[Page: H4239]
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 169 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2038) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1992 for the intelligence activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and the first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and which shall not exceed one hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule, by title instead of by section, and each title shall be considered as having been read. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] is recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, for the purposes of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purposes of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 169 is the rule providing for the consideration of H.R. 2038, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1992. This is an open rule, providing for 1 hour of general debate to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and the ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
The rule provides that the bill shall be considered by title instead of by section, with each title considered as having been read.
Finally, the bill provides for one motion to recommit.
Mr. Speaker, the bill for which the Rules Committee has recommended this rule, H.R. 2038, authorizes funding for the Central Intelligence Agency and other United States
intelligence agencies and intelligence-related activities. The bill also provides for some consolidation of intelligence activities, sets ceilings for personnel, and substantially increases funds for intelligence agency foreign language programs.
The amounts provided for the activities authorized by H.R. 2038 are contained in a classified annex to the bill, available to Members for viewing in room H-405.
Mr. Speaker, to repeat: House Resolution 169 is a simple open rule; any germane amendment is in order. I urge adoption of this rule so that the House can proceed to consideration of this important measure.
[Page: H4240]
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I have no requests for time, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 169 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2038.
The Chair appoints the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. Slaughter] as chairman of the Committee of the Whole and asks the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] to assume the chair temporarily.
[Page: H4241]
[TIME: 1355]
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2038), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1992 for intelligence activities of the U.S. Government, the intelligence community staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. Beilenson (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2038, the Intelligence Autorization Act for fiscal year 1992.
H.R. 2038 authorizes all of the funds for the coming fiscal year for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government. The term intelligence activities includes all of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligency Agency, and the National Security Agency; as well as the activities of other intelligence components of the Department of Defense and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Included as well are the activities of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the intelligence division at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, intelligence elements of the Departments of the Treasury and Energy, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the intelligence community staff of the Director of Central Intelligence. These activities provide intelligence for the use of national leaders like the President, the Cabinet, the National Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This legislation also authorizes the tactical intelligence and related activities programs of the Department of Defense which have as their primary responsibility the provision of intelligence to military commanders, but which may be tasked, particularly in peacetime, for national intelligence purposes. The similarity of programs and functions between the national intelligence programs and the intelligence related activities of the Department of Defense is the reason that both are considered by the Intelligence Committee and authorized in this bill. The sequential referral of the bill to the Committee on Armed Services ensures that the judgments we have made are sound from the standpoint of both intelligence and military perspectives. On behalf of the Intelligence Committee, I want to extend my appreciation to the members and staff of the Committee on Armed Services for their assistance in our work.
Most intelligence activities are cloaked in a mantle of secrecy, and necessarily so. In some cases, the very existence of programs or activities is highly classified, and the ability to discuss them in an open setting such as this is therefore extremely limited. Those programs and activities are, however, set forth in a classified schedule of authorizations, which is incorporated by reference into H.R. 2038, and described in detail in a classified annex to the committee's report. Those documents are available for review in the committee's offices, and I urge those Members who have not already done so to review this material.
H.R. 2038 is the product of approximately 45 hours of hearings by the Program and Budget Authorization Subcommittee. I want to commend the committee staff and in particular the staff of the subcommittee--Bob Fitch, Jeannie Seelbach, Ken Kodama, Larry Prior, and Dee Jackson--for their dedicated and effective work. That the bill enjoys the bipartisan support of committee members is, I believe, evidence that it is a balanced and thorough assessment of the budgetary needs of our Nation's intelligence and intelligence-related programs and activities. I am especially grateful for the time and effort the committee's ranking Republican, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], put into this legislation. His commitment to the work of our intelligence agencies is reflected in all aspects of H.R. 2038.
Madam Chairman, as was vividly demonstrated in the past year, the end of the cold war has not eliminated international challenges to which the United States must respond. Effective intelligence capabilities will be essential if threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, Third World instability, and the international narcotics trade are to be successfully addressed. We must ensure that U.S. intelligence agencies are able to provide the information which policymakers will need to deal with the complex crises and contingencies we are likely to confront. Adequate resources and an intelligence community structure that will enable those resources to be employed with maximum effectiveness, will be necessary if that goal is to be met. H.R. 2038 contributes to this end in two ways. First, the bill authorizes an appropriate level of resources. While less than requested by the President, the level of authorizations is, in conformance with the budget agreement, more than was made available in fiscal year 1991. Second, the bill encourages, and in some cases accelerates, the structural changes already underway in some components of the intelligence community. It is imperative that unnecessary duplication of effort be eliminated, and that management be able to provide centralized direction and coordination. The committee looks forward to working with representatives of the Department of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence in particular, to ensure that changes are made, where appropriate, in the current organizational framework of the intelligence community to produce these results.
In addition, the bill authorizes resources to correct some deficiencies noted throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm. For example, an increase in funding is recommended for innovative language training and standardized testing and evaluation for linguists. I believe this initiative is the beginning of a long-term program which could help reshape our thinking on the recruitment and retention of linguists and analysts who support the intelligence community. Also, funding adjustments are recommended to enhance reconnaissance support to deployed military commanders.
Madam Chairman, I want to take a moment to commend the many professionals throughout the intelligence community who came together and worked long hours in support of our deployed forces. Intelligence played a vital role in the outcome of Desert Storm.
At this time, I want to briefly summarize the provisions of H.R. 2038.
It should be noted that the administration's legislative requests for the intelligence agencies were not received by the committee until May 2. Our Subcommittee on Legislation has begun work on those requests, and a separate bill reflecting the judgment of the committee on them may be reported later in this session. H.R. 2038 is therefore strictly an authorization measure.
Title I provides authorizations for the majority of U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities. As I explained earlier, specific authorization levels and program details are in the classified schedule of authorizations and the annex to the report.
Title II provides for the intelligence community staff whose function is to assist the Director of Central Intelligence coordinate the activities of the various elements of the intelligence community, and prepare the community's budget. A reduction of 27 personnel is recommended.
Title III provides an authorization of $164.1 million for the Central Intelligence Agency's retirement and disability system. This system provides benefits to those CIA employees performing hazardous duties or serving in special situations, usually overseas, which may limit the lengths of their careers.
Finally, title IV contains two recurring general provisions, one of which provides for adjustments to pay which may occur as a result of general pay raises and other personnel legislation. The other provides that authorizations in the bill are not to be construed as authorizing intelligence activities not otherwise permitted by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Madam Chairman, H.R. 2038 seeks to address our Nation's near-term intelligence needs as well as encouraging the kinds of structural changes that will give our intelligence agencies the flexibility to deal with future challenges. I urge the passage of the bill.
[Page: H4242]
[TIME: 1400]
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. SHUSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, this intelligence authorization bill, H.R. 2038, is a simple, basic, indeed bare bones authorization for our country's intelligence activities for the coming fiscal year. My good friend from Oklahoma, the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee, has ably summarized its significant provisions.
As Chairman McCurdy noted, the administration's fiscal year 1992 request includes a number of legislative proposals which are not contained in H.R. 2038. I would hope and expect that the Intelligence Committee will have an opportunity later in this session to fully consider those legislative proposals and, where appropriate, take action on them. The Legislation Subcommittee of the Intelligence Committee did, in fact, hold a hearing on two of the administration's fiscal year 1992 legislative proposals last week. A subcommittee hearing on another initiative is scheduled for tomorrow.
Those Members who have had an opportunity to look at the minority views in our committee report to accompany H.R. 2038 will observe that the principal issue on which we differed with our majority colleagues involved the committee's decision on reorganizing the Defense Department's science and technology intelligence components. The minority dissented from that conclusion not because we think it necessarily incorrect, but because we believe that there has been insufficient study of the issue to support any particular conclusion at this time.
In addition to this issue, the minority has reservations about the Committee's treatment of certain CIA programs discussed in the minority views to the classified annex to the report. We remain sensitive to most of the administration's concerns about the Committee's actions with respect to these classified programs. Hopefully, these concerns and reservations can be constructively addressed by the time we reach the conference stage on this legislation.
Apart from these issues, members of the Intelligence Committee were in substantial agreement on almost all other matters in the bill and report. Therefore, barring the adoption of harmful amendments during consideration of the bill on the floor today, I expect to vote in favor of its passage.
As you may recall, I continue to hold the view that members and staff of the Intelligence Committee ought to take an oath of secrecy as formal evidence of our solemn commitment to diligently protect the sensitive intelligence information to which we are privy by virtue of our committee duties. Therefore, at the appropriate point during consideration of the bill, I expect to offer an amendment to require such an oath of secrecy. Because of potential germaneness problems with an amendment addressing this issue, I requested that the Rules Committee include a waiver of points of order for my amendment in the rule for consideration of H.R. 2038. Regrettably, by a 5-to-4 vote the Rules Committee declined.
Some of us have long endeavored to give the House an opportunity to consider and vote on this matter. For the life of me, I cannot understand the stiff-necked, foot-dragging, teeth-pulling resistance to letting the House have that opportunity. One would think that we were proposing that Members and staff of the Intelligence Committee be strip-searched in the well of the House. Instead, we are merely proposing a modest measure, the thrust of which is educational. It is intended to raise the consciousness of Intelligence Committee members and staff and to engrave more effectively in their minds the rules and corresponding responsibilities pertaining to the constant protection of sensitive intelligence information to which our sensitive positions give us access.
I want to emphasize that thanks to the chairman and members on both sides of the aisle of this committee, there have been very strong bipartisan support as we come to the floor today.
[TIME: 1410]
In discussing these matters last week with the distinguished chairman of the Rules Committee, he reminded me of the high caliber of the Members who served as chairmen of the Intelligence Committee and of their diligence in trying to assure that Members and staff remember their responsibilities in this area. I do not dispute that at all. I would argue that my amendment complements those very efforts.
I would also like to remind the distinguished Rules Committee chairman that our former colleague, Eddie Boland, the first and longest serving Intelligence Committee chairman, in a letter to Chairman Moakley on June 26, 1990, just last year, stated that he did not oppose secrecy oaths of the nature of the one I propose.
If today is not the day when the House finally gets to consider this issue, then I will keep looking for every opportunity which may present itself in the future. Perhaps one day the pigeonholing and the gag rules will end and this proposal can be openly debated on the floor of the House.
Two final points, Madam Chairman. First, I would like to emphasize the point our distinguished chairman made with regard to the outstanding performance of U.S. intelligence activity in the Persian Gulf. The performance of U.S. intelligence in Desert Storm and Desert Shield was absolutely extraordinary.
Never, never in the history of our country have our military people had the kind of precise targeting information which was available to them and available to them because of the outstanding performance of our intelligence agencies. Never before have we had the kind of detailed order of battle information that was provided by our intelligence capabilities. And yes, the performance of our intelligence agencies with regard to thwarting terrorism was absolutely heroic. I wish I could go into more detail to tell some of the stories of the tremendous efforts on the part of the CIA and FBI around the world to stop terrorism before it really inflicted its deadly awesome pain on American citizens here in the United States and around the world. Major terrorists act were blocked because of U.S. intelligence efforts.
If there is any one area where I think our intelligence activities have been criticized, and in a sense unfairly, it is that we have heard that the intelligence activities of our country were not able to foresee Saddam Hussein's intentions. We have been holding hearings on this, and I have looked at this issue quite carefully. I have come to the conclusion that our intelligence people would have had been fortune tellers to be able to divine the intentions of Saddam Hussein. There is absolutely no credible evidence that shows that he knew what his intentions were going to be until a few days before he invaded Kuwait.
Indeed, our allies in the region unanimously informed us that they believed he was not going to invade, the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, the Egyptians, et cetera. So I think on balance, while there certainly always is room for improvement in human endeavor, the intelligence performance of our agencies in the gulf war was absolutely extraordinary, and the American people can be very proud of that performance.
Last, on the subject of counternarcotics we hear a lot about the need to shift priorities in a post cold war world. I can assure my colleagues that the intelligence community is indeed reordering priorities, and one of those reordered priorities, which is very critical, is the increased emphasis on counternarcotics.
Around the world, our intelligence activities are performing extremely well to provide both the strategic and the tactical intelligence necessary to rollup drug organizations and indeed drug lords. I certainly would not want to be a drug lord in one of these far away countries today, knowing what I know about the tremedous capability and effort and accomplishment of our intelligence agencies around the world. It is something else that the American people can be very proud of, the role that is being played in this spectacular effort. We bring a bill to the floor today which supports sound, well thought our intelligence capabilities for our country in the coming fiscal year, and I urge my colleagues to vigorously support this legislation.
[Page: H4243]
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. Kennelly], chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
(Mrs. KENNELLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Mrs. KENNELLY. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 1992, and I want to compliment our chairman, Mr. McCurdy, and his leadership in this year's authorization process.
This is a bill which is difficult to discuss on the floor because so many of the program details and authorization levels are classified. Classification is necessary because an awareness that an intelligence activity even exists may reduce or eliminate its effectiveness, endanger lives, or lead to the collection of false information contrived by our adversaries to confuse or mislead us. However, I recognize that classification does produce a certain sense of frustration on the part of Members who are uncertain about whether we are spending too much, or too little, on intelligence.
I believe this bill provides the right level of resources for our intelligence agencies for the coming fiscal year. It does not give the President all he requested in the aggregate, nor does it match his specific requests for each and every program and activity. The bill does, however, provide a level of resources that the members of the committee, Democrats and Republicans alike, were convinced, after many hours of hearings and briefings, is necessary for our intelligence agencies to carry out their important responsibilities.
This legislation also moves us in the direction of ensuring that those agencies are working together to provide a reliable and timely intelligence product with an absolute minimum of duplication and wasted effort. Our committee's efforts to streamline the intelligence community begins with this bill. That effort is not one in which we engage on our own. The Department of Defense has completed a review of its intelligence structure and recommended a number of changes. The CIA has a similar review underway, and with a new Director of Central Intelligence on the horizon, I am certain that the organization of the entire intelligence community will be closely examined.
This is as it should be because a robust intelligence capability will be every bit as important as the United States enters a new century, as it was at the height of the cold war. International challenges may be of a different character, but they are not going to go away. The task before us is to
determine whether the intelligence structure that developed as a response to the threats of the past is the best possible structure with which to confront the threats of the future.
I believe that it is clear that intelligence is going to have to do more with less in the years ahead. Budget constraints will affect both equipment purchases and personnel levels. Resources for new technologies and the people to use them will be stretched, making sound investment decisions in all categories of spending essential.
To operate successfully in this environment, our intelligence agencies will need to stress intracommunity cooperation and eliminate redundancy. Consolidation of activities within agencies should be a priority. I am especially pleased, therefore, that H.R. 2038 recommends consolidation within elements of the Department of Defense, of defense scientific and technical intelligence, human intelligence, and theater intelligence. These kinds of consolidation efforts should produce the type of effective centralized management of intelligence activities that will be crucial in the years ahead. I'm sure that the committee will encourage greater efforts in this regard in next year's bill, but I want to commend our chairman for his insistence that we take these first, but important steps this year.
Madam Chairman, I urge that the House endorse H.R. 2038.
[TIME: 1420]
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. I will not use that time.
But I just would be remiss if I did not stand for a moment and say how difficult it is to talk about a subject you cannot talk about, Madam Chairman, but I do want to pay the accolades where they are due. This is a very good committee on which to serve, and I appreciate very much the cooperative spirit in which there is a bipartisan effort on that committee.
I would be very remiss if I did not compliment the staff. I do not know, and I am not familiar with, all of the staffs on the Hill, but I think it would be impossible to have a staff that is more professional, more courteous, or more knowledgeable than the staff on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the great works that they do. They are the one continuity in that committee which continues with the rotation of the membership.
Then, very briefly, with the matter for which we are here, Madam Chairman, I would rise in strong support regardless of the disposition of any of the other matters that are currently not a part of this authorization bill, to rise to very strongly support it and encourage my colleagues to support it and to say that those people, particularly on my side, who know where I am philosophically, this is a bill in which I think they can firmly support and place their confidence in.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman], a very active and hard-working member of our committee.
(Mr. GLICKMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of this bill.
It is a good bill, and as the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] said, most of it has been agreed to in a bipartisan context.
I would like to make a couple of comments about the intelligence community and intelligence legislation and activities at this time. We are at an intelligence crossroads in two areas, one substantively and one procedurally. On a substantive basis, we are at a crossroads in this world from an intelligence base that was directed almost exclusively at the Soviet threat. We are now moving to an intelligence base which is directed at, first, economics, to make sure that we know what is happening to us in the economic theater of the world, at terrorism, at counternarcotics and particularly at the Third World and areas like the Middle East.
The question is: Can our intelligence community adopt and adapt its functions, functions that since 1945 have been geared to the cold war, and adapt to those functions, to threats which are a lot more serious and a lot more modern? What we on the committee try to do all the time is to try to ensure that the intelligence community focuses on what are the current threats to this country, and not merely get locked into historic threats.
I compliment both the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], and the committee for putting together a bill that is focused on that.
I would reiterate one of my great interests, which is economic intelligence. In a modern world, in a global economic world with a lot of very serious competitors to the United States, we must make sure that what we know about what is happening to America economically, particularly from threats from other countries, that that should remain a very high priority of the intelligence community.
The other intelligence crossroad is organizationally oriented. We see we will have a new director of the CIA hopefully fairly soon, one who will have great influence on the future of American intelligence. In that connection, we see that relationships between the intelligence communities, the intelligence agencies, are under very serious discussion. We also look at relationships between the intelligence community and policymakers such as those within the State Department and the administration, and we see in some cases things are working well, and in other cases, areas of great confusion.
One of the reasons we are at a crossroads right now is because a new director of the CIA will have the opportunity to put together organizationally an intelligence network which makes more sense in a modern world; to not only focus the intelligence community substantively at economics and terrorism and counternarcotics, but also organizationally to maybe break the yokes of the organization of the cold war era and look to a modern organization of intelligence which makes sense and which makes us leaner and meaner when it comes to our organization of intelligence.
Intelligence can be the eyes and the ears to keep America on top in this world economically or militarily, or it can be an expensive albatross which keeps us from being as innovative as we need to be in meeting our threats.
The jury is still out on how well the intelligence community functioned in the Middle East crisis of the Iraq-Kuwait war. I agree with the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] that most of the time I think it operated in a very fine sense. I am not so sure it operated well in conjunction with how it related to the policymakers in the State Department and the administration, who were making poor decisions prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
One of the things we have to focus on is how well intelligence relates to the policy people in the State Department, the National Security Council and the administration who were actually making and carrying out the decisions in Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia which affected the lives of our servicemen and women in the future of this great country of ours. So we have a lot of issues to face in this area, a lot of challenges to make intelligence activities function more effectively.
I compliment, again, the chairman of the committee and the staff of the committee for putting together a bill which I think pushes the intelligence community into areas that if needs to be focused on.
[Page: H4244]
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas], a member of the committee.
(Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GEKAS. Madam Chairman, to the members of the committee, I am grateful for the yielding accorded to me by the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
I, too, want to pay my compliments to the chairman of the committee and the ranking Republican.
As a new member of this committee, I have learned a lot fast, and I appreciate the solicitude which has been offered to me by the staff on both sides and by the individuals who man and woman the committee.
The important opening statement made by the gentleman from Oklahoma brings to mind a pet concern of mine. The gentleman from Oklahoma, the chairman, quite rightly said that one of the focuses of our committee is to make sure that the agencies within the intelligence community can work better together. In some cases, perhaps their activities should be merged or some other accommodations made for a concentration of effort and a minimum of cost to be applied to these functions. I would have to say that that same concern applies to my pet peeve, the necessity for having two intelligence committees, one on the House side and one on the Senate side.
The very same concern that the gentleman from Oklahoma proscribes with respect to cost can apply to two committees working as an intelligence committee as these two are, the permanent select committees on both sides of the Chambers, and the other one, and it is more important than anything, and it does not apply to any other committee, the argument that other committees have the same face and the same function on both sides of the Capitol which does not apply to this, because in this particular case, we have to deal with the national security, and the one most sickening aspect of some of the news that we have heard over the past years has been the extent of the leaks by Members and perhaps by staff of vital information that could have led to threaten the very existence of our country and the lives of our servicemen and, indeed, our agency people throughout the world.
Madam Chairman, the existence of leaks perhaps can never be forbidden or protected against. But would it not be a certainty that the number of leaks and the ferocity of leaks could be diminished if we had but one Select Committee on Intelligence, a joint committee, House and Senate? One set of people would be testifying. One set of documents would be proffered. One set of testimony would come to the ears of the Intelligence Committee members and nothing more. That automatically would diminish and reduce the chances for leaks of vital national security information.
I intend to pursue this subject. Just as the gentleman from Pennsylvania wants very much to insert an oath into the process, I want to explore fully the possibility of joining up the committees, and at the appropriate time I will ask the gentlewoman who heads the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Intelligence Committee to offer a hearing on this question.
I feel very strongly about this.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chairman, just in response to my friend and colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas], who is a member of the committee, first of all, I want to commend him for his participation in the committee. I think, as he indicated, he has learned a great deal in a short amount of time as we all do on this committee.
[TIME: 1430]
It is one of the most fascinating jurisdictions that the Congress is involved in because it is a window onto the world in a number of respects, and it is obviously very important to our national security and the foreign policy of our country.
I just wanted to respond briefly to one of the comments made regarding the function of the committee, and perhaps even the other gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] had referred to it as well in his comments regarding the secrecy oath. As chairman of this committee, and I have had the pleasure of serving under four distinguished chairmen including the original chairman, Mr. Boland from Massachusetts, the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], the distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Stokes], and the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson]. Each of the chairs that preceded me have undertaken that unique responsibility that we hold with the utmost seriousness in trying to maintain the security of the committee. We have taken renewed precautions to improve the fiscal security of the committee room, the suites. We have tried to impress upon members and staff the importance of information with which we deal and the procedures under which we operate which are protected under the rules of the House and governed by the rules of the House regarding the disclosure of any classified, unlawful disclosure of any classified material.
I would say during my tenure, I think the record has been very good within the committee. Specifically, to the reference of the joint committee, I only just want to say rather parenthetically that there has been great progress over the years in references to this issue. At one point the Select Committee on Intelligence had to report to eight separate committees of the Congress in the House. Eight separate committees. Now, they report to one committee. I believe that by that consolidation we have addressed much of the concern of the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
We do not control the other body. We deal with them at times, but there are substantive issues of difference between the two bodies. There are areas of jurisdiction that, although may overlap, that obviously require that we investigate and oversee different degrees of detail, and it has always been the prerogative of the chair of the committee to lay out the agenda for the committee to follow for the tenure of that particular chair and for the term in Congress.
This year, we have looked very aggressively at the issue of lessons learned from Desert Shield/Desert Storm to improve the overall effectiveness in the intelligence community. As I have said, and I think other members have said, in my opinion the intelligence community performed admirably and well, and in many cases spectacularly, in support of these operations. I believe that they were on the mark prior to the full invasion in many respects.
Nonetheless, there are other areas of importance. The whole issue of the end of the cold war, the tremendous turmoil internationally, potential for chaos in the Soviet Union, and the unique challenges that face vital United States interests around the globe are also, I think, coming at a time when we are having diminished resources in the Department of Defense, and I think over time within the intelligence community as well. Therefore, we have to get more out of these agencies, greater requirement, and more demand, with fewer funds. So it is important that we have the utmost efficiency and effectiveness in these operations and in these agencies.
Having said that, I still believe that there is a strong sense of bipartisanship within our committee. I have made it a point to try to depoliticize the debate and the agenda to make sure we get an agenda that is looking at improving the overall national security and effectiveness in our community. I believe we are making real progress toward that end.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
...............[Page: H4247]
[TIME: 1440]
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WOLF. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I would say to my good friend that our committee has informed the CIA that we expect to be fully kept abreast of this study and expect to be fully involved in any such decision.
I would also say to my friend, in addition to the reference to this matter in our report, in the open report before the body, there is further reference in our classified annex, so the gentleman may want to peruse that at his convenience as well.
Mr. WOLF. Madam Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman doing that. It is important that the Agency knows that this is in here so they cannot move ahead on anything until they come back to the Agency, and I will follow up on that, and I thank the gentleman.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss].
Mr. GOSS. Madam Chairman, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to have a few minutes to speak on this subject because it is one that is very personal to me, as most of you know.
I was a classified intelligence officer for the Central Intelligence Agency for 12 years. I bring that perspective to this debate and to the question of the oversight of Congress on our intelligence operations.
I think today's debate on the future of our Nation's intelligence gathering really does miss an opportunity, perhaps even a golden opportunity, to discuss an issue very crucial to the success of our operations, and I want to emphasize the success of our operations is something that we do read about in the papers, because when we fail we hear about that and there is a great hue and cry for accountability of what went wrong; so it is incumbent upon us to do our best to provide every possible edge that our operations in the intelligence theater will succeed.
The issue that I am speaking of is an oath of secrecy. It is a very simple oath. It is given to members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and to their staffs.
Let me quickly say, by the fact that we do not have this oath of secrecy now I am in no way making any suggestion that we are not doing the job properly. I am talking about sending a signal for the future.
It may seem to some to be a symbolic step, but it is one that could go a long way in shoring up what I think is a waning confidence in Congress, sending a message to our allies and our operatives in the field that we take their work most seriously and that we in fact will not take any chances on betraying their trust for political reasons or for political gain.
Of course, this is not a new idea. Every year I have been here it has been mentioned. It has been discussed at this time. The concept of an oath of secrecy for committee members and staff has been around for a long time. I think we eventually are going to have to implement it.
Repeated efforts to have an open vote on the issue I think have fallen victim to partisan politics, sadly. Take it from somebody who knows, we need better safeguards to insure that classified material remains classified. It seems to me common sense to demand a little accountability from the people to whom we trust some of our most sensitive information and the lives of many loyal, hard-working people around the world.
A few simple words of commitment does not seem that much to ask.
Having said that, I honestly do not think that there would be much resistance from any members of the staff or of the committee to take such an oath. I think that we are kidding ourselves by not making a requirement of it. I think it is a simple way to send a signal that is so terribly important.
Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the opportunity to be able to make these remarks again. Until we get this provision, I am going to try to have the opportunity to make these remarks at every occasion like this.
The reason I say that is that I know of very few places in the whole intelligence network where there is such a concentration of vital information as in the House Select Committee on Intelligence. I think we have to go the extra step to provide those safeguards and assurances that the people who depend on us handling that information wisely know that we are taking every step.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered under the 5-minute rule by titles and each title shall be considered as having been read.
The Clerk will designate section 1.
The text of section 1 is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1992'.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to section 1?
If not, the Clerk will designate title I.
The text of title I is as follows:
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1992 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specification of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings: The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1992, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany H.R. 2038 of the One Hundred Second Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations: The Schedule of Authorizations described in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments: The Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the numbers authorized for fiscal year 1992 under sections 102 and 202 of this Act when he determines that such action is necessary for the
performance of important intelligence functions, except that such number may not, for any element of the Intelligence Community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under those sections for that element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees: The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by subsection (a).
SEC. 104. TRANSFER AUTHORITY.
(a) Purpose and Amounts of Transfer: Of the funds authorized to be appropriated under section 101, an amount specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102 may be transferred, in accordance with the provisions of section 502(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)), by the Director of Central Intelligence to a special program identified in that classified Schedule of Authorization.
(b) Transfer Schedule: The Director may exercise the transfer authority provided by subsection (a) only in three increments, as follows:
(1) The first increment of funds may be transferred only during the three-month period beginning on January 1, 1992, in an amount not to exceed one third of the amount referred to in subsection (a).
(2) The second increment of funds may be transferred only during the three-month period beginning on April 1, 1992, in an amount which, when added to any amount transferred in the first increment, does not exceed two thirds of the amount referred to in subsection (a).
(3) The third increment of funds may be transferred only during the three-month period beginning on July 1, 1992, in an amount which, when added to any amounts transferred in the first and second increments, does not exceed the full amount referred to in subsection (a).
(c) Identification of Sources of Funds: Not later than 15 days before the date of the transfer of each increment, the Director shall identify for the intelligence committees of the Senate and House of Representatives each specific program, project, or activity within the National Foreign Intelligence Program that is proposed as a source of the funds to be transferred.
[Page: H4248]
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the committee amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Committee amendments: Page 3, at the beginning of line 11, insert `2038'.
Page 4, after line 11, insert the following new section:
SEC. 104. TRANSFER AUTHORITY.
(a) Purpose and Amounts of Transfer.--Of the funds authorized to be appropriated under section 101, an amount specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102 may be transferred, in accordance with the provisions of section 502(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)), by the Director of Central Intelligence to a special program identified in that classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Mr. McCURDY (during the reading). Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendments be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?
There was no objection.
Mr. McCURDY Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last work.
Madam Chairman, among other things, the committee amendment authorizes the transfer of funds to a single program identified in the classified schedule of authorizations incorporated by reference in the bill. The scope of this authority and limitations on it, are set forth in the classified annex to the report.
It is the committee's intention that, before each and every occasion in which this authority is used, the proposed sources of funds will be identified, and the committee will render its judgment on them. The committee believes this procedure is entirely consistent with the meaning of section 502(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)), and the legislative history applicable to that provision.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of the committee amendments.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the committee amendments.
The committee amendments were agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title I?
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the bill be printed in the Record and open to amendment at any point.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?
There was no objection.
The text of the remainder of the bill is as follows:
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Staff for fiscal year 1992 the sum of $30,719,000.
SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL END-STRENGTH.
(a) Authorized Personnel Level: The Intelligence Community Staff is authorized 240 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1992. Such personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(b) Representation of Intelligence Elements: During fiscal year 1992, personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be selected so as to provide appropriate representation from elements of the United States Government engaged in intelligence and intelligence-related activities.
(c) Detailees To Be on Reimbursable Basis: During fiscal year 1992, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the Intelligence Community Staff from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
SEC. 203. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF ADMINISTERED IN SAME MANNER AS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
During fiscal year 1992, activities and personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be subject to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) in the same manner as activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1992 the sum of $164,100,000.
SEC. 401. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 402. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the committee amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Committee amendment: Page 6, line 10, strike out `240' and insert in lieu thereof `213'.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the committee amendment.
The committee amendment was agreed to.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant: Page 8, after line 15, insert the following new subsection:
Sec. 403. Intelligence Community Contracting.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall direct that elements of the Intelligence Community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United States and consistent with the operational and security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, shall award contracts in a manner that would maximize the procurement of products in the United States. For purposes of this provision, the term `Intelligence Community' has the same meaning as set forth in paragraph 3.4(f) of Executive Order 12333, dated December 4, 1981, or successor orders.
Mr. TRAFICANT (during the reading). Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there any objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?
There was no objection.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Madam Chairman, this is the same language that was added to last year's Intelligence Authorization Act.
I want to commend the new chairman, a young chairman, for giving everybody an equal opportunity and access to look at the bill and have an opportunity in their own minds to try to enhance it.
I also want to thank the ranking minority member that I served with on the Committee on Public Works and Transportation for the fine job he has done.
It is the same language that was in the bill last year.
[Page: H4249]
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the committee chairman.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Madam Chairman, the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio is identical to language included in the conference report on the fiscal year 1991 intelligence authorization bill. Although that measure was vetoed, the same language on intelligence community contracting is contained in the revised authorization bill for fiscal year 1991 which is now before the Senate.
I would have preferred that the gentleman wait to offer his amendment until the committee could evaluate how the intelligence community responds to the directives on this issue contained in the 1991 bill. That would have allowed the committee to work with the gentleman to address any problems identified as a result of the community's experience with the implementation of this kind of provision. Nevertheless, I understand the gentleman's desire to further express his concerns in this area.
As the language in the amendment is identical to a provision we hope will soon be enacted into law in another intelligence bill, I have no objection to accepting the amendment.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
[TIME: 1450]
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Shuster: Page 8, after line 15, add the following new section at the end of Title IV:
SEC. 403. OATH OF SECRECY.
In order to promote an enhanced consciousness by the Members and staff of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of their special responsibilities for the protection of sensitive classified intelligence information, and thereby to promote an increased readiness on the part of the Executive Branch to provide information to the Committee necessary for it to most effectively carry out its legislative and oversight responsibilities for programs for which funds are authorized in this Act, Rule XLVIII (Rule 48) of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended--
(a) at the end of clause 1 by adding the following new paragraph:
`(d) At the time a Member is appointed to serve on the select committee, or within thirty days after the adoption by the House of this provision, whichever is later, the member shall take the following oath:
`I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will not directly or indirectly disclose to any unauthorized person any classified information received in the course of my duties on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, except with the formal approval of the committee or of the House.'
The oath shall be administered by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Clerk of the House of Representatives of the One Hundred Second Congress and each succeeding Congress shall cause this oath to be printed, furnishing two copies to each Member appointed to the select committee who has taken this oath, which shall be subscribed to by the Member, who shall deliver them to the Clerk, one to be filed in the records of the House of Representatives, and the other to be recorded in the Journal of the House and in the Congressional Record.':
(b) at the end of clause 5 by adding the following new sentences: `Each employee of the select committee and any person engaged by contract or otherwise to perform services for or at the request of the select committee who is required to subscribe to the agreement in writing referred to in the first sentence of this clause shall, at the time of signing or within thrity days after the adoption by the House of this provision, whichever is later, also take the oath set out in clause 1(d) of this rule. The oath shall be administered by the chairman or by any member of the committee or of the committee staff designated by the chairman. The Clerk of the House of Representatives of the One Hundred Second and each succeeding Congress shall cause this oath to be printed, furnishing two copies to each of such persons taking this oath, which shall be subscribed by each such person, who shall deliver them to the Clerk, one to be filed in the records of the House of Representatives, and the other to be recorded in the Journal of the House and in the Congressional Record.':
(c) in clause 7(d) by inserting immediately after the words `paragraph (c)' the words `or of the oath required by clause 1(d) or by clause 5,' and by adding immediately after the last sentence of clause 7(d) the following new sentences: `The select committee may refer cases of unauthorized disclosure and violations of the required oaths to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct for investigation. While a member of the committee is the subject of such a pending investigation, the select committee may determine by majority vote that the member shall not be given access to classified information.': and
(d) by adding the following new sentence at the end of clause 7(e): `If the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct determines that any member of the select committee or any person on its staff who is the subject of any such investigation has violated the oath required by clause 1(d) or clause 5, such person shall be permanently expelled from membership on the select committee or have his employment in any capacity by the select committee terminated permanently, as the case may be, in addition to being subject to such other actions as the House may determine are appropriate.'.
Mr. SHUSTER (during the reading), Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?
There was no objection.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I make a point of order against the amendment.
Madam Chairman, the amendment proposes a change in the rules of the House. Changes in House rules are outside of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Rules. H.R. 2038 therefore contains no changes to House rules.
The amendment fails the test of committee jurisdiction under section 798c of the Rules and Practices of the House of Representatives by including matters within the jurisdiction of a committee not reporting the bill, the Committee on Rules. As a result, the amendment is not germane, and therefore it violates clause 7 of rule XVI (16).
Madam Chairman, I insist on my point of order.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I regret that once again the House will not apparently be given the opportunity to vote on this amendment, and I am prepared for the ruling of the Chair.
Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman wish to speak on the point of order?
Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, did the gentleman reserve a point of order or did he make a point of order?
Mr. McCURDY. I made a point of order.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has made a point of order.
Mr. SOLOMON. So it is not debatable and I cannot engage in a colloquy with the sponsor of the amendment then?
The CHAIRMAN (Ms. Slaughter of New York). The gentleman is correct.
The Chair is ready to rule on the point of order of the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
For the reasons stated by the gentleman from Oklahoma, and based on the Chair's ruling of May 1, 1991, on the question, the Chair agrees that this amendment is not germane to the bill before the committee and, accordingly, the point of order is sustained.
Are there further amendments?
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, in the spirit of compromise, I offer another amendment which I trust will be acceptable.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Shuster: Page 8, after line 15, insert the following new section:
SEC. 403. LIMITATION ON SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION--OATH OF SECRECY.
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, during fiscal year 1992, no element of the United States Government for which funds are authorized by this Act may provide any classified information concerning or derived from the intelligence or intelligence related activities of any such element to a Member or employee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence unless and until a copy of the oath set out in subsection (b), signed by that Member or employee, as the case may be, has been published in the Congressional Record.
(b) The oath referred to in subsection (a) is as follows:
`I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will not directly or indirectly disclose to any unauthorized person any classified information received in the course of my duties on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, except with the formal approval of the committee or of the House.'.
[Page: H4250]
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, as with the previous amendment, I would raise a point of order that this amendment, too, is not germane. I would argue, Madam Chairman, that the amendment restricts the ability of the Speaker to appoint members to the committee and is therefore an amendment to House rules. It conditions and amends the implementation of an existing law, the National Security Act of 1947, which is outside the scope of the bill.
Therefore, Madam Chairman, it violates rule XVI, that is clause 7 of rule XVI, and I insist upon my point of order.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, this clearly is within the rules of the House. First of all, the Speaker may appoint anybody he chooses. This does not limit the Speaker's ability to appoint. And second, this does not amend the National Security Act referred to by the gentleman. Rather, this amendment is limited specifically to the piece of legislation that is before us today. It simply prohibits the intelligence components of the Government for which funds are authorized in this bill from providing classified intelligence-related information to members or employees of the Inteligence Committee unless and until a simple oath of secrecy, signed by them, has been published in the Congressional Record. And I emphasize, this amendment is limited to fiscal year 1992. This is limited to this bill before us today.
Its primary purpose is to promote an increased readiness on the part of the executive branch agencies covered to provide information to the Intelligence Committee necessary for it to most effectively carry out its legislative oversight of the activities for which the funds are authorized in this bill. Making the provision of this classified intelligence information to members and staff of the Intelligence Committee contingent on the solemn commitment represented by their taking this oath to protect the information will strongly encourage the full candor we seek. It does not change any rules of the House. It does not go to any law beyond that which we are considering today. This clearly is within the rules of the House and is indeed germane and is a much more modest amendment than that which I previously offered.
Furthermore, Madam Chairman, may I emphasize that there are two other provisions of this bill, as amended here today, that already deal with the transfer of information by the executive agencies to Congress. Section 103(b) regards information on exceeding personnel ceilings, section 104(c) concerns information on funding accounts from which funds are transferred.
So, if these two provisions are within the scope of this bill, then certainly my amendment is within the scope of this bill.
The CHAIRMAN (Ms. Slaughter of New York). The Chair finds that this amendment does differ from the previous one ruled upon. This amendment constrains the flow of information from the entities that are funded by the bill for this fiscal year to the Congress only for the period of such funding. In addition, the bill directly addresses the flow of information from the intelligence community to the Congress. Accordingly, the Chair finds that the amendment is germane to the bill.
[TIME: 1500]
Mr. SHUSTER. I thank our distinguished Madam Chairwoman, thank her for her very fair treatment, and I am delighted that finally, through the persistence of many fine people, we have been able to bring this very important issue to the floor of the Congress.
My colleagues, this is a simple amendment that asks only that those members of the Permanent Select Committe on Intelligence and the employees who have the distinct honor and privilege of being responsible for the handling of our Nation's most sensitive secrets are required to take an oath of secrecy.
Madam Chairman, there is nothing new about this. When a predecessor to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee of Secret Correspondence, met in the Second Continental Congress, Benjamin Franklin and others who handled the Nation's sensitive material at that time indeed did take a similar oath of secrecy.
Beyond that, I referred earlier today to a letter the committee received just last year from the distinguished Eddie Boland, the first chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, in which he said that he was not opposed to such an oath of secrecy.
Beyond that, in the Iran-Contra report provided this body not too many years ago there are repeated references to specific leaks which occurred in the House, in the Senate, leaks which occurred from sitting members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, sitting members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and so we are not talking theory here. We are talking about direct experience in the past.
Madam Chairman, having said that, I emphasize that I believe the chairman has done an outstanding job in emphasizing the importance of protecting leaks so that we do not divulge classified information, and I believe that my colleagues on both sides of the the aisle are indeed sensitive to this issue.
However, Madam Chairman, this goes beyond the question of simple sensitivity of the members sitting on the committee. It goes fundamentally to the issue of our setting an example, our setting the best example in this town, so when others in this town and in this official Government community, particularly those in the executive branch, as well as our colleagues in both bodies, deal with sensitive, classified information, they know that, like Caesar's wife, we on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence are going to be very, very concerned and sensitive. We on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence are taking an oath to protect that secrecy.
Madam Chairman, this is extremely important because there has been example after example of leaks, most of which we think of coming from the executive branch, but, nevertheless, there have been very specific examples of classified leaks in the past out of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, out of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Indeed it has been published that a former Member of the Senate of the other body's Intelligence Committee threatened to disclose two covert actions as a method of stopping those covert actions from being implemented.
So, there is a clear need, not only for us to address this issue ourselves, but, even more importantly, for us to set a good example.
In closing, Madam Chairman, I cannot understand for the life of me why my colleagues are so opposed, so afraid, of our taking a simple oath of secrecy to preserve our Nation's most sensitive secrets. When is wrong with this simple amendment? Why are we afraid? In fact I would suggest that several colleagues on the other side of the aisle have told me that they have no problem with this, but that it is a Democratic leadership position, and so they have got to march in lockstep to support the opposition to this amendment. I say we should all think for ourselves. I cannot believe that the Democratic leadership has in fact attempted to muzzle our colleagues on the other side of the aisle on this issue. Let us vote on this. Let us be free to vote on both sides of the aisle, and let us support this modest amendment which indeed will improve the security of the United States of America.
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I have been somewhat perplexed this year since I have taken over the chair of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence at the amount of time spent on this amendment, and I am also a little perplexed by the statement of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], my friend and colleague, when he obviously has become very worked up on this position and says that he cannot understand why anyone would oppose this amendment. On the face of it there is very little to oppose, but, as we sit here and we see the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] with his amendment on drug testing, we see the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] with his amendment on an oath, we have seen amendments here on saluting the flag, it appears that, in spite of the multibillions of dollars in our bill, in spite of the incredible authorization authority that we have and the jurisdiction that we cover, we spend all of our time on provisions such as this.
Mr. Chairman, the fact of the matter is it irritates me because it seems as if people are trying to take partisan advantage or create some partisan position here by placing people in a position. If we accept the oath on this, what is next? Polygraphs? And after polygraphs do we have to do random drug testing to Members?
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is shaking his head that he would like to see that as well.
[Page: H4251]
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCURDY. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, this gentleman did not shake his head yes.
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, it was the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, as my colleagues know, I have extended my hand in an attmept to be fair in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. We come here with an open rule, we come here, and the gentleman knows in the committee we have taken extra precautions to admonish and advise Members about the information that we deal with, and now he is saying we are just here to set an example.
My colleagues, I think, more importantly for the American public, we need to really put this issue to rest here today and discuss this. Members of Congress are elected in each of our individual districts across the United States, 435 Members of Congress, by roughly 500,000-plus individuals; some districts more, some a little less. We come to this body, and we take an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States. Every single Member of Congress takes the oath. It is the same that the President of the United States takes, an oath to uphold and defend.
Now, Mr. Chairman, if we single out this committee as being so unique, then maybe another symbolic step would solve this problem. But then the next question will be: What about the R&D Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, which I also serve on? That also handles classified information. And what about the Committee on Appropriations' Subcommittee on Defense? They, too, happen to get involved in appropriating on matters involving intelligence. Are we going to require them to do it? All of a sudden we might as well bring in the whole Congress and start swearing them in.
The point of the matter is that we already take an oath of office, and I believe that the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] is redundant. Again I think there are those who are looking for a position which not necessarily advances the posture of the committee. The gentleman is continually; he said it a few weeks ago; talking about leaks. I do not know of an example of a leak from the committee that has been pointed out to a Member. In addition, the gentleman mentioned the Senate, but we, quite frankly, do not have jurisdiction over the other body.
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCURDY. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, I refer to the Iran-Contra minority report which refers to a former distinguished Member of this body who at that time sat on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, who admitted to staff that he was the leak of a Newsweek article, and it is in chapter 13, entitled `The Need To Patch Leaks,' and the gentleman's name is included there.
[TIME: 1510]
Madam Chairman, this is not a retroactive amendment, so it does not apply to former members of the committee. There have been instances, I will point out to the gentleman, where Members have been basically removed from committee positions.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. McCurdy was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, there have been instances where Members have actually been removed. I think the other body has made tremendous strides in improving the situation, and I commend the distinguished chairman on the Senate side, Mr. Boren, for his efforts to correct any potential abuses over there. They do not have an oath of office or an oath of secrecy. I commend the gentleman from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski] as well.
I think we, too, on this side have taken precautions and continue to take precautions to protect information. I know the gentleman has raised earlier concerns about the requirement under the rules of the committee that were already there, that testimony before our committee be taken under oath. We talked about Iran-Contra, where the administration obviously appeared before committees, including ours, and there have been allegations of misleading or false testimony, but this rule applies to all committees in the Congress. It applies to the Committee on Appropriations and other committees as well. Even the Science Committee has that same provision in the rule. So we did not set a new precedent by using that rule. It has been used at times in other committees as well.
So again, I am a little surprised at the vigor and the persistence of the gentleman on this point since he admits, and I think the gentleman would have to admit, that during his tenure, since he has been the ranking member and I have been chairman of this committee, we have not had abuses, and I would hope we could maintain that record as well.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Madam Chairman. I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster].
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I thank my good friend for yielding, and I take this oppportunity to respond to my good friend, the gentleman from Oklahoma, on several of the points he has made.
First of all, I could not agree more that there appear not to have been any leaks from our committee in the past 5 months or so. That is not the point I am making here. The point I am making here is that there have been leaks in the past. This city leaks like a sieve, and we need to set an example.
Beyond that, my good friend, the gentleman from Oklahoma, apparently complains about the amount of time spent on this amendment. The reason we have spent time on this amendment is because of the gentleman's opposition. We could have solved this in 3 minutes 5 months ago. So it is not this gentleman who has caused the time to be spent, but it is the opponents of this amendment.
Beyond that, my good friend, the gentleman from Oklahoma, says--and let me quote him, if I wrote the words down accurately--`On its face, there is very little to oppose in this amendment.'
I agree with that. If there is so very little to oppose, why all the opposition?
Beyond that, my good friend said, `What's coming next, a drug amendment?' Well, this is not a drug amendment.
Then he says, `What's coming next?' He refers to our already having passed one on saluting the flag. This is not saluting the flag.
Then he says, `Are we going to have polygraph tests?' This is not a polygraph test.
So we should not be dredging up straw men and indicating this amendment is about something it is not. This amendment is only about members and staff of the committee taking an oath of secrecy, members who deal with our Nation's most sensitive secrets.
The gentleman suggests, darkly perhaps, that there might be those here wanting to take partisan advantage by offering this amendment. This amendment was not meant to be partisan. It was only made partisan by the majority who opposed it. This was not offered in a partisan way at all. So that point should be emphasized as well.
We should emphasize also that this goes to the question of trust with our allies. We know there have been cases where our allies have refused to share intelligence with us. So this is one more step to say to our allies that we are setting a good example.
Beyond that, the gentleman referred to our requiring an oath by those in the executive branch who come before us to testify. Yes, we do. Those very same officials who come before us have also previously, when they assumed their office, held up their right hands and taken an oath to preserve and protect the Constitution of the United States, just as we have. The gentleman said that because we took that oath, somehow we do not need to take this oath. Those very people who came before us took that same oath that we took, and we require another oath of them.
So it seems to me that this is simply one more reason to support the amendment.
Finally, we should also never forget that our Founding Fathers took this kind of an oath as they dealt with the top secrets of their country in their day and age.
So, Madam Chairman, for all those reasons, on a bipartisan basis, we should pass this simple amendment.
[Page: H4252]
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Madam Chairman, I just want to say that I rise in very strong support of this amendment. It seems to me that if we went out and asked the American public what they thought about this, whether they thought members of this committee should take such an oath, they would overwhelmingly say yes.
Mr. DORNAN of California. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the amendment.
Madam Chairman, let me say to the chairman of our distinguished committee and Members on both sides that I truly also underscore what the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] has said. This is not a partisan amendment.
Now, I understand deep in the liberal soul, particularly if Members are over about 45 years of age, this can conjure up the image of loyalty oaths, which strikes terror in the hearts of some of our most senior liberals who are long of tooth. But I would remind the Members here what I have just reaffirmed from my own knowledge, that our staff members on both sides--and they are good, loyal Americans, all of them; I know some well and some not so well and some I have just only been introduced to--do not as members of the staff of the Intelligence Committee ever come into this job and raise their hands and swear or affirm to uphold the Constitution of the United States. They sign certain documents that have the same effect, but they do not do that.
Now, I know that our chairman, the gentleman from Oklahoma, is an Air Force officer in the Reserves. I do not know whether he was ever an enlisted man, but I know that when he got that Air Force commission, he raised his hand and swore to defend the Constitution, as he has done here every 2 years from 1980 on. And knowing the gentleman pretty well, I will bet that he and I and most of the Members in this Chamber get goose pimples, no matter how many times we have done it, even those who are senior Members, Mr. Michel and Mr. Broomfield on this side, and our Speaker and all the way to Jamie Whitten, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Appropriations on the other side. I know they get goose pimples; I can see it on everybody's face. I know when we do that at the beginning of each two years of Congress, we get goose pimples. We like doing it. Yet once we have done it, if we are incumbents, is there any other reason to do it over again except for the ceremony to indicate that this is a new Congress and we are just doing it over again?
I did it as an enlisted man, a teenager, when I joined the Air Force for 4 years. I did it within a year or so later when I became an aviator cadet. I did it again a year and a half after that when I got my wings, and I have done it seven times on the floor of this Chamber, sometimes holding the hand of my youngest daughter when I first came here and she was still a teenager, and then with four or five different grandchildren over the years, holding their hands with my left hand and raising my right hand and swearing to defend the Constitution.
Now, certainly if somebody were to break this down for staff and we would get a vote on this, every Member knows that it is going to be an ovewhelming vote for the staff of the Intelligence Committee, this powerful and important select committee; we know that is going to win overwhelmingly. Our staffers, some of them young people without military service, will for the first time in their lives get the goose pimples connected with raising their hands and swearing to defend the Constitution and defend it against every enemy, foreign and domestic.
[TIME: 1520]
Did you hear that last word, folks? `Domestic.' Yes, there are some people who call themselves Americans, that in their hearts have already betrayed their country, that we have to defend the Constitution against those people. I would simply say that since it would win overwhelmingly to have our intelligence staffers do what we do at the beginning of each Congress, and do it proudly and willingly and get a lump in our throat doing it, if we are going to do it to the staff, then why can we not lead by example, as the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] has said so eloquently, and merely have the Members and the staff do it one more time?
I have done it as an enlisted man, a cadet, a young Air Force officer, and seven times in this Chamber. I think I have done it in between testifying at certain committees. We have now taken to swearing in certain people, and I am sure if we had a Member, a Senator or Congressman testifying with other Members, and you asked the panel to stand, which I support your doing it every time, a Member would stand and take the oath. I have seen them do it over in committee hearings in the Rayburn and Longworth Buildings.
Madam Chairman, in conclusion, I would ask the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], quite simply, is it really anything but another goose pimple moment for Members and staffers?
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DORNAN of California. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I think the gentleman for yielding.
Madam Chairman, I actually think that I would concur and agree with the gentleman that every time we take the Oath of Allegiance to our country, I get goose bumps. I get goose bumps every time I salute the flag.
Mr. DORNAN of California. Madam Chairman, reclaiming my time, I knew the gentleman did, because I do, too.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I actually get goose bumps when I walk up these stairs.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan] has expired.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Oklahoma is recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, as chairman of this committee I felt constrained to resist this on the germaneness issue earlier because it was a rules change. Now that the Parliamentarian has ruled that it is germane, if I could engage with the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] for just a moment.
As I indicated, on the face of this I have no problem. I have not had problems with that. What I am concerned about though is, having done this, that now we are going to hear about drug testing, or polygraphs, or other amendments, that all of a sudden our committee becomes so unique with regard to responsibility requirements, that it becomes almost unworkable.
Madam Chairman, I honestly do not believe that we should impugn the honor of any member of our committee.
[Page: H4253]
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCURDY. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, that is certainly not my intention, I wold say to my good friend, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], as I am sure the gentleman knows.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, reclaiming my time, before we start loading up requirements into this bill, will this now become the next standard amendment on the floor, like the Walker amendment on 2 percent, or the Solomon drug amendment?
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, that is certainly not this Member's intention.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, if the gentleman would agree to that then, if that is not going to be the case, then I personally could accept the amendment.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I thank the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] and give him my assurance it is not my intention to offer a series of amendments as he has described.
Mr. McCURDY. Would the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] resist the other amendments if offered?
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I would have to vote my conscience on any of them. I would not intend to actively participate.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I would accept the amendment.
Mr. McEWEN. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] for his colloguy with the ranking member, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster]. I commend him for it.
Madam Chairman, I intended to rise for the purpose of taking just a selection from the reports of the Iran-Contra Committee to the Congress in which it has various subtitles, one being, `The Leaky 1970's,' and the other being, `The Still Leaky Congress During the Reagan Years.' Then it begins to cite specific examples in which one member of the Committee on Intelligence allowed as how he had leaked certain documents. The final conclusion was that this member was set straight by the House Intelligence Committee chairman, but who decided to take no action against this member since leaks were so epidemic.
Madam Chairman, I think that the conclusion that is made here by the acceptance of the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] is a step in the right direction. My father used to urge me, as I would run home with some dire explanation as to a crisis at hand, he would look at me and say, `Young man, you must learn to not fight battles not worth winning.'
Madam Chairman, the opposition to a cause such as this is not worth the fight. The people in this country want to know that their secrets are secure, and there is no reason to oppose it. I commend the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] for accepting it.
Madam Chairman, the final point would be that there are people, and when I say people, I mean not only just Members, I mean families, wives and husbands and children, whose parents serve this country in a very, very dangerous position. They carry within their brain information that makes them subject to attack, to abuse, to capture, and to destruction, because they house our Nation's most vital secrets.
If someone, on purpose or inadvertently, leaks that information and makes them a target, that father, that mother, that serves our Nation so ably, is placed at risk.
For their benefit, if for no one else's, for their benefit we want to assure them that the one composite, if you go to the Central Intelligence Agency, that agency is what we call compartmentalized. The person working next door to another person does not know what that person is doing. The only place in the Government where all of that is compiled in one central location is in the hands of the Intelligence Committees of the Congress.
Therefore, we have a very, very sacred obligation and responsibility. I think the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] is trying to say to those employees, trying to say to those families, trying to say to those who place their lives at risk, that we are going the extra mile to assure you that every staff member and every member of the committee is committed to that protection, and, thereby, your safety as well.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McEWEN. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I would say to my good friend, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], I thank him for accepting my amendment, and give him the assurances he requested from me. I would also say for the Record it is my understanding from the gentleman that he indeed will support the House position as we go to conference on this issue.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McEWEN. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, that is correct. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] can count on the word of the gentleman from Oklahoma.
I would just for the Record state one thing. It has often been reported now from the Iran-Contra affair about the leaks. I just want to state for the Record that this is a position held within the minority views of the committee, the Iran-Contra Committee, and was not the full committee.
Mr. McEWEN. Madam Chairman, reclaiming my time, that was an excellent addition to the report.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, If the gentleman will yield further, I also say with all the pounding on the Congress on this, that in many respects I think it unjustified, I would like to point to the Record that the principal leaks are coming from the administration. When the Secretary of Defense instructs members of the intelligence community to give interviews to report on the record during a conflict, I for one believe that is what has to stop as well. I do not think we ought to be taking potshots at the Congress. Our record is good.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McEWEN. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, the gentleman from OKlahoma [Mr. McCurdy) makes an excellent point. As the gentleman knows, I have dealth with that particular issue earlier today.
Mr. McEWEN. Madam Chairman, reclaiming my time, let me emphasize that that which I quoted was a quote from the chairman of the committee as reported in Newsweek. That is what I was reporting in the monority report.
Madam Chairman, let me conclude by saying I commend the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy) the chairman of the Committee on Intelligence. He is an excellent leader. I believe the choice by the Speaker to choose him as chairman was an excellent choice. It has been my privilege to serve with him on the Committee on Intelligence. In handling the rule I intended to say so.
Madam Chairman, I especially commend the gentleman now for accepting this amendment, which he has opposed in the past. That shows, again the reason that he is held in such high esteem and regard by this body.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Solomon: At the end of title IV (page 8, after line 15), insert the following new section:
SEC. 403. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES TESTING PROGRAM FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Establishment of Program.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish and carry out a program for random testing of the officers and employees of the Central Intelligence Agency for the use of controlled substances.
(b) Definition.--For the purposes of this section, the term `controlled substance' has the meaning given that term in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)).
(c) Implementation.--The program of random testing for the use of controlled substances required by subsection (a) shall be implemented not later than October 1, 1991, or the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later.
[Page: H4254]
Mr. SOLOMON (during the reading). Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, let me just say this same amendment was offered last year to this same authorization bill, and it was accepted. It is one of two amendments that I am offering to all authorization bills affecting all branches of Government from now through the end of this Congress.
Madam Chairman, I regret that it is necessary to offer this amendment to each authorization bill, but the reason is that the committee of jurisdiction has not seen fit to allow my all-encompassing bill to be considered. That bill has been languishing in the House Administration Committee for several years now.
[TIME: 1530]
I wish it could be brought to the floor because then we could settle once and for all this issue. We could bring to the floor the concept of random drug testing of all Federal employees. Then that law could be tested in the courts and we would know once and for all whether it was constitutional or not.
I for one believe it is. I have sponsored a number of amendments that have been upheld in the courts; namely, the Solomon amendment which required all young men to register for the draft or be disqualified from any kind of Federal benefits. Many Members on this floor, a minority, but many Members said that amendment was unconstitutional. The same Members are now saying that this amendment today is unconstitutional.
All this does is establish, in the Central Intelligence Agency, a random drug testing program that would be set up by the Director of Central Intelligence.
Let me tell my colleagues something, Federal employees are no different than anyone else. I happen to think that they are some of the finest people in the entire world; I am not here to pick on Federal employees. I think my colleagues all know that I am one of the major sponsors of the repeal of the Hatch Act, which I consider to be a totally, totally unconstitutional law on the books. And it should be repealed, it should be repealed today on a bipartisan basis.
Having said that, let me say to my colleagues that back in the early 1980's, when Ronald Reagan was elected President of this country, and what a great President he was, he, at the urging of myself and others established in our military a random drug testing program for all Members of the military, all branches of the military. And it was not just for privates and PFC's and corporals and sergeants. It was for admirals and generals and five-star generals, four-star admirals as well. At that time, according to studies, there was casual drug use by 27 percent of the people in our military. My colleagues all know what kind of shape our military was in back in the late 1970's, when our American hostages were being held in Iran and we had to cannibalize about 14 helicopter gunships just to get 4 that would work. We attempted to rescue those hostages, and those four helicopters did not even work. The rescue mission failed miserably. At that time we were losing a lot of our capable noncommissioned officers and
commissioned officers to the private sector because we had such serious problems in our military.
Yes, Ronald Reagan and this Congress, all of us together in a concerted effort, established random drug testing. And do my colleagues know what happened? In a period of 5 years, that casual use of drugs by 27 percent of the people in our military dropped to 4.5 percent, just 4.5 percent.
Do my colleagues know that is an 82-percent drop, 82 percent?
It is considered an average nationwide in the private and public sectors, that 10 percent of the American people are on illegal drugs today. Suppose we dropped the use of illegal drugs in the Federal Government employees by 82 percent. Suppose we enacted this law on the State and local government, the second largest employers in the Nation. And suppose the illegal drug use dropped by 82 percent among all State employees in the 50 States and all of the thousands of local government employees around the country. And then, because of the example that we set here in this Congress today, suppose the large corporations like IBM and the General Electric Corp. and General Motors and the Ford Motor Co., and even the little corporations, all adopted the same policy. What do my colleagues think would happen to the illegal drug use in America?
First of all, all of the drug kingpins would go out of business. There would not be any more profit because nobody would be using drugs except a finite number of people.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Solomon asked and was given permission to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)
Mr. SOLOMON. My point is, my colleagues, we do need to be setting the example here, just as we were told by the ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. We want to set the example. I do not believe that there is a vast, huge amount of drugs being used by Federal employees, but there is a Rand study, recently completed, about this Greater Washington, DC Capital District area. That Rand study said that
75 percent of all the illegal drugs used in this area are used by casual drug users not living here in Washington, DC., but coming from the suburbs, out there where my colleagues and I live in Maryland and Virginia.
They are driving their brand new Volvos and Saabs into Washington, DC and buying these drugs from people who live here.
The point is that if 75 percent of all the drug use in America is used by casual drug users, they are the ones that we need to go after. Let us set the example.
I know last year and the year before that my amendments were passing on this floor by overwhelming margins. I think the last time was by a vote of 405 to 3. All of a sudden a public union gets its back up because some of the members of that public union, probably 1 or 2 percent, do not like to be drug tested.
So they went to their leaders in the union and they started raising cain. So all of a sudden, there are `Dear Colleague' letters roaming around in all of our offices here, signed by a lot of distinguished Members, who all of a sudden are opposing my random drug testing amendment.
I say to those Members, why do they not stand up and be counted? Seriously, there is no difference today in what I am offering than what I offered last year and the year before that. If they really want to be fair, go to the House Administration Committee, tell them to let my bill out so that I do not have to waste their time and mine debating these individual amendments for each authorizing bill which comes on the floor. Let us do it once and for all for all Federal employees.
If they let my bill out, put it on the floor, I will never offer this amendment again because we will have a legitimate up and down vote once and for all.
Last, let me just tell my colleagues from a political point of view, that I do not want to be partisan. I want to be absolutely fair and bipartisan. But I am going to tell my colleagues something. I would not want to be in the shoes of any Member of Congress who 17 months from now is faced with an opponent who all of a sudden is running TV ads out there that say, `Do you know your Congressman voted 17 different times to prevent random drug testing of himself and his staff and Federal employees?' Do not do that to yourselves. That is not fair to Members.
[Page: H4255]
Mr. DORNAN of California. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SOLOMON. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. DORNAN of California. Madam Chairman, I want to let the gentleman from New York know before his time ran out, I did not mean to destroy his rhythm because, frankly, his rhythm is marvelous. But I wanted to tell him, we are prepared to accept his amendment on the Republican side. So if he wants to take that into consideration as he closes, be so advised.
Mr. SOLOMON. I would hope that the amendment would be accepted, but if it is not, I am going to call for a vote because I have promised those Federal employees who are now subjected to random drug testing, and it is about 25 percent of them out there, that they ought to be treated just as fairly as everyone else. They should not be discriminated against.
If we are going to have some people drug-tested, then let us random drug test them all so that they know it is fair. Let us also adopt my amendment for pre-application drug testing of all Federal employees so that they know once and for all if they are going to work for the Federal Government, if they are going to be paid by the taxpayer, they are going to be subject to random drug testing; that is going to be a part of their job.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word, and I rise in opposition to this amendment.
I do appreciate the rhythm of the gentleman from New York. Several weeks ago, when the revised fiscal year 1991 intelligence authorization bill was before the House, we accepted an amendment similar to the one now being offered by the gentleman from New York.
[TIME: 1540]
Madam Chairman, I was reluctant to do that not because I disagreed with the purpose of the amendment but because I was not certain that it was necessary. After additional consideration, I have concluded that the Solomon amendment would not significantly add to the aggressive and effective drug awareness and prevention program already in place at the CIA.
That the CIA is actively committed to preventing and detecting drug use among its employees cannot be seriously questioned. Before an employee is hired by the Agency, he or she must undergo a background investigation which focuses on use or abuse of drugs or alcohol, a medical examination which screens urine and blood samples, and a psychological assessment which is meant to identify behavior indicative of the abuse of drugs or alcohol. Potential employees who clear those hurdles still may not be hired until they complete a polygraph examination to determine if they have abused alcohol or drugs.
The Agency's concern with drug use does not end with the acceptance of an applicant for employment. New employees are subject to reinvestigation after 3 years on the job. In the course of the reinvestigation, another medical examination is administered, and the employee is subjected to another polygraph focused on substance abuse during the time of his or her employment at the Agency.
In addition to the scheduled reinvestigation, periodic routine investigations involving the same types of tests and examinations are administered. If there are indications of drug abuse, a specific-issue polygraph examination and/or fitness-for-duty medical examination may be conducted at any time.
Madam Chairman, I know of no Federal agency with a more vigorous program to ensure a drug-free workplace than that administered by the CIA. Given the sensitivity of the information to which Agency employees have access, it is altogether appropriate that such a program be implemented.
The point is that program is already in place. The Solomon amendment does not add to it in any significant way, and I should think that with all the talk we hear on this floor about the dangers of Congress micromanaging the affairs of executive branch agencies, we would want to avoid adding any redundant requirement to a drug-detection program that is thorough and effective.
I urge the rejection of the amendment.
Madam Chairman, I would say that of all the agencies out there, this is the most intrusive when it comes to drug testing. We have voted on this amendment three times previously in the House, and I believe that it has only been done just to get the record so they can have the position that the gentleman seeks.
However, in this particular instance, I am not sure one can find a better model, a more effective model than what is already in place in the CIA.
Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCURDY. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, let me just say that I concur 100 percent with what the gentleman is saying. The CIA is, first of all, one of the finest organizations anywhere. They do have one of the best models.
The only reason I offer it to this particular bill is because of a pledge that I am going to offer it to every authorization bill for every branch of Government, and the CIA knows that.
So, otherwise, I would not be offering it.
Mr. McCURDY. I understand that, and because of that, I would urge that we, since we voted on this three times, that we move the amendment. We have heard the debate before, gentleman. There are other bills scheduled. I would just as soon that we take the vote. If the gentleman is going to ask for a vote, fine.
The Agency here is not in question. They have a good program, but if the gentleman wants to get the record in, let us do it and save the time, and let me finish the bill.
Mr. SOLOMON. Or the gentleman could just accept the amendment, and you could work it out in conference.
Mr. McCURDY. We have had this vote. We know what the vote is going to be. So let us proceed with the amendment.
Mr. WALKER. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCURDY. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. WALKER. The gentleman had indicated that the amendment of the gentleman from New York is not different in any significant way from what the Agency now does. Can the gentleman tell me what the differences are?
Mr. McCURDY. As I understand it, his is purely random. Theirs at the CIA is a periodic examination of employment, and also verification of behavior that may pose a national security risk in addiction to drugs, and, by the way, it is even more intrusive, because it has a polygraph. We go much further than the gentleman from New York. I am not suggesting that the gentleman ought to adopt that kind of provision. I am just saying that if there is an intrusive program, this is the one.
Mr. WALKER. If the gentleman will yield further, that is helpful. In other words, the CIA is presently going much further than anything the gentleman from New York recommends in his amendment, and the one thing that the gentleman from New York would add that they are not now doing is the potential of random testing of employees?
Mr. McCURDY. Correct.
Mr. WALKER. Over and above that which the Agency now does, and now, how would that significantly harm the program that the Agency now has?
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] has expired.
(At the request of Mr. Walker and by unanimous consent, Mr. McCurdy was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
Mr. WALKER. I am not certain how that would significantly harm it.
Mr. McCURDY. I appreciate the gentleman's point. The fact of the matter is I do not believe it is broken at the CIA, and the gentleman's amendment is trying to fix something that is not broken.,
I understand the pride of authorship. I understand the need to try to develop a record and wanting to put people on record on this particular position, but, quite frankly, as it pertains to this Agency, I think this amendment is irrelevant.
[Page: H4256]
Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. HOYER. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
Madam Chairman, I appreciate the chairman wanting to bring this to a vote, and I understand that. But I just want to make sure that we do understand the amendment.
I have great faith in democracy. I want to tell my friend from New York that I am convinced that America is going to survive 30-second ads. I am convinced that America is going to survive the simplification of politics by 30-second sound bites. I am convinced that America has survived for more than two centuries, and will continue to survive, even though we have 17 redundant amendments on which we are asked to vote, and we are informed that we may have to respond in 30-second sound bites.
I want to tell the gentleman from New York that I do not believe there is a Member, and I hope there is not a Member on this floor, who votes intimidated by the specter of 30-second sound bites.
Now, let me tell the Member what is wrong with this amendment. It does not do anything. What it does, it provides opportunities for 30-second sound bites.
The gentleman from New York has said that the CIA does this right now. There is not a Member on this floor who disagrees with that.
This Member worked very hard to come up with this policy in conjunction with the then Director of OPM, Connie Horner, members of the Defense Department, the executive department, Mr. Taft, who was then the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I believe, members of OMB and the White House, and one thing we said was that if a person is in a security position where the security of this country may be at risk, then that person ought to be subject to random drug testing. CIA employees are. We said, further, that employees who are in a position where they might damage the safety of individuals, they fly an airplane, drive a train, drive a truck, et cetera, et cetera, carry a gun, that they ought to be sure that Americans can be secure in those persons' being substance abuse free.
In fact, the CIA goes further. Their tests cover alcohol which, of course, this would not necessarily cover, because the definition to which the amendment refers does not cover alcohol.
Let me say that I am hopeful that we will reject this amendment. We will reject this amendment because, first, it is redundant; second, because the administration and the leadership of the CIA are carrying out the now-existing program. There ought not to be an implication on this floor that the Members of Congress and, I might say, the administration of whose party I am not a member, as will come as no surprise to all of you, who is carrying out the policy carefully crafted to protect the security and safety of American citizens, the constitutional rights of Government employees and the integrity of the tests; there is no need for these amendments. The administration is carrying out a program, the administration that I did not support. Either the prior administration or this administration has not come to us and said, `We need to change the policy.' They have not requested anybody on this floor to introduce these amendments. The Commander in Chief is not saying that the security of America is at risk if we do not pass the Solomon amendment.
As a matter of fact, the Agency informally is opposed to this amendment. Why? Because it imposes upon them additional costs that they think are totally unjustified and unnecessary.
I respect and enjoy my friendship with the gentleman from New York. We disagree on this issue.
[TIME: 1550]
If it is the subject of a 30-second sound bite, I will tell Members that I am hopeful that every Member will be able to stand up and say with confidence and with clarity that this amendment is not necessary and clouds the issue that Congress and the administration have responded to the concerns upon which it is positive. All Members in this body are concerned about the abuse of drugs. All Members are concerned about the security of America. We just accepted an amendment on our side of the aisle that the gentleman from Pennsylvania offered. Why? Because we think that people ought to keep secrets, that not kept can damage the safety of employees in our security agencies or the welfare of our Nation.
However, this amendment is not necessary. This amendment costs unnecessary money to effect an end where there is not a problem.
The gentleman from New York said that we did this in the armed services and we had 27-percent drug abuse in the armed services. Let me tell Members that is 54 times the rate of abuse that was found in random testing in the Defense Department, a less security agency than this one. Listen to that: One fifty/fourth of the problem exists as the result of testing that we found out. One fifty-fourth of the problem in the Defense Department. A half a point subject to random testing.
I would suggest to Members that CIA authority has this authority. Let Members reject this amendment. If we have to reject it 14 more times, let Members stand with the same conviction when we rejected this amendment 269 to 157; and 262 to 145 just recently. We were right then, we are right now, in our hearts we will continue to know we are right.
Mrs. KENNELLY. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
(Mrs. KENNELLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Mrs. KENNELLY. Madam Chairman, I stand in strong opposition to the Solomon amendment on the grounds that it is redundant and unnecessary. Madam Chairman, we have all debated mandatory drug testing on its merits and on philosophical grounds, carefully weighing the civil liberties of the employees with the right of an employer to institute policy to maintain a drug-free workplace. We've all formulated opinions on drug testing, but this question is not what is being debated today.
This amendment would call for duplicated efforts. The CIA currently conducts the most extensive and comprehensive drug testing program in the Government. Not one single individual who is not already tested for drug abuse would be tested under the Solomon amendment. And need I remind everyone how expensive drug testing is. To overlay another drug testing program where one exists in order to retest the same employees is a waste of time, money, and energy--it's as simple as that.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment. We all want to eradicate the problem of drug abuse in workplaces throughout America. But the Solomon amendment is unnecessary. I hope it is defeated as it has been in previous efforts.
Mr. WALKER. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word. I was interested in the direction, Madam Chairman, that the debate has taken. I was interested in the gentleman from Maryland claiming piety on the issue of 30-second commercials.
We are going to have a whole series of votes here, at some point over the next couple of months, on an entire labor agenda, all of which we know is going to be vetoed at the White House, and all of which will be subject to the veto being sustained on Capitol Hill, and no one will care about that because that will be the Democratic Party, lining up their 30-second ads for the upcoming election. All Members know it. So let Members be clear that that is not a technique which does not have precedence in much of what we do in the House.
I am also fascinated by the contention that we ought not vote on these things all the time. The only reason why we end up voting on a number of these things all the time is legislation dealing with the issue in an overall sense never moves out of the committees controlled by Democratic chairmen. If a Member wants a good example of it, it was the drug-free workplace amendment a few weeks ago. A drug free workplace amendment came on the floor and we heard many of the same arguments. This is not necessary, we ought not do it. However, after we had voted on it a few times, and after we actually had it out on the floor and had a system that the Members had voted on, we decided maybe we could move some legislation on that, and we ended up with a Drug Free Workplace Act of 1988 which
most people think is working pretty well.
However, the only reason why it came about is we managed to force some votes on the House floor that put the Members on record, and decided we needed to have an overall bill. Perhaps if the gentleman from New York were successful in a few of his amendments, we would actually get an overall bill dealing with drug testing that would deal with all the agencies, and we would not have to go through this exercise. However, we do not see that kind of legislation emerging. That is not happening out of the various committees. For that I am disappointed.
That is the problem the minority faces. If we cannot get it done the right way, what we have to do is, we have to come to the floor and offer a series of amendments, hopefully, to put the House on record despite the fact it is not being done right.
[Page: H4257]
Mr. HOYER. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WALKER. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. HOYER. Madam Chairman, I just want to make the comment with respect to the partisanship that the gentleman seems to refer to, with reference to the legislation that the gentleman has in the Committee on House Administration, or that the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service have jurisdiction over, either one, I do not believe the administration which is, of course, of your party, has asked for this legislation nor has supported these amendments.
Mr. WALKER. Reclaiming my time, my experience has been that we do not pay much attention to that unless the committee chairman happens to agree with the administration. We often move legislation around here.
I would tell the gentleman that I do not remember the administration asking for the parental leave bill. Members are going to move at some point in the near future, along the way, and Members will not care a hoot about what the administration's opinion is on that, because what Members want to do is force the President into a veto of that bill. I just would remind the gentleman that that is a partisan way of dealing with national issues, too.
Mr. CLAY. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WALKER. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.
Mr. CLAY. Madam Chairman, in regard to the parental leave bill, as I recall, when the President of the United States was a candidate for President, in his acceptance speech at the convention, he said he wanted parental leave.
Mr. WALKER. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his contribution. Has he asked to bring forward that bill? I do not think so. That is the gentleman from Maryland's point, and the gentleman can make any issues that he wants in that regard.
The fact is, they have an agenda, and they are pushing it forward, and if need be, they will use that agenda for 30-second spots.
I would certainly like to also make the point that this is not useless legislation. This is something that can be blended in with what is going on. I was fascinated to hear many of the people coming to the floor, indicating the CIA did this problem and does it well. A couple of weeks ago Members were on the floor arguing that we ought not have any program for another agency, and at that time their arguments were that we ought not be testing Federal employees. Somewhere along the line we ought to have a bit of balance. The gentleman from New York is balanced. He is offering his amendment all the time. It would be nice to hear the same arguments.
Mr. HOYER. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WALKER. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. HOYER. So we do not mischaracterize what the debate was, the present policy which I worked on, and a number of people on both sides of the aisle and the former administration, President Reagan's administration worked on it, covers employees involved in security endeavors.
Mr. WALKER. Reclaiming my time, the gentleman from New York believes it ought to.
Mr. HOYER. All of these employees are involved in security-sensitive positions.
Mr. WALKER. The gentleman from New York believes it ought to go beyond that, and at that point the gentleman from Maryland argues, `No, we ought not test people involved in the narrow categories of duties that I personally support.' The gentleman from New York suggests that perhaps having it broadened across the whole Federal Government might, in fact, save Members from having some people on drugs that are presently users and abusers. I happen to agree with the gentleman from New York. The gentleman from Maryland is entitled to his opinion. Only I am suggesting, there needs to be some consistency in what we are doing in terms of policy.
Mr. SIKORSKI. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the Solomon amendment.
(Mr. SIKORSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. CLAY Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the Solomon amendment.
(Mr. CLAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
[Page: H4258]
(Mr. STOKES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
(Mr. MORAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. MORAN. Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Solomon amendment. It is bad legislation, and in fact beyond that it is demeaning to our finest civil servants who are dedicated in their professionalism to serving this country.
I trust that this body will reject any such attempt to demean their professionalism.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Oklahoma is recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. McCURDY. I just want to commend these gentlemen for truncating their statements. In the interest of moving this amendment, I would urge others to do so as well.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
Madam Chairman, I will not take but just a couple of seconds.
I do not plan on doing any 30-second sound bites, but I would like to give the Chair a look from a freshman's perspective. It seems like every single item that we want to do to limit the flow of drugs, to stop drugs, that there is opposition to it from the other side of the floor, and I cannot understand that.
Our country is being devastated by drugs. If I were a betting man, I would say someone in the CIA, someone in the FBI, we had a mayor of this city, pilots in my own command, air crews, policemen, across the board, and, yes, even in some cases casual use by Members of Congress, that everthing we can do to stop to flow of drugs, we should try to do.
Let me give you something from a personal perspective. In a squadron, as a commanding officer, in the last 20 years drugs were rampant when I first joined the Navy. We put random drug testing to use. Over a period of time, we cut that utilizations, but still 95 percent of all the cases that I saw in captains mast were drug-related.
Now, we had regular tests. We had a good program, but the only way that I was able to catch some of these rascals was through random tests. They used diuretics. They knew what period of time the tests were going to come. They would abstain from utilization, and even on deployment we would take the antidrug team and catch these rascals.
I submit, my colleague saying this is a demeaning bill, it is demeaning for the flow of drugs and utilization in this country and our inability to stop it.
In my opinion, from a freshman's perspective, we cannot continue not to support legislation that will improve that.
The amendment of the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] will do just that, add one more step in catching these rascals and I think we ought to support it.
[Page: H4259]
Mr. MFUME. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. MFUME. Madam Chairman, is the gentleman aware that the CIA currently conducts the most extensive drug testing program in the Federal Government?
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Yes, I am, and I am saying that regardless of how extensive it is, I bet we would find a member from the CIA who is a casual user of drugs. Would the gentleman say that is wrong?
Mr. MFUME. Well, I will just remind the gentleman that this is the most extensive drug testing program in the Government, conducted by the CIA on its employees.
I would just ask the gentleman further if the gentleman is aware that the Government spends $77,000 for each positive test that it conducts.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Yes, I am.
Mr. MFUME. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, the gentleman is also aware that it costs $10 per test, according to the CIA, according to the Department of Transportation, and every other Federal agency presently conducting random drug testing. That's $10 a test, and it is worth it.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. How much did it cost this Government when Mayor Barry used drugs in the city?
Mr. MFUME. Madam Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I will answer his question.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 169, noes 234, not voting 28, as follows:
[TIME: 1640]
The Clerk announced the following pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. DeLay for, with Mr. Ackerman against.
Mrs. Roukema for, with Mr. Dymally against.
Mr. Marlenee for, with Mr. Guarini against.
Ms. Molinari for, with Mr. Dingell against.
Messrs. VOLKMER, LEWIS of Georgia, WEBER, HUCKABY, and ANNUNZIO changed their vote from `aye' to `no.'
Messrs. BREWSTER, ERDREICH, CRAMER, and BROWDER changed their vote from `no' to `aye.'
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mr. MILLER of Washington. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Miller of Washington: At the end of the bill add the following new title:
[Page: H4260]
SEC. 501. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING UNITED STATES PERSONNEL CLASSIFIED AS PRISONER OF WAR OR MISSING IN ACTION AFTER 1940.
(a) In General.--Except as provided in section 502, the head of each department or agency which holds or receives any records and information, including live-sighting reports, which have been correlated or possibly correlated to United States personnel listed as prisoner of war or missing in action after 1940, including from World War II, the Korean conflict, and the Vietnam conflict, shall make available to the public all such records and information.
(b) Department of Defense.--The head of a department or agency referred to in subsection (a) in the Department of Defense shall make available to the public with its records and information made available under subsection (a) a complete listing of United States personnel of the agency classified as prisoner of war, missing in action, or killed in action (body not returned) after 1940, including from World War II, the Korean conflict, and the Vietnam conflict. The listing shall include--
(1) the current classification for each person listed; and
(2) any changes which have occurred in the person's classification during or after the conclusion of hostilities of World War II, the Korean conflict, and the Vietnam conflict.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 552a of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (11) by striking `and' after the semicolon at the end;
(2) in paragraph (12) by striking the period and inserting `; and'; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
`(13) required by title V of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1992.'.
SEC. 502. LIMITATIONS ON DISCLOSURE.
(a) Protection of Sources and Methods.--Section 501 does not apply with respect to information that would reveal sources and methods of intelligence collection that if released would compromise national security.
(b) Specific Mention by Name:
(1) Consent required for disclosure.--No record or
information, including a fatality report, which specifically mentions by name a United States service member who is classified by the Secretary of Defense as a prisoner of war, missing in action, or killed in action shall be made available to the public pursuant to this title unless--
(A) express consent for the disclosure is provided by the primary next of kin, or in order, the living--
(i) spouse,
(ii) child,
(iii) parent, or
(iv) sibling,
of the service member; or
(B) no relative of the service member listed in subparagraph (A) is alive.
(B) Disclosure to relative having authority not prohibited.--Paragraph (1) shall not be considered to prohibit disclosure of information to a person authorized to consent to disclosure of the information under paragraph (1)(A).
(3) Limitation on delegation of authority to consent.--The authority of a person to provide consent under paragraph (1)(A) may not be delegated to any other person without execution of an express legal power of attorney delegating that authority from the person having that authority to the other person.
SEC. 503. DEADLINES.
(a) Existing Records and Information.--The head of a department or agency referred to in section 501(a) shall make records and information available pursuant to this title not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) New Records and Information.--If the head of a department or agency referred to in section 501(a) receives records and information after the date of the enactment of this Act, such records and information shall be made available pursuant to this title not later than 180 days after it is received by the department or agency.
Mr. MILLER of Washington (during the reading). Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?
There was no objection.
(Mr. MILLER of Washington asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MILLER of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I would inform the committee that the chairman intends to accept the amendment offered by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller]. Therefore, there will not be a recorded vote on that amendment. It is also not my intention to request a recorded vote on final passage. So if we could have the patience of Members and quiet in the House, I think, we can resolve this matter very quickly.
Madam Chairman, I do not know the schedule after this bill, but if we can have the attention of Members for just a few minutes, we will finish this bill without further votes.
Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MILLER of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, I would inform Members that the next order of business after this bill passes is the rule on the foreign aid bill. We do not intend to ask for a vote on that.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MILLER of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, it is our intention to support the amendment of the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller] as well.
Mr. WALKER. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MILLER of Washington, I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. WALKER. Madam Chairman, I do not want Members to get the impression there are not going to be more votes today. There is a suspension bill left over from yesterday. Even after this bill is completed and the rule is completed, the suspension bill will come up. There is at least one more vote left for the day.
Mr. MILLER of Washington. Madam Chairman, I offer this amendment on behalf of the distinguished gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Carper] and myself.
Madam Chairman, for years families and friends of POW/MIA's from across the United States have waited for information on the fate of their loved ones. For some, the wait has been since Vietnam. For others, like Bill Sowles in my district, the Korean conflict. Still others have waited since as long as World War II. Today, I say enough is enough. Let us join together to pass an amendment that would open up Federal Government files to families of POW/MIA's.
This provision seeks to protect the rights and privacies of families of POW/MIA's by ensuring that no information mentioning a serviceman's name could be released without the consent of the family. At the same time, this amendment would protect Government sources because it does not require the release of information that might compromise national security.
Many Federal agencies have information about missing servicemen, including live sighting reports, which have been kept classified. But, beyond protecting intelligence sources and intelligence gathering methods, there are no other security considerations to justify keeping this information secret any longer.
It is high time that we make these files public--for our national conscience, for the morale of our veterans, and for the families of these soldiers.
Passage of this amendment is critical to obtaining the fullest possible accounting of literally thousands of missing military personnel from World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Many Members of Congress are now questioning why live-sighting
reports on missing soldiers dating back to World War II are still kept classified by Federal agencies on national security grounds. The Miller-Carper amendment will solve this perplexing dilemma by requiring the information to be declassified unless an agency can explain why it should remain classified.
This legislation is endorsed by a broad coalition of veterans and family groups including the Vietnam Veterans of America, the American Ex-Prisoners of War, and the National Alliance of Families of POW/MIA's. Together, we must seek answers from Federal departments and agencies on what POW/MIA information remains classified after all these years and why.
The families of World War II, Korean, and Vietnam soldiers, as well as the families of those now deployed in the Persian Gulf, need to know that Congress will do everything possible to ensure that Americans will never be forgotten or abandoned in a foreign land.
I hope that you will join me in supporting this amendment. The families of POW/MIA deserve to know of information that the Government may have about loved ones. It is the right thing to do.
[Page: H4261]
Mr. CARPER. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the amendment.
(Mr. CARPER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. CARPER. Madam Chairman, I will remind Members there are 2,000 American men who are still classified as missing in action, and the kind of discussion that is going on on this floor today does disrespect to them and their families. We will be very brief in describing this amendment.
Madam Chairman, the families of American men who are missing in Vietnam, in Laos, in Korea, deserve to know what our Government knows about their husbands, their fathers, their brothers, and their uncles. This legislation offered by my friend, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller], a version of the truth bill the gentleman introduced earlier this year, does just that.
[TIME: 1650]
It does so in a way to protect our intelligence sources. I want to thank him for his leadership. I want to thank the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] for accepting this amendment and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], as well. It deserves unanimous support.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
Madam Chairman, let me state at the outset that I am fully in sympathy with the motivation behind the Miller amendment. All of us want a full and final accounting of American servicemen who are missing and unaccounted for in foreign conflicts. We owe those individuals no less than a vigorous exploration of every lead that can reasonably be expected to shed some light on their fate. To the families of the missing in action, we owe as complete a disclosure as possible of available information about their loved ones. That is why I fully support the requirements in existing law and defense department regulations that the primary next of kin of all Americans unaccounted for in Southeast Asia be provided with all information which correlates or may correlate to their missing relative.
Most of the work done to collect and analyze information about those listed as missing in action is done by our intelligence agencies. It is extremely important that the sources and methods employed by those agencies to collect reports on missing Americans not be compromised. Once it becomes clear from whom a report was
received, or how information was collected, the future utility of that source or method is substantially degraded. Nothing would more directly detract from our ability to obtain the type of information sought by the Miller amendment than to disclose, even inadvertently, the sources and methods by which the information is obtained and reviewed.
The original version of the Miller amendment would not, in my judgment have adequately protected intelligence sources and methods.
The version now before the House is a significant improvement in this area over its predecessor. As a result, we will accept the amendment on this side. It still may not be acceptable to the administration, but we will work with administration representatives, and the gentleman from Washington to address those concerns.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCURDY. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, we are happy to accept the gentleman's amendment.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
(Mr. LAGOMARSINO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Madam Chairman, as Chairman of the Task Force of POW/MIA in Southeast Asia, I appreciate and share my colleague from Washington's deep concern about the fate of Americans still missing from the Vietnam, Korean, and Second World Wars. Both Presidents Reagan and Bush have made the fullest possible accounting of American POW/MIA's a highest national priority. We all should continue to support positive, responsible measures designed to enhance the return home of these missing Americans and, at the minimum, satisfactorily resolve their final fate. While I have some important reservations about this amendment, which I will describe and hope they can be addressed by the amendment's sponsor, in general I support it.
As Chairman of the House POW/MIA Task Force, I believe beyond a doubt and based on seven different investigations, including at least two by the House Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Committees, that the real answers to the fate of most of these men lie in Hanoi and Pyongyang, not in Washington in some secret Pentagon file.
For those who may not remember, on May 26, 1988, this House passed an amendment to the fiscal year 1989 Intelligence Authorization Act, which was subsequently signed into law, providing primary next of kin with all live sighting information that is related or could possibly be corelated to their missing relative. This information and any new reports are automatically provided to the next of kin--they don't even have to ask for it. This is already the law. The other contents of the missing serviceman's record are also already available to the primary next of kin. Should the family release this information, it is free to do so.
However, this 1988 amendment which I helped enact applies only to those POW/MIA's in Southeast Asia--those from the Vietnam War. I concur with Mr. Miller that the families of Korean war and World War II POW/MIA's also deserve the same service. These primary next of kin should receive all the information that is reasonably available that is related or could be corelated to their missing loved one.
The Miller amendment would allow the closest living relative to provide written consent to others in the public to be given access to the information to which the family is entitled. Because the family is already free to share whatever it likes with whomever it likes, I do not have problems with this provision. It retains family control over information about the missing member of the family. However, I believe it should be clear that the intent of Congress
is for the public to access this information through presently available channels and within presently established guidelines, like the Freedom of Information Act.
I am concerned by the time frame by which the various U.S. Government agencies must fulfill the obligations of this amendment. In the 1988 amendment, Congress specified that this information shall be made `in a timely manner.' And, it was. To arbitrarily assign a certain period of time, such as 180 days, can limit the flexibility of agencies like the Defense Intelligence Agency to accommodate the provisions of this amendment with conducting investigations and operations on any new live-sighting or other intelligence reports received. The last thing we want to do is create an unnecessary obstacle to today's efforts to followup on new intelligence. Our first and foremost goal must remain the repatriation of any live Americans.
I hope my concern will be satisfactorily addressed. Making the changes I have recommended will make this a more workable and more responsive provision. In general, I support the Miller amendment.
One concern I do have, however, is that providing this information may take away the time and talent and availability of personnel from what I think is the most important task and that is running down life sighting reports of people who may still be alive in Southeast Asia.
I would like to ask my colleague, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller], if it is his intention that that not happen?
Mr. MILLER of Washington. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. MILLER of Washington. That is certainly my intention. We do set a time limit on providing this information because many of our constituents have explained and complained about the delays and frustration. But it is not my intent that man or women power be diverted from doing intelligence operations. And as the gentleman from California [Mr. Lagomarsino] said, two Presidents have said this is the highest national priority.
If it takes another couple of people in order to supply the information that those who are inquiring need, then I am sure this Congress and the administration will supply those people and we should.
[Page: H4262]
Mr. DREIER of California. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. DREIER of California. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I simply rise in strong support of this amendment. I would like to compliment the chairman of the POW-MIA task force. The gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller], has pursued this in other legislation that we have had earlier this year. I would like to thank the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], for accepting the amendment.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection the gentleman from Oklahoma is recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. PENNY. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCURDY. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.
Mr. PENNY. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I simply want to rise in support of the amendment as well and thank the chairman, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], for his cooperation in getting this issue addressed.
Mr. McEWEN. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCURDY. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
(Mr. McEWEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. McEWEN. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I rise in strong support of the amendment.
Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCURDY. I yield to the gentlewoman from Kansas.
(Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas. Madam Chairman, I rise in strong support of this amendment. I think there are sufficient safeguards in here so that our sources and our methods of intelligence would be protected.
Mr. RAY. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCURDY. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.
(Mr. RAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. RAY. Madam Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 2038, fiscal year 1992 intelligence authorization bill.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller].
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further amendments to this bill?
If not, under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Panetta) having assumed the chair, Ms. Slaughter of New York, Chairman of the Committee on the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2038) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1992 for intelligence activities of the U.S. Government, the Intelligence Community staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 169, she reported the bill back to the House with sundry amendments adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will put them en gros.
The amendments were agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed.
The title of the bill was amended so as to read: `A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1992 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.'.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
[TIME: 1700]
END