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Mr. NUNN. I ask unanimous consent the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 734, S. 2834, the Intelligence authorization bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 2834) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 1991 for the intelligence activities of the United States Government, the intelligence community staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes which had been reported from the Committee on Armed Services with amendments; as follows:
(The parts of the bill intended to be stricken are shown in boldface brackets, and the parts of the bill intended to be inserted are shown in italic.)
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1991 the amounts referred to in section 102 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(2) the Department of Defense;
(3) the Defense Intelligence Agency;
(4) the National Security Agency;
(5) the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force;
(6) the Department of State;
(7) the Department of the Treasury;
(8) the Department of Energy; and
(9) the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) The amounts authorized to be appropriated by section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1991, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations to accompany ( ) of the One Hundredth First Congress. Such Schedule of Authorizations shall be considered to be a part of this Act, and any limitation, requirement, or condition contained in such Schedule pertaining to the amount specified for any project, program, or activity shall be considered to be a part of this Act.
(b) Such Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch of the Government.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
The Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the numbers authorized for fiscal year 1991 under sections 102 and 202 of this Act if he determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that such number may not, for any element of the Intelligence Community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such sections for such element. The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section.
TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Staff for fiscal year 1991 $28,900,000, of which amount $6,580,000 shall be available for the Security Evaluation Office of the Central Intelligence Agency.
SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL END-STRENGTH.
(a) Authorized Personnel Level: The Intelligence Community Staff is authorized 240 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1991, including 50 full-time personnel who are authorized to serve in the Security Evaluation Office of the Central Intelligence Agency. Such personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(b) Representation of Intelligence Elements: During fiscal year 1991, personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be selected so as to provide appropriate representation from elements of the United States Government engaged in intelligence activities.
(c) Reimbursement: During fiscal year 1991, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the Intelligence Community Staff from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
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SEC. 203. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF ADMINISTERED IN SAME MANNER AS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
During fiscal year 1991, activities and personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be subject to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) in the same manner as activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
TITLE III--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1991 $164,600,000.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
SEC 401. ELIMINATION OF 15-YEAR CAREER REVIEW FOR CIARDS AND FERS SPECIAL CATEGORY PARTICIPANTS.
Section 203 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended--
(1) by striking out the last sentence thereof; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new sentences: `Any officer or employee who elects to accept designation as a participant entitled to the benefits of the system shall remain a participant of the system for the duration of his or her employment with the Agency. Such election shall be irrevocable except as, and to the extent, provided in section 301(d) of this
Act and shall not be subject to review or approval by the Director.'.
SEC. 402. QUALIFYING PERIOD FOR CIA FORMER SPOUSE.
Section 204(b)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting before the period at the end thereof the following: `during the participant's service as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency'.
SEC. 403. SELECTION BETWEEN CIARDS ANNUITY AND OTHER SURVIVOR ANNUITIES.
Section 221(g) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
`(3) A surviving spouse who married a participant after his retirement shall be entitled to a survivor annuity payable from the fund under this title only upon electing this annuity instead of any other survivor benefit to which he or she may be entitled under this or any other retirement system for Government employees on the basis of a marriage to someone other than the participant.'.
SEC. 404. SURVIVOR ANNUITIES UNDER CIARDS FOR SPOUSES OF REMARRIED, RETIRED PARTICIPANTS.
(a) Calculation of Reduction in Annuities: Section 221(n) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting `or elected under section 226(e)' after `(unless such reduction is adjusted under section 222(b)(5)'.
(b) Election of Reduction in Annuity: Section 226 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(e) Upon a remarriage occurring on or after the date of enactment of this subsection to a spouse other than the spouse at the time of retirement, a retired participant whose annuity was not reduced (or was not fully reduced) to provide a survivor annuity for the participant's spouse or former spouse as of the time of retirement may irrevocably elect, by means of a signed writing received by the Director within one year after such remarriage, a reduction in the retired participant's annuity for the purpose of providing an annuity for such retired participant's spouse in the event such spouse survives the retired participant. The reduction shall be effective the first day of the month which begins nine months after the date or remarriage. For any remarriage that occurred before the date of enactment of this subsection, the retired participant may make such an election within two years after such date. To the greatest extent practicable, the retired participant shall pay a deposit under the same terms and conditions as those prescribed for retired employees under the Civil Service Retirement and Disability System under section 8339(j)(5)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code. A survivor annuity elected under this subsection shall be treated in all respects as a survivor annuity under section 221(b).'.
(c) Conforming Amendment: Section 226(d) of such Act is amended by striking out `This' and inserting in lieu thereof `Subsections (a) through (c) of this'.
SEC. 405. RESTORATION OF CERTAIN FORMER SPOUSE BENEFITS AFTER DISSOLUTION OF REMARRIAGE.
(a) Section 224(b)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting before the semicolon `, except that, if such survivor annuity is terminated because of remarriage, such annuity shall be restored at the same rate commencing on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce'.
(b) Section 225(b)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting before the semicolon `, except that the entitlement of a former spouse to benefits under this section shall be restored at the same rate commencing on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce'.
(c) Section 16(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403p(c)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
`(3) A former spouse who is not eligible to enroll in a health benefit plan under this section because of remarriage before the age of 55 shall be restored to such eligibility on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce.'.
(d) The amendment made by this section shall take effect on October 1, 1990, and no benefit shall be payable before such effective date.
(e) Any new spending authority (within the meaning of section 401(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974) provided pursuant to the amendments made by this section shall be effective for any fiscal year only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts.
SEC. 406. CONFORMING CIARDS TO THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM.
Section 292 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(c) Notwithstanding section 4(h) of the Civil Service Retirement Spouse Equity Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-615), Executive Order No. 12684 of July 27, 1989 (insofar as it conforms the Central Intelligence Agency Disability and Retirement System to the Civil Service Retirement System by lowering the remarriage age regarding the termination of surviving spouses' annuities from 60 to 55) shall be given effect as of its date of issuance.'.
SEC. 407. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN ALIEN EMPLOYEES IN HONG KONG.
(a) Authority: In applying the proviso of section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, in the case of an alien described in subsection (b), the Director may charge the entry of the alien against the numerical limitation for any fiscal year (beginning with fiscal year 1991 and ending with fiscal year 1996) notwithstanding that the alien's entry is not made to the United States in that fiscal year so long as such entry is made before the end of fiscal year 1997.
(b) Eligible Aliens: An alien eligible under subsection (a) is an alien who--
(1) is an employee of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in Hong Kong; or
(2) is the spouse or child of an alien described in paragraph (1) if accompanying or following to join the alien in coming to the United States.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENTS
SEC. 501. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COVER SUPPORT AUTHORITY.
(a) In General: Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new chapter:
`431. Authority for certain commercial activity
`The Secretary of Defense, consistent with this chapter, may carry out certain commercial activities as may be necessary for the purpose of providing security for the conduct of intelligence collection activities undertaken by the Department of Defense. Such activities shall be carried out only with the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and, to the extent such activities take place within the United States, shall also be coordinated with and, where appropriate, be supported by, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
`432. Use and disposition of funds
`Proceeds generated by a commercial activity carried out under this chapter may be used to offset necessary and reasonable expenses arising from that activity and shall be kept to the minimum necessary to operate such activity in a secure manner. Any proceeds in excess of those required for this purpose shall be deposited, as often as may be practicable, into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts. The disposition of such proceeds shall be audited at least annually by the organization assigned auditing responsibility by the head of the military department or defense agency for the commercial activity concerned.
`433. Relationship with other Federal laws
`(a) Except as provided by subsection (b), commercial activities conducted pursuant to this chapter shall be carried out in accordance with applicable Federal law.
`(b) Whenever the Secretary of Defense, an official of no lower rank than an Assistant Secretary of Defense who is designated by the Secretary for this purpose, or the head of a military department certifies that, in connection with the establishment or operation of a commercial activity pursuant to this chapter, compliance with Federal laws or regulations pertaining to the management and administration of Federal agencies would create an unacceptable risk of compromise of authorized intelligence collection activities, he may authorize the establishment and operation of such activities, notwithstanding such laws or regulations, to the extent necessary to prevent the disclosure of the commercial activity concerned as an instrumentality of the United States Government, except that such certification and authorization shall be in writing and shall specify the Federal laws or regulations for which compliance by the commercial activity concerned is not required consistent with this section.
`(c) As used in this section, the phrase `Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the management and administration of Federal agencies' includes-- means only the following--
`(A) Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the receipt and use of appropriated and nonappropriated funds;
`(B) the acquisition or management of property or services;
`(C) information disclosure, retention, and management;
`(D) the employment of personnel;
`(E) payments for travel and housing;
`(F) the establishment of legal entities or government instrumentalities; and
`(G) foreign trade or financial transaction restrictions that would reveal the commercial activity as an activity of the United States Government.
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`434. Reservation of defenses and immunities
`Commercial activity undertaken pursuant to this chapter, including the submission to judicial proceedings of any State, shall not constitute a waiver of the defenses and immunities of the United States.
`435. Restrictions
`(a) No corporation, partnership, or other legal entity may be established to carry out commercial activities pursuant to this chapter except with the approval of the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Such approval may not be delegated.
`(b) Nothing in this chapter authorizes the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by law or Executive order.
`(c) Personnel conducting commercial activity authorized by this chapter may only engage in those activities in the United States necessary to support intelligence activities abroad.
`(d) A citizen of the United States or an alien admitted to permanent residence in the United States may not be employed by, or assigned or detailed to perform operational, managerial, or supervisory duties for, an entity engaged in commercial activity authorized by this chapter unless that person has been informed of the purpose of such activity.
`436. Regulations, oversight, and legal review
`The Secretary of Defense shall issue regulations to implement the authority contained in this chapter within 180 days of its date of enactment. Copies of such regulations shall be provided to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives prior to their issuance. Such regulations shall be consistent with this chapter and shall, at a minimum--
`(1) specify all officials authorized to approve commercial activities pursuant to this chapter and, where a determination is required pursuant to section 433(b) only the officials specified by such section may approve the establishment or operation of the commercial activity concerned;
`(2) designate a single office within the Defense Intelligence Agency to implement, and maintain accountability for, all activities authorized pursuant to this chapter;
`(3) require prior legal review of all commercial activities authorized pursuant to this chapter; and
`(4) provide for appropriate internal audit controls and oversight for such activities.
`437. Reports to Congress
`(a)(1) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives (hereafter in this chapter referred to as `the intelligence committees') are kept fully and currently informed of actions taken pursuant to this chapter, including any significant anticipated activity to be authorized pursuant to this chapter.
`(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the Secretary of Defense shall provide the intelligence all such committees with prior notice of the establishment of any corporation, partnership, or other legal entity.
`(b) Not later than November 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the intelligence committees the committees described in subsection (a) a report on all commercial activity undertaken pursuant to this chapter during the previous fiscal year. Such report shall include a description of any exercise of the authority provided by section 433(b) to the Secretary of Defense, or other authorized officials, as well as a description of any expenditure of appropriated or nonappropriated funds made pursuant to this chapter.
`438. Definitions
`As used in this chapter--
`(1) the term `commercial activities' means activities conducted in a manner consistent with prevailing commercial practice and includes--
`(A) the acquisition, use, sale, storage, and disposal of goods and services;
`(B) entering into employment contracts, leases, and other agreements for real and personal property;
`(C) depositing funds into and withdrawing funds from domestic and foreign commercial businesses or financial institutions; and
`(D) acquiring licenses, registrations, permits, and insurance; and
`(2) the term `intelligence activities' means the collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information.'.
(b) Clerical Amendments: The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of title 10, United States Code, and at the beginning of part I of subtitle A of such title, are each amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 21 the following new item:
`22. Security Support for Department of Defense Intelligence Activities 431.'.
SEC. 502. POST-EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE FOR CERTAIN NSA EMPLOYEES.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
`Sec. 17. (a) Notwithstanding any other law, the Director of the National Security Agency may use appropriated funds to assist employees who have been in sensitive positions who are found to be ineligible for continued access to Sensitive Compartmented Information and employment with the Agency, or whose employment has been terminated--
`(1) in finding and qualifying for subsequent employment,
`(2) in receiving treatment of medical or psychological disabilities, and
`(3) in providing necessary financial support during periods of unemployment,
if the Director determines that such assistance is essential to maintain the judgment and emotional stability of such employee and avoid circumstances that might lead to the unlawful disclosure of classified information to which such employee had had access. Assistance provided under this section for an employee shall not be provided any longer than five years after the termination of the employment of the employee.
`(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall report annually to the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives with respect to any expenditure made pursuant to this section.'.
SEC. 503. REIMBURSEMENT RATE FOR CERTAIN AIRLIFT SERVICES.
(a) Authority: The Secretary of Defense is authorized to grant the use of the Department of Defense reimbursement rate for military airlift services provided by the Department of Defense to the Central Intelligence Agency, if the Secretary of Defense determines that those military airlift services are provided for activities related to national security objectives.
(b) Definition.--For purposes of subsection (a), the term `Department of Defense reimbursement rate' means the rate of reimbursement charged by the Department of Defense to the military departments.
TITLE VI--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PERSONNEL AUTHORITY
SEC. 601. EXCEPTED POSITIONS FROM THE COMPETITIVE SERVICE.
Section 621 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7231) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(f) All positions in the Department which the Secretary determines are devoted to intelligence or intelligence-related activities of the United States Government are excepted from the competitive service, and the individuals who occupy such positions as of the date of enactment of this Act shall, while employed in such positions, be exempt from the competitive service.
TITLE VII--OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 701. REPEAL.
Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2422) is hereby repealed.
SEC. 702. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.
(a) In General: Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413) is amended to read as follows:
`(1) nothing contained in this title shall be construed as requiring the approval of the intelligence committees as a condition precedent to the initiation of such activities; and
`(2) nothing contained in this title shall be construed as a limitation on the power of the President to initiate such activities in a manner consistent with his powers conferred by the Constitution.
`(b) The President shall ensure that any illegal intelligence activity is reported to the intelligence committees, as well as any corrective action that has been taken or is planned in connection with such illegal activity.
`(c) The President and the intelligence committees shall each establish procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.
`(d) The House of Representatives and the Senate, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall each establish, by rule or resolution of such House, procedures to protect from unauthorized disclosure all classified information and all information relating to intelligence sources and methods furnished to the intelligence committees or to Members of Congress under this title. In accordance with such procedures, each of the intelligence committees shall promptly call to the attention of its respective House, or to any appropriate committee or committees of its respective House, any matter relating to intelligence activities requiring the attention of such House or such committee or committees.
`(e) As used in this section, the term `intelligence activities' includes `covert actions', as defined in subsection 503(e).'.
(b) Information Required To Be Disclosed; Findings: The National Security Act of 1947 is amended--
(1) by redesignating sections 502 and 503 as sections 504 and 505, respectively; and
(2) by inserting after section 501 the following:
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`(1) keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities, other than covert actions, as defined in subsection 503(e), which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity and significant failures; and
`(2) furnish the intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities other than covert actions which is within their custody or control and which is requested by either of the intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.
`(1) Each finding shall be in writing, unless immediate action by the United States is required and time does not permit the preparation of a written finding, in which case a written record of the President's decision shall be contemporaneously made and shall be reduced to a written finding as soon as possible but in no event more than 48 hours after the decision is made.
`(2) A finding may not authorize or sanction covert actions, or any aspect of such activities, which have already occurred.
`(3) Each finding shall specify each and every department, agency, or entity of the United States Government authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in such activities, except that any employee, contractor, or contract agent of a department, agency, or entity of the United States Government (other than the Central Intelligence Agency) directed to participate in any way in a covert action shall be subject to the policies and regulations of the Central Intelligence Agency, or to written policies or regulations adopted by such department, agency, or entity, governing such participation.
`(4) Each finding shall specify whether it is contemplated that any third party which is not an element, contractor, or contract agent of the United States Government, or is not otherwise subject to United States Government policies or regulations, will be used to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in the covert action concerned or be used to undertake the covert action concerned on behalf of the United States.
`(5) A finding may not authorize any action intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media.
`(6) A finding may not authorize any action which violates the Constitution of the United States or any statutes of the United States.
`(b) To the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods, or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in a covert action shall--
`(1) keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government, including significant failures; and
`(2) furnish to the intelligence community any information or material concerning covert actions which is in the possession, custody, or control of any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government and which is requested by either of the intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.
`(c)(1) Except as provided by paragraphs (2) and (3), the President shall ensure that any finding approved, or determination made, pursuant to subsection (a) shall be reported to the intelligence committees before the initiation of the activities authorized.
`(2) On rare occasions, the President may direct that covert actions be initiated before reporting such actions to the intelligence committees. On such occasions, the President shall fully inform the intelligence committees in a timely fashion and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.
`(3) If the President determines it is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, the President may limit the reporting of findings or determinations pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, and the Majority and Minority leaders of the Senate. In any such case, the President shall provide a statement of the reasons for limiting access to such findings or determinations in accordance with this subsection.
`(4) In each case reported pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), or (3), a copy of the finding, signed by the President, shall be provided to the chairman of each intelligence committee.
`(d) The President shall ensure that the intelligence committees or, if applicable, the Members of Congress specified in subsection (c)(3) are notified of any significant change in a previously approved covert action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a previously approved finding, in the same manner as findings are reported pursuant to subsection (c).
`(e) As used in this section, the term `covert action' means an activity or activities conducted by an element of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad so that the role of the United States Government is not intended to be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include--
`(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of the United States Government programs, or administrative activities;
`(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;
`(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or
`(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of other United States Government agencies abroad.'.
(c) Availability of Funds Subject to Findings: Section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by subsection (b)(2), is further amended--
(1) by striking out `501' in subsection (a)(2) and inserting in lieu thereof `503'; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(d) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government, may be obligated or expended, or may be directed to be obligated or expended, for any covert action, as defined in section 503(e), unless and until a Presidential finding required by section 503(a), has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance with that section.'.
TITLE VIII--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 801. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR INCREASES IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1991 such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees which are authorized by law.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the bill?
There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, first let me thank my good friend and colleague from Oklahoma and note how pleased and proud I am to have served with him. Senator Boren makes every effort to forge a well-considered, bipartisan approach to the committee's work of overseeing the U.S. intelligence community and thereby does the country a great service.
This is the first in what augurs to be a number of difficult years for the U.S. defense and intelligence communities. As Senator Boren has noted, we are recommending serious reductions to national and tactical intelligence programs.
We have done this with reservations, acknowledging the new budgetary reality, and with the conviction that intelligence becomes more important--not less--as military personnel strength and budgets decline and as our forces are withdrawn from foreign shores. In a time of defense cutbacks, knowing the capabilities and intentions of your potential adversaries becomes all the more important. Although we want to do our part, we continue to believe that intelligence should not take a so-called fair share of defense cuts, a view I know is supported by the chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee. This is especially important as we spend less for weapons systems in order to make the most efficient use of our remaining defense dollars.
These budget pressures come at a time when one could easily argue that we need more, not less, intelligence. True, the Soviet Union has taken great strides in permitting freedom in Eastern Europe and advancing the cause of arms control. But the Soviet political and economic system--with or without Mikhail Gorbachev--is in crisis, and its future is highly uncertain. The collapse of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe has revealed faltering economies and fragile social structures and unleashed long-repressed ethnic tensions.
Beyond our traditional preoccupation with the Soviet Union and Europe, new threats are emerging, Counternarcotics, counterterrorism, chemical weapons, economic competitiveness, and the prospect of low-intensity conflict have created new challenges for U.S. intelligence. Nuclear weapons are no longer limited to the super powers, and the proliferation of ballistic missiles represents an ever-increasing threat to stability throughout the world.
We also cannot ignore our traditional friends and the espionage threat they may represent in the ever more competitive world economy. There is growing evidence that longtime allies are as voracious in seeking to steal our technological secrets as our traditional adversaries. And we must continue to guard against the individual who is willing to sell out his country. It is critical that we sustain a commitment of resources and reorient our counterintelligence and security programs to meet the emerging challenges.
Given the undeniable, though unpalatable, combination of budget reductions and proliferating threats, we will have to achieve greater efficiences within the intelligence community. In this context, I would like to briefly address the issue of Department of Defense intelligence. Overall, the Department of Defense is the country's largest spender, collector, producer, and consumer of intelligence. Over 85 percent of U.S. investment in intelligence is spent by defense, and it is replete with intelligence agencies and entities, as Senator Boren has noted.
Throughout the years, numerous individuals and reports have suggested that the proliferation of these agencies is as much tied to protecting rice bowls as it is to servicing a real need. Admiral Crowe, former JCS Chairman, is the latest to lament the state of DOD intelligence, citing significant duplication of effort, insufficient integration and sharing of information, and gaps in intelligence coverage and support.
The presence of as many organizations has a negative effect on maintaining our overall intelligence posture, particularly as we enter tight budget years. We cannot afford necessary collection systems because the Department of Defense is unable and unwilling to centralize and consolidate its operations.
I understand the Pentagon is looking into DOD intelligence to address these problems, but there is every reason to believe that the parochial interests within DOD are so powerful that little will come of the study. This is why I have urged that the Senate Intelligence and Armed Services Committee hold joint hearings with an eye toward creating legislation to consolidate activities, draft a charter for the Defense Intelligence Agency, and, above all, increase joint, and thus less parochial and more independent, intelligence activities. While such a reorganization may not save money immediately, I am confident that it will provide huge dividends in the out years, both in terms of intelligence and weapons acquisition savings.
There is another issue on which I would like to touch briefly, the section of the intelligence authorization bill dealing with covert action reporting requirements. Senator Boren has already summarized title VII, which deals with congressional oversight, but I think it important to explain why we have again included this provision in the authorization bill, as we did a year ago.
I think my colleagues ought to be aware that this title would establish important requirements governing the approval of covert actions by the President, as well as requirements for reporting covert actions to the Congress.
Most of these were contained in a bill which I introduced in 1987 in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair. Indeed, the bill was perhaps the most direct and comprehensive legislative response to that affair considered by the Congress. It passed the Senate in March 1988 by a vote of 71 to 19. A counterpart bill was reported in the House of Representatives but never reached the floor.
The principal feature of that bill, and the one that raised the greatest controversy, was an absolute requirement that the President report to the intelligence committees within 48 hours any covert action that he had approved. This would have replaced with a time certain, the vague requirement in existing law that where prior notice to the committee had been withheld, the President provide notice `in a timely fashion.'
President Reagan contended, however, that there would likely be circumstances where notice could not be provided within 48 hours, and to impose such a requirement would put him in the position of having to violate the law if he chose to withhold such notice. He asserted, indeed, that his constitutional responsibilities may give him authority to withhold beyond a 48-hour period. His Justice Department, in fact, stated that the President has `unfettered discretion' to interpret `timely' as he sees fit, that it could be as long as a year, as in the case of Iran-Contra.
In any case, it was clear that the President would veto any bill with a strict 48-hour limit imposed. Moreover, it was clear that there was not a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives willing to override such a veto.
Given these realities, Senator Boren and I undertook a series of discussions last summer with the Bush administration concerning the reporting of covert actions to the Intelligence Committee. Our goal was to obtain, at at minimum, a commitment from the President with respect to how he intended to implement the existing statutory requirement to provide notice `in a timely fashion.'
These negotiations culminated in a letter from President Bush to the committees on October 30, 1989, in which he stated:
[Page: S12300]
I intend to provide notice in a fashion sensitive to congressional concerns. The statute requires prior notice or, when prior notice is not given, timely notice. I
anticipate that in almost all circumstances, prior notice will be possible. In those rare instances where prior notice is not provided, I anticipate that notice will be provided within a few days. Any withholding beyond this period would be based upon my assertion of the authorities granted this office by the Constitution.
I interpret this letter to mean that if the President withholds notice for more than a few days after a covert action is approved, he will assert as his reason for doing so his authorities under the Constitution. He will not rely upon the wording of the statutory requirement as authorizing such latitude.
And quite clearly, Mr. President, the Congress never intended the statutory requirement for notice `in a timely fashion' to mean anything other than a few days after a covert action had been approved.
As a result of the President's commitment last fall, the committee decided to drop its insistence on a strict 48-hour notice requirement, and in the oversight language in last year's authorization bill, it opted to retain the `timely notice' formulation in existing law. The same approach is taken in title VII of this year's bill. But the report language makes clear that Congress in enacting this language intends to authorize withholding of notice for no more than a few days.
Whether or not the Constitution may authorize the President to withhold for longer periods is a matter that we can debate, but it is also one that we cannot resolve.
I would have preferred that a time certain for notice of covert actions to committees be established by law. I think this would have been the best way to ensure that the Congress is able to fulfill its own constitutional responsibilities. But, failing this, I think we have, nonetheless, with this bill and report, significantly clarified the institutional position of the Congress and enhanced notification procedures.
There are two other legislative initiatives in this bill that deserve special attention. The first is the authority in section 501 for the Defense Department to provide better commercial cover for its intelligence collection operations abroad. The Intelligence Committee has considered proposals of this sort by the administration for the last 5 years or so, and we have finally decided to go ahead on a very tightly controlled basis.
The main point is to keep these kinds of operations from growing to unmanageable dimensions. There is a very limited area where Defense Department intelligence components have made their case, and I expect the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees will keep a very close watch over the Department's use of this authority to make sure it does not go beyond those narrow bounds.
The second legislative provision with particular significance is the authority for the NSA Director under section 502 to assist former NSA employees whose financial difficulties might lead them to consider espionage. As the chairman has described, this is one of the 13 recommendations made by the Jacobs panel for improvements in U.S. counterintelligene capabilities.
This particular proposal responds specificially to the lessons of the Ronald Pelton espionage case. Pelton was an NSA employee with access to very sensitive information who, after leaving the Agency, got into financial difficulties and gave in to the temptation to sell out his country. While no single measure can be guaranteed to prevent espionage, the Jacobs panel correctly identified NSA's need to have the same authority as the CIA to assist former employees in circumstances of this sort, before their situation becomes so desperate.
In closing, while considering the importance of intelligence issues in this new environment, it might be worth citing the words of noted diplomat David Bruce as he
evaluated the lessons of Pearl Harbor. `The attack on Pearl Harbor,' Bruce said, `startled us like some gigantic dissonant firebell in the night of our false security. We felt betrayed and indeed we were. We were betrayed by the complete failure of our intelligence agencies. Any intelligence service worthy of the name should have foretold this event.'
Bruce ascribed this failure to America's `island state' psychology. `Our comparative geographic isolation,' he said, `led us, erroneously, to consider ourselves invulnerable to attempts against our sovereignty. Our immediate concern was with internal affairs; the alarums and excursions of foreign wars seemed to us infinitely remote and somewhat ridiculous.'
Today's world is far smaller than it was at the time of Pearl Harbor. If we could not afford to be isolationist then, we certainly cannot afford to be now. Budget reductions are justified, and they will be made, but they must be made responsibly. They must be made in a way that will not force us to abandon our international responsibilities. And, as they are made, as the margin for error becomes smaller, a robust intelligence capability is all the more essential.
Mr. President, let me conclude my remarks with the simple recommendation to my colleagues that they support this legislation. It has received the broad bipartisan approval of the committee and merits the support of our colleagues.
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Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, it is an honor for me to present to the Senate the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 1991. This is the 14th consecutive year, dating back to the creation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 1976, that the Senate has had the opportunity to consider an intelligence authorization bill.
Joining me in offering this bill is the distinguished Senator from Maine, the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee. This is Senator Cohen's last year of service on the Intelligence Committee and I can think of no one who has made a greater contribution to the work of the committee. During his 8 years on the committee, he has become extremely knowledgeable on intelligence matters and his insights and judgments have enormously benefited all of us on the committee and have been of great benefit to our country. It has been a privilege for me to work with him to fashion what I believe are sensible bipartisan policies and programs in this critical area of national security. He will be missed.
In addition to Senator Cohen, I also specifically want to thank those members of the Intelligence Committee who also serve on the Armed Services Committee--Senator Nunn, the distinguished chairman of that committee, Senator Warner, the ranking member, and Senator Glenn. Without the interests, contribution, and support of these crossover members, the Intelligence Committee's work would be undoubtedly much more difficult and much less successful.
I should also note that the work of the strategic forces and nulcear deterrence subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee makes an important contribution to the review of U.S. Intelligence activities. As such, I thank Senator Exon and Senator Thurmond, the chairman and ranking member of that subcommittee, for their careful review and continuing support of our efforts.
Mr. President, because of the sensitivity of the matters dealt with in the intelligence authorization bill, I cannot discuss many of the details in open session. However, the committee's recommendations on these matters have been set forth in the classified supplement to the committee's report on S. 2834 which has been available to Members since July 20, under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400.
U.S. Intelligence is clearly in a period of transition. The late 1970's and early 1980's saw dramatic growth in virtually every aspect of the intelligence budget, and we continue to see improvements in our capabilities as the systems and activities suported by past investment come on line. These improved capabilities were designed to meet the intelligence requirements of the 1980's and, as a result of this growth, I believe that U.S. intelligence is stronger today than it was 10 years ago. Obviously, it is important that these capabilities be maintained and we continue to try to strengthen them.
It is clear, however, that this will be difficult to accomplish in the current and expected future budget environment. Resources are ever more scarce and the Department of Defense cannot be as generous in allocating funds for those new or improved intelligence programs deemed necessary by intelligence program managers. Given this situation and understanding that the budgetary picture is probably going to get worse before it gets better, the committee adoped an approach different from previous years.
Rather than having individual program managers appear before the committee to defend their respective budgets, the committee first heard testimony from various officials relating to the dramatic changes rapidly taking place in the world order. Following this series of presentations, senior officials in the intelligence community described how U.S. intelligence was responding, or was planning to respond, to such developments, with emphasis on any programmatic and budgetary shifts that may be necessary or desirable. While the committee recognizes that such adjustments need to be made at a deliberate pace and continue over several years, this year's authorization bill does, in fact, reflect the beginning of a process to reorder priorities and objectives of U.S. intelligence activities.
For example, over the last 40 years U.S. intelligence has been properly consumed with developing, delivering and operating intelligence systems and activities aimed at countering the Soviet Union and its surrogates. In view of recent world events, it is clear that the underlying rationale for many of these programs is in serious need of review. This is not to say that requirements for intelligence on the Soviet Union are behind us, only that they are likely to be very different in the future. There is a vast amount of openly available information on the Soviet Union are behind us, only that they are likely to be very different in the future. There is a vast amount of openly available information on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that should offset the need for old strategies and investments. On the other hand, it is also clear that U.S. intelligence will have to cope with a more daunting arms control monitoring regime than heretofore envisioned that will require new investments.
In addition, there are other intelligence requirements demanding attention in the future that have not received adequate resources given the intelligence community's longstanding preoccupation with the Soviet threat. These include intelligence support to low-intensity conflict, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics, as well as intelligence on political and economic developments. We also need to contend with the worldwide proliferation of sophisticated weaponry, to include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the long-range missile systems to deliver them.
Finally, the committee believes that human intelligence--which can provide information on the intentions of both adversaries and friends--must be improved and has consequently funded an initiative to augment this type of collection.
As a result of this process--in which we sought to begin the process of shifting resources, reordering priorities, and meeting future needs within the context of the recognized need to reduce Federal spending wherever possible--the committee achieved a significant net savings in the intelligence budget compared to the administration's request.
Apart from its budgetary review, the committee--jointly with the armed Services Committee--is recommending that a major review of Department of Defense intelligence priorities, resources, organizations, roles, and functions be undertaken. Every echelon from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to the U&S commands, individual services, and below, has its own intelligence capability. Each organization requires separate buildings, administration, and security. This has raised concerns, not only of significant duplication of effort, but also of insufficient integration and sharing of information, uneven security measures and regulations, parochial service and commend interests prevailing over national intelligence interests, and gaps in intelligence support and coverage, despite the number of intelligence organizations.
Another problem, which transcends strictly Department of Defense intelligence, is that the tactical and national intelligence communities appear to be excessively isolated from one another, leaving each free to pursue self-sufficiency in their particular realms. Military commanders seek self-sufficiency through organic systems and organizations on the argument that national systems cannot be relied upon for support. The national community, likewise, emphasizes its peacetime missions and pays scant attention to the commander's needs.
Accordingly, our two committees have directed the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to review all Department of Defense inteligence and intelligence-related activities with the objective of consolidating redundant functions, programs, and entities, and strengthening joint intelligence organizations and operations. Both committees intend to initiate staff studies and to hold joint hearings to monitor the progress of these efforts and, if necessary, to draft legislation to achieve these objectives.
Now, Mr. President, let me turn to the bill itself and summarize very briefly what is accomplished by this legislation.
Title I of the bill authorizes the funds for the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government, incorporating by reference the classified schedule of authorizations.
Title II authorizes appropriations for the intelligence community staff for fiscal year 1991 at $28,880,000, and authorizes 240 personnel for that organization.
Title III authorizes appropriations for the CIA retirement and disability system for fiscal year 1991 in the amount of $164,600,000.
Title IV of the bill contains a series of seven relatively minor administrative authorities affecting the Central Intelligence Agency. The first six are amendments to CIA retirement programs. The most significant of these is section 405 which corrects an inconsistency in the treatment of former CIA spouses whose benefits were terminated because of remarriage before the age of 55. Under existing law, former spouses divorced after November 15, 1982, could have their benefits restored upon dissolution of their subsequent marriage, but former spouses divorced before this date could not. Section 405 would permit both groups to have their benefits restored in such circumstances.
Section 407 of the bill addresses a particular problem that CIA has with employees of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service who serve as translators of public broadcasts in Hong Kong. Without a guarantee that they will be able to immigrate to the United States when Hong Kong reverts to control of the PRC in 1997, many of these employees had indicated they would not remain in their positions. In consultation with the immigration subcommittees in both Houses, we have worked out a provision permitting the DCI to use unallocated portions of his annual allocation to permit up to 100 aliens to enter the United States to take care of these employees.
Another legislative provision in section 501 of the bill would provide authority to the Defense Department to engage in commercial activities to provide security for intelligence collection activities undertaken abroad by elements of the Defense Department. This legislation has been proposed by this administration and by the previous administration, and it has been subject to thorough scrutiny and careful revision by both the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees.
The intelligence components of the Defense Department have traditionally had a legitimate, but limited, role in carrying out intelligence collection operations abroad under commercial cover. The Intelligence Committee is satisfied that this legislation is necessary for the security of those operations and that the safeguards in the bill will ensure that the authority is properly controlled.
One of the major concerns of the Intelligence Committee this year has been legislation to strengthen U.S. counterintelligence capabilities. We have had the benefit of the recommendations of a distinguished panel of prominent Americans, chaired by Eli Jacobs, which proposed 13 different legislative initiatives based upon their analysis of the most serious espionage cases of the past 20 years. The vice chairman and I have introduced a bill, S. 2726, to implement those recommendations, and we have held public hearings leading to a mark up of that bill.
The Intelligence Committee decided that one of the Jacobs panel's recommendations should be reported as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act. Section 502 of the bill would allow the Director of the National Security Agency to provide assistance to former NSA employees for up to 5 years after leaving NSA employment where such assistance is essential to avoid circumstances that might lead that former employee to consider unlawful disclosure of classified information.
As far as the remainder of the Jacobs panel recommendations are concerned, we look forward to bringing S. 2726 to the Senate after the Intelligence Committee and the other committees with jurisdiction complete their consideration of that bill.
This brings us to title VI of the bill which provides authority for the Secretary of Energy to designate certain intelligence and intelligence-related positions on his staff as exempt from the requirements of the competitive service in order that the Department is able to fill these slots more expeditiously with qualified personnel.
Last, Mr. President, but certainly not least, title VII of the bill contains the provisions relating to congressional
oversight of intelligence activities that has passed the Senate on two previous occasions: Once in 1988, as part of S. 1721, which Senator Cohen introduced; and once in 1989, as part of the Senate's action on the fiscal year 1990 intelligence authorization bill.
The House Intelligence Committee did not accept these provisions in conference on last year's bill, wanting to make what it considered as further improvements to the bill. They did agree to consider it again on this year's bill.
I know Senator Cohen is planning to cover this subject in more detail in his statement, but let me just say to my colleagues that this remains an important piece of legislation, and, indeed, perhaps the most important legislation growing out of the Iran-Contra affair of three summers ago. It would correct many of the shortcomings noted by the congressional investigating committees and preserve for the future a legislative framework that is both workable and more predictable.
Among other things, the bill would require that--
All covert action findings must be in writing and may not authorize covert actions retroactively;
All Government agencies who participate in covert actions must be identified;
The findings must also state whether there are third parties not subject to U.S. Government control who are participating in the covert action concerned; and
Findings may not authorize covert actions which violate U.S. statutes or the Constitution, or for the purpose of influencing events in the United States.
The bill also incorporates a new definition of the term `covert action' which should help to eliminate the confusion as to what is, and what is not, a covert action.
These are important provisions, Mr. President, not only to the members of the Intelligence Committee, but to all of our colleagues in the Senate and to the American people, for whom, as we are deeply aware, we act in a surrogate role.
In conclusion, Mr. President, let me simply acknowledge the contributions of all of the members of the committee, as well as our very competent and dedicated staff, to the development of this legislation.
It was a cooperative, productive, and bipartisan effort of which the committee and the Senate, as a whole, can be proud. I urge the passage of the legislation that is now before us.
Mr. President, I now relinquish the floor so that my colleague, the distinguished vice chairman, can make his opening remarks.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from the Congressional Budget Office on cost estimate for S. 2834 be printed in the Congressional Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
U.S. CONGRESS,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, August 1, 1990.
Hon. David L. Boren,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
[Page: S12303]
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the attached cost estimate of S. 2834, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, as reported by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on July 10, 1990.
Should the Committee so desire, we would be pleased to provide further details on the attached cost estimate.
Sincerely,
Robert D. Reischauer.
1. Bill number: S. 2834
2. Bill title: Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991
3. Bill status: As reported by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on July 10, 1990.
4. Bill purpose: To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for the intelligence activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
5. Estimated cost to the Federal Government of titles II through VII of S. 2834:
[By fiscal year, in millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
----------------------------------------------------------------
Direct spending:
Estimated budget authority ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
Estimated outlays ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
Amount subject to appropriations:
Estimated authorization level 195 2 3 4 6
Estimated outlays 20 9 4 3 5
Bill total:
Estimated BA/auth 195 2 3 4 6
Estimated outlays 20 9 4 3 5
Net revenues ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
----------------------------------------------------------------
The CBO was unable to obtain the necessary information to estimate the costs for Titles I and VIII of this bill because of the classified nature of the material. The estimated costs in the table above, therefore, reflect only the costs of Titles II through VII of the bill. The
information about the budget functions in which some of these costs would fall also is classified. Therefore, a functional distribution of these costs has been excluded from this estimate.
Title IV contains several provisions that would directly change federal spending by altering entitlements of federal government employees. Most of these provisions would alter the requirements governing benefits for survivors of CIA employees. Changes would: Require that former spouse status under the CIA Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS) be granted only to those with five years of marriage while their spouse was employed outside the U.S. with the CIA; allow a CIARDS retiree who had not elected benefits for a former spouse to elect a survivor benefit upon remarriage; lower the age at which a former spouse can remarry without losing survivor benefits to 55; restore benefits to former spouses who had remarried but whose remarriage had dissolved; and, permit receipt of only one survivor benefit to surviving spouses who remarry and then become eligible for a second survivor annuity. Most of these provisions would conform the CIARDS with other federal retirement systems (such as the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System or the Civil Service Retirement System), and none of these provisions would apply to more than ten people. Costs or savings to the federal government from enactment of these provisions are not likely to exceed $50 thousand annually.
This estimate assumes that funds will be appropriated for the full amount of the authorization and that all resources will be available for obligation by October 1, 1990. Outlays are estimated based on historical outlay rates.
Titles II and III of the bill state fiscal year 1991 authorizations for appropriations for the Intelligence Community Staff of $28.9 million and for the required contribution to the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund of $164.6 million.
Section 401 of Title IV would eliminate a required review of retirement options after 15 years of employment at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Many employees of the CIA are eligible to retire under the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS) or under the Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) Special Category. The initial reason for this review was to allow a CIA employee to switch to a different federal retirement system if the benefits under CIARDS or FERS Special Category had not kept pace with other federal systems. Since CIARDS and FERS Special Category are relatively more generous retirement systems, no one elects a change in status at this 15 year review point. Abolishing this review would reduce the administrative burden of the CIA, though savings are not expected to exceed $100 thousand throughout the next five years.
Section 501 of Title V would provide the Department of Defense (DOD) the authority to engage in commercial activities for cover purposes. The cost of this section will depend on the Defense Secretary's use of the authority provided and will be partly offset by any funds generated through the commercial activity. No amounts are specifically authorized to be appropriated for these activities. CBO's estimate of the funds needed beyond those produced by these activities is based on a plan of the Defense Intelligence Agency for an execution of this cover system that would require additional amounts of approximately $1 million in the first year increasing to $5.7 million by 1995.
Section 502 would allow the Director of the National Security Agency to use appropriated funds to aid ex-employees who had been in sensitive positions. This assistance could take many forms, but cannot be provided for longer than five years after the termination of employment of the employee concerned. This estimate assumes that there will be fewer than 10 such cases in any fiscal year and that the National Security Agency will be able to provide this assistance within its existing resources.
Section 503 would clarify the rules governing reimbursements to the DOD for military transportation provided to the CIA. Specifically, this provision would allow the DOD to exempt the CIA from paying indirect labor costs associated with military airlifts. Enactment of this section would result in no net cost to the federal government.
[Page: S12304]
Section 404 of Title IV would permit a CIARDS retiree who had not elected benefits for a former spouse to elect a survivor benefit upon marriage. Retirees electing this option must remit an additional employee's survivor benefit contribution within two years of his election. This provision would apply to fewer than ten people. The revenue effects of this bill would be negligible in 1991-1995.
6. Estimated cost to State and local governments: None.
7. Estimate comparison: None.
8. Previous CBO cost estimate: None.
9. Estimate prepared by: Barbara Hollinshead (226-2840); Maureen Griffin (226-2859).
10. Estimate approved by:
James L. Blum,
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the fiscal year 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act. I would like to acknowledge the fine leadership of my good friend from Oklahoma, David Boren, the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intellingence, for bringing the administration's budget request for intelligence through the legislative review process.
I would also like to pay tribute to the excellent work of Bill Cohen, our committee's vice chairman. This is Senator Cohen's last year on the committee, and his departure is a significant loss for us. Senator Cohen and I have worked closely on many issues over the years, particularly since we share other committee assignments--in addition to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, we both serve on the Governmental Affairs Committee, which I chair, the Select Committee on Aging, and the Senate Armed Services Committee. I have great respect and admiration for his intelligence, integrity, and dedication as a public servant. Bill Cohen's hard work and commitment to a vigorous but responsible intelligence capability will be sorely missed from the Intelligence Committee.
Mr. President, I would like to discuss several elements of the committee's unclassified report.
The report contains a provision I sponsored along with Senator Warner which requires that the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] submit an unclassified report to the Congress by next May 1 dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I am hopeful that this report will prove sufficiently useful to become an annual publication. The unclassified report will provide a global assessment of the current state of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon and delivery vehicle proliferation, and an estimate of proliferation-related developments expected to occur within the next 5 to 10 years.
I am convinced that one of the most ominous threats facing the United States is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Third World. I believe that coming to terms with this difficult problem will require greater public awareness of the threat--an awareness that demands easier and more timely access to relevant information.
Because of my concern with public awareness of this important issue, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, which I chair, has begun a monthy newsletter entitled `Proliferation Watch.' This newsletter will provide updates on the progress and setbacks in international efforts to halt the spread of these weapons of mass destruction. I believe that an unclassified intelligence community document assessing the proliferation threat will make a significant contribution to awareness of a problem that is certain to be a growing source of concern to the public as well as the intelligence community and policymakers.
Mr. President, I would also like to express my strong support for language in our report calling for a reorganization of defense intelligence and a reassessment of DOD collection and analytical priorities. Such a reorganization of DOD intelligence should consolidate disparate or redundant functions and programs and strengthen joint intelligence organizations and operations. As a member of both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee, I intend to pursue this issue closely as both committees hold hearings and review legislative proposals on this matter.
Also, I would like to take this opportunity to comment about S. 2726, the `Counterintelligence Improvements Act of 1990' which is currently pending before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. While I have concerns with various provisions of this legislation, I would like to express my particular concern with section 12 `Authorizing Access to Subscriber Information of Persons With Unlisted Numbers Who are Called by Foreign Powers of Agents of Foreign Powers.' This provision has serious implications for protections currently afforded citizens under the Privacy Act. The disposition of personal information collected by the Government is inextricably linked with proposals for creating new means of Government access to personal information. The integrity of our Nation's privacy laws becomes jeopardized if we allow for the creation of such provisions without assurance of adequate protection.
Specific concerns include the following: How long will the records be kept? Will a data base, electronic or otherwise, be created? Who has access to the information? Is it accessible to other agencies? Is it available to the public? What privacy protections apply?
Mr. President, this provision raises additional questions of overbreadth as changes in the policies of the Soviet Union and recent developments in Eastern Europe have resulted in increased communications, including telephone contacts, between Americans and foreign officials and citizens. While I certainly share the concern with the ongoing threat posed to U.S. security by hostitle intelligence services and the importance of a vigorous yet responsible U.S. counterintelligence program, it is important to balance legitimate national security concerns with the need to provide adequate protection for individual privacy rights. If this provision is separated out of the bill and included as a floor amendment to our authorization bill, I hope that these issues will be adequately addressed in conference with the House.
In conclusion, I would like to express my concern with what I consider to be a growing perception that with the apparent end of the cold war, we no longer have a need for a robust intelligence capability. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an editorial I wrote on this subject which appeared in the Columbus Dispatch on July 3 of this year.
There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Accurate and timely intelligence is the foundation of America's national security. Intelligence provides us with information to define the constantly changing threat to American interest; it helps us determine what defense systems we should be acquiring based on that evolving threat; and it provides decision-makers with the data and analyses necessary to form a responsible national security strategy.
Intelligence plays perhaps its most vital role when the decision is made to commit U.S. forces into combat. Our most sophisticated weaponry and our most trained military personnel are useless unless we know where, when and how to deploy these resources for optimal effect in conflict. Indeed, accurate and timely intelligence is our greatest force-multiplier.
Yet with the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the decline of the Soviet threat, some believe that it is now safe to decrease the intelligence budget. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, our need for reliable intelligence is at its greatest during such periods of enormous change and uncertainty. The United States relies heavily on intelligence to detect and monitor these changes in the international system so we can reallocate increasingly scarce resources in a more efficient manner.
Calls for reductions in our intelligence spending are particularly troubling because America's preoccupation with the Soviet Union over the last several decades has minimized other threats to our national security. Perhaps the most ominous of these threats is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Third World--ballistic missiles, and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Iraq's recent attempt to obtain trigger devices to aid its nuclear program, the controversy over Libya's chemical facility at Rabta and the growing threat of war between India and Pakistan (both of which have nuclear programs and delivery systems of great concern to the United States), underscore the gravity of this threat. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is certain to be a growing source of concern to policy-makers and the intelligence community.
Another concern is the change taking place in the international economic system. America's international power and prestige are reflected not only in its political and military strength, but its economic vitality as well. Increasingly, our great power status will be defined in economic rather than military terms. If we are to remain competitive in the international marketplace with Japan and the European Community, we must focus our intelligence capabilities on economic objectives such as foreign trade activities and science and technology developments. The adage that `knowledge is power' is particularly true in the economic realm.
In addition, we must focus more of our intelligence capabilities on other emerging national security threats such as drug smuggling, terrorism, environmental change, low-intensity conflict in the Third World and the illicit export of high-technology items.
Besides these emerging threats, the need for intelligence gatherning to cover developments within the Soviet Union remains significant. After decades of having a comparatively static political and economic system, the Soviet Union is now confronting a highly uncertain period of profound political change, economic restructuring, a declining military establishment, ethnic and religious turmoil, and growing secessionist pressure.
Most significant among these many problems may be the chaotic Soviet economy. In fact, it is likely that the Soviets will devote more of their intelligence assets than ever before to obtaining our high-technology secrets--a relatively easy way for the Soviets to leapfrog their stagnant 19th century economy into the 21st century. Our counter-intelligence capabilities must remain strong in order to combat Soviet espionage efforts against America's science and technology base.
The changing international environment has also heightened expectations for the conclusion of a sweeping array of arms control agreements this year that will provide an important measure of predictability and stability to the superpower relationship--but only if verification concerns are adequately addressed by intelligence collection and analyses.
These arms control agreements will be highly complex and therefore very difficult to monitor. Enormously expensive intelligence systems that are necessary to monitor Soviet compliance with these agreements constitute the hidden cost of arms control. If these essential intelligence systems are sacrificed to narrow budgetary considerations, our ability to adequately monitor these agreements will be placed at risk--endangering our nation's security as well as the public's support of the arms control process.
Few realize the magnitude of the decision to cancel important systems needed for arms control monitoring and other essential intelligence functions. For example, last year the administration decided to terminate the SR-71, a high altitude, high speed long-range aerial reconnassance platform that brought a unique and reliable capability to America's intelligence community for decades. Such shortsighted action is often a result of the fact that the vast majority of our nation's intelligence resources cannot be fully discussed in public, if at all.
Indeed, relatively few members of the administration and Congress are even aware of the existence of many of these intelligence systems and programs. As a result, our intelligence capabilities have virtually no public constitency. In the years ahead, America can successfully navigate the turbulent waters of a rapidly changing world only with accurate and timely intelligence. Any effort to reduce our intelligence capability, particularly during this era of enormous change, would be both unwise and irresponsible.
[Page: S12305]
Mr. NUNN. I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendments be agreed to en bloc.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the committee amendments are considered and agreed to en bloc.
The bill is open to further amendment. If there be no further amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed, as follows:
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1991 the amounts referred to in section 102 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(2) the Department of Defense;
(3) the Defense Intelligence Agency;
(4) the National Security Agency;
(5) the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force;
(6) the Department of State;
(7) the Department of the Treasury;
(8) the Department of Energy; and
(9) the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) The amounts authorized to be appropriated by section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1991, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations to accompany ( ) of the One Hundredth First Congress. Such Schedule of Authorizations shall be considered to be a part of this Act, and any limitation, requirement, or condition contained in such Schedule pertaining to the amount specified for any project, program, or activity shall be considered to be a part of this Act.
(b) Such Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch of the Government.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
The Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the numbers authorized for fiscal year 1991 under sections 102 and 202 of this Act if he determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that such number may not, for any element of the Intelligence Community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such sections for such element. The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section.
TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Staff for fiscal year 1991 $28,900,000, of which amount $6,580,000 shall be available for the Security Evaluation Office of the Central Intelligence Agency.
SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL END-STRENGTH.
(a) Authorized Personnel Level: The Intelligence Community Staff is authorized 240 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1991, including 50 full-time personnel who are authorized to serve in the Security Evaluation Office of the Central Intelligence Agency. Such personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(b) Representation of Intelligence Elements: During fiscal year 1991, personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be selected so as to provide appropriate representation from elements of the United States Government engaged in intelligence activities.
(c) Reimbursement: During fiscal year 1991, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the Intelligence Community Staff from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
SEC. 203. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF ADMINISTERED IN SAME MANNER AS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
During fiscal year 1991, activities and personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be subject to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) in the same manner as activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
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TITLE III--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1991 $164,600,000.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
SEC 401. ELIMINATION OF 15-YEAR CAREER REVIEW FOR CIARDS AND FERS SPECIAL CATEGORY PARTICIPANTS.
Section 203 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended--
(1) by striking out the last sentence thereof; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new sentences: `Any officer or employee who elects to accept designation as a participant entitled to the benefits of the system shall remain a participant of the system for the duration of his or her employment with the Agency. Such election shall be irrevocable except as, and to the extent, provided in section 301(d) of this Act and shall not be subject to review or approval by the Director.'.
SEC. 402. QUALIFYING PERIOD FOR CIA FORMER SPOUSE.
Section 204(b)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting before the period at the end thereof the following: `during the participant's service as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency'.
SEC. 403. SELECTION BETWEEN CIARDS ANNUITY AND OTHER SURVIVOR ANNUITIES.
Section 221(g) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
`(3) A surviving spouse who married a participant after his retirement shall be entitled to a survivor annuity payable from the fund under this title only upon electing this annuity instead of any other survivor benefit to which he or she may be entitled under this or any other retirement system for Government employees on the basis of a marriage to someone other than the participant.'.
SEC. 404. SURVIVOR ANNUITIES UNDER CIARDS FOR SPOUSES OF REMARRIED, RETIRED PARTICIPANTS.
(a) Calculation of Reduction in Annuities: Section 221(n) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting `or elected under section 226(e)' after `(unless such reduction is adjusted under section 222(b)(5)'.
(b) Election of Reduction in Annuity: Section 226 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(e) Upon a remarriage occurring on or after the date of enactment of this subsection to a spouse other than the spouse at the time of retirement, a retired participant whose annuity was not reduced (or was not fully reduced) to provide a survivor annuity for the participant's spouse or former spouse as of the time of retirement may irrevocably elect, by means of a signed writing received by the Director within one year after such remarriage, a reduction in the retired participant's annuity for the purpose of providing an annuity for such retired participant's spouse in the event such spouse survives the retired participant. The reduction shall be effective the first day of the month which begins nine months after the date or remarriage. For any remarriage that occurred before the date of enactment of this subsection, the retired participant may make such an election within two years after such date. To the greatest extent practicable, the retired participant shall pay a deposit under the same terms and conditions as those prescribed for retired employees under the Civil Service Retirement and Disability System under section 8339(j)(5)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code. A survivor annuity elected under this subsection shall be treated in all respects as a survivor annuity under section 221(b).'.
(c) Conforming Amendment: Section 226(d) of such Act is amended by striking out `This' and inserting in lieu thereof `Subsections (a) through (c) of this'.
SEC. 405. RESTORATION OF CERTAIN FORMER SPOUSE BENEFITS AFTER DISSOLUTION OF REMARRIAGE.
(a) Section 224(b)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting before the semicolon `, except that, if such survivor annuity is terminated because of remarriage, such annuity shall be restored at the same rate commencing on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce'.
(b) Section 225(b)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting before the semicolon `, except that the entitlement of a former spouse to benefits under this section shall be restored at the same rate commencing on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce'.
(c) Section 16(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403p(c)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
`(3) A former spouse who is not eligible to enroll in a health benefit plan under this section because of remarriage before the age of 55 shall be restored to such eligibility on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce.'.
(d) The amendment made by this section shall take effect on October 1, 1990, and no benefit shall be payable before such effective date.
(e) Any new spending authority (within the meaning of section 401(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974) provided pursuant to the amendments made by this section shall be effective for any fiscal year only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts.
SEC. 406. CONFORMING CIARDS TO THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM.
Section 292 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(c) Notwithstanding section 4(h) of the Civil Service Retirement Spouse Equity Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-615), Executive Order No. 12684 of July 27, 1989 (insofar as it conforms the Central Intelligence Agency Disability and Retirement System to the Civil Service Retirement System by lowering the remarriage age regarding the termination of surviving spouses' annuities from 60 to 55) shall be given effect as of its date of issuance.'.
SEC. 407. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN ALIEN EMPLOYEES IN HONG KONG.
(a) Authority: In applying the proviso of section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, in the case of an alien described in subsection (b), the Director may charge the entry of the alien against the numerical limitation for any fiscal year (beginning with fiscal year 1991 and ending with fiscal year 1996) notwithstanding that the alien's entry is not made to the United States in that fiscal year so long as such entry is made before the end of fiscal year 1997.
(b) Eligible Aliens: An alien eligible under subsection (a) is an alien who--
(1) is an employee of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in Hong Kong; or
(2) is the spouse or child of an alien described in paragraph (1) if accompanying or following to join the alien in coming to the United States.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENTS
SEC. 501. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COVER SUPPORT AUTHORITY.
(a) In General: Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new chapter:
` 431. Authority for certain commercial activity
`The Secretary of Defense, consistent with this chapter, may carry out certain commercial activities as may be necessary for the purpose of providing security for the conduct of intelligence collection activities undertaken by the Department of Defense. Such activities shall be carried out only with the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and, to the extent such activities take place within the United States, shall also be coordinated with and, where appropriate, be supported by, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
` 432. Use and disposition of funds
`Proceeds generated by a commercial activity carried out under this chapter may be used to offset necessary and reasonable expenses arising from that activity and shall be kept to the minimum necessary to operate such activity in a secure manner. Any proceeds in excess of those required for this purpose shall be deposited, as often as may be practicable, into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts. The disposition of such proceeds shall be audited at least annually by the organization assigned auditing responsibility by the head of the military department or defense agency for the commercial activity concerned.
` 433. Relationship with other Federal laws
`(a) Except as provided by subsection (b), commercial activities conducted pursuant to this chapter shall be carried out in accordance with applicable Federal law.
`(b) Whenever the Secretary of Defense, an official of no lower rank than an Assistant Secretary of Defense who is designated by the Secretary for this purpose, or the head of a military department certifies that, in connection with the establishment or operation of a commercial activity pursuant to this chapter, compliance with Federal laws or regulations pertaining to the management and administration of Federal agencies would create an unacceptable risk of compromise of authorized intelligence collection activities, he may authorize the establishment and operation of such activities, notwithstanding such laws or regulations, to the extent necessary to prevent the disclosure of the commercial activity concerned as an instrumentality of the United States Government, except that such certification and authorization shall be in writing and shall specify the Federal laws or regulations for which compliance by the commercial activity concerned is not required consistent with this section.
`(c) As used in this section, the phrase `Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the management and administration of Federal agencies' means only the following--
`(A) Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the receipt and use of appropriated and nonappropriated funds;
`(B) the acquisition or management of property or services;
`(C) information disclosure, retention, and management;
`(D) the employment of personnel;
`(E) payments for travel and housing;
`(F) the establishment of legal entities or government instrumentalities; and
`(G) foreign trade or financial transaction restrictions that would reveal the commercial activity as an activity of the United States Government.
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` 434. Reservation of defenses and immunities
`Commercial activity undertaken pursuant to this chapter, including the submission to judicial proceedings of any State, shall not constitute a waiver of the defenses and immunities of the United States.
` 435. Restrictions
`(a) No corporation, partnership, or other legal entity may be established to carry out commercial activities pursuant to this chapter except with the approval of the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Such approval may not be delegated.
`(b) Nothing in this chapter authorizes the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by law or Executive order.
`(c) Personnel conducting commercial activity authorized by this chapter may only engage in those activities in the United States necessary to support intelligence activities abroad.
`(d) A citizen of the United States or an alien admitted to permanent residence in the United States may not be employed by, or assigned or detailed to perform operational, managerial, or supervisory duties for, an entity engaged in commercial activity authorized by this chapter unless that person has been informed of the purpose of such activity.
` 436. Regulations, oversight, and legal review
`The Secretary of Defense shall issue regulations to implement the authority contained in this chapter within 180 days of its date of enactment. Copies of such regulations shall be provided to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives prior to their issuance. Such regulations shall be consistent with this chapter and shall, at a minimum--
`(1) specify all officials authorized to approve commercial activities pursuant to this chapter and, where a determination is required pursuant to section 433(b) only the officials specified by such section may approve the establishment or operation of the commercial activity concerned;
`(2) designate a single office within the Defense Intelligence Agency to implement, and maintain accountability for, all activities authorized pursuant to this chapter;
`(3) require prior legal review of all commercial activities authorized pursuant to this chapter; and
`(4) provide for appropriate internal audit controls and oversight for such activities.
` 437. Reports to Congress
`(a)(1) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives (hereafter in this chapter referred to as `the intelligence committees') are kept fully and currently informed of actions taken pursuant to this chapter, including any significant anticipated activity to be authorized pursuant to this chapter.
`(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the Secretary of Defense shall provide all such committees with prior notice of the establishment of any corporation, partnership, or other legal entity.
`(b) Not later than November 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the committees described in subsection (a) a report on all commercial activity undertaken pursuant to this chapter during the previous fiscal year. Such report shall include a description of any exercise of the authority provided by section 433(b) to the Secretary of Defense, or other authorized officials, as well as a description of any expenditure of appropriated or nonappropriated funds made pursuant to this chapter.
` 438. Definitions
`As used in this chapter--
`(1) the term `commercial activities' means activities conducted in a manner consistent with prevailing commercial practice and includes--
`(A) the acquisition, use, sale, storage, and disposal of goods and services;
`(B) entering into employment contracts, leases, and other agreements for real and personal property;
`(C) depositing funds into and withdrawing funds from domestic and foreign commercial businesses or financial institutions; and
`(D) acquiring licenses, registrations, permits, and insurance; and
`(2) the term `intelligence activities' means the collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information.
(b) Clerical Amendments: The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of title 10, United States Code, and at the beginning of part I of subtitle A of such title, are each amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 21 the following new item:
`22. Security Support for Department of Defense Intelligence Activities 431.'.
SEC. 502. POST-EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE FOR CERTAIN NSA EMPLOYEES.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
`Sec. 17. (a) Notwithstanding any other law, the Director of the National Security Agency may use appropriated funds to assist employees who have been in sensitive positions who are found to be ineligible for continued access to Sensitive Compartmented Information and employment with the Agency, or whose employment has been terminated--
`(1) in finding and qualifying for subsequent employment,
`(2) in receiving treatment of medical or psychological disabilities, and
`(3) in providing necessary financial support during periods of unemployment,
if the Director determines that such assistance is essential to maintain the judgment and emotional stability of such employee and avoid circumstances that might lead to the unlawful disclosure of classified information to which such employee had had access. Assistance provided under this section for an employee shall not be provided any longer than five years after the termination of the employment of the employee.
`(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall report annually to the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives with respect to any expenditure made pursuant to this section.'.
SEC. 503. REIMBURSEMENT RATE FOR CERTAIN AIRLIFT SERVICES.
(a) Authority: The Secretary of Defense is authorized to grant the use of the Department of Defense reimbursement rate for military airlift services provided by the Department of Defense to the Central Intelligence Agency, if the Secretary of Defense determines that those military airlift services are provided for activities related to national security objectives.
(b) Definition.--For purposes of subsection (a), the term `Department of Defense reimbursement rate' means the rate of reimbursement charged by the Department of Defense to the military departments.
TITLE VI--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PERSONNEL AUTHORITY
SEC. 601. EXCEPTED POSITIONS FROM THE COMPETITIVE SERVICE.
Section 621 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7231) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(f) All positions in the Department which the Secretary determines are devoted to intelligence or intelligence-related activities of the United States Government are excepted from the competitive service, and the individuals who occupy such positions as of the date of enactment of this Act shall, while employed in such positions, be exempt from the competitive service.
TITLE VII--OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 701. REPEAL.
Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2422) is hereby repealed.
SEC. 702. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.
(a) In General: Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413) is amended to read as follows:
`(1) nothing contained in this title shall be construed as requiring the approval of the intelligence committees as a condition precedent to the initiation of such activities; and
`(2) nothing contained in this title shall be construed as a limitation on the power of the President to initiate such activities in a manner consistent with his powers conferred by the Constitution.
`(b) The President shall ensure that any illegal intelligence activity is reported to the intelligence committees, as well as any corrective action that has been taken or is planned in connection with such illegal activity.
`(c) The President and the intelligence committees shall each establish procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.
`(d) The House of Representatives and the Senate, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall each establish, by rule or resolution of such House, procedures to protect from unauthorized disclosure all classified information and all information relating to intelligence sources and methods furnished to the intelligence committees or to Members of Congress under this title. In accordance with such procedures, each of the intelligence committees shall promptly call to the attention of its respective House, or to any appropriate committee or committees of its respective House, any matter relating to intelligence activities requiring the attention of such House or such committee or committees.
`(e) As used in this section, the term `intelligence activities' includes `covert actions', as defined in subsection 503(e).'.
(b) Information Required To Be Disclosed; Findings: The National Security Act of 1947 is amended--
(1) by redesignating sections 502 and 503 as sections 504 and 505, respectively; and
(2) by inserting after section 501 the following:
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`(1) keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities, other than covert actions, as defined in subsection 503(e), which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity and significant failures; and
`(2) furnish the intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities other than covert actions which is within their custody or control and which is requested by either of the intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.
`(1) Each finding shall be in writing, unless immediate action by the United States is required and time does not permit the preparation of a written finding, in which case a written record of the President's decision shall be contemporaneously made and shall be reduced to a written finding as soon as possible but in no event more than 48 hours after the decision is made.
`(2) A finding may not authorize or sanction covert actions, or any aspect of such activities, which have already occurred.
`(3) Each finding shall specify each and every department, agency, or entity of the United States Government authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in such activities, except that any employee, contractor, or contract agent of a department, agency, or entity of the United States Government (other than the Central Intelligence Agency) directed to participate in any way in a covert action shall be subject to the policies and regulations of the Central Intelligence Agency, or to written policies or regulations adopted by such department, agency, or entity, governing such participation.
`(4) Each finding shall specify whether it is contemplated that any third party which is not an element, contractor, or contract agent of the United States Government, or is not otherwise subject to United States Government policies or regulations, will be used to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in the covert action concerned or be used to undertake the covert action concerned on behalf of the United States.
`(5) A finding may not authorize any action intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media.
`(6) A finding may not authorize any action which violates the Constitution of the United States or any statutes of the United States.
`(b) To the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods, or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in a covert action shall--
`(1) keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities, other than covert actions, as defined in subsection 503(e), which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity and significant failures; and
`(2) furnish the intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities other than covert actions which is within their custody or control and which is requested by either of the intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.
`(c)(1) Except as provided by paragraphs (2) and (3), the President shall ensure that any finding approved, or determination made, pursuant to subsection (a) shall be reported to the intelligence committees before the initiation of the activities authorized.
`(2) On rare occasions, the President may direct that covert actions be initiated before reporting such actions to the intelligence committees. On such occasions, the President shall fully inform the intelligence committees in a timely fashion and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.
`(3) If the President determines it is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, the President may limit the reporting of findings or determinations pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, and the Majority and Minority leaders of the Senate. In any such case, the President shall provide a statement of the reasons for limiting access to such findings or determinations in accordance with this subsection.
`(4) In each case reported pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), or (3), a copy of the finding, signed by the President, shall be provided to the chairman of each intelligence committee.
`(d) The President shall ensure that the intelligence committees or, if applicable, the Members of Congress specified in subsection (c)(3) are notified of any significant change in a previously approved covert action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a previously approved finding, in the same manner as findings are reported pursuant to subsection (c).
`(e) As used in this section, the term `covert action' means an activity or activities conducted by an element of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad so that the role of the United States Government is not intended to be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include--
`(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of the United States Government programs, or administrative activities;
`(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;
`(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or
`(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of other United States Government agencies abroad.'.
(c) Availability of Funds Subject to Findings: Section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by subsection (b)(2), is further amended--
(1) by striking out `501' in subsection (a)(2) and inserting in lieu thereof `503'; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(d) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government, may be obligated or expended, or may be directed to be obligated or expended, for any covert action, as defined in section 503(e), unless and until a Presidential finding required by section 503(a), has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance with that section.'.
TITLE VIII--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 801. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR INCREASES IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1991 such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees which are authorized by law.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. SIMPSON. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
END