[Page: S14774]
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of S. 1539, the Intelligence authorization bill that, with the exception of the amendments reported by the Armed Services Committee, the only amendment in order to the bill be one offered by Senator Glenn to require Senate confirmation for the general counsel and five Deputy Directors of the CIA; that there be 4 hours of debate on the Glenn amendment, equally divided and controlled in the usual form; that there be 30 minutes of debate on the bill, including the committee amendments, equally divided and controlled between the chairman and ranking members of the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees;
That, after all debate has been completed on the bill and the Glenn amendment, and the committee amendments have been disposed of, the Senate vote on, or in relation to, the Glenn amendment, to be followed immediately by third reading and final passage of the bill, and that the preceding all occur without any intervening action or debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Mikulski). Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will now report the bill.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
[Page: S14775]
A bill (S. 1539) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1992 for intelligence activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
The Senate proceeded to consider the bill which had been reported from the Committee on Armed Services, with amendments, as follows:
(The parts of the bill intended to be inserted are shown in italics.)
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1992'.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1992 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Amounts and Personnel Ceilings: The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1992, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany S. 1539 of the One Hundred Second Congress.
(b) Availability of the Schedule of Authorizations: The Schedule of Authorizations described in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
The Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the numbers for such personnel authorized for fiscal year 1992 under sections 102 and 202 of this Act whenever he determines that such action is necessary for the performance of important intelligence functions, except that such number may not, for any element of the Intelligence Community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section.
SEC. 104. PRESIDENTIAL BUDGET SUBMISSION.
Section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
`(29) a separate, unclassified statement of the aggregate amount of expenditures for the previous fiscal year, and the aggregate amount of funds requested to be appropriated for the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, for intelligence and intelligence-related activities.'.
SEC. 105. FUNDING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:
`(c) Any bill reported by a committee of conference of the Congress which authorizes funds to be appropriated for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States shall contain an unclassified statement of the aggregate amount of such funds authorized to be appropriated.'.
SEC. 106. EFFECTIVE DATE OF SECTIONS 104 AND 105.
The amendments made by sections 104 and 105 shall take effect on the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 1993 for the conduct of intelligence activities of all of the elements of the United States Government referred to in section 101.
TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Staff for fiscal year 1992 $28,832,000, of which amount $6,566,000 shall be available for the Security Evaluation Office.
SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL END-STRENGTH.
(a) Authorized Personnel Level: The Intelligence Community Staff is authorized 240 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1992, including 50 full-time personnel who are authorized to serve in the Security Evaluation Office. Such personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(b) Representation of Intelligence Elements: During fiscal year 1992, personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be selected so as to provide appropriate representation from elements of the United States Government engaged in intelligence and intelligence-related activities.
(c) Reimbursement: During fiscal year 1992, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the Intelligence Community staff from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
SEC. 203. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF ADMINISTERED IN SAME MANNER AS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
During fiscal year 1992, activities and personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be subject to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) in the same manner as activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency are subject to those provisions.
TITLE III--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $164,100,000 for fiscal year 1992.
SEC. 302. SURVIVOR BENEFITS FOR CHILDREN WHO HAVE A SURVIVING PARENT.
(a) Computation of Annuities for Other Than Former Spouses: Section 221 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(1), by striking out `wife or husband and by a child or children, in addition to the annuity payable to the surviving wife or husband, there shall be paid to or on behalf of each' and inserting in lieu thereof `spouse or a former spouse who is the natural or adoptive parent of a surviving child of the annuitant, there shall be paid to or on behalf of that surviving';
(2) in subsection (c)(2), by striking out `wife or husband but by a child or children, each surviving child shall be paid' and inserting in lieu thereof `spouse or a former spouse who is the natural or adoptive parent of a surviving child of the annuitant, there shall be paid to or on behalf of that surviving child';
(3) by amending subsection (d) to read as follows:
`(d) On the death of the surviving spouse or former spouse or termination of the annuity of a child, the annuity of any remaining child or children shall be recomputed and paid as though the spouse, former spouse, or child had not survived the participant. If the annuity to a surviving child who has not been receiving an annuity is initiated or resumed, the annuities of any other children shall be recomputed and paid from that date as though the annuities to all currently eligible children were then being initiated.';
(4) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(q) For purposes of this section--
`(1) the term `former spouse' includes any former wife or husband of the participant, regardless of the length of marriage or the amount of creditable service completed by the participant; and
`(2) the term `spouse' has the same meaning given the terms `widow' and `widower' in section 204(b).'; and
(5) in subsection (e), by striking out `under paragraph (c) or (d) of this section, or (c) or (d)' and inserting in lieu thereof `under subsection (c) of this section, or subsection (c) or (d)'.
(b) Death in Service: Section 232 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) by striking out `wife or a husband and a child or children, each' and inserting in lieu thereof `spouse or a former spouse who is the natural or adoptive parent of a surviving child of the participant, that';
(B) by striking out `section 221(c)(1)' and inserting in lieu thereof `subsections (c)(1) and (d) of section 221'; and
(C) by striking out the last sentence;
(2) in subsection (d)--
(A) by striking out `wife or husband, but by a child or children, each' and inserting in lieu thereof `spouse or a former spouse who is the nature or adoptive parent of a surviving child of the participant, that';
(B) by striking out `section 221(c)(2)' and inserting in lieu thereof `subsections (c)(2) and (d) of section 221'; and
(C) by striking out the last sentence; and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(e) For purposes of subsections (c) and (d)--
`(1) the term `former spouse' includes any former wife or husband of the participant, regardless of the length of marriage or the amount of creditable service completed by the participant; and
`(2) the term `spouse' has the same meaning given the terms `widow' and `widower' in section 204(b).'.
[Page: S14776]
SEC. 303. 18-MONTH PERIOD TO ELECT A SURVIVOR ANNUITY.
(a) Section 221 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (q) (as added by subsection (a)) as subsection (r); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (p) the following new subsection:
`(q)(1)(A) A participant or former participant--
`(i) who, at the time of retirement, is married, and
`(ii) who elects at such time (in accordance with subsection (b)) to waive a survivor annuity for the spouse, may, during the 18-month period beginning on the date of the retirement of such participant, elect to have a reduction under subsection (b) of this section made in the annuity of the participant (or in such portion thereof as the participant may designate) in order to provide a survivor annuity for such spouse of the participant.
`(B) A participant or former participant--
`(i) who, at the time of retirement, is married, and
`(ii) who, at such time designates (in accordance with subsection (b)) that a portion of the annuity of such participant is to be used as the base for a survivor annuity, may, during the 18-month period beginning on the date of the retirement of such participant, elect to have a greater portion of the annuity of such participant so used.
`(2)(A) An election under subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be considered effective unless the amount specified in subparagraph (B) is deposited into the fund before the expiration of the applicable 18-month period under paragraph (1).
`(B) The amount to be deposited with respect to an election under this subsection is an amount equal to the sum of--
`(i) the additional cost to the system which is associated with providing a survivor annuity under subsection (b) and results from such election, taking into account (I) the difference (for the period between the date on which the annuity of the participant or former participant commences and the date of the election) between the amount paid to such participant or former participant under this title and the amount which would have been paid if such election had been made at the time the participant or former participant applied for the annuity, and (II) the costs associated with providing for the later election; and
`(ii) interest on the additional cost determined under clause (i), computed using the interest rate specified or determined under section 8334(e) of title 5, United States Code, for the calendar year in which the amount to be deposited is determined.
`(3) An election by a participant or former participant under this subsection voids prospectively any election previously made in the case of such participant under subsection (b).
`(4) An annuity which is reduced in connection with an election under this subsection shall be reduced by the same percentage reductions as were in effect at the time of the retirement of the participant or former participant whose annuity is so reduced.
`(5) Rights and obligations resulting from the election of a reduced annuity under this subsection shall be the same as the rights and obligations which would have resulted had the participant involved elected such annuity at the time of retiring.
`(6) The Director shall, on an annual basis, inform each participant who is eligible to make an election under this subsection of the right to make such election and the procedures and deadlines applicable to such election.'.
(b)(1) The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect three months after the date of enactment of this Act.
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the amendment made by subsection (a)(2) shall apply with respect to participants and former participants who retire before, on, or after such amendment first takes effect.
(B) The provisions of paragraph (1)(B) of section 221(q) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (as added by subsection (a)(2) of this section) shall apply to participants and former participants who retire before the date on which the amendments made by subsection (a) first takes effect. For the purpose of applying such provisions to these annuitants--
(i) the 18-month period referred to in section 221(q)(1)(B) of such Act shall be considered to begin on the date on which the amendments made by subsection (a) first becomes effective; and
(ii) the amount referred to in paragraph (2) of section 221(q) of such Act shall be computed without regard to the provisions of subparagraph (B)(ii) of such paragraph (relating to interest).
SEC. 304. WAIVER OF THIRTY-MONTH APPLICATION REQUIREMENT.
(a) Waiver: Section 224(c)(2)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: `The Director may waive the 30-month application requirement under this subparagraph in any case in which the Director determines that the circumstances so warrant.'.
(b) Effective Date: The amendment made by this section shall be effective as of October 1, 1986.
SEC. 305. REIMBURSEMENT FOR DISABILITY EXAMS--DIRECTOR'S DISCRETION.
Section 231(b)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees, as amended (50 U.S.C. 403 note), is amended in the sixth sentence by striking `shall' and inserting in lieu thereof `may'.
SEC. 306. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO SECTION ON PREVIOUS SPOUSES OF CIARDS PARTICIPANTS.
(a) Survivor Annuities for Previous Spouses: Section 226 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking out `whose retirement or disability or FECA (chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code) annuity commences after the effective date of this section';
(B) by striking out `applicable to spouses' and inserting in lieu thereof `applicable to former spouses (as defined in section 8331(23) of title 5, United States Code)'; and
(C) by striking out `married for at least nine months with service creditable under section 8332 of title 5, United States Code' and inserting in lieu thereof `as prescribed by the Civil Service Retirement Spouse Equity Act of 1984'; and
(2) in subsections (a) and (b), by striking out `the effective date of this section' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof `September 29, 1988'.
(b) Effective Date: (1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), the amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act.
(2) The amendments made by subparagraphs (B) and (C) of subsection (a)(1) shall be deemed to have become effective as of September 29, 1988.
(3) The amendment made by subparagraph (A) of subsection (a)(1) shall be deemed to have become effective as of September 30, 1990, and shall apply in the case of annuitants whose divorce occurs on or after such date.
SEC. 307. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT PROVISION UNDER CIARDS.
Section 235(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended--
(1) in the first sentence, by striking `grade GS-18 or above' and inserting in lieu thereof `of level 4 or above of the Senior Intelligence Service pay schedule'; and
(2) in the second sentence, by striking `less than GS-18' and inserting in lieu thereof `that of level 4 of the Senior Intelligence Service pay schedule'.
SEC. 308. EXCLUSION OF CIA FOREIGN NATIONAL EMPLOYEES FROM CERTAIN CSRS PROVISIONS AND FROM FERS.
(a) Definition of `Employee': Section 8331(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking `or' at the end of clause (xii);
(2) by striking the period at the end of clause (xii) and inserting in lieu thereof `; or'; and
(3) by adding after clause (xii) the following: `(xiii) a foreign national employee of the Central Intelligence Agency whose services are performed outside the United States and who is appointed after December 31, 1989.'.
(b) Participation in the Thrift Savings Plan: Section 8351 of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
`(d) A foreign national employee of the Central Intelligence Agency whose services are performed outside the United States shall be ineligible to make an election under this section.'.
(c) Federal Employees' Retirement System: Section 8402(c) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
`(7) The Director of Central Intelligence may exclude from the operation of this chapter a Central Intelligence Agency foreign national employee who is a permanent resident alien.'.
(d) Effective Date: (1) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall be effective as of January 1, 1990.
(2) The amendments made by subsections (b) and (c) shall be effective as of January 1, 1987.
(3) Any refund which becomes payable as a result of the effective dates made by this subsection shall, to the extent that such refund involves an individual's contributions to the Thrift Savings Fund (established under section 8437 of title 5, United States Code), be adjusted to reflect any earnings attributable thereto.
[Page: S14777]
SEC. 309. CORRECTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS TO QUALIFIED FORMER SPOUSE PROVISIONS UNDER FERS.
(a) Special Rules for Former Spouses: Section 304 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended to read as follows:
`(1) the term `employee' means an officer or employee of the Agency who is subject to chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, including one referred to in section 302(a) of this Act;
`(2) the term `qualified former spouse' means a former spouse of an employee who was divorced from the employee after November 15, 1982 and who was married to the employee for at least 10 years during periods of service by the employee which are creditable under section 8411 of title 5, at least five years of which were spent outside the United States by both the employee and the former spouse during the employee's service with the Central Intelligence Agency;
`(3) the term `pro rata share' means the percentage that is equal to (A) the number of days of the marriage of the qualified former spouse to the employee during the employee's periods of creditable service under chapter 84 of title 5 divided by (B) the total number of days of the employee's creditable service;
`(4) the term `spousal agreement' means any written agreement (properly authenticated as determined by the Director) between an employee and the employee's spouse or qualified former spouse that has not been modified by court order; and
`(5) the term `court order' means any court decree of divorce, annulment or legal separation, or any court order or court-approved property settlement agreement incident to such court decree of divorce, annulment or legal separation.
`(c)(1)(A) Unless otherwise expressly provided by any spousal agreement or court order governing disposition of benefits payable under subchapter II or subchapter V of chapter 84 of title 5, a qualified former spouse of an employee is entitled to a share (determined under subparagraph (B)) of all benefits otherwise payable to such employee under subchapter II or subchapter V of chapter 84 of title 5.
`(B) The share referred to in subparagraph (A) equals--
`(i) 50 percent, if the qualified former spouse was married to the employee throughout the entire period of the employees service which is creditable under chapter 84 of title 5; or
`(ii) a pro rata share of 50 percent, if the qualified former spouse was not married to the employee throughout such creditable service.
`(2) The benefits payable to an employee under subchapter II of chapter 84 of title 5 shall include, for purposes of this subsection, any annuity supplement payable to such employee under sections 8421 and 8421a of title 5.
`(3) A qualified former spouse shall not be entitled to any benefit under this subsection if, before commencement of any benefit, the qualified former spouse remarries before becoming 55 years of age.
`(4)(A) the benefits of a qualified former spouse under this subsection commence on--
`(i) the day the employee upon whose service the benefits are based becomes entitled to the benefits; or
`(ii) the first day of the second month beginning after the date on which the Director receives written notice of the court order of spousal agreement, together with such additional information or documentation as the Director may prescribe;
whichever is later.
`(B) The benefits of such former spouse and the right thereto terminate on--
`(i) the last day of the month before the qualified former spouse remarries before 55 years of age or dies; or
`(ii) the date the retired employee's benefits terminate (except in the case of benefits subject to paragraph (5)(B)).
`(5)(A) Any reduction in payments to a retired employee as a result of payments to a qualified former spouse under this subsection shall be disregarded in calculating--
`(i) the survivor annuity for any spouse, former spouse (qualified or otherwise), or other survivor under chapter 84 of title 5, and
`(ii) any reduction in the annuity of the retired employee to provide survivor benefits under subsection (d) of this section or under sections 8442 or 8445 of title 5.
`(B) If a retired employee whose annuity is reduced under subparagraph (A) is recalled to service under section 302(c) of this Act, the salary of that annuitant shall be reduced by the same amount as the annuity would have been reduced if it had continued. Amounts equal to the reductions under this subparagraph shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund.
`(6) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (4), in the case of any qualified former spouse of a disability annuitant--
`(A) the annuity of such former spouse shall commence on the date the employee would qualify, on the basis of his or her creditable service, for benefits under subchapter II of chapter 84 of title 5, or on the date the disability annuity begins, whichever is later; and
`(B) the amount of the annuity of the qualified former spouse shall be calculated on the basis of the benefits for which the employee would otherwise qualify under subchapter II of chapter 84 of title 5.
`(7) Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(B), in the case of an employee who has elected to become subject to chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, the share of such employee's qualified former spouse shall equal the sum of--
`(A) 50 percent of the employee's annuity under subchapter III of chapter 83 of title 5, United States Code, or under title II of this Act (computed in accordance with section 302(a) of the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 or section 307 of this Act), multiplied by the proportion that the number of days of marriage during the period of the employee's creditable service before the effective date of the election to transfer bears to the employee's total creditable service before such effective date; and
`(B) if applicable, 50 percent of the employee's benefits under chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, or section 302(a) of this Act (computed in accordance with section 302(a) of the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 or section 307 of this Act), multiplied by the proportion that the number of days of marriage during the period of the employee's creditable service on and after the effective date of the election to transfer bears to the employee's total creditable service after such effective date.
`(8) For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, payments to a qualified former spouse under this subsection shall be treated as income to the qualified former spouse and not to the employee.
`(d)(1)(A) Subject to an election under section 8416(a) of title 5, United States Code, and unless otherwise expressly provided by any spousal agreement or court order governing survivor benefits payable under this subsection to a qualified former spouse, such former spouse is entitled to a share, determined under subparagraph (B), of all survivor benefits that would otherwise be payable under subchapter IV of chapter 84 of title 5, to an eligible surviving spouse of the employee.
`(B) The share referred to in subparagraph (A) equals--
`(i) 100 percent, if the qualified former spouse was married to the employee throughout the entire period of the employee's service which is creditable under chapter 84 of title 5; or
`(ii) a pro rata share of 100 percent, if the qualified former spouse was not married to the employee throughout such creditable services.
`(2)(A) The survivor benefits payable under this subsection to a qualified former spouse shall include the amount payable under section 8442(b)(1)(A) of title 5, and any supplementary annuity under section 8442(f) of title 5, that would be payable if such former spouse were a widow or widower entitled to an annuity under such section of title 5.
`(B) Any calculation under section 8442(f) of title 5, United States Code, of the supplementary annuity payable to a widow or widower of an employee referred to in section 302(a) of this Act shall be based on an `assumed CIARDS annuity' rather than an `assumed CSRS annuity' as stated in section 8442(f) of such title. For the purpose of this subparagraph, the term `assumed CIARDS annuity' means the amount of the survivor annuity to which the widow or widower would be entitled under title II of this Act based on the service of the deceased annuitant determined under section 8442(f)(5) of such title.
`(3) A qualified former spouse shall not be entitled to any benefit under this subsection if, before commencement of any benefit, the qualified former spouse remarries before becoming 55 years of age.
`(4) If the survivor annuity payable under this subsection to a surviving qualified former spouse is terminated because of remarriage before becoming age 55, the annuity shall be restored at the same rate commencing on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, divorce, or annulment, if--
`(A) such former spouse elects to receive this survivor annuity instead of any other survivor benefit to which such former spouse may be entitled under subchapter IV of chapter 84 of title 5, or under another retirement system for Government employees by reason of the remarriage; and
`(B) any lump sum paid on termination of the annuity is returned to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund.
`(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a modification in a court order or spousal agreement to adjust a qualified former spouse's share of the survivor benefits shall not be effective if issued after the retirement or death of the employee, former employee, or annuitant, whichever occurs first.
`(B) In the case of a post-retirement divorce or annulment, a modification referred to in subparagraph (A) shall not be effective if issued--
`(i) more than a year after the date the decree of divorce or annulment becomes final, or
`(ii) after the death of the annuitant,
whichever occurs first.
`(C) To the extent a modification under subparagraph (B) increases a qualified former spouse's share of the survivor benefits, the annuitant shall pay a deposit computed in accordance with the provisions of section 8418 of title 5, United States Code.
`(6) After a qualified former spouse of a retired employee remarries before becoming age 55 or dies, the reduction in the retired employee's annuity for the purpose of providing a survivor annuity for such former spouse shall be terminated. The annuitant may elect, in a signed writing received by the Director within two years after the qualified former spouse's remarriage or death, to continue the reduction in order to provide or increase the survivor annuity for such annuitant's spouse. The annuitant making such election shall pay a deposit in accordance with the provisions of section 8418 of title 5, United States Code.
`(7) Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(B), in the case of an employee who has elected to become subject to chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, the share of such employee's qualified former spouse to survivor benefits shall equal the sum of--
`(A) 50 percent of the employee's annuity under subchapter III of chapter 83 of title 5 or under title II of this Act (computed in accordance with section 302(a) of the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 or section 307 of this Act), multiplied by the proportion that the number of days of marriage during the period of the employee's creditable service before the effective date of the election to transfer bears to the employee's total creditable service before such effective date; and
`(B) if applicable, 50 percent of--
`(i) the employee's annuity under chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, or section 302(a) of this Act (computed in accordance with section 302(a) of the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 or section 307 of this Act), plus
`(ii) the survivor benefits referred to in subsection (d)(2)(A), multiplied by the proportion that the number of days of marriage during the period of the employee's creditable service on and after the effective date of the election to transfer bears to the employee's total creditable service after such effective date.
`(e) An employee may not make any election or modification of election under section 8417 or 8418 of title 5, United States Code, or any other section relating to the employee's annuity under subchapter II of chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, that would diminish the entitlement of a qualified former spouse to any benefit granted to such former spouse by this section or by court order or spousal agreement.
`(f) Whenever an employee or former employee becomes entitled to receive the lump-sum credit under section 8424(a) of title 5, United States Code, a share (determined under subsection (c)(1)(B) of this section) of that lump-sum credit shall be paid to any qualified former spouse of such employee, unless otherwise expressly provided by any spousal agreement or court order governing disposition of the lump-sum credit involved.
`(g)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) in the case of an employee who has elected to become subject to chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, the provisions of sections 224 and 225 of this Act shall apply to such employees former spouse (as defined in section 204(b)(4) of this Act) who would otherwise be eligible for benefits under such sections 224 and 225 but for the employee having elected to become subject to such chapter.
`(2) For the purpose of computing such former spouse's benefits under sections 224 and 225 of this Act--
`(A) the retirement benefits shall be equal to the amount determined under subsection (c)(7)(A) of this section; and
`(B) the survivor benefits shall be equal to 55 percent of the full amount of the employee's annuity computed in accordance with section 302(a) of the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 or section 307 of this Act.
`(3) Benefits provided pursuant to this subsection shall be payable from the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.'.
(b) Effective Date: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the amendments made by this section shall be deemed to have become effective as of January 1, 1987.
(2) Subsection (g) of section 304 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees, as amended by this section, shall be deemed to have become effective as of December 7, 1987.
[Page: S14778]
SEC. 310. ELIMINATION OF OVERSEAS SERVICE REQUIREMENT FOR FORMER SPOUSES.
(a) Eligibility: Section 204(b)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (60 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by striking out `at least five years of which were spent outside the United States by both the participant and the former spouse' and inserting in lieu thereof `at least five years of which were spent by the participant outside the United States or otherwise in a position whose duties qualified him or her for designation by the Director as a participant pursuant to section 203 of this Act'.
(b) Applicability: The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply only to a former husband or wife of a participant or former participant whose divorce from the participant or former participant became final after the date of enactment of this Act.
TITLE IV--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 401. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
TITLE V--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PROVISIONS
SEC. 501. FBI CRITICAL SKILLS SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM.
(a) Study: The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall conduct a study relative to the establishment of an undergraduate training program with respect to employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that is similar in purpose, conditions, content, and administration to undergraduate training programs administered by the Central Intelligence Agency (under section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403j)), the National Security Agency (under section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 (note)), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (under 10 U.S.C. 1608).
(b) Implementation: Any program proposed under subsection (a) may be implemented only after the Department of Justice and the Office of Management and Budget review and approve the implementation of such program.
(c) Availability of Funds: Any payment made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to carry out any program proposed to be established under subsection (a) may be made in any fiscal year only to the extent that appropriated funds are available for that purpose.
TITLE VI--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PROVISIONS
SEC. 601. AMENDMENT TO TITLE 5.
Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended to insert at the end thereof the following:
`Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency'.
TITLE VII--NATIONAL SECURITY SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND GRANTS
SEC. 701. AMENDMENT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
The National Security Act of 1947 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new title:
`TITLE VIII--NATIONAL SECURITY SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND GRANTS'
`SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE.
`This title may be cited as the `National Security Education Act of 1991'.
`SEC. 802. FINDINGS.
`The Congress finds that--
`(1) the security of the United States is and will continue to depend on our Nation's international leadership;
`(2) United States leadership is and will increasingly be based on our Nation's political, economic, as well as military strength around the world;
`(3) recent changes in the world pose threats of a new kind to international stability as Cold War tensions continue to decline while economic competition, regional conflicts, terrorist activities, and weapon proliferations have dramatically increased;
`(4) the future national security and economic well-being of the United States will substantially depend on the ability of its citizens to communicate and compete by knowing the languages and cultures of other countries;
`(5) the Federal Government has a vested interest to ensure that the employees within its national security agencies are prepared to meet the challenges of this changing international environment;
`(6) the Federal Government also must address the fact that American undergraduate and graduate students are inadequately prepared to meet the challenges posed by increasing global interaction among nations; and
`(7) American colleges and universities must place a new emphasis on improving the teaching of foreign languages, regional studies, and international studies to help meet such challenges.
`SEC. 803. PURPOSES.
`It is the purpose of this title--
`(1) to establish the National Security Education Trust Fund to--
`(A) provide the necessary resources, accountability, and flexibility to meet the Nation's security needs, especially as such needs change over time;
`(B) increase the quantity, diversity, and quality of teaching and learning of subjects in the fields of international studies, area studies, and foreign languages deemed to be critical to the Nation's interest;
`(C) enhance the pool of possible applicants to work in the national security agencies of the United States Government; and
`(D) in conjunction with other Federal programs, expand the international experience, knowledge base, and the perspectives on which the United States citizenry, government employees, and leaders shall rely; and
`(2) to permit the Federal Government to advocate the cause of international education;
[Page: S14779]
`SEC. 804. PROGRAM AUTHORIZED.
`(a) Program Authorized:
`(1) In general: The National Security Education Board shall conduct a program of--
`(A) awarding scholarships to undergraduate students who are United States citizens or resident aliens to enable such students to study abroad, for at least 1 semester, in countries identified by the Board as critical countries pursuant to section 805(c)(2);
`(B) awarding fellowships to graduate students who--
`(i) are United States citizens or resident aliens to enable such students to pursue education in the United States in the disciplines of international studies, area studies, and foreign languages, that the Board determines pursuant to section 805(c)(3) to be critical areas of such disciplines; and
`(ii) agree to work for the Federal Government or in the field of education, in the area of study for which the scholarship was awarded, in accordance with the agreement described in paragraph (3); and
`(C) awarding grants to institutions of higher education to enable such institutions to establish, operate, and improve programs in international studies, area studies, and foreign languages that the Board determines pursuant to section 805(c)(4) to be critical areas of such disciplines.
`(2) Reservations: The Board shall have as a goal reserving--
`(A) 1/3 of the amount available for obligation under section 806(f)(1) to award scholarships pursuant to paragraph (1)(A);
`(B) 1/3 of such amount to award fellowships pursuant to paragraph (1)(B); and
`(C) 1/3 of such amount to award grants pursuant to paragraph (1)(C).
`(3) Agreement: Each individual receiving a fellowship pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) shall enter into an agreement with the Board which shall provide assurances that each such individual--
`(A) shall maintain satisfactory academic progress; and
`(B) shall agree to work for the Federal Government or in the field of education, in the area of study for which the fellowship was awarded, for a period determined by the Board which shall at least be equal to the period that fellowship assistance was provided under this title and shall not exceed 3 times such period, upon completion of such individual's education.
`(b) Criteria and Information: The Board shall--
`(1) develop criteria for awarding scholarships, fellowships, and grants under this title; and
`(2) provide for the wide disbursement of information regarding the activities assisted under this title.
`(c) Distribution of Assistance: The Board shall take into consideration providing an equitable geographic distribution of scholarships, fellowships, and grants awarded under this title among the various regions of the United States.
`(d) Merit Review: The Board shall utilize a merit review process in awarding scholarships, fellowships, and grants under this title.
`(e) Inflation: The amount of scholarships, fellowships, and grants awarded under this title shall be annually adjusted for inflation.
`SEC. 805. NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION BOARD.
`(a) Establishment: The Secretary of Defense shall establish a National Security Education Board.
`(b) Composition:
`(1) In general: The Board shall be composed of the following individuals or the representatives of such individuals:
`(A) The Secretary of Defense, who shall serve as the chairperson of the Board.
`(B) The Secretary of Education.
`(C) The Secretary of State.
`(D) The Secretary of Commerce.
`(E) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
`(F) The Director of the United States Information Agency.
`(G) 4 individuals appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, who have expertise in the fields of international, language, and area studies education.
`(2) Special rule: Individuals appointed to the Board pursuant to paragraph (1)(G) shall be appointed for a period not to exceed 4 years. Such individuals shall receive no compensation for service on the Board but may receive reimbursement for travel and other necessary expenses.
`(c) Functions: The Board shall--
`(1) establish qualifications for students and institutions of higher education desiring scholarships, fellowships, and grants under this title;
`(2) identify as the critical countries described in section 804(a)(1)(A) those countries that are not emphasized in other United States study abroad programs, such as countries in which few United States students are studying;
`(3) identify as the critical areas within the disciplines described in section 804(a)(1)(B) those areas that the Board determines to be critical areas of study in which United States students are deficient in learning;
`(4) identify as critical areas those areas of study described in section 804(a)(1)(C) in which United States students, educators, and government employees are deficient in learning and in which insubstantial numbers of United States institutions of higher education provide training; and
`(5) review the administration of the program assisted under this title.
`SEC. 806. NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION TRUST FUND.
`(a) Establishment of Fund: There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the `National Security Education Trust Fund'. The Fund shall consist of amounts transferred to it pursuant to subsection (b) of this section and amounts credited to the Fund under subsection (d) of this section.
`(b) Transfer of Amounts:
`(1) Transfer: The Secretary of Defense is authorized to transfer to the Trust Fund $180,000,000 from funds appropriated for fiscal year 1992 pursuant to section 101 of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1992.
`(2) Reservations: From the amounts transferred pursuant to paragraph (1) for fiscal year 1992, the Board shall reserve--
`(A) $15,000,000 to award scholarships pursuant to section 804(a)(1)(A);
`(B) $10,000,000 to award fellowships pursuant to section 804(a)(1)(B); and
`(C) $10,000,000 to award grants pursuant to section 804(a)(1)(C).
`(c) Investment of Fund Assets: It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to invest in full the amounts transferred to the Fund. Such investments may be made only in interest-bearing obligations of the United States or in obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the United States. For such purpose, such obligations may be acquired on original issue at the issue price or by purchase of outstanding obligations at the market price. The purposes for which obligations of the United States may be issued under chapter 31 of title 31, United States Code, are hereby extended to authorize the issuance at par of special obligations exclusively to the Fund. Such special obligations shall bear interest at a rate equal to the average rate of interest, computed as to the end of the calendar month next preceding the date of such issue, borne by all marketable interest-bearing obligations of the United States then forming a part of the public debt, except that where such average rate is not a multiple of 1/8 of 1 percent, the rate of interest of such special obligations shall be the multiple of 1/8 of 1 percent next lower than such average rate. Such special obligations shall be issued only if the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the purchases of other interest-bearing obligations of the United States, or of obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the United States or original issue or at the market price, is not in the public interest.
`(d) Authority To Sell Obligations: Any obligation acquired by the Fund (except special obligations issued exclusively to the Fund) may be sold by the Secretary of the Treasury at the market price, and such special obligations may be redeemed at par plus accrued interest.
`(e) Proceeds From Certain Transactions Credited to Fund: The interest on, and the proceeds from the sale or redemption of, any obligations held in the Fund shall be credited to and form a part of the Fund.
`(f) Obligations From the Account: The Board is authorized to obligate such sums as are available in the Fund (including any amounts not obligated in previous fiscal years) for--
`(1) awarding scholarships, fellowships, and grants in accordance with the provisions of this title; and
`(2) properly allocable administrative costs of the Federal Government for the activities described in this title.
`SEC. 807. ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS.
`(a) In General: In order to carry out this title, the Board may--
`(1) appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title, except that in no case may an employee other than the Executive Secretary be compensated at a rate to exceed the maximum rate of basic pay payable for GS-15 of the General Schedule;
`(2) prescribe such regulations as the Board considers necessary governing the manner in which its functions shall be carried out;
`(3) receive money and other property donated, bequeathed, or devised, without condition or restriction other than it be used for the purposes of the Board, and to use, sell, or otherwise dispose of such property for the purpose of carrying out its functions;
`(4) accept and use the services of voluntary and noncompensated personnel;
`(5) enter into contracts or other arrangements, or make grants, to carry out the provisions of this title, and enter into such contracts or other arrangements, or make such grants, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the Board, without performance or other bonds and without regard to section 5 of title 41, United States Code;
`(6) rent office space in the District of Columbia; and
`(7) make other necessary expenditures.
`(b) Annual Report: The Board shall submit to the President and to the Congress an annual report of its operations under this title. Such report shall contain--
`(1) an analysis of the mobility of students to participate in study abroad programs;
`(2) an analysis of the trends within language, international, and area studies, along with a survey of such areas the Board determines are receiving inadequate attention;
`(3) the impact of the Board's activities on such trends; and
`(4) an evaluation of the impediments to improving such trends.
[Page: S14780]
`SEC. 808. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.
`(a) Appointment by Board: There shall be an Executive Secretary of the Board who shall be appointed by the Board. The Executive Secretary shall be the chief executive officer of the Board and shall carry out the functions of the Board subject to the supervision and direction of the Board. The Executive Secretary shall carry out such other functions consistent with the provisions of this title as the Board shall prescribe.
`(b) Compensation: The Executive Secretary of the Board shall be compensated at the rate of basic pay payable for employees at level III of the Executive Schedule.
`SEC. 809. AUDITS.
`The activities of the Board under this title may be audited by the General Accounting Office under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States. Representatives of the General Accounting Office shall have access to all books, accounts, records, reports, and files and all other papers, things, or property belonging to or in use by the Board pertaining to such activities and necessary to facilitate the audit.
`SEC. 810. DEFINITIONS.
`For the purpose of this title--
`(1) the term `Fund' means the National Security Education Trust Fund established pursuant to section 806;
`(2) the term `Board' means the National Security Education Board established pursuant to section 805; and
`(3) the term `institution of higher education' has the same meaning given to such term by section 1201(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965.'.
TITLE VIII--MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
SEC. 801. TRANSPORTATION OF REMAINS OF CERTAIN NSA EMPLOYEES.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new section.
`Sec. 17. (a) The Director of the National Security Agency may pay the expenses referred to in section 5742(b) of title 5, United States Code, in the case of any employee of the National Security Agency who dies while on a rotational tour of duty within the United States or while in transit to or from such tour of duty.
`(b) For the purposes of this section, the term `rotational tour of duty', with respect to an employee, means a permanent change of station involving the transfer of the employee from the National Security Agency headquarters to another post of duty for a fixed period established by regulation to be followed at the end of such period by a permanent change of station involving a transfer of the employee back to such headquarters.'.
SEC. 802. MINOR TRANSFERS OF INTELLIGENCE APPROPRIATIONS FOR OPERATIONAL EMERGENCIES.
(a) Authority To Transfer: Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 503 the following new section:
`Sec. 504. Minor transfers for operational emergencies.'.
SEC. 803. CLARIFICATION OF EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION FROM CERCLA DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.
Section 120(j)(2) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620(j)(2)) is amended--
(1) by striking out `Atomic Energy Act and' and inserting in lieu thereof `Atomic Energy Act,';
(2) by inserting after `information,' the following: `and all statutes or Executive orders that authorize the protection of specified types of unclassified information from disclosure,'; and
(3) by striking out `classified information' and inserting in lieu thereof `such information'.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma, the chairman of the committee.
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, the unanimous-consent request, which I just propounded a few moments ago and which was agreed to, had been previously cleared by the leadership on the other side of the aisle.
Madam President, it is an honor for me to present to the Senate today the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 1992. This is the 15th consecutive year, dating back to the creation of the Select Committee on Intelligence in 1976, where the Senate will have considered a separate authorization bill for U.S. intelligence activities.
I might add it has been my pleasure now to have presented at least five of these authorization bills.
Joining me in offering this bill is the distinguished Senator from Alaska, the vice chairman of the committee, Senator Murkowski. This is his first year as vice chairman, and I want to express to him my appreciation for the cooperative spirit that he has brought to our work together on the committee.
In many ways, this has been a momentous year for both of us.
The committee began the year with intensive review of organizational arrangements for the intelligence communty, looking toward possible legislation on this subject later in this Congress. Indeed, the events that have taken place in the Soviet Union just since August have provided an even greater impetus for the review that we are already undertaking.
This summer, we enacted a comprehensive overhaul of the statutory framework for congressional oversight of covert actions, which addressed the key weaknesses in the current system revealed in the Iran-Contra affair some 5 years before. After literally years of negotiations, with the administration, with the executive branch, with two Presidents, we were finally able to arrive at a compromise, which I believe respects the institutional prerogatives of both the legislative and executive branches of Government.
It is good for this country that we were able to place those reforms, those lessons learned from the Iran-Contra affair into the statutory law of the United States so that they will be binding not only on this administration, but future administrations and Congresses as well.
Of course, we have only recently completed a series of hearings on the nomination of Robert Gates, to be Director of Central Intelligence, which are unprecedented really in the history of the committee. Never before have the American people had such a glimpse into the internal workings of the Central Intelligence Agency. While they have seen the tensions and the frustrations that exist within that community, they have been able to also see what the CIA contributes to the security of this country. I think these hearings may have done more to educate the American people about the role that the CIA has played and can continue to play than anything ever before made a matter of public record, and we are proud of that hearing record. As members or our committee, we are proud of the thoroughness and the fairness with which we attempted to proceed.
It is a timely point in evolution of the CIA that this should have been done. With the dramatic events unfolding in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the future role and the utility of the CIA is being called into question. The resources previously allocated to intelligence are being challenged not only by those on the outside but those on the inside as well, including the oversight committees of Congress. Indeed, the committee has recommended in this year's authorization bill a substantial cut in terms of the administration's request originally made to us.
Because of the sensitivity of the matters dealt with by the bill, we cannot, unfortunately, discuss in detail the nature of the specific reductions we are recommending. However, the committee's recommendations are set forth in a classified supplement to the committee's report on the bill, which has been available to all Members of the Senate since July 24, under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400.
But if cuts are in order, certainly the events of the past year have tempered our rush to slash away at budgets too precipitously without thinking where we are headed and without thinking through the ultimate framework that should be established. We must be prepared to anticipate events like the invasion of Kuwait, and we must have the intelligence capabilities needed to support military commanders in the field, wherever they might be deployed around the world.
The world of the 1990's is a hopeful, but uncertain place. Will the reforms in the Soviet Union succeed? What will be their implications for the United States? How will they effect other countries such as China, Cuba, or North Korea and others? Will we be able to detect and control threats to our security: nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the missile technology needed to deliver them? Can we detect and counter terrorist acts or narcotics trafficking?
The United States must be prepared to deal with these problems, to cope as best we can, with events around the world. While U.S. intelligence does not and cannot provide all of the answers, it does provide a capability, a resource, that the United States must preserve if we are to maintain our place of leadership in the world.
With that, Madam President, let me turn to the bill itself.
As we do annually, the committee has conducted a detailed, thorough review of the administration's budget request for the National Foreign Intelligence Program for fiscal year 1992, as well as a review of the tactical intelligence and related activities of the Department of Defense for the same period. This entailed document reviews, staff visits and briefings, and a series of formal hearings with witnesses from the intelligence community, as well as policy officials from the Departments of Defense and State. It also included an intensive look at the performance of intelligence agencies at both the national and tactical levels during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
On the basis of this comprehensive review, we have arrived at our recommendations to the Senate, the budgetary portions of which, are, as I previously mentioned, contained in the classified annex of the committee's report. With respect to the public portions of the bill:
Title I authorizes the funds for the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government, incorporating by reference the classified schedule of authorizations. This title also contains two sections dealing with the public disclosure of certain information relating to the intelligence budget.
Section 104 provides that the President's annual budget submission to the Congress must include a separate, unclassified statement of the aggregate expenditures for the previous fiscal year, and the aggregate amount of funds requested for the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, for intelligence and intelligence-related activities. Put another way, this section would require the President to disclose the total amount spent the previous year, and the total amount being requested for the next fiscal year, for both the National Foreign Intelligence Program and for DOD tactical and related intelligence activities.
This would mark the first time that this information would be put forward in a public forum and shared with the American people.
Section 105 is a companion to section 104. It would require any bill reported by a committee of Congress which authorizes funds to be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities to contain an unclassified statement of the aggregate amount authorized to be appropriated. It was intended that the annual intelligence authorization bill be the only bill that would meet the criteria of this section. Moreover, if enacted as written, this section would require such a disclosure in the next intelligence authorization bill, the intelligence authorization for fiscal year 1993.
So this would be prospective in its application. It would be 1 year before this particular provision, if enacted into law, takes affect.
Title II of the bill authorizes appropriations for the intelligence community staff for fiscal year 1992 in the amount of $28,832,000 and provides that $6,566,000 of this amount shall be allocated to the security evaluation office at CIA. This title also authorizes 240 full-time personnel for the intelligence community staff.
Title III of the bill authorizes appropriations for the CIA retirement and disability fund in the amount of $164,100,000 for fiscal year 1992, and contains a number of provisions pertaining to the CIA retirement and disability programs. Most of these provisions are technical in nature, conforming to changes in other federal retirement programs or to clarify elements within existing provisions. I highlight only section 310 which drops the requirement contained in existing law that in order for a former spouse of a CIA employee to qualify for a portion of the employee's retirement benefits, the divorced spouse must have been married to the employee for 10 years, 5 of which were spent outside the United States. As revised by section 10, the divorced spouse must have been married to the employee for 10 years, but only the employee must have served 5 years outside the United States. This change conforms to similar provisions in the Foreign Service Retirement System Act.
Title IV authorizes increases in personnel benefits where such increases have otherwise been authorized by law.
Title V provides that the Director of the FBI will undertake a study with respect to the establishment of an undergraduate training program to meet critical needs of the FBI, similar to other programs in effect at CIA, NSA, and DIA.
Title VI provides that the statutory inspector general at the CIA will be compensated at the same level as inspector generals at other departments and agencies of the Government.
The last title of the bill, title VII, amends the National Security Act of 1947 to create a new National Security Education Program.
I want to pause on this one, Madam President, and give my colleagues some additional background.
Several weeks ago, on September 26, 1991, I offered an amendment to the Defense appropriations bill to provide funding for a program that I do want to mention specifically, and that is a program to create a national security education program. it passed the Senate on a voice vote. The language in the intelligence authorization bill would specifically authorize the funds which have already been appropriated under the Department of Defense authorization bill. While I will later offer an amendment to conform the wording in the intelligence authorization bill to that contained in the amendment to the Defense bill, the basic thrust of these provisions remains, for the most part, unchanged.
I will not repeat today all of the justification I provided at the time my amendment was offered to the Defense bill. If any of my colleagues wish to refer to it, it can be found at pages S13788-S13789 of the Congressional Record of September 26, 1991.
Suffice it to say, this title of the bill would specifically authorize the use of $180 million of the intelligence budget to create an international education trust fund to help the United States and its national security agencies meet the challenges of the postcold war period.
It provides funding for graduate fellowships and grants to universities for foreign language studies and area studies programs. It also provides undergraduate scholarships for study abroad, programs in countries that are now under-represented in terms of American studies at this time.
It is tragic indeed that while we have 386,000 foreign college undergraduate students studying in the United States, coming here to learn about our language, to learn about our culture, to learn about our economic system and our markets, that we have only about 50,000 American students studying in the rest of the world, and most of those are concentrated in only three countries.
It is a sad thing that we are about the only leading country in the world that provides no Government help to allow our students to gain the skills they need by studying abroad, learning other languages and other cultures firsthand. Only those from affluent families or those that receive special kinds of scholarship help from nongovernmental sources are able to have that opportunity to study abroad today, Madam President. It is time that the United States filled that gap and provided that opportunity for all of our young people, so that we can begin to build the kinds of international skills that are going to be so necessary in a world environment in which we are getting ready to move in the next century.
So this bill would do that. After the launching of Sputnik, we had the National Defense Education Act. We all remember the good that it did to prepare our country in the fields of math and science and many other fields. Many talented people who later came into Government services were educated through the aid provided by the National Defense Education Act.
We again face a new world, a new challenge, a new situation, that is going to demand that the next generation of Americans speak the languages of the world, understand how people think, understand their cultures, are able to relate to them. We cannot begin to compete in the world's markets, for example, if we do not speak the world's languages.
Gone is the time in which we could sit back, smug in our knowledge that others would have to come to us, learn our language, and learn about our culture without us having to bother ourselves to know about them. The private sector, the Government itself, in sensitive agencies like the Defense Department, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, is having a harder and harder time finding those people with the skills and the education and the training necessary in these particular areas.
So it is time, as we passed the National Defense Education Act in an earlier period, to now pass the National Education Security Act, as we propose in this particular piece of legislation.
It is the first major national security education initiative undertaken in this country since the passage of the National Defense Education Act, and it is included in this bill.
It will provide out of the trust fund in the first year $35 million in fiscal year 1992. That will be broken down as follows: $15 million for study abroad for undergraduate students; $10 million for grants to colleges and universities to strengthen and improve their courses of study and curriculum in foreign languages, area studies and international studies; and $10 million for graduate fellowships.
A board of trustees is established by the bill to advise the Secretary of Defense with respect to the administration of the trust fund, and to develop specific criteria and guidelines for the distribution of grants, fellowships, and scholarships. The Secretary of Defense or his designee will chair the board, which will also include the Secretaries of State, Education, and Commerce, and the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, or their respective designees. The program would be administered through the defense intelligence college.
Madam President, at the committee's recent hearing on the Gates nomination, I had the opportunity to ask a number of our witnesses for their opinion of this proposed program.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has spoken for 15 minutes.
[Page: S14782]
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent I might be able to complete my remarks without it counting against the time to run on the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BOREN. These included not only the nominee himself, but also Adm. Bobby Inman, the former Deputy DCI and Director of the National Security Agency, and Richard Kerr, now currently serving as Acting Director of Central Intelligence. All testified that it would meet a clear need of the intelligence community, a need that was likely to grow in the future.
It is my hope that with the significant degree of cooperation we have had to date in developing this proposal and bringing it to fruition in the Senate--particularly from the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations--we will be able to reach agreement in conference to make this program a reality. I am convinced that in the long run it will make a difference, in terms of both the quality and quantity of those who serve the Government in the area of national security.
So, Madam President, I urge my colleagues to act favorably on the legislation which we present with great pride, a product of the bipartisan work of all of the members of our committee and staff.
I will conclude my remarks and yield the floor to the vice chairman for his opening remarks, the distinguished Senator from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski]. But before I yield the floor I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the Congressional Budget Office on cost estimates for S. 1539 be printed in the Congressional Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, September 12, 1991.
Hon. David L. Boren,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the attached cost estimate of S. 1539 except for Titles I and IV, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992, as reported by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on July 24, 1991.
The bill would affect direct spending and thus would be subject to pay-as-you-go procedures under section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. Should the Committee so desire, we would be pleased to provide additional information on the estimate.
Sincerely,
Robert D. Reischauer.
1. Bill number: S. 1539 (Except for Titles I and IV).
2. Bill title: Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992.
3. Bill status: As reported by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on July 24, 1991.
4. Bill purpose: To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1992 for the intelligence activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
5. Estimated cost to the Federal Government of S. 1539 except for titles I and IV:
[By fiscal year, in millions of dollars]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct spending:
Estimated budget authority -( 1 ) -( 1 ) -( 1 ) -( 1 ) -( 1 )
Estimated outlays -( 1 ) -( 1 ) -( 1 ) -( 1 ) -( 1 )
Amount subject to appropriations:
Stated Authorizations:
Authorization level 193 0 0 0 0
Estimated outlays 183 8 1 * 0
National Security scholarship fund:
Estimated authorizations 9 12 10 7 5
Estimated outlays -107 6 34 37 41
Total:
Estimated budget authority authorizations 202 12 10 7 5
Estimated outlays 77 13 35 37 41
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Page: S14783]
The CBO was unable to obtain the necessary information to estimate the costs for Titles I and IV of this bill because of the classified nature of the material. The estimated costs in the table above, therefore, reflect only the costs of Titles II, III, and V through VII of the bill. The information about the budget functions in which some of these costs would fall also is classified. Therefore, a functional distribution of these costs has been excluded from this estimate.
Direct Spending
Title III contains several provisions that could directly change federal spending by altering entitlement of federal government employees or their survivors. Most of these provisions would not increase the spending of the federal government because they either put into law current practices of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or distribute current retirement payments between divorced spouses. Two sections would bring about savings to the federal government. Section 302 would reduce the survivor benefits paid to children of deceased participants in the CIA Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS) if they have another surviving parent. Under current law these children are paid as if both parents are deceased. This provision is expected to save approximately $700 per year per child; total savings would not exceed $10,000 in any year of the estimate period.
Section 305 would remove the requirement that the CIA pay the full cost for disability exams at the retirement of a CIARDS employee. If enacted, some portion of the costs of these exams could be paid by the employees' health insurance providers. The CIA estimates that savings associated with this provision would not be significant.
Title VII of the bill contains the National Security Education Act of 1991, which would establish a National Security Education Board to oversee a program of scholarship, fellowship and grant awards for foreign language studies. The administrative provisions of the Act would allow the Board to accept gifts and to use or sell these gifts to carry out its functions. This would grant direct spending authority for the Board, though the CBO estimates that the net outlay effect would be zero since over time the spending cannot exceed the receipts.
The administrative provisions in Title VII also would provide the Board with the authority to enter into contracts to carry out the provisions of the title. This is similar to the authority regularly granted to new agencies, commissions, and boards as part of their administrative provisions. These new entities normally do not use this contract authority to enter into obligations in advance of receiving appropriations, thus the CBO does not expect this to increase outlays.
Amounts Subject to Appropriations
This estimate assumes that funds will be appropriated for the full amount of the authorization and that all resources will be available for obligation by October 1, 1991. Outlays are estimated based on historical outlays rates.
Titles II and III of the bill state fiscal year 1992 authorizations for appropriations for the Intelligence Community Staff of $28.8 million and for the required contribution to the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund of $164.1 million.
The National Security Education Act in Title VII would create a National Security Education Trust Fund and would authorize the transfer of $180 million from intelligence activities funding for fiscal year 1992 to the fund. The amounts in this fund are to be invested in Treasury securities and the balances would be available for scholarships, fellowships and grants for foreign language studies, and for the administrative expenses of the fund. The fund is disburse $35 million in fiscal year 1992 for the foreign language studies. In the future, these scholarships, fellowships and grants are to be adjusted for inflation. This estimate assumes inflation rates and interest rates that are consistent with rates in the CBO summer baseline, and that the timing of interest payments would be the same as that for similar trust funds. The net change to federal outlays from this transfer were calculated as the difference between spending for intelligence activities (using the outlay rate for operations and maintenance for the Defense Department) and spending from the fund.
6. Pay-as-you-considerations: Section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 sets up pay-as-you-go procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts through 1995. The direct spending costs of this bill for provisions that are known to CBO and that are subject to the pay-as-you-go procedures are shown in the following table. CBO was unable to obtain the necessary information to review the full text of the bill and the reports accompanying it because they are classified at a level above the clearances now held by CBO employees. Consequently, CBO does not know if the bill contains additional provisions with pay-as-you-go implications.
[By fiscal year, in millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------
1992 1993 1994 1995
----------------------------------------
Change in outlays * * * *
Change in receipts ( 1 )
----------------------------------------
7. Estimated cost to State and local governments: None.
8. Estimate comparison: None.
9. Previous CBO cost estimate: None.
10. Estimate prepared by: Barbara Hollinshead (226-2840) Kent Christensen (226-2840).
11. Estimate approved by: C.G. Nuckols for James L. Blum, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I now ask unanimous consent the distinguished vice chairman be recognized following a brief motion that I will make on another matter, and that whatever time is used by the vice chairman for his opening remarks not be counted against the time to run on the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, this bill was reported last July 24 as an original bill by the Select Committee on Intelligence. It was subsequently referred to the Committee on Armed Services for a period of 30 days for matters within the jurisdiction of that committee.
The Committee on Armed Services reported out this bill on October 3, 1991, Senate Report No. 102-172, with several amendments.
It is my understanding that all of these amendments are acceptable to both sides of the aisle, and I therefore ask unanimous consent that they be considered en bloc.
The first of these amends section 105 of the bill which provides that any bill reported by a conference committee which authorizes funds to be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States shall contain an unclassified statement of the aggregate amount of the funds to be appropriated. The Armed Services amendment inserts the word `all' before `intelligence and intelligence-related activities,' making it clear that only the annual intelligence authorization bill is subject to the disclosure requirement contained in section 105. This is agreeable to us.
The second amendment also relates to the disclosure of the aggregate number for the intelligence and intelligence-related budget, and would delay the effective date of the disclosure requirements until the enactment of next year's intelligence authorization. Thus, it would delay the effective date of the budget disclosure provisions for approximately a year. This amendment is also agreeable to the committee.
Finally, the Armed Services Committee added three new provisions to the bill.
The first, found in section 801, would provide authority for the Director of the National Security Agency to pay the costs of transporting the remains of employees who had died while on rotational assignment within the United States to their home for burial.
The second, set forth in section 802, would permit the Director of Central Intelligence to transfer funds between accounts in the National Foreign Intelligence Program to meet operational emergencies. Such transfers would be permitted, however, only for amounts less than $10 million, and only where prior notice had been provided the relevant congressional committees, and where the head of the department or agency concerned had provided concurrence to the transfer.
The third provision, set forth in section 803 of the amended bill, would amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 to provide that where unclassified information is protected from public disclosure by law or Executive order, that any such information furnished under the act will be handled in accordance with such laws or Executive orders.
Madam President, it is my understanding that these amendments are acceptable to both sides of the aisle.
I therefore ask unanimous consent that the amendments reported by the Committee on Armed Services be agreed to en bloc.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The question is on agreeing to the committee amendments en bloc.
The committee amendments were agreed to en bloc.
[Page: S14784]
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I now send to the desk an amendment in the nature of a technical amendment and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to considering the amendment? Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Boren] proposes an amendment numbered 1256.
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
Title VII of S. 1539 is amended by striking section 701 in its entirety and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
Sec. 701. (a) The Congress finds that--
(1) the security of the United States is and will continue to depend on the ability of the United States to exercise international leadership;
(2) United States leadership is and will increasingly be based on the political and economic strength of the United States, as well as United States military strength around the world;
(3) recent changes in the world pose threats of a new kind to international stability as Cold War tensions continue to decline while economic competition, regional conflicts, terrorist activities, and weapon proliferations have dramatically increased;
(4) the future national security and economic well-being of the United States will substantially depend on the ability of its citizens to communicate and compete by knowing the languages and cultures of other countries;
(5) the Federal Government has a vested interest in ensuring that the employees of its national security agencies are prepared to meet the challenges of this changing international environment;
(6) the Federal Government also has a vested interest in taking actions to alleviate the problem of American undergraduate and graduate students being inadequately prepared to meet the challenges posed by increasing global interaction among nations; and
(7) American colleges and universities must place a new emphasis on improving the teaching of foreign languages, area studies, and other international fields to help meet such challenges.
(b) The purposes of this section are as follows:
(1) To provide the necessary resources, accountability, and flexibility to meet the national security education needs of the United States, especially as such needs change over time.
(2) To increase the quantity, diversity, and quality of the teaching and learning of subjects in the fields of foreign languages, area studies, and other international fields that are critical to the Nation's interest.
(3) To produce an increased pool of applicants for work in the national security agencies of the United States Government.
(4) To expand, in conjunction with other Federal programs, the international experience, knowledge base, and perspectives on which the United States citizenry, Government employees, and leaders rely.
(5) To permit the Federal Government to advocate the cause of international education.
(c)(1) The National Security Act of 1947 (47 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new title:
`SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE.
`This title may be cited as the `National Security Education Act of 1991'.
`SEC. 802. PROGRAM REQUIRED.
`(a) Program Required:
`(1) In general: The Secretary of Defense; in consultation with the National Security Education Board established by section 803, shall carry out a program for--
`(A) awarding scholarships to undergraduate students who are United States citizens or resident aliens in order to enable such students to study, for at least 1 semester, in foreign countries;
`(B) awarding fellowships to graduate students who--
`(i) are United States citizens or resident aliens to enable such students to pursue education in the United States in the disciplines of foreign languages, area studies, and other international fields that are critical areas of such disciplines; and
`(ii) pursuant to subsection (c)(1), enter into an agreement to work for the Federal Government or in the field of education in the area of study for which the fellowship was awarded; and
`(C) awarding grants to institutions of higher education to enable such institutions to establish, operate, and improve programs in foreign languages, area studies, and other international fields that are critical areas of such disciplines.
`(2) Reservations: The Secretary shall have a goal of reserving for each fiscal year--
`(A) for the awarding of scholarships pursuant to paragraph (1)(A), 1/3 of the amount available for obligation out of the National Security Education Trust Fund for such fiscal year;
`(B) 1/3 of such amount for the awarding of fellowships pursuant to paragraph (1)(B); and
`(C) 1/3 of such amount to provide for the awarding of grants pursuant to paragraph (1)(C).
`(b) Contract Authority: The Secretary may enter into one or more contracts, with private national organizations having an expertise in foreign languages, area studies, and other international fields, for the awarding of the scholarships, fellowships, and grants described in subsection (a) in accordance with the provisions of this title. The Secretary may enter into such contracts without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5) or any other provision of law that requires the use of competitive procedures.
`(c) Service Agreement: In awarding a fellowship under the program, the Secretary or contract organization referred to in subsection (b), as the case may be, shall require the recipient of the fellowship to enter into an agreement that contains the assurances of such recipient that the recipient--
`(1) will maintain satisfactory academic progress; and
`(2) upon completion of such recipient's education, will work for the Federal Government or in the field of education in the area of study for which the fellowship was awarded for a period specified by the Secretary, which period shall be equal to not less than one and not more than three times the period for which the fellowship assistance was provided.
`(d) Distribution of assistance: In selecting the recipients for awards of scholarships, fellowships, or grants pursuant to this title, the Secretary or a contract organization referred to in subsection (b), as the case may be, shall take into consideration the extent to which the selections will result in there being an equitable geographic distribution of such scholarships, fellowships, or grants (as the case may be) among the various regions of the United States.
`(e) Merit Review: A merit review process shall be used in awarding scholarships, fellowships, or grants under the program.
`(f) Inflation: The amounts of scholarships, fellowships, and grants awarded under the program shall be adjusted for inflation annually.
`(g) Administration of Program Through the Defense Intelligence College: The Secretary shall administer the program through the Defense Intelligence College.
`SEC. 803. NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION BOARD.
`(a) Establishment: The Secretary of Defense shall establish a National Security Education Board.
`(b) Composition:
`(1) In general: The Board shall be composed of the following individuals or the representatives of such individuals:
`(A) The Secretary of Defense, who shall serve as the chairman of the Board.
`(B) The Secretary of Education.
`(C) The Secretary of State.
`(D) The Secretary of Commerce.
`(E) The Director of Central Intelligence.
`(F) The Director of the United States Information Agency.
`(G) Four individuals appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, who have expertise in the fields of international, language, and area studies education.
`(2) Term of appointees: Each individual appointed to the Board pursuant to paragraph (1)(G) shall be appointed for a period specified by the President at the time of the appointment but not to exceed 4 years. Such individuals shall receive no compensation for service on the Board but may receive reimbursement for travel and other necessary expenses.
`(c) Functions: The Board shall--
`(1) develop criteria for awarding scholarships, fellowships, and grants under this title;
`(2) provide for wide dissemination of information regarding the activities assisted under this title;
`(3) establish qualifications for students and institutions of higher education desiring scholarships, fellowships, and grants under this title;
`(4) make recommendations to the Secretary regarding which countries are not emphasized in other United States study abroad programs, such as countries in which few United States students are studying, and are, therefore, critical countries for the purposes of section 802(a)(1)(A);
`(5) make recommendations to the Secretary regarding which areas within the disciplines described in section 802(a)(1)(B) are areas of study in which United States students are deficient in learning and are, therefore, critical areas within such disciplines for the purposes of such section;
`(6) make recommendations to the Secretary regarding which areas within the disciplines described in section 802(a)(1)(C) are areas in which United States students, educators, and Government employees are deficient in learning and in which insubstantial numbers of United States institutions of
higher education provide training and are, therefore, critical areas within such disciplines for the purposes of such section; and
`(7) review the administration of the program required under this title.
[Page: S14785]
`SEC. 804. NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION TRUST FUND.
`(a) Establishment of Fund.--There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the `National Security Education Trust Fund'.
`(b) Availability of Sums in the Fund.--(1) To the extent provided in appropriations Acts, sums in the Fund shall be available for--
`(A) awarding scholarships, fellowships, and grants in accordance with the provisions of this title; and
`(B) properly allocable administrative costs of the Federal Government for the program under this title.
`(2) Any unobligated balance in the Fund at the end of a fiscal year shall remain in the Fund and may be appropriated for subsequent fiscal years.
`(c) Investment of Fund Assets.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall invest in full the amount in the Fund that is not immediately necessary for obligation. Such investments may be made only in interest-bearing obligations of the United States or in obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the United States. For such purpose, such obligations may be acquired on original issue at the issue price or by purchase of outstanding obligations at the market price. The purposes for which obligations of the United States may be issued under chapter 31 of title 31, United States Code, are hereby extended to authorize the issuance at par of special obligations exclusively to the Fund. Such special obligations shall bear interest at a rate equal to the average rate of interest, computed as to the end of the calendar month next preceding the date of such issue, borne by all marketable interest-bearing obligations of the United States then forming a part of the public debt, except that where such average rate is not a multiple of 1/8 of 1 percent, the rate of interest of such special obligations shall be the multiple of 1/8 of 1 percent next lower than such average rate. Such special obligations shall be issued only if the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the purchases of other interest-bearing obligations of the United States, or of obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the United States or original issue or at the market price, is not in the public interest.
`(d) Authority To Sell Obligations: Any obligation acquired by the Fund (except special obligations issued exclusively to the Fund) may be sold by the Secretary of the Treasury at the market price, and such special obligations may be redeemed at par plus accrued interest.
`(e) Proceeds From Certain Transactions Credited to Fund: The interest on, and the proceeds from the sale or redemption of, any obligations held in the Fund shall be credited to and form a part of the Fund.
`SEC. 805. ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS.
`(a) In General: In order to conduct the program required by this title, the Secretary may--
`(1) prescribe regulations to carry out the program;
`(2) receive money and other property donated, bequeathed, or devised, without condition or restriction other than that it be used for the purpose of conducting the program required by this title, and to use, sell, or otherwise dispose of such property for that purpose;
`(3) accept and use the services of voluntary and noncompensated personnel; and
`(4) make other necessary expenditures.
`(b) Annual Report: The Secretary shall submit to the President and to the Congress an annual report of the conduct of the program required by this title. The report shall contain--
`(1) an analysis of the mobility of students to participate in programs of study in foreign countries;
`(2) an analysis of the trends within language, international, and area studies, along with a survey of such areas as the Secretary determines are receiving inadequate attention;
`(3) the impact of the program activities on such trends; and
`(4) an evaluation of the impediments to improving such trends.
`SEC. 806. AUDITS.
`The conduct of the program required by this title may be audited by the General Accounting Office under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States. Representatives of the General Accounting Office shall have access to all books, accounts, records, reports, and files and all other papers, things, or property of the Department of Defense pertaining to such activities and necessary to facilitate the audit.
`SEC. 807. DEFINITIONS.
`For the purpose of this title--
`(1) the term `Board' means the National Security Education Board established pursuant to section 803;
`(2) the term `Fund' means the National Security Education Trust Fund established pursuant to section 804; and
`(3) the term `institution of higher education' has the same meaning given to such term by section 1201(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965.'.
(2) The table of contents for such Act is amended by inserting at the end the following:
`Sec. 801. Short title.
`Sec. 802. Program required.
`Sec. 803. National Security Education Board.
`Sec. 804. National Security Education Trust Fund.
`Sec. 805. Administrative provisions.
`Sec. 806. Audits.
`Sec. 807. Definitions.'.
(d) Of the amounts made available in the National Security Education Trust Fund for fiscal year 1992 for the scholarships, fellowships, and grants program provided for in title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (c), the Secretary shall reserve--
(1) $15,000,000 for awarding scholarships pursuant to section 802(a)(1)(A) of such Act;
(2) $10,000,000 for awarding fellowships pursuant to section 802(a)(1)(B) of such Act; and
(3) $10,000,000 for awarding grants pursuant to section 802(a)(1)(C) of such Act.
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, this amendment amends title VII of the bill by substituting the language that was passed by the Senate on September 26, 1991, as an amendment to the Defense appropriations bill. As my colleagues will recall, this amendment established a national security education fund to provide for scholarships, fellowships, and grants to educational institutions to encourage and develop scholarship in language studies, foreign area studies, and international studies.
As I explained in my opening statement and when this amendment was considered as part of the debate on the Defense appropriations bill, I believe there is a critical need for this type of educational assistance program in the national security area.
The purpose of this amendment is simply to conform the language in the intelligence bill with the language which has already passed the Senate in the Defense bill. The basic purposes and framework of the proposal remain the same.
We have also been advised by the Office of Management and Budget that if this legislation is enacted, the appropriation would be scored within the O-50 account, consistent with the budget agreement.
I, therefore, urge the adoption of this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 1256) was agreed to.
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the amendments adopted en bloc as part of the conforming amendments earlier to the Armed Services Committee.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to considering the amendment? Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Boren] proposes an amendment numbered 1257.
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
Add at the appropriate place in the bill the following new subsection:
( ) The Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate action to ensure that included within the budget submitted to Congress for the General Defense Intelligence Program for fiscal year 1993, and for every fiscal year thereafter, shall be the amounts requested to be authorized and appropriated for the (1) the TR-1 airborne reconnaissance platform and related sensor programs; and (2) the Airborne Reconnaissance Support Program. The Secretary of Defense is further directed to consolidate management during fiscal year 1992 of the TR-1, U-2, and Airborne Reconnaissance Support Programs within the General Defense Intelligence Program.
[Page: S14786]
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, this year, in their reports on the Department of Defense authorization and appropriations bills, both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended the transfer of funds for the TR-1 airborne reconnaissance platform and related sensor programs from the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program [TIARA] to the General Defense Intelligence Program [GDIP]. The committees further directed the consolidation of the TR-1 and U-2 programs within the GDIP, and recommended that advanced sensor, data-link and ground station resources from another TIARA program--the Airborne Reconnaissance Support Program--also be transferred and managed as part of a consolidated U-2/TR-1 program.
The Select Committee on Intelligence endorses these recommendations. Indeed, the committee had previously recommended this course of action to the Senate Armed Services Committee as part of our independent review of the fiscal year 1992 TIARA request, both to improve program management and achieve savings in a period of declining defense resources. Because the Intelligence Committee does not have jurisdiction over TIARA, however, we could not direct the transfer of the appropriate funds to the GDIP in our own authorization bill without the agreement of the Armed Services Committee.
As I have indicated, that agreement, as well as the agreement of the Senate Appropriations Committee, is now a matter of record. Accordingly, the committee now wishes to offer an amendment to the fiscal year 1992 Intelligence authorization bill to mirror the actions already taken by the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees in their reports on the Defense authorization and appropriation bills, respectively.
Madam President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? There being no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 1257) was agreed to.
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, this concludes the opening comments that I have to make and also the housekeeping business that it is necessary for us to undertake.
I have been joined on the floor by my distinguished colleague, the vice chairman of the committee, the Senator from Alaska. As I have indicted, it is my privilege to work with him. We have carried forward a tradition in this year that was begun by Senator Cohen and myself, when we served together in previous years, of a bipartisan approach to the sensitive issues we must face on the Intelligence Committee, a common commitment to be truly trustees for the rest of the Senate and the American people in overseeing these very sensitive activities.
I again want to express my appreciation to him for the spirit that he has brought to this process, for the bipartisan spirit with which he has approached these challenges, for his diligence in trying to ensure that the oversight which our committee provides will be as thorough as possible and as efficient and effective as possible for the American people. I, again, want to express my appreciation to him. We have already obtained unanimous consent that his opening remarks not count against the time on the bill.
I happily yield the floor at this time so that the vice chairman can make his opening remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska, the vice chairman of the committee.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Madam President, if I may just for a moment embellish the extraordinary relationship that exists with the chairman and, as a consequence of this relationship, I think that we have worked together in a manner that I think reflects professionalism on behalf of an extraordinary staff on both sides and have been able to fashion harmoniously, for the most part, an agenda that represents a consensus of the committee. As we look forward to the increasing responsibility associated with this oversight by the Intelligence Committee and look to new challenges ahead, I think we both agree that the efforts to achieve accountability within the agencies is something that both the chairman and I are dedicated to achieve in a greater degree, as well as the staff.
So I am very pleased to join with the distinguished chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence and the other Members on our side as a cosponsor of the fiscal year 1992 intelligence authorization bill.
As we all know, Madam President, the world has changed more dramatically in the last year than any time probably since the Second World War. Nowhere are the effects and challenges of these changes felt more acutely than within the intelligence agencies. We have seen that in the hearings held in the committee for Mr. Gates.
Almost overnight, the great adversary against which we built the CIA and other components of the intelligence community seems to have disappeared. Threats to our national security that were acute just 2 or 3 years ago have now faded to the point where they might be considered invisible. As a result, questions that were unthinkable a short time ago are now asked seriously, including whether or not we even need a Central Intelligence Agency any more in this Nation.
Madam President, I and my colleagues on the committee will not hesitate to answer: Of course, we need the continuity, the commitment, and the capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency to serve this country.
The world remains a very dangerous place, as our recent military involvement in Iraq makes clear. The threat from the Third World countries is a very real one and the world is aware of it. New perils are emerging as the alarming revelations about the Iraq nuclear program indicate. Each day we are hearing more and more about what their capability was at a crucial time of that conflict. Whether the challenge is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or terrorism or economic competitiveness or monitoring of arms control, information, accurate information, is vital. We cannot act to forestall dangers we are unaware of or do not understand.
The criticism has been laid to the agency from time to time about the adequacy of information. But as the chairman and I, and members and staff of the Intelligence Committee are well aware of, if you begin to disclose the extent of your information, you also begin to disclose the sources, and if you disclose the sources, why, more often than not, it is quite
likely that you can lose those sources, or even a worse set of circumstances.
Having said this, I think it is also clear that ways will have to be found to conduct the Nation's intelligence business at less cost. Basically, Madam President, we should be able to get better intelligence for less money through the process of consolidation, and I think this is a pledge that has been made in the hearings that we have had so far by the President's nominee, Dr. Gates.
The bill before this body has made major cuts in the budget request of the President. The committee made some very, very hard choices and some of the cuts will clearly hurt, but the committee, I think, did a responsible job in a time of increasing budget constraints.
I think it important to point out that we had a discussion on the floor with the Armed Services Committee. I, as one, regret, and I regret deeply, that the committee was unsuccessful in persuading the Armed Services Committee to pass on all of the savings directly to the Treasury, and these were savings that were made within the committee. I think it is a matter that we are going to have to revisit next year with the Armed Services Committee in a more diligent and forceful manner because it is appropriate that if these savings are made by the committee, they be passed on for the benefit of the bottom line and not necessarily incorporated in some aspects of the budget in the Armed Services Committee.
Further, Madam President, in addition to budget cuts, the new environment requires us to reexamine the whole structure of the intelligence community, look for opportunities to reorganize and streamline these agencies. The staff of the Intelligence Committee has already undertaken a major effort to identify the available options.
Chairman Boren and myself have conducted lengthy conversations with Senator Nunn and Senator Warner, and because of the complexity of the issue and the time that was unavoidably lost in the dealing of the confirmation of the new DCI, we have agreed, somewhat reluctantly, certainly on my part, to defer most of the reorganization initiatives to the fiscal year 1993 authorization bill. My feeling is the longer we put things off, the less likely we are to complete them with diligence. But my staff assures me otherwise. So I am going to hold my staff to that. I trust that the chairman will, as well.
It is also important that the committee hear from the new DCI before it acts, and we hope to have that opportunity in the not-too-distant future, assuming that we can wind up our confirmation process in an expeditious manner, not follow the most recent pattern we have seen here in this body. But let me emphasize that we have already done much of the spadework needed for the initiatives with regard to increasing the efficiency of the agency.
The bill before us contains many, many provisions, some of which will be discussed at great length on the floor this afternoon. We anticipate a number of amendments with regard to the increased number of confirmations that should be made within the agency. It is my understanding that there was some talk of an FBI amendment being offered relative to the Thomas case concerning leaks. It is my understanding that has been dropped and will be pursued on other legislation at a more appropriate time.
Clearly, it is an obligation of the committee to address matters of intelligence, and the FBI is certainly under our oversight. But as we reflect on the significance of the charge of those leaks, why, I think it references a responsibility that we all have, particularly on the Intelligence Committee, to have the assurance from our staffs that leaks will not occur and we certainly should be setting an example for all committees. Of course, there is absolutely no excuse for leaks of any kind.
So I think the point is well taken. But clearly it is going to get more attention by this body as a consequence of what happened with the Thomas and the Professor Hill incident.
Madam President, the bill before us, as I have said, contains many of the provisions that I think are important, and I know the chairman believes they are important. The chairman already spoke of the educational program which is designed to put significant resources into international education to better prepare our population, as he indicated, to cope with the kind of changes that are occurring in the world. And I mentioned this in the previous part of my opening statement.
The committee has crafted this program under an endowment concept. It is a departure from the normal activities of the committee. Yet, the merits of reaching out and meeting the obligation, of having trained people, I think, is certainly meritorious and deserves the support of the committee.
The idea of a self-sustaining source of income in the years ahead under the endowment concept certainly has an application.
I understand that there has been general thought and some acceptance to require recipients of graduate fellowships to work for the Government in the area of study at least for which the fellowships were awarded. The chairman and I have had some conversations about this. I would like to see this at further levels. I believe the chairman still has somewhat of an open mind to it. But I think it is fair to say that since we no longer have a mandatory draft type of an arrangement--yet we have the ROTC, NROTC, all of which requires some kind of contribution back to the Government for the educational opportunities--I think some type of service commitment is an appropriate responsibility for the recipient of these types of grants or scholarships, as the case may be. I urge my colleagues to give that consideration.
But overall it is an important initiative. It is worthy of careful consideration.
I encourage that consideration also be given that these scholarships and basic opportunities for higher education in the sense of an international opportunity be extended to regional institutions throughout the country as opposed to the more traditional recognition that the larger, more well-established Eastern schools more traditionally are favored with this type of endowment.
I think consideration should be given to those educational institutions which interact more directly with some of the new and exciting regions of the world that are opening up as a consequence of may changes which have occurred in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. I refer specifically to the Pacific rim activities associated with the situation as it unfolds in Vietnam, Cambodia. Clearly we are going to want people who have an expertise and an interest in that part of the world; Eastern Siberia, where in my State of Alaska, through the University of Alaska, we have exchange programs set up; we have probably 40 students from Siberia in residence in Fairbanks, AK; Alaska Pacific University specializing in the Pacific rim countries.
We need to see that these endowment scholarships are spread out to areas for regional coverage and provide these educational institutions with opportunities to provide even more and better programs in serving, if you will, the needs of communication between our two peoples. I have talked with these students who have been over in Siberia, Alaskans, young people from the State of California who have gone to our schools. When they live in a Soviet home in Siberia, they have a different appreciation and understanding not only of Western values but an appreciation of the trials and tribulations of our
Soviet neighbors and have a tremendous contribution that they can make in the sense of easing tensions and establishing a better world understanding.
So I hope that I can appeal to my good friend, the chairman, the senior Senator Senator from Oklahoma, to encourage universities in regional areas that have an expertise to step up and become involved in this program.
Finally, Madam President, I would also stress that the existence of this body of anticipated trained intelligence specialists will not only benefit the Government agencies, including the intelligence community, but also the business community as well.
I think it is critical to our national future that American business become more equipped to compete in the international marketplace. Oftentimes, this is difficult because of antitrust regulations. One only has to follow the effectiveness of a Japanese trading corporation and the interlock, the linkage between their ability not only to manufacture raw materials but produce, advertise, finance, transport, you name it. We are precluded from those kinds of things, so how are we going to be competitive in an international marketplace?
We have to have people who are versed in business as well as diplomacy representing us in our missions overseas. This will require more skilled managers, analysts, knowledgeable people about foreign countries and international conditions and, most of all, fluent in language.
It is a terrible thing to observe, Madam President, but you know and I know it is so easy to do business overseas because your hosts understand English and the American person doing business overseas being conversant certainly pays off.
Another difficulty we have, and it has been expressed by a number of colleagues on the committee, is the question of just how we handle information that is gathered from an intelligence source and made available to our private sector when more often than not we have two or three competing businesses and how do you share the information. It is a very difficult thing to do. But it is commonplace. And we are aware that the other countries are very much involved in their intelligence-gathering process in determining advantages in the U.S. marketplace and they share that with firms in their country. Unfortunately, more often than not, many of these firms are partially owned by the Government or participated in substantially through financial commitments by that Government. It is easier for them to provide the intelligence.
But this is a world of survival, Madam President, and if we are going to survive in the international marketplace we must have the capability of playing on a level field, and that means competing in an international marketplace in a different manner than we compete domestically. And this is going to put not only a challenge on the committee and the staff but all Members of the Senate to recognize that we must maintain an international competitiveness if we are to prosper as a nation.
I thank the Chair. I thank my colleague and good friend, the chairman of the committee, for his diligence in proceeding to get our bill up today, and I look forward to the process ahead.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
[Page: S14788]
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I thank my colleague for this generous remarks. As I have said, it is, indeed, a pleasure to work with him in these constructive endeavors.
We have talked a lot in our opening remarks about the new educational initiative proposed by the committee, one already acted upon in the appropriations bill on the floor earlier. It is an exciting proposal.
As I have indicated, it is the first major educational initiative of this type understanding that the national security interests of the United States cannot be defined in very narrow terms, technical terms, dealing only with items of military hardware, for example. But the national security interests of the United States, especially in these changing times, must be viewed broadly and making certain that we have the human resources we need, that we have the well-trained people coming out of the next generation in the field of foreign languages, the understanding of various religions and cultures and other communities around the world is absolutely essential and vital to our national security in the broadest sense of that term and in the most meaningful sense of that term.
We are, indeed, proud of the National Security Education Act and the initiative our committee has taken.
I should also indicate that while we have not been able to discuss in detail the cuts we have made in the original administration request in the intelligence bill and have not been able to describe, because of reasons of classification, the detailed nature of the shifts of priorities we have undertaken also in the intelligence bill, this bill does reflect a greater emphasis on improving our human intelligence source capability.
As many of us have said, with all the changes in the world, we are going to be facing a situation where we will have fewer troops stationed around the world in forward positions.
This means that we will need to have earlier warning of the intentions of those that might inflict danger on the world, that might cause regional conflicts. We learned very painfully with the situation in the Middle East, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, that by the time we can learn through national technical means of the movement of forces on the ground that it is often too late to give the policymakers a whole range of actions that they might take to avoid a conflict.
Had the President of the United States had good human source intelligence about the intentions of Saddam Hussein, for example, 6 months before the invasion of Kuwait, he could have considered a whole range of policy options that might have enabled us to avoid that war, that conflict--perhaps joint exercises with Saudi Arabia in the forward positionings of aircraft and supplies, sending a signal a Saddam Hussein, a very clear signal that any attempt at aggression would be resisted.
These are the kinds of actions that, had we had intelligence warning from human sources early enough, might have enabled us to avoid the Persian Gulf conflict, costly as it was both in material goods, and even more important, in terms of the cost of precious lives. Perhaps it could have been avoided with earlier warning.
In this kind of early warning, this kind of understanding of the intentions of potential adversaries, direct inside information from human sources becomes even more important. The nature of the threat also changes. We cannot, from satellite photography, have a good idea of what is going on in some tiny garage behind some residence where a terrorist group might be putting together a very potent but small explosive or chemical device to be used by the terrorist organizations.
This kind of information basically must come from human sources through development of the expertise, both in terms of language and ethnic understanding and background, to make it possible to have very legitimate and credible human source intelligence in various areas of the world given the nature of the challenges we face.
So the committee has undertaken in this bill to shift some priorities to continue the very strong emphasis on improvement of our human source intelligence, the human resources available, into the intelligence community that we began over 2 years ago.
This bill continues to reflect that shift of priorities. It makes some initial changes that reflect the changes that have gone on in the Soviet Union. More will remain to be done on this score. It does also reflect the fiscal environment, the very difficult fiscal environment in which we are now living and trying to get the most to the American taxpayers for the dollars spent in the intelligence field.
It does represent not only a major new educational initiative, but also some substantial adjustments of priorities within the intelligence budget that we provide in this bill.
Madam President, I see the distinguished Senator from Ohio is on the floor. Under the previous unanimous-consent request entered into, he will be offering an amendment on which the time limitation has been set.
I will yield the floor so the Senator from Ohio might have an opportunity to offer his amendment.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Madam President, if I may just make an inquiry from the standpoint of the agreement, would the Chair state the agreement on time that remains between the two sides?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time on the Glenn amendment is limited to 4 hours, equally divided, under control.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Madam President, it is my understanding it is limited just to the Glenn amendment. And is there any time agreement pending on the bill?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a time agreement. The Senator from Alaska controls the remaining time, which is 15 minutes.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair.
Mr. GLENN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself, Senator Specter, Senator Harkin, Senator Byrd, Senator Akaka, Senator Bryan, Senator Cranston, and Senator Adams, and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Ohio [Mr. Glenn], for himself, and Mr. Specter, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Cranston, and Mr. Adams, proposes an amendment numbered 1258.
On page 34, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following new section:
SEC. 602. APPOINTMENT OF CERTAIN OFFICIALS BY THE PRESIDENT.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by inserting at the end thereof the following new section:
[Page: S14789]
`SEC. 18. APPOINTMENT OF CERTAIN OFFICIALS BY THE PRESIDENT.
`(a) Presidential Appointments.--The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the following officers of the United States who shall serve within the Central Intelligence Agency:
`(1) the Deputy Director for Operations.
`(2) the Deputy Director for Intelligence.
`(3) the General Counsel.
`(b) Basis for Removal.--Notwithstanding section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(c)), any individual appointed pursuant to this section shall serve at the pleasure of the President and may be removed from office only by the President.'.
Mr. GLENN. Madam President, the amendment I am offering today is a modified version of S. 1003, legislation which would require Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation of certain senior officials at CIA.
Currently, there are only three CIA officials, the Director of Central Intelligence, the DCI; the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, DDCI; and the Inspector General, the IG; that are confirmed by the Senate.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the conclusion of my remarks, the following documents be entered into the Record: A July 2 letter from Judge Webster; September 6 letter from former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in support of this legislation; and the prepared statements of Dr. Richard Betts of Columbia University, Gen. William Odom of the Hudson Institute, and Dr. Allan Goodman of Georgetown University, as well as several press clippings.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. GLENN. I note that this amendment is the same as S. 1003, but with several modifications.
First, the original legislation, S. 1003, called for Senate confirmation of six senior officials, CIA's General Counsel, and the five Deputy Directors of CIA: the Deputy Director for Operations; the Deputy Director for Intelligence; the Deputy Director for Science and Technology; the Deputy Director for Administration; and the Deputy Director for Planning and Coordination.
I modified this amendment so that it requires Senate confirmation of only three of these senior CIA officials: the General Counsel, the Deputy Director for Operations, and the Deputy Director for Intelligence. Clearly, these positions are the most important of the second-tier management positions at CIA.
Second, I have deleted subsection (b) of the legislation, which specifies that appointments for these positions:
* * * shall be limited to persons with substantial prior experience and demonstrated ability in the field of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.
This provision was originally placed in the legislation because of the concern that appointing nonprofessionals could cast doubt on the objectivity of intelligence judgments and the independence of intelligence leadership.
Some have argued that this provision does not permit sufficient flexibility to bring in qualified individuals from the outside of the intelligence community. So I have been persuaded by this argument, and therefore have deleted the subsection (b) provision from the amendment that I am offering today.
In striking this provision, I note that the confirmation process merely provides a Senate check on the President's judgment in selecting a nominee. It cannot compel the President to nominate a particular individual. Assuring that the nominee is qualified for a position is the primary objective of the confirmation process.
If the individuals holding top positions at CIA are subject to confirmation, the Senate will make the determination whether the individual nominee is sufficiently qualified for the position in question. Ultimately, such a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.
If a majority of this body is convinced that a nominee for a particular position must be a career intelligence professional, such a view can be enforced whenever a confirmation vote comes before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence or before the full Senate.
It is important to note that on the infrequent occasion when a Presidential nominee is rejected, it is often because the nominee is considered to lack the requisite professionalism for the position. Hence, the confirmation process tends to support professionals against administration efforts to place unqualified nonprofessionals into senior positions in the Federal Government.
Also on occasion, there may well be a legitimate reason to have a well-qualified outsider in one of these three positions.
As Robert Gates recently responded to a question by me:
I would obviously prefer to have senior CIA positions filled with individuals with substantial prior experience and demonstrated ability in the intelligence field. However, I do believe that the DCI should have some flexibility in this respect, recalling that DCI Turner appointed a very distinguished scholar as head of the analytical directorate [Robert Bowie of Harvard University]. * * * Also, several fine CIA general counsels have had little or no direct intelligence experience. I would not consider, under any circumstances, appointing someone as Deputy Director for Operations without substantial prior experience and demonstrated ability in the intelligence field.
Undoubtedly, it would be more the exception rather than the rule for the President to nominate an intelligence outsider for one of these positions. Traditionally, DCI's have relied on intelligence professionals for the senior positions at the CIA. As Judge Webster conceded in his July 2, 1991, letter to me, of `CIA's 47 Deputy Directors, spanning more than 40 years, only 7 did not have extensive intelligence experience. Of those seven, only three were appointed within the last 14 years.' Clearly, intelligence professionals are preferred for these key senior positions.
Nevertheless, should the President make a mistake in appointing an outsider to one of these positions, it is the purpose of the confirmation process to reveal that mistake.
Madam President, the amendment I offer today will help ensure that only well-qualified individuals serve in these posts and prevent the possibility of appointments made by DCI's which might be based on political factors or personal and business ties. Such appointments could ultimately be damaging to the CIA, its mission, and most of all, the confidence of the American people and the Congress in this important agency.
For example, shortly after he assumed his position as DCI, William Casey appointed Max Hugel as Deputy Director for Operations--one of the most-sensitive positions in American intelligence. Mr. Hugel, a friend of Mr. Casey's who had no experience in covert action or clandestine human intelligence, was ultimately forced to resign after 2 months as DDO amid allegations of business-related improprieties. While the allegations against Mr. Hugel were apparently baseless, many believe his brief tenure at the CIA was damaging to that vitally important directorate's effectiveness and morale.
I believe such an appointment would have never been confirmed by the Senate, and a President knowing this would have been highly unlikely to submit such a nomination to the Senate in the first place. In other words, one of our very prime purposes with this is to cut the chance of politicizing the CIA.
Confirmation can also serve to protect career professionals from political leaders in the executive branch who may be tempted to corrupt intelligence processes, and could make senior CIA personnel think twice about circumventing congressional oversight when they are pressured to do so from the executive branch.
For instance, during the Iran-Contra affair, CIA general counsel, Stanley Sporkin, provided a highly dubious legal rationale for the administration's ill-conceived arms-for-hostages policy by drafting a retroactive finding for President Reagan's signature that directed: `The Director of Central Intelligence not to brief the Congress of the United States * * * until such time as I may direct otherwise.' The final version of this finding was not reported to the Congress for almost a year.
Had the general counsel and other senior agency officials gone through the Senate confirmation process, they would have undoubtedly been more sensitive than they apparently were to the fact that Congress shares both the power and the responsibility for our Nation's foreign policy. And they would have been much
less inclined to look the other way while laws requiring notification to the intelligence committees were deliberately ignored.
(Mr. LIEBERMAN assumed the chair.)
[Page: S14790]
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, Senate confirmation is a constructive means of enhancing public and congressional confidence in the senior leadership of the CIA. That is the reason we do it for all of the other agencies of Government were it is required. This is accomplished not only by ensuring that the nominee has the necessary qualifications for the job, but that the nominee is also firmly committed to the intelligence oversight laws and will be truthful, candid, and forthcoming in dealing with Congress.
In the course of his confirmation hearings, Mr. Gates has declined to either endorse or oppose S. 1003, but he has stated that:
* * * It is hard for me in principle to quarrel with the idea of senior officials of a Government agency not being subject to the confirmation process.
Senator Specter and I sponsored this legislation because we are convinced that the confirmation process has become an increasingly important means to insure the accountability of senior level executive branch officials to the American people through their duly elected representatives in the Congress. This is particularly true of the CIA, which plays a special role in our Government.
Indeed, the CIA is unique among all Federal agencies in the level of trust it demands from the American public and the Congress. And the CIA is unique from other intelligence agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA], the National Security Agency [NSA], and the FBI.
Although the CIA is not charged primarily with policymaking, it plays a significant role in the formulation of national security policy. The close relationship between the CIA and policymakers is recognized in the legislation that established the CIA. The National Security Act of 1947 specifically places the CIA under the National Security Council. The first two duties of the CIA under this Act specify that the Agency is:
First, to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government Department and Agencies as relate to national security; and second, to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the Departments and Agencies of the Government as relate to the national security.
Among the duties assigned to the CIA by section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 is `to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.' This broad provision has been interpreted to include, among other things, the CIA's role in planning and implementing various types of sensitive activites overseas--including covert action, which is, need I remind my colleagues, operational U.S. policy.
As the CIA has grown over the years, its support for U.S. national security policies has broadened into many different areas. The individuals who hold these three positions advise the DCI and the DDCI about policy. The DCI and the DDCI are in turn responsible for providing leadership and direction not only to the CIA, but the entire U.S. intelligence community as well. Thus, the Deputy Director for Operations, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, and the CIA general counsel play a significant role supporting the entire national security infrastructure of our Nation.
For example, the CIA's general counsel is responsibile for providing legal advice to the DCI and the Agency as a whole on all matters and is responsibile for determining the legality of CIA activities and for guarding against any illegal or improper activity, and that is an enormous responsibility.
The Deputy Director for Operations has responsibility for clandestine human source intelligence collection and is responsible for extraordinarily sensitive and highly classified operations such as covert action.
The Deputy Director for Intelligence has responsibility for producing intelligence assessments in support of U.S.
policymakers. These intelligence estimates form the foundation of our foreign policy and define the threat to U.S. national security that is the basis of our defense spending.
Unlike other intelligence agencies such as NSA, DIA, or the FBI, the CIA is not organizationally subordinate to another department of the Federal Government--by statute, it directly supports the National Security Council. NSA and DIA are Agencies of the Department of Defense, and the FBI is subordinate to the Department of Justice. In addition, the CIA, unlike the NSA, DIA, FBI, and all other components of the intelligence community, is the only intelligence agency--and indeed the only Federal agency--that is not subject to GAO audits.
Former DCI William Colby has stated that the CIA `was supposed to be above the other departmental intelligence centers. It wasn't coequal. It is a Central Intelligence Agency and not something off by itself.' This organizational centrality places the CIA in a different category from other components of the intelligence community and argues for a greater degree of scrutiny of high-level agency officials.
Mr. President, in view of their responsibilities in supporting the National Security Council in sensitive areas of policy formulation, I believe that Senate confirmation of these three senior CIA officials will ultimately serve to create confidence and rapport between the nominees and the legislative branch. Through the record established during confirmation, the nominee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence could clarify and establish a common understanding of the position's role and responsibilities, develop a constructive working relationship, and define the appropriate constraints on CIA activities. This process will go a long way toward avoiding problems as a result of misunderstandings, which in turn could lead to abuses of authority.
Senate confirmation could also bring greater stability to the CIA-congressional relationship by avoiding the adversarial oversight which replaces normal oversight after abuses of authority occur such as after the Iran-Contra affair. Such adversarial oversight is damaging to the intelligence process.
In addition, the Senate confirmation process provides a second forum to assess the competence of an individual for a high-ranking post in the Federal Government--serving as a check against possible executive branch politicization of these positions. And that is basically the purpose of this legislation today.
As Dr. Richard Betts of Columbia University has stated in expressing his support for this legislation, confirmation `should do more to prevent politicization than to promote it.' This is because:
* * * The confirmation process can * * * only block the Executive from appointing a given individual, it cannot force the appointment of anyone with a particular viewpoint or loyalty preferred by Congress. * * * Under current practice, nothing at all stands in the way of politicization of these offices by the administration. Considering the difference between the power to appoint and the power to review the appointment, politicization comes from the Executive more readily than from Congress. If a President or * * * DCI wish to put unqualified political cronies in sensitive CIA positions, they can do so, as of now, without challenge.
And that is really at the heart and soul of what we are talking about here.
I repeat the last sentence. `If a President or * * * DCI wish to put unqualified political cronies in sensitive CIA positions, they can do so, as of now, without challenge.'
It should also be noted that the confirmation of senior officials in Government has traditionally worked to protect against the politicization of these positions, while failure to confirm has worked to protect politicization. For example, senior Government officials who are not confirmed, such as the White House Chief of Staff and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, have been exempted from the confirmation process precisely to prevent Congress from interfering with the President's political control of these positions.
Mr. President, there have been various criticisms made about this legislation which I would like to address.
It has been argued that Senate and White House involvement in the selection of these senior CIA officials would somehow compromise the CIA's ability to provide objective intelligence to policymakers. Nothing could be further from the truth.
The CIA and its top officials give policy advice to the President and others, and conduct operations and activities that give them important roles and responsibilities in the field of policy development. Confirmation of three additional officials at the CIA would be no more likely to politicize the organization or impede the objectivity of its analyses than would the longstanding requirement to confirm the DCI, the DDCI, and the inspector general.
Indeed, Senate confirmation will help prevent politicizing these posts by raising the standards of these important deputy directorships. Because they must appear before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence [SSCI], the nominees are more likely to be scrutinized carefully--by both the executive branch and the Congress--than otherwise. This process would help preclude a hasty or ill-considered appointment by a single individual--the DCI.
Mr. President, it has also been argued that this proposal could somehow adversely affect the DIC's managerial control over these senior officials and have a negative impact on CIA relationships abroad. Once again, I see absolutely no foundation for these concerns.
We should remember that ultimately all employees of the executive departments and agencies are under the authority of the President--whether or not they are directly appointed by the President. Commissioned officers of the armed services, even at lower ranks, are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. As a 23-year veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps, and as chairman of the Senate Armed Services' Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, I feel confident in stating that there appears to be no evidence that this formal selection process has ever hindered commissioned officers' ability or willingness to respond to their immediate superiors.
Furthermore, it is extremely doubtful that the distinction between Presidential appointment and more routine methods of selecting senior intelligence officials is apparent to representatives of foreign governments. This is particularly true in the Third World, where much of America's intelligence activity will be focused in the years ahead. In Third World nations, control over intelligence agencies by the chief of state is pervasive. It would not be unusual, for example, for a chief of state to personally approve the appointment of comparatively junior intelligence officials.
In addition, it is quite likely that many foreign intelligence representatives already assume that senior U.S. intelligence officials are Presidential appointees. Indeed, foreign officials may even regard Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation as a mark of prestige and heightened status.
Mr. President, it is also argued that this legislation would somehow preempt the DCI from reorganizing the agency to meet future, unknown changes. I just find that concern as being baseless.
I would simply note that this amendment does not call for any specific organization within the agency, it simply establishes three statutory positions in addition to the three that already exist. It does not prevent the director from appointing other senior officials to serve in the agency in other capacities that the DCI may wish to designate.
I stress to my colleagues that this legislation merely recognizes positions that already exist--it does not create any new positions. These directorates have existed for at least 40 years: The First Deputy Director for Operations was appointed in 1951 and the First Deputy Director for Intelligence was appointed in 1952. The General counsel position was in existence when the agency was established in 1947.
Thus, the basic CIA organizational structure of the Directorate of Operations, the Directorate of Intelligence, and the general counsel's office implied in this measure has stood the test of time, and it is unlikely that a future DCI would choose to alter the broad organizational scheme which has been essentially in place virtually since the inception of the CIA. In any event, within this general framework, the DCI would be free to make numerous modifications as he or she may see fit.
If the DCI decided to eliminate these two directorates or the general counsel's office--and I think that would be extremely unlikely--the director would request the appropriate legislative authorization from the two intelligence committees. And this is precisely as it should be. Congress should be involved in approving the elimination or consolidation of any of these vitally important offices.
An additional concern has been raised about conducting public confirmation hearings for these officials which could harm the sensitive missions of these directorates.
Mr. President, I am sympathetic to this concern, and I would anticipate that these hearings would, for the most part, be conducted in the committee's secure hearing room in the Hart Building. If any Senator who does not serve on our committee wishes to review the nominee's background and the hearing transcript, they may review this material at our committee's secure spaces. Mr. President, this very procedure is followed at present when any Senator wishes to review the lengthy classified annex of our markup of the intelligence authorization bill before it reaches the Senate floor every year.
Finally, opponents of this amendment argue that this legislation is premature in light of the Senate Intelligence
committee's reorganization effort.
Mr. President, I would only note that the prospect for reorganization is a constant fact of life in modern American Government. If the possibility of reorganization is an excuse for failure to address the issue of Senate confirmation of these senior CIA positions, it could easily become a permanent excuse.
Over 1 year ago, the SSCI announced its effort to begin a review of intelligence organizations internal to the Department of Defense. Between that time and this year's markup of the fiscal year 1992 intelligence authorization bill, the committee held precisely two hearings on intelligence reorganization. In its markup of the fiscal year 1992 intelligence authorization bill, the SSCI overwhelmingly voted to create a brandnew position at the CIA--an assistant deputy director for operations. This was done without any hearing. This amendment, however, does not go as far as to create new positions. No new organizations or positions are created by this legislation. This legislation merely mandates that three existing positions are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
Furthermore, the confirmation of these three senior CIA officials can hardly be considered a major or dramatic change as opponents assert. In fact, this is an extremely simple and straightforward proposal.
I would note that the precedent for White House and Senate involvement in the selection of senior CIA officials was established at the inception of the present-day U.S. intelligence establishment. The National Security Act of 1947 provided for Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation of the DCI, and the same procedure for selection of the deputy director of central intelligence [DDCI] was established in 1953. In 1989, President Bush signed legislation into law which created a statutory inspector general [IG] for the CIA with a requirement that the nominee be confirmed by the Senate.
Confirmation of the CIA general counsel has also been proposed over the years. As early as 1976, the church committee recommended Senate confirmation of the general counsel, and a similar recommendation was made by the congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair in 1987.
I want to repeat that. The Iran-Contra committee in 1987 made a similar recommendation with regard to confirmation of the General Counsel at CIA.
Several distinguished past and current members of our Intelligence Committee served on the Iran-Contra Committee--such as Senator Boren, Senator Rudman, and Senator Cohen. And I would also note that 17 general counsel positions, or the equivalent in other departments and agencies are confirmed by the Senate.
Mr. President, it is important to note that there are over 1,000 positions in the Federal Government requiring Senate confirmation, and that of that more than 1,000 positions in the Federal Government requiring confirmation, these three officials at the CIA are at least as high in rank and as high in importance of their position as officials in similar roles in other Federal agencies and departments.
Here are just a few of them: State has 187 positions that require confirmation. Many of those are Ambassadors, of course. But just for regular administrative purposes within these agencies, Energy has 20 confirmed positions, Commerce has 30 confirmed positions, Defense has 53 confirmed positions plus all the general officers in addition to that number. I believe the Governmental Affairs Committee I chair is responsible for over 30 confirmed positions that we oversee.
So confirmation is not an unusual thing that we are asking for in Government. Quite the opposite. Confirmation is very common, with the over 1,000 positions requiring Senate confirmation. Requiring Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of these positions would merely validate this standing.
As Cyrus Vance has stated in endorsing this measure:
[Page: S14792]
I have served for many years in various positions in the Federal Government requiring Senate confirmation. I have worked with officials of the CIA serving in the . . . designated positions during my tenure as Secretary of the Army, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State. On the basis of my experience, I can see no harm and only good coming from the proposed legislation.
Mr. President, in his response to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence [SSCI] questionnaire for his current confirmation hearings to become DCI, Robert Gates stated:
Accountability--with respect to adherence to the law, relevant executive orders, guidelines, and regulations, as well as effective management and preformance--is in my judgment, the fundamental purpose of congressional review of intelligence activities.
I strongly agree with that statement.
Intelligence oversight imposes a unique burden on the two congressional intelligence committees which serve as surrogates, not only for the Congress as a whole, but the American people.
because Congressional oversight of the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community must necessarily be conducted in the black box of secrecy, the committees must demand accountability and possess the will to conduct thorough oversight. I would also point out to my colleagues that the CIA is the only intelligence agency over which the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has sole and exclusive jurisdiction.
Before the two intelligence oversight committees were created in the mid-1970's, Congress conducted what I refer to as `oversight by oversight' of U.S. intelligence--preferring to know little more than it was told by the CIA. As one Senator stated some years ago:
It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials to speak to us. Instead, it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information and knowledge on subjects which I personally * * * would rather not have * * *.
Mr. President, this is an attitude that this body can ill afford, particularly in the post-cold war era.
I am second to no one in my support for a strong, effective, and responsible CIA. Nevertheless, the Central Intelligence Agency, like any large bureaucracy, is capable of waste, abuse, mismanagement, and incompetence. Because the CIA is such a vast and secretive organization, it is essential that it be made fully accountable for its actions.
Intelligence activities are consistent with democratic principles only when they are conducted in accordance with the law and in an accountable manner to the American people through their duly elected representatives. I am convinced that the confirmation process is a constructive means of demanding accountability, thereby enhancing public and congressional confidence in the senior leadership of the CIA.
Senate confirmation of the CIA's general counsel, the deputy director for operations, and the deputy director for intelligence will serve to strengthen the accountability of the CIA--and ultimately enhance the effectiveness of this important agency.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment and I reserve the remainder of my time.
.................The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
The Chair recognizes the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski].
[Page: S14803]
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I listened closely to the statement of my friend, Senator Glenn. I am sorry to say I must rise in opposition to the pending amendment which requires the Senate to confirm an additional three officials to the Central Intelligence Agency, those three described as the Deputy Director for Operations, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, and the general counsel.
As has been noted, currently the Senate only confirms the Director, Deputy Director, and inspector general. I think the points raised by my colleague from Ohio are good ones. He clearly is interested in good, efficient government. We all have that in mind. And when he argues that the Senate confirmation process will ensure that high officials in the Agency will not be swayed by political consideration in doing their job, I know he has that intent. And it is certainly a noble goal and objective. But I seriously question whether the amendment itself is going to achieve that goal.
I think the amendment very well may inject political considerations in the process. It would, in the opinion of the Senator from Alaska, vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, force three more persons to go through a political process when they are nominated by the President, and I think we have to recognize the process of nominating and confirming takes two steps.
The first is for the nominee to pass muster downtown at the White House. At times this involves, frankly, political considerations. I do not think there is any secret about it and every Member of this body would be naive to think otherwise.
The second step of the process involves the Senate confirming the nominee. Rarely do nominees fail to gain Senate confirmation. Sometimes, as noted yesterday, votes are quite close.
However, Mr. President, if the process starts with a political consideration at the White House, which it certainly does, these considerations will not necessarily be eliminated merely because the nominee comes before the Senate Intelligence Committee for confirmation.
What this means in reality is that career CIA employees, some of whom deal in the Nation's most sensitive intelligence collection activities in the Directorate of Operations, will have to be sensitive to political matters in attaining the highest position in the Central Intelligence Agency.
In other words, we are going to have to see they are elevated or they are going to have to be elevated or they are going to consciously be elevated to that political sensitivity. Otherwise, they are simply not going to be able to have, if you will, the visibility to be included in the selection process. They will have to understand that their career goals in reaching the top position in the Agency will not be realized unless, somehow, they get themselves enough attention so there is some political connection with the White House.
I fear for that. I think that in itself is the very issue here and the very concern we have.
So I do not simply understand how the argument of my friend from Ohio eliminates the political consideration from this appointment process.
Some would argue that confirming these three people will make them more accountable. Clearly, we all want accountability. It is so frustrating to see in the Agency the lack of accountability. One only has to look at the Soviet Moscow Embassy fiasco to wonder where the accountability went. Where did it go to the point where we allowed pouring of concrete forms offsite so the foundation could basically be bugged? You go in today and neither the Agency nor the State Department can address the issue of responsibility.
So, clearly, the question of accountability is important. But the problem is that there will be accountability to the White House and not necessarily to the oversight committee, because the White House is nominating the individual. I fail to see what we are attempting to fix here.
Senator Glenn has argued, strongly and very well, that one prior appointment in the early days of the Reagan administration was unfortunate. We would acknowledge that. While others may agree with the assessment, I have not discovered that there is any pattern of similar appointments made in the Central Intelligence Agency, and I think that was one of the arguments used yesterday on the floor in the Thomas matter--Was there a pattern?
To get back to the point, I see a pattern in this case of high-quality appointments in the Central Intelligence Agency in the top positions. For example, if we look at the current cadre of personnel, the current general counsel, Elizabeth Rindskopf, an outstanding civil servant who has provided enormous assistance to our committee on some of the most difficult legal questions that we face.
Tom Twetten, the present Director of Operations is a career professional who literally rose from the ranks of the most secret of all our services. It is no offense to Tom Twetten to wonder whether the personnel office in the White House, including those who are concerned with the issue, and that is politics, would even recognize his name let alone his accomplishments as an operations officer overseas.
I think we are unlikely to get people who have had a depth of training in senior positions to simply come in and take those positions as a consequence of the appointment process. It is more likely that the special nature of this type of intelligence gathering addresses the theory of coming from within the Agency; knowing the Agency; understanding its uniqueness, and, as a consequence, moving up.
Finally, Mr. President, the issue of micromanaging bothers me a great deal.
So, overall, I do not understand the problem we are trying to solve here. By and large, the quality of the deputies at the CIA has been, I think, very, very high. They appear to me at least to be professionals in their fields of endeavor. Persons who head the various directorates at the Agency should not be wondering whether they are pleasing somebody down at the White House who helped them get their jobs. And I think that is an important point to recognize. They should not have to have allegiance, otherwise they lose some of their objectivity.
There is another reason to oppose the measure. It weakens the DCI's ability, the Director of Central Intelligence, to manage the Agency itself. Under this proposal the Director of Central Intelligence would not be able to select or remove his subordinates.
I having spent a lifetime in senior management, cannot imagine working under conditions of that nature. Those he wanted to promote would have to pass muster through the White House Personnel Office and the political process. In addition, this proposal would restrict his or her ability to remove those who are not doing their jobs.
I grant you the provision is in other agencies. But, let us face it, our Agency is different. It is structured to be different. Its budget is different. It is handled here on the floor in a different manner, and it warrants, I think, a different type of structure within. We only have to go back to the Agency's organizational chart to recognize that there are appropriate actions that have been taken relative to the confirmation process, by adding the inspector general, which was done a short time ago.
The appropriateness of that was questioned by some of my colleagues. But, clearly, if you are going to have an inspector general, you better have him independent of the DCI. That is a good argument. It is an argument that I accepted. But you just simply cannot accept the same application of principle in the case pending before us on the amendment.
So, as a consequence, at this time, the Intelligence Committee is trying to develop proposals to strengthen the authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to enable him to better manage the community.
I think the proposal before us, in contrast, would weaken the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. It would not allow him or her to select the most important deputies of the agency. This seems to fly in the face of what our committee is trying to accomplish in our reorganization initiatives.
However, Mr. President, our committee, as many of my colleagues know, is in the midst of trying to determine the best structure and the best organization for the Central Intelligence Agency and the community in general to meet the challenges of the 1990's and beyond. We have not completed that process. As far as I am concerned, we are not far enough along in that process, but it is fair to say we have initiated collectively the determination to begin.
But the reason we have not is primarily because we have been involved in confirmation hearings. The chairman and I intend to redirect our energies after we vote on the Gates nomination and move to the reorganization initiative priority. But it seems to me that we should certainly include the proposal of my colleague from Ohio, the Glenn proposal, as one of several matters to consider in terms of the management structure at the CIA. However, I think it is inappropriate to adopt it now, at a time when we are talking about a new head of the organization. Adopting it in piecemeal fashion I think will defeat the objective of our committee to take a comprehensive look at all aspects of the intelligence community and to make sure that whatever changes we propose will make sense in the overall structure.
Mr. President, the chairman and I have been in discussion with our counterparts in the House and with Senator Nunn, Senator Warner, and others on the reorganization initiatives. Our goals on many of the proposals are the same. But the means of attaining these goals is where I think we sometimes differ, and I think we do today. It is for this reason we tentatively agreed to delay the implementation of the reorganization initiatives until next year. This will provide us time with our hearings to think through in an orderly fashion those proposals that will have long-term impacts on the intelligence communities.
In addition, Mr. President, I am anxious to have the next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency confirmed and to then confer with him to get his views on reorganization initiatives. After all, Mr. President, we are going to hold him responsible and he should certainly have the opportunity to comment on the proposed reorganization initiative.
Finally, Mr. President, I believe that the Senate has to act to defeat this measure now and not wait to see the change that the Glenn proposal would provide. Simply put, Mr. President, the House of Representatives has no stake in the question of confirmation. Confirmation is our responsibility. I believe the Senate must act now to defeat the proposal.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the position of the President by letter dated October 16, which I intend to read in the Record, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
The White House,
Washington, DC, October 16, 1991.
Hon. George J. Mitchell,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
[Page: S14804]
Dear Senator Mitchell: The Intelligence Authorization Act (S. 1539) will shortly be considered by the Senate. I understand that an amendment will be offered that would require Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of six senior positions at CIA. Before the Senate takes action on the legislation, you should be aware of my strong opposition to this proposal.
The proposed amendment is unnecessary and would create the opportunity for the politicization of the intelligence process. Politicization of intelligence is unacceptable, and I am pleased that the intelligence provided by CIA to me and my predecessors has been straight and objective. CIA has been able to provide objective intelligence by being insulated from political pressure. The Director's ability to appoint his immediate subordinates has been critical in insulating CIA from political pressure. As a former DCI, I know how critical it is that these positions be filled with qualified individuals irrespective of their political associations or beliefs. My concern is that the confirmation process itself will inevitably create pressure on qualified candidates--either real or imagined--to conform their views to correspond to those that are perceived to be necessary to win confirmation.
My objectives to this amendment are shared on a bipartisan basis. I agree with Senators Hollings and Chafee that it is `premature to enact such legislation at a time when the Senate Intelligence Committee has just begun a comprehensive review of the structure and organization of the U.S. Intelligence Community.' At the very minimum, the Senate Intelligence Committee should closely examine the need for this proposal and its possible unintended adverse consequences before action is taken by Congress.
I hope that I can count on your support to defeat this amendment when the Intelligence Authorization Act comes to the floor.
Sincerely,
George Bush.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, this is a letter to the Senate majority leader dated October 16:
Dear Senator Mitchell: The Intelligence Authorization Act (S. 1539) will shortly be considered by the Senate. I understand that an amendment will be offered that would require Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of six senior positions at CIA.
I will reference here that this is three as proposed in the Glenn amendment.
I continue the letter:
Before the Senate takes action on the legislation, you should be aware of my strong opposition to this proposal.
The proposed amendment is unnecessary and would create the opportunity for the politicization--
Or close to it--
of the intelligence process. Politicization of intelligence is unacceptable, and I am pleased that the intelligence provided by CIA to me and my predecessors has been straight and objective. CIA has been able to provide objective intelligence by being insulated from political pressure. The Director's ability to appoint his immediate subordinates has been critical in insulating CIA from political pressure. As a former DCI, I know how critical it is that these positions be filled with qualified individuals irrespective of their political associations or beliefs. My concern is that the confirmation process itself will inevitably create pressure on qualified candidates--either real or imagined--to conform their views to correspond to those that are perceived to be necessary to win confirmation.
My objections to this amendment are shared on a bipartisan basis. I agree with Senators Hollings and Chafee that it is `premature to enact such legislation at a time when the Senate Intelligence Committee has just begun a comprehensive review of the structure and organization of the U.S. Intelligence Community.' At the very minimum, the Senate Intelligence Committee should closely examine the need for this proposal and its possible unintended adverse consequences before action is taken by Congress.
I hope that I can count on your support to defeat this amendment when the Intelligence Authorization Act comes to the floor.
Sincerely,
George Bush, President of the United States, with copies to the Honorable David Boren and the Honorable Frank Murkowski.
So, in conclusion, Mr. President, I think our obligation is to have a management structure for the Director of the Central Intelligence that provides for accountability, not one to micromanage the agency within the dictates of this body.
I see a number of Senators on the floor. It is my understanding that Senator Danforth would like to address the pending amendment.
I ask how much time remains on both sides Mr. President? It is my understanding we had 4 hours equally divided. Can you give us some idea of where we are?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time in opposition is 103 minutes. The time in favor is 85 minutes.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair. I ask my colleague about how much time he might require.
Mr. DANFORTH. Maybe 10 minutes.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I yield to the Senator from Missouri.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri [Mr. Danforth].
[Page: S14805]
Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, it is one of those rare ironies in the Senate that less than 24 hours after voting on the Thomas nomination, we are now debating whether to add three more positions in the Federal Government where the Senate is going to be involved in confirming the people who have been appointed to those offices.
We have just concluded yesterday a very tense debate in the U.S. Senate. Two strongly held views were expressed, but one thing that was held in common on both sides of the aisle is that something has gone very wrong with our confirmation process. I think all of us, Republicans and Democrats, believe that something was seriously wrong with the Thomas confirmation process and, as we reflect on what it was that was wrong, it included the participation of interest groups who were scouring the country for information, the use of confidential information by Senate staff, and the releasing of that information to members of the press.
Unfortunately, what happened with the Thomas confirmation was not unique in the recent history of the U.S. Senate. It has become something of an art form. If you want to accomplish your political objective, you leak confidential material, get it out to the press, and the press is very good at protecting confidential sources. That is what a free press does, and I understand that.
The fact of the matter is the method works. It brings results. To leak information to the press and to build a public uproar as a result changes votes in the U.S. Senate. It is a tried-and-true method of accomplishing political results. It has happened as recently as within the past 2 weeks. At the same time that the Judiciary Committee was considering the Thomas nomination, the Intelligence Committee was considering the Gates nomination.
As part of that consideration, a closed meeting was held one night in the Intelligence Committee's room in the Hart Building, and it is my understanding from talking to the chairman of the Intelligence Committee that no sooner did we have that meeting, a confidential, closed meeting of the Intelligence Committee, than the contents of that meeting were leaked to the press. Where confirmations are concerned, the Senate leaks like a sieve.
A year or two ago, we had the confirmation of Mr. Ryan to be the Chairman of the Resolution Trust Corporation, and during the process of that confirmation the contents of his FBI report were leaked to the press at great embarrassment to Mr. Ryan and to his family. It was a violation of Senate rules, but Senate rules mean nothing, apparently, in protecting confidentiality. A complaint is made to the Ethics Committee. The Ethics Committee does its best, does not find out what happened, and that is the end of it.
I do not know; maybe there is some time in the Senate history when the leaking of confidential information has caused some sanction to occur, but it has not been in my time.
So we now have a situation where the method of operation among some of our people, either staff or Members--who knows who they are--is to get confidential information out in the public, get it in the public domain in order to accomplish the destruction of a nominee. And it has happened several times.
How ironic it is that less than 24 hours after voting on the Thomas nomination, we now have a matter on the floor of the Senate which would add three new positions for confirmation. I thought that what we were saying yesterday, Republicans and Democrats alike, was something has gone terribly wrong with our confirmation process. I thought that what we were saying was that we had to clean up our act in the Senate.
And now without cleaning up anything at all, without even getting out a dustpan, we have a proposition on the floor of the Senate to add three more people to the list of those who are to be confirmed, as though we are saying the present situation is not only just fine but it does not go far enough; we need more people to confirm.
Mr. President, these are not just any old souls who would be confirmed by the Senate. We are not talking about some Commission or some Assistant Secretary of Labor, for example. We are talking about the Central Intelligence Agency and three of the most sensitive positions that there are in the Federal Government.
As a matter of fact, the Director of Operations is the most sensitive person in the Federal Government. The Director of Operations is a person who almost certainly has spent his or her entire career in the operations half of the CIA. This is a person who has spent an entire career not in the public eye but avoiding the public eye, as a matter of fact. And now we are supposed to have confirmation hearings on the Director of Operations.
I suppose someone would say, well, they do not have to be public hearings.
I must say, Mr. President, that in the real world of the Senate, the difference between public hearings and closed hearings has begun to escape all of us. The object is, apparently, to leave a closed hearing and blurt it out to the press. If you have gone to a closed hearing, it increases the value of the information you are going to leak. It is the law of supply and demand. The supply of information is limited, the demand is infinite, and the value of what you are spilling increases.
Mr. President, I hope before we start adding to the list of confirmable positions, and particularly before we add these three very sensitive positions to the list of those that are confirmable, we will in fact cleanup our own act. I think the time has come for a very close look at how we conduct our own business in the Senate. I think the time has come for a very careful analysis of how we conduct the confirmation process.
I believe that we, not only we in the Senate but the country at large, should focus on the process of confirmation. I believe that we should ask ourselves whether in the confirmation process anything goes, whether in the confirmation process there should be any limit at all on what we are willing to do to destroy a nominee. I believe we should focus on how we conduct ourselves here in the Senate before we exacerbate the problem and add to the list of positions in which we muck around.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HOLLINGS and Mr. MURKOWSKI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield 15 minutes?
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I will be happy to yield 15 minutes. Might I ask how much time remains on the opposing side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 92 minutes remaining.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair. I yield to my friend from South Carolina.
Mr. HOLLINGS. I thank the distinguished ranking member of our Intelligence Committee. Let me add in the same breath, under his leadership, under the leadership of our chairman, Senator Boren, and the former ranking member, Senator Cohen of Maine, as the ranking member on the Intelligence Committee, we have had a very tight, operative ship.
And when I had been on the committee before their particular leadership, when there were some leaks, I deplored them. I tried to insist, but unsuccessfully, that we would take lie detector tests. There has been a lot of discussion about lie detector tests. They do not tell us necessarily whether you tell the truth or not. But it gives an indication from the responses whether a further probing is required and desired, and we use it with respect to the CIA, the FBI, the National Security Agency, and the Secret Service.
You cannot get that job right out there at the door, on the Capitol Police force, if you do not take a polygraph. I went down and took one myself. I do not want, ever, to ask the troops to do something I do not do. I flunked, I say to the Senator from Rhode Island. The very first question I started to answer, `In my humble opinion,' and the needle just went right off the chart.
But in all candor and seriousness, I have been in this field 35 or more years as a member of the Hoover Commission task force. Can you imagine me appointed by a Republican President?--President Herbert Hoover. Gen. Mark Clark was the chairman of the commission; Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker, and others also served. We worked together in the McCarthy days. We got McCarthy's papers in 1954 and 1955. We had Richard Helms, Sherman Kemp, Bob Avery, Allen Dulles, and others in it at that time.
Now, I look advisedly at that era and at security today, and say, yes, we are doing well. But there is a point to be made that the Senator from Missouri has pointed out. That is, when these things become partisan, the leaks start. I have an outstanding staffer, and it is invariably a foot race, if I have missed an Intelligence Committee session, when I have had to be at another committee event--to see if he briefs me or if I brief him--because I have read the New York Times. Just 3 weeks ago we had such an occurrence. I quote from the New York Times of September 26, 1991: The headline reads, `Ex-CIA Official Is Said To Testify***Gates Cut Dissent.' The very first paragraph reads.
[Page: S14806]
A former Central Intelligence Agency official asserted in Senate hearings today that Robert M. Gates actively suppressed dissent, slanted intelligence conclusions, and intimidated analysts who disagreed with his views in his years as a senior intelligence official, according to people familiar with testimony he presented before a closed session of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
We are getting leaks like this all over now. It is just unfortunate. When we have nonpartisan private matters, we have not had that particular problem. But I note it now has surfaced with respect to the partisanship of the Thomas hearings before the Judiciary Committee, and the partisanship in the Gates hearings before our Intelligence Committee, which we will vote on in the committee on Friday.
I am shocked in the sense that, heavens above, do we never learn? I am like the Senator from Missouri. I believe that public hearings, confirmation hearings for the three top officials, under the Director of Central Intelligence, should be totally unheard of. This is not a policy body, the Central Intelligence Agency. As its title denotes,
`intelligence' and factual findings are its mission, never, never, policy. That is one of the faults we find at this particular time--in the Robert Gates confirmation process--because there is no question in anybody's mind around here, 100 Members, that Bill Casey fashioned his intelligence to the policy, to the preconceived policy. That is counter to intelligence work. It never should happen, it never should be allowed. It violates the professional ethics of intelligence work.
What happens if we have confirmation proceedings for these officials? Try it on for size, Mr. President. Here I am, I come into clandestine service, and I operate there 10, 20 years, working my way up to the top, doing a good job, wherever they send me. I can be selected by a Director without the politicization, without the public hearings, and know I will not be barred. But if we had confirmation proceedings on these officals, I can tell you categorically that a top man in the clandestine service could not be appointed under this particular amendment. I happen to know the present top man in that service. He is outstanding, with years in this particular work. But I doubt if he could pass political muster because he has too much clandestine knowledge. He is bound to be examined.
Do not tell me about handling these confirmations in closed hearings because I just read a news story from the closed hearings. The closed hearings are sieves, as the Senator from Missouri said. Information goes out like gangbusters. You have to race your staffer and brief him for the New York Times and the Washington Post before he can brief you.
It is ludicrous to bring forth such a proposal for intelligence work. It is not as if the President would appoint a Secretary of Agriculture for farm policy or Secretary of Commerce or Deputy Secretary of Commerce for business policy. This particular agency is for naught policy, nonpolicy, no policy. Politicization of intelligence is our problem right at the moment. Why did we flunk in Afghanistan, Iran, Angola, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kuwait, the fall of the wall, the Soviet Union? Why do you think we have that sorry track record? Because of Casey. He was adamant in his view of the Soviets, and you had to play his game at the expense of your ethics.
Suppose I want to come along as a career man. I am aware that the Presidential appointment has to have senatorial confirmation. Why, I must start watching my P's and Q's politically because we have seen what can happen with a particular nominee here on national TV all over the weekend. So there is an old political adage: When in doubt, do nothing, and stay in doubt all the time. As a result you have, as a nominee one of these brilliant fools that smile, condescend, and obsequiously go along. You get nothing out of them. You certainly get nothing meaningful out of them. I think in essence that is what Schwarzkopf was saying to us from the gulf. He could not depend on the CIA intelligence. If he had waited for CIA to give the word, he would never have gone forward. They took the sharp edges of factual intelligence, shaved here smoothed here, and produced, in his words, `mush.'
Now you want to institutionalize mush with this amendment. 0
Mr. President, there are letters here. The Senator from Rhode Island, Senator Chafee, yielded to me, because I have to get back in this conference on appropriations. But he has letters from the President, and the former Directors and others, that are very, very significant on this score.
But let us not, for Heaven's sake, go along with an amendment of this kind and really politicize the Central Intelligence Agency. It is bound to happen if we pass this amendment. We are not going to be able to really clean it up at CIA as we proposed to do.
I can be categorical in this sense because I publicly said I am worried about my friend, Bob Gates, because I do not think he is the proper man at this time. Too many, not just in the Soviet section, but in many analytical sections, say that he, to put it crudely, `cooked the books', adopted the intelligence, pressured that intelligence to conform to the Casey policy. So to go in there, he would have a tough time for 2 or 3 years to get things straightened out.
But I will bet this: I bet he will get a majority vote of our committee on Friday. I will bet also this, that he will probably get a majority vote in this Senate.
So I do my job conscientiously. I am not the mother superior around here on the mistakes we make. But I will back Bob Gates to the hilt on appointing his team. I do not want to be brought up here next year at this time and say, `Bob, what about so and so?' And he said, `Well, you know, you gave me some political appointments for Deputy Director for Intelligence, Deputy Director for Operations, and general counsel. I had to take them and put them through those hearings, and I am having a problem.'
I want him to have a strong directorship. I can tell you, if you really want to weaken him, go along with this amendment. It is totally out of order and never should be brought up, particularly at this time with the track record of the confirmation process over the weekend.
I thank the distinguished Senator from Alaska. I yield the floor.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank my friend from South Carolina and the Senator from Rhode Island.
I yield as much time as I think the Senator from Rhode Island might need.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. CHAFEE. If I could be reminded at 20 minutes, I would appreciate it.
Mr. President, I have the greatest respect for the intelligence, integrity, and judgment of the distinguished Senator from Ohio. When he comes up with an amendment like this, Mr. President, I just say to myself, what can he be thinking of?
If I have ever seen an amendment that was the wrong amendment at the wrong time, this is it. Mr. President, I am not just talking about the wrong time being what Senator Danforth was referring to earlier--the bitter experiences we have been through in this Chamber and in this body, the whole U.S. Senate, over the Thomas confirmation. But it is the wrong time for a series of other reasons.
I want to point out to my colleagues in the Senate that right now in the Intelligence Committee we are contemplating a total reorganization of the intelligence community. Already we have held three hearings on this issue, and many more are expected this year. You might say: Oh, three hearings, what is that? You folks cannot be very serious. After all, why can't you finish by the end of this year?
Well, I want to point out that the most comprehensive and intelligent review of the reorganization of the Defense Department was the so-called Goldwater-Nichols Act. That took 3 years, 25 hearings, 10 markup sessions, and when it was done, it was done right. It is one of the finest things we have done in the Senate and the Congress for the benefit of the Defense Department.
So to say at this time that we are going to step in, we are going to have three more positions over there, setup in law, appointed by the President, sent up to the Senate for confirmation--the general counsel, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, and the Deputy Director of Operations--at the time while we are reviewing the whole agency, in my judgment makes no sense.
On another point, when you put somebody in charge, you want them in charge, and you want to hold them responsible. It is what we call `accountability.' So we have, over there in the intelligence community, the Director of Central Intelligence. We confirm him. He is appointed by the President, subject to confirmation, and he is held responsible for what takes place.
Now we are saying: Oh, by the way, the President is going to appoint not only a general counsel, the person you have to turn to for advice on legal matters, but also two of the most important deputy directors you have, namely those for operations and intelligence. These are going to be political appointments.
You might say, well, we really do not intend them to be political appointments. Of course, they are going to be political appointments. What is the White House all about? They are going to send up political appointees for these positions. If I am correct, there have been some revisions. I would like the sponsor to tell me if I am correct--has the Senator altered his bill as originally presented? Am I correct that the individual appointed pursuant to this section shall serve at the pleasure of the President, and may be removed from office only by the President; is that the language still present?
[Page: S14807]
Mr. GLENN. That is correct.
Mr. CHAFEE. I thank the Senator very much. So, furthermore, we end up with a situation where not only can the director not appoint his subordinates, he cannot even get rid of them. They serve at the pleasure of the President. Only the President can get rid of them. This includes the person the OCI is relying on for legal advice and counsel, and there is plenty of that which comes up in that agency. What is legal? How do I observe the Boland amendment? How do I not? What does it provide. When do I have to have a finding? When do I not need a finding? All of these are very important. He gets somebody in there whom he did not want to begin with and, once more, he cannot get rid of him.
Mr. President, we are in the process of selecting a new Director of that Agency. If all goes well, Mr. Gates will be confirmed very shortly. Or, if he is not, another name will come up and, presumably, that individual will be confirmed before too long. I certainly think we ought to let that individual get into the department, into the Agency, give us his views, come up with his thoughts, and let us hear them.
Now we are in a peculiar situation. For some reason, the CIA is singled out for these additional confirmations. There are no such confirmations in the National Security Agency, or in the FBI, or in the Defense Intelligence Agency. I do not know why in the Central Intelligence Agency we have this, without the others. There is only one thing we can assume: That hard on the heels of the approval of these three additional politically appointed positions we will start doing the same thing with the other agencies--the FBI, NSA, and the DIA.
One of the arguments that was made by the distinguished Senator from Ohio--and I will say this: Any time he is supporting an amendment on the floor, there is something to be heeded. He is a Senator who has been here a good deal of time, and who has given this some thought, so his views carry weight. He has just pointed out that in all the other departments, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Housing and Urban Affairs, you name it, they are appointed positions.
So what is the matter with doing the same thing in the CIA?
Well, there is a world of difference. I served as a political appointee of the President in the Department of Defense. I was the Secretary of the Navy for 3 1/2 years. Why was I appointed to that position? I was appointed to that position by the President in order that the President's policies could be carried out in the Navy Department. I got my orders from my boss, the Secretary of Defense--the Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, and Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird. They got their orders from the President of the United States.
Those orders came to me, and we would meet every Monday morning at 8:30 in the office of the Secretary of Defense. There we got our marching orders for the week. `You are going to
reduce the size of the Navy.' That is what I was told. `We have to get rid of a lot of those old ships. We have to cut the budget, and you ought to do it.' I was carrying this out. I was a policymaker. Those were my instructions. I was a political appointee carrying out the orders of the elected official of the United States of America, the President.
That is exactly what we do not want in the CIA. We do not want somebody who is carrying out Presidential policy in the CIA, in the director of operations and in the director of intelligence. What is the director of intelligence? That is a fancy name. That means somebody who is head of all the analysts.
And the analysts are given a chore: Analyze what is going to happen in the Soviet Union, or do you see a breakup of the Soviet Union coming? Or, let us look into the future. Analyze what is going to happen in these Republics. Are they going to fly off by themselves and remain independent? Will they come back together in a confederation? Are they going to have problems with minorities within the various Republics? Are they liable to go to war with each other?
That is an order that is issued to the analysts, and they are to come up with a dispassionate, objective appraisal of what is going to happen.
They are not meant to be carrying the water for the administration and say that the President has come out very strongly that these Republics are going to be off on there own as independent entities, he has said that in a speech, and so forth, therefore you should come up with a justification for that speech. That is not what we want from those serving in the intelligence directorate. That is what we call politicization.
Mr. President, we have been through stormy hearings on the confirmation of Bob Gates, and what have been the charges? The charges have been Mr. Gates has politicized, the term is `cooked the books.' There is no way in the world if this amendment is enacted, that a political appointment down in the next echelon below would not be liable to be charged, and probably accurately, of politicizing what came up.
Worse than that, Mr. President, if we have this confirmation process and the political appointment of those top jobs, anybody who wants to get ahead in the CIA in the lower echelon is going to know how to get ahead, and the way you get ahead is make points with the administration, tell them what they want to hear. They do not want to hear bad news, nobody wants to hear bad news. Tell them good news. Tell them what they want to hear, and they will think you are pretty good.
By golly, if you keep that handle on the front door polished up, pretty soon you will be appointed to one of these positions by the President. That is the danger of this amendment.
Mr. President, I feel very strongly, as you can gather, that what we would be doing if we adopt this amendment is fostering politicization within the very agency where we do not
want it. There is a world of difference between the CIA, where you are seeking objective analysis, and policy making organizations. Indeed, Mr. President, I would point out that for many years the Director of CIA, that is the head of the CIA, was not a position that changed with administrations. Dick Helms stayed there. So did McCone. So did Bedel Smith. So did Alan Dulles. The whole purpose of the agency was not to have turmoil when a new administration came in.
The reason you have turmoil in the other departments is because you want policy carried out. If a new President comes in he does not want somebody that he is not acquainted with heading the Treasury Department, or heading the Defense Department, or the State Department. He wants his policy carried out.
But the CIA is an entirely different agency. I think it is more akin to the Federal Reserve. There you want the Federal Reserve to be an objective agency, not one that is jumping and leaping to the whims of the President, whoever the President might be, or change when the head of the party in power changes.
Now, for some reason the distinguished Senator from Ohio cut back his original bill. Originally he had six positions confirmed, and now he has cut it back to three. I do not know why three. If you are going to do it, do it. If you are going to have political appointees, have them right through. There are in effect six Deputy Director positions, and for some reason he cut it back to three. Why he cut the others I do not know.
Maybe he felt it would be a little more palatable, take it in small bites. But the principle is the same.
Mr. President, these are just my thoughts.
Yes, I am serving in my second term in the Intelligence Committee. I served 8 years before, and I have served about a year now.
I have here, Mr. President, letters of opposition to this proposal of the distinguished Senator from Ohio from three former Directors, Admiral Turner, Bill Colby, and the President of the United States, George Bush, who was a Director, as we know.
I also have letters of opposition from the current acting Director Richard Kerr, who was Deputy Director, and two other former Deputy Directors, who stand in tremendous esteem not only before this Senate but especially before the Intelligence Committee. I am referring to Adm. Bobby Inman and to John McMahon.
Mr. President, I would just briefly like to read to you from several of these letters.
Admiral Stansfield Turner, October 14, 1991:
[Page: S14808]
Dear Senator Chafee:--
And I will put this letter in the record. I shall point out several things.
With this bill, the DCI would feel inhibited in changing subordinates. He might even be pressured by the White House or the committee to appoint particular people. And, he will be prohibited from appointing someone who had no prior experience in intelligence.
I believe that that provision has been changed by the distinguished Senator from Ohio.
Two of the deputy directors I appointed would have been excluded by that rule.
Now, Mr. President, I next read from a letter dated October 8, 1991, from William Colby.
You very kindly solicited my opinion. * * *
In brief, I oppose it.
Referring to the Glenn amendment.
These positions traditionally have been the pinnacles of the career services of the Agency, operations, analysis, technology, and administration. While I understand that the amendment would require the nominees have some intelligence experience, I think both familiarity with the duties and the morale of the services would be adversely affected by such a requirement, since the practice would probably grow filling these posts with a number of individuals who have not served in the services involved.
If congressional committees disapproved of an individual assuming such a post--or continuing in it--there are a variety of channels--
Meaning if you do not like who is in there, if the director has appointed someone you do not approve of, you do not need the Presidential appointment system, the confirmation system.
there are a variety of channels through which they--
Meaning the Senate or the committees--
could indicate their opinion, and even enforce it.
Mr. Colby disapproved.
A letter from the White House, the President of the United States: Most of this letter has been read by our distinguished vice chairman of the committee, in which he concludes:
I hope I can count on your support to defeat this amendment when the Intelligence Authorization Act comes to the floor.
I read now from Adm. Bobby Inman. All of us who served in that committee and many who have not know Admiral Inman. He served as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
I do not believe it would be wise to enact such proposed legislation.
This is dated today.
A. The temptation to politicize the process would be high.
And then he deals with the experience factor.
Am I correct, I would like to ask the distinguished Senator from Ohio, that he has eliminated the experience section that the Senator had in there--the requirement for experience?
Mr. GLENN. Yes, we did, because there was some objection. It was thought that it might eliminate experienced outsiders who would be of value to the Agency. And rather than trying to defend a claim that we were doing that, we eliminated that particular provision.
And in response to the comment made a few moments ago by my distinguished colleague, the reason we cut back on the numbers of positions affected by this bill was because these three positions were the most sensitive and important, and so we thought it was better to tailor it down to just those three.
Mr. CHAFFEE. So, Mr. President, Admiral Inman. He concludes:
If I had more time I would write a better memo. In summary I accept that legislation has been proposed with the best of intentions, but I believe it would prove counterproductive over time.
Mr. President, the next letter is from John McMahon, dated October 15, 1991. This is what John McMahon says.
I fear enactment would create the very condition the Senate is trying to avoid, namely the politicization of intelligence.
Bear in mind that it would be the White House that would be making the nominations--thus giving the White House the opportunity to infiltrate the Agency at several levels across the spectrum of Agency activities.
It further runs the risk that the change of administrations would sweep the top leadership out thus denying the Agency the top professionals presently on board.
Carrying this thought forward, the amendment provides the framework for not only politicizing intelligence--
That is what I was talking about with regard to analysis, but Mr. McMahon refers to the operations side as well.
it also establishes the threat of a short-term outlook, namely the duration of the administration not what is in the best interest of the Agency in the long run. Would the Agency really be in position to make long-term trade-offs? Beyond administrations?
The Agency, under the amendment, would run the risk of becoming just another policy organization, stripped of its independence, objectivity and `tell it like it is.'
In sum, the downside far outweighs what might be gained. Political appointees make policy along administration desires.
This is a very, very important point that John McMahon makes. `Political appointees make policy along administration desires.' Of course they do. That is why they are there.
They are not there to go against the administration. They are not appointed to get in there and throw a monkey wrench into the gears of the administration. They are there to carry out the administration's desires.
Do you think I would have lasted long as Secretary of the Navy when my orders were to cut the size and number of ships in the Navy if I said no and went out and gave a speech saying no we are not going to cut it, we are going to increase it? I would not have had time to clean out my desk; I would have been gone.
Political appointees make policy according to Administration desires and party platforms. You don't want intelligence so constrained or so directed.
Finally, a letter from the Acting Director, Mr. Kerr. This is what Mr. Kerr says in a letter of which I have a copy directed to the chairman of our committee dated October 10.
And they keep getting back to this point which we cannot avoid.
[Page: S14809]
First and foremost, I am concerned that Senate confirmation of the CIA Deputy Directors and General Counsel would increase the risk of politicization of the intelligence process. CIA is not a policymaking agency.
And then he touches again on the experience factor which the distinguished Senator has removed. And then he touches on a final point.
My final concern is that the Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of our senior managers could have adverse consequences on foreign intelligence liaison relationships. If a perception develops that our managers are beholden to political interests, foreign intelligence liaison services could be less willing to share information with us. Public hearings in which details about individual Directorates are disclosed would also be inconsistent with secret intelligence service, and would have negative effects on our ability to persuade other nations that we can keep their information confidential.
So, Mr. President, I find very, very strong arguments against proceeding with the amendment proposed by the distinguished Senator from Ohio. I hope very much for a whole variety of reasons, one of which we never even had any hearings on this. Now I am not blaming the Senator for that. He attempted to have hearings. Due to the Gates hearings, it was not possible. But the fact is that we have had no hearings on this particular measure.
So for all the reasons I have listed--the politicization, the fact that this is unlike what we have in any of our other intelligence agencies, be it the FBI, be it the Defense Intelligence Agency, be it in the National Security Agency--this would be absolutely unique. We are not trying to carry out policy there. And, furthermore, the fact is that we are in the midst of a study and I believe a well-motivated and thorough study and it will take us time to decide where we are going with the intelligence community.
For all those reasons, I think it is inappropriate to act on this amendment at the present time, and I do most sincerely hope that it will be defeated.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letters to which I referred be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
October 14, 1991.
Hon. John Chafee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Chafee: I have recently studied the draft bill before your Select committee on Intelligence which requires Senate confirmation of an additional six officials of the CIA. I would like to offer some comments.
In the wake of exposures of the CIA's role in Iran-Contra, the Fiers' case and the recent allegations before your committee of politicization of the CIA's analysis, I can readily understand why the committee wants to establish more firm oversight of the CIA. Too tight a control could discourage risk taking in both the collection and the analysis of intelligence, however. I suggest that you will want to be quite careful that any additional controls are likely to enhance oversight sufficiently to be worth it.
You already have a good check on the appointment of DCIs (I would not have been DCI had your committee not balked at President Carter's first nominee for the position.) That, I believe, must be your principal control over the CIA's personnel. If a DCI is going to ensure that the CIA is administered legally and within ethical bounds, he must have personal confidence and the loyalty of his immediate subordinates. Because of the secrecy involved, there is more weight on the DCI's shoulders as to the performance of his subordinates than in almost any other agency of our government. He should be able to appoint or dismiss them on the basis of his instincts as to their ethical standards and their respect for law. It would be unfair for your committee to hold his feet to the fire, as it should, for the ethics and legality of the CIA if he must place trust in people he does not quite trust.
With this bill, the DCI would feel inhibited in changing subordinates. He might even be pressured by the White House or the committee to appoint particular people. And, he would be prohibited from appointing someone who had no prior experience in intelligence. Two of the deputy directors I appointed would have been excluded by that rule and both did excellent jobs. There are times, in my opinion, when it is highly desirable to bring in outside blood with new, open viewpoints. Three of the deputy directors operate in areas where their required skills are interchangeable with people from outside: Research and Development, Analysis, and Administration.
As a case in point, I did not support much of what Mr. Casey did, but I did publicly back his appointment of Max Hugel. It was an appropriate time for an outsider to be the DDO. It just turned out that Casey's judgment of character was poor; not his decision to reach outside the agency.
The issue here is one face of how the congressional committees go about the process of oversight. I believe the practices of select committees on intelligence need to differ from those of standing committees more than they presently do, as in this instance. I hope we can discuss the broader issue also some day.
With warmest regards.
Yours,
Adm. Stansfield Turner,
U.S. Navy (retired).
LAW OFFICES OF
Donovan Leisure, Rogovin, Huge ampersand Schiller
Washington, DC, October 8, 1991.
Hon. John H. Chafee
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Chafee: You very kindly solicited my opinion on the amendment suggested by Senator John Glenn, for whom I have the greatest respect, which would require that the Deputy Directors for Operations, Intelligence, Science and Technology, Administration and Planning of the Central Intelligence Agency be confirmed by the Senate.
In brief, I oppose it. These positions traditionally have been the pinnacles of the career services of the Agency, operations, analysis, technology, and administration (I am not informed on the make up of the Planning Directorate). While I understand that the amendment would require that nominees have some intelligence experience, I think both familiarity with the duties and the morale of the services would be adversely affected by such a requirement, since the practice would probably grow of filling these posts with a number of individuals who have not served in the services involved (as I think can be seen in the Department of State, where many Assistant Secretaries--and Ambassadors--come from outside the Foreign Service). There was one experiment along this line under Director William Casey, and I understand the results were not positive. Certainly if the Congressional Committees disapproved of an individual assuming such a post--or continuing in it--there are a variety of channels through which they could indicate their opinion, and even enforce it, without a confirmation process.
Thank you for the opportunity to express my views.
Respectfully,
William E. Colby.
The White House
Washington DC, October 16, 1991.
Hon. George J. Mitchell,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Mitchell: The Intelligence Authorization Act (S. 1539) will shortly be considered by the Senate. I understand that an amendment will be offered that would require Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of six senior positions at CIA. Before the Senate takes action on the legislation, you should be aware of my strong opposition to this proposal.
The proposed amendment is unnecessary and would create the opportunity for the politicization of the intelligence process. Politicization of intelligence is unacceptable, and I am pleased that the intelligence provided by CIA to me and my predecessors has been straight and objective. CIA has been able to provide objective intelligence by being insulated from political pressure. The Director's ability to appoint his immediate subordinates has been critical in insulating CIA from political pressure. As a former DCI, I know how critical it is that these positions be filled with qualified individuals irrespective of their political associations or beliefs. My concern is that the confirmation process itself will inevitably create pressure on qualified candidates--either real or imagined--to conform their views to correspond to those that are perceived to be necessary to win confirmation.
My objections to this amendment are shared on a bipartisan basis. I agree with Senators Hollings and Chafee that it is `premature to enact such legislation at a time when the Senate Intelligence Committee has just begun a comprehensive review of the structure and organization of the U.S. Intelligence Community.' At the very minimum, the Senate Intelligence Committee should closely examine the need for this proposal and its possible unintended adverse consequences before action is taken by Congress.
I hope that I can count on your support to defeat this amendment when the Intelligence Authorization Act comes to the floor.
Sincerely,
George Bush.
[Page: S14810]
1. On reflection of your notification of a proposal to require Senate confirmation of CIA DDO, DDS&T, DDI, DDA, DDP&C, AND GC, I have concluded that I do not believe it would be wise to enact such proposed legislation. My quick reaction is based on the following thoughts:
A. The temptation to politicize the process would be high. I can remember clearly the 1980 transition process when members of the transition team for CIA wanted to replace most if not all of the individuals in those jobs with persons considered `politically reliable.' Some of their candidates had long experience in intelligence, but they had moved beyond the spirit of the Hatch Act. I was able to head off this effort with the threat to publicly charge politicization. If the billets had been expected to change and had been part of the confirmation process, I doubt that I would have prevailed.
B. The DCI and DDCI have responsibilities that extend beyond CIA, and their being subject to confirmation is entirely appropriate. It is my view that CIA should not be considered to rank above DIA and NSA, but should be seen as coequal. Requiring six CIA officials to be confirmed will be used inside the community to assert congressionally mandated superior status. Either plan to confirm like billets at DIA and NSA, or don't do it at CIA.
C. The level of experience varies with the experience level of the DCI and DDCI, and of the immediate requirements of the job. Several of those assigned as General Counsel have come with little past experience and have done a superb job--Dan Silver immediately comes to mind. Similarly, depth of knowledge in science and technology is more important than past time in the intelligence community for DDS&T. The other four need very competent individuals with substantial experience in the intelligence community, and the DDO should always be a career DDO officer. But for reasons of cover I would not want a public confirmation process when I think about getting the best talent in place as DDO.
2. If I had more time I would write a better memo. In summary I accept that legislation has been proposed with the best of intentions, but I believe it would prove counterproductive over time.
B.R. Inman.
My comments on Senator Glenn's amendment--
I fear enactment would create the very condition the Senate is trying to avoid, namely the politicization of intelligence.
Bear in mind that it would be the White House that would be making the nominations--thus giving the White House the opportunity to infiltrate the Agency at several levels across the spectrum of Agency activities.
It further runs the risk that change of Administrations would sweep the top leadership out thus denying the Agency the top professionals presently on board.
It also runs the risk of not only politicizing the intelligence product but also Agency operations; to wit, Agency DDO division chiefs interact with Asst Secretaries in State, DOD, and the NSC staff. Any Division Chief aspiring to be the DOD might be torn in running operations along pure professional lines versus slanting them to carry political support from the other political appointees.
Carrying this thought forward, the amendment provides the framework for not only politicizing intelligence but OPS as well.
It also establishes the threat of a short term outlook, namely the duration of the Administration and not what is in the best interest of the Agency in the long run. Would the Agency really be in the position to make long term trade-offs? Beyond Administration?
The Agency, under the amendment, would run the risk of becoming just another policy organization, stripped of its independence, objectively, and `tell it like it is.'
In sum, the downside far outweighs what might be gained. Political appointees make policy along Administration desires and party platforms. You don't want intelligence so constrained or so directed.
John McMahon.
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC, October 10, 1991.
The Hon. David L. Boren,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Senate will take up the Fiscal Year 1992 Intelligence Authorization Act in the near future. I understand Senator Glenn intends to offer as an amendment to that Act his Bill, S. 1003, that would require Senate confirmation of officials appointed to six senior positions at CIA. I had hoped that I would be able to provide my views directly to the Committee in a hearing that was scheduled on this Bill. However, because of the press of other business, the Committee was not able to conduct such a hearing. I am, therefore, providing my views directly to you and other members of the Intelligence Committee.
I have the highest regard for Senator Glenn and for the goals that he seeks to further--the accountability of CIA and the non-politicization of those appointed to guide it. It saddens me to say that I do not believe enactment of S. 1003 would contribute to the realization of these goals. I am convinced that this legislation would lead to unintended negative consequences that would far outweigh any benefits it might otherwise achieve. By far, the most damaging is the increased risk of politicization of the intelligence process. I am also concerned that the proposal would diminish the DCI's authority to manage CIA, and have an adverse impact on our foreign intelligence liaison relationships. Below I have described each of these concerns in more detail.
First and foremost, I am concerned that Senate confirmation of the CIA Deputy Directors and General Counsel would increase the risk of politicization of the intelligence process. CIA is not a policymaking agency. We support the policymakers by providing them intelligence that is as accurate and objective as possible. Right or wrong, we call them as we see them. As you know well, this wins us some praise and some criticism from all sides. To ensure that our intelligence remains objective, we have been insulated from institutionalized political pressure.
One way we have minimized political pressure is by giving the DCI direct authority to appoint his immediate subordinates. Fourteen DCI's have had the freedom of appointing their senior managers of operations, analysis, technical collection and administration. These officers have been chosen, with practically no exceptions, irrespective of their political associations or beliefs. I do not believe a future DCI would be as free to choose a Deputy Director without consideration of his political association or beliefs, or his position on international issues, if this proposal is enacted.
I know that the proposed attempts to limit this problem by requiring that `appointments shall be made without regard to political affiliation and shall be limited to persons with substantial prior experience and demonstrated ability in the field of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.' Despite this provision, it is my view that the confirmation process itself, no matter how well handled, creates an opportunity for politicization that does not now exist. I fear that qualified candidates will perceive themselves to be under pressure--either real or imagined--to conform their views to correspond to those that are perceived to be necessary to win confirmation. The potential for politicization of intelligence thus increases enormously, an no requirement regarding appointment qualifications can alleviate this risk. Among similarly qualified potential nominees, politically acceptable views could take on overriding importance if this proposal becomes law.
I am also concerned that the proposal limits the flexibility and authority of the DCI in managing the CIA. When CIA was created over 40 years ago, the Director was given authority to pick the senior leadership of CIA because it was presumed that the Director would be in the best position to know the qualities needed for senior Agency positions. I know of no reason why this judgment should be altered today.
I am also worried that the bill could impede the Director's authority to create or alter senior positions within CIA. For example, if this proposal had been enacted into law several years ago, some may have argued that the Director would have had to seek legislation before establishing the position of Deputy Director for Planning and Coordination. During a period where we are facing unprecedented changes in the world situation, I do not think it wise to limit the DCI's flexibility to change our organizational structure. We will need to adapt to a radically changed world, and the process has already begun through studies underway to reorganize the Intelligence Community. Now is not the time to limit the DCI's flexibility to make necessary changes that might be called for in the near future.
The proposal also could have a significant adverse effect on the continuity of CIA management. If the proposal is enacted, it is possible--and I believe would come to be expected--that our senior managers would be asked to step down with the coming of a new Administration. The resulting loss of experience and knowledge from such a wholesale change of our top leadership would be profound. Changing CIA management with a new Administration would also contribute to the danger of politicizing the intelligence process. Certainly the perception of politics would be there.
Finally, I object to the proposal's requirement that appointments as Deputy Director or General Counsel `shall be made without regard to political affiliation and shall be limited to persons with substantial prior experience and demonstrated ability in the field of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.' I understand that this requirement is of dubious constitutionality; under the Appointments Clause, the only qualifications that the Congress may require of persons appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate are those that the Senate considers appropriate in the context of considering individual nominations. Congress may not be law require the President to nominate only those persons with congressionally-specified qualifications.
Further, this requirement may have the effect of making it more difficult to assemble the most qualified management team for CIA because there may be instances in which the requirement purports to prevent the appointment of highly qualified individuals from the outside. While in most instances individuals selected to fill the position of a Deputy Director or General Counsel will have substantial prior experience in the field of intelligence or counterintelligence, or related area of law, there have been instances where highly capable and talented individuals who have not had such experience have been selected for these positions and served with distinction.
[Page: S14811]
My final concern is that Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of our senior managers could have adverse consequences on foreign intelligence liaison relationships. If a perception develops that our managers are beholden to political interests, foreign intelligence liason services could be less willing to share information with us. Public hearings in which details about the individual Directorates are disclosed would also be inconsistent with a secret intelligence service, and would have negative effects on our ability to persuade other nations that we can keep their information confidential.
Given the potential for harm posed by this proposal, it should not be adopted unless compelling reasons are established to show that it is actually needed. I am not convinced that such a need has been demonstrated.
It has been argued that Senate confirmation is necessary to ensure accountability of senior CIA officials to the American people. The need for accountability is indisputable. It is essential to our health as an American institution, and our success as an intelligence agency. But the provision under consideration is neither the only way, nor the best way, to achieve this objective. One effective means of ensuring accountability exists through the exercise of vigorous oversight by the Intelligence Committees. If members of the Committee believe that there needs to be further communication with the CIA Deputy Directors on the role and functions of their respective positions, they can use the existing oversight mechanism to obtain this information rather than requiring Senate confirmation for these positions.
It has also been suggested that the confirmation process will help ensure that only the most qualified individuals will be selected to fill senior positions at CIA. To the contrary, I believe that requiring CIA senior managers to be confirmed will have at best a marginal impact on their overall quality, and in fact, has the potential to backfire if politicization fears are borne out. To be sure, any candidate totally unqualified for CIA management positions would be identified and, hopefully, eliminated through the process of confirmation. But this is not an Agency problem requiring a solution. The record demonstrates that during the last 40 years, the vast majority of individuals appointed to senior management positions have had extensive intelligence experience and were well qualified to assume their duties. There exist by any standard only isolated examples of individuals so lacking in qualification that they might have been excluded through confirmation. In short, the problem addressed by the proposal appears far less serious than the problems created by the proposed solution.
Finally, it is argued by analogy that CIA Deputy Directors should be confirmed because comparable positions in DoD and State require confirmation. This comparison misses the mark. The Departments of State and Defense are policy-making Departments, central to the political process. In contrast, CIA operates outside the policy realm. Indeed, as I stated earlier, it is critical to the intelligence function of CIA that it be outside the policy arena and free from political `taint'. A more appropriate comparison, in this regard, would be to agencies like NSA or FBI. This bill would treat CIA as a policy agency.
In summary, I do not believe the proposal is necessary and I am very concerned about the unintended consequences that could result from its enactment. At the very least, I would hope that the Senate would not approve this proposal without the Committee first conducting a careful examination of the need for the legislation and the effect of the legislation on CIA.
Sincerely,
Richard J. Kerr,
Acting Director of Central Intelligence.
Mr. CHAFEE. I thank the Chair and thank the floor manager on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, how much time is remaining on this side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 57 minutes.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may reserve the remainder of our time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need.
Mr. President, when I listened to some of the things being charged against this very simple and straightforward amendment, I must say I have trouble recognizing my own amendment.
What we are trying to do really is increase accountability. Bill Casey's name was brought into this debate by the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, and I think very properly so. He was worried about what would happen under Bill Casey at the CIA. And I too was worried about that.
In retrospect, I wonder if we did not come closer to a disaster in the intelligence community during his tenure perhaps than we realized. And we saw the impact of Iran-Contra on the CIA's credibility with Congress and the American people who were not being told what was being done. This was done because one person, the DCI, made political appointments to some extent at the CIA. That was not the cause of Iran-Contra. I do not mean to imply that. But there were political appointments made at that time that were disturbing.
We are trying to protect against that happening. We are trying to make sure that qualified people are out there.
We are also trying to make certain that there is not any politicization to tailor things just to suit a preconceived administration policy. In every other department of Government and most agencies, we require confirmation.
Let me point out one thing to my colleagues who are so unhappy with the confirmation process. And I join them in being unhappy with the confirmation process. But how do you carry out one balance of powers responsibility? Our President is not omnipotent; nor is the single head of the CIA an omnipotent person whose judgment we trust in all matters. The President of the United States is not a prime minister, I would point out. And that galls a lot of Presidents of the United States.
But we operate in this country with a separation of powers, and a balance in which the Congress has some of that balance of power and part of that is the confirmation process. Is it perfect? No. And of all times for this to come up, adding people to confirmation, there probably could not have been a worse time in the history of the Nation than bringing it up today after the Thomas vote.
Is the confirmation process very popular at the moment? I would say it is about as unpopular as anything I can think of at the moment because of all the trauma and drama of this past weekend.
But we have a balance of powers in this country. We have a separation of powers in this country. We try our level best, imperfect though it is, to go through this confirmation process and to make certain that neither a President nor a head of CIA has the authority to do irreparable damage to this country and making solely political appointments.
Bill Casey's name was brought up by another Senator here this afternoon. He made a political appointment out there to the DOD, something that was remedied in a short period of time.
But was it right that that could happen? Could we have been able to prevent that had we had the confirmation process? I think it would have been far less likely to happen had we had this confirmation process. It was pointed out by my distinguished colleague, the floor manager of the bill on the other side, that they say there was some difficulties with one case in the last administration, and he sort of dismisses it. I believe that example shows what can happen. This is what we are trying to protect against. This is anything but politicizing the CIA. It is exactly the opposite.
Now, considerable comment was made about the ability of the DCI to manage. Well, why does that not apply then to every other agency in the Government?
Every other agency of Government that has anywhere from 15 to 100 positions seems to be able to be managed by the person on top.
It is true, as my distinguished colleauge from Rhode Island says, that maybe all of those persons are in there to carry out political functions, and that is their purpose. And he met at the Pentagon every Monday morning, he said, at 8:30, and they got their marching orders politically during that time.
I was a little surprised at that, but let us accept that and say that is the way things work at DOD. But here we have CIA that is not subordinated to another agency of Government. That is the reason why it is unique. Yet at the same time we have the responsibility here to perform an oversight function of that most unique agency.
NSA and DIA report to the Department of Defense. FBI reports to the Department of Justice. So there are people there who are responsible to the Congress and whom we confirm in their nomination and approval process.
It is different at CIA. They have no one overlooking them. Their overisght does not flow through any other organization to us. We do not appoint. We do not confirm the head of NSC that they report to.
What we are saying here is there should be a process by which we exercise our advice and consent role.
Let me run through some of these issues very briefly. Would this proposal undermine the management role? No more so than it does for any other branch of Government, as I see it.
Would this politicize the CIA? Absolutely not. What we are trying to do is exactly the opposite.
Could it adversely affect DCI control and CIA relationships abroad? I would not be surprised, if you polled some of these foreign intelligence agencies or their governments or their Departments of State, that they already think that all these positions are already confirmed, having observed our Nation for many years.
Another charge being made: This measure does not allow the DCI to bring in highly qualified individuals from outside. This is just not true. The DCI could bring in whomever he or she wanted from outside. But we hope they would be qualified people.
But at least in these areas where we have had, in the Gates nomination process and in the hearings, so much concern about intelligence being politically slanted out there--and the jury is still out on that as far as I am concerned--but when we have that as one of the main concerns, certainly we should be concerned about it to conduct our oversight function.
We must make sure that the CIA has qualified people for the job.
Another charge made against us: the bill effectively legislates the organization of the agency. It does this no more than it does to any other agency of Government. Certainly no one is proposing to change the general counsel role or doing away with the general counsel at the agency. Nor is anyone proposing that we do away with the directorate of operations or of intelligence. Those have been in existence for many years and those are the only ones we are addressing with this provision.
Another criticism was that this is premature action in light of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reorganization effort. I would say with regard to that, if we wait all those years, we will not get much action. We have had two hearings in the last year or so. It is going to be a long, long time before we get around to an overhaul of the whole intelligence community.
I can understand the concern of my distinguished colleague from Missouri, Senator Danforth, about the confirmation process. This is not a Thomas-type situation that we are talking about. And much was made of leaks by my distinguished colleagues, Senator Danforth and Senator Hollings. I do not see what that really has to do with leaks.
I do not think anyone, including those who oppose this amendment, would say that the alternative should be no oversight whatsoever of the CIA, and no advice and consent role. I do not think anyone would say that. So I just do not see that those arguments about leaks are relevant in this case.
I am just as concerned about leaks out of the Intelligence Committee and out of the classified sessions we have just as much as anyone here. I have spent a good part of my life in the military. I have a very great appreciation of what happens when you have leaks like this. I am for investigating these leaks as aggressively as possible, just as the majority leader stated on the floor yesterday afternoon before our vote. And I will support whatever investigation he wants to make into where these leaks come from and how they occurred.
But this amendment was also talked about as institutionalizing mush. That is ridiculous. It will simply mean that we will be performing our oversight role, our role in making sure there are qualified people, and there are people there who are fully qualified to carry out their duties, and that they are going to do that without fear or favor to what the administration's views may be.
This would not result in checking in every morning to get political marching orders.
My distinguished colleague from Rhode Island also said, as far as putting one person in charge, that we could not effectively operate unless a person in charge had full authority--or I believe there were words to that effect. yet, the President of the United States does not have that kind of complete authority. The President does not operate solely as a prime minister does in a parliamentary system where the Prime Minister operates with pretty much complete authority, and is tossed out of office if his party or the people do not like what he or she has done.
We, have a system of separation of powers, advice and consent. That is our end of the avenue. The President makes his nominations. It is up to us to see that we feel that we have the right person at the right time for a particular job. And I do not believe anybody would propose that we change that balance. That is a continual tug and haul, back and forth on Pennsylvania Avenue as to who has the most power in Government. Does the legislative branch or the executive branch have the most power at any particular given moment? And I am not proposing that we upset that.
But I think the arguments made on the other side of how we have to have one person in charge, and we cannot exercise any review of the people that might be put in under that person, just does not fit in with how all the rest of the Government operates.
I would say there is not a single department head in Government who does not hate the confirmation process, because it limits what he or she can do. But it is the Congress, exercising its role of advice and consent in the confirmaiton process. This is as it should be.
I do not think most people realize how much we do in the confirmation process. Do they realize that there are 1,065 positions that we confirm in our monitoring of appointments that are going to run Government? That does not prevent them from being good people. It does not mean we tell the President who goes into a certain job. Quite the opposite. We never do that.
There has never been a person voted on here, and proposed that the President then should nominate that particular person. The President has full choice of making his nominations.
But the Senate, under the Constitution of the United States, has a role to play in this process. And in one of the most critical agencies of Government, the CIA, I see no reason why we should not have this confirmation process. We have 1,065 confirmed positions. The CIA has only three of those. The Department of Agriculture--16; U.S. Trade Representative--4; Office of Science and Technology Policy--3; OMB--4; Department of Commerce--30 positions that have to come before us for confirmation. Are we proposing we do away with all those positions? At the Department of Defense--53; Department of Education--32 positions come before us for confirmation; the Department of Energy--20; Health and Human Services--17; Department of Housing and Urban Development--13; and the Department of Justice--159.
I think that it is necessary that we carry out our role under this separation of powers. All we are trying to do is make certain that we not politicize the CIA. I think it came closer than maybe many of us realized in the recent past. I do not want to take that chance again. The CIA is too important.
We have gone through a long series of hearings on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to determine in our own minds--and each person has to make up his own mind on that committee--as to whether there was politicization going on out there, tailoring views at the top echelons of the CIA to reflect what they knew the President wanted to hear.
I do not know how the confirmation process would tend to make this a more leaky Government. We have hearings on the very most sensitive pieces of information in this Government. We have them in committee, and I think the committee has done a pretty good job of keeping secrets secret.
The distinguished Senator from South Carolina mentioned there had been leaks back some time ago. There had, indeed. But there are occasionally leaks out of the Pentagon, leaks out of one place and the other, and I think this committee, by and large, has been very responsible in keeping secrets.
Mr. President, those are a few comments with regard to statements made regarding this amendment. I urge my colleagues to vote for this amendment. I think it is the right thing to do, in spite of coming the day after we went through such unpleasantries with regard to the Thomas nomination.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
[Page: S14813]
Mr. CHAFEE. I yield the distinguished Senator from Maine such time as he desires.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I find myself in a somewhat unique position. I have the pleasure of serving with the Senator from Ohio on the Armed Services Committee and the Governmental Affairs Committee. When I was a member of the Intelligence Oversight Committee, I had the privilege of serving with him on that as well. I usually find myself in agreement with him. I regret to say that today I do not.
First, I would suggest to the Senator from Ohio he is absolutely right. This is not about leaks. There is, in my judgment, no suggestion or substantiation of the fact that any confirmation proceedings for any of the deputies that have been designated in this amendment would lead to leaks coming out of the Intelligence Committee.
Senator Boren--Chairman Boren--myself, Senator Murkowski, and others have worked during recent years to adopt procedures which I believe have stemmed the possibility of leaks coming out of that committee. We have done a very good job, so this is not a matter of whether we would enhance the possibility of leaks coming out of the Intelligence Committee.
It does have to do with the question of balance of power. I do not think there is any question about that. Mr. President, when I first came to Congress, we talked a great deal at that time about balance of power, checks and balances.
We have a Government of checks and balances. We have the House that checks the Senate; we have the Senate that checks the House; we have the Congress that checks the President; we have the President who checks the Congress with his veto power; and we have the U.S. Supreme Court that checks all of us.
The problem has become for me that everyone is in check, but no one is in charge. And that is one of the reasons today why the wheel of Government seems to be cracked, why the axle is broken. The wheel of Government is not turning very smoothly any longer. We seem to be bogged down, almost paralyzed, incapable of dealing with the great issues of the day. And the American people sit back in wonderment as to what has happened to this great institution; why is it we are not dealing with issues; why is it we are squabbling; why is it there is so much conflict?
It seems to me that something happened back when I first came to Congress, just before the Watergate incident. There used to be a time when the chairman of the various committees could hold their hearings, conduct their deliberations, listen to all of the evidence, make a judgment in the committee, and then come to the House or Senate floor and have that legislation considered rather expeditiously.
Today, that no longer applies. Today, the Senate Armed Services Committee, under the leadership of Senator Nunn, a recognized expert in the field of defense matters with, I think, quite a competent committee, can deliberate for days and weeks and months and come to the floor, and the minute the bill hits the floor, we have 200 amendments pending. Everybody has become an expert. Everyone knows as much as any member of any other committee. As a result, it now takes not hours or days to debate a bill, but weeks, and possible even longer. That is true not only of the Armed Services Committee, but virtually every other committee in the Senate, and indeed in the House of Representatives. Every Member now has become an expert. Every Member has his or her own little fiefdom. And so, as a result, we no longer delegate any responsibility to our superiors, those who serve as chair men and women. They no longer can control the vote; they are simply another member of the committee.
It seems to me that this is taking place more and more, and what we are seeing is that the leaders can no longer lead because they do not have any followers.
That is what I am referring to in terms of the balance of power. Here we have a situation where it is almost glasnost run amok. We have shown this in the confirmation of more and more CIA personnel.
I remember reading one time a statement about a river, the definition of a river. A river has to have banks. A river without a bank is not a river; it is a flood. What we are witnessing is a floodtide of authority resulting in a diffusion of accountability.
When I run for office, the people of Maine elect me, and they expect me to set up my office in a way that will make me responsive to their particular needs, hopefully to reflect what I think will be the prevailing philosophy, if one can do so with the people of Maine. I do not want them, I do not want Bob Dole, I do not want President Bush, I do not want the Republican National Committee to tell me who my legislative assistants should be or who my administrative assistant should be. I want to determine that.
I think I am capable of deciding who the top policy people within my office are going to be, what their qualifications are, what their philosophies might be, and, indeed, whether or not I have the right to hire or fire them or whether they serve at the pleasure of the people of my State. I want that responsibility. I want that accountability.
If I hire good people, if I hire bright, intelligent, hardworking people who are accountable to me, and if they do a good job, I will do a good job and the people of my State will be satisfied with my performance. And if I do not, they will know that, and they will seek to remove me from office at my next election cycle.
Maybe that is not entirely applicable here. There are some obvious distinctions, but it does come back to a question: Are we diffusing accountability in our system by insisting on more and more--and I hate to use this word because it is thrown so often in my face--micromanagement? Every time we start to look at an executive branch department or organizational setup, we are accused of micromanaging executive affairs.
Sometimes we have done good things. The Senator from Rhode Island pointed out something that is very important. We went through an extensive examination of the reorganization of the Department of Defense. It took 3 years, as the Senator from Rhode Island pointed out. There were many, many hearings.
Even prior to that time, and to me equally as important, was the fact that we had a study group that was set up well in advance of this. Senator Tower, who was then the chairman of the committee, recommended the staff conduct an analysis of a reorganizational scheme for the Department of Defense, reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
And concomitant with that particular study we had an outside group, the CSIS group, that consisted of a number of Members of the Senate and the House. Senator Nunn was on it, I was on it; Congressman Les Aspin was on it. We were members of the Center for Strategic Studies at the time. But, more important, former members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former chairmen were also on the committee, and a year prior to that we started our analysis of what needed to be done.
What was interesting about that particular study is the expertise of those people who had been in the executive branch, who had been in the Department of Defense, who had been members of the Joint Chiefs, who had been chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that is quite different than what we are saying here.
Here we are attempting in a fashion to intervene in this reorganization process at a time when it has not really been undertaken, when every former Member that we have respect for has voiced his opinion in opposition to this--unlike the reorganization of DOD where the significant expertise that was brought to us said, yes, we need change. We have seen the flaws. We need change. And this is what has to be done. We have to give the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff more power. We have to get more accountability out into the field. And they strongly supported these changes.
Just the contrary has taken place here where those former experts, those who have served in the field, who have no vested interest in this legislation or in the Agency as such have said it is a bad idea, it is an absolutely bad idea. Whether it is Colby or Helms or Turner, McMahon, or Bobby Inman, to a person, they say do not do this.
The question about experience was raised earlier today. That has been dropped apparently from the legislation because initially it was thought we should have some criteria that would at least include experience. Well, it has been dropped, and I think it was good it was dropped because some people think that if Bob Gates is not the man to be confirmed as the Director of the CIA, we need some kind of outside executive, some top CEO, someone who has managed a large corporation--bring him in or bring her in and take an outside look at this particular Agency. That may or may not be a good idea.
I happen to think Bob Gates will bring the experience necessary to that position, but there is some division, obviously, within the Senate about that. How about philosophy? Should we look at the nominee's philosophy? Should they be Republicans, Democrats? Should we try to get a balance? Should we be concerned about what their political philosophy is? Are they hawkish? Are they dovish? Are they agnostic pigeons? What exactly is the lens through which they look at the world? Do they see a Soviet Union in the advanced stages of disintegration or of rebirth? Exactly what is their world view? Do we want to strike a balance among those who have a much harsher view perhaps, less benign view of the Soviet Union or China or all of those other countries on the world scene, or someone who has a moderate view? Indeed, balance, is that something we want to look at during this confirmation process?
What I suggest, Mr. President, is there something inherently pernicious involved in this legislation in the sense that if the DCI cannot remove his top aides, his top subordinates, his DDI, his DDO, then it seems to me we are inviting the emasculation of the DCI himself. If he is not in a position to say to his director of intelligence or director of operations, `You are fired, I disagree with what you are doing,' because that person serves only at the pleasure of the President, then what we have set in motion is some sort of a division of
power within the directorate itself. He no longer can make the decisions about the quality of the work, the quality of the intelligence, the integrity of the intelligence, the integrity of the operations. That individual can then perhaps even go around the DCI, make a little visit not only to Capitol Hill to talk with the oversight committee but to talk to the National Security Adviser, saying, `Mr. National Security Adviser, I don't think the President is getting the information straight. I think there might be a little shading here on the intelligence. I think he is not fully aware of what is going on in the operation field. I think we have to get around the DCI, let this be known to the security adviser and maybe the President and let him know what is really going on in the operation of the agency.'
That, to me, is one of the most potentially destructive situations that I can imagine, where the DCI, in effect, does not have control over his top subordinates. In this amendment they are relegated to a position which, if not coequal, nonetheless insulates them against the type of direction he may want to give them.
The accountability belongs to the President of the United States. His direct subordinate is the DCI. That direct subordinate also is accountable to us in a very real sense, and that is the person we should exercise oversight upon.
I rise in strong opposition to the legislation that will be offered by my friend from Ohio because I believe that we have not achieved more accountability. In fact, this amendment would undermine the accountability of the top intelligence official within the executive branch, and that is the DCI. For that reason I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment.
[Page: S14814]
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bingaman). The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time to the Senator?
Mr. GLENN. How much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 66 minutes and 3 seconds.
Mr. GLENN. I yield such time as the Senator from Pennsylvania might require.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank my distinguished colleague from Ohio.
Mr. President, I support this legislation, and in fact am an original cosponsor of it, because I believe that the additional oversight which would be provided by confirmation would be desirable.
I could not be present for much of the debate today because we have a conference on the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education appropriations bill. I have just heard the comments by the distinguished Senator from Maine, and I must say that I am impressed by the quality of his argument, but I ultimately disagree on drawing a judgment as to what oversight is desirable and what independence is desirable.
I support this legislation because I am not satisfied with the oversight which the Congress has on the intelligence operations in this country. Since the Iran-Contra affair had come to light, it seemed to this Senator that more by way of oversight was necessary.
While the Senator from Maine is still on the floor, I would recollect his strenuous efforts, joined in by many of us on the Intelligence Committee at that time, to try to provide a statutory requirement for notice of covert activities. The Senator from Maine had introduced legislation calling for 48 hours' notice. This Senator had introduced legislation calling for 24 hours' notice. Neither legislation was never enacted. One bill did come out on the inspector general, which this Senator introduced after some very fine staff work by my liaison, Charles Battaglia.
After considerable deliberation by the Intelligence Committee and considerable analysis at the White House, we do have confirmed by the Senate an inspector general at CIA who can provide some independent oversight. That is a step forward but only a small step forward. I think more is necessary.
The arguments which have been advanced here against the legislation do have some merit, and earlier today when I talked to the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Chafee], who raised the issue of concern about politicizing the appointees since they would be Presidential appointees, it seems to me that they could still be selected as they are now, as the Director of Central Intelligence may choose, with the significant change being that they would be confirmed by the Senate.
When the Senator from Maine raises the concern that the Director of Central Intelligence cannot fire them because they would have to be fired by the President, I respond that as a practical matter they can be fired by the Director because he runs the operation must like the Secretary of Defense. If he is dissatisfied with one of his subordinates who has been appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, he can in fact have that official fired.
So the situation, I suggest, would be about the same as it is now with the one additional factor that there would be confirmation.
This is a bad day to talk about the confirmation process. I think my colleague from Ohio could have picked a better day to bring this to the floor than the day after the proceedings on Judge Thomas were concluded, given the last weekend that we all went through, or at least those of us on the Judiciary Committee went through. This is not the best of all days to urge expansion of the confirmation process. But we have the confirmation process, and I think it ought to be extended here.
I add, Mr. President, that I believe that a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence community is necessary, and toward that end, again with the assistance of my liaison in the Intelligence Committee, Charles Battaglia, I introduced Senate bill 175 in the 101st Congress, now Senate bill 421 in this, the 102d Congress, which would provide for a separation of authority between the Director of the CIA and a new director of national intelligence.
Right now the Director of CIA also functions as the Director of Central Intelligence. And, as Director of Central Intelligence he directs all the other intelligence agencies of the Government. It is a responsibility that is too vast for any one man. In addition, this dual-matter position has led to the problems of cooking the intelligence which we have heard so much about during the nomination proceedings of Mr. Robert Gates.
I shall not discuss that issue at any length today except to note that former Secretary of State Shultz testified very emphatically on the point. The Secretary of State was very much involved in the use of intelligence information and was concerned that the intelligence gatherers were also the policymakers; there was an inclination to have the intelligence correspond to the policy which they wanted.
I have written to the chairman and the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee asking that we have a hearing on S. 421. We had a date earlier this year which had to be postponed, I do think that kind of an analysis of the DCI responsibilities is very, very important.
As for today, I commend the Senator from Ohio for this legislation. I think it is an important step forward, and therefore I support it.
Mr. President, I am an original cosponsor of S. 1003, a bill which would require Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of three senior positions in the Central Intelligence Agency. Currently, the total number of Presidential appointments, by and with the advice of the Senate is 1,065. Three of these appointments are for positions in the CIA. They are the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and the inspector general.
If the hearings on the nomination of Mr. Robert Gates to be the Director of Central Intelligence have demonstrated anything, they have shown the need for an extension of intelligence oversight through the advise-and-consent process of confirmation. Therefore, in S. 1003, we are seeking confirmation of the following additional senior CIA positions: Deputy Director for Operations, Deputy Director for Intelligence, and general counsel.
The Iran-Contra hearings and both Gates confirmation hearings have done much to elucidate and educate the American public and the Congress on the capabilities, contributions, limitations, and deficiencies of intelligence and our intelligence agencies. They have also served as a reminder that we still have a great deal more to learn about these institutions if we are to assure the American public that their tax dollars are being spent wisely and that the intelligence arm of Government is functioning within the parameters of American law and regulation.
When the Senate established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence it did so because of a public outcry of abuses of authority, of illegalities and violations of basic civil liberties by intelligence agencies. In 1975, not only the public but also the Congress of the United States knew very little about the world of intelligence, especially the Central Intelligence Agency. Over the past 15 years, we have increased our institutional knowledge and we are still learning. The Iran-Contra and Gates confirmation hearings have borne out this learning process. But equally, confirmation hearings have served two important roles. First, they help ensure that individuals nominated are qualified. Second, they serve as a means of transmitting a very important public message. The message is that their failure to conform to laws and regulations
will jeopardize not only the effectiveness of their position, but also will raise a cloud of doubt over the credibility of their institution. In short, they will be harming national security. In my view, this is the principal message emanating from the confirmation hearings of CIA officials including those of Robert Gates.
The senior managers of the CIA constitute a common denominator in that they represent the strengths and weaknesses of that institution. In confirming them, we oversee intelligence law, regulations, policy, budget, and programs of clandestine intelligence collection, covert actions, and analyses. In confirming them, we are able to assess in advance their qualifications, their understanding of laws and regulations governing intelligence activity, and their commitment to intelligence oversight. While the confirmation process cannot guarantee the truth of their responses, it does serve as a very important baseline upon which to assess future performance. This has certainly been the case with Directors of Central Intelligence.
Now, however, Senate confirmation of the senior management positions at the CIA is especially needed. The CIA is a large, independent organization. Unlike other intelligence agencies, there is little external oversight. For example, the General Accounting Office cannot inspect or investigate the CIA. The intelligence oversight committees are not large enough nor do they have sufficient resources to do other than selected inspections and investigations. I am hopeful that the new inspector general position at the CIA will help fill this void.
As the agency responsible for a policy implementing arm of national security; namely, covert action, such oversight is especially important. But there is another reason.
Fifteen years of congressional oversight have confirmed the view that the CIA consists of four semiautonomous directorates--for operations, for analysis, for science and technology, and for administration. The fifth directorate for planning and coordination is relatively new and not large. Each directorate is headed by a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who, by tradition, functions somewhat independently. On this basis alone, it is surprising that Senate confirmation of these positions was not instituted long ago.
Second, hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have indicated that senior CIA intelligence officials are not as well versed in intelligence law and regulations as they should. The failure of senior officials in the CIA's Directorate of Operations to recognize that it should have first sought a Presidential finding before providing
propriety aircraft assistance to Lieutenant Colonel North to ship arms to Iran is a case in point. Therefore, it would seem to me to be in the best interest of the CIA if the Congress were assured that future appointees to these senior CIA positions had a clear understanding of the laws and regulations governing their activity.
The American public and the Congress are often caught up in the necessary secretiveness and wonderment of spying and as a result, we raise the art to the near occult and supernatural. Spying is the stuff made glamorous by novelists. But, analysis, I would submit, is a world without glamor. Nonetheless, it is the essence or substance of intelligence; it is what intelligence is really about. The primary purpose of analyzed intelligence is to provide the President and his policymakers and military leaders clear and objective information upon which to base policy and planning. If the process of spying or the very information collected is faulty, analysis may be inaccurate.
However, if the basis of intelligence analysis rests in the preconceived judgments or perceptions and fears of a senior official or an analyst, no amount of information will matter and objectivity will be lost. As Senator Boren indicated during the recent Gates confirmation hearings, if such is the case, the intelligence community will have wasted billions of taxpayer dollars over the years in collection systems.
A third problem has long existed. It lies in getting the finished analysis to policymakers in a timely manner and in a useful form.
There is a fourth problem. In essence, it is akin to taking a horse to water. If the horse is not going to drink, there isn't much you can do. The same holds true in getting policymakers to read and respond to intelligence reports. But, if the horse believes the water is foul, he may have good reason for not wanting to drink.
During the Iran-Contra hearings, former Secretary of State George Shultz testified about foul intelligence, in his distrust of some of the analytical reporting he was receiving from the CIA on Iran because of the CIA's involvement with the policy affecting that analysis.
The Gates confirmation hearings have raised many questions on the objectivity of analysis and the responsibility for such objectivenness. One question raised in my mind is why we have not subjected the position of authority which, by design, shapes national security and foreign policy, to confirmation?
Similar arguments can be made for the other CIA directorate positions.
In regard to confirmation of the position of the general counsel, I would remind my colleagues that this recommendation is not new. In its final report of April 26, 1976, the select committee to study operations with respect to intelligence activities recommended that the general counsel of each intelligence agency be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. That committee cited the extraordinary responsibility of that position, the fact that senatorial confirmation would increase the stature of the office and protect the independence of its judgment.
Today, we have solid reasons for wanting to increase the stature and independence of that office. During the Iran-Contra affair, CIA's general counsel provided a highly dubious legal rationale for the administration's ill-conceived arms-for-hostages policy in drafting a retroactive finding.
Senate confirmation is a fundamental element in the oversight process of ensuring public and congressional confidence in the CIA. Indeed, during his recent confirmation hearings, Mr. Gates stated that--
[Page: S14816]
It is hard for me in principle to quarrel with the idea of senior officials of a government agency not being subject to the confirmation process.
In addition, I would argue that total responsibility and accountability to the American public for the effectiveness and credibility of the CIA cannot rest solely with the CIA if the Congress neglects to review each senior official through the nomination and confirmation process.
Congress shares a constitutional responsibility for national security; it reviews the CIA budget in advance. It reviews CIA programs in advance. It should assess in advance prospective CIA officials who will be responsible for these budgets and programs.
Some will charge that to require Senate confirmation of the senior CIA officials outlined in S. 1003 is to politicize intelligence. If that is the case, then we should consider not subjecting CIA Directors and Deputy Directors to confirmation. Are there a majority of Senators prepared to recommend this? The confirmation process will do more to prevent the politicization of intelligence than to promote it. Further, as we all know, the confirmation process can only block the President from appointing a given individual; it cannot force the appointment of an individual with a particular viewpoint or loyalty preferred by the Congress.
The criticism is that the legislation, if enacted, would preempt the DCI from reorganizing to meet the future structural changes. S. 1003 does not establish new positions nor does it prevent the DCI from reorganizing and creating new positions. Today, over 40 positions at the Defense Department and 30 positions at the State Department require Senate confirmation.
Their ability to reorganize has not been barred by the confirmation process.
As Senator Glenn and I have stated in our `Dear Colleague' of October 2, 1991, intelligence activities are consistent with democratic principles only when they are conducted in accordance with the law and in an accountable manner to the American people through congressional oversight. We are convinced that the confirmation process is a constructive means of demanding accountability and enhancing public confidence in the senior leadership of the CIA.
In closing, I wish to give public thanks to Senator Glenn for the yeoman work he has conducted on this legislation. He has worked hard and tenaciously to bring it to the fore.
I urge support for its passage.
I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I note that the distinguished floor leader on this side is absent and I would suggest a brief quorum call perhaps to be equally divided, and we will try to move this right along shortly. So I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll, and without objection, it will be charged equally to both sides.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I think the Senator from Rhode Island would like 2 minutes on the subject. How much time remains on our side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 41 minutes, 29 seconds.
The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized for 2 minutes.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I think this is a very, very serious amendment. I think those who have listened have gotten an indication of the concern with which I view this amendment.
The principal problem I have with this amendment, Mr. President, is that I am absolutely convinced it will lead to politicization of the agency. It will mean that those who wish to get ahead within the agency--I am talking down in the lower levels, and let us particularly concentrate on what we call the intelligence section; namely, the analysts--those individuals who seek to get ahead are going to make certain that they trim their sails to the views of those who subsequently will have the political power to make the appointments; because to get ahead in the agency, it is going to require that an individual ingratiate himself with the powers that be on the political side, with the security advisers to the President, or with the President himself, or with those individuals in the White House who are going to control appointments.
To me this is a very, very dangerous proposition.
So, Mr. President, I believe the basic question before us this evening is what kind of an agency do we want? Do we want an agency that is subordinate to the wishes of the administration and will carry out the policies of the political leaders?
If that is what we want, then vote yes on the amendment.
But, Mr. President, if we want an intelligence agency that is independent and objective, that is going to give us the hard facts, tell it as it is, if we want an agency that is indeed faithful to its motto, `Ye shall seek the truth,' then, Mr. President, we should vote against this amendment.
Then, Mr. President, we should vote against this amendment. To me, it is that simple. For the amendment encourages politicization. To oppose the amendment is to encourage independence, objectivity, and the ability to tell it as it is. To me, it is that simple.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. GLENN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require.
Mr. President, I was interested in the remarks of Senator Cohen, who talked about our system of government, the way people view it from all over this country as being sort of bogged down, that we need people with authority, and we have a situation where leaders cannot lead. I am sure that Senator Cohen would not propose doing away with the advise-and-consent role that the Constitution gives to the Congress.
This is not like Goldwater-Nichols that he mentioned. This is not a reorganization of the CIA. It is very simple. What we have seen during the hearings with the Gates nomination are charges that perhaps there was `cooking of the books,' the worst sin in all of the intelligence community. That has been the charge.
Yet, we have a case where in the recent past, where a head of the CIA may have appointed people that were not qualified for either personal reasons, the friendship reasons, for political reasons, or whatever. That is all this is supposed to prevent. It is to make sure that under our separation of powers, our balance of powers, we have a role in this, as the Constitution provides.
Much was made out of the fact that every former Director of the CIA, or a number of the former Directors of the CIA, said they would not like this. They did not want to see this go in.
I repeat what I said a little while ago on the floor: Have you ever seen a manager, or the head of any department, that wanted any oversight over that person's authority and ability to do something? Yet, if that person is misguided, if that person has his own agenda, of his own ideological bent that he is trying to carry out, then great and grievous damage can be done to the United States of America.
All this does is try and say that we have our role to play in this, and the DO, DI, and the general counsel are extremely important positions, far more important than many that are in the confirmation process in other agencies or departments of Government.
It was mentioned that this might politicize people. We have such notables as Mr. McMahon and Bobby Inman, who have done such a superb job out there at the Agency. They went through the confirmation process and did not find themselves politicized. They did not find themselves being forced to carry out some preconceived administration position. Nor do I believe this amendment would force anyone to do that either.
I want to say one other word before we wind down here and go to our vote today. I have been cast in a light here today as perhaps someone who could be construed as being anti-CIA. Nothing could be further from the truth. I wanted to make that very clear before I yield the floor and yield back the time before the distinguished chairman of the committee has time to make his remarks.
I have been one of those on the committee who, when proposals
were made to cut back on the CIA budget, was the one that was fighting to keep the budget up there, because I believe we need the strongest intelligence community in the world, and we need it more now even than before. Before the demise of the Soviet Union, before we had the Persian Gulf situation, and before we started a pulldown of our military strength. We are reducing, over the next 4 years--we already started the process--494,000 people out of a 1.2 million person military. That is the regulars. I do not have any doubt that, in years hence, the Congress will require more pull down than that.
I submit that that is the time you need better intelligence, not less. I have fought in the committee to keep that intelligence budget up there, and I might have to admit that I lost, also. I wanted the budget this year to be higher than it is.
History is replete with examples of where we have pulled down the military and had to rebuild them again, and I pray along with everybody else that is not the case this time out; but if that is the case, and we have to rebuild, we had better do it from the best intelligence base and the best information we can have on what is going on around the world. We better do it with the most advanced warning system, which means good intelligence of who is developing what weapons, whether chemical, biological, nuclear, missiles, who is doing what around the world that we may not know, unless we have a strong intelligence community.
So I wanted to make sure that was on the record and stated very clearly, because I favor a stronger CIA, particularly when we are pulling down much of our military strength.
I believe this amendment strengthens the CIA, because it helps the Congress and the people to have a confidence that we do not have a rogue Director of the CIA, or a rogue top group out there. There are people that we will have had through the confirmation process that gives us more confidence in our ability to work with them. I did not want someone out there who is off running as a single entity, directing the Agency to that person's own ideology, nor do I want someone that is overly subordinate and supportive of the President, which has been the charge in the Gates hearings, that there was too much slanting of the intelligence information to support an administration's preconceived view.
What I am talking about is accountability for these three very important positions. That is the issue here. Our confirmation process says, as we follow it under the advise and consent of the Constitution, we follow it under all the separation of powers, that the confirmation process is about accountability. It is that simple.
That is the reason for this amendment. It is nothing else. It is not to weaken the CIA. It is to strengthen the CIA, in my view, because the CIA, with something like this in place, will have more believeability in their objectivity than would otherwise be the case. That is what this is all about.
I know the distinguished chairman desires some time to speak on this, and I am glad to yield.
[Page: S14817]
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Ohio, and I apologize for being absent from the floor during some of the debate.
When the Senator from Ohio first described his amendment to me, I must confess that I was not totally enthusiastic about it. My first reaction to it was that we do not want to get into the micromanagement of the Agency. We do not want to confirm too many people that we will deprive the Director of the Agency of the authority and the responsibility for picking good subordinates to carry out the key positions, the work of the key positions of the Agency, in a way that he will not be able to run it, since the Director ultimately is held accountable for the quality of the product.
Certainly, the experience that we have been through in other confirmation processes has not always been a happy one, as we have seen this past week. No one has been more outraged than I by what we have viewed in terms of the lack of responsibility of those who are part of the system. We do not yet know their identities, but whether it was a staff member, or a Senator, or whether it was someone associated with this institution who leaked information in the recent confirmation process of Judge Thomas, it must be determined.
We will not have met our responsibility to the American people until the identity of those parties is determined and until those people are held accountable, and to my way of thinking, if they are employees of this institution until their employment with this institution is terminated.
I am one of those who feels very strongly that the integrity of the confirmation process is so important that even if it takes outside help in terms of conducting an investigation to determine the parties responsible, it should be done. We felt very strongly about that in our committee. We adopted strong committee rules and made it clear we would dismiss staff members or ask members of the committee to step down if they were found responsible for leaking sensitive information without authorization of our committee.
So I understand that in some ways this perhaps is not the best moment of timing for the Senator from Ohio to present this amendment since all of us have just been through a process that did not work very well because at least in part of the irresponsibility apparently of someone associated with this institution that we all love and cherish and this institution which belongs to the American people. It would be easy, I suppose, having come through this experience, atypical as it is, to then take the point of view that we should start reducing rather than increasing the numbers of positions subject to Senate confirmation.
I think that would be a mistaken lesson from this process. This lesson is that the Senate should not have a part in advice and consenting to the nomination of people nominated for important posts--like membership on the Supreme Court of the United States, a lifetime appointment, or appointment to the directorship of the Central Intelligence Agency, sensitive as it is, operating very often in secret beyond the knowledge of most people in this country, subject only to scrutiny of a small number of people, primarily members of the two Intelligence Committees.
The lesson to be drawn from what we have been through is that not that we should do away with the advice-and-consent role set forth in the Constitution for the Senate of the United States. The lesson we should learn is we should do it much more effectively, much more carefully, and much more responsibly. Another lesson we should perhaps learn is that we need to take a look at reform of Congress as a whole as an institution.
And I think when we have committees with over 100 employees and staff members, that probably much of the work of committees, even offices, sometimes in an individual office, is turned over to those who have not been elected by the people and not directly accountable to them, that it is the mistake.
We need to look at the whole process. Whether or not we should have a good confirmation is not the issue here. Whether or not we wanted to give the Director of Central Intelligence Agency enough authority to run his agency or her agency as the case may be is not the issue here. The question is whether or not the positions that are described in the Glenn amendment are sensitive enough and important enough to merit the requirement that confirmation should be required.
When I first became chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I would have answered that question probably in the negative. It is enough for the Intelligence Committee to be involved and the Senate to be involved in the process of confirming the Director and the Deputy Director.
Over the years, because of problems that arose during the Iran-Contra affair, we all learned from our experience. We came to understand the importance of oversight, in terms of preventing the politicization of the intelligence community, in terms of even making certain that laws were not violated and that is why this body wisely decided to pass a statute which the President signed which set up an independent inspector general for the Central Intelligence Agency.
We decided that for that particular position to be assured of independence and objectivity it was important that the Senate act to confirm the person named as inspector general.
Over the last few months, and perhaps even more importantly, over the last few weeks, as we have dealt with the confirmation process as it relates to the nomination of Robert Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence, we have become even more sensitive to the fact that other positions within the agency are extremely important. If we spent billions and billions of dollars in the area of providing the equipment and personnel and other tools for the intelligence community only to have the intelligence product politicized or skewed to tell the policymakers what they want to hear, the integrity of the whole process is undermined. It does not take an expenditure of billions of dollars to simply write down on a sheet of paper what the policymakers already want to hear. We could certainly have saved a lot of money in the budget if that is all that was to that.
So the person who holds the position of Deputy Director for Intelligence holds the post of tremendous importance and sensitivity in terms of ensuring the integrity of the intelligence product.
Likewise, the Deputy Director for Operations, often called the spy master in the popular press, is also a position of immense responsibility.
When you look at the history of the Central Intelligence Agency and look at those moments that have been most embarrassing to the agency, most damaging to the United States, and our national security interests in terms of mistakes that have been made, most of them had to do with operations.
Whether we are talking about the mining of harbors in Nicaragua or other instances that have occurred in terms of mistakes being made in the past that have embarrassed this country, most of them related to operations.
There have also been a tremendous number of successes, and that always has been my frustration as chairman of the Intelligence Committee that by their very nature successes never become public and there are probably a hundred successes for every failure we know about that eventually finds its way into the media.
So I cite the failures not to show the importance of this position but I also could cite the successes as well to show the importance of the position of Director of Operations. It is absolutely essential that we have a good person in that position.
In 1981, that position was not a confirmable position, and we all remember that Mr. Casey at that time appointed a man Max Hugel at that position who was clearly disqualified for it and to his credit the then Deputy, one step below the Director of Operations, at that time Mr. Dick Stolz, decided to retire from the agency rather than continue to work in those circumstance. To the credit of Judge William Webster when he became the Director he asked Stolz to come out of retirement, a man who demonstrated tremendous personal integrity, a man later recognized to receive the National Intelligence Medal from the hand of the President of the United States agreed to come out of retirement and become Director of Operations again.
I can tell you that as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, knowing that a man of the character and ability of Mr. Stolz was the Director of Operations for the agency made me sleep a lot better at night and made me much more certain that I could look to the American people and tell them I thought all was well in that particular highly sensitive, very important division of the Central Intelligence Agency.
If the Director had been a different kind of person than Judge Webster and the President had been a different kind of man, if we had another situation where there was an attempt made to appoint someone like Mr. Casey's choice of Mr. Hugel there is simply no legal remedy to prevent such an appointment in the future short of confirmation by the Senate of the United States and scrutiny by the Intelligence Committees of the Congress.
Therefore, I have come to the conclusion, just as one individual--the other members of our committee who feel quite strongly to the contrary, and this is certainly not a matter that ought to be politicized. It is not a matter on which I would attempt to sway the vote of any other Senator. Senator Chafee has spoken on this issue. Senator Cohen who served as vice chairman for 4 years of our committee has spoken on this issue as have other members of the committee, people for whose judgment I have immense respect.
This is a very close question. There are very strong arguments on both sides and my only hope is that Members would think about it before they vote and will carefully weigh the arguments before they vote, and I think again it is not the kind of thing that I can say with great force and vehemence that I am sure that it is absolutely right and essential that this amendment be adopted.
But having thought about it, having lived with the experience of being chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and having been responsible for the effectiveness of the oversight process, and having realized how sensitive these positions are and what abuse can occur and what damage can be done to the interests of the United States if the wrong person occupies the position of being Deputy Director for Operation or Deputy Director for Intelligence of the CIA or general counsel because the general counsel often gives advice to the leaders of the agency about what the law is in terms of what is legal and illegal for the CIA to do, oftentimes out of public view, another very important position, I simply believe I would be more comfortable in the long run knowing that the committee and the Senate had an opportunity to at least make a judgment about the quality of the persons appointed to these three positions. It ought to be done with great care. The confirmation process should never be a circus. It should not be politicized.
Most Members of the Senate will not even recall that we had a public hearing on the confirmation of the inspector general or the current Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and that is the way most confirmation processes go on. There are over 60 key positions in the defense establishment that are confirmed by the Armed Services Committee, and when you consider the size of the intelligence operations in this country and you consider the budget of this operation, and the sensitivity of it, I do not believe it would be out of line to say that we should have six positions in the Central Intelligence Agency subject to Senate confirmation.
As I say, Mr. President, this is a matter upon which honest men and women may differ in their opinions. It is certainly a matter of which there is a difference of opinion between people I respect, people who have every bit as much experience in this field as I have. They come down on the other side.
But I intend to vote for the Glenn amendment because I think it is an important protection for the American people in an agency that has to operate out of the public view. And I think if we are to error on one side or the other of strengthening the oversight process, strengthening a check and balance system, since we are dealing with an agency whose budget is not out in the open, whose operations are not out in the open, who mainly act in secret, even with the kind of hearing we have had on the confirmation of Robert Gates, extraordinary hearings that have done more to educate the American public about the intelligence community than any other set of public hearings probably in the history of this country, still even with that kind of process and that kind of determination to have effective oversight that is shared in a very bipartisan way by the members of our committee, most of what the CIA does is still secret and will probably continue to be. And that is why if we are to error on one side or the other, let us error on the side of accountability, let us error on the side of making sure that we have enough checks in the system as opposed to too few.
I think that the Glenn amendment, as it has been modified to include only three positions, strikes that balance. I intend to vote for it myself. I do not intend to try to twist arms or influence the outcome of the vote on this amendment. It is something each Member should weigh very carefully. I just urge my colleagues to think about it in a very serious way--it is a substantial issue of importance--before they cast their votes.
I thank my colleague from Ohio for yielding to me and giving me the opportunity to share these brief thoughts about the amendment which he has put forward.
[Page: S14819]
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require.
I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee for his remarks and for his support for this amendment. I concur wholeheartedly with the remarks he made and the rationale behind them. I think they were very good.
Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today in strong opposition to the amendment by my distinguished colleague from Ohio to make additional Central Intelligence Agency positions subject to Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. I share my colleague's concerns about the operation of the CIA, but I believe that his amendment will cause more trouble than it will cure.
I understand that the committee has received a communication from the White House indicating that the President will be advised to veto S. 1539 if this amendment should become a part of this bill. In addition, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Richard J. Kerr, has written a letter to the chairman dated October 10, 1991, opposing this amendment.
As we are about to finish the committee's action on the nomination of Mr. Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence, we have fresh in our minds the problems associated with the confirmation process. This amendment would add the CIA's general counsel, Deputy Director for Operations, and Deputy Director for Intelligence to the three positions which are already subject to the confirmation process--the DCI, DDCI, and inspector general.
Having just completed a most thorough and painful review of internal Directorate of Intelligence disputes in the course of the Gates hearings, it is clear that the people of the United States, the U.S. Government as a whole, and the CIA would have little or nothing to gain from this amendment. In fact, this amendment would invite initiation of more internal disputes throughout the Agency, and would provide aid, comfort, and encouragement to the inception and growth of factions within the Agency.
Rather than curing the problems we found, I believe extending the confirmation process further will increase the risk of politicization of the organization and increase the chances that CIA analysis will be regarded as untrustworthy by policymakers. I want to make clear, in this regard, that politicization does not always come from the top. Sometimes, it grows from within when a particular faction resists, for whatever reason, legitimate management direction of its activities.
If a new DDI comes before the committee for confirmation, we will likely be faced with officers coming forward to attack the nominee. Extending the confirmation process to the DDI will just encourage the growth and entrenchment of factions in the CIA's analytic community in particular. If that happens, the effect on the CIA's written intelligence product will be strikingly negative.
Publicly airing the Directorate of Intelligence's internal disputes was troubling. The proposal to subject the Deputy Director of Operations to confirmation is simply impossible. It is impossible because of our responsibilities to conduct a fair and open confirmation process.
I believe we have an obligation to conduct as much of our government in public as possible. Accordingly, we should hold as much of our confirmation hearings in public as possible. I do not know how we do that with the DDO.
Mr. President, let me remind my colleagues that the Deputy Director of Operations at the CIA is in charge of the
most sensitive U.S. intelligence activities. Human lives literally hang in the balance on many decisions he has to make. Our most sensitive intelligence sources and methods are directly involved in the activities for which he is responsible.
I do not think we can meet our constitutional obligations to the people of the United States if too much of the confirmation process must be held behind closed doors. I want to remind my colleagues and the citizens who may be watching this floor debate on C-SPAN that the vast majority of the Gates hearings were held in public. I think that is very important.
I do not believe we could hold public hearings on the DDO, at least not in any meaningful way. Any serious, substantive questions would have to be asked and answered behind closed doors. Otherwise, the CIA would not be able to conduct its legal, authorized, and necessary activities.
Mr. President, let me turn for a moment to institutional considerations. Because of the necessarily secret nature of intelligence, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and our counterpart, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, have a more significant role in oversight of activities under their jurisdiction than have other committees of matters within their respective jurisdictions. Let me explain why.
In matters that are not secret, interested parties, the media, and citizens at large are able, if they choose to spend the time and effort to do so, to become very well informed on the facts and circumstances surrounding any public policy issue. They are then free to form conclusions and to advocate specific policy directions and choices. This large community of interested and informed people is a key element of successful oversight by other committees of activities under their respective jurisdictions.
This community of informed people is necessarily largely absent in secret intelligence matters. The two committees and their staffs must do what other committees do, but they must do it better. They must find out in detail what is going on and they must be able to form sound judgments on the information they gather, without much aid from public policy debates in the public arena that form the environment in which other oversight committees operate.
This situation has very strong implications for the way we do our business. It is essential that we sustain the trust and confidence of the people in the intelligence community in our oversight process.
If we extend the confirmation process to the DDO, the DDI, and the general counsel, we risk having partisan confirmation battles on an annual basis. Then, the President may choose to nominate people more on the basis of how their nominations will play with the committee and the Senate than on the basis of how well they will perform in the positions to which they have been nominated.
I believe that passage of this amendment would so seriously complicate our oversight process as to put it in danger of becoming ineffective. Nominees chosen to suit the confirmation process could alienate and factionalize the various professional communities within the CIA. Repeated partisan confirmation hearings run the clear risk of undermining and even destroying the cooperative nature of the intelligence oversight process on the committee itself. If that happens, we can anticipate even sharper conflicts between the executive and legislative branches over intelligence policy and operations, with potentially serious negative effects on our national security.
Mr. President, I hope my colleagues will agree with me that now is not the time to enact this amendment. I ask that they join with me in opposing this amendment.
[Page: S14820]
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, we have no one else on this side waiting to speak. I am prepared to yield back all time and go to a vote on this if the other side is willing to yield back time.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I concur with my friend from Ohio. We are willing to yield back the remainder of our time.
I would just like to reiterate the opposition that this side has to the Glenn amendment. We have heard the statements by Senator Danforth, Senator Hollings, Senator Chafee, Senator Cohen. I think I can best, in summary, say, `If it's not broke, don't fix it.'
With that, I, too, yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield back my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time on the amendment has been yielded back.
Mr. GLENN. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is time remaining on the bill under the control of the ranking member, as I understand it.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I know I have no time remaining. I might suggest to my colleague that he could yield back the remainder of his time on the bill, so that, immediately after the vote on the amendment--I do not anticipate that there will be a rollcall on final passage unless someone makes that request.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I do not think we should at this time suggest that there will not be a rollcall on final passage. I would prefer to hold back on that if we might.
Mr. BOREN. Perhaps I might ask my colleague to just reserve his time on the bill until after the vote occurs on this amendment. Because if indeed there is a request for a rollcall vote, there might be a need for final debate before the passage of the bill.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. The Senator from Alaska would concur.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the time on the bill will be reserved until after the vote on this amendment.
The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Glenn]. The yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor], and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Wofford] are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Wellstone). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber who desire to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 38, nays 59, as follows:
So the amendment (No. 1258) was rejected.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I am advised by the managers that no Senator has requested a rollcall vote on final passage. If that is the case, then I am advised by the managers that they can proceed promptly to complete action on the bill by voice vote. Therefore, the vote just having occurred will have been the last roll call vote of the day. I take the current lack of response to mean that no Senator does request a rollcall vote.
Accordingly, Mr. President, unless someone does so at the last moment, the managers can now proceed to complete action on the bill by voice vote, and there will be no further rollcall votes this evening.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, the majority leader is correct. I know of no one asking for a rollcall vote at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ranking member of the committee has 15 minutes left on the bill.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, we on this side yield back the remainder of our time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time on the bill has been yielded back. The question is on the engrossment and the third reading of the bill.
The bill (S. 1539) was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read the third time.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 2038 and that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of H.R. 2038, the companion bill to S. 1539; that all after the enacting clause be stricken, and that the text of S. 1539, as amended, be inserted in lieu thereof and that the bill be considered read three times.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The bill having been deemed read the third time, the question is, Shall the bill pass?
So the bill (H.R. 2038), as amended, was passed.
[Page: S14821]
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. BOREN. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate insist on its amendments, request a conference with the House, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees on the part of the Senate.
There being no objection, the Presiding Officer [Mr. Wellstone] appointed Mr. Boren, Mr. Nunn, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Bradley, Mr. Cranston, Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Metzenbaum, Mr. Glenn, Mr. Murkowski, Mr. Warner, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Danforth, Mr. Rudman, Mr. Gorton, Mr. Chafee, and from the Committee on Armed Services, Mr. Exon, and Mr. Thurmond, conferees on the part of the Senate.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that S. 1539 be indefinitely postponed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I thank all of my colleagues for their interest in this piece of legislation. I particularly thank the members of the Intelligence Committee who have labored long and hard to produce this legislation.
As I have indicated, in many ways it is a landmark piece of legislation. It includes in it the first major new national security education initiative for more than two decades, since the passage and implementation of the National Defense Education Act, following the launching of Sputnik by the Soviet Union. It will provide for the first time grants for college undergraduates to study overseas to learn about other cultures, to learn other languages. It will provide grants to colleges and universities to increase courses and improve curriculum
in international studies, area studies, foreign studies. It will also provide grants in these fields to those who agree to spend some time in Government service after they receive those graduate degrees.
It helps enhance the human source base and talent of this country in fields that are critical to the national interest, not only to our security, as most broadly and realistically defined, but also for the economic and social strength of this country as well, as we enter a new and very much more international environment, as we approach the next century.
It is also a bill that begins the process, which will rapidly accelerate by next year, to change the budgetary priorities within the intelligence field. It continues the initiative of our committee commenced over 2 years ago to rebuild the human source intelligence capability in the intelligence community, the kind of strengths that are going to be badly needed in a new world environment in which regional conflicts rank high as a risk to this country, where we will need earlier warning of the intentions of potential adversaries so that we will not only have the ability of forceful intervention such as after the invasion of Kuwait, but we can have early knowledge of possible intentions such as those of Saddam Hussein who might threaten our interests, and be able to take other actions short of war to deter aggression in advance, also to penetrate terrorist cells and those trafficking in narcotics and those responsible for the proliferation of weapons, nuclear, chemical, and biological. All of these kinds of challenges.
In addition, the challenge of economic information to combat theft of our economic secrets in the counterintelligence field and to make sure we have a level playing field in terms of the actions of other governments, so that we can compete in the international economy on a fair basis.
All of these areas will demand an improvement in our human source intelligence capability, and this legislation moves us in the right direction in terms of putting more emphasis, a greater budgetary priority on that kind of skill and on that kind of resource.
I thank my colleague, the vice chairman, especially for his leadership in assisting the committee and preparing this legislation. I thank the majority staff director, Mr. George Tenet and the minority staff director, Mr. John Moseman. As I have said many times, these are the only two persons of our committee staff designated as majority and minority. We have a totally unified staff. We do not have a majority and a minority staff. Uniquely, as a committee, we have an American staff. I do not even know the political affiliation of most of the staff members. It is an example I hope perhaps will be taken up by others in the Senate in other areas of jurisdiction because we must find ways to work together more closely and the members of our committee try to do that. As chairman and vice chairman, Senator Murkowski and I try do that. Mr. Tenet and Mr. Moseman set an admirable example to the rest of staff in terms of their own cooperative, bipartisan approach.
Among the other members of the staff I particularly want to thank our general counsel, Mr. Britt Snider; Regina Genton, Gary Sojka, Terry Ryan, Mary Sturtevant, Jim Martin, John Eliff, Chris Straub, Chris Mellon, David Garman, Don Mitchell, Ed Levine, Mr. Keith Hall, who for many years was the budget director of our staff, who is now serving as deputy secretary for intelligence at the Department of Defense, and many other members of the staff that I could mention on this occasion who have given important support to us in preparing this legislation. They have my deep appreciation and they have made a real contribution to their country in the process of working on this legislation.
I also thank my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee and on the Appropriations Committee. Senator Byrd and his committee have been extremely cooperative with us in terms of tracking the anticipated language in our authorization bill and their appropriations bill. They have been fully supportive, enthusiastically supportive of the new directions we are taking in intelligence, of this important education initiative, and I thank my colleague from West Virginia and those who serve with him on the Appropriations Committee.
I also thank my colleagues, Senator Nunn and the ranking member, Senator Warner, on the Armed Services Committee likewise for their cooperation with us. The work on this bill has been a model of cooperation, not only between the two parties, as we have been virtually unanimous in our deliberations in the intelligence committee, Democrats and Republicans alike, it has also been a model of cooperation between committees of the Senate, especially the Intelligence Committee, the Appropriations Committee, and the Armed Services Committee. I thank all of my colleagues who have been an important part of this process and who have contributed so much to it.
I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
Mr. MURKOWSKI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair. I will not duplicate the remarks of the chairman other than to add in the case of one of the staff members, Mr. Keith Hall, who has moved to the Department of Defense. He was our budget officer. We wish him well in his new responsibility.
I think the chairman has adequately recognized all of the fine work of our staff on both sides and, needless to say, we expect that caliber of work to continue and perhaps even excel, and with a little more praise, why, perhaps that would be accomplished.
But seriously speaking, Mr. President, it has been a pleasure to work with the chairman and the members of the committee as well. I think that we function in a responsible manner and with dispatch, and with that last word I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
[Page: S14822]
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is my pleasure to serve as a member of this committee with our distinguished chairman and distinguished ranking member. As the chairman and the ranking member pointed out, we have a very close working relationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee, on which I am also privileged to serve.
I am confident that the work of our committee reflects not only the charter that we have but also the goals that we have set under the new leadership in this committee. I pay my respects to our chairman and distinguished ranking member for seeing us through some troubled waters this past year, in laying the foundation for what I hope will be a very effective and, I think, Mr. President, necessary reorganization of the Central Intelligence Agency and other aspects of our overall intelligence network.
I look forward to the coming year and working with my distinguished chairman and ranking member.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I want to thank my colleague from Virginia, Senator Warner, and of course my colleague, Senator Murkowski, the vice chairman, for the kind remarks which they have made.
As I indicated a moment ago I really believe that the cooperation not only in a bipartisan sense within our committee but the special cooperation that we have had with the Armed Services Committee, the leadership of Senator Warner and Senator Nunn, has really been to the benefit of this country and will enable us I think in the years ahead to make the changes that are going to be necessary.
We built the foundation, as the Senator from Virginia has said. We have already charted a new course. We have set new priorities. We are beginning to move in that direction. We made important progress on this bill, and it really is the building block upon which we can make truly major changes in a constructive way next year. I want to thank him for his words, and certainly for the immense contribution that he has made to this process personally.
Mr. SEYMOUR. Mr. President, in the wake of the way that the U.S. Senate has handled--or I should say mishandled--the nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas, one of the tasks we have before us is how we repair the confirmation process that has clearly broken down.
Mr. President, today, I am proposing the first step in bringing some sense of order and fairness into the way the Senate conducts itself on the confirmation of nominees. I am submitting for the record the text of an amendment that calls on the FBI to undertake an investigation of the leak of the FBI report from the Senate Judiciary Committee concerning Prof. Anita Hill's allegations.
If states that the FBI will have authority to subpoena the attendance of witnesses and all relevant documentation pertaining to this leak. It also requires the FBI to submit its report to Congress no later than 30 days after the enactment of this act. It is simple. It is straightforward. And it is intended to clean out the stench that today hangs over this highest elected body in our country.
I want to put my colleagues on notice that I intend to offer this amendment to bills that the Senate will be considering in the coming days. And I sincerely hope that when that happens, we will have support on both sides of the aisle. Because it is not just the reputation and credibility of my Democrat colleagues that has been tarnished by this episode. It is not just the reputation and credibility of my Republican colleagues either. It is the credibility of this institution--the U.S. Senate--that has suffered as a result of this national disgrace.
Mr. President, I am circulating a letter to all Senators today on this matter, and I urge them to review it and join with us in supporting this amendment.
One of the things that the American people have complained about in this whole ordeal is that the process is out of order. And they have a clear understanding of what the new rules of the game appear to be. If a nominee can't be challenged on his or her views or opinions, then he or she can be torpedoed, can be defamed, can have their character besmirched and dragged through the public sewer. And all of this by the deliberate and calculated leaking of information, with the clear intent of creating an ethical cloud that's sufficient to sway some votes.
Now, there's been a lot of talk around this town that `well, everyone leaks.' `It's just the way things are done.' `You can't stop people from leaking.' `It's normal.' But what happened over the past week and a half is anything but normal.
We've heard it a lot these past few days, but it bears repeating today: FBI reports contain raw, unsubstantiated, confidential allegations. Without investigation, the charges are inconclusive. Left unsubstantiated, they can be damning. Leaked, they are damning, and they can permanently destroy a person's reputation.
As Senator Danforth reminded us last week and again today, leaking an FBI file is not a trivial matter. It is an extremely serious violation of Senate rules. It subjects a Member of the Senate to expulsion from this body. It subjects a staff member of the Senate to termination.
It's one of the main reasons why the American people are so outraged with what has gone on here the past 10 days. If you doubt it, just look at the polls that are in the newspapers and the news magazines. The vast majority believe that we are incapable of conducting the business of confirming nominees in a fair and responsible manner.
That is what we witnessed when the FBI report containing Professor Hill's allegations was leaked. It has caused severe and lasting damage to Judge Thomas, to Professor Hill, and to the Senate. Everybody looks bad because of the reckless action that was taken when this document was leaked. It is unfair, it is unjust, it is unconscionable, and it cannot be permitted to go on. We must do all that we can to ensure that in the future, no human being again goes through what Professor Hill and Judge Thomas were forced to endure.
That's why I will be offering this amendment in the coming days. It begins the process of repairing the damage that this entire episode has created. And it will send a message to the American people that we take this matter, very, very seriously, and that we will not tolerate it in the future.
Now that the vote has been taken on Judge Thomas' nomination, the question people are now asking is: What can we do to get our house back in order. This FBI investigation is the first step in that process, and I hope that my colleagues will join with me in working for its swift approval.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I want to join my colleague from California in his efforts to raise what I think is a very important question before this body. The long ordeal which we have just been through here with the Thomas nomination is over, I think much of the relief of the Senate, and certainly to the relief of the American people.
It is not my intention to rehash that debate this evening, but I want to join my colleague from California in raising an issue that I think is unresolved. It is very troubling, and that deserves the Senate's attention.
What we have just completed can only be described as a cheap melodrama. We have conducted our constitutional duties with a decorum of a Phil Donahue Show or Oprah Winfrey Show. We have been trading in allegation and innuendo, and we have decisively and unfortunately rejected the long history of careful deliberation in the nomination process.
There is going to be a great tendency around here to think that is behind us, that is done, let us just put it aside, and everybody will forget about it.
The Members of the Senate may forget about it, or at least want to forget about it, but the American public will not and has not. The process is broken. And our continued participation in it dignifies what I think many consider a sham.
So we are presented with a pretty stark choice. We can either pursue change, pursue reform, or we can further allow further damage to what has been a very badly damaged body.
Mr. President, from discussions with Senators on both sides of the aisle, I know that this is a frustration that is just not reserved to one party, but I think it is essential that our discontent be transformed into a constructive reform effort. I am not exactly sure what final shape this reform effort should take but I think we have some ideas about the direction it ought to go.
First, I think we need to establish clearly a process where the standards of our judgment are clear before we reach conclusions. We have to have some procedural firewalls that prevent lurid allegations from becoming media events and dominating our deliberations. In the case of Clarence Thomas the accusations were both very late and very public, and smelled of obvious political manipulation.
Surely there is some middle ground here, a middle ground where the charges come early enough to be examined, where a committee is trusted to determine which charges are serious enough to merit sustained attention, and where the ploys of ideologs are banished and fair rules of evidence are applied. Without a context for our deliberations with set procedures the nomination process can quickly degenerate from hearing, to inquisition, to character assassination.
Second, we can no longer allow Senate staff to destroy the credibility of this process with unethical and illegal leaks. Staff are not paid by the public to serve a personal political agenda at the expense of this institution and its deliberations or as opposed to what the American people expect of us. In the case of Clarence Thomas it is clear to me that staff has exhibited an exaggerated sense of power and a very deficient sense of mission. It is unvarnished arrogance. And I am convinced that those who are responsible have to be held accountable.
So I support the efforts of my colleague from California to request an FBI investigation into what has taken place, and then the Senate after reviewing that can determine what action we ought to take.
Why do we need a fair, predictable, regular process? Because reputations are valued and allegations are cheap. Something is badly wrong when it becomes this easy to discredit or ruin a nominee, and when it becomes this difficult to find out the truth.
When Senate decisions or nominations are made on the weight of allegations and not on the weight of evidence, the potential for abuse is enormous, and the sifting of evidence requires a process with predictable standards of judgment. We demand it in the Court, and we should expect it in a confirmation. Without this, the Senate is going to be subjected to continuing tyranny, the tyranny of scheming staffers, of last-minute allegations, tyranny of being driven by every media tempest, the tyranny of self-doubt, knowing in the end that we have not been fair, or just, or true to the standards that we ought to be exercising.
So I hope the Senate will join Senator Seymour and I and others in reexamining the process that is deeply flawed. We owe it to good men and good women who seek to serve this Nation. We owe it to the future of this institution.
In the final analysis, we must make changes so that posterity may know we have not loosely through silence permitted the things to pass away as in a dream.'
That was a statement by Richard Hooker, and I think it is a statement that this Senate ought to take very, very seriously.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
[Page: S14823]
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, tomorrow when the distinguished Senator from California offers his amendment demanding an FBI investigation of those factors surrounding the Clarence Thomas nomination that had to do with the breach of Senate rules and breach of confidence, I am going to be proud to join him in that process.
I want to make it clear that there is a problem. We have had speculation now around here for several weeks as to what all this has done to the reputation of Clarence Thomas or Anita Hill. My guess is if you did a poll tonight on reputations, and you included the Senate, that they would both outpoll us. We have an opportunity to do something about it.
What the distinguished Senator from California is going to do is offer an amendment calling for an independent investigation centered outside the Senate by the FBI to gather the facts as to what happened, how Senate rules were violated, and how we had a breach of trust and confidence.
I think it is vitally important that we adopt that amendment. Let me make it clear that the amendment is going to be offered on the first bill that comes along, and it is going to be offered over and over and over again until, finally, we have an opportunity to vote on it.
I know the American people are for it. I hope the majority of the Members of the Senate are for it.
Mr. BROWN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I will join my colleague from California in this effort. I think one of the untold stories is how Anita Hill was mistreated by the U.S. Senate. The simple facts are these:
First of all, she was assured by Senate staff that there were rumors circulating about sexual harassment at the EEOC and an implication was made that they involved her. In effect, they urged her to make a statement to protect against the rumors that they said were circulating. The tragedy of this is that the story they told her was untrue.
Second, there is a report that those staffers, who the committee declined to question, assured Anita Hill that if she would simply sign the affidavit, it was quite likely that Judge Thomas would withdraw his nomination, and the matter would be settled. That was obviously untrue, as well.
Third, Anita Hill was assured by those people that her affidavit and her statement would be treated in confidence. The simple fact is that that was untrue, as well. A witness came forward to provide the U.S. Senate with vitally needed information, whether you favored Clarence Thomas or opposed him, and the simple fact is that this was relative information, and it was significant information. That witness, who put her faith in the U.S. Senate, was let down by this body in a direct violation of our rules.
The simple fact is that we, as a body, cannot afford to simply ignore the rules that we have passed. We either ought to amend the rules, or we ought to abandon the commitment to keep some communications in confidence, or we ought to enforce them. I see this as an essential ingredient in saying to the American people that we intend to stand by the rules we passed. It is a commitment of honor.
I believe and hope this body will stand behind the initiative of the Senator from California.
Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, on Tuesday last, as the Senate went in recess, pending the final hearings on the Supreme Court nominee's case, I was here on the floor, because by then we were aware of the fact that the rules of the U.S. Senate had been violated and that a breach of confidence had occurred. I said then--and I do not repeat in exact words--that we cannot let this happen if we expect our rules to mean anything. Frankly, if you have U.S. Senate rules that do not mean anything, you probably do not have much of a Senate.
So that night, as forcibly as I could, I suggested that while the proceedings might go on, the U.S. Senate ought to undertake some way to find out who breached the confidence. It had to be a Senator, or a staff person either of the committee, or of one of the committees that a staffer might have shared it with.
Frankly, I compliment the Senator from California, and I will be on his amendment. If it were a bill, I would be on it, because it probably is a simple and, if properly worded, ingenious way to get reliable, trustworthy third parties who do not breach their confidences but have the authority, if the U.S. Senate says, by law, we want you to do this, then they will have all of their authority. And I believe there is a reasonable chance that they will succeed.
On the other hand, if there is not a reasonable chance, it is better by anything we have by way of our committee structure, because it has never worked with this kind of a breach of confidence.
So I say that the Senator from California may be new to the Senate, but he has more than a new idea here tonight. He has one that will work. It is simple, straightforward, and to the point. Once a few words are added to it to make sure everybody understands what they are doing, I think it can have a timeframe to it and get done rather quickly. Frankly, there are a lot of ways to make sure that every single staff person is subjected to the inquiries and subjected in such a way that they would be vulnerable to our rules if, in fact, it is ascertained that they do not cooperate, or that they were the culprit in these breaches of confidential information.
I agree with the Senator from Colorado that the thing that is lost in all of this is that Anita Hill was given some very, very strong what I consider confidential information assurances that I believe might have been part of her reasons for giving her statement. She found shortly thereafter that it meant almost nothing. I just do not believe that is the way the U.S. Senate ought to leave this matter. We ought to at least try, even if we do not succeed, to get to the bottom of it. If nothing else, tonight's words might suggest to somebody around here--if not in this building, maybe in one of the three where we house people, or to the ones that did it--that they ought to be careful, because this time the Senate is going to try to find out who they are.
I yield the floor.
[Page: S14824]
Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from California for the amendment which has been described here on the floor of the Senate in the last few moments and indicate my wholehearted support for that, and I will ask that I be added as a cosponsor when it is subsequently added.
I might say, Mr. President, that the Senator from California is right on the mark. The first problem before us is to figure out what happened in the case of the leak of the information provided by Anita Hill.
Beyond that, Mr. President, it is a question of the future. What the Congress has done so often in the past is exempted itself from legislation applying to everybody else. There are two pieces of legislation, Mr. President, that makes it a crime to leak FBI reports--the Privacy Act and another piece of legislation. What Congress has essentially done is exempt itself from the operation of this statute so that for anybody else in the Federal Government to leak an FBI report is a crime. For a Member of the Senate or a Senate staffer to do, it is not a crime, apparently, but simply a violation of Senate rules.
So, at the appropriate time, I will be offering an amendment on some vehicle dealing with the broader problems of how we deal with this in the future. It seems to me that it is quite simple. The Congress and Members of Congress, all staff, should not be exempt from the criminal laws of this country. It is a crime for an FBI agent to leak an FBI report to the press, and it ought to be a crime for a Senator, or a Senate staffer, to do it.
So I commend the Senator from California for his approach to getting at the problem that has already occurred. but in addition to that, Mr. President, we need to deal with the problem as it may occur in the future, because this is not the first time we have had an FBI report leak out of this body. The Congress should not be treated any differently from any other person in America when it comes to the criminal laws of this country. So there are two ways of getting at the problem.
As I said, I commend the Senator from California for his approach. I, too, will be offering an amendment along the lines I just suggested to legislation coming down the pike in the next few weeks.
Mr. MURKOWSKI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I will join my colleague from California as a cosponsor of his amendment. The Senator from Alaska came back for the proposed vote a week ago Tuesday, and prior to that vote, after about 10 hours on the airplane, I went in and read the FBI report, and the accompanying report that Professor Hill had provided that was attached to it. And after reading the periodicals, the newspapers, watching television, and so forth, on the way down, I was struck by the reality that the trust of the Senate had been broken, and certainly the rights of Anita Hill had been violated by this body directly and indirectly through its agents.
I was struck by the significance of that because I felt it was a credibility, if you will, of the Senate itself that had been violated.
I think that, in the last 11 years the Senator from Alaska has been here, we have had leaks in this body before. There has been talk about manner of redress but we have not followed up on it for reasons that I am still a bit perplexed about. So I think there is a frustration now. We have seen this leak of the FBI report.
This is a body that operates under rules, otherwise we will have chaos and, as a consequence, the American public will show its frustration, as it should.
So I think that we are approaching this in a responsible manner. I would hope that we would approach it in a bipartisan manner. I think that we certainly owe it to people who come forward, whether they are asked or come forward voluntarily, and have the assurance from this body or its agents that they will remain confidential. When, through leaks in this body, that confidentiality is broken, it is clearly a case of their rights being violated.
I would only offer one bit of advice to my colleague from California, that I would hope that the special investigator, if indeed it goes that route, does not follow the course of the special investigator in the Iran-Contra affair which has been going on since 1987; and I know my colleague, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, could wish that as well.
So with that observation, Mr. President, I think we are about ready to go into wrap-up.
I will defer to my colleague, the Senator from Oklahoma, and my good friend, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I have been listening with great interest to my colleagues who have been discussing the problem of leaks during the Thomas confirmation process and, as I have indicated earlier, it is a matter about which I have very strong feelings. I also believe we must have a complete investigation of this matter. It strikes at the heart of the integrity of this institution and the confirmation process.
Many people have been damaged as a result, including both Judge Thomas and Professor Hill. I think we have a responsibility not to rest until those who have been responsible for this leak are determined and are held accountable for it and held responsible for it. As I said, if I had my way, the very smallest amount of accountability that would occur would be that they would be immediately terminated as employees of this institution. I think that is the least that should be done. I could not feel about it more strongly.
I also indicated we followed this kind of process in our committee. I am proud of the fact that in the Intelligence Committee we have established I believe over the past 5 years a very good record in terms of stopping the leaking of sensitive information. We do not even allow Members to take sensitive reports and classified information out of our space.
Most recently, in terms of the Gates confirmation process, we have not allowed staff members to look at FBI reports; Members only will have looked at those reports. And they have never been able to look at those reports except in the presence of agents of the FBI who have been instructed to stay with the documents, the phone calls, or any other matter in the reports, the reading of the reports; the agent has maintained custody of the reports at all times, and also custody of any notes or records that Members might take as they are reading the reports.
So I feel very, very strongly, as do my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who have spoken about it. I talked with the distinguished majority leader, Senator Mitchell, about it. He made comments on the floor about his view. And he shares that strong determination to bring those responsible for this act to justice. He also shares the determination that we build discipline back into this institution and to all the operations of all the committees of this institution. And so I think it would be only appropriate, as he suggested, that we not simply investigate this one matter, but that we also adopt a systematic approach, generic approach, establishing a right framework of rules and right enforcement procedures that will assure that we have some accountability and this discipline built back into the entire process.
There is no difference of opinion on the two sides of the aisle about that matter, and I commend my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Maine, the majority leader, for the leadership which he has already taken.
We have had a very tragic affair, one that has tarnished the reputation of this institution and I think quite probably tarnished the reputation of many.
I am not one of those who cannot understand why the public is angry about what they have seen. I understand why they are angry. I think they have every right to be angry. I think Professor Hill has every right to be angry. I think Judge Thomas had every right to make the comments that he made about the way he had been treated by the Senate of the United States--or more appropriately, not by the Senate of the United States, but by whomever was responsible for that leak. He was victimized. The members of the committee themselves were victimized, and this institution has been victimized and suffered as a result.
But I think we should view this not as one incident to be dealt with but as a general problem that must be dealt with, a cancer eating away at the reputation of this institution.
The use of leaks--and it occurs, I might sadly say, in the legislative branch; it occurs in the executive branch as well, for those who lose internal debates within the executive branch also leak information as a way of getting their way if they cannot prevail in terms of internal arguments. That happens all too often in this city. It is a matter that needs to be addressed by those in public office and addressed by members of the media who need to set professional standards for themselves as well, and to think long and hard about whether or not it is appropriate for them to be used by people with their own political agendas to distort the integrity of a process.
I do not say that to point the blame at the media. All I say is that we have a problem that is a real serious problem and involves individuals and interest groups with their own agendas. It involves the Congress of the United States and involves the journalistic community. It involves many of us in this country, and we have to do something about it.
Senator Danforth once said in the course of this debate that we had gotten into a political climate in this country where it is not enough to beat someone, it is enough to beat them on an issue, it is not enough to have a political triumph; we have the kind of mean-spirited politics now developing where the destruction of the individual is now the accepted means of getting a desired political result.
Nothing is worse than that. Nothing will do more to undermine the public confidence in our Government. Nothing will do more to undermine the moral authority of our Government, or to undermine and tear apart the social fabric of this country than that kind of mean-spirited action that any means is justified by the ends, even the destruction of individuals who are entitled to respect and the treatment of dignity that should be accorded to any individual, the presumption of innocence of individuals, the right of privacy of individuals.
A terrible thing has happened. It has affected many individuals, in fact, on both sides of this issue involved in the Thomas confirmation. It is a sad day. But hopefully from what has happened we will learn some lessons and we will, all of us together, without regard to partisan difference, all of us together will decide to do something to start curing this sickness in our system and in our society, and work together to do it.
Another discouraging element of the division and divisiveness which has occurred is that we have divided people along party lines--some agreed we have been divided by race, divided by gender--at the very time in which our country faces immense challenge. And the only way that we are going to rise to these challenges, the only way we are going to get the country ready for the next century to rebuild the spirit of community in this country is when we stop thinking of ourselves as Democrat or Republican, male or female, members of one racial
group or another and start to understand we are part of one American family and that each person in this American family is entitled to respect and fair treatment, and that no one political agenda, no one political agenda on the right or the left justifies inhuman treatment of people, of individuals. We have too much of that in this community.
As I said when we began the confirmation process related to Mr. Gates to be Director of CIA, I was determined that process would be one aimed at weighing the qualifications of an individual person, a human being, with children and parents and a spouse and neighbors and friends, whose reputation, whose respect for his own personal reputation he values. Every person who comes into a confirmation process or involves himself or herself in the political process is entitled to that respect and entitled not to be treated as a pawn in a political chess game as some symbol for some political issue. And that is sadly what we have seen again and again and again; people, whether they are on the right or the left, Democrats or Republicans, male or female, not being treated as individuals but being treated as pawns in a political chess game that has become more and more mean-spirited with lower and lower standards of personal integrity and less and less responsibility being exercised by those who are part of the process, even some of those in this institution and employees of this institution.
And it has to stop. It should be stopped and it should be dealt with in a systematic way, not isolated to this issue alone and this case alone.
But let us work together in a bipartisan way to find a system of appropriate rules and appropriate enforcement, an investigative mechanism to deal not only with the Thomas affair but also with other leaks that have occurred in the past or those that might occur in the future, so that we will create a climate in the entire Senate, as we have tried to create in the Intelligence Committee, with some level of success; not perfect success by any means, because I still find myself very frustrated by some of the things that happen even in the course of our progress. But at least we have made some progress in changing the climate. We must try to do that across the board in this institution.
I join in expressing my concern with my colleagues across the aisles. I want to assure them that I now have spoken with the majority leader, having heard his words on the floor that it is a concern that he shares. It is a matter of deep conviction with him and absolute sincerity with him. I know that he, along with the distinguished Republican leader and others, will be getting together to work for a solution, not to score a political point on this matter, not to score some partisan advantage on this matter, but to find a constructive solution to a very, very real problem.
Mr. President, one of these days we are going to have to get on to the broader tasks of reforming this institution. The distinguished Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Domenici] and I have joined with Congressman Hamilton and Congressman Gradison on the House side in calling for a new commission along the line of the Monroney-LaFollette Commission, which helped to organize Congress in 1947.
There is so much work to be done. We have gone from 38 committees to 310 committees and subcommittees. Staff has mushroomed all out of control. Procedures have become unmanageable. We have campaigns that are tainted in a way, giving aid and advantage to incumbents.
One of these days, and it is not going to be far off, the American people in utter frustration are going to say: Those people are never going to reform themselves. Those people are never going to reform their institution. We will have to turn
to the radical solutions of term limitations to do it.
That is going to happen. There is not going to be a long pause before this movement really takes off. We are going to be voting on it in the State of Washington in just another month. That will be the next sign of the outrage of the American people.
And I might say I felt it myself. I have never felt such disappointment in this institution as I have felt during the last week. And on leaving this city over the weekend, I got on the airplane and someone turned to me and said, `Aren't you a Member of the Senate?'
And looking at the reaction of the other people sitting on the airplane looking at me, you would have thought I had just been accused of a criminal act. It brought home to me the deep feelings of alienation that exist in the country. And what a tragedy, what a tragedy it is, not just for the Senate but for the country, because something is badly wrong if the people cannot believe in their own Government.
Let me say I think we roundly deserve a lot of criticism that we are now getting as an institution. Let us not wait. The time is now to have hearings on our proposal to reassert a Monroney-LaFollette type effort as we had in 1947, not only to look at the problem of the confirmation process, not only to look at leaks in this institution, but again to look at restoring the basic health and functioning of this institution.
It needs to be done. The public is ready for it. The time is right for it. And we should begin with it.
Mr. President, I do not want to keep my colleagues here any longer. I know that all of us share the same frustration. I know all of us feel the same disappointment and personal hurt from what has happened during this past week. And now we just all have to go to work in a very positive and constructive way and set things right. That is the challenge that is before us.
It is now time to stop the gnashing of teeth. It is the time for healing, but more than anything else, it is the time to start in a constructive way to regain--and merit regaining--the confidence of the American people in this institution and in our political process.
[Page: S14826]
END