision or control by the Secretary of Defense or by any officer or employee of the Department of Defense;
`(B) shall not exercise, by reason of his or her status as a commissioned officer, any supervision or control with respect to any of the military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense except as authorized by this title; and
`(C) shall not be counted against the numbers and percentages of commissioned officers of the rank and grade of such officer authorized for the military department of which he is a member.
`(2) Except as provided in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), the appointment of a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces pursuant to subsection (c) shall in no way affect the status, position, rank, or grade of such officer in the Armed Forces, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, position, rank, or grade.
`(3) Such commissioned officer of the Armed Forces appointed pursuant to subsection (c), while serving in such position, shall continue to receive military pay and allowances (including retired or retainer pay) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service for which the appropriate military department shall be reimbursed from funds available to the Director of National Intelligence. In addition to any pay or allowance payable under this subsection, such officer shall also receive, out of funds available to the Director of National Intelligence, annual compensation in an amount by which the annual rate of compensation payable for such position exceeds the total of his annual rate of military pay (including retired and retainer pay) and allowances.
`(e) The offices of the Deputy Directors of National Intelligence shall constitute a National Intelligence Center which shall be located in the same office building as that of the Director of National Intelligence.'.
(b) Amendments to Title 5, United States Code: (1) Section 5312 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new undesignated paragraph:
`Director of National Intelligence.'.
(2) Section 5314 of such title is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new undesignated paragraphs:
`Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
`Deputy Director of National Intelligence for the Intelligence Community.
`Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Estimates and Analysis.'.
SEC. 202. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General: The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended--
(1) by redesignating section 103 as section 106; and
(2) by striking section 102a and inserting in lieu thereof the following new sections:
`SEC. 103. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
`(a) Provision of Intelligence: Under the direction of the National Security Council, the Director of National Intelligence shall be responsible for providing timely, objective intelligence, independent of political considerations or bias and based upon all sources available to the United States Intelligence Community--
`(1) to the President; and
`(2) where appropriate--
`(A) to the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch;
`(B) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders; and
`(C) to the Senate and House of Representatives and the appropriate committees thereof.
`(b) Establishment of Council and Office: (1)(A) There is established the National Intelligence Council (hereafter in this section referred to as the `Council'), composed of senior analysts within the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by, and serve at the pleasure of, the Director of National Intelligence.
`(B) The Council shall be responsible for--
`(i) the production of national intelligence estimates for the Government, which shall, among other things, convey, as appropriate, alternative views held by elements of the Intelligence Community; and
`(ii) otherwise assisting the Director in carrying out the responsibilities described in subsection (a).
`(C) Within their respective areas of expertise and under the direction of the Director, the members of the Council shall constitute the senior intelligence advisers of the Intelligence Community for purposes of representing the views of the Intelligence Community within the Government.
`(D) The Director shall make available to the Council such number of staff as may be necessary to permit the Council to carry out its responsibilities under this paragraph.
`(2) There is established under the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Estimates and Analysis an Office of Intelligence Analysis that shall be headed by a director appointed by, and serving at the pleasure of, the Director of National Intelligence. The Office shall be composed of analysts assigned to agencies within the Intelligence Community and shall be responsible for preparing all current intelligence and other analysis that is intended to be disseminated within the Government as a whole.
`(c) As Head of the Intelligence Community: In his capacity as head of the Intelligence Community, the Director shall, at a minimum, be responsible for--
`(1) developing and presenting to the President and the Congress an annual budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program of the United States;
`(2) managing the collection capabilities of the Intelligence Community to ensure the satisfaction of national requirements;
`(3) promoting and evaluating the utility of national intelligence to consumers within the Government;
`(4) eliminating waste and unnecessary duplication within the Intelligence Community;
`(5) providing guidance, direction, and approval for the procurement and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems pursuant to sections 208 and 209 of this Act, to ensure appropriate compatibility and integration of such systems; and
`(6) protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
`(d) Establishment of Office and Board: (1) There is established under the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for the Intelligence Community an Office for Warning and Crisis Support that shall be composed of full-time senior representatives of the Intelligence Community appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. The Office shall be headed by a director appointed by, and serving at the pleasure of, the Director of National Intelligence. The Office shall be responsible for--
`(A) identifying on a regular, continuing basis, using all available intelligence, any immediate threat to the national security of the United States, or any area or circumstance where United States intervention or involvement is, or may become, necessary or desirable;
`(B) providing to the President and other senior officials options pertaining to such intervention or involvement;
`(C) providing intelligence support during periods of crisis to the President and other senior officials, as appropriate; and
`(D) otherwise assisting the Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the responsibilities described in subsection (c).
`(2) The Director shall establish a board, under his control, composed of experienced current or former Government officials, without conflicting allegiances to particular elements of the Intelligence Community--
`(A) to provide a full-time capability to evaluate objectively the quality and timeliness of intelligence support provided the Government; and
`(B) otherwise to assist the Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the responsibilities described in subsection (c).
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`SEC. 104. STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
`(a) Appointment of Director, Central Intelligence Agency: There shall be a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Director of National Intelligence, the Director shall be responsible for--
`(1) collecting intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers, or internal security functions;
`(2) providing overall direction for the collection of intelligence through human sources by elements of the Intelligence Community to make the most effective use of resources and to minimize the risks to the United States and those involved in such collection, except that responsibility for carrying out such collection shall remain in the existing elements of the Intelligence Community which perform such functions;
`(3) performing such additional services of common concern to the Intelligence Community as the Director of National Intelligence determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally; and
`(4) performing such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the National Security Council may direct, including the carrying out of such covert actions as are authorized by the President under title V of this Act.
`(b) Establishment of Assistant Deputy Director for Operations: (1) There shall be within the Central Intelligence Agency an Assistant Deputy Director for Operations (Military Support), who shall be appointed by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from among the general or flag officers of the Armed Services and shall carry the grade of Major General or Rear Admiral.
`(2) The Assistant Deputy Director for Operations (Military Support) shall--
`(A) serve as the principal liaison of the Central Intelligence Agency with the Department of Defense to facilitate the collection of intelligence through the use of human sources; and
`(B) otherwise assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency with the responsibilities described in subsection (a)(2).
`SEC. 105. AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
`(a) Access to Intelligence: Each component of the Intelligence Community shall provide access to the Director of National Intelligence to any intelligence related to the national security collected by that component.
`(b) Use of Funds: The Director of National Intelligence shall be responsible for the allocation, obligation, and expenditure of funds within the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget for the purpose of achieving national objectives.
`(c) Role of DNI in Reprogramming: No funds made available under the National Foreign Intelligence Program may be reprogrammed by any component of the Intelligence Community without the prior approval of the Director of National Intelligence.
`(d) Reprogramming Procedures: The Director of National Intelligence may reprogram funds within the National Foreign Intelligence Program in accordance with established reprogramming procedures in order to satisfy national requirements of a higher priority if prior notice is given to the head of the component of the Intelligence Community whose funds would be reprogrammed and a reasonable opportunity is provided for such head to appeal such action to the President.
`(e) Use of Reserve for Contingencies: The Director of National Intelligence shall have authority to obligate or expend funds from the Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence Agency for any intelligence or intelligence-related activity of the Intelligence Community in accordance with section 502 of this Act.
`(f) Temporary Reassignment of Personnel: Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the Director of National Intelligence may temporarily reassign, for any period or periods totaling not more than 180 days, any individual assigned to a particular program within the National Foreign Intelligence Program to any other program within the National Foreign Intelligence Program in order to satisfy national requirements of a higher priority if, before such reassignment, the Director of National Intelligence--
`(1) notifies the head of the component of the Intelligence Community to which the individual is currently assigned;
`(2) provides a reasonable opportunity for such head to appeal such action to the President; and
`(3) notifies the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate of the proposed reassignment.
`(g) Intelligence Priorities: Under the direction of the National Security Council, the Director of National Intelligence is authorized to direct the use of any collection capability within the Intelligence Community in order to satisfy a priority intelligence requirement of the United States.
`(h) Coordination With Foreign Governments: Under the direction of the National Security Council, the Director of National Intelligence shall coordinate the relationships between elements of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments.
`(i) Preparation of National Intelligence Analyses: The Director of National Intelligence may direct the preparation of intelligence analyses to satisfy national requirements by any element or elements of the Intelligence Community after appropriate consultation with the head or heads of the department or agency concerned.
`(j) Use of Personnel: The Director of National Intelligence shall institute policies and programs within the Intelligence Community to provide for the rotation of personnel between components of the Intelligence Community, and to consolidate, wherever possible, personnel, administrative, and security programs to reduce the overall costs of these activities within the Intelligence Community.'.
(b) Amendments to Existing Law: (1) Section 1(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a(b)) is amended by striking `Director of Central Intelligence' and inserting `Director of the Central Intelligence Agency'.
(2) Section 111(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by striking `Director of Central Intelligence' and inserting `Director of the Central Intelligence Agency'.
(3) Any reference in any provision of law before the date of enactment of this Act to the Director of Central Intelligence with respect to his duties as head of the Central Intelligence Agency shall, on and after such date, be deemed to refer to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(c) Amendments to the Table of Contents: The table of contents of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking out the items relating to sections 102a and 103 and inserting in lieu thereof the following new items:
`Sec. 103. Responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence.
`Sec. 104. Structure of the Central Intelligence Agency.
`Sec. 105. Authorities of the Director of National Intelligence.
`Sec. 106. National Security Resources Board.'.
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SEC. 203. SUBMISSION OF A SEPARATE BUDGET FOR THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
(a) Submission of Budget Requests: Beginning with fiscal year 1994, and for each fiscal year thereafter, the President shall include in any budget request for that fiscal year submitted to the Congress an aggregate amount for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
(b) Role of the Director of National Intelligence: Any amount authorized to be appropriated, or appropriated, for the National Foreign Intelligence Program shall be considered to be authorized to be appropriated, or appropriated, as the case may be, to the Director of National Intelligence, who shall obligate, expend, and allocate such funds within the Intelligence Community in accordance with the appropriate authorization or appropriation Act.
TITLE III--THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Subtitle A--Office of the Secretary of Defense
SEC. 301. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General: Section 136(b)(3) of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`(3)(A) One of the Assistant Secretaries shall be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, who shall--
`(i) have responsibility for the development of policy, resource allocation, and oversight for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Department of Defense;
`(ii) ensure that the Secretary of Defense and his staff receive appropriate and timely intelligence support from the Intelligence Community; and
`(iii) have principal responsibility for integrating the tactical intelligence programs of the Department of Defense with the National Foreign Intelligence Program, as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947.
`(B) One of the Assistant Secretaries shall be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, and Communications, who shall have as his principal duty the overall supervision of command, control, and communications affairs of the Department of Defense.'.
(b) Definition: Section 101 of such title is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
`(48) The term `Intelligence Community' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947.'.
(c) Conforming Amendment: Section 921(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 is amended by striking out `section 136(b)(3)' and inserting in lieu thereof `section 136(b)(3)(A)'.
SEC. 302. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERTAINING TO THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
The Secretary of Defense shall be responsible for--
(1) ensuring the implementation of the policies and resource decisions of the Director of National Intelligence by elements of the Department of Defense within the National Foreign Intelligence Program; and
(2) ensuring that the tactical intelligence activities of the Department of Defense complement and are compatible with intelligence activities funded within the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
SEC. 303. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS.
(a) Budget Submissions Regarding Tactical Intelligence Matters: As part of the budget submission made to the Congress for fiscal year 1994, and for each fiscal year thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall identify to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives those intelligence activities of the Department of Defense currently listed as the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) which--
(1) produce positive intelligence in peacetime;
(2) interface or interoperate directly with national intelligence systems; or
(3) satisfy the intelligence requirements of Department of Defense elements generally rather than the requirements of a single element.
(b) Tactical Intelligence Program: Beginning with fiscal year 1995, and each fiscal year thereafter, the intelligence activities of the Department of Defense which were identified by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to subsection (a), shall be funded as elements of a Tactical Intelligence Program within the budget of the Department of Defense, and shall be managed as a separate program by the Secretary of Defense. Elements of existing Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) not identified by the Secretary under subsection (a) as intelligence activities shall be designated for program management under existing arrangements within the Department of Defense.
Subtitle B--The National Security Agency
SEC. 311. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.
(a) In General: Title II of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
`SEC. 208. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.
`(a) Establishment: There is established within the Department of Defense a National Security Agency which shall be headed by a Director. The Director shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, from among the active component commissioned officers of the Armed Forces. The term of appointment is four years. The position of the Director shall be a position of importance and responsibility carrying the grade of lieutenant general or admiral. During the period of service as Director, a commissioned officer shall not be counted against the number and percentage of commissioned officers of the grade of such officer authorized for the Director's armed force.
`(b) Responsibilities: The Agency, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, shall--
`(1) establish and operate, subject to the authorities and guidance of the Director of National Intelligence, an effective unified organization within the Intelligence Community for the conduct of signals intelligence activities and shall ensure that the product of such activities is disseminated in a timely manner to authorized recipients within the Government;
`(2) subject to the authorities and guidance of the Director of National Intelligence, serve as the sole agent within the Intelligence Community for the procurement and operation of such overhead reconnaissance systems as may be required to satisfy the signals intelligence collection requirements of the Intelligence Community; and
`(3) provide for the communications security needs of the Government.'.
(b) Table of Contents: The item relating to section 208 in the table of contents of such Act is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 208. Establishment of National Security Agency.'.
Subtitle C--The National Imagery Agency
SEC. 321. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL IMAGERY AGENCY.
(a) In General: Title II of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 311, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
`SEC. 209. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL IMAGERY AGENCY.
`(a) Establishment: There is established within the Department of Defense a National Imagery Agency which shall be headed by a Director appointed by the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.
`(b) Responsibilities: Subject to the authorities and guidance of the Director of National Intelligence, the Agency shall--
`(1) establish and operate an effective unified organization within the Intelligence Community for the tasking of imagery collectors, for the exploitation and analysis of the results of such collection, and for the dissemination of the product of such collection in a timely manner to authorized recipients within the Government; and
`(2) serve as the sole agent within the Intelligence Community for the procurement and operation of such overhead reconnaissance systems as may be required to satisfy the imagery collection requirements of the Intelligence Community.
`(c) Definition: As used in this section, the term `imagery' refers to the results of photographic reconnaissance undertaken from any type of collection platform.'.
(b) Table of Contents: The item relating to section 209 in the table of contents of such Act is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 209. Establishment of National Imagery Agency.'.
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Subtitle D--The Defense Intelligence Agency
SEC. 331. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Establishment: There is established within the Department of Defense a Defense Intelligence Agency which shall be headed by a Director.
(b) Director: The Director shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, from among the active component commissioned officers of the Armed Forces. The term of appointment is four years. The position of the Director shall be a position of importance and responsibility carrying the grade of lieutenant general or admiral. During the period of service as Director, a commissioned officer shall not be counted against the number and percentage of commissioned officers of the grade of such officer authorized for the Director's armed force.
SEC. 332. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AGENCY.
(a) In General: Subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency shall--
(1) produce timely, objective military and military-related intelligence, independent of political considerations or bias and based upon all sources available to the United States Intelligence Community, and disseminate such intelligence--
(A) to the Secretary of Defense;
(B) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders, as appropriate;
(C) to other elements of the Department of Defense, as appropriate; and
(D) to other agencies and elements of the Federal Government, as appropriate;
(2) coordinate the production of all military and military-related intelligence by intelligence elements of the Department of Defense to ensure adequacy and objectivity and to avoid unnecessary duplication;
(3) manage the Defense Attache system;
(4) validate, in accordance with applicable guidance, the intelligence collection requirements of intelligence elements within the Department of Defense; and
(5) perform such additional services of common concern to the intelligence elements of the Department of Defense as the Secretary of Defense determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.
(b) Effective Date: This section shall take effect upon the expiration of the period described in section 921(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190; 105 Stat. 1452, 10 U.S.C. 201 note).
SEC. 333. AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
To carry out the responsibilities set forth in section 332, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency--
(1) shall have access to all intelligence collected by any intelligence element of the Department of Defense, or any component of the Intelligence Community, which bears upon a matter within his area of responsibility;
(2) may evaluate any military and military-related intelligence produced by any component of the Department of Defense for use or dissemination outside the component concerned, to ensure its accuracy, completeness, objectivity, or timeliness;
(3) in order to avoid unnecessary duplication, may evaluate the production of military and military-related intelligence by intelligence elements of the Department of Defense, or within an element of the Department of Defense, and may direct the consolidation or elimination of existing capabilities, or direct that the requirements of a particular element or elements be satisfied by alternative means, except that independent intelligence production capabilities shall be maintained, as required by each of the military departments, pursuant to section 425 of title 10, United States Code; and
(4) shall require the military departments to assign qualified active duty officers of the Armed Forces to the Defense Attache system.
Subtitle E--The Military Departments
SEC. 341. INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.
(a) Maintenance and Consolidation: Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting at the end of subchapter I the following new section:
`425. Intelligence capabilities of the military departments
`(a) Requirement for Maintenance of Capabilities: Under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the military departments shall maintain sufficient capabilities to collect and produce intelligence in satisfaction of--
`(1) any requirements of the Director of National Intelligence;
`(2) the requirements of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
`(3) the requirements of the military department concerned, including the provision of intelligence support to--
`(A) military planners;
`(B) tactical commanders;
`(C) the process for the acquisition of military equipment;
`(D) training and doctrine; and
`(E) the research and development process.
`(b) Level and Form of Capabilities To Be Maintained: The Secretaries of the military departments shall ensure that the capabilities maintained pursuant to subsection (a) do not exceed that which is necessary to satisfy the requirements of their respective departments. To the extent feasible, the Secretaries shall provide for such capabilities to be maintained jointly and in the most efficient and cost-effective form.'.
(b) Clerical Amendment: The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter II of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 424 the following new item:
`425. Intelligence capabilities of the military departments.'.
TITLE IV--CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
SEC. 401. INCLUSION OF TACTICAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WITHIN JURISDICTION OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Amendment to S. Res. 400 (94th Congress): Section 14(a) of Senate Resolution 400 (94th Congress) is amended by striking the last sentence in its entirety.
(b) Effective Date: This section shall take effect October 1, 1993.
TITLE V--TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS AND SAVINGS PROVISIONS
SEC. 501. DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this title, unless otherwise provided or indicated by the context--
(1) the term `Federal agency' has the meaning given to the term `agency' by section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code;
(2) the term `function' means any duty, obligation, power, authority, responsibility, right, privilege, activity, or program;
(3) the term `transferee agency' means the National Security Agency established under section 208 of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Imagery Agency established under section 209 of that Act, or the Defense Intelligence Agency established under section 331, whenever the transferor agency is an agency by the same name; and
(4) the term `transferor agency', with respect to a transferee agency by the same name, means the Defense Intelligence Agency established pursuant to Department of Defense Directive 5105.21 (effective October 1, 1961, the National Security Agency established pursuant to classified Presidential directive of October 24, 1952, or any component of the Intelligence Community which may be performing functions described in section 209 of the National Security Act of 1947, as jointly determined by the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense.
SEC. 502. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS.
There are transferred to the transferee agency all functions which the head of the transferor agency exercised before the date of the enactment of this title (including all related functions of any officer or employee of the transferor agency).
SEC. 503. DETERMINATIONS OF CERTAIN FUNCTIONS BY THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET.
If necessary, the Office of Management and Budget shall make any determination of the functions that are transferred under section 502.
SEC. 504. PERSONNEL PROVISIONS.
(a) Appointments: The head of the transferee agency may appoint and fix the compensation of such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the respective functions transferred under this title. Except as otherwise provided by law, such officers and employees shall be appointed in accordance with the civil service laws and their compensation fixed in accordance with title 5, United States Code.
(b) Experts and Consultants: The head of the transferee agency may obtain the services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, and compensate such experts and consultants for each day (including traveltime) at rates not in excess of the rate of pay for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of such title. The head of the transferee agency may pay experts and consultants who are serving away from their homes or regular place of business travel expenses and per diem in lieu of subsistence at rates authorized by sections 5702 and 5703 of such title for persons in Government service employed intermittently.
SEC. 505. DELEGATION AND ASSIGNMENT.
Except where otherwise expressly prohibited by law or otherwise provided by this title, the head of the transferee agency may delegate any of the functions transferred to the head of the transferee agency by this title and any function transferred or granted to such head of the transferee agency after the effective date of this title to such officers and employees of the transferee agency as the head of the transferee agency may designate, and may authorize successive redelegations of such functions as may be necessary or appropriate. No delegation of functions by the head of the transferee agency under this section or under any other provision of this title shall relieve such head of the transferee agency of responsibility for the administration of such functions.
SEC. 506. REORGANIZATION.
The head of the transferee agency is authorized to allocate or reallocate any function transferred under section 502 among the officers of the transferee agency, and to establish, consolidate, alter, or discontinue such organizational entities in the transferee agency as may be necessary or appropriate.
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SEC. 507. RULES.
The head of the transferee agency is authorized to prescribe, in accordance with the provisions of chapters 5 and 6 of title 5, United States Code, such rules and regulations as the head of the transferee agency determines necessary or appropriate to administer and manage the functions of the transferee agency.
SEC. 508. TRANSFER AND ALLOCATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS AND PERSONNEL.
Except as otherwise provided in this title, the personnel employed in connection with, and the assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed, used, held, arising from, available to, or to be made available in connection with the functions transferred by this title, subject to section 1531 of title 31, United States Code, shall be transferred to the transferee agency. Unexpended funds transferred pursuant to this section shall be used only for the purposes for which the funds were originally authorized and appropriated.
SEC. 509. INCIDENTAL TRANSFERS.
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, at such time or times as the Director shall provide, is authorized to make such determinations as may be necessary with regard to the functions transferred by this title, and to make such additional incidental dispositions of personnel, assets, liabilities, grants, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds held, used, arising from, available to, or to be made available in connection with such functions, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall provide for the termination of the affairs of all entities terminated by this title and for such further measures and dispositions as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this title.
SEC. 510. EFFECT ON PERSONNEL.
(a) In General: Except as otherwise provided by this title, the transfer pursuant to this title of full-time personnel (except special Government employees) and part-time personnel holding permanent positions shall not cause any such employee to be separated or reduced in grade or compensation for one year after the date of transfer of such employee under this title.
(b) Executive Schedule Positions: Except as otherwise provided in this title, any person who, on the day preceding the effective date of this title, held a position compensated in accordance with the Executive Schedule prescribed in chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, and who, without a break in service, is appointed in the transferee agency to a position having duties comparable to the duties performed immediately preceding such appointment shall continue to be compensated in such new position at not less than the rate provided for such previous position, for the duration of the service of such person in such new position.
SEC. 511. SAVINGS PROVISIONS.
(a) Continuing Effect of Legal Documents: All orders, determinations, rules, regulations, permits, agreements, grants, contracts, certificates, licenses, registrations, privileges, and other administrative actions--
(1) which have been issued, made, granted, or allowed to become effective by the President, any Federal agency or official thereof, or by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the performance of functions which are transferred under this title, and
(2) which are in effect at the time this title takes effect, or were final before the effective date of this title and are to become effective on or after the effective date of this title,
shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, or revoked in accordance with law by the President, the head of the transferee agency or other authorized official, a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law.
(b) Proceedings Not Affected: The provisions of this title shall not affect any proceedings, including notices of proposed rulemaking, or any application for any license, permit, certificate, or financial assistance pending before the transferor agency at the time this title takes effect, with respect to functions transferred by this title but such proceedings and applications shall be continued. Orders shall be issued in such proceedings, appeals shall be taken therefrom, and payments shall be made pursuant to such orders, as if this title had not been enacted, and orders issued in any such proceedings shall continue in effect until modified, terminated, superseded, or revoked by a duly authorized official, by a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law. Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to prohibit the discontinuance or modification of any such proceeding under the same terms and conditions and to the same extent that such proceeding could have been discontinued or modified if this title had not been enacted.
(c) Suits Not Affected: The provisions of this title shall not affect suits commenced before the effective date of this title, and in all such suits, proceedings shall be had, appeals taken, and judgments rendered in the same manner and with the same effect as if this title had not been enacted.
(d) Nonabatement of Actions: No suit, action, or other proceeding commenced by or against the transferor agency, or by or against any individual in the official capacity of such individual as an officer of the transferor agency, shall abate by reason of the enactment of this title.
(e) Administrative Actions Relating to Promulgation of Regulations: Any administrative action relating to the preparation or promulgation of a regulation by the transferor agency relating to a function transferred under this title may be continued by the transferee agency with the same effect as if this title had not been enacted.
SEC. 512. SEPARABILITY.
If a provision of this title or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, neither the remainder of this title nor the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances shall be affected.
SEC. 513. TRANSITION.
The head of the transferee agency is authorized to utilize--
(1) the services of such officers, employees, and other personnel of the transferor agency with respect to functions transferred to the transferee agency by this title; and
(2) funds appropriated to such functions for such period of time as may reasonably be needed to facilitate the orderly implementation of this title.
SEC. 514. REFERENCES.
Any reference in any other Federal law, Executive order, rule, regulation, or delegation of authority, or any document of or relating to--
(1) the head of the transferor agency with regard to functions transferred under section 502, shall be deemed to refer to the head of the transferee agency; or
(2) the transferor agency with regard to functions transferred under section 502, shall be deemed to refer to the transferee agency.
TITLE VI--EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC. 601. EFFECTIVE DATE.
Except for sections 332 and 401, this Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall take effect 180 days after its date of enactment.
The primary purpose of the Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992 is to strengthen the management of the Intelligence Community at all levels. A strengthened management structure, in turn, should result in a more focused and effective use of personnel and resources, in better integration of civilian and military intelligence activities, in less waste and duplication, and with better service to the Government consumer.
The U.S. Intelligence Community had its beginnings in the National Security Act of 1947, which established this country's security arrangements in the aftermath of the Second World War. That statute provided for an intelligence structure that cut across department and agency lines, to marshal the resources of the entire Government for the achievement of a common objective. Placed at the head of this structure was a Director of Central Intelligence, but his statutory responsibilities was left purposely vague and his authorities over the Intelligence Community left very limited.
It was clear, however, that the DCI was created to provide the President with assessments based upon all intelligence available to the Government and that he could be independent of the policy process within a particular Administration. Yet the statute did not itself institutionalize the relationship between the DCI and the President. How this relationship was to work was essentially left to be worked out between a particular President and a particular DCI. Historically, this has varied, with some DCIs being closely involved with the particular President they were serving, and others less so.
The Intelligence Community itself has changed enormously since 1947, far exceeding the size and capabilities that the drafters of the National Security Act could have imagined at the time. New agencies have been created by department or agency directives; new technologies, introduced. Organizational relationships have changed and changed again, occasionally in response to an overall scheme, but more often in response to a situation or circumstance. None of these organizational arrangements are reflected in the law itself. Similarly, the role of the DCI itself has evolved, but has never been enunciated in law beyond the vague prescriptions of the 1947 statute.
The extent to which the DCI has historically attempted to exert his management prerogatives over the Intelligence Community has varied from DCI to DCI, with some taking more interest than others. Usually, this has meant working with the heads of departments and agencies within the Intelligence Community to persude them to adopt a particular course, because the DCI, for the most part, lacked the legal authority to direct or manage elements within the Community himself. Even the DCI's role in the development of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, which evolved in the mid-1970s, has rarely been used to bring about significant management changes.
A similar situation has existed within the Department of Defense, where most of the collection and analytical resources of the Intelligence Community are located. For the most part, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has taken a relatively minor role in terms of coordinating or managing the intelligence elements of DoD. Whether this was due to the role the DCI was ostensibly playing with respect to the DoD elements of the Intelligence Community, or whether it was a matter of leaving tactical intelligence to the military departments, the result has historically been relatively weak management of the DoD intelligence elements that are part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and relatively little DoD-level management of tactical intelligence, either to ensure compatibility within DoD itself or with elements of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
In any case, far from the centralized management structure suggested by the term `Intelligence Community,' in reality, effective management control has rested largely in the hands of the various agency heads (or `program managers') within this `Community' rather than with the DCI or, for the Defense elements of the `Community,' the Secretary of Defense. Moreover, even within this decentralized structure, roles and missions have evolved incrementally, usually in response to new requirements levied by their parent organization or to new technical developments, as opposed to an overall organizational scheme.
Arguably, this decentralized structure has served the country well over the last forty years. Despite the absence of a centralized management structure, there was a common target which was well understood by all elements of the Community whatever their mission and capability: the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. The lion's share of U.S. intelligence activities were focused upon the threat posed to U.S. interests by the activities of these countries. In the meantime, resources were relatively plentiful. Funds were made available as necessary to keep track of this predominant threat to U.S. security interests.
Those times are now behind. The Soviet empire has now
disintegrated, and no longer poses a significant security threat to the United States and its allies. While the U.S. must prepare to meet different challenges and circumstances around the world, its attention is no longer focused upon a single predominant threat to its interests. At the same time, faced with huge budget deficits, funding for intelligence activities is certain to decrease significantly during the next decade. It is clear intelligence agencies will have considerably fewer resources available to carry out their missions. There can be less tolerance of waste and duplication; and, conversely, must be more attention to focus and effectiveness.
The proposed bill attempts to deal with these changed circumstances by establishing clear lines of authority and assigning clear responsibilities within the Intelligence Community. It creates a new Director of National Intelligence and gives him new authorities to manage the Intelligence Community. At the same time, the bill provides new roles to the Secretary of Defense in terms of managing DoD intelligence activities at both the national and tactical levels. It also clarifies the responsibilities of agencies within the Intelligence Community, and in some cases, creates new organizational entities to bring together functions that are now being performed in disparate areas of the Community.
The objective is to strengthen the framework for the management of intelligence activities, and thereby, ensure consistency of policy and emphasis, avoid waste and duplication, get the most from available resources, and provide a quality product to the Government consumer.
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Section 1 of the bill contains the short title of the bill and a table of contents.
Section 2 contains the fundings of the Congress which form the basis for the legislation, as well as a statement of its purposes.
Section 3 contains definitions of terms which are used in titles I, II, and III of the bill, each of which amends portions of the National Security Act of 1947.
The National Security Council was created by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President with respect to national security matters. Named as members were the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. The statute was subsequently amended to provide, for example, that the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Director for National Drug Control Policy may participate in meetings of the National Security Council when matters pertaining to their areas of responsibility were concerned. These provisions do not mention the Director of Central Intelligence.
To some extent, this omission is a reflection of the drafters' intent that the Director of Central Intelligence remain an advisor, and should not be an advocate of a particular policy position.
Section 101 of the bill provides that the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), created by the bill, may participate in meetings of the National Security Council but shall not be entitled to vote on policy matters coming before the Council. It is intended to ensure that the head of the U.S. Intelligence Community is part of the policy process, though not an advocate for policy.
Section 102 of the bill provides for the establishment of a Committee on Foreign Intelligence of the National Security Council to establish overall requirements and priorities for the U.S. Intelligence Community. It also provides that this Committee will regularly assess for the President the performance of the Intelligence Community in satisfying these requirements and priorities. From time to time, there have been similar bodies created on an ad hoc basis within the NSC structure. The form and effectiveness of these bodies has fluctuated, however, from Administration to Administration.
This provision provides for a permanent structure, composed of the senior policy-making officials within the principal consumer agencies of the Government, to set the course for U.S. intelligence activities from year to year. Indeed, the purpose of this provision is to make the senior policymakers whom the Intelligence Community was primarily created to serve expressly responsible for providing such direction and to make them responsible for assessing, for the President, how well the Intelligence Community has responded to their needs. For example, the Committee might define what it sees as the most likely scenarios where the United States could be involved in crisis or war, and ask the Intelligence Community to develop collection or analytical strategies to provide appropriate intelligence support. In addition, the Committee might address itself to what proportion of the overall budget should be devoted to intelligence, what areas should receive priority, or what means of collection or analysis should be emphasized.
The bill provides that the Committee be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In addition to the DNI and representatives of the NSC principals, the bill also provides that the Secretary of
Commerce, or his representative, should be a member of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, in order to involve a policy-making official who can integrate the needs of the Government for economic intelligence into this process.
Section 201 of the bill amends section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 which created the Central Intelligence Agency and the office of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). This section, indeed, has remained virtually unchanged since its enactment in 1947.
Reflecting the trifurcated role of the DCI which has evolved over time, Section 201 provides for the appointment of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and two Deputy Directors, and provides that the DNI will exercise operational control of the Central Intelligence Agency. (Section 202 of the bill provides for the appointment of a separate Director for the Central Intelligence Agency.) Each of the deputies would assist the DNI in carrying out his principal coordinating roles assigned by the bill: as principal intelligence adviser to the President and as head of the Intelligence Community. The DNI, both deputies, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
This structure is intended to enhance the ability of the DNI to manage effectively each of his functional areas of responsibility. It is also intended that certain of the DNI's responsibilities, which, under present arrangements, are carried out by CIA, are more appropriately placed under the DNI directly. Thus, it is contemplated that the new Deputy Director for Estimates and Analysis will be responsible for national estimates and other national-level analysis (including current intelligence products) that will be produced by a staff of Community (as opposed to CIA) analysts.
It is intended that the new Deputy DNI for the Intelligence Community would supersede the position of Director, Intelligence Community Staff under existing law. Indeed, the bill repeals section 102a of the National Security Act of 1947 which created the position of Director, Intelligence Community Staff. It is intended, that the staff positions which currently support the Director, Intelligence Community Staff, would be transferred to the new Deputy Director of National Intelligence for the Intelligence Community. It is further intended that the positions currently filled by persons on rotational assignments from elements of the Intelligence Community be filled on a permanent basis by persons selected by the Deputy Director of
National Intelligence from elements within the Intelligence Community.
The bill provides that either the position of DNI or the position of Deputy DNI for the Intelligence Community will be filled by a military officer in the rank of four-star general. This is to ensure a tie at the senior management level to the military components of the Intelligence Community, which, indeed, compose a larger part of the Community's overall capability.
Section 201 also provides that the Director of National Intelligence shall be at level I of the Executive Schedule, the same level as Cabinet officials. The duties of the Director merit the same status as the heads of many departments and agencies included at Executive level I. It is also important that the DNI be at a level that is comparable to the heads of agencies within the Intelligence Community with whom he must often interact. The level of the two Deputies and the Director of the CIA is set at Executive level III, where the current Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is now positioned.
Section 201 also provides that the offices of the two Deputy Directors shall form a `National Intelligence Center' physically located with the offices of the DNI. This is believed necessary inasmuch as the existing physical separation between the DCI and the existing Intelligence Community Staff is viewed as having been a practical hindrance to this relationship.
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Section 202 would amend the National Security Act of 1947 to elaborate, for the first time in statute, the areas of the DNI's responsibilities mentioned above: as provider of substantive intelligence; as head of the Intelligence Community; and as exercising control of the CIA itself.
Subsection 202(a) amends the National Security Act of 1947 by adding three new sections, 103 through 105, to that Act.
Subsection 103(a) charges the DNI with providing timely, objective intelligence, free of bias, based upon all sources available to the U.S. Intelligence Community, public and non-public, to the President personally and the Executive Office of the President, and, where appropriate, to the heads of departments and agencies, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and military commanders in the field, and to the Congress. This charge is more specific than exists in current law, and, for the most part, encapsulates the DNI's responsibility to provide intelligence to all Government consumers.
Subsection 103(b) creates two specific mechanisms to assist the DNI in performing this function. It is contemplated that both of these mechanisms would be under the Deputy DNI for Estimates and Analysis, created under section 201.
The first is the creation of a National Intelligence Council, composed of the senior analysts of the Intelligence Community appointed by the DNI, which will be solely responsible for producing national estimates, and whose members are recognized as the senior substantive experts of the Intelligence Community within their respective areas of expertise. It is intended that this mechanism will serve as the primary substantive `voice' of the Intelligence Community in terms of advising policymakers within the Government. In short, by creating this Council by statute and providing for the appointment of its members, it is intended to give permanence to this structure and increase its stature government-wide.
The DNI is expressly directed to provide an adequate, full-time staff to the Council to assist in the execution of its responsibilities. The absence of such staff support appears to have considerably hampered the existing council in fulfilling its objectives.
The second mechanism created under subsection (b) is the Office of Intelligence Analysis headed by a director appointed by the DNI. This office is made responsible for the current intelligence production (e.g. the President's Daily Brief, the National Intelligence Daily) as well as other forms of national-level analysis (other than national estimates which are prepared by the National Intelligence Council). The bill expressly provides that this Office shall be staffed with analysts assigned to various elements of the Intelligence Community. These would include CIA, the Departments of State and Defense. Indeed, it is contemplated that while some residual analytical capability would remain within CIA to support its collection operations, most of the analysts currently assigned to the CIA Directorate of Intelligence would be shifted under this construct to the staff of the Deputy DCI for Estimates and Analysis. Such a realignment is intended, in part, to provide the analytical side greater organizational independence from the clandestine service of CIA, which has in the past prevented experts on the outside from contributing their talents or sharing their expertise with the Directorate of Intelligence.
By structuring this office with senior analysts from the Intelligence Community, it is also intended that national-level analysis will be more representative of a `community' view and at the same time become sharper and more focused (rather than being merely a compendium of what every agency thinks). Such a structure should also alleviate the
need for repetitive and duplicative analytical structures within the Intelligence Community itself, leading to down-sizing and streamlining intelligence production capabilities generally. While it is clear that some analytical capabilities serving purely departmental interests must be retained, the manpower devoted to such activities could be significantly reduced.
Subsection 103(c) sets forth six general responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence as head of the Intelligence Community.
Subsection (c)(1) provides that the DNI will have responsibility for developing an annual budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and for presenting this budget to the President and to the Congress. This is akin to the responsibility the DNI currently has pursuant to Executive order. It is the intent of this provision, however, to give the DNI an effective tool to manage the Intelligence Community, not merely to establish him as a conduit for apportioning budget allocations among departments and agencies within the Intelligence Community.
Subsection (c)(2) makes the DNI responsible for managing the collection capabilities of the Intelligence Community to ensure the satisfaction of national requirements. This subsection contemplates that the DNI will not only establish policies and procedures to identify standing and recurring intelligence requirements, but also will institute policies and procedures to satisfy short-term, contingency requirements of the Government. Taken in conjunction with section 104, below, it is intended that the DNI will have the ability to direct certain types of collection, as needed to satisfy priority intelligence requirements.
Subsection (c)(3) makes the DNI responsible for promoting and evaluating the utility of national intelligence for consumers within the Government. This subsection contemplates that the DNI will be responsible for evaluating the adequacy of the links between the Intelligence Community and consumers, and for evaluating the quality and timeliness of intelligence analysis provided such consumers. Various efforts by past DCIs to carry out such responsibilities have largely failed due to the objections or lack of cooperation from elements of the Intelligence Community, yet the functions remain crucial ones.
Subsection (c)(4) gives the DNI authority to eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication within the Intelligence Community. To a degree, this responsibility may be carried out within the context of the annual budget process to develop the National Foreign Intelligence Program, but this provision is also intended to give the DNI authority to terminate or require the consolidation of redundant programs
and activities within the Intelligence Community on an ad hoc basis.
Subsection (c)(5) charges with DNI with providing guidance, direction and approval for the procurement and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems pursuant to section 208 and 209 of the Act to ensure the compatibility and integration of such systems. Sections 208 and 209 of the bill make the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the National Imagery Agency (a new agency created by the bill) responsible for the procurement and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems to satisfy signals intelligence requirements and imagery requirements, respectively, subject to the authorities of the DCI. Subsection (c)(5) expressly makes the DNI responsible for approving such procurement decisions. While the bill is intended to alter existing arrangements for the performance of the procurement function by placing such responsibility directly with the collection agencies, it recognizes that such systems are typically costly, requiring tradeoffs and long-term financing within the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and may, indeed, serve multiple purposes. Accordingly, the bill gives the DNI responsibility for approving such procurement decisions.
Finally, the DNI is made responsible by subsection (c)(6), as the DCI is under existing law, for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Under this authority, the DNI is expected to issue uniform policies for the Intelligence Community to provide for the protection of information which reveals intelligence sources and methods, as well as take appropriate measures on an ad hoc basis for the protection of such information.
It is contemplated that the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for the Intelligence Community would have principal responsibility for executing these functions on behalf of the DNI.
Indeed, subsection (d) provides for the establishment of two separate mechanisms under the Deputy Director for the Intelligence Community to carry out the functions set forth in subsection (c).
The first is the establishment of an Office for Warning and Crisis Support to be staffed with senior representatives of the Intelligence community selected by the DNI. This office is given specific responsibility for identifying potential threats to the United States, or areas where U.S. involvement or intervention may be called for, and providing possible options for U.S. actions to the President and other senior officials. This office also is charged with maintaining a permanent capability to provide intelligence
support in times of crisis, in terms of arranging for collection and/or analytical support to policymakers. The absence of such a permanent mechanism in the past appears to have hampered the performance of the Intelligence Community in past crises.
The second mechanism established by subsection (d) is an independent board, composed of experienced current or former senior officials of the Government (not necessarily the Intelligence Community itself), appointed by the DNI, to provide a full-time capability to evaluate the performance of the Intelligence Community. It is the intent of this subsection that this board look at intelligence support both in terms of specific cases or support to specific decisions made by the Government, and in terms of satisfying standing and recurring intelligence requirements. It is anticipated that reports prepared by this board would go directly to the DNI for appropriate action without prior coordination with affected agencies of the Intelligence Community.
Similar mechanisms established by previous DCIs have been largely unsuccessful. As a consequence, there is at present no mechanism to provide independent, objective assessments of the Intelligence Community's performance to the DCI. By providing for such a mechanism in law, the bill provides an authoritative mandate for the performance of this critical function.
Section 104 provides for the appointment by the President of a separate Director for the Central Intelligence Agency, subject to Senate confirmation, and provides that he will carry out his responsibilities under the supervision and operational control of the DNI. These responsibilities are set forth in subsection (a).
Subsection (a)(1) makes the Director of CIA responsible for the collection of intelligence through human sources and through other appropriate means. This latter reference refers to various types of technical sources which might be appropriately employed by the CIA. This subsection also incorporates the provision in existing law that the CIA shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions. This limitation has been an important restraint upon CIA's activities within the United States, including its role in domestic counterintelligence activities, and thus is retained in this reformulation of its responsibilities.
Subsection (a)(2) makes the Director of CIA responsible for providing overall direction for the collection of intelligence through human sources by elements of the Intelligence Community. While CIA under existing law coordinates the human source collection activities abroad of other agencies in the Intelligence Community, it does not
provide `direction' to these activities. Indeed, there is no element in the Intelligence Community which effectively performs this role under the existing structure.
It is the intent of this subsection that CIA have responsibility for ensuring that the human source collection capabilities of the Government as a whole, both overt and covert, are effectively utilized to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the Government as a whole, as well as to minimize the risks to those involved in such collection activities. This would entail examining U.S. requirements at particular locations abroad, and determining how such requirements might best be satisfied, given the capabilities of the Intelligence Community as well as departments and agencies outside the Intelligence Community. Subsection (a)(2) makes clear, however, that it is not the intent of this subsection that CIA supplant the human source collection activities of other agencies which may currently perform such functions. Rather, this provision anticipates CIA will analyze such activities in terms of how they might best be employed to meet the requirements of the Government as a whole for such collection.
Subsection (a)(3) also incorporates a provision of existing law, making the Director of the CIA responsible for providing additional services of common concern to the Intelligence Community as the DNI determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally. This has been a useful provision in existing law, permitting the CIA to perform a variety of services for the Intelligence Community as a whole, and is therefore retained in this section.
Subsection (a)(4) is also akin to current law, authorizing the Director of the CIA to perform such other functions and duties as may be directed by the President or the National Security Council. Specifically identified is the conduct of covert actions authorized by the President under the intelligence oversight provisions of title V of the National Security Act of 1947. Under existing law, the authority for CIA to carry out covert actions has been implied in the general provision authorizing CIA to carry out functions at the direction of the NSC. This subsection makes explicit such authority.
Subsection 104(b) addresses a particular aspect of the CIA's responsibilities: The provision of intelligence support to the military. This subsection provides for the appointment of an Assistant Deputy Director for Operations (Military Support) within the CIA Directorate of Operations. The incumbent would be a general or flag officer of 2-star rank, selected by the Director, CIA, after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and would serve as the principal liaison between CIA and the Department of Defense to facilitate CIA intelligence support to military
plans and operations. The establishment of this office is intended to address a long-standing weakness in the existing structure.
Section 105 sets forth the authorities of the Director of National Intelligence, which are specified in ten separate subsections.
Subsection (a) provides that all departments and agencies within the Intelligence Community shall provide the DNI access to national intelligence collected by their respective department or agency. This provision is similar to existing law, and is needed to ensure that the DNI has access to intelligence from all sources available to the Government. It is the intent of this provision that departments and agencies who have intelligence which bears upon national intelligence requirements (and not solely those of a particular department or agency), such intelligence shall be made available to the DNI in an appropriate fashion.
Subsection (b) provides that the DNI shall be responsible for allocating and disbursing funds within the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget to elements within the Intelligence Community. This provision should be read together with Section 203 of the bill, which requires a separate budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), appropriated to the DNI, beginning with fiscal year 1994. Subsection (b) makes the DNI responsible for the allocation and disbursement of NEIP funds.
Under the existing structure, the National Foreign Intelligence Program is not a separate line item in the President's budget. Instead, most of it, including the budget of the CIA, is `buried' in various line items of the DoD budget. Accordingly, the amount devoted to the NFIP within the DoD budget has in the past been determined by the agreement of the DCI and the Secretary of Defense The funds authorized and appropriated for most of the NFIP are appropriated to the Secretary of Defense, who disburses such funds to DoD elements within the NFIP and to the CIA.
Subsection (b), together with Section 203, below, would change this structure. The NFIP would no longer be a part of the DoD budget, but rather would be a separate line item in the President's budget. This means that while the NFIP would no longer be tied to fluctuations in Defense spending, it would have to compete against other funding priorities within the President's budget, something it does not do under the existing arrangement.
Funds appropriated for the NFIP would be appropriated to the DNI, who would make the appropriate allocations and disbursements to departments and agencies within the
Intelligence Community, including the intelligence elements of the Department of Defense.
Subsection (c) provides that no funds appropriated for the National Foreign Intelligence Program may be reprogrammed for any other purpose by a department or agency which receives such funds without the prior approval of the DNI. This is intended to prevent departments and agencies from using funds appropriated for the NFIP for other purposes unless the DNI is consulted in advance and approves the use of such funds for the purposes identified. Although the DCI has had authority by Executive order to review and approve requests for reprogramming of NFIP funds, this has not been cast in terms of a prohibition binding upon heads of departments and agencies. From time to time, in fact, department and agency heads have reprogrammed NFIP funds without the prior approval of the DCI despite the Executive order language giving the DCI the authority to approve such requests.
Subsection (d) provides that the DNI, upon his own initiative, may reprogram funds within the NFIP in accordance with established reprogramming procedures (which include prior notice and/or approval to appropriate congressional committees) in order to satisfy national requirements of a higher priority, so long as prior notice is given to the head of the department or agency concerned and a reasonable opportunity is provided for an appeal of the DNI's proposed reprogramming to the President. The DCI does not now have such authority apart from the ability to reprogram funds appropriated for CIA activities. It is the intent of this provision to permit the DNI to reprogram funds across NFIP accounts to satisfy significant national requirements which have a higher priority so long as the department or agency head concerned has an opportunity to seek appeal of the DNI's proposed decision should he choose to do so.
Subsection (e) provides additional flexibility for the DNI by authorizing him to shift funds to satisfy contingency requirements by allowing the DNI to obligate or expend funds from the CIA Reserve for Contingencies for other intelligence and intelligence-related activities. While section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 appears to allow for such transfers, as a practical matter, DCIs have not used the CIA Reserve for Contingencies to fund other than CIA activities. Subsection (e) would clarify that the DNI may use the CIA Reserve to fund the intelligence activities of other departments and agencies should he choose to do so, so long as the provisions of section 502 are adhered to.
Subsection (f) authorizes the DNI to temporarily reassign personnel assigned to one NFIP program to another NFIP program, for periods not to exceed an aggregate of 180 days in a given year, in order to meet national requirements
of a higher priority, provided the DNI gives prior notice to the head of the department or agency concerned and permits a reasonable time for such agency head to appeal such action to the President, and provides prior notice to the two congressional intelligence committees. The DCI does not have such authority under existing law. The bill provides such authority in order to give the DNI an ability to deal effectively and quickly with emergency situations facing the Intelligence Community.
Subsection (g) authorizes the DNI, under the direction of the National Security Council, to direct the use of any collection capability within the Intelligence Community to satisfy a priority collection requirement of the United States. The DCI does not currently have such authority, either under law or Executive order. He is given authority under Executive order to establish mechanisms to provide guidance on collection as well as to resolve conflicts in priority. But he lacks formal authority to task collection assets owned by other departments and agencies within the Intelligence Community to satisfy national requirements of a higher priority. By providing that the DNI shall exercise this authority under the direction of the National Security Council, it is intended that department or agency heads affected by the decision of the DNI will have a forum in which to raise possible objections to the DNI's actions.
Subsection (h) authorizes the DNI to coordinate the relationships between elements of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments. The DCI is currently given similar authority by Executive order, but it has not been well adhered to by other elements of the Intelligence Community. By making this authority a matter of law, the intent is to strengthen it. It is not intended that the DNI shall be responsible for making all liaison contacts with foreign governments, but rather that the DNI, or his representative, will be given prior notice of such arrangements in order to avoid duplication or creating confusion in such relationships by having various elements of the Intelligence Community establish separate liaison arrangements oblivious to other actions on the part of the United States.
Subsection (i) provides that the DNI may direct any element or elements of the Intelligence Community to prepare intelligence analyses after consultation with the head of the department or agency concerned. The DCI currently does not have this authority today, either by statute or Executive order. He may request such assistance, but he may not direct it. It is intended that this authority be used, as necessary, to carry out the responsibilities of the DNI as a provider of intelligence to the Government as a whole. While the DNI must take into account the capabilities and departmental requirements of analytical elements within the
Intelligence Community in levying such tasking, he should be in a position to require such assistance to meet high priority national needs.
Subsection (j) directs the DNI to institute policies and programs within the Intelligence Community to provide for the rotation of personnel between departments and agencies, and to consolidate where possible administrative programs to reduce the overall costs of these activities within the Intelligence Community.
With respect to the rotation of personnel within the Intelligence Community, it is intended that the DNI will take actions to eliminate barriers which currently exist to such rotation, and will, in conjunction with other departments and agencies in the Intelligence Community, establish programs which will encourage and facilitate rotational assignments among Intelligence Community agencies, either by providing monetary or career incentives. Greater use of rotational assignments should improve the understanding and cooperation which now exists between elements of the Intelligence Community, and ultimately lead to more effective mission accomplishment.
With respect to the consolidation of personnel, administrative, or security costs within the Intelligence Community, it is intended that the DNI will take actions to assess where costs savings in these areas may be achieved by consolidating activities within the Intelligence Community, and will institute appropriate actions to achieve such savings. For example, in the area of security for contractors who have contracts with several elements of the Intelligence Community, the DNI should consolidate security administration for such contractors, so they will not be subject to repeated inspections by various elements of the Intelligence Community. Another area for examination is training, where the DNI should explore the consolidation of training programs for personnel in the Intelligence Community who are performing comparable functions. A third possible area is communications, where the DNI should explore the feasibility of Intelligence Community elements sharing available communications systems, rather than each having its own. In short, this authority is intended to provide the DNI, in his role as head of the Intelligence Community, with the authority to institute changes that will result in costs savings within the Intelligence Community as a whole.
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Section 203 provides that beginning with the budget submission for fiscal year 1994 and for each fiscal year thereafter, the President will submit as a separate line item an aggregate amount for the National Foreign Intelligence Program. This section further provides that any amounts
authorized and appropriated for this program will be appropriated to the Director of National Intelligence who will disburse such funds to the elements of the Intelligence Community.
The effect of this section would be to remove the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget from the Defense Department budget, and have it considered as a separate program budget. This would mean that the NFIP would compete (as other programs) for a slice of the overall Administration budget request, rather than being established by an informal agreement between the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence as has been the practice. It would also mean the NFIP would no longer be tied to the fluctuations in the Defense budget but would be treated on its own terms.
By providing that the NFIP will be appropriated to the DNI rather than to other department or agency heads as is now the case (even with the budget for CIA), it is intended that the DNI, as head of the Intelligence Community, be placed in a position of ostensible control of these funds. While clearly the DNI would be legally obliged to disburse appropriated funds to Intelligence Community agencies in accordance with congressional enactments, this enhanced administrative role is nonetheless viewed as consistent with his overall responsibility.
Under existing law (10 U.S.C. 136), the Secretary of Defense is authorized to establish among his Assistant Secretaries an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, but to date he has chosen not to exercise this authority. Responsibility for intelligence has been lodged with the Assistant Secretary of Defense responsible for Command, Control, Communications--the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I). Section 301 would, in fact, require shifting the staff responsibility for intelligence from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) to a new Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), who would have sole responsibility on the staff of the Secretary of Defense for all intelligence and intelligence-related matters.
Under the present organizational arrangement, the Assistant Secretary (C3I) is expected to cover two large substantive areas (C3 and I), which are, for the most part, unrelated. Each area is so broad that it is physically impossible for one Assistant Secretary to do justice to both. Under previous Administrations, the incumbents, for the most
part have had little experience with, or interest in managing, Defense intelligence activities. Effective control was left largely in the hands of intelligence program managers in DoD Components, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense itself playing a relatively small role.
Exacerbating the management difficulties within the OSD staff, there are at least three offices in addition to the ASD (C3I) which report to the Secretary directly on intelligence or intelligence-related matters: the Under Secretary for Policy, which has cognizance of international security policy and special access programs, and staffs the Secretary on certain types of intelligence activities, the Assistant to the Secretary for intelligence activities; the Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence Policy; and the Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence Oversight. It is intended that a new Assistant Secretary for Intelligence would subsume all of these functions, resulting in fewer officials (not more) reporting directly to the Secretary on intelligence matters. This section is also intended to establish clearer accountability for intelligence activities at the DoD level, both from the standpoint of the Congress and others outside DoD.
Finally, the provisions of the bill itself provide an enhanced role for the Office of the Secretary of Defense in managing intelligence activities of both a national and tactical nature. Only the Secretary of Defense can set policy for all elements of the Department of Defense; only the Secretary of Defense can assess the resources needed for intelligence in terms of the broader DoD interest; and only the Secretary of Defense can effectively integrate national and tactical intelligence activities. Without the designation of an Assistant Secretary dedicated solely to intelligence, none of these critical functions will be performed as well as it might be.
Section 302 sets forth the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as they pertain to the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). These responsibilities are the subject of neither statutory nor regulatory enactment, and the lack of an authoritative statement of the Secretary's role vis-a-vis the NFIP has in the past led to considerable confusion. To illustrate, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is not part of the Intelligence Community, yet a number of DoD Components are part of the Intelligence Community. To what extent, then, is the Secretary of Defense bound by the decisions of the DCI? On the other hand, who represents the interests of DoD intelligence components to the DNI? the Secretary of Defense? Or is this left to individual program managers within DoD Components?
Subsection 302(1) provides that the Secretary of
Defense shall be responsible for implementation of the DNI's policy and resource decisions by DoD elements within the NFIP. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has historically performed this function, but without a specific charge to do so.
Subsection 302(2) charges the Secretary of Defense with ensuring that the tactical intelligence activities of DoD are compatible with and complement the intelligence activities funded within the NFIP. This subsection should be read in conjunction with section 303, below, which requires the creation of a new budget program for tactical intelligence activities, and program management by OSD.
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Section 303 institutes a procedure leading to the establishment of a new DoD Tactical Intelligence Program, to be managed by the Secretary of Defense. Subsection (a) provides that beginning with the annual budget submission for fiscal year 1994, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall identify those intelligence activities currently found in the list of Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) which constitute true `intelligence' activities which serve the interests of DoD generally. Subsection (b), in turn, requires that with the submission of the budget for fiscal year 1995, the intelligence activities identified the preceding year shall be funded as elements of a new Tactical Intelligence Program, to be managed as a separate program by the Secretary of Defense.
Several problems which plague the existing system would be addressed by Section 303. First, activities currently identified by the Department of Defense as part of TIARA are, in fact, not intelligence activities at all and should not be part of the management structure for intelligence, either within DoD or within the Congress. Second, activities identified within the TIARA category are not themselves managed as `program' at all, in the sense of being a discrete group of activities under the control of a single manager, but rather are managed on a decentralized basis within Defense Components as `non-intelligence', operational activities. Thus, as currently structured, TIARA is a not susceptible of overall program management by an intelligence manager. This situation has significantly hampered the effective integration of national and tactical intelligence activities either by the Office of the Secretary of Defense or by the DCI. Section 303 attempts to address this requiring true tactical intelligence activities to be grouped together to form a single program under a single DoD manager. It is also contemplated that within the military departments, those activities identified as elements of the DoD Tactical Intelligence Program would be managed by the intelligence
elements of the departmental staffs rather than by the operations staffs as is now the case with TIARA.
Section 311 of the bill would amend the National Security Act of 1947 to provide for the establishment of the National Security Agency (NSA) within the Department of Defense. NSA, while subsequently recognized in several statutory enactments, was created by presidential directive on October 24, 1952. While NSA has since carried out signals intelligence activities and communications security activities on behalf of the Government as a whole, it has remained a creature of Executive directive, with its principal missions and functions set forth only in such issuances. Section 311 would provide a statutory basis for its existence as well as for its principal missions. In recognition of the national role it has played and continues to play, NSA would be established under the National Security Act of 1947.
Under the existing framework, the Director of NSA has historically been a general or flag officer at the three-star level appointed by the Secretary of Defense, who serves at the pleasure of the Secretary. While length of actual service has varied, a `normal' tour as Director has heretofore been considered three years. This position has not been exempt from the statutory ceilings on general or flag officer positions within DOD, occasionally causing the military services to decline to nominate for the position, or leading them to nominate officers with little or no intelligence experience for the position.
Subsection (a) of the new section 208 of the National Security Act (as set forth in section 311 of the bill) would make several significant changes to this framework. While the Director would continue to be selected by the Secretary of Defense, the bill would require prior consultation with the DNI, reflecting the critical role which NSA plays in the Intelligence Community. Under the bill, the Director would be subject to a fixed term of four years, providing greater stability both to the Director and to the programs which he administers than which currently exists. Finally, while the bill would retain a requirement that the Director be a military officer (recognizing the necessity of a close and continuing relationship between NSA and the military services), it would exempt the position of Director from the statutory ceilings set for general and flag officers. This is intended to achieve several objectives: (1) to encourage each of the military departments to nominate for this position; (2) to encourage the military departments to groom qualified senior officers for this assignment; and (3) more generally, to create a senior officer position that military intelligence officers (as opposed to officers in
non-intelligence branches of service) can aspire to.
Subsection (b) sets forth the principal responsibilities of NSA.
Subsection (b)(1) provides that NSA will operate an effective unified organization for the conduct of signals intelligence activities, which, in fact, has been its basic mission since its creation in 1952.
Subsection (b)(2) sets forth a responsibility that NSA does not have under current organizational arrangements. It makes NSA the sole agent within the Intelligence Community, subject to the authorities of the DNI, for the procurement and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems as may be needed to satisfy U.S. signal intelligence requirements. This places responsibility for the procurement of such systems in the purview of the agency charged with carrying out the signals intelligence mission rather than having such decisions made elsewhere. This responsibility is predicted on the assumption that the director of NSA is at the outset in the best position to assess resource decisions concerning overhead systems within the context of the expenditures for his particular collection discipline. However, in view of the paramount need to ensure that such systems (which are normally quite costly) are needed, affordable, and provide maximum value for all collection disciplines, ultimate approval authority for these procurement decisions in placed by the bill in the hands of the DNI.
Subsection (b)(3) charges NSA with providing for the communications security needs of the Government as a whole. This, too, has been a long-standing part of NSA's mission, but has not heretofore been recognized in statute.
Section 321 of the bill would also amend the National Security Act of 1947 to create a new intelligence agency with national responsibilities, which is not already in existence: the National Imagery Agency.
The bill gives the new agency responsibility for operating an effective unified organization for the tasking of imagery collectors (i.e. satellites and airborne platforms), for the exploitation and analysis of imagery collection, and for the dissemination of imagery production within the Government as a whole. Under the existing framework, these functions are performed by a number of disparate elements of the Intelligence Community, located within CIA, the Intelligence Community staff, DIA, and other intelligence elements of the Department of Defense. This decentralized framework had resulted in a lack of uniform governmental standards to govern exploitation, analysis and
dissemination; considerable waste and duplication of effort; and a failure to integrate effectively U.S. capabilities.
The bill attempts to address this situation by placing these functions under a single manager (similar to the role which the Director NSA plays in coordinating U.S. signals intelligence activities). In recognition of its role as the largest consumer of imagery within the Government, the bill would place this new organization within the Department of Defense (similar to the National Security Agency). It is intended, however, that the new Agency will establish and operate an imagery system to support all of the Government's requirements for this type of collection, not simply those of the Department of Defense.
In addition, the bill makes the National Imagery Agency the sole agent within the Intelligence Community, subject to the authorities of the DNI, for the procurement and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems as may be needed to satisfy U.S. imagery requirements. As with NSA, this places responsibility for the procurement of such systems within the purview of the agency charged with carrying out the imagery intelligence mission rather than having such decisions made elsewhere. This responsibility is also predicated on the assumption that the director of the agency is at the outset in the best position to assess resource decisions concerning overhead systems within the context of the expenditures for his particular discipline. However, in view of the paramount need to ensure that such systems (which are normally quite costly) are needed, affordable, and provide maximum value for all collection disciplines, ultimate approval authority for these procurement decisions is placed by the bill in the hands of the DNI.
The bill also provides that the Director of the new agency be appointed by the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the DNI. This is a reflection of the essential role this agency will play within the Intelligence Community. Subsection (a) leaves the Secretary with discretion to appoint either a military officer or civilian as Director in recognition that the Agency's responsibilities are broader than satisfying only military requirements.
Section 501 of the bill, which generally addresses the various transfers of functions made by the bill, provides that the new National Imagery Agency will be composed of those elements of the Intelligence Community currently performing the functions described in section 209, as jointly determined by the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense.
Section 331 of the bill provides for the establishment
of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) within the Department of Defense. DIA was created by order of the Secretary of Defense on October 1, 1961, to consolidate analytical and production activities at the DoD level. While its existence has been recognized in several previous statutory enactments, it has until recently remained a creature of DoD directive with its principal functions and authorities set forth only in DoD regulations. Indeed, the lack of clear missions and authorities, established in an authoritative manner, has historically hampered DIA in the performance of these functions.
In section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, responsibilities for DIA were set forth for the first time in law, but, under the terms of the law, this provision expires on January 1, 1993.
Sections 331 through 333 would provide a permanent statutory basis for DIA's existence as well as for its principal missions and authorities.
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Under the existing framework, the Director of DIA has historically been a general or flag officer at the three-star level appointed by the Secretary of Defense, who serves at the pleasure of the Secretary. While length of actual service has varied, a `normal' tour as Director has heretofore been considered three years. In addition, this position has not been exempt from the statutory ceilings on general or flag officer positions within DoD, occasionally causing the military services to decline to nominate for the position, or leading them to nominate officers with little or no intelligence experience for the position.
Subsection (b) would make several changes to this framework. First, while it would left appointment of the Director with the Secretary of Defense, it would require prior consultation with the DNI, in recognition of the critical contribution made by DIA to the Intelligence Community. Under the bill, the Director would be subject to a fixed term of four years, providing greater stability both to the Director and to the programs which he administers than which currently exists. Finally, while the bill would retain a requirement that the Director be a military officer (recognizing the necessity of a close and continuing relationship between DIA and the military services), it would exempt the position of Director from the statutory ceilings set for general and flag officers. This is intended to achieve several objectives: (1) to encourage each of the military departments to nominate for this position; (2) to encourage the military departments to groom qualified senior officers for this assignment; and (3) more generally, to create a senior officer position that military intelligence
officers (as opposed to officers in nonintelligence branches of service) can aspire to.
Section 332 sets forth the responsibilities of DIA, each of which is made subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense. In general terms, these relate to the production of intelligence and to providing services of common concern to other intelligence elements of the Department of Defense. While these functions do not differ markedly from those currently assigned DIA under departmental regulation, it is intended that placing them in the law will provide a more authoritative base for DIA's exercise of these responsibilities.
Subsection 332(1) provides that DIA shall produce timely and objective military and military-related intelligence, based upon all sources available to the Intelligence Community, and disseminate such intelligence to the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders, as appropriate; other elements of the Department of Defense, as appropriate; and to other agencies and elements of the federal government, as appropriate. This is currently DIA's principal mission, assigned by DoD directive.
Subsection 332(2) provides that DIA will coordinate the production of military and military-related intelligence by other intelligence elements of the Department of Defense to ensure the adequacy and objectivity of intelligence support and to avoid unwarranted duplication. DIA has a similar function under DoD directive but its coordination role is limited primarily to avoiding duplication by DoD production elements.
Subsection 332(3) charges DIA with management of the Defense Attache System, a function DIA performs under its existing regulatory charter. Recognition of this function in statute is intended to strengthen DIA's ability to obtain qualified military officers to serve as military attaches.
Subsection 332(4) charges DIA, as principal producer of intelligence within DoD, with validating the intelligence collection requirements imposed on other DoD intelligence elements. It is intended that DIA will review such requirements to determine if they have been, or are being, satisfied by other U.S. intelligence collectors, prior to assigning such requirements to collectors within the Department of Defense.
Subsection 332(5) provides that DIA will perform such additional services of common concern to DoD intelligence elements as the Secretary of Defense might determine can be accomplished more efficiently in a central location. For
example, it might be more efficient for DIA to provide certain administrative or personnel services to all career personnel in intelligence positions within DoD rather than having separate programs in each intelligence component; or it may be more efficient for DIA to provide communications system design services to all DoD intelligence components to ensure compatibility and lower procurement costs.
To carry out the responsibilities set forth in section 332, section 333 provides the Director of DIA with certain authorities. These generally exceed the authorities which DIA currently has under departmental regulation. Indeed, it is the intent of this section to enhance such authorities to improve DIA's capability to perform its basic mission.
Subsection 333(1) provides that the Director, DIA shall have access to all intelligence collected by any intelligence element of the Department of Defense, or any component of the intelligence Community (outside the Department of Defense), which bears upon a matter within his area of responsibility. This exceeds the existing authority of the DIA Director, insofar as it addresses access to intelligence beyond DoD. It also permits the DIA Director to obtain access to intelligence held in special compartmented channels among DoD components which bears upon his production responsibilities, an area where DIA has previously experienced difficulty in obtaining access.
Subsection 333(2) provides that the Director, DIA may evaluate intelligence on military and military-related topics produced by any DoD intelligence component for use outside such component, in order to assess its accuracy, completeness, objectivity, or timeliness. This is an authority the Director, DIA does not have under existing regulation. It is intended to give the Director DIA the ability to effectuate his role as coordinator of intelligence production within the Department of Defense.
Subsection 333(3) provides the director, DIA with complementary authority to evaluate intelligence production within intelligence components of the Department of Defense, and to direct the consolidation or elimination of existing capabilities, or direct that the requirements of a particular component for production be satisfied by alternative means. This is authority that the Director, DIA does not now possess under currently DoD regulations. It is intended to permit the Director of DIA to satisfy his responsibilities as coordinator of intelligence production within DoD, providing authority to deal effectively with unnecessary duplication in the production area. The subsection also makes clear, however, that each of the military departments shall maintain separate, independent production capabilities to support the
departmental functions set for in section 341 of the bill.
Section 333(4) provides the Director of DIA with authority to require the military department to assign qualified active duty officers to the Defense Attache System. It is intended that the Director, DIA shall establish uniform standards governing the qualifications of such officers, and that the military departments will institute programs to develop and train officers capable of filling such positions.
Section 341 of the bill would amend Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, by adding a new section 425, imposing a requirement upon the Secretaries of the military departments to maintain sufficient capabilities to collect and produce intelligence in satisfaction of national, DoD, and service requirements.
This provision is included to ensure that with the drawdown in defense resources, sufficient intelligence capabilities will be maintained by the military departments, to serve both national purposes and their own service needs. It is also intended to acknowledge that even as the management arrangements for the conduct of U.S. intelligence activities are centralized and strengthened at higher levels, it is imperative to the continued vitality and effectiveness of U.S. intelligence activities, that the military departments continue to provide adequate personnel and logistical support to these efforts.
Section 401 of the bill amends Senate Resolution 400 (94th Congress), which established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), to bring within its jurisdictional tactical intelligence activities. When the SSCI was established in 1976, the resolution establishing the Committee expressly excluded `tactical foreign military intelligence serving no national policy-making function.' It was believed at the time that such activities more properly belonged in the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services.
When the House counterpart to the SSCI was established in 1977, however, the same limitation upon its jurisdiction was not included in the resolution establishing the Committee. Moreover, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) was expressly given jurisdiction over `intelligence-related' activities, which, over time, has come to include various DoD programs and activities whose relationship to intelligence was, arguably, minimal.
Section 401 would adopt a `middle of the road' approach.
It would eliminate the limitation in the Senate resolution which excludes `tactical intelligence' from `intelligence activities' under the jurisdiction of the SSCI, but it would not give the SSCI jurisdiction over `intelligence-related activities.
There are several reasons for this approach.
First, it is consistent with the changes proposed by section 303 of the bill which mandate the development of a DoD `Tactical Intelligence Program,' eliminating those elements of the existing TIARA which do not qualify as `intelligence' activities, i.e. are `intelligence-related.'
Second, experience has made clear that congressional oversight of national and tactical intelligence programs cannot be effectively performed separately or in a vacuum. Programmatic decisions made in the tactical area can have a direct bearing upon programmatic decisions made in the national area, and vice-versa. Support to military commanders and military planners necessarily involves national and tactical elements. To separate intelligence into two major segments for purposes of congressional oversight, and for the authorization of appropriations, establishes an arbitrary and artificial distinction that does not exist in reality.
Indeed, the SSCI has found it necessary as a practical matter--even though it is expressly excluded from jurisdiction over tactical intelligence activities--to establish a capability to monitor and oversee developments in the tactical intelligence arena. It cannot perform its functions vis-a-vis national programs without making this analysis. Typically, the Committee's recommendations in the tactical area are conveyed to the Committee on Armed Services which has previously accorded them substantial weight in arriving at its annual authorizations for tactical intelligence programs.
Because the House intelligence committee has jurisdiction over tactical intelligence programs, and the Senate intelligence committee does not, the annual authorizations for these activities are agreed upon in conference between the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence within the context of the action on the DoD authorization, rather than the intelligence authorization, and the SSCI has played only an informal, advisory role in this process.
The purpose of section 401 would be to make the Senate's jurisdiction consistent with that of its House counterpart committee, and to ensure that all intelligence issues are dealt within the context of congressional action on the annual intelligence authorization bill. It would not alter
the provisions of S. Res. 400 which give the Committee on Armed Services the right to ask for and receive sequential referral of the annual intelligence authorization bill. Accordingly, its right to review and recommend changes to the annual authorization for tactical intelligence activities would be preserved by this proposal. Similarly, when read in conjunction with the proposed section 303, this would leave DoD `intelligence-related' activities with arguably little direct relationship with intelligence outside the scope of SSCI or HPSCI jurisdiction altogether.
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Sections 501 through 514 contains provisions which apply to the transfers of functions mandated by title III of the bill, namely, the transfer of functions to the newly-created National Imagery Agency, as well as the transfer of functions from the National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, both of which exist pursuant to Executive branch regulations, to the succeeding statutory agencies.
The effect of these provisions is basically to provide, as a matter of law, for the effective transition of functions, legal authorities, appropriations, personnel and equipment, obligations, and liabilities from the previously-established organizational entities to the newly-created ones.
Section 601 provides that the effective date of the Act shall be 180 days from the date of its enactment, except for the amendment to Senate Resolution 400 which takes effect upon enactment. The 180-day delay in the effective date is intended to provide sufficient time for the actions called for by the bill to be implemented.