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The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 1352) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for military functions of the Department of Defense and to prescribe military personnel levels for such Department for fiscal years 1990 and 1991, and for other purposes.
The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
Mr. WIRTH addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. WIRTH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Chair recognizes the Senator from Illinois, Mr. Dixon.
(The remarks of Mr. Dixon pertaining to the introduction of S. 1379 are located in today's Record under `Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.')
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is S. 1352.
Mr. NUNN, Mr. President, I am pleased to bring before the Senate, S. 1352, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991. This bill provides the authorization required in law for almost all of the major functions under the jurisdiction of our Committee on Armed Services, including the activities of the Department of Defense; the Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Programs; and the Military Construction Program.
Two years ago at the beginning of the 100th Congress, the Armed Services Committee reported the first 2-year authorization bill for the Department of Defense. President Reagan submitted a 2-year budget request for the Defense Department in January, and President Bush's budget amendment in April endorsed this biennial approach for fiscal years 1990 and 1991. This year the committee again recommends authorization of national defense programs for a 2-year period.
The committee's work on the second-year of this 2-year budget was made more difficult by the fact that the April budget summit agreement between Congress and the President covered only 1 fiscal year, fiscal year 1990. Without agreement between Congress and the administration on an overall National Defense figure for fiscal year 1991, the committee was not able to authorize the total National Defense Program for fiscal year 1991. However, we continue to believe that 2-year budgeting will not only improve congressional oversight of defense programs but also achieve long-term savings and better management as the Defense Department stabilizes its planning and procurement.
For fiscal year 1990, the bill reported by the committee authorizes programs totaling $305.5 billion in budget authority, the level agreed to in the budget summit agreement. For fiscal year 1991, the committee has approved 85 percent of the defense authorization request. The committee focused its work on the second year of the budget request on stable, noncontroversial programs, and activities. Programs and activities not authorized for fiscal year 1991 were not done so with prejudice as to their merits.
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Most Members are aware that the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that outlays for the Defense Department in the amended fiscal year 1990 budget will be $3.8 billion higher than the administration estimate and the outlay level in the bipartisan budget agreement. I have urged the leadership of the Senate as well as people at the White House to get CBO and DOD together, as well as OMB, discuss why this estimating difference exists, and to see if some resolution is not possible.
This continuing technical scoring difference threatens to cause major disruptions in our national security policy. Since it is virtually impossible to hit both the budget authority and outlay target as estimated by CBO in the bipartisan budget agreement, we faced two equally unpleasant prospects in marking up this bill. One choice, either cutting fiscal year 1990 defense budget authority by $8 to $10 billion below the level of the bipartisan budget agreement to get the necessary $3.8 billion in outlay savings; or cutting faster-spending accounts, which are personnel, operations, and maintenance, and adding funds to slower spending investment accounts. This approach would let us meet both the budget authority and outlay target of the bipartisan budget agreement, but it would also drastically reorder our defense priorities in ways no one would support.
We believe the committee bill solves this dilemma by putting a mandatory, legal ceiling on expenditures or outlays in the Defense Department for fiscal year 1990. This binding expenditure ceiling will force the Defense Department to manage its obligations in order to live within the outlay target of the bipartisan budget agreement and the fiscal year 1990 budget resolution. The Defense Department has maintained all along that their budget for fiscal year 1990 meets this outlay target--this provision will simply make sure that they live up to their word.
For instance, it would be very easy for the committee to meet the budget authority and the outlay targets given to us by the leadership of the Congress and the White House if we, for instance, put in three or four new ships that spend out at a very slow rate, over 6 or 7 years, which would obligate the taxpayers of this country for a lot more in future years in defense expenditures while at the same time cutting the pay or cutting the operations and maintenance, which are fast-spending accounts.
We could meet the budget authority and outlay targets by doing that, but it would be counterproductive to our national security and also counterproductive to deficits in future years. We would be increasing the deficits in future years in order to meet an outlay target in this year.
I want to commend Secretary Cheney for the approach that the took in meeting the targets of the bipartisan budget agreement. He realized that the budget pressures facing the Defense Department required a long-term, multiyear approach and could not be dealt with simply on a 1-year basis. This long-term approach is essential if we are to bring the strategy and programs of the Defense Department back in line with fiscal reality.
Secretary Cheney's priorities in this budget were ensuring the continued well-being of our uniformed personnel; preserving the gains in readiness and sustainability of our forces, even if it means reducing their overall size; maintaining efficient production rates of weapons systems, even if major procurement programs must be terminated; and continuing the modernization of our strategic land-based missiles.
The authorization bill reported by the committee endorses these priorities. The committee's actions are described in detail in Senate Report 101-81, which accompanies S. 1352. I want to take a few moments to summarize some of the committee's actions in this bill.
Secretary Cheney took a controversial step in his amended budget request by recommending termination of eight major new weapon systems.
Not really new, but they are being terminated at a time where they are producing new units and these are, of course, very controversial cuts. They are: V-22 tiltrotor, F-14 D (new production), F-15E (after fiscal year 1991), AH-64 (after fiscal year 1991), Army Helicopter Improvement Program, M88 Recovery Vehicle, SSN-688 submarine, and the Phoenix missile (after fiscal year 1990).
These program terminations represented $3 billion, or 30 percent, of the budget savings Secretary Cheney had to achieve in fiscal year 1990, and 28 percent of the total savings made by the Defense Department in the amended budget request over the 5-year defense plan.
The committee spent considerable time debating and reviewing these programs. We concluded that all of them, with the exception of the V-22, should be terminated as recommended by Secretary Cheney.
With respect to the V-22, the committee provided $255 million of research and development funds in fiscal year 1990 to complete the flight test program for the V-22.
I have heard a lot of people say there is commercial potential there. I hope there is. But that potential will never be realized if the program is not completed in terms of flight testing.
(Mr. FORD assumed the chair.)
Mr. NUNN. If a substantial commercial market for the V-22 is demonstrated, and if a number of other questions posed by the committee are answered satisfactorily, the committee will reconsider the issue of whether the program is affordable for our defense needs.
Mr. President, the committee voted by a wide, bipartisan margin to support these program terminations. Unless the Senate gives us different instructions during the debate on this bill, we intend to strongly argue the committee position in conference with the House, since the House has added many of these terminated programs back into the budget.
The committee approved funds as requested by the administration for the modernization of the land-based ICBM force and for the Trident submarine programs. The committee increased funds for the procurement of Trident II missiles to bring the production rate closer to the level requested by the Navy 2 years ago for fiscal year 1990.
The committee established a comprehensive set of restrictions on the obligation of funds for the procurement of B-2 aircraft in the current low rate initial production phase. These restrictions are tied to demonstrated flight milestones, such as first flight, completion of the initial block of flight testing, and initiation of low observable testing. The committee reduced the procurement funding requested for the B-2 by $300 million in fiscal year 1990, and directed a clarification in the process by which responsibilities for correction of deficiencies in the production of the aircraft, if any, are determined.
For the advanced cruise missile, the committee fenced funding until the missile demonstrates improved flight test performance. The committee also applied the `fly-before-buy' principle to the B-1 modification program by limiting modifications to the aircraft's electronic countermeasures system to six aircraft, and mandating a flight test program as a condition for further modifications to the aircraft fleet.
The committee authorized a total of $4.5 billion for the strategic defense initiative research in the Defense and Energy Departments, a reduction of $66 million from the combined amended budget request. The committee again extended the restriction on SDI development and testing which requires the Defense Department to conduct SDI consistent with the plan it submitted to Congress this year. In a hearing last month, administration witnesses testified that the plan wold not involve any development or testing under the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.
In the national security programs of the Department of Energy, the committee provided $418 million above the budget request for environmental restoration and waste operations activities to speed the cleanup of the extensively contaminated facilities in the nuclear weapons complex.
The amount of $418 million is a lot of money, but this is only a small down payment on the bills that we face in cleaning up the nuclear mess that has accumulated over the years.
The committee also added $100 million to the budget request to fund the creation of a new program to accelerate the development of innovative cleanup technologies, for a total of $1.819 billion in waste cleanup accounts.
Additional environmental, safety and management provisions recommended by the committee include establishment of a Presidentially appointed Blue Ribbon Task Group to review the long-term funding of and requirements for environmental restoration and defense waste activities; special personnel management authority for critical DOE positions; regular reporting requirements for major national security programs; 5-year planning for all DOE defense programs; authorization of a management training program; and recognition that environmental restoration is one of the major missions of DOE's national security programs.
Mr. President, these environmental, safety and management provisions, along with authorization of $1.8 billion in cleanup funds, were reported as a separate bill by the committee and will be offered as an amendment to this bill.
We are doing that for several reasons, but one of the reasons is we want everyone to focus on this cleanup problem and focus on the amount of money that is going to be required over the long haul for this major effort.
In the nuclear materials programs, the committee fully funded the new production reactor program. The committee also reduced funding for the special isotope separation [SIS] project by $75 million in recognition of the Secretary of Energy's decision to prepare an environmental impact statement on the SIS test facility, delaying the construction program by at least 1 year. The committee further required that the Secretary of Energy certify that the SIS technology has been proven and that all environmental requirements have been met before construction funds beyond those authorized in the bill are obligated.
I want to commend Senator Exon and Senator Thurmond for their strong and capable leadership of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence.
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The committee concluded that the reductions in advanced conventional munitions proposed in the budget are militarily unwise and economically unsound. The Commanders in Chief from the principal war-fighting commands face serious shortages of these critical weapons. In addition, the proposed cuts in missile production would have raised unit costs and nullified any benefits from dual-source competition. The price of five key munitions programs, for example, increased by 19 percent in fiscal year 1990 because of program stretchouts. As a result, the committee authorized an increase in the fiscal year 1990 purchase of the Army Tactical Missile System [ATACMS], Hellfire, Stinger, Multiple Launch Rocket System [MLRS] rockets, TOW, and HARM missiles. This munitions initiative was reported by the committee as a separate bill and will be offered as an amendment to this bill, and indeed I hope we will be voting on that later this afternoon.
The committee also reaffirmed its commitment to help the Army improve its armor-antiarmor capability. The committee added funds for the block II M-1 tank upgrade program; the Heavy Forces Modernization Program; research and development of electromagnetic gun technology; and the use of the fiber optic guided missile for antiarmor missions.
The committee found that the Army and the Marine Corps emphasize research and development of sophisticated weapons systems at the expense of weapons and equipment for the individual soldier and marine. The committee believes that the effectiveness of our Nation's foot soldiers can be significantly increased through more aggressive efforts to identify and purchase, as well as develop, better weapons and equipment for our soldiers and marines. These efforts should include surveying foreign armies and commercial sources for items that can be procured off the shelf.
We do not have to invent everything and have Army specifications or Marine specifications for every piece of equipment. We need to go ahead and make decisions and get some good equipment out there to the people who have to do the fighting if there ever is a war.
The committee authorized $30 million in research and development funds for the Army and Marine Corps to develop lighter, more lethal infantry weapons; better, lighter antiarmor weapons; and improved field gear and equipment.
The committee also continued its emphasis on improving equipment for the Reserve and National Guard. The committee approved $397 million for additional equipment in this area above the amount requested in the budget.
These two initiatives--the Soldier/Marine Enhancement Program and the Reserve and National Guard procurement initiative--were reported as separate bills by the committee, and will be offered as amendments to this bill during the course of the debate.
Senator Levin and Senator Wilson, the chairman and ranking member of the Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense, deserve a great deal of credit for their hard work in this area.
For programs other than fleet ballistic missile submarines, the committee recommended $8.4 billion in the Navy shipbuilding and conversion account for the construction of 16 ships and the conversion of 2 others. Ships authorized for construction were one 688-class submarine; five DDG-51-class guided missile destroyers; three mine countermeasures ships; one MHC-51-class coastal minehunter; one cargo variant of the LSD-41-class landing ship dock; one TAGOS ocean surveillance ship; one AOE-6-class fast combat support ship; and three AGOR oceanographic research ships. Fourteen landing craft air cushion vehicles were recommended for authorization.
Advance procurement for one fast sealift ship was recommended, as well as advance procurement for two SSN-21-class submarines and one LHD-1-class amphibious assault ship. Authorization of funds was recommended for the aircraft carrier Enterprise service life extension program and for the jumbo conversion of one fleet oiler. Funds to provide a moored training ship for nuclear propulsion plant training were recommended as well.
For strategic airlift, the committee recommended authorization of $885.2 million in research and development and $1.42 billion in procurement for the C-17 transport aircraft program. Six aircraft will be procured in fiscal year 1990.
Finally, funding for research and development programs and procurement of equipment for special operations forces were recommended as requested.
I want to commend Senator Kennedy and Senator Cohen, the chairman and ranking member of the Projection Forces Subcommittee, for their leadership in this important area.
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As in past years, the committee is recommending increased funding for several important technology programs, including digital gallium arsenide; high temperature superconductors; high resolution displays; high performance computers; manufacturing technology; concurrent engineering; and x-ray lithography. A total of $296 million was authorized to continue the balanced technology initiative to develop and deploy revolutionary conventional weapons technologies. The committee believes these programs have excellent potential to make a significant impact on the capabilities of future weapon systems.
The committee remains concerned over the ability of the Defense Department laboratories to adequately support the technology base and weapons system acquisition process. The committee bill directs the Secretary of Defense to establish demonstration programs in each service to evaluate laboratory performance gains where laboratory management is given greater flexibility, authority, and accountability.
Confidence in the ability of the Defense Department to develop and acquire new weapons has been repeatedly shaken as a result of cost overruns, delays, defective products, fraud, and difficulties in attracting and retaining quality people to the acquisition work force. In 1986, the Packard Commission described the system as `fundamentally ill' and prescribed a series of reforms to streamline the acquisition process. This year the committee received disturbing testimony about deficiencies in the Department's implementation of the Packard Commission reforms. Little progress has been made in streamlining the acquisition process, making greater use of commercial products, and improving the responsiveness of the Department's regulatory reform process.
The committee is recommending a number of provisions to address these problems, including measures concerning simplification of the source selection process; use of streamlined
procedures for procurement of `off-the-shelf' items; consolidation of reporting requirements; development of uniform rules on the treatment of sensitive procurement information; and revision of the Defense Enterprise Program concept to promote procurement reform.
Witnesses at the committee's hearings on defense acquisition policy consistently stressed the need to give the highest priority to acquisition personnel reform. This bill includes provisions establishing alternative personnel management demonstration programs; providing the Secretary of Defense the authority to remove the pay cap now imposed on former military personnel who choose to work as civilians for the Department; authorizing special pay for a limited number of scientists and engineers in critical positions; and requiring the Department of Defense to issue rules clarifying the impact of various postemployment restrictions on DOD personnel.
I want to commend Senator Bingaman and Senator Wallop for the outstanding leadership of the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology which overseas these critical areas of our defense effort.
In reviewing the budget request in this area, the committee identified those programs where funding shortfalls will cause readiness and sustainability problems in the future, and, where possible, found offsets in lower priority programs to increase funding in these areas. The committee approved increases above the amendment budget request for Army, Navy and Air Force depot maintenance programs; for supply activities; for ammunition; and for spare parts to repair the extensive damage to the Army helicopter fleet sustained during the severe storm at Fort Hood, TX, on May 13, 1989.
Funding for overseas military construction programs was reduced in light of uncertainties over future overseas deployments of U.S. forces. The bill reported by the committee authorizes $300 million in fiscal year 1990 and $500 million in fiscal year 1991 to begin the process of closing and realigning military bases in line with the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closures.
Senator Dixon and Senator Gorton, the chairman and ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability and Support, deserve a great deal of credit for their strong
efforts to preserve the readiness and sustainability of our military forces.
In the area of manpower strengths, the Department of Defense requested an active duty end strength of 2,121,500 for fiscal year 1990, and an active duty end strength of 2,120,000 for fiscal year 1991. The committee reduced the requested active duty end strengths by 1,305 in both fiscal years.
The committee supported the increases requested by the Department of Defense in part-time and full-time manning in the Reserve and National Guard needed to accommodate the transfer of certain missions from the Active to the Reserve and National Guard Forces.
In a package of improvements to military pay and benefits, the committee approved a 3.6-percent pay raise for military personnel and a substantial increase in aviation career incentive pay to aid the Department of Defense in retaining military aviators. In addition, the committee increased the amount of money that the Army can pay above the basic GI bill benefits to assist the Army in recruiting quality enlistees in critical skills. The committee also increased the selective reenlistment bonus ceiling from the current $30,000 to $45,000 to help the Navy retain nuclear qualified personnel.
In the area of health care for military personnel and their families, the committee approved a number of initiatives to enhance the recruiting and retention of military health care providers. This is one of our critical needs. In addition, the committee approved several initiatives to hold down the cost of health care and to improve the efficiency of health care delivery to military personnel and their families.
I want to congratulate Senator Glenn and Senator McCain for their excellent work as chairman and ranking member of the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee.
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Section 908 of the committee bill establishes a nine member, independent Commission to make a systematic, comprehensive study of the concept of national service. Three members of the Commission will be appointed by the President, and six members by the leadership of the Congress.
This Commission will survey the community needs that could be met through a program of national service; determine the costs as well as the potential benefits to the nation of such a program; and make recommendations on the advisability of different types of national service programs and how such programs could be implemented. The provision requires the Commission to report its findings to the Nation by February 15, 1991, and requires the President to provide his written views on the report 90 days after its publication.
Mr. President, I want to reiterate my earlier comment that the committee believes this bill meets the budget authority and outlay targets of the bipartisan summit agreement and the fiscal year 1990 budget resolution. This means that any amendment that adds money to the bill will cause the bill to be over the budget targets. For that reason, the committee will generally oppose any amendment that adds additional budget authority or outlays to the bill unless the amendment includes offsets to pay for the add-on.
In closing, Mr. President, I want to thank the ranking member of the committee, Senator Warner, for all of his assistance. The committee voted unanimously to report this bill, which is an indication of the strong sense of bipartisanship and cooperation which marked the committee's work on this bill. It has been a pleasure to serve with Senator Warner on the Armed Services Committee, and I look forward to working closely with him throughout the remainder of this Congress.
Mr. President, this National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 represents the culmination of a great deal of hard work by the members and staff of our committee. Hugh Evans and Greg Scott of the Legislative Counsel's Office also made an indispensable contribution in preparing this bill, and of course we will be calling on them as changes are made and as we go to conference. This is a good bill which will strengthen the Nation's defense posture. I urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. President, I understand that we have a letter from President Bush that states his very strong views on this bill and on the importance of the budget submission that was made available to the Congress earlier this year. We had a very constructive meeting at the White House this morning between people involved in this defense debate and the President and his key advisers. I felt that he laid out his support for the Cheney approach on this overall defense posture very clearly and very forcefully this morning. I ask unanimous consent that this Presidential letter be printed in the Record. It particularly refers to the strategic modernization program, the question of the B-2, which I am sure we will be debating, the question of the MX and the Midgetman Program as well as other strategic concerns. I ask unanimous consent this letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
The White House,
Washington, July 24, 1989.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington,
DC.
Dear Chairman: When the Fiscal Year 1990 Defense Authorization Bill comes to the floor next week, you and your colleagues will make critical decisions affecting the future of deterrence and arms control for the balance of the century. Before you vote, I want to be certain that you understand my reasons for the strategic modernization program I have proposed.
Taken together, these strategic programs are essential to preserve a capable, survivable and effective deterrent. They are an integrated package that deals with the evolving threat and is flexible enough to hedge against uncertainties. They also undergird our arms control negotiations and provide incentives to the Soviets to continue the internal changes they appear to be making. Each represents, not simply modestly improved capability but fundamental change in strategy or system performance.
I am optimistic about what we are beginning to see in the Soviet Union. The Soviets may finally be willing to make significant changes in the character and size of their military forces. This willingness is at least in part the result of our commitment to a modern, capable deterrent force. Weakening the commitment now could undermine the positive trends we see emerging in Soviet forces.
I have taken another hard look at SDI and confirmed that the goal of the program--providing the basis for an informed decision on deployment of defenses that would strengthen deterrence--remains sound. We owe it to ourselves and our children to pursue that goal. I am personally and deeply committed to doing so.
Moreover, SDI is at a critical juncture. The technological progress we have made means that we need to conduct large scale realistic, and therefore expensive, tests to prove the feasibility of defenses. Already, because of cuts required in the overall Defense budget, I have reluctantly submitted a revised budget, cutting over $1 billion from the program. If the Congress cuts even more deeply, our ability to investigate and test the most promising options will be seriously damaged. We will be unable to determine, in a meaningful way, whether we can rely more on defenses for our security. The American people are entitled to that assessment.
The B-2 is also at a critical point. The aircraft is based on revolutionary technology that will guarantee the effectiveness of the penetrating bomber well into the next century. Without it, the strategic Triad, which has been the bedrock of our nuclear strategy, will virtually disappear. The B-2 is also the core of our START strategy for achieving stable deterrence at reduced levels. Indeed, under the terms of our current arms control proposal, the bomber force will be assigned a very large percentage of our targets. I have no doubt that the B-2 is worth its cost and deserves your support.
ICBM modernization has been marked with considerable controversy and strong opinion. Yet there is broad agreement that mobility is required for our land-based missiles to improve their survivability and enhance their unique capabilities. After careful review of the issue, I have determined that we should deploy, in a carefully phased manner, the Rail-garrison Peacekeeper and the Small road mobile ICBM. I am committed to doing so.
Rail-garrison Peacekeeper will improve the survivability of the ICBM force quickly and at modest cost, while preserving the considerable military capability of this system. The Small ICBM represents the future of the ICBM force. It offers a high degree of survivability, even with virtually no warning. But, it will not be ready to deploy as soon as Rail-garrison and will obviously be more expensive than a multiple warhead system. We can field Rail-garrison in the near term while at the same time continuing development of the Small ICBM for 1997 deployment. We likewise need to commit to an ICBM mobility program to avoid a deadlock in the START negotiations on the mobile issue.
In addition to the requirement for these forces as the heart of our nuclear deterrent strategy, in which they form an integrated and inseparable whole, there is the role which this modernization program plays in our arms control strategy. We are entering a very important and promising stage in our strategic arms control negotiations. We have already introduced some changes in our position and we are actively considering others which could make a significant contribution to the stability of the nuclear balance. To pull the rug out from under me at this crucial juncture by weakening my program could destroy this opportunity to make real progress. Indeed, it could even prevent the conclusion of an arms control agreement. I need the negotiating flexibility which this dynamic and sensible modernization program provides. Don't prevent me from achieving a treaty which could make great strides toward reducing the chances of nuclear conflict.
Let me add two cautionary notes. First, good arms control cannot be legislated. I seek and welcome the advice and counsel of the Congress and regularly consult you on the full range of arms control issues. But, in the final analysis, I must be responsible for negotiating arms control agreements. The many arms control amendments that are customarily proposed to the defense bills only undercut me and our foreign policy and frequently have an effect opposite to that intended by their sponsors.
Second, the pressures to play one modernization program off against another or to pay for one with cuts in another threaten the balanced strategy behind our programs. Secretary Cheney and I have had to make hard choices in these times of tight budgets--this budget is the best balance of needs and affordability and represents an integrated strategic approach.
As you begin final debate on the defense bill, I ask you to carefully consider the affordable, integrated plan we have designed to strengthen deterrence, to reinforce the incentives for change in the Soviet Union, and to further our goal of negotiating arms control agreements that will reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. We cannot afford to lower our defenses because of Gorbachev's rhetoric; we cannot afford to pull the rug out from our negotiators, and we cannot afford to forfeit the investments we have made in strategic modernization. We can afford to make the needed improvements provided by this cohesive, fiscally sound package. It deserves your support.
Sincerely,
George Bush.
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Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman for his words with respect to bipartisanship.
Throughout the formulation of this bill, and the hearings, open and closed, in meetings, the chairman strove to have bipartisanship. Indeed, he recounted the fact that this bill supports the President and Secretary of Defense in almost every respect, the one exception being an intentional, I think a beneficial, exception, the restoration of the R&D funds for the V-22.
Otherwise, it was a remarkable bipartisan effort, and I join in complimenting our staff. In the 11 years I have been privileged to be a member of this committee, I have never seen staff work better to serve the full committee.
Indeed, there was active participation by all Senators on our committee throughout the formulation of this bill, beginning of course in the subcommittee hearings through and including the markup which took an entire week.
I am especially pleased that the committee again under the strong able leadership of the chairman was able to deal with each of the major issues. Unlike in earlier years we did not have a single party line vote throughout the deliberations of this bill, both in subcommittee and in full committee.
I am also pleased that the Committee, after full discussion and debate, chose not to reverse any major defense policy decision reflected in the President's amended budget request. The committee, by a strong bipartisan vote, refused to reduce DOD funding for the strategic defense initiative below $4.3 billion; the committee, by an overwhelming vote, refused to alter the President's dual track ICBM modernization funding plan; the committee, by clear bipartisan votes, refused to reverse the President's decisions to terminate production of the V-22 Osprey and of the F-14D Tomcat, and the decision to terminate production of the AH-64 Apache helicopter after 1991. Finally, the committee, by an overwhelming and bipartisan vote, refused to terminate production during fiscal year 1990 of the B-2 program, but rather made the availability of funds for that program subject to a number of specific testing and developmental milestones. These statutory milestones truly do convert the B-2 program into a `fly-before-we-buy' endeavor.
Now turning to some of the other important provisions contained in this bill. In the manpower and personnel areas, the committee recommended full funding of the proposed 3.6-percent pay raise for military personnel in fiscal year 1990. Maintaining a proper standard of living for our military personnel is the responsibility of each of us in this body, and this becomes even more important in this fifth straight year of declining defense budgets.
I think, parenthetically, I would like to say that at the meeting with the President this morning Senator Inouye, the chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, reiterated again his intention to lead his subcommittee in affirming what we have done to protect the quality of the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States.
Additionally, the committee has recommended several improvements in retention incentives for military aviators and health professionals, two areas in which there are growing demands for highly trained personnel in the private sector.
In Navy shipbuilding, the committee recommends that the Senate authorize funding for all ships requested.
Of course the committee backed the President's decision not to include that last submarine which was in an earlier iteration by President Reagan.
The carrier Enterprise will be overhauled and the committee recommends that funding for that project be consolidated in the shipbuilding account.
Title VIII of the bill contains several provisions intended to streamline defense acquisition. Some of the provisions would allow the Department of Defense more flexibility in acquisition of professional and technical services, commercial products, and products under the Foreign Military Sales Program. The committee also took action to stress the importance of maintaining the health of the U.S. defense industrial and technological base. We have provided the basis for better monitoring the state of industries supporting national defense, and increased support for such key programs as the Manufacturing Technology [Mantech] Program.
Mr. President, in the conventional forces area, the committee adopted three important initiatives, each of which the committee believed was important enough to bring to the Senate floor so that all Members may vote on them. During the course of debate on the bill, amendments will be offered on behalf of committee members on funding for procurement of equipment for the Guard and Reserve, for procurement of modern smart missile systems, and `foot soldier' equipment enhancement initiatives. These types of programs are often included in a committee reported defense authorization bill, but they are often overlooked in the debate on the Senate floor. This year, the committee members felt that the committee's action in these areas was important enough to be brought to the attention of all Members of the Senate, so that each Member can cast a vote on these important programs.
Finally, Mr. President, this morning as mentioned by the chairman, a number of Senators had the opportunity to confer with President Bush and his top advisers to discuss many of the national security issues to be addressed in this bill. The President made clear his views that the elements of his strategic modernization program, including dual track ICBM modernization, SDI, and B-2, are interrelated. Each of these elements is important, not only because of the improved military capabilities offered by each, but also because each element provides a vital link in the chain of our overall national security strategy, including our goals in ongoing arms control negotiations.
The President addressed these same issues in a letter sent today to Members of the Senate, which has been put in the Record by the chairman.
I would like at this time, Mr. President, to read the last paragraph of the President's letter to various members of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees:
As you begin final debate on the defense bill, I ask you to carefully consider the affordable, integrated plan we have designed to strengthen deterrence, to reinforce the incentives for change in the Soviet Union, and to further our goal of negotiating arms control agreements that will reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. We cannot afford to lower our defenses because of Gorbachev's rhetoric; we cannot afford to pull the rug out from our negotiators, and we cannot afford to forfeit the investments we have made in strategic modernization. We can afford to make the needed improvements provided by this cohesive, fiscally sound package. It deserves your support.
Sincerely,
George Bush.
Last, Mr. President, I believe the President of the United States makes a strong case for keeping his strategic modernization program intact. Not only this letter, but certainly the debate on the floor will reinforce his arguments and those which are vital to the continuation of this program.
Mr. President, the President of the United States has now presented the Congress with such an approach. The program is coherent, is integrated, and it enhances deterrence while fully recognizing the possibilities offered for arms control.
I urge my colleagues to consider this letter very carefully, and then to actively participate in the debate on this bill which I hope in every major respect will be adopted as recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee.
I thank again my distinguished chairman for his leadership, and for the privilege and pleasure of working with him in the formulation of this bill.
I yield the floor.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I have been listening with keen interest to the chairman and the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee. I simply want to thank them for their leadership in the whole complicated area of national defense.
I suspect that the meetings of the subcommittee and the full committee probably were a little more contentious than ever before, but even with that, I think we have come to a consensus, an agreement. As has been pointed out by both Chairman Nunn and Senator Warner, the measure passed out of the Armed Services Committee unanimously.
Mr. President, I strongly support the Armed Services Committee's version of the defense authorization bill, particularly those portions which are the responsibility of my Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence.
The committee showed tremendous responsibility and good sense in `holding the line` against funding for nonrequested programs and items. It acted wisely by not mortgaging our future through the restoration of the programs terminated by the Secretary of Defense. The only significant addition to the request was the restoration of limited research and development funding for the V-22 Osprey and the committee did not make a commitment to that aircraft's production.
We can always find a few tens of millions to keep a program alive. But we cannot afford the price which such a decision inevitably commits us to further down the road. Indeed, our current defense morass is largely due to the failure of the previous administration and this body to demonstrate proper fiscal responsibility. We are facing our fifth consecutive year of declining defense budgets. The unchecked defense buildup is history.
Our task is now to maintain our security in a changing and unpredictable world and to do so with less money. The committee bill is a step in this direction. I will strongly oppose any effort to return to the old ways of doing business, which was to buy anything that `pop's' without consideration for present and future budget considerations.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, I would like to take a few moments to describe for the Senators the main features of the bill that bear upon the programs and issues under the subcommittee's purview.
Let me begin by discussing the nature and magnitude of the problems in the area where we made the largest increases. It will surprise no one to learn that the area is the Department of Energy's defense programs, and that the sizable increases are for cleanup activities. The major problem before the committee this year, next year, and for the forseeable future, will be to provide enough funds to allow the Department of Energy to make significant progress in three areas simultaneously:
First, to upgrade its current operating facilties to bring their operations into compliance with existing laws and safety standards;
Second, to prevent further deterioration and make a substantial start on the cleanup of hundreds of inactive storage sites contaminated with nuclear, toxic, and mixed wastes; and
Third, to start construction on new, modern, safe facilities to allow us to phase out older facilities that can be kept in safe and compliant operation only with increasing effort and needless cost.
Many of my colleagues, Mr. President, have expressed sticker shock at the cost of the B-2. To them I say, `you ain't seen nothin' yet!'
I cannot tell you with any confidence what the final bill for these three tasks will be, because the Department of Energy has not yet even bounded the problem. But the most recent estimates we have seen for the parts that have been assessed with some care is a cost of well over $150 billion--that is in today's dollars, not out year dollars. For illustration, that is more than twice the cost of the sticker shock price of the B-2. Sticker shock is the newest buzz word for some who customarily have not addressed in depth the overall demands of national security in our dangerous world.
Put another way, the Department of Energy's defense programs will need more than $4 billion more per year than they have been getting from the Office of Management and Budget.
Mr. President, we have not increased the Department of Energy's programs by $4 billion this year, not by a long shot because we do not have that money. We have reluctantly transferred some $500 million from the Department of Defense to the Department of Energy's defense programs.
I say reluctantly, not because the committee is reluctant to address the cleanup problem; rather, I am reluctant because this transfer from one agency to another causes problems with the budget and appropriations committee, and, if the practice were continued, would lead to friction between the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.
I say in the strongest possible terms to the President and to the Office of Management and Budget--you must provide the needed resources to the Department of Energy in the annual budget requests. In the report accompanying this bill, we reiterate this point and set out the priorities that will govern this committee's markups in future years.
Now, if those are the committee's stated priorities, and if the committee does not intend to transfer funds from the Department of Defense to the Department of Energy to make up shortfalls, where will the money come from?
Well, let me point out to the Office of Management and Budget and to the President that apart from modernization, cleanup, and compliance accounts that will have first priority, there is not much left except money for nuclear weapons productions and money for nuclear materials production for nuclear weapons.
Of the roughly half a billion dollars transferred into the Department of Energy from the Department of Defense, the committee increased the cleanup and remediation funds by $418 million above the requested amount by the administration. The committee is confident that these funds can all be productively utilized. Another $100 million went into a new program to develop new kinds of cleanup techniques.
Cleanup will be a multi-billion-dollar effort spread over several decades, and there are some contaminated sites for which there are no known cleanup techniques, unfortunately. Clearly, research now on new cleanup approaches and technologies could potentially reduce the ultimate cleanup costs substantially. These are the major funding initiatives we have taken in this bill to address the cleanup problem.
We have a number of other initiatives affecting the Department of Energy which I will discuss a little later, but I would now like to turn to the major strategic programs and issues in the Department of Defense part of the bill.
First, the bill fully funds the ICBM modernization worked out between the administration and the congressional leadership earlier this year.
Second, the SDI account is reduced by $300 million, which is largely being used to beef up the Department of Energy Cleanup Program that I have just addressed. This reduces the SDI funding in the Department of Defense from $4.6 billion to $4.3 billion, which is still and increase of 16 percent of the current level.
Some will no doubt consider $4.3 billion too high. I believe we must recognize that the House Armed Services Committee is already at $3.5 billion, which is well below the current level, and they may go lower during their floor debate.
Some will no doubt consider $4.3 billion too low. To them, I simply make two observations: First, SDI cannot justify full funding, and second, last year on the Senate floor we needed five rollcall votes to turn back by one vote an effort to cut $600 million out of SDI--after the committee had cut $271 million. The year before, the Vice President cast the tie-breaking vote to sustain the committee's mark, and the year before that, the committee's mark was sustained by only two votes.
My own judgment is that this proposed SDI mark may still be a bit high, but I urge its acceptance as part of the package, and for us to deal with the House during conference.
The bill reduces the B-2 procurement account by $300 million and those funds are also helping to pay for environmental restoration.
The committee thoroughly reexamined the B-2 program to see whether concurrency could be reduced without doing serious violence to the vendor base and to production schedules, which would require widespread layoffs and add substantial costs for qualifying vendors and reclearing employees. Some procurement funding must also be provided to keep in force an advantageous, firm, fixed price contract covering numerous avionics and electronics components.
To meet these conditions means that only a few hundred million dollars can be cut from the program this year. However, the bill also contains numerous restrictions on the obligation of funds for the procurement of additional production aircraft. I hope all Members will read these provisions carefully. I think they serve to fully protect the taxpayers' interest in this program so that we do not get ahead of ourselves.
If the B-2 test schedule from here on follows the planned course, then the fences and limitations on the B-2 in the proposed package are fully adequate to ensure there will be no undue concurrency, without doing great damage to the program or greatly increasing its costs, as the House Armed Services Committee cuts of $800 million will surely do. Or as some of their suggested floor amendments would do.
Let me highlight quickly a few of the other `good government' reductions, the meritorious `add-backs,' and the policy guidance offered in the Defense bill. The largest of these are $100 million from the air defense initiative, $66 million from the nuclear directed energy research in the Department of Energy, and $85 million from the special isotope separation project in Idaho.
An amount of $101 million was added to increase Trident II missile productions rates to try to get them back toward the milestone authorization levels the committee established in the fiscal year 1988 authorization bill. There are also minor adds for traditionally underfunded projects like ASMS, Lightsat, SSBN security, nuclear and chemical monitoring, and the use of the Department of Energy National Labs to support the development by the services of `smart' conventional weapons.
Finally, the bill contains a number of legislative initiatives and requirements for studies and reports. Several initiatives are aimed at the Department of Energy's continuing problems. We propose to set up a blue ribbon task force to advise the Department and Congress on how best to set priorities for allocating scarce cleanup funds to a multibillion, multiyear cleanup problem. We also grant the Department of Energy some relief from salary, revolving door, and ethics legislation to allow them to draw more heavily on the scientific and technical talent at our national laboratories to help in the management of the Department's activities and programs. We also require them to develop 5-year plans, as the Department of Defense already does.
For the Department of Defense, we propose legislation restricting concurrency in the ACM and B-1 defensive avionics programs as well as the B-2, extending the requirement for robust testing before further production investments in these programs also.
In summary, let me say that I think this is a solid recommendation to the Senate, and I want to thank Senator Thurmond for all of his aid and assistance as the ranking minority member on my subcommittee in preparing our part of the bill.
Strategic issues are complex and controversial. Arriving at a reasonable package with bipartisan support is tremendously challenging. That we have such a package before us today is largely due to the tremendous knowledge, hard work, and undying patience of many committee staff members. On the majority side, I would like to express my gratitude and admiration to Bill Hoehn, Sherri Goodman, Bob Bell, Kirk McConnell, Jan Wise, and Cindy Pearson. On the minority side, I would like to thank Jack Mansfield and Brian Dailey for their superb efforts as well, and certainly to Pat Tucker, who is always there for advice and counsel of a very wise nature, the Strategic Subcommittee `team' is truly first rate in all ways.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to carefully study this bill. There may be ways to improve it, possibly, but, for the most part, it is a very sound and a very responsible bill. I hope that the full Senate will act expeditiously in approving it.
Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, I am pleased to support S. 1352, the national defense authorization for fiscal years 1990-91. This is a good bill that will strengthen our national defense, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability and Support, I want to take a few moments to summarize the recommendatins of the committee in this area.
Mr. President, jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability and Support covers approximately one-third of the Defense budget, including the operation and maintenance accounts; spare parts and ammunition procurement; the defense stock funds; and military construction and family housing.
The good news this year is that we have not had to make large reductions to the budget request to meet the budget resolution targets.
The bad news, though, is that there are still some important programs under the subcommittee's jurisdiction, particularly in the area of sustainability, which were underfunded in fiscal year 1990-91 budget request. The committee did its best to provide additional funds to meet some of the shortfalls. I think we improved on the budget request, but there remain some important shortfalls in sustainability programs, particularly ammunition and maintenance programs.
In the operation and maintenance area, the subcommittee has identified about $800 million in funding reductions--most of them financing adjustments--and applied these savings to high priority readiness-related programs: depot maintenance; real property maintenance; Army supply operations; and the proposed civilian pay raise.
Members will recall that the amended budget request called for a 2-percent pay raise for Federal civilan employees and a 3.6-percent pay raise for military personnel in fiscal year 1990. Congress and the administration have since agreed to a 3.6-percent pay raise for Federal civilian employees in fiscal year 1990. Since almost all Defense Department civilians are paid out of the operation and maintenance accounts, this higher pay raise needs to be funded--or other readiness-related activities will end up paying the bill. The committee bill adds $219 million to the budget for this higher civilian pay raise, which will fund 80 percent of the total cost of the 3.6-percent pay raise, meaning the Defense Department will have to absorb 20 percent of the pay raise costs. This level of absorption is consistent with past practice.
The operations and maintenance recommendations also include a reduction of $200 million to the fiscal year 1990 request of $500 million for the base closure account. This reduction is based on the testimony of the base closure commissioners that $300 million would meet the minimum requirements for this account in fiscal year 1990.
In the area of revolving funds the committee bill includes a modest reduction of 10 percent, or $75 million, largely to fund some of the readiness-related increases in the operation and maintenance and procurement accounts.
The committee made two major recommendations in the procurement area:
An increase of $73.2 million for high priority conventional ammunition programs recommended by the Army; and
An increase of $130 million for repair parts to fix the large number of Army helicopters damaged in the recent severe storm at Fort Hood, TX.
In the military construction area, there are very few reductions to projects in the United States in the committee bill. The request for overseas projects is reduced by approximately one-third in light of uncertainties of U.S. forces. The $15.4 million in funding for the proposed new Air Force base at Crotone, Italy, was deleted from the bill.
There are two legislative provisions I want to mention. The first is the requirement for the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress a master plan for environmental restoration activities in the Defense Department. This is becoming an increasingly visible and important area of Defense Department activity, and one the subcommittee is monitoring very closely.
The second provision is the approval of the Defense Department's request to transfer management of the Pentagon from the General Services Administration to the Defense Department. In doing so, though, we have restricted the amount that the Defense Department would otherwise pay to the General Services Administration for Defense Department leases in the National Capital region in order to finance the cost of the Pentagon renovation. Our subcommittee's hearing on the question showed that the General Services Administration, I regret to say, has been a very poor landlord for the Pentagon for the last decade.
The committee's recommendations include authorization of fiscal year 1991 programs in operation and maintenance and the revolving funds at the levels requested. In the ammunition and spare parts programs, the committee authorized the full request for the second year, except for the increases in the Army ammunition area necessary to maintain efficient production of the at-4 and the new M864 155mm artillery round. Approximately half of the military construction programs for fiscal year 1991 are authorized--primarily multiyear programs or projects which support ongoing investment programs.
That is a brief overview of the recommendations of the committee in the area of readiness, sustainability and support. I want to thank my friend and colleague Senator Gorton, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability and Support, for his fine cooperation and assistance. It has been a pleasure working with him this year on the subcommittee.
Mr. President, I would like to add a few more comments regarding the base closure account, and the Base Closing Commission in general. My opposition to the legislation that created the Base Closing Commission, and the report of the Commission, is well known. The process provided for and followed by the Commission was fatally flawed in several respects. The Commission was given too much power, insufficient time was allowed for an unbiased, independent analysis, and no oversight activity was included. Five hearing were held in my subcommittee ot examine the recommendations of the Base Closure Commission. At one of those hearings, the General Accounting Office described errors in the data the Commission used, and discrepancies in the analytical techniques. The General Accounting Office has been directed to provide a full report of their findings by November 15. I feel very strongly that where errors have been identified in the Commission's analysis utilized to close a base in a category where excess capacity exists, the bases cited should not be closed until the category is reevaluated.
Mr. President, I want to thank the chairman of the committee and the ranking member for the outstanding work they did this year and I am delighted to enthusiastically support this fine result of the markup of the Armed Services Committee. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississppi.
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It has been a distinct privilege for me as a new Member of this body, to work with my colleagues on the committee in establishing this workable framework for national security. Although the continuing downward trend in defense spending concerns me, I believe we have produced a well balanced program for the Nation's future defense given the realities of a curtailed resource environment.
I want to commend the distinguished chairman and ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee for their leadership in charting our course through a series of very tough decisions that will clearly influence the future of our national security well into the next century.
I also want to commend my colleagues on the committee on both sides of the aisle. We certainly have worked very closely together at the subcommittee level and I have been very much impressed with the bipartisan way in which we have dealt with this most important legislation. We deliberated long and hard over many important issues.
Some members of the committee had amendments they felt they had to offer and they did so. Certainly the other members understood. But when the votes were taken, very strong, courageous positions were taken by the committee and I am very much impressed with that. The resulting decisions ultimately formulate the policies that will fulfill one of our fundamental constitutional responsibilities this Government has: to provide for the common defense.
The real story of this defense bill is courage. It is the moral courage to make the tough and painful decisions now and not put them off to another day when the consequences to our national security will only be more serious. It is stepping up to the big problems and putting national interests ahead of parochial interests. In the recent past we have had the luxury of a funding environment that allowed support of nearly every defense program that had any reasonable merit. Unfortunately, those days are past and we can no longer cover every base--we have to be wiser in making the critical choices between weapon systems we buy and how we structure our armed forces in a changing world.
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney also deserves a lion's share of credit for his courage in sending over a lean and mean defense budget that addresses the difficult and unpopular choices that have to be made. Instead of taking the easy way and `nickeling and diming' existing programs across the board, he performed `triage' and did the unexpected--canceled major weapons systems.
In the past, many of us in the Congress have been critical of Secretaries of Defense because they wanted to have every program. If not the full amount, they wanted at least a little bit. And so these programs were quite often continued on and on, and no tough choices were made. This tough, unusual courage of conviction in the face of an avalanche of criticism from vigorous and well-meaning advocates of some weapons programs was a very important step.
Secretary Cheney should also be commended for his effort to protect the most important component of our defense establishment--the men and women of our armed services. Without them the most expensive and capable weapon systems are useless. Their morale and well-being are an invisible `force multiplier' in any potential conflict. We must contiue to place a top priority on the quality of the soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen who man our defenses and ultimately hold the Nation's security in their hands. We must never return to those times of a hollow Army where low morale was manifested by one of the poorest quality of discipline rates in recent history. His proposed budget recognizes the importance of those in uniform by placing a priority on pay and benefits at the necessary expense of weapon systems. Finally, Secretary of Defense Cheney has helped the Armed Services Committee immeasurably by giving us the realistic baseline from which to operate in developing the bill before us.
This is a changing world, but the only certainty is uncertainty itself. The enduring question for national defense has been, and always will be, `what is the acceptable risk?' Clearly, momentous change appears to be at hand in the Soviet Union, which has posed such great danger to the United States and our allies for over four decades. But, as we have seen so recently in China, unexpected events can sharply influence the course of national policy. There, a Communist government appeared to be slowly embracing democratic change but violently reversed course with tragic consequences for the most courageous and creative people of that ancient culture.
When it comes to national security, we must always be prepared for the unexpected--prepared to deal with the world as it is and not as we wish it to be. The strategy of deterrence has stood the tests of uncertainty for nearly half a century. But when it failed, because we did not put credible forces behind it Korea in 1950, we paid the price in blood. In Europe, deterrence has delivered the longest peace in the long history of that war-torn continent and it presided over a phenomenal era of economic prosperity for a free Europe. A similar policy of deterrence has worked for our allies along the Pacific Rim since the Korean war.
So, as we draw on the experience of past success and failure, we must continue to place our trust in deterrence and provide the essential resources to make that strategy credible.
At the beginning of this century, the Secretary of War dedicated the Army War College only a short distance from where we are assembled here today. On that day he made one of the wisest of all propositions:
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I believe that this defense authorization bill meets the test posed by those prophetic words, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
If we on the floor of the Senate begin to take this legislation apart piece by piece, we will have missed a great opportunity to support one of the best bipartisan packages I have seen in my years of service in the Congress.
So I urge my colleagues to support the measure before us and to back up the tough decisions that were made in the Committee on Armed Services. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I guess I am the first person to rise and say that I am not sure I am going to support this bill. I was telling the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee a while ago I might offer an amendment to buy some new smoke and some new mirrors because the ones we have been using are not working.
Ever since Gramm-Rudman-Hollings passed, we have been supposed to reduce the deficit every year, and every year we finesse it and wait until the time passes when we have to make that critical decision as to whether or not we are going to be within the budget or not. And every year, because of the time of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings we are able to say yes, we are going to be able to meet the budget targets--and everybody knows we are not--but we go through that little smoke and mirrors exercise to try to tell the American people we are really up here doing their work for them.
We are supposed to have a budget deficit this year, 1989, of $100 billion. Nobody thought it was going to be that when we voted for it, and everybody knows it is not going to be that on September 30. Yet, in August when the snapshot is taken, I promise you OMB, CBO, they will all figure out somehow or another, yes, it is going to be within the $100 billion target. Everybody in the United States knows it is not and this is despite the fact that revenues from income taxes are $15 billion higher this year than we projected, and we still will not even get close to the $100 billion mark.
The thing that is really interesting, and the things that ought to be talked about in the coffee shops across America, is this point: that if you fund defense, Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, interest on the debt, civil service pensions and veterans' pensions, just those 7, out of the 500 programs we finance in this country, you just fund those 7 and do not cut, funds for education, do not cut funds for the Environmental Protection Agency, do not cut funds for drugs, cancer research, AIDS research. If we eliminate all the other 493 programs we fund, you still have a deficit.
Do you know that, I say to my colleagues? You just fund those seven and you have a deficit. You only have 15-percent funds in the budget that are discretionary for this body to work with, and that has to cover education and all the other things I mentioned, plus a lot that I did not.
We are budgeting $2 billion in the National Institutes of Health this year for AIDS research. Not one person here would take a dime of that out.
We make these long pontificating statements about how our children are dead last in education in comparison with the children of other developed countries. This has been going on ever since that study called `A Nation at Risk' came out. What has happened? Nothing. We are still last in global studies among other countries. We are still last in math and science.
The Japanese continue to eat our lunch because they spend 1 percent of their budget on defense and we spend 6. Paul Kennedy, the very able professor at Yale who wrote `The Decline and Fall of the Great Powers,' said the United States will never overtake the Japanese as long as you have 30 percent of the scientists in this country working on weapons. Almost all of Japan's scientists, 98 percent of them are working in the civilian sector taking American business right and left.
Mr. President, the reason for this outburst today was just over this weekend I began to think about the insanity of what is going on. I got to thinking, where is the real threat to this country? Is it within or is it without? I made a speech here the night after my grandson was born, my first grandchild. That was on the day care bill, but I could not help think today--he was at my house last night--he will be 5 weeks old tomorrow. Do you know what we in Congress have been doing and continue to do and what we are going to do all this year? We are going to mortgage his future. At 5 weeks old, he is not in a position to defend himself. He has to look to 100 Senators and 435 House Members to be concerned about what kind of life he is going to have.
As the President's own OMB Director said this week, Bob Darman--and I was impressed with his speech; I have not heard an administration official speak with that kind of candor in the last 8 1/2 years--he said, we are still living as though there is a free lunch and as though there is no tomorrow.
But I guess the thing that really kicked this off in my mind is the President cavalierly standing out in a press conference, saying: `We need to go to Mars; we need to go back to the Moon, too.' I do not know why you want to go back. As my friend from South Carolina, Senator Hollings, has said, there is no education in the second kick of the mule. What are you going to learn the second time that you did not learn the first time? The trip to Mars will be $400 billion. The President did not say where the money is coming from. He just said we ought to go to Mars.
I am not nearly as interested in going to Mars as I am assuring this grandson of mine that he is going to have a reasonable, decent future where he can breathe clean air, where
he can drink clean water, where if he happens to get AIDS or cancer or whatever, that a sensitive, caring Congress is going to have done everything they can to provide him good health, a decent chance at a house, a decent chance at a good education and all the other things that we consider to be quality life for all of us.
The President says $400 billion to go to Mars. Read my lips. He said do not put on budget the $200 billion it is going to cost to bail the S&L's out because that makes the deficit look bad. Put it over here, you guys know the smoke-and-mirrors routine. You figure out how to do it. Put it anyplace, but do not put it on the budget where it will show. So everybody comes tiptoeing over here and they vote not to put it on budget so it will not show. Now we are going to spend $200 billion to clean up all the plutonium-producing sites in the United States.
The Senator from Ohio, my good friend from Ohio sits here and his State has been a victim--is that not right, I say to my colleague--of the inefficient operation of a plutonium-producing facility in Ohio. I want to take care of his constituents, and I am going to vote to do whatever we have to do to clean that mess up. But that is $200 billion over the next 10 or 20 years. The President did not tell us where to get the money. He just said, read my lips.
Now the President says, `I want the rail mobile MX and the Minuteman. I want them both, and I want that B-2 bomber at a cost of $530 million, too.' God help the poor pilot who ever bails out of one of those.
Mr. President, where are we going to get the money? Read my lips. I suggested to one of our negotiators--I was in Geneva and Vienna a couple weeks ago--I suggested to our negotiators, why do we not say to the Soviet Union, as has been suggested by no less than the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, you give up the SS-24, your 10 warhead MIRV'd mobile missile, and we will not build the MX. This negotiator said, you are not ever going to get the Soviet Union to talk to you about that. What you have to do is to build it and then talk to them about giving it up.
What we have to do is to appropriate the money in this bill to build the rail garrison MX and then go to the Soviets and say, `now, look, we have a 10-warhead missile, too, on rails. Now let us trade out, let us bargain those two away. That will leave you with the SS-25, the single-warhead mobile missile, and it will leave us with the Midgetman.'
That does not make any sense to me. It does not make any sense to General Akhromeyev, who testified before the House Armed Services Committee in a precedent-setting testimony last week and then later in an interview said, yes, the Soviet Union would consider giving up the SS-24 if the President of the United States will say that we are not going to build the MX. What a deal. How many times have you been offered a deal like that? Now, that is not an offer. I am not saying Akhromeyev has the ability or the authority to make that deal. But he said, yes, we would entertain that idea.
He is just recently the top military defense official in the Soviet Union, so he did not just fall off a watermelon truck. He knows what he is talking about.
And then you add to all of the predictions on the economy. Thirty-seven economists have written to the President saying we have big problems ahead, a recession that could turn into a depression. Bob Darman, head of OMB, says the growth rate next year is not going to be 3.5 percent. Do you remember when we debated the budget? The projection for arriving at a $100 billion deficit was that the economy would grow at 3.5 percent and for every point you miss, you have to add $20 billion to the deficit. If the growth rate next year is 1 percent, add somewhere between $40 and $50 billion to the deficit. And Bob Darman is saying that is a distinct possibility. Alan Greenspan, head of the Federal Reserve Board, is saying that is a very distinct possibility.
The President wants a lower capital gains tax because it gives us a little extra revenue next year, but how about the next 4 years? A net loser. I am not voting for the President's capital gains tax; I am announcing that right now. I have said it all along. I am not going to do that. Do you know where 90 percent of capital gains goes? People who make over $100,000. Did you know that according to at least one study the bottom 20 percent of the people in this country have lost 9 percent of their disposable earnings in the past 8 years and the top 20 percent have increased theirs by 16 percent. And that is not enough. They want capital gains to make the disparity even worse than it already is.
The other day the New York Times said we had a little leak from the Pentagon saying that our Joint Chiefs of Staff do not think SDI will work and that we ought to start pulling back from it and support the ABM Treaty which the Soviets are in a much better position to break out of plan wear. That's what the Joint Chiefs are saying. But everybody has been apologizing ever since. Now, that happened while I was in Geneva so I did not get all the facts on it, but apparently the Joint Chiefs of Staff are having serious second thoughts about SDI.
I promise you, Mr. President, there is going to be an amendment to cut SDI from where the committee wound up on it. The House is already way below this committee. There is going to be an amendment to at least fence the amount for MX for some period of time to give our negotiators an opportunity to negotiate with the Soviet Union so they give up the SS-24 and we do not have to spend the $5
billion on the MX rail garrison.
Incidentally, we are negotiating in Geneva saying we want everybody to give up mobility. We want the Soviets to give up their two mobile missiles, the SS-24 and the SS-25. That is our official position there. And here in the United States the President comes over here and asks us for the money to fund both of our mobile missiles. Does that sound like a contradiction? It certainly does. Do you know why? Because it is. How can you say to the Soviets in Geneva both sides ought to give up mobility and come over here and ask us for money for two mobile missiles?
`If we were to suddenly tomorrow agree with the Soviet Union that everything came out--6,000 warheads each--that is a 50-percent cut from our 12,000 and roughly their 12,000. Let us assume we both agree tomorrow on 6,000 warheads each. We are buying longlead items for the Trident submarine in this bill that you could not possibly build unless you are willing to put virtually all of those warheads on the Trident. Why are we buying longlead items for the 19th Trident submarine when everybody will concede to you that we may not be able to have more than 18 Tridents under any START agreement?
I am on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, and I forget which of the admirals testified to it. He says, well, we are thinking about pouring concrete in some of the 24 tubes on the Trident or similar steps. As everybody knows, the Trident carries 24 missiles. That's dandy for us. But do we want the Soviets doing that? The verification problems on that would be horrendous.
If you put 10 on each Trident II missile, that would be 240. We are not planning to do that. But I have often said if the Soviet Union launched a preemptive strike and destroyed every bomber we had on the ground, destroyed every ICBM we had on the ground, destroyed every single submarine we had except for one lonely Trident, that one Trident submarine has the ability to obliterate every city in the Soviet Union of over 100,000 people. And yet we just continue to build more and more and more.
Mr. President, there will also be a move to slow down funding for the B-2 until they will prove to us that the B-2 will fly. I voted against the B-1 bomber, not because I did not think it would fly, not because I thought when they finished it they were going to want another $2 billion to $5 billion to make it do what it was supposed to do in the first place. I voted against it because I had a lot the faith in the B-2 Stealth bomber. If I had known then that that successor was going to cost $530 million each, believe you me, I would have had some real soul searching before I voted for it.
And then, Mr. President, there is going to be an amendment, probably withdrawn, offered just to get the debate going on what we are doing in Korea. Forty-three thousand troops in Korea, $2.6 billion a year to maintain 43,000 troops. South Korea has twice as many people as North Korea. They have a gross national product almost eight times greater than North Korea. And South Korea's commitment to defense spending has dropped from almost 6 percent of gross national product to 5 percent. In other words, their economy is growing but their commitment as a percentage of gross national product is declining, and South Korea has a $10 billion trade deficit against the United States. I have nothing against Korea, and our amendment would have nothing to do with our commitment to South Korea that if they are ever attacked, we will come to their defense. How would you like to go to the hospital and say, `Doc, take my appendix out; it is hurting.' He takes your appendix out. Three days later you are feeling pretty good. You say, `Doc, I am ready to go home.' `No, sorry, you have to spend the rest of your life here.' Is not that what we are doing in Korea? We went there to defend South Korea in 1950, and we did it. We helped them rebuild their economy. And now they are one of the most vibrant economies on Earth, a burgeoning democracy. They are actually voting for what they want for that country in the future. That is what we want. And yet every dissident group in South Korea, what do they do, every time something goes wrong? They go burn an American flag. That is a pastime in South Korea, burning flags.
I read this in the International Herald Tribune. So I guess it is suitable to tell it here. It is the story about the Englishman, the Frenchman, and the Korean. Each one caught his wife in bed with another man. The Englishman politely excused himself and walked out. The Frenchman grabbed the guy, beat him up, and threw him out. And the Korean went down to the American Embassy and started a demonstration. [Laughter.]
So now you tell me. This has nothing to do with our affinity for South Korea, whether you think they ought to be defended. Of course, they ought to be defended. And our amendment incidentally would only remove 10,000 troops between now and 1992. That is not some kind of a headlong assault on our commitment to South Korea. But we are a lightning rod. We are an irritant to all the dissident groups in South Korea. I say it is time not just to ask them to pick up some of the tab. I noticed they agreed with Secretary Cheney the other day to give us another $30 million a year. Considering our budget constraints, I am not
denigrating $30 million a year but that is not the problem.
Mr. President, the opportunities in the world are unbelievable. And yet the rhetoric goes on. It is just the same thing. I could not watch television yesterday. You would have thought--this was worse than any political election I have ever seen. Here is a 30-second spot showing that Stealth bomber flying, shows it as such an ominous looking plane, and this mellifluous voiced announcer comes on and says `The B-2, America has to have it for its security.' That is followed by one on the Osprey, `The Osprey is absolutely essential to the defense of this Nation,' and they show that plane flying around.
And then the F-14 Tomcat--you see it take off from the carrier, and land on the carrier. All these television ads, television networks, saturated with ads, calculated to get your constituents to write me and say: `Please don't scrub the Osprey; please don't cut funding for B-2; please don't do this,'--all of this because they know the appropriations process is going on now.
You do not vote for weapons because the guy that builds the weapons wages a public relations campaign on television, do you? If you do, you ought to resign your seat in the Senate and say, `I don't know what is going on around here. I am just voting according to what I see on television.'
But the rhetoric, Gorbachev may not make it. I tell you one thing. I hope he does. James Baker says he hoped he did. George Bush said he hoped he did. We have been waiting for 70 years for the old Bolsheviks to die out; they die out and we get a leader that is charismatic, intelligent, and says to all the world, without actually using these words, that communism has been an unmitigated disaster socially, politically, culturally, and certainly economically. What do we want them to do--unilaterally disarm and let the New York Times editorial bureau witness it and report back to us?
It is the greatest time in the world to be alive so far as world peace is concerned. The President went to Poland, Hungary, and they are talking about democracy--our style of democracy.
Mr. President, I tell all these high school kids I do not want them with their diaper down. You know, Gorbachev's rating in Germany is twice as high as George Bush's. It is higher in Maggie Thatcher's England than George Bush's. And I can tell you, if you talk to the scholars of Europe, they will tell you that is a mindset that is changing in Europe.
You know what Einstein said after the first bomb went off. `Everything has changed except man's thinking.' I believe that man's thinking is beginning to change. It is the most positive thing I have seen, and it is downright exciting.
I get rhapsodic when I think about the possibilities. Let me also say, Mr. President, in Vienna our negotiators at the conventional forces Europe talks said it is absolutely amazing what the Soviets are offering. We said, `Why don't you destroy 35,000 tanks?' They came back a month later and said, `That is not a bad idea.' I told the Soviet Ambassador that we have a new steel mill in Arkansas, and we would love to have those 35,000 tanks and melt them down. They are selling their scrapped tanks to Sweden right now. In Stockholm they are melting Soviet tanks and making other things out of them. And the Soviet Union needs the money.
We have this brandnew $250 million steel mill up in northeast Arkansas. I told the Ambassador `I am going to put them in touch with you because if and when this deal is cut and you decide to destroy 25,000 to 40,000 armored personnel carriers and 35,000 tanks, we would like to have the right to buy that scrap metal from you.' He seemed genuinely pleased by it. They are already selling to the Swedes. Why would they not?
Mr. President, you know if I were going to sit down with President Bush for just 2 minutes, it would only take me 2 minutes to sum up what I am trying to say to this body; that is, if you read Barbara Tuchman or any other good historian you will find that virtually all of the wars, and all of the world's plagues have come about because some politician wanted to stay in office forever, so he put his finger to the wind, and said, `That is the way I am going.' Or he did not even see the opportunities when they existed.
When I think of the lost opportunities, I have said it before on this floor. You know Robert E. Lee did not want Virginia to secede from the Union, did not want that war, and when it was over he said to one of his aides one day, `That war should never have been fought. At a time when this country needed a few men of vision, forbearance, and courage, all we got were a bunch of demagogues feeding their hostilities, their prejudices, and their bigotries until this war became inevitable.' So I am pleased with this body as we debate this bill probably the rest of this week, and to the President, the Secretary of Defense and everybody else that is an opinion maker and a policy maker, do not let these opportunities pass us by. We have a chance for the first time in 4,000 years to provide a lasting peace on this Earth.
I want it just for my grandson.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
[Page: S8577]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise to comment on the defense authorization bill that is before us today. Mr. President, I want to commend the chairman of the Armed Services Committee for his leadership in crafting a very solid defense authorization bill for fiscal years 1990 and 1991. Under the budget limitations which we had to operate, this was no simple task. There were some very difficult choices that had to be made.
Mr. President, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, I am very pleased to report that the actions we took on the bill on military personnel and compensation programs continue to support strongly the combat readiness of our men and women in uniform, and the quality of life of their families.
Mr. President, I think the one area where there is no question about the return on our investments in defense over the last 8 or 9 years is in manpower. Working together, the Congress and the administration have substantially improved manpower readiness. In the late 1970's our military leaders warned of gaping shortfalls in noncommissioned officer and petty officer manning that threatened the combat readiness of our forces. The Army was characterized by the Chief of Staff of the Army as a `hollow Army.' The Navy faced the prospect of tying up ships for lack of trained and experienced personnel.
The problems which were severe then have largely been corrected. The Congress working with the administration provided two large pay raises in 1980 and 1981 at a cost of about $13 billion in first-year costs. These raises equalized military pay levels with private sector levels. Concurrently, the Congress authorized a variable housing allowance which now costs $1.2 billion annually. That has gone a long way, despite some appropriations caps, to closing the gap between actual off-station costs and housing reimbursements.
The Congress also invested in targeted compensation initiatives, such as enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, sea pay and submarine duty pay, aviation bonuses, nuclear duty pay, and medical pay. In addition, the Congress invested in improved permanent change of station reimbursements--even though there is still more that needs to be done in this area--and in improving the overall quality of life of military members and their families through substantial upgrades in facilities, such as child development centers and housing.
As a result of these initiatives, recruiting and retention of quality people have improved significantly and have stabilized at record levels over the last 4 years. For example, last year, 93 percent of non-prior-service recruits were high school graduates and 95 percent scored average or better on the mental category entrance examination. Comparable percentages for 1980 were 68 percent and 65 percent respectively, so what we have here is an improvement in recruit quality of 37 percent in the rate of high school graduates and an increase of 46 percent in the rate, of average or above mental categories.
The gains in retention are equally dramatic. Last year, first-term and career retention rates came in at 49 percent, and 86 percent respectively. Comparable figures for 1980 were 39 percent and 71 percent. So what we have here is an increase of 26 percent in the rate of first-term retention and an increase of 21 percent in the rate of career retention.
This is not to say that the recruiting and retention picture in the military services is perfect. There are obviously problems, such as the declining youth population and nagging shortages in specific skills that continue to require our attention. However, the point I want to make with these examples is that the Congress does care about manpower readiness and the welfare of military personnel and their families and has continued to invest in the personnel accounts even in these difficult fiscal times.
Like the rest of the Defense budget, the manpower program came under pressure and was reduced by the administration in the amended budget request.
For example, the amended budget proposed a 3.6-percent pay raise for military personnel--a cutback from the 4.6-percent pay raise
advertised by the administration last year. Also, in order to tighten the manpower belt, the administration proposed a reduction in Active Force strength of 16,700, from the original Reagan request for fiscal year 1990.
Nonetheless, of the $10 billion that had to be cut out in the amended Defense budget, the manpower account was reduced by only $700 million or 7 percent of the required cut, so the manpower account came out relatively unscathed.
Mr. President, in our action on the manpower portion of the amended budget request, we were guided by the general philosophy that we should support the difficult choices of the Secretary of Defense had to make in arriving at the amended budget level. At the same time, however, we have our own responsibility in the Congress to assess the Secretary's proposals in light of our best judgments on security needs. We followed the principle that the hard won gains in personnel readiness should be protected, that manning levels should adequately support the programmed force structure, and that military personnel should be treated equitably in terms of compensation and benefits.
In the area of manpower strengths, we approved, with minor modification, the active duty and Reserve strengths requested for fiscal years 1990 and 1991. The approved strength levels represent a reduction in Active Force strength of 16,900 in fiscal year 1990 from the authorized fiscal year 1989 level, and an increase of 5,250 in Reserve Force strength in fiscal year 1990 from the authorized fiscal year 1989 level. These manpower changes essentially reflect the shifting of misions from the Active to the Reserve Forces, a matter we believe requires attention in context of a total force policy review.
Specifically, we require the Secretary of Defense to report to us on the operation of the total force policy--in other words, the effectiveness of the integration of Active and Reserve Forces--in the Department of Defense.
Mr. President, in hearings the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel had this year, I was surprised to learn that there has been no comprehensive, authoritative study on the operation of the total force policy since its implementation over 15 years ago, in 1973.
Up until the promulgation of this policy, we traditionally relied on our Reserve and National Guard Forces during periods of national emergency or war to augment relatively small standing Active Forces. During peacetime, National Guard and Reserve Forces trained to the extent resources allowed them to do so to be prepared for callup. That is history.
Since the promulgation of the total force policy in the Department of Defense over 15 years ago, our National Guard and Reserve Forces have been designated as full partners with the active components in deterring aggression during peacetime and in waging war if peace should fail. Under this policy, substantial missions were assigned to the National Guard and Reserve components. They were no longer just standbys; they were part of that force we depended on. Therefore, our National Guard and Reserve components are no longer only forces held in reserve for a future use, nor are they just a cadre force. Instead, National Guard and Reserve units are an integral part of theatre operational plans, and successful combat operations cannot be carried out without them.
For example, the Army Reserve is relied on to provide 70 percent of the Army's combat support an combat service support forces. Combat support missions including engineer, signal, intelligence, and chemical activities. Combat service support missions include medical, maintenance, supply, transportation, and ammunition activities. Obviously, an Army cannot fight for very long without this support, and if 70 percent of this support comes from Army Reserve Forces, it is crystal clear that the Army has a big stake in the readiness of these forces. In those Army Reserve Forces involved with combat support and combat service support, what is their status now? Well, 45 percent are not combat-ready. I repeat, 45 percent are not combat-ready.
In a conventional war in Europe, Active Army Forces depend heavily upon rapid reinforcement from Army National Guard and Army Reserve units within the first 10 to 30 days after the conflict begins--without fail within 4 to 6 weeks. Without these reinforcing units, the Active Forces cannot sustain themselves and would become ineffective.
This situation is demonstrated in war game scenarios which indicate that shortfalls in the Reserve reinforcing forces quickly
become `war stoppers.' Another example: Some 80 percent of our medical combat support is supposed to come from the reserves--80 percent. Specifically, medical shortfalls in early deploying reserve units fall in this category. According to the Department of Defense, these units are short of their wartime requirements for physicians and nurses by 7,000--71 percent--and 31,000--66 percent--respectively. This is not solely an Army Reserve problem, but a serious total Army problem because it seriously affects Army combat readiness. It is a priority problem that the Army leadership must give priority attention to solving.
Every year since I have been on the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Armed Services Committee, every single year, we have heard about a new plan, and yet another plan that is going to somehow remedy this problem. And yet, the figures remain nearly the same year in and year out.
In fact, this year's report omitted the readiness figures that were reported in the past. They do not want them compared anymore, so they just omitted the readiness percentages that were normally reported so we no longer have those figures, uinless we specifically ask for them. What a head-in-the-sand approach that illustrates.
I make these points because I believe that the Department of Defense must critically and systematically review warfighting capability in a total force context, a context which must recognize the interactive dependencies among Active and Reserve Forces and the timetable for their deployment in event of war.
We need this study, Mr. President, to validate that current missions and roles are properly assigned and can be carried out, rather than a report year after year after year of the inability certain elements of our Reserve Forces to do the job they are depended on to do. We either have to have those missions and roles carried out or redo the assignments of the missions and roles to provide one basic thing, and that is effective combat capability. It either will work or not. We either can rely on it or not.
So when it comes to combat--and, God forbid that we ever have to get to that time again--but if we do, in combat there are no excuses. We either have a system that works or it does not. And if it does not, we lose and a lot of people get killed unnecessarily. That is the bottom line of what we are talking about here.
Now, before the picture gets too bleak as far as the Reserves go, let me say the Air Reserve and Guard components seem to be in very great shape in terms of combat readiness. They are performing admirably and perhaps could accept more missions. That too should be looked into in this review of our total force concept.
One other element. As we look ahead toward substantially smaller Active Forces in the future, there will, of necessity, be an even greater reliance on our Guard and Reserve and the missions they may be called upon to perform. So I think we need to, in this evaluation we are asking for, make sure there is a real comprehensive framework for evaluating the capability tradeoffs as we move in this direction.
So I look forward to receiving the mandated report so that we can use it as a basis for a plan of action to correct, on a systematic basis, persistent problems that have plagued the effective operations of the total force policy in the Department of Defense.
Now, let me turn to our action on military personnel compensation and benefits.
We approved the requested 3.6-percent pay raise for military personnel. We also asked that a study be done to review the whole military pay structure. It has not been done, except on a very piecemeal basis, for a long time.
The second area we acted on, we increased aviation career incentive pay by 60 percent, $400 per month, up to $650 per month for aviators with over 6 years of service, to help the military services retain aviators.
Let me expand on that just a little bit. Most people are unaware that we are right now, 1,500 Navy pilots short--1,500 pilots short in the Navy. We are short in the Air Force right now about 250 pilots. That is forecast, by the year 1992, to go up to 2,500 pilots short in the Air Force.
What is the problem? Is it that people do not want to serve? No, it is not.
The problem is we have a great need for airline pilots and as soon as the commitment of these service pilots reaches a certain point where they no longer have to stay in, they are off to the airlines at equal pay, about, starting out, much increased pay after a few years, and really big-time increased pay and health benefits and retirement once they have been with the airlines for, say, a 9- or 10-year period.
So we find ourselves with a problem of losing our pilots--pilots that we spend a great deal of money on to train. We spend somewhere around $500,000 just to train a pilot up to the day he pins his or her wings on. Then we send them to a replacement air group or combat crew training that costs another couple of million dollars over the next year to a year and a half. Then we send them to a squadron and they then put in a 3-year tour with that squadron and at that time you spend another $2 million to $2.5 million on that particular person. You have invested, say, $4.5 to $6 million in that person. Then we say, `you have a limited commitment'--the Air Force 7 years, going to 8 now; Navy, 7; Army, 5; Marine Corps, 4 1/2 . And we say, `OK, that is your commitment, and beyond that you are on your own.' And they get out and we start over again with another $5 million to $6 million invested in the training of a pilot to get him up to a real true combat status.
Now, I know the kind of training those people get, so I am very comforted when I get on an airliner and I know that I have a former military pilot up front. That is all good. Maybe it is to the benefit of our country overall that we have pilots like that flying for our airlines.
But we do not provide a military training program for just that purpose. That is the point. And the point is this: over the next 10 years, it is estimated the airlines and commercial air interests will be hiring pilots at a rate of about 7,000 per year. So we have to do something. Some of our incentive programs before, particularly with regard to the Navy, have worked out pretty well. So we are expanding this now with what we have proposed within this bill. But along with this we are also going to require a 9-year commitment beyond the date of pinning on the wings for fixed wing jet pilots and 7 years for other aviators, which I think is quite reasonable. I do not have any problem with that at all.
I know there has been some discussion of that in the military as to whether or not that is going to be too long. I would say to my friends in the military who are pilots right now, this does not apply to you. The old ground rules apply to you. This would be prospective. This would start with the new people signing up, new people who are just starting out on their flight training program.
I do not have any doubt at all that we can get quite a sufficient number of good people that will still sign up and want to be military pilots, even with the 9 and 7 year commitments.
In another area, we increased the ceiling on education benefits, kickers, that the Army can pay in addition to basic GI bill benefits from $400 a month to $700 per month, a $25,200 benefit over 3 years, to help the Army recruit highly qualified enlistees in critical skills, those that we are having a lot of difficulty filling.
In another area, we increased the ceiling on selective reenlistment bonuses for nuclear qualified personnel by 50 percent from $30,000 per contract for 6 years to $45,000 for 6 years.
In another area, we enhanced the survivor benefit plan, the SBP, a plan to provide an annuity to survivors of retirees by reducing the premium to a flat rate of 6.5 percent of designated retired pay; providing a supplemental option that would afford a level payment of 55 percent of retired pay to a survivor--the standard option is 55 percent until age 62, at which point the benefit drops to 35 percent; and, finally, providing a 1-year open season to allow participation in the enhanced program.
In the area of health care for military personnel and their families, we approved a number of initiatives to enhances the recruiting and retention of health care providers.
We extended the authority for the Department of Defense to pay a retention bonus of up to $20,000 per year for retention agreements entered into by certain physicians based on critical needs of the Department of Defense.
We increased medical officer monthly special pays by 35 percent.
We provided new authorities to recruit and retain nurses including: A nurse accession bonus of up to $5,000; a nurse anesthetist incentive pay of up to $6,000 per year to encourage retention; and a Navy nurse candidate program targeted at recruiting nurses who have completed 2 years of a 4-year nursing program.
We increased medical specialty pay for reservists when on active duty for training to encourage more participation by physicians in the selected Reserve.
Mr. President, this concludes my summary of the action we took in the manpower and personnel area. I think they are good actions and I recommend them for support by my colleagues in this body.
I want to close by recognizing the hard work that Senator McCain, the ranking minority member of my subcommittee, put in the manpower portion of this bill. We worked very closely together in a spirit of teamwork and cooperation in forging a responsible package--one that takes care of readiness requirements as well as our commitments to our individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. I want to thank the Senator from Arizona for his hard work and counsel.
Mr. President, I also want to thank the staff--Fred Pang and Ken Johnson of the committee staffs; Fred Pang with the majority and Ken Johnson with the minority committee staff. Also Phil Upschulte and Milt Beach of my personal staff, for their hard work. As usual, they did a great job.
In particular, it has been a real pleasure to work with Fred Pang, who is here with me on the floor today. He is an outstanding committee staff member. I can vouch for that. He is very pleasant to work with, very thorough in the work that he does. It is a real pleasure to work with him on these very complex matters of pay and compensation and retirement benefits and all of the things that go into making military life palatable for people who are willing to serve their country.
It is not an easy job and some of these things that Fred works on, has worked on, are particularly beneficial to our men and women in uniform.
As usual, he has done a great job. Ken Johnson on the minority side, also, has done an outstanding job and I am sure Senator McCain will wish to address that when he makes his remarks.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the `Study on Total Force Policy,' from the committee report, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
[Page: S8580]
There is no doubt in the committee that our National Guard and Reserve forces are vital to our national security. We have traditionally relied on these forces during periods of national emergency or war to augment relatively small standing active forces. During peacetime, National Guard and Reserve forces trained to the extent resources allowed them to do so to be prepared for call-up. That is history.
Since the promulgation of the Total Force Policy in the Department of Defense over 15 years ago, our National Guard and Reserve forces have been designated as full partners with the active components in deterring aggression during peacetime and in waging war if peace should fail. Under this policy, substantial missions were assigned to the National Guard and Reserve components. Therefore, our National Guard and Reserve components are no longer only forces held in reserve for a future use nor are they just a cadre force. Instead, National Guard and Reserve units are an integral part of theater operational plans, and successful combat operations cannot be carried out without them.
For example, the Army Reserve is relied on to provide 70 percent of the Army's combat support and combat service support forces. Combat support missions include engineer, signal, intelligence, and chemical activities. Combat service support missions include medical, maintenance, supply, transportation, and ammunition activities. Obviously, an Army cannot fight for very long without this support, and if 70 percent of this support comes from Army Reserve forces, it is crystal clear that the Army has a big stake in the readiness of these forces.
In a conventional war in Europe, active Army forces depend heavily upon rapid reinforcement from Army National Guard and Army Reserve units within the first 10 to 30 days after the conflict begins. Without these reinforcing units, the active forces cannot sustain themselves and would become ineffective.
This situation is demonstrated in war game scenarios which indicate that shortfalls in the Reserve reinforcing forces quickly become `war stoppers.' Specifically, medical shortfalls in early deploying reserve units fall in this category. According to the Department of Defense, these units are short of their wartime requirements for physicians and nurses by 7,000 (71 percent) and 31,000 (66 percent) respectively. This is not solely an Army Reserve problem, but a serious total Army problem because it seriously affects Army combat readiness. It is a priority problem that the Army leadership must give priority attention to solving.
The committee makes these points because it believes that the Department of Defense must critically and systematically review warfighting capability in a Total Force context, a context which must recognize the interactive dependencies among active and reserve forces and the timetable for their deployment in event of war.
The committee looks forward to receiving the mandated report so that it can use it as a basis for a plan of action to correct, on a systematic basis, persistent problems that have plagued the effective operation of the Total Force Policy in the Department of Defense.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Reid). The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the 1990-91 defense authorization bill. While the authorization bill is not ideal, it represents the best compromise given the current budget problems that face our Nation. As ranking member of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, I can assure my colleagues that this bill continues to provide our Nation with a strong strategic nuclear triad, which has been so critical in keeping the peace between the United States and the Soviet Union.
I do, however, wish to express a few serious concerns about the defense bill before us today, Mr. President. Over the years, I have made my position clear with respect to ICBM modernization. I have been, and continue to be, a strong supporter of the MX Program and the rail garrison basing concept. This year, though, I announced my support for the small ICBM, which President Bush included in his defense request. I have done so for two reasons. First, I believe that if we are to end the protracted and seemingly internecine debate over ICBM modernization, we must seek a bipartisan consensus on how a two-missile program should proceed. I believe President Bush may have achieved that consensus.
Second, the President and Vice President have indicated that support for the two-missile program is related to the funding of the strategic defense idnitiative or SDI. I am a strong supporter of SDI, and agree with the President that we must fund the program well above last year's authorization level. This is the only way that the President can make an informed decision about the program during his first term in office. My continued support for the small ICBM Program is, therefore, contingent upon the Congress funding SDI at a much higher level than last year. I am concerned, however, that the House is moving to cut SDI even further than the already drastic House Armed Services Committee reduction of $1.1 billion. Further reductions by House Members on the floor will only make an adequate conference outcome more difficult and possibly even jeopardize the bipartisan consensus on ICBM modernization.
I am also concerned about the B-2 Program. While I support the President's program, I am very concerned that the cost of the bomber may ultimately result in its cancellation. I realize that some have argued that the B-2 is only 20 percent more than the B-1B in so-called flyaway cost; that it is cheaper per warhead than the MX; and that the MX and small ICBM together are slightly less expensive than the B-2. But the bomber is still too expensive given the current budget situation. I am not sure that the American people will support the program given the high cost.
Mr. President, the committee bill also contains $303 million for the design and development of new production reactors. The country is rapidly approaching a critical shortage of nuclear materials. The Department of Energy does not have a single reactor producing plutonium or tritium for nuclear weapons. Unless we get on with building new production reactors, our supply will decay--leaving the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent forces in question and preclude our ability to meet new military requirements. Such an outcome could seriously undermine deterrence and stability. While there are adequate supplies for the moment, there is no hope, I repeat, no hope, of satisfying our requirements 10 years from now unless we get on with the new production reactor program, today.
For the interim, the Department of Energy has prudently developed a special isotope separation program, to refine already existing plutonium, if needed, before the new production reactors are finished. The President's report to Congress calls this project time-critical and essential, yet some would prefer to stop this program, in part, because we have no immediate need for plutonium. This SIS project will be the country's only source of weapon-grade plutonium. It is essential that we get on with its construction.
Finally Mr. President, as we begin the floor debate on this defense bill, I would like to make a few observations to my colleagues and the American public. As always, there will be amendments by Members to change or cut the defense bill. There are some Members, in particular, that will argue that the defense budget is unnecessarily large given certain changes in the international situation. Many will point to changes in the Soviet Union as justification to reduce defense spending--particularly funds for our nuclear deterrent forces.
I join my colleagues in welcoming Mr. Gorbachev's pronouncements to reduce his country's vast arsenal of weapons and to truly turn the Soviet Union's abundant resources to peaceful use. But in considering whether or not to cut our defense posture based on Mr. Gorbachev's recent announcements, it is important not to confuse words with deeds. Mr. Gorbachev, for example, has declared his intention to cutback Soviet military forces by 20 percent, to reduce troops and equipment in Eastern Europe and along the Chinese border, and to cut defense spending by 14 percent. All of these are welcomed gestures, if they materialize. We must, however, also look at other actions taken by the Soviets since Mr. Gorbachev assumed power.
Soviet military production and modernization are important indicators of intentions. Yet, in these arass we still see little change form past practice; in fact, in many areas of Soviet military production there have been significant increases. For example, when Mr. Gorbachev assumed power in 1985, the Soviet Union produced 3,000 tanks annually. Over the past 3 years, Soviet tank production has increased to 3,500 annually. Compare this to the United States, which only produced 775 tanks last year, and will produce even fewer this year. Indeed, the Soviet Union produces more tanks than all NATO countries combined.
In the area of strategic nuclear forces, the Soviet Union has yet to make a single reduction. The Soviets are continuing, unabated, their strategic nuclear modernization program. According to the Department of Defense, the Soviet Union produced eight submarines per year in 1986 versus three for the United States. In 1988, the Soviets produced nine submarines compared to five for the United States. The Soviets have substantially out produced the United States in ICBM production. In 1985, the Soviets produced 100 ICBM's, the United States none. In 1988, the Soviets produced 150 ICBM's versus only 19 for the United States. All of these increases occurred during Mr. Gorbachev's tenure.
While I may be willing to concede that Mr. Gorbachev is serious about his declared intentions, history tell us not to be precipitious in our desires to reduce military spending based on promises alone. Mr. President, during my more than 30 years in this distinguished body, I have heard these declarations of change in the Soviet Union many times before. During the 1950's, Mr. Khruschev alledgedly attempted to liberalize Soviet society only to have the initiatives reversed upon his removal from power. Many of my distinguished colleagues in the Senate believed that during the euphoria of detente we should reduce reduce military spending and expand high technology trade with the Soviets, which we did, only to watch Soviet military power and aggressiveness grow at unprecedented rates during the 1970's. During these periods of so-called change many of my colleagues considered Soviet attempts to liberalize their society `irreversible' and `unprecedented.' We hear these same words, today.
History shows that we should welcome peaceful change, but only, and I repeat `only,' when deeds match words. The outcome of declared Soviet reforms and intentions has not been determined and will not be for many years to come. More important, we must understand fully what the objectives of Soviet reforms are, and the implications of those objectives for U.S. national security.
Additionally, we cannot pin our hopes for true democratic change in the Soviet Union, on one leader. As recent events in China illustrate, threre can be dramatic reversals in intentions and behavior. China initiated major economic and political changes, indicating a desire to become more democratic; yet, it reverted to brutal totalitarian methods to quash democratic demonstrations and purged empathetic leaders. The same could happen in the Soviet Union and, in fact, has in certain Soviet republics. Recent strikes by Soviet miners and discontent among some Soviet leaders over the direction of Mr. Gorbachev's reforms should give us pause before making further cuts to an already austere U.S. defense budget.
Mr. President, in light of this, we must ensure that our defenses and military production base are able to maintain deterrence and stability. Mr. President, I ask my distinguished colleagues to consider these factors during their deliberations of this defense budget. We must not engage in further cuts to the defense budget or attempts to add back terminated programs. Secretary Cheney has made tough choices, and we should support him in his efforts to secure the highest quality of military capability during this time of seriously reduced military spending.
Mr. President, in closing, I want to take this opportunity to commend the distinguished chairman of this committee and the able ranking member, Senator Nunn and Senator Warner. I think they have provided good leadership to our committee, and I also wish to express my deep appreciation to the various members of the committee for their cooperation and assistance in bringing to this body what I consider to be a sound defense bill. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
[Page: S8581]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I too rise to support the defense authorization bill now pending. I would like to begin by echoing the words of our senior member of our committee, in terms of tenure, the Senator from South Carolina, and by also commending the work of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle who are members of this committee and who have worked hard to produce a good bill.
It cannot be said that we left all vestiges of partisanship at the door in the drafting of this bill, but it is true that we minimized partisanship and only allowed through those parts of it which reflected major differences of approach. Overall, the authorization bill represents good faith efforts by Senators in both political parties to reach agreement on what is best for the national defense at a time of rapid change at home and in the world. I am proud to have been a part of that effort.
I, too, wish to commend the leadership of our chairman, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], and the ranking Republican member of the committee, the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner]. I wish to commend the subcommittee chairs and the ranking members of each subcommittee, and I would like to commend the staff. This is a very professional staff, Mr. President, and they have done an excellent job in supporting the efforts of the members to produce this bill.
I think it is also appropriate to join others on the committee in saluting the work of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Cheney. I strongly disagree with his approach to some issues, but I do agree that his leadership has helped to heal some of the wounds that were caused earlier by the controversy over the nomination of Senator Tower. All of us are impressed by the degree to which Secretary Cheney has come to grips with difficult issues and the hard work he has put in. Even though many of us do disagree on one issue or another, we do all respect his readiness to make firm decisions and to accept the controversy certain to follow.
Mr. President, as authorizers, our central task has been to find an equilibrium between the defense needs of the country and the country's ability to pay for them. At a time when political relations with the Soviet Union seem to be improving and when the Nation's fiscal situation remains severe, we are keenly aware that anticipatory cuts in defense spending made in the expectation of arms control agreements or in the hopes of relieving budgetary pressures through budgetary control can prove unsound if the arms control does not then materialize. The art of it has been to authorize a defense posture which is neither grossly out of keeping with budgetary and diplomatic realities nor likely to leave us in any danger in the event of a turn for the worse in United States-Soviet relations. That turns out to be a narrow line, indeed, as I hope it will become clear during the debate over this bill.
With those comments as preface, let me turn now to a discussion of issues in the bill which are of particular concern to me, including, first of all, issues relating to strategic forces.
An extraordinarily unusual situation was developing. Some weeks ago, the President began the current round of START negotiations by noting that he would not at this time make any adjustments in U.S. proposals for mobile ballistic missiles until he is certain that Congress will support his modernization plan for the MX and the single warhead mobile missile. Then last week, the Air Force Chief of Staff informed the committee that our entire approach to strategic arms control would have to be overhauled were Congress not to support the B-2.
As a result of these assertions, modernization of our weapons and arms control, which ought to complement and facilitate each other, are clearly in some danger of gridlock. Some in this body are opposed to the rail mobile MX; others to the single warhead mobile missile; and still others oppose both. Some are opposed to SDI, except at very reduced levels of spending, if at all. Some are opposed to the B-2 as too costly, and some are vehement proponents of one or more of these weapons systems or all of them. Consensus is, therefore, extremely hard to obtain and the problem of sustaining it is compounded by its tentative nature.
Under the circumstances, Mr. President, I firmly believe that the committee may well have struck the only possible balance in its approach to these systems. MX rail mobile will proceed; Minuteman will proceed at a slower pace; the B-2 will proceed provided the aircraft meets a series of test flight criteria; SDI has been cut but is still well funded, particularly in view of the shifting of gears now going on in that program with the Brilliant Pebbles, as the latest design is called, grinding against the former design of SDI as we used to know it.
Clearly, there are elements in the strategic program as acted upon by the committee which are controversial no matter which way one surveys opinion in the Senate. Very few Members are prepared to support the entire program as a matter of conviction. Almost everyone has druthers. But if we pull the plug on any of these programs, agreement on the others is then jeopardized. The outcome would almost certainly be further delay and expense in these defense programs and a possible crisis in the way the administration sees its situation in arms control.
To some extent, the administration has a point. There is little point in pursuing an arms control concept that involves certain rights to modernization if at the end of the process the United States lacks the will to exercise those rights. On the other hand, Mr. President, the administration would have had a better chance to marshal support if it had at least given us a sense of where it intends to go if it does, indeed, when Congress gives its support. So far that overall framework, including the indications of what our course will be in Geneva, is still missing, and its absence contributes to the risk that we will fall into disarray.
I do not believe we will fall into disarray. I believe the committee's workproduct will be supported, and I urge my colleagues to support it. One of the reasons I do so is I believe very deeply, Mr. President, that in a democracy confronted with the kind of challenge we face throughout the postwar period, consensus is itself a strategic asset. We discard it at our peril. We build it to our benefit. I believe that we have in this committee product created the basis for a sound consensus.
I think the product stands on its own merits.
This year the problem is not as acute as it will be next year. Our decisions are still reversible this year. Members who dislike one element or another of the package approved by the committee might yet feel comfortable voting for the whole package. Next year, however, we will be approaching a threshold where change becomes much more problematic. MX rail mobile will be moving rapidly toward deployment by then. Midgetman should be receiving a new infusion of funds. The B-2, assuming it has been successful in its flight test next Wednesday, will then become a production issue. SDI presumably will have achieved some new kind of focus and be ready to proceed toward its stated research goals.
So this year I urge that the Senate support the Armed Services Committee mark on strategic modernization. Next year I believe that the administration must have by then showed its hand in arms control. We must understand by then where the administration proposes to go. We need to have debated between now and then how much it will cost us to get there and whether we can afford the tab. We need to have explored alternative outcomes in arms control that might reflect funding decisions that Congress has the duty to consider and the right to make.
Mr. President, it is worth noting that the Soviet Union has been clearly signaling its view that the future of the strategic balance lies with increased mobility of single-warhead missiles. Indeed, a well-known projection of the future of strategic forces, referred to at least twice by General Secretary Gorbachev publicly, has stated the view of the authors in the Soviet Union that the ideal strategic balance in the future will one day comprise a few hundred single-warhead mobile missiles based on land in conjunction with other forces.
Just this morning we see new reports of a prominent Soviet military spokesman indicating that multiple-warhead land-based mobile missiles might be subject to negotiation, the MX for the SS-24. We do not know how much stock to put in those comments, but if they are true, if they, in other words, provide any accurate measure of Soviet intentions, then they would somewhat justify the reports coming out of the White House that one option under active consideration on our side is to propose a ban not on mobile missiles across the board but on multiple-warhead land-based mobile missiles.
Such a proposal, Mr. President, would point both superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, in the direction of a single-warhead mobile missile as the deterrent weapon of choice for both sides in the future. Why? Because that weapon is simultaneously accurate and powerful enough to provide deterrence but invulnerable and capable of riding out any kind of aggressive first strike by the other side. It is, therefore, the ideal weapon system to produce what is called stability, that is, a relationship between the arsenals on both sides which minimizes the fear of a first strike on either side.
Mr. President, the National Security Adviser for President Bush is well versed in these matters, and as one member of this committee I take some comfort from his presence in the National Security Council at the hand of President Bush as these issues are considered in the months and years ahead.
Next, Mr. President, I would like to turn from strategic modernization to another major concern of this Senator, and that is the environment and speak about that concern as it is manifested in the authorization bill before us.
This year the committee has made an extremely important step toward coming to grips with the clean up of Department of Energy facilities. We have added nearly one-half billion dollars to the budget for this purpose, one-half billion dollars over the amount proposed by the administration, but it is just a start and all of us realize that. Ahead of us are expenditures which will consume very large amounts of resources for a long time to come. But in this bill we have made an important beginning.
In another aspect of the environmental problem we face, the emission of chlorofluorocarbons and halons to the
atmosphere and the problem of biodegradables and recycling, I am happy to have been able to work closely with the ranking minority member of the committee, Senator Warner, on a modest but precedent-setting set of provisions. Under these provisions, the Department of Defense will be encouraged to pursue both its near-term efforts to reduce unnecessary emissions of these chemicals, to find replacements for them in the longer term, and through the use of biodegradable packaging to play a constructive role in the national effort to arrest environmental damage. Indeed, this committee takes the position with this bill and report, and urges the Senate to do the same, that the environmental crisis now facing humankind should be seen as a national security issue. Our national security is threatened by the environmental crisis before us, and we must respond with urgency.
Mr. President, in closing, the bill presented by the Armed Services Committee today is not perfect and no one connected with this kind of activity claims that or would expect that, but it is a well-made product. I am proud as a member of the committee to have taken part in its creation and I am proud to commend this bill to my colleagues in the Senate.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
[Page: S8583]
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment in behalf of myself and Mr. Warner, and actually every member of the committee individually on both sides of the aisle, and I ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for himself, Mr. Warner, Mr. Exon, Mr. Levin, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Dixon, Mr. Glenn, Mr. Gore, Mr. Wirth, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Wilson, Mr. McCain, Mr. Wallop, Mr. Gorton, Mr. Lott, Mr. Coats, and Mr. DeConcini, proposes an amendment numbered 392.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of part A of title I insert the following:
SEC. 108. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS OF ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS FOR PROCUREMENT OF MISSILES
(a) Fiscal Year 1990: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1990 for procurement of missiles for the Army, Navy, and Air Force as follows:
For the Army, $362,400,000.
For the Navy, $125,100,000.
For the Air Force, $109,300,000.
(b) Fiscal Year 1991: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1991 for procurement of missiles for the Army, and Air Force as follows:
For the Army, $227,500,000.
For the Air Force, $109,300,000.
(c) Additional Authorization: Funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) are in addition to funds authorized to be appropriated under sections 101, 102, and 103.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, at the time the Armed Services Committee reported the Defense authorization bill, the committee also reported a separate bill (S. 1367) authorizing an increase in funds for the purchase of advanced conventional munitions for the military services--the so-called smart munitions. This separate bill is now being offered by me, Senator Warner, Senator Levin, Senator Wilson, and all the other committee members, in our capacities as individual Senators, as an amendment to the Defense authorization bill.
This amendment increases by $596.8 million in fiscal year 1990 and $336.8 million in fiscal year 1991 the amounts in the underlying authorization bill to procure smart munitions such as air-to-air missiles and air-to-ground missiles. However, this amendment does not increase the overall authorization total of the bill over the budget summit level of $305 billion. The committee left room for the funding increase in this amendment in the hope that the Senate would approve it duirng floor debate.
We are offering this amendment because the administration's budget request proposes deep reductions in missile procurement programs, resulting in increasingly
inefficient production lines. These stretchouts also occur unfortunately for munitions which are in short supply.
This amendment enjoys bipartisan support on the Armed Services Committee. I strongly support the amendment as does my colleague, Senator Warner. Senator Levin, and chairman of the Conventional Forces Subcommittee, and Senator Wilson, the ranking minority member, developed the recommendation in the Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense and will provide the detailed explanation.
Mr. President, there are three key reasons why the full Senate should support this amendment. And I would hope that the Senate could vote on it in the 5 p.m. timeframe.
During our committee's hearings on this bill, some of America's most senior military commanders told the committee that they face serious shortages.
This spring, Gen. Thomas C. Richards, deputy commander in chief of the U.S. European Command, testified that `our greatest weaknesses are in the areas of * * * war reserve stocks of preferred munitions. We can ill afford to reduce our readiness and sustainability.' General Richards also stated that `all the services, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, all have shortages, severe shortages of preferred munitions.'
Several of the commanders in chief complained that the forces under their command were limited to days of supply of some key munitions. Maj. Gen. Christian Patte from the U.S. Central Command noted that `overall [U.S. Central Command] has realized only marginal growth in the amount of stocks on hand. There is no fix for these problem areas short of procuring the needed stocks. We need strong support for additional funding to improve both the level of effort and threat oriented posture.'
During the past 8 years there has been a dramatic improvement in the quality and readiness of our forces. But combat sustainability has lagged far behind. We are ready for the most part to go to war within days, but we can't stay in the battle for long because of limited stocks of advanced conventional munitions.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record a table comparing the inventory of selected guided munitions with the stocks available.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
[Page: S8584]
13
MLRS
47
Stinger (Army)
43
Hellfire (Army)
63
HARM (Navy & AF)
60
Maverick (Navy & AF)
30
Mr. NUNN. This table vividly illustrates that the services fall far short of required inventory levels for many of our most important modern munitions. These are also the munitions for which the production rates are being reduced unless we change the administation's proposed budget request by increasing it as we do in this amendment.
For example, the chart shows that we have only 13 percent of our inventory requirements of TOW 2 antitank missiles. This is the primary tank-killing missile in the Army. Most of our TOW missiles are ineffective because the Soviet Union has installed so-called reactive armor on their tanks. Only the TOW 2 will be effective and we have only 13 percent of our inventory needs met.
Similarly, the Army has only 47 percent of its requirement of multiple-launch rockets. During the past 18 months the Department of Defense conducted a comprehensive study called competitive strategies. This study examined ways to use our most promising technology against the enduring weaknesses of the Soviet military. The multiple-launch rocket sys-tem was one of the most important weapons in our inventory, and we have only 47 percent of our inventory requirements.
In some instances, our attack helicopters and combat fighters could make just a handful of sorties before running out of advanced munitions. For example, the Army couldn't fully load the AH-64 attack helicopters to fly more than two missions before they run out of Hellfire missiles. Mr. President, the Apache helicopter costs $11 million each, yet after two missions it will have nothing to fire at Soviet tanks if there is a war.
The Air Force won't have enough Maverick missiles--which is the Air Force's only tank-killing missile--to send all of their tactical aircraft off for just one mission.
Mr. President, does it make sense to buy helicopters that cost $11 million each and fighters that cost between $20-50 million each--and some of them much more than that--but not to buy enough $35,000 missiles to last more than a few days? Obviously the answer is it does not make sense.
Another example--the Army will have only 43 percent of its requirements for Stinger air defense missiles with this year's budget request. The Stinger missile more than anything else we provided helped turn the war in Afghanistan, yet we will have only 43 percent of our requirements for American military forces.
Our inventories are dangerously low--in many cases the services have less than half of their requirements for advanced munitions--and this year's budget request would significantly slow the rate of improvement. This amendment is designed to reverse this situation.
Because of these stretchouts, the unit costs for munitions has skyrocketed. The unit cost on five of the major munitions programs would increase by an average of 19 percent as a result of these production stretchouts. I ask unanimous consent that a chart showing the proposed administration stretchouts in missile production and the impact on the unit cost be printed in the Record at this point.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
TABLE 2: STRETCHOUTS IN MISSILE PRODUCTION AND IMPACT ON UNIT COSTS
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year-- Percent
1989 actual 1990 proposed Decrease quantity Increase in unit cost
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hellfire (Army) 6,000 3,102 48 25
MLRS rockets 48,000 24,000 50 21
Stinger (Army) 6,750 2,375 65 35
TOW 2 (Army) 12,000 9,455 21 11
HARM (Navy and AF) 2,200 1,488 32 1 4[Footnote] 1 CBO estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, because of the stretchout, the unit costs for the Hellfire missile increases 25 percent; for the MLRS rocket, a 21-percent increase in cost; for the Stinger Army missile, a 35-percent increase; for the TOW II missile, an 11-percent increase; and costs on the HARM missile would also go up.
Mr. President, we hope to turn that around with this amendment if it is agreed to by the Senate.
This table illustrates the serious impact on costs that come with stretchouts. The administration proposed to cut back the Hellfire missile from 6,000 last year to 3,102 this year, which is a 48-percent reduction. That stretchout causes the unit cost to skyrocket 25 percent per missile. So every Hellfire missile is going to cost 25 percent more than it should because of this stretchout. The Army proposed to cut back the production rate on Stinger missiles by 65 percent, and unit costs will soar 35 percent. We will pay a third more than we need to for Stinger missiles because of these stretchouts.
Mr. President, I could go through each one but the bottom line is the same--stretchouts raise the cost per unit and we are still far short of our requirement.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table showing the proposed production rates in the budget request be printed at this point in the Record. This table shows the minimum production rate required for competition, the maximum production rate and the proposed production rate for fiscal year 1990.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
TABLE 3: PROPOSED PRODUCTION RATES COMPARED TO MINIMUM EFFICIENT PRODUCTION RATES
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum economic rate Maximum rate Proposed rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Hellfire (Army & MC) 6,360 13,500 4,200
MLRS 36,000 96,000 24,000
Stinger 5,100 25,440 2,375
TOW 2 (Army & MC) 21,600 30,000 10,294
HARM (Navy & AF) 2,400 3,240 1,488
Maverick (Navy & AF) 1 3,060 6,000 2,830[Footnote] 1 Denotes minimum sustaining rate, rather than minimum economic rate.
----------------------------------------------------------------------The minimum production rate is the number of missiles that can be produced with the tools and facilities, assuming one shift of workers working 8 hours a day, 5 days a week. The minimum rate, while not desirable, is really the lowest level at which a system should be produced to avoid exorbitant costs per unit.
The maximum rate is the highest efficient production rate given the tools and facilities that have already been purchased. In other words, this is the desirable rate since we have facilitized at this level.
As can be seen in this table, the proposed production rate consistently falls below the minimum economic production rate, and far short of the maximum efficient production rate. In the case of the Maverick missile, the proposed production rate falls below the minimum sustaining production rate.
The fact that there are two producers for these missiles makes the problem even more serious, because you cannot sustain any kind of competitive base at these uneconomic rates.
Again, the Hellfire missile is a good example of what we lose in terms of competition. The Hellfire missile is carried by the Army's AH-64 attack helicopter and is designed to destroy enemy tanks. The Army established two manufacturers for Hellfire missiles in order to have annual competitions. Each producer must be given at least 2,100 missiles per year in order to stay in production. In recent years the Army procured approximately 7,000 missiles per year which was sufficient to sustain a robust competition. But the Army and the Marine Corps are now proposing to buy only 4,200 missiles in fiscal year 1990 and the following 2 years. At this level there can be no competition, because each company has to get half of the production just to stay open. The millions of dollars spent to establish competition is being frittered away because the Army is proposing to buy insufficient numbers of missiles.
This is a typical story. The Navy and the Air Force are qualifying a second source producer for the HARM missile, yet the production rate for fiscal year 1990 of 1,488 missiles is 40 percent below the minimum efficient production rate. That is the rate where each producer can produce missiles with only one shift working 5 days a week. That is the minimum economic rate, yet the Navy and Air Force plan to buy HARM missiles at a rate 40 percent lower than that minimum rate. We will have workers and machines standing around idle in two factories because the Navy and Air Force are not buying enough missiles.
Because the administration proposes to buy such small number of missiles, each missile costs too much because excess plant capacity goes unused. And for these five missiles, there are two producers that are supposed to be competing to produce missiles, but which cannot compete because the proposed production rate is so low that each company has to be guaranteed minimum rates if they are to stay in business.
Mr. President, the services, particularly the Navy, have gone out and qualified two sources for these missiles, which is a good move in the right direction. But dual source competition is premised on a certain inventory objective and production rate. The Navy, the Army, and the other services, when they qualify a second company in order to provide competition, then pay for the tooling, for the production facility at two plants. Then all of a sudden, the services propose to reduce production levels to the point where you simply cannot sustain two sources. The services end up wasting a lot of money. That is absolutely useless.
In short, Mr. President, we have serious stretchouts as well as excessive production capacity--in other words, the worse of all possible situations. The proposed cuts in the budget are militarily unwise and economically unsound.
Secretary Cheney has made some excellent decisions in the amended budget request, but this area isn't one of them. In fairness to Secretary Cheney, the bulk of these stretchouts occurred in the Reagan budget submission, but Secretary Cheney was unable to correct these problems with his amended budget. The Senate today has an opportunity to start that corrective action.
[Page: S8585]
The amendment does not add back any expensive programs that have been recommended for termination by Secretary Cheney. Nor does it buy systems that are not needed. In fact, the amendment would restore funding to the production level that we had for those systems just last year so as to prevent massive stretchouts, delays in filling the war stocks and to avoid the cost increases caused by stretchouts.
If these shortages go unaddressed, American soldiers, sailors, marines, and pilots will run out of advanced munitions early in a conflict and be forced to utilize less effective munitions. Pilots, for example, would have to fly right over defended targets and drop dumb gravity bombs. This needlessly puts at risk highly trained pilots and very expensive platforms. Soldiers would have to launch TOW missiles that we know can't penetrate the latest Soviet armor. And in some cases--such as the Hellfire missile, AH-64 helicopters would have no tank-killing munitions at all once the current stocks are depleted. In short, the vulnerability of our forces--both men and equipment--would increase substantially once the sophisticated munitions inventories are depleted.
America cannot afford to match the Soviet Union bullet for bullet. If we tried that we would lose. Instead, the United States relies on its technological advantage. But if we don't buy sufficient stocks of technologically advanced munitions we will cede our technological lead in sensor technology, computers and guidance systems to the Soviet Union.
Mr. President, I encourage all of my colleagues to support this amendment. It represents the type of responsible action our committee has taken in the past and proposes today to increase the sustainability of our combat forces. We are not proposing to buy anything the Defense Department doesn't have in its budget. We are just proposing to buy the missiles are more efficient production rates.
Specifically, this amendment would buy 24,000 more MLRS rockets, 2,000 more Stinger missiles, 2,800 more Hellfire missiles, 4,300 more TOW missiles, and 700 more HARM missiles. This amendment would in effect double the production rate on MLRS rockets and Stinger missiles, buy 66 percent more Hellfire missiles, 40 percent more TOW missiles, and nearly 50 percent more HARM missiles. I ask unanimous consent that a chart listing the sytems included in the amendment at the level that would occur if the amendment is adopted be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the chart was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
MUNITIONS TO BE PURCHASED WITH FUNDS PROVIDED BY AMENDMENT
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amended budget request Authorized with amendment
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multiple launch rockets 24,000 48,000
Stinger missiles 2,375 4,375
Hellfire missiles 4,200 7,000
TOW 2 missile 10,294 14,594
HARM missile 1,488 2,188
-------------------------------------------------------------------------Mr. NUNN. We want to give every Member of the Senate an opportunity to review and consider these recommendations.
Mr. President, this amendment makes military and economic sense and I urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. President, I want to thank, particularly, Senator Levin and Senator Wilson for their leadership on this initiative. Senator Levin has taken a deep interest in making sure we have efficient production rates. I know he will be back in a few minutes to discuss this amendment in greater detail. I also thank Senator Warner for his support. We will be voting on this amendment shortly after 5 o'clock. I will ask for a rollcall vote on it.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. I strongly support this amendment. Clearly, the chairman points out lower unit costs and greater efficiency. This is what we are trying to invoke in so many of the programs in the Department of Defense.
Mr. President, I see one of our distinguished members of the committee about to make his opening statement. I yield the floor.
Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
[Page: S8586]
This Defense Department authorization bill has been carefully crafted over a period of several months. And, as is usually the case in these circumstances, it represents a marriage of convenience. But while it has been aptly said that `marriages of convenience are not expected to be joyous,' there is nothing that keeps them from being successful. And I am convinced that this bill has the elements required for success.
First of all, I am convinced that Secretary of Defense Cheney should be congratulated, not criticized, for making the very tough stretch-out, reduction, and termination decisions he did. For years, the Congress has been calling on the Secretary of Defense to trim its procurement. Now Secretary Cheney has finally heeded the call. This is not to say that the DOD bill should be closed to further debate. I am not implying that all its decisions were uniformly sound. But I would suggest that Senators seriously consider the tradeoffs that went into this bill and those that will be required in reversing termination decisions that he made.
Second, I would also add that as a freshman on Armed Services, my introduction to the process was instructive and encouraging. The chairman and ranking member--the managers of the bill--should be congratulated for their outstanding job thus far. During the markup of the DOD bill, the Senators from Georgia and Virginia provided balanced leadership--strong but not suffocating. And I would hope that the standards set by the Senate Armed Services Committee in considering the DOD authorization bill would be applied by the Senate as a whole.
Before closing, let me make several observations relevant to our consideration of this vital piece of legislation.
Despite obvious changes in the Soviet Union and international relations more generally, the United States and its allies continue to face significant military threats. During this year's Armed Services Committee budget hearings, the Joint Chiefs and numerous other military witnesses described a tremendous growth in Soviet military capabilities, especially in strategic forces.
It follows that since our adversaries has not relaxed their ambitions, we must not relax our vigilance. Strong and balanced forces will be required for the foreseeable future to ensure deterrence and to provide important leverge in arms control negotiations.
Finally, I am convinced that modifications in our defense budget should thus not come at the expense of any particular element of our military posture. It would be shortsighted to significantly cut any single category in order to fund increases in others. For example, I hope that Senators will avoid using strategic force accounts to fund terminated conventional programs, however worthy these programs may be.
Mr. President, once again, I would like to commend the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee for an excellent job in bringing the DOD authorization bill to the floor, and I look forward to working with them this week as we address this very important piece of legislation.
I yield the floor.
Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment which has been offered by all member of the Armed Services Committee, by the chairman of the committee and the ranking minority member thereof. This is a well thought-out piece of legislation, and if we are going to have a rollcall vote on this, I urge strong support for the amendment.
It makes sense from the standpoint of making basic munitions as well as smart munitions available to the armed services. While they are generally supported by the administration, they were not supported to the extent that it was necessary for effective production rates. Therefore, I salute the chairman and the ranking member for offering this on behalf of all memers of the Armed Services Committee and hope that it will receive strong support in the U.S. Senate.
I thank the Chair and yield to floor.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, before I speak on the pending committee amendment which has been offered by our chairman, let me briefly indicate my support for the authorization bill as a whole that is before us.
I am the chairman of the subcommittee that has responsibility for reviewing our major conventional defense commitment, which is the conventional defense of Europe and northeast Asia. Our subcommittee is the Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense. We also oversee the unified commands that are assigned those responsibilities.
To complement those duties the subcommittee is responsible for reviewing the development and procurement proposals for the conventional weapons systems that are required to meet those particular military requirements.
Our subcommittee has jurisdiction over approximately 13 percent of the budget request. We held a series of hearings this spring which became the basis for our recommendations which were incorporated in this bill.
Through those hearings, we uncovered some important problems in our defense program. We provided a direction for reviewing and revising the administration's amended budget request. I would like to spend a few moments to highlight some of the recommendations of the subcommittee that were incorporated in this bill.
The first is this munitions initiative which is the subject of the amendment which the chairman has proposed. Our subcommittee has recommended that over $500 million be added in fiscal year 1990 for additional tactical missiles. Tactical missiles were inadequately funded in the budget request. Eighty percent of all missile production lines were stretched out compared to last year and we recommended increases to avoid these expensive stretchouts; the shortages in key munitions And we also avoid through this amendment the expense of curtailing production this year, only to ramp up again next year as proposed by the administration.
The administration proposed very erratic production rates: Cutting down production this year, stretching out production thereby, and increasing unit cost. Yet at the same time they propose to go right back up again next year. That is a very expensive proposition.
The full committee accepted these recommendations and, as you have already heard, our chairman has offered the so-called munitions package to the full Senate for our consideration as a committee amendment.
In another important area, the subcommittee I chair continued our evaluation of the Army's progress in addressing the armor-antiarmor balance that had deteriorated through the 1980's. Last year the subcommittee conducted a comprehensive review and found that the armor-antiarmor balance between the United States and the Soviet Union's Armed Forces had deteriorated. Army witnesses acknowledged that our bullets, in the form of antiarmor missiles, would literally bounce off Soviet tanks. Our hearings and investigations found that the Army had substantially increased its commitment during the past year to restoring the qualitative superiority that had characterized our armor and antiarmor forces in previous years and were back on the right track. We continue that initiative to redress that armor-antiarmor balance in this year's budget.
In the area of close air support, last fall Senator Dixon offered an amendment, which was adopted, directing the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to develop a test plan for close air support aircraft. There has been substantial controversy associated with close air support in recent years.
The subcommittee reviewed that test plan and concluded that it was a solid basis for evaluating modernization alternatives for close air support aircraft.
Mr. President, I want to take a moment to thank members of the subcommittee, all of the members, but particularly Senator Wilson, the ranking Republican member, for the contributions and cooperative bipartisan approach to the work of this subcommittee.
Now, Mr. President, on the matter which is before us, which is the committee amendment that would add funds for conventional munitions, I rise to support that committee amendment; indeed, to be cosponsor of it.
It would add approximately $600 million in fiscal year 1990, and $336 million in fiscal year 1991 to buy needed, sophisticated, guided munitions.
This amendment does not break the budget summit agreement nor does it require offsets, because the committee-reported bill already assumes that this amendment will be adopted.
If it is not adopted, of course, we would have that much room in the budget for something else. There is room, in other words, in this bill to accept these increases without exceeding the budget summit ceiling.
This amendment would add funds for MLRS rockets, for Stinger missile, Hellfire missile, TOW II missile, and the standard missile. The amendment would add the following numbers in this year's budget.
I ask at this point in my remarks, the numbers requested by the administration for those items, the proposed increase in the items, and the percentage increase be incorporated and printed in the Record in full because I understand the chairman has already listed them for the Senate.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
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Administration request Amendment increase Percent increase
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
MLRS rocket 24,000 24,000 100
Stinger missile 2,375 2,000 84
Hellfire missile 4,200 2,800 67
TOW 2 missile 10,294 4,300 42
HARM missile 1,488 700 47
Standard missile 590 370 63
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this is not a pork-barrel amendment or a parochial matter. This amendment corrects problems with the budget that was sent to the Congress by the administration. We wanted to emphasize this initiative because sometimes the actions of our committees, not just the Armed Services Committees but other committees, are mischaracterized. Sometimes they are properly characterized. But at times they are mischaracterized.
We are criticized at times for adding items which benefit our home States. We thought it important to highlight this initiative as an important initiative for our Nation's defense and our Nation's security.
The problem with the President's budget is that the President cuts back production rates of needed precision-guided missiles to extremely low levels. Eighty percent of missile production lines were stretched our compared to last year. Funding for 25 of the most important missiles fell by 17 percent. Every single missile in the Navy budget request was stretched out.
Stretchouts will make production rates inefficient, increasing costs needlessly. Inefficient production rates mean great additional costs for each one of these missiles, over what they otherwise would have been.
This amendment adds funds for five key conventional munitions. Every one of these missiles we propose to increase will be manufactured below the minimum economic production rate unless this amendment is adopted.
Just to give one example, the costs of each one of the Hellfire missiles will go up 25 percent if we stretch out the production of that missile as proposed in the administration's budget.
Ths Stinger missile. If that production is stretched out so we produce fewer, missiles, the unit costs will go up by 35 percent for each Stinger missile. In other words, we can buy four Stinger missiles, instead of three, if we have a decent production rate. The average missile would go up by 19 percent because of the stretchouts in this year's proposed budget.
We also have a shortfall in our munitions inventories. General Thomas Richard, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the European Command said that all of the services--Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps--have shortages, severe shortages, in his words, of preferred munitions.
The first one is the multiple launch rocket system, the MLRS. This is one of the most effective weapons that is in the Army's arsenal. One MLRS launcher can deliver 8,000 grenades over a 30-acre area 40 kilometers behind enemy lines in 30 seconds. It is a revolutionary new weapon. It has proven to be one of the most important weapons systems in the competitive strategies review which was recently held by the Defense Department. Because of its importance, the Army recently doubled its inventory requirements from 400,000 rockets to 800,000 rockets. We only have half of the requirements met.
From 1982 to 1988, the Army procured 72,000 rockets per year, but because of a shortage of propellant, last year that figure was cot to 48,000 rockets. This year, without that shortage, but for budget reasons, the administration is proposing to buy 24,000 rockets. That is not even enough to fully require one shift of workers 5 days a week. Just to show how inefficent that production line is, you cannot even keep one shift going at that rate. Putting aside the military need for this rocket, which substantial the administration has proposed a the totally inefficient production rate for this rocket, which is going to cost so much more per unit as a result.
We have sufficient plant capacity to produce 96,000 MLRS rockets a year. We have the need for many, but we have stretched it out in this proposed budget and in the committee amendment before the Senate at this point will avoid that stretch out. We will add $128 million in fiscal year 1990 and $132 million in fiscal year 1991 to restore that production to last year's level of 48,000 rockets.
One other item is the Stinger missile, which is a heat-seeking shoulder-fired missile. Its combat effectiveness was proven in Afghanistan where they had over 75 percent success rate. Those were the early models of the Stinger. Today we are producing a much more sophisticated version. The Army has less than half of its inventory requirement of the Stinger missile, but the administration slashed Stinger missile production by 75 percent from about 10,000 last year to only 2,400 this year. That stretchout sends unit costs through the roof. As a matter of fact, Stinger missile costs increase by 35 percent.
Mr. President, the story is the same basically with the Hellfire antitank missile, the TOW II antitank missile and the HARM antiradar missile.
The Hellfire missile is the only system that the Army's AH-64 attack helicopter can fire.
We have only enough missiles for a few sorties. Once those missiles are gone the AH-64 helicopters will be useless.
The budget proposal slashes production in half, from approximately 7,000 in fiscal year 1989 to 4,200 in fiscal year 1990.
The production stretchout drives up unit costs by 25 percent from $35,000 per missile to $44,000 per missile.
The Army has only 63 percent of its requirements, while the Marine Corps has only one quarter of its requirements.
From the beginning the Army has had two producers of Hellfire missiles. But each producer has to have 2,100 missiles to stay in business. So at the budget request of 4,200, there is only enough to keep each producer barely alive.
There can be no competition if you buy enough missiles so that both barely stay alive. They cannot compete if they cannot do anything other than stay afloat.
The committee amendment adds $93 million this year and $94 million next year to bring the production rate back up to 7,000 per year. This is sufficient to maintain the competition.
[Page: S8588]
The amended budget request would cut Army TOW missile production form 12,000 last year to 9,455 this year, a 21 percent reduction. This stretchout would drive up unit costs by 11 percent.
This represents an extremely inefficient production rate. Despite the fact they are requesting only 9,455 missiles, there is sufficient production capacity to manufacture 30,000 missiles a year.
The Army is also planning to establish a second source producer, even though they are procuring missiles at only a third of existing capacity.
The committee amendment adds $51.1 million to buy an additional 4,300 missiles. This is sufficient to keep production at last year's level to avoid a needless stretchout.
The administration has proposed a massive 32 percent cut in production from 2,200 last year to about 1,500 this year. Both the Navy and the Air Force use HARM missiles and will have satisfied only 60 percent of their inventory requirements.
The Navy has developed a second producer for HARM missiles, and that competition is threatened by the low production rates.
Mr. President, finally, returning to the authorization bill itself, one of the hardest issues that we had to deal with--was Secretary's Cheney's recommendations to terminate several major conventional weapons systems. Most of those weapons systems were in the jurisdiction of my Conventional Forces Subcommittee. We had a far-ranging debate within the subcommittee, and within the full committee on the program termination issue. Many of us did not favor termination of some of those programs.
I offered amendments to restore funding for terminated programs by taking funds from what I believed are redundant strategic nuclear weapons systems. I did not succeed. I plan to offer an amendment during consideration of this bill that would cut funds from certain nuclear weapons systems, which I consider to be redundant, in order to increase funding for conventional systems, including some of the terminated conventional systems.
We should give Secretary Cheney his due, even those of us who do not agree with his priorities. He faced up to the serious mismatch between the programs that the services have started and the resources which are available to fund those programs. While I happen not to agree with all of Secretary Cheney's selections for termination, I commend him for facing up to the challenge. He has done what is long overdue and what is necessary, particularly this year in this time of budgetary constraint and huge budget deficits.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and I thank the Chair.
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself and Senator Warner and ask that it be printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place insert the following:
SEC. . DEATH PENALTY FOR ESPIONAGE.
(a) Espionage.--Section 794(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking `by death or' and by inserting immediately before the period the following: ', or the court may impose a sentence of death in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 7001 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (21 U.S.C. 848)';
(b) Espionage In Time of War.--Section 794(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking `by death or' and by inserting immediately before the period the following: `, or the court may impose a sentence of death in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 7001 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (21 U.S.C. 848)';
Mr. SPECTER. If I might have the attention of the distinguished Senator from Michigan, I had just come to the floor since there was a break in the impeachment proceedings of Judge Hastings where I am on the committee, and I am glad to find the Senator from Michigan on the floor. The amendment I have sent to the desk, not having asked for its immediate consideration, but for printing, provides for dealth penalty for espionage.
I have talked to Senator Hatfield on other business shortly before coming to the floor and had intended to notify the distinguished Senator from Michigan about this amendment because it might be objected to. As it is noted, the distinguished Senator from Michigan, along with the distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] have opposed death penalty bills in the past. It may be since this one applies to espionage that they will not oppose it. I just alert my friend as to the nature of this amendment. I have discussed with the managers of the bill, the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] and the distinguished Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner] my intention to offer this amendment to the bill.
Senator Nunn had commented that it was the intention of the committee to proceed with the B-2 issue tomorrow. I said that I respectfully did not want to interfere with the plans of the manager of the bill, but I would like to have the matter printed for the Record.
I anticipate, Mr. President, that there may be other cosponsors. When an analogous amendment was offered last week as to the death penalty for terrorism, I had a series of cosponsors--Senators Lieberman, Dole, Wilson, Grassley, DeConcini, and Bond. I would anticipate there would be other cosponsors of this amendment. For the next few minutes, I would like to talk about it briefly to outline my basic reasons for advancing this amendment at this time.
I think it is especially pertinent for a Department of Defense authorization bill, where we are seeking to spend something in the range of $300 billion, that the funds involving military secrets be safeguarded. Many may be surprised, as some of my colleagues have been, in discussing this proposed amendment, that there is no death penalty on the books today for espionage. That is true, Mr. President, because a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in Furman versus Georgia handed down in 1972 has, in effect, invalidated all pending Federal death penalty acts which do not comply with Furman.
The current act on the books found in title 18, United States Code annotated at section 794 provides for the death penalty for espionage, but there is no provision for consideration by a jury of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. So there is no doubt that the current death penalty is unconstitutional; that it cannot be applied in criminal prosecution in the courts of the United States. In fact, at the present time, Mr. President, the only valid death penalty bill which is on the books is the provision contained in the drug bill as to murder evolving from drug kingpins which was passed last year which has the requisite articulation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances which are necessary to pass constitutional muster.
There was an aircraft piracy bill passed in 1974 which most probably does not pass constitutional muster. There was a provision in the Code of Military Justice in 1985 which probably is constitutional, and that does comprehend the crime of espionage for those in the military service.
But that would not be sufficient to hold the possibility of the death penalty for those committing espionage other than those in the military service.
Mr. President, I think it ought to be noted with particularly that this Senator had put the Senate and others on notice of my intention to proceed with a broader range of death penalty statutes beyond the death penalty for terrorism when I had offered that terrorism amendment last week. As it may be recalled, an arrangement was worked out in collaboration with the distinguished majority leader and Senator Thurmond and others that that amendment was not pressed on the Department of State authorization bill but instead the majority leader made a commitment to bring that bill up as a freestanding bill under a 4-hour time limit sometime between Labor Day and October 31.
But at the time I offered that bill I had noted that there were quite a number of Federal statutes, important Federal statutes, for which the death penalty was invalid, and one of those that I had mentioned was espionage. So I want it plain that this is not a result of the recent notoriety of the allegations or the potential allegations involving Mr. Felix Bloch, but it had been my intention for some time to move into the area of espionage and as well into many of the other, in fact all of the other, areas where the Federal death penalty had been on the books but had in effect been invalidated by the decision of Furman versus Georgia and other Supreme Court decisions.
Mr. President, as I say, it is the view of this Senator that this is a very important amendment generally but especially important as this body consists the Department of Defense authorization bill. If the expenditures we are to make are to be kept secret so that the defense of this country may be maintained, there is hardly any purpose in having expenditures on matters like the Stealth bomber, and it may be of interest to those in the Chamber or those who may be listening that charges of selling the Stealth technology were in fact the subject of a Federal prosecution against Mr. Thomas P. Cavannagh, an engineer at Northrup Aviation Corp., who was arrested back on December 18, 1984, on charges of trying to sell Stealth technology to shield bombers from radar to undercover FBI agents posing as Soviet officials. Mr. Cavannagh received $25,000 from the agents and as a result of the further proceedings Cavannagh entered pleas of guilty to two to four counts of espionage and was sentenced to life in prison.
There have been a variety of espionage cases brought involving very significant military decisions, and it is important to note, Mr. President, that there has been a sharp increase in espionage cases where money is involved in the course of the past 12 years coinciding. I think not coicidentally, with the Furman decision which removed the possibility of the death penalty for espionage. It had been in the 1930's and 1940's and perhaps beyond that the motivation for espionage was ideological, but it is plain that the motivation for espionage more recently has been accounted for by monetary consideration. A CRS report for Congress notes the following:
[Page: S8589]
It is interesting to note, Mr. President, that according to the FBI statistics there were 6 arrests in the decade from 1966 to 1975, 47 arrests in the following decade--almost eight times as many, and 26 of those arrests occurred in 1984 and 1985. And then in 1986 there were five arrests, in 1987, three arrests, and in 1988, four arrests.
Analysis of these cases, Mr. President, shows regrettably the impact of money on these matters. For example, a Mr. Jerry A. Whitworth, a retired Navy senior chief radioman, was arrested on June 5, 1985, and charged with conspiring with John Walker to pass sensitive information to the Soviet Union since 1965, a companion case to the famous case involving John Anthony Walker, Jr., Arthur James Walker, and Michael Walker.
Continuing with the Whitworth case, Whitworth was alleged to have received $332,000 for secret information. Ultimately, Whitworth was sentenced to 365 years in prison and fined $410,000.
Along the lines of other high dollar amounts, a Mr. Richard W. Miller, an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for 20 years, was arrested along with two Soviet employees. Miller was charged with espionage on October 2, 1984. He had reportedly acknowledged that he had given one of the Russians a 25-page classified document for which Miller allegedly received $65,000 and was later sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment.
Mr. President, in the case of James D. Harper, Jr., a freelance computer engineer, who was arrested on October 15, 1983, having been accused of selling missile data, he reportedly was paid over $250,000 for documents allegedly passed through Polish agents to the Soviet KGB.
In another celebrated case involving one Mr. Joseph G Hellmich, a former Army warrant officer, he was arrested on July 15, 1981, on charges of selling top secret information about a sophisticated teletype coding machine to Soviet officials while he was stationed in Paris allegedly receiving some $131,000 for those items. He was ultimately sentenced to life imprisonment.
Mr. President, the incidents involving espionage have involved highly sensitive information cases. For example, in the case of Ivan Rogalsky, a Soviet alien living in Jackson Township, NJ, was arrested on January 7, 1977, the allegation was that he was involved in a classified document concerning satellite communications allegedly received from an RCA space center in Princeton, NJ: a matter involving Valdik Alexandrovich Enger and Rudolf Petrovich Chernyayev, allegedly involved classified documents pertaining to the Navy's underwater warfare projects; a matter involving William H. Bell, who was arrested on June 24, 1981, allegedly involved advanced radar designs for which Bell reportedly received approximately $110,000. Another matter involving Stephen A. Boba, who was arrested on December 4, 1981, on an allegation of sending classified electronic warfare documents to the South African Embassy in Washington, DC. Beyond that, Mr. President, one Penyu B. Kostadinov was arrested on September 23, 1983, and charged with paying an American graduate student some $300 for classified U.S. nuclear energy documents.
Richard C. Smith, a former Army intelligence officer, was accused on April 14, 1984 of selling the identities of six United States double agents to the Soviet Union for some $11,000.
This matter eventually resulted in an acquittal on April 11, 1986, but the importance of the matter involving the sale of the identities of some six U.S. double agents is obviously a matter of great importance.
Mr. President, I do not intend to occupy the floor much longer because I see my colleagues are here prepared to proceed with other matters. But I want to alert my colleagues, who may be hearing or viewing the floor action at this moment, to the filing of this amendment and what this Senator considers to be the very great importance of this issue because of the very important military secrets involved in the few cases specifically identified and many, other cases could be involved. And other cases will be involved. The fact that substantial sums of money are involved and the proliferation of these cases for money is absolutely revolting.
A case involving espionage is a quintessential case of malice aforethought and premeditation, malice aforethought and premeditation being the hallmarks of murder in the first degree, where there is motivation by money there is strong reason to believe that the death penalty would be a deterrent. For those people who were figuring where they can make some money if they face the death penalty, there may well be quite a different consideration to what risks they may be willing to undertake.
That is a very brief summary of the general import of this amendment and, as I say, I intend to offer it at a later time. I will not interfere with the managers who wish to proceed today to lay down the amendment on the B-2 bomber.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania and join him in this effort. There have been parallel efforts by other Members of this body in years past but I think the strong case set forth by the Senator from Pennsylvania may well provide the momentum this time to carry this thing through the Congress such that it will become law.
I thank the Senator.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I would like to ask a question or two of the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania. I would first like to say I think the Senator from Pennsylvania and this Senator from Nebraska have been shoulder-to-shoulder on every death penalty measure that has come up before the body. It was my understanding that the Judiciary Committee has now scheduled or is about to have a hearing on the whole death penalty matter. I know my friend from Pennsylvania is a member of the Judiciary Committee. Could he enlighten me on that?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes; I would be delighted to enlighten the distinguished Senator from Nebraska on that subject. As a part of the arrangement which was worked out last Thursday night late, when I went through the amendment for the death penalty on terrorism, an arrangement was worked out with Senator Thurmond to have a broader death penalty bill submitted for consideration by the Judiciary Committee. That bill doubtless will include espionage. There will be a vote on that matter.
There is no commitment however as to when that issue will come before this body, and when the majority leader was asked for a commitment to have the matter considered by the full Senate in this year, the distinguished majority leader declined to do so because of the crowded calendar.
Those issues will involve much, much broader and much more complicated issues than are comprehended, candidly, with the terrorist death penalty or with the espionage death penalty. The thrust of the Supreme Court decisions has been to raise concern at discriminatory application of the death penalty. I think that issue will draw lengthy debate, and may not be decided for a long time by the Congress. However, the issue of the terrorism death penalty and an espionage death penalty I believe is something that could be agreed to by the Congress in relatively short order.
I believe that the problem of espionage is so serious in this country today and involves such fundamental values of national security that it is one that ought not wait. I hope we can put it on this bill and move it through.
Those who oppose the death penalty on other grounds, discriminatory grounds, or where there is a very different case as the courts have said it is discriminatorily applied to minorities, for example, and would not apply to espionage, and others who have concerns about death penalty on the grounds of conscience or scruples, might be willing to let us proceed with this issue.
Mr. EXON. I thank my friend from Pennsylvania. I simply say that I hope before he offers the amendment--I believe I tend to support his amendment because I think it is a good one--I have some concerns that I would like to address to the Senator from Pennsylvania.
As he knows, we have an awful lot of amendments to an awful lot of issues to the defense authorization bill generally attaching like a lightning rod. I have been advised by Members of the Senate who do not have the same basic philosophy with regard to the death penalty as does this Senator from Nebraska and my colleague from Pennsylvania, that it is very likely to slow down considerably the discussion and disposal of the defense authorization bill.
So I would simply encourage my friend from Pennsylvania to discuss this proposal further. I intend to support the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and the ranking member thereof. I simply cite that I suspect there will be a reference made to a unanimous consent agreement that was entered into on July 20, 1989. I cite the Congressional Record of that date, page S8456, wherein the chairman of the Judiciary Committee entered into a unanimous consent agreement that in addition
It is agreed there will be no other action on death penalty amendments of any kind other than Senator Specter's death penalty bill prior to the time the Judiciary Committee reports the Thurmond bill back to the floor; and, further, that there will be no further death penalty amendments in the Judiciary Committee for the remainder of the year.
We can argue whether or not that included the offering of this type of an amendment by the Senator from Pennsylvania. But I think he should be advised that unfortunately I have been advised that there are Members of the body, not this Senator, who believe the agreement that was entered into covered the exclusion under unanimous consent agreement of what the Senator is offering now.
Whether that is right or wrong, I am not making that judgment. I am simply alerting the Senator from Pennsylvania that that could be a problem. While I support, as he knows, the death penalty and certainly would support him on espionage and terrorism legislation, I am wondering whether or not that could possibly wait until the Judiciary Committee makes its determination.
Mr. SPECTER. If the Senator will yield for a response, the unanimous consent agreement that the chairman of the Judiciary Committee sought was to avoid having other death penalty measures brought up before the Judiciary Committee.
I shall study this matter to see if its language might be broader, but I can tell you categorically that the intention was to have matters not brought before the Judiciary Committee as opposed to the floor of the Senate.
Mr. EXON. As opposed to an agreement that nothing would be done in the Judiciary Committee or on the floor of the Senate on another measure?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes. That is correct. There is no limitation as to what happens on the floor. There is a limitation as to what happens in the Judiciary Committee. I am aware of the importance of this authorization bill and therefore consulted before even sending this amendment to the desk for printing purposes with the managers of the bill. But this Senator intends to press the matter on this bill.
I think people ought to be on notice because I think it is futile to spend $300 billion which involves secrets if there is a sieve, the secrets can be disclosed through espionage, and we lack the real deterrent which is the death penalty to protect the military security of this country.
Mr. EXON. If the Senator presses his amendment, would he not be persuaded that in the interest of time, efficiency, and getting something through the Judiciary Committee that it might not be better to put this aside as far as the defense authorization is concerned? That is the line of reasoning the Senator from Pennsylvania is not ready to accept at this time, as I understand it.
Mr. SPECTER. The Senator reads me correctly.
Mr. EXON. I thank my friend from Pennsylvania. I yield the floor.
Mr. KENNEDY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President. I address the parliamentary inquiry to the Chair.
Is it the Chair's understanding that a death penalty amendment would be in order on this particular piece of legislation, given the unanimous-consent agreement that was placed before the body by the chairman of the Judiciary Committee on July 20?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The President will take a moment to confer with the Parliamentarian before giving an answer to the Senator. The Senator will suspend for one moment.
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. I am developing an answer to the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. SPECTER. I was going to make a comment on that subject.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would be happy to entertain the comment of the Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. What I was going to suggest, Mr. President, was that this Senator would confer with Senator Biden and the others who were party to that unanimous-consent agreement prior to the time the issue is put before the Chair, and before the Chair rules, that there be that kind of discussion among the parties, of the unanimous-consent agreement, before the Chair simply reads that language and makes a ruling.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator will withhold for 1 minute, then I would be glad to also hear from the Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. KENNEDY. I hope the Chair will hear the Senator from Massachusetts, as well.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will be glad to hear from the Senator from Massachusetts as well.
The Senator from Nebraska has asked for a chance to be heard.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I would just say that I think the Chair is going to make a rather important ruling here, and the only interest that this Senator has on this matter is to try to move the bill ahead as expeditiously as possible to provide for the national defense of the United States of America.
In listening to the Senator from Pennsylvania and reading the way I would interpret the unanimous-consent agreement, then that is a matter for the Chair to rule on, and I am willing to accept whatever the Chair's ruling is.
I simply say that I suspect that the Chair would be required to rule on what the Chair's interpretation of the unanimous-consent agreement was, and put it in the Record. And any understandings that any other Members of the body had with regard to this would not be properly considered, it seems to me, in ruling on the request that has been made of the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, one additional item regarding the specific language of the July 20, 1989 agreement is set further on page 8,537, on which the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, modification of the unanimous-consent agreement of S. 32 and uses these words:
To clarify the prior order, earlier there was consent that there would be no further action on death penalty amendments of any kind before the Judiciary Committee reports S. 32.
It seems to me, Mr. President, that that language, taken with the earlier July 20 language, as well as the general understanding of the Membership, was that floor consideration of this matter was going to be deferred until after the action that was taken by the Judiciary Committee, and I would like to get a ruling of the Chair.
This matter has been brought by the Senator from Pennsylvania. We did not initiate it. If there is going to be a question about it, it seems to me that it would have been entirely proper for the Senator from Pennsylvania to inquire of the chairman of the committee and otherwise.
Since he raised it and has talked about it, I think we ought to get a ruling. I ask the Chair for a ruling.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, if I may be heard.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I do not know that the later reference on 8537 has any applicability. But where the Senator from Massachusetts says that the Senator from Pennsylvania should have considered the matter earlier, this Senator had considered the matter, and knows that it was not the intent of the parties to the unanimous-consent agreement to foreclose the matters, other than in committee.
I did not raise the unanimous-consent agreement here. That is a matter which was raised by somebody else. I do think it is appropriate to have the chairman of the Judiciary Committee consulted on the matter, perhaps to have his comment, before there is a ruling. I will point out to the Chair the context where Senator Biden is commenting about star printing S. 32. He says:
That is a roundabout way of saying that Senator Thurmond and I and the leadership have agreed that Senator Thurmond's expansive death penalty bill will have a hearing in the Judiciary Committee in September; that further, there will be a vote on the Thurmond bill up or down in the committee; and that we will report out of committee by October 17 and have a committee report by October 20 on the Thurmond death penalty bill which will be S. 32 star print.
The Presiding Officer. Is there objection to the proposed unanimous consent request?
Mr. Biden. Excuse me, Mr. President. In addition, it is agreed there will be no other action on death penalty amendments of any kind other than Senator Specter's death penalty bill prior to the time the Judiciary Committee reports the Thurmond bill back to the floor; and further, that there will be no further death penalty amendments in the judiciary Committee for the remainder of the year.
When Senator Biden makes the additional comments, as they appear at S8537, he says:
Second, I want to state the agreement of the Judiciary Committee regarding consideration of S. 32 (star print).
The committee will hold hearings on the bill; the committee will consider the bill and amendments thereto relating to the death penalty and procedures for implementation of the death penalty and vote to report the bill as it may be amended by October 17, 1989; the committee will file its report on the bill as it may be amended by October 20, 1989; and the committee will not consider any other death penalty bill or amendment this calendar year.
To clarify the prior order, earlier there was consent that there would be no further action on death penalty amendments of any kind before the Judiciary Committee reports S. 32.
This makes it clear that the prohibition was against any consideration of such an amendment, not any action.
Mr. President, I would suggest to the Chair that it is plain that the thrust of what Senator Biden is talking about, as he elaborates on it, is what is going to happen in the committee. Senator Biden, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, was concerned that the work of the Judiciary Committee not be bogged down by having repeated consideration of the death penalty brought before that committee. There has been a practice, as the Senator from Massachusetts knows, for many people to attach death penalty amendments to many bills which seek to prevent action by the Judiciary Committee.
But it was not Senator Biden's intention to control what would happen on the floor. That is not the principal concern of the chairman of the Judiciary Committee.
I believe that this language does not preclude this amendment. If you want to read this language in a hypertechnical way, as the Senator from Massachusetts is suggesting. At page S8456, there is an allowance for Senator Specter's death penalty bill which might comprehend this as well.
But I do think, as a matter of fairness, that Senator Biden ought to be consulted and ought to have a chance to be a party to this interpretation of what is essentially his wording.
Mr. EXON and Mr. KENNEDY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska and then we will come back to the Senator from Massachusetts.
I further ask unanimous consent that the rollcall vote be a 30-minute rollcall vote.
Mr. President, this matter has been cleared on both sides of the aisle.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I just drew the attention of the Chair to the second paragraph of the unanimous-consent agreement of July 20, 1989, at S8456. It reads:
This is a roundabout way of saying that Senator Thurmond and I and the leadership * * *.
I daresay if we were going to have a consent agreement that was just going to relate to the Judiciary Committee, that could be done with just the support of Senator Thurmond.
Beyond that, and what I think is the most powerful and convincing argument, Mr. President, is to direct the attention of the Chair to the final four lines of Mr. Biden's midway on that page:
Excuse me, Mr. President. In addition, it is agreed there will be no other action on death penalty amendments of any kind other than Senator Specter's death penalty bill prior to the time the Judiciary Committee reports the Thurmond bill back to the floor.
It continues:
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That would be redundant, Mr. President, unless it complies with the position of the Senator from Massachusetts. Why would we have the chairman saying we will not have any amendments in the Judiciary Committee and say further that there will be no further death penalty amendments in the Judiciary Committee for the remainder of the year? Why do you have him saying the same thing twice?
Plain common sense, as well as the specific language, as well as, I believe, the debate and discussion on the previous bill reaches only one conclusion, Mr. President. I think that we are entitled to have a ruling.
I appreciate the chairman of the Judiciary Committee's intention, but we have to abide by what the institution accepts here, not what is the intention of a particular Member. We have to go on the basis of the words.
I am certainly interested in what the Senator from Delaware believes. I think I understand what he was intending. I think we are all talking about common language and a common agreement. This is a very important matter in terms of this bill and also on the issue. I would press and ask for a ruling of the Chair. I would indicate that if it is going to be adverse to my position that I would ask that any appeal of the ruling be left to the chairman of the Judiciary Committee if he so desires to make that point.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Pennsylvania wish to respond?
Mr. SPECTER. Just another word or two, Mr. President.
I think that the Senator from Massachusetts, in effect, concedes the argument if he is allowing Senator Biden, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, to come in and have a voice in any appeal from the ruling of the Chair. I think that is tantamount--well, that is a flat concession that Senator Biden does have something to say about what this ruling ought to be.
Mr. President, if the Chair rules preemptorily in this matter without having an opportunity for Senator Biden to be consulted and to be heard on this matter, let me say flatly that unanimous-consent agreements in the future are going to be scrutinized in writing for every semicolon and for every comma, as opposed to a good-faith understanding of what the Senators have agreed to.
Senator Kennedy was not a party to this unanimous-consent agreement. This matter was worked out laboriously in the Republican Cloakroom, involving Senator Biden, Senator Thurmond, myself, and Senator Dole participated.
Where the Senator from Massachusetts makes an argument based upon redundancy, it is amazing to me to argue that redundancy means anything on this floor where arguments are filled with nothing but redundancy. If there is one thing that is characteristic of the floor of the U.S. Senate, it is that things are said two, three, four, five times, when you might say it on one occasion.
But I would further remind the Presiding Officer that there is no matter pending which really requires a ruling. This Senator is not pressing this amendment at this time.
But let those be on notice that if a good-faith undertaking on a unanimous-consent agreement is to be disregarded in this matter, that this Senator, who has some familiarity with examining semicolons, will do so with minute care every time he is involved in a unanimous-consent agreement.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask a parliamentary inquiry as to whether the death penalty amendments are in order on the defense authorization bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Presiding Officer would determine, with great respect for the inquiry being propounded by the Senator from Massachusetts for a ruling from the Chair, that at this time the decision and the matter are not ripe for decision by the Chair; that the issue has not been joined; that the Senator from Pennsylvania has not offered to the body for its consideration the amendment; and that it would be especially unwise for the Chair to rule before the parties who participated in the unanimous-consent agreement have the chance to work out what is clearly a differing interpretation as to what that agreement meant.
And so, with that said, the Presiding Officer would defer a decision until the matter is ripe.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I appreciate the careful judgment of the Parliamentarian on this issue and respect that decision. Hopefully, I will receive the assurances from the chairman of our committee to have access to the floor at the time when such a request is made in a timely fashion.
If there is nothing further, I would like to be able to proceed, Mr. President, to comment on the defense authorization bill, unless the Senator from Pennsylvania has something.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, as chairman of the Projection Forces and Regional Defense Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, I rise in support of the Defense authorization bill for fiscal years 1990 and 1991.
This subcommittee oversees over $23 billion of defense programs related to the military missions of sea control, maritime force projections, special operations, airlift and sealift. This year, the subcommittee held five hearings and sponsored two trips to the field to review the programs in these areas. Mr. President, I will highlight the major conclusions and results of that review.
A major concern of the subcommittee was the significant gap in our surge sealift capabilities. Over the past 2 years, we have received repeated testimony from our commanders in the field that the biggest gap in our ability to reinforce NATO Europe results from the absence of sufficient fast sealift.
The gap in fast sealift could become even more pressing as a result of conventional arms reductions in Europe. If mutual reductions take place in Europe, American forces will be withdrawn across the Atlantic while Soviet forces will remain at the other end of the European rail network. In such an environment, a robust fast sealift program would be a crucial element of continued conventional deterrence in Europe.
The bill therefore recommends initiation of a new line of fast sealift ships. The first ships are authorized in fiscal year 1990 and long lead funds for that ship are authorized in fiscal year 1991. We plan to continue this program through the 1990's to add approximately eight new fast sealift ships to the fleet, doubling our current force and substantially reducing the gap in our surge lift capability. We anticipate that funding for the program can be found in savings from other strategic lift programs and shipbuilding programs.
A companion research and development program has been recommended as well to develop multimission capabilities for the sealift ship and to push technology to achieve higher speeds in heavy displacement ships.
A second major concern of the subcommittee was the V-22 tilt rotor aircraft program. The Secretary of Defense chose to terminate the V-22 as a cost saving measure. Two billion dollars have already been spent in bringing this program to where we are now--at the threshold of flight testing.
The Marine Corps wants this airplane to enhance their amphibious assault capability. The Secretary of Defense declared this mission is not of a sufficiently high priority to justify the cost of the V-22. It is clear that if the V-22 Program is to survive, the priority of the mission must be raised and the potential costs of the program have to be lowered.
The bill recommends restoration of research and development funds to complete the flight testing of V-22. During this period, we call for validation of the commercial potential for the aircraft, as well as demonstration of commercial intent. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to coordinate a review of the priority of the amphibious mission and capabilities of the Armed Forces and to provide his assessment to the Congress.
A third area of concern is the Navy's force of aircraft carrier battle groups. Last year, Senator Nunn, Senator Levin, and I offered an amendment to the fiscal year 1989 Defense authorization bill which proposed holding the growth of our aircraft carrier force to 14 ships by retiring two older carriers earlier than planned. In that amendment we detailed the savings that would result. This year the Secretary of Defense adopted our proposal completely and his directed the retirement of two older carriers in exactly the way we foresaw as offering substantial savings.
Our aircraft carrier hearing this year focused on the refueling and modernization of the U.S.S. Enterprise, which is planned to last a minimum of 45 months and to cost $2.0 billion. While the committee recommends that this program proceed as planned, the bill directs that program funding be identified in the shipbuilding account, where management and contracting efficiencies may be exercised by virtue of the requirement of full funding in this account.
Whenever another carrier might be authorized, it would not be delivered until after the year 2000, and it could be operating at the midpoint of the next century. This bill will require the Navy, with the help of the National Academy of Sciences and the Office of Technology Assessment, to take a close look at aircraft carrier and aircraft technology, so we will have a clearer view of how to shape the future, in order to maintain the Nation's superiority in sea-based aviation.
Finally, Mr. President, the subcommittee reviewed the Navy's planning for the surface combatants of the next century. It was clear from our hearing that the critical path for implementing this technology plan is the integrated electric drive system. The bill recommends increased emphasis on electric drive and directs that the program be focused on getting the system to sea in a DDG-51-class ship in flight three of that program.
Mr. President, I urge Senate support of the Defense authorization bill for fiscal years 1990 and 1991.
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Just as soon as the divisive debate over the nomination of Senator Tower to be Secretary of Defense was completed, the committee went to work on an authorization bill in what I felt to be a thoughtful spirit; not only a bipartisan spirit but one of considering, with great care, the many and different challenges facing the United States.
This was due largely to the firm and fine leadership of the chairman of the committee, the ranking minority member of the committee, as well as of the various chairs and ranking minority members of the subcommittees. This year was my first opportunity to serve on the Committee on Armed Services, and I may say it has been not only an important but a gratifying experience.
By and large, Mr. President, I agree with the priorities and value judgments which are both explicit and implicit in this bill. It is, I must say, my view that this will be the last year in which we will have an authorization bill based, fundamentally, on the value judgments with respect to national defense which have caused a fairly broad bipartisan consensus through the decade of the 1980's.
While the administration has done a dramatic, almost unprecendented job in setting priorities in a fashion which involves the total abandonment of a number of programs which were considered high priorities in previous years, I think it is still safe, nonetheless, to say that the basic structure and philosophy of national defense reflected in this bill is one of a continuation of the philosophy and structure of the bills of previous years, rather than representing a dramatic change.
By next year I suspect, Mr. President, either consciously through the leadership of the administration and this committee, or simply as a result of profound changes in public opinion, we are likely to start down a rather new and different road. I hope that new and different road will be blazed by the administration's thoughtful reexamination of defense policies and, by this time next year, its successful completion or the prospects for successful completion both of negotiations with respect to START and conventional force reductions.
In any event, we will be faced with a very, very different world next year, and I have little doubt that we will be faced with profoundly changed priorities at the same time.
We will debate those changed priorities during the course of the next 2 or 3 weeks. There will be a serious and thorough debate of the role of manned strategic bombers in our nuclear defense triad, and most specifically the B-2.
I may say, Mr. President, that I joined this committee and returned to the Senate without strong views one way or the other with respect to the B-2.
The information I have gained and the knowledge I have received during the course of the last several months has led me to believe that the B-2 program advanced by the administration and by this committee is sound. There will be a need with respect to our strategic nuclear defense and the ability of the United States to project power at a time when the number and spread of our foreign bases are likely to decline, which only the B-2 will be able to fill.
Like other Members, I am concerned about the cost of this weapon. Most research and development costs of the B-2, however, have already been expended, and at this point it would seem to me unwise either to cancel or drastically alter the program for the B-2 which is outlined in this bill.
Similar remarks, Mr. President, seem to me appropriate with respect to the strategic defense initiative. I think at least in the absence of negotiations with the Soviet Union with respect to strategic defense, that we should proceed forward with the kind of research and development that are called for in this bill for at least the next year, until such time as we have a better grasp of both the desirability of a strategic defense and its relationship, not only to defense needs, but to negotiations for reductions in nuclear forces.
If I have a disagreement with the major provisions of this bill as they relate to our strategic programs, Mr. President, it would be with respect to the decision to proceed forward with two mobile missiles. I do not believe in the long run that that will be the answer that we will come to.
It seems to me this year, as has been the case in the past, the decision to go forward with two such missiles reflects more a profound and, I think, sincere disagreement between the proponents of a rail mobile MX and a small ICBM. I certainly hope that within a year we would have reached some conclusion in that respect, a conclusion which might well be that we will press with the Soviet Union for a treaty which will call for the abandonment of mobile missiles on both sides, an agreement which would be enforceable and verifiable.
Nevertheless, I believe that the general thrust of this bill is sound, and I have every hope that the Senate of the United States will accept it. It will give us 1 more year, Mr. President, for a new President faced with an entirely new strategic situation in the world to determine what our priorities for national defense should be in the 1990's and, for that matter, into the 21st century.
These are challenges which arise out of success, Mr. President, not out of failure. The defense program of the 1980's has been a profound success with respect to the most important single goal of any national defense system which is, of course, not to win a war but to prevent a war from ever taking place in the first place. The prospects for peace have perhaps never stronger since the end of World War II or the beginning of the cold war. The changes in the Soviet Union are, in my belief, changes which are real, changes which have been caused in part by internal challenges within the Soviet Union and the failure of its own economic and social system. But these are changes which have also been caused in part by the commitment of the United States of America to a strong and robust defense and the strong and affirmative leadership of the Western alliance--for that matter, our alliances in other parts of the world as well.
We should look on the changes that we face today, Mr. President, as a result of our successful defense policies of the past, just as other changes in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, as they move toward freer economies and in the direction of democracy, are a tribute to the strength of the societies and economic systems of the United States and of the Western alliance.
So, Mr. President, we are in a year of transition. What changes are required with respect to strategic defenses? How much more attention should we be paying to the kind of challenges posed by rogue or outlaw nations, such as Libya or Syria? What greater attention should we be spending on the prospects of terrorism? What greater attention should we pay to the fact that some of the smaller nations may be developing or may have developed some nuclear or chemical capability? And what of the growing proliferation of ballistic missiles throughout the world? How do these changes, as
well as changes in the Soviet Union, impact on defense policies of this country?
We do not know the answer to all those questions at this point, Mr. President. We will know them better a year from today and, in the meantime, the kind of policies which are outlined in this bill are the wisest and the soundest course of action for this country to take. We have been successful this way in the past. I believe that we should continue along the line that is proposed in this bill, but I believe that we should recognize that within a year we are likely to be able, to be required to set quite different priorities from those which are set out here today.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Robb). The Chair recognizes the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Exon].
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. EXON. If there are any other Senators wishing the floor, they have 7 minutes before the rollcall vote starts. I see the Senator from California is here. He may be seeking recognition.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from California [Mr. Wilson].
Mr. WILSON. Mr. President, I rise to speak in support of the pending amendment. This amendment reflects, I think, some very good work by the Subcommittee on Conventional Forces. I commend in particular my colleague, the chairman of the subcommittee, with whom it has been a great pleasure to work this year. He has been both diligent and gracious. I think in this particular initiative he deserves our support.
What we are talking about with this amendment is a redress of the imbalance that has been created in a larger statement. I think it is clear that almost every Member would agree that the administration, deficit driven, has engaged in a request that, in some instances, substantially underfunds their desires, and even what wisdom would prescribe as necessary in certain accounts. That has been particularly true with respect, Mr. President, to the sustainability of our ammunitions supply and, in particular, we have, I think, been driven to a position in the actual request of the administration that works out to be penny wise in the short time and really pound foolish. For that reason I think the administration will probably support the restoration of a cut which they really did not want in the first place.
The budget request from the department reflected deep reductions in the near term for many of our so-called smart missiles, which are already in short supply. Furthermore, these reductions in procurement result in sharply increased unit costs for these missile systems because of the increasingly inefficient production that results from the stretchout. The reductions proposed by the administration generally resulted in a 1-year cut in production rates.
As I say, these stretchouts create inefficiencies in production with the expectation that production will rise in the outyears. The unit costs as a result increases on an average of 19 percent. Further, these lower rates of production are so severe that they threaten the competition which has helped to lower our costs for these missiles in earlier years. Production rates proposed by the department in far too many instances fell below the minimum rates required to induce competition and far short of the maximum efficient production rate.
The committee recommended funding on an increase in the procurement of Hellfire missiles, rockets for the multiple launch rocket system, MLRS, the Stinger shoulder-launched system, the TOW II antitank missile, the HARM missile, the high-speed antiradiation missile, called HARM, and the Maverick.
Mr. President, all of these increases are warranted. The increased procurement for these missile systems will help stabilize these programs. The increases, which are really restorations, will preclude unnecessary increases in unit costs so that we are not getting fewer missiles for the money. They will alleviate some of the severe shortages that exist in certain very critical inventories of these weapons.
So without elaborating at great length, let me simply say this is the part of wisdom; it is an effort to prevent the department from engaging in what are cuts but not efficiencies; cuts that will result in a position of our being, in fact, not just penny wise and pound foolish, but as a result in critical short supply of certain weapons that are necessary to our inventory.
What we are talking about is that unwieldy work `sustainability,' but it is a concept that has great relevance to the ability of conventional forces to be credible. If you cannot sustain your supply of ammunition, you cannot sustain combat. The war is over when you run out of ammunition. It is that simple. And again in an effort to try to save money, or at least to reduce spending in the near term in order to respond to deficit pressures, what we have seen here is an administration request that is not a sensible one in terms of what it produces in inefficiency of production and higher unit costs. This amendment will remedy that. I urge my colleagues to support it. I thank the Chair.
Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I want to add my support for the committee amendment which increases funds for a number of proven successful conventional munitions programs, including the TOW, MLRS, and Stinger missiles.
I would also commend the committee for cutting funds for several programs that have yet to demonstrate their effectiveness and worthiness for total funding. While I am disappointed that the committee did not do more in this area, these efforts are a step in the right direction.
One of the programs that will receive more funding under the committee's proposal is the Army's highly successful multiple-launch rocket system, or MLRS. It is one of the rare success stories of the Pentagon's procurement system.
A good weapon should be reliable, effective, easy for the troops to operate and maintain, and cheap enough to procure in adequate quantities. The MLRS meets all of these characteristics. It is deployed to U.S. troops all over the world and has been sold to many of our allies. Its formal test program has demonstrated its effectiveness and its informal test program, which is how the troops in the field respond to the weapon, has also given the missile system glowing reviews. The MLRS is also one of the few weapons that has been developed and delivered on time and on schedule.
The Pentagon this year proposed scaling back production of the MLRS from 48,000 missiles per year to 24,000 in order to increase funding for many questionable but politically popular programs. The committee's plan to boost MLRS production back to 48,000 not only recognizes the importance of emphasizing successful technologies but also the economic sense of running the MLRS production line at its most efficient rate.
Mr. President, I urge approval of the amendment offered by Senators Nunn and Warner.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I am pleased to support the members of the Armed Services Committee who are offering this amendment to provide an increased rate of production of convention tactical missiles. For instance, this amendment increases the rocket procurement quantities for the MLRS from the requested 24,000 per year to at least 48,000 for fiscal year 1990 and fiscal year 1991.
I am particularly acquainted with the multiple launch rocket system because Fort Sill, OK, is the home of the U.S. Army field artillery. Oklahoma also has the first MLRS National Guard Battalion. The enthusiasm by the personnel involved in this program is unanimous. They truly believe in the viability of the `scoot and shoot' tactics of MLRS operations. The fire control system receives a fire mission, determines the launcher location, computes the technical firing data, orients on the targets, and can fire from 1 to 12 rockets--all in less than 50 seconds.
MLRS is the capstone of the Army's field artillery. Its firepower makes it an awesome weapon that can completely saturate enemy postions. The programmed introduction of smart munitions will make MLRS an even more awesome response to the threat.
The development of smart and brilliant munitions however, has taken longer than anticipated. Deployments of the sense and destroy armor [SADARM] munition and the MLRS terminally guided warhead are not expected until the last half of the 1990's. We will, therefore, have to rely on the current MLRS warheads until then. And even after introduction of these smart munitions, current warheads will continue to be effective against a large array of targets.
The delayed introduction of the smart munitions, together with reduced production quantities of the current rocket, has created a dangerous gap where only minimal ammunition is available to our soldiers. We must make sure that our soldiers will have an adequate supply of these rockets in the event of a conflict. I urge my colleagues to join in supporting this amendment which provides a cost-efficient rate of purchase for this excellent conventional weapons system.
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MLRS is the kind of weapon program that everyone likes and supports. It came in on time, under budget, and met its performance requirements. It plays a key role in helping to deter Soviet conventional attack by posing a formidable obstacle to massed troop concentrations. Its firepower is awesome. It raises the nuclear threshold in Europe by enabling us to use conventional weapons against Soviet forces threatening to break through NATO front lines.
Some people argue that Congress should not touch the budget proposals of the Pentagon, that they know best, and that we should just rubberstamp what they send over. Not only does that kind of thinking do violence to the Constitution itself, but it ignores the fact that the people in the Pentagon are human and can make mistakes, too. And they sure made one with MLRS.
Listen to what the committee has to say about MLRS:
The committee recommends a substantial increase in the number of multiple launch rocket system [MLRS] rockets over the amended budget request. The committee notes that the MLRS Program has been a model acquisition program, characterized by stable configuration, production procedures, and subcontractors. The committee encourages the Army to continue its successful formula for production of the rockets, to include the rocket motor case and warhead skin metal parts. The committee believes the current contractor and subcontractor base should be sustained.
MLRS has been perhaps the best program the Army has. In the words of the Armed Services Committee, `a model acquisition program.' Taking a program like this and cutting its production in half is a slap in the face of the idea of good program management. I am glad that the committee listened to the several protests that Senator Pryor and I made and restored this program to last year's production level.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I am pleased to be a cosponsor and supporter of the Armed Services Committee amendment to provide an additional $596.8 million for fiscal year 1990 and $336.8 million for fiscal year 1991 to procure additional guided munitions.
The Cheney amendments to the Department of Defense budget reduced the production rates for many of these munitions to dangerously low levels from the standpoint of inventories. Many of the cuts also would result in inefficient production rates.
The matter of inventory levels was described by Gen. Thomas C. Richards, Deputy Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command, in his testimony before the Armed Services Committee. He stated that,
Our greatest weaknesses are in the areas of war reserve stocks of preferred munitions * * * all the services, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, all have shortages, severe shortages of preferred munitions.
I commend Chairman Nunn and the members of the committee for bringing this amendment before the Senate so that we can take action on this problem of munitions shortfall within the constraints of the budget agreement.
In addition to other important munitions, the amendment includes $51.1 million for the procurement of 4,300 additional TOW 2A missiles that will be produced in my State of Arizona. It is important to note that these are the latest version of the Army's basic heavy antitank missile. The TOW 2A version is the only antitank missile we have that can penetrate the latest Soviet armor. Our inventory of these missiles is very low--only about 13 percent of the Army's stated requirement.
Under the amended Cheney budget, the Army would procure only 9,455 TOW missiles--a 21-percent reduction below the production of the current fiscal year. With a capacity to produce 30,000 missiles a year, it just does not make sense to buy less than 10,000 missiles. Furthermore, the Army is planning to establish a second source for the production of the TOW missile, thus adding to production capacity when we already have a substantial unused capacity.
The $51.1 million for additional TOW 2A's will improve the Army's inventory position for a much-needed weapon and will also provide for a more economic production rate that will result in a lower price to the Army.
Again, I thank the chairman and ranking member for bringing this matter to the attention of the Senate. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the Chair state the order of business that we have agreed to?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. It now being 5:45, under the unanimous-consent order, amendment No. 392 to S. 1352 is now the order of business before the Senate. The yeas and nays have not been requested. A 30-minute vote has been asked.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.
The nays and yeas were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden] and the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Simon] are necessarily absent.
I also announce that the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Matsunaga] is absent because of illness.
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. Armstrong], the Senator from Utah [Mr. Garn], the Senator from Utah [Mr. Hatch], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Humphrey], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Murkowski] are necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] would vote `yea.'
The result was announced--yeas 91, nays 0, as follows:
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YEAS--91
NOT VOTING--9
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business before the Senate is S. 1352.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, amendments are in order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for himself and Mr. Nunn, proposes an amendment numbered 396.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out line 3 on page 15 and everything that follows through line 3 on page 19 and insert the following in lieu thereof:
SEC. 133. B-2 BOMBER PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS.
(a) Amount Authorized.--(1) Of the amounts appropriated pursuant to section 103(a)(1) for the Air Force for procurement of aircraft for fiscal year 1990, not more than $2,549,374,000 may be obligated for procurement for the B-2 aircraft program.
(2) Funds appropriated for the Air Force for fiscal year 1990 may not be obligated for the B-2 aircraft until the first flight of a B-2 aircraft has occurred.
(b) Block 1 Requirements.--(1) Funds appropriated for the Air Force for fiscal year 1990 for procurement of aircraft may not be obligated for the procurement of B-2 aircraft until--
(A) the initial planned Block 1 program of flight testing of the B-2 aircraft, consisting of approximately 75 flight test hours and 15 flights has been conducted;
(B) the Defense Science Board has conducted an independent review of the Block 1 flight test data and reported the results of that review, together with its findings and conclusions, to the Secretary of Defense;
(C) the Director of Operational Tests and Evaluation has evaluated the performance of the B-2 aircraft during its Block 1 flight testing with respect to `Critical Operational Issues' and has provided an `Early Operational Assessment' to the Secretary of Defense; and
(D) the Secretary of Defense certifies to the Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives that--
(i) no major aerodynamic or flightworthiness problems have been identified during the Block 1 testing;
(ii) the performance milestones (including initial flight testing) for the B-2 aircraft for fiscal year 1990 (as contained in the B-2 full performance matrix program established under section 121 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180) and section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456)) have been met and that any proposed waiver or modification to the B-2 performance matrix will be provided in writing in advance to such committees;
(iii) the goals of the cost reduction initiatives established for the B-2 program under section 121 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal years 1988 and 1989 and section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 will be achieved; and
(iv) the quality assurance practices and fiscal management controls of the prime contractor and major subcontractors associated with the B-2 program meet or exceed generally applicable Department of Defense standards.
(2) Any certification by the Secretary under paragraph (1)(D) shall include a description of any savings that will be realized under the initiatives referred to in such paragraph.
(c) Block 2 Requirements: Funds appropriated for the Air Force for fiscal year 1990 for the procurement of aircraft may not be obligated for the procurement of B-2 aircraft before the commencement of the low-observables portion of the Block 2 testing on B-2 developmental aircraft.
(d) Defense Science Board Assessment: Of the amounts made available for the Air Force for fiscal year 1990 for the procurement of B-2 aircraft not more than 25 percent may be expended before submission by the Secretary of Defense to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives of a classified report containing the assessments of the Low-Observables Panel of the Defense Science Board as to the progress and problems, if any, encountered during the initial phase of low-observables testing of the B-2.
(e) Efficient Production Rate Funding: Funds appropriated for the Air Force for fiscal year 1990 for procurement of aircraft may not be obligated for the procurement of B-2 aircraft until the Secretary of Defense certifies that, in the five-year defense program prepared in conjunction with any amended budget request for fiscal year 1991, the Air Force has included sufficient funding for any increase in the production rate of B-2 aircraft required to attain an efficient production rate following the planned acquisition milestone decision authorizing rate production.
(f) Application of Prohibitions: The prohibitions in subsections (b) through (d) apply only to the three new production B-2 aircraft for which funds for procurement were requested in the President's April 1989 amended budget request for fiscal year 1990.
(g) Certification Requirement: (1) The Secretary of Defense shall certify annually to Congress that the unit flyaway cost for 132 B-2 aircraft measured in constant 1990 dollars does not exceed $295,000,000 per aircraft..
((2) The certification required by this subsection shall be submitted not later than March 15, 1990, and each succeeding March 15 thereafter until the B-2 procurement program is completed. Such certification shall be submitted to the Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(3) If the Secretary cannot make the certification required by paragraph (1), the Secretary shall report to Congress the amount that the unit flyaway cost will exceed the amount described in paragraph (1) and submit an explanation of the reasons for such an increase in cost.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for himself and Mr. Warner, proposes an amendment numbered 397 to amendment No. 396.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
In the amendment proposed by Mr. Warner and Mr. Nunn strike out everything after `SEC. 133. B-2 BOMBER PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS.' and insert in lieu thereof the following:
(a) Amount Authorized.--Of the amounts appropriated pursuant to section 103(a)(1) for the Air Force for procurement of aircraft for fiscal year 1990, not more than $2,549,374,000 may be obligated for procurement for the B-2 aircraft program.
(b) Block 1 Requirements: (1) Funds appropriated for the Air Force for fiscal year 1990 for procurement of aircraft may not be obligated for the procurement of B-2 aircraft until--
(A) the initial planned Block 1 program of flight testing of the B-2 aircraft, consisting of approximately 75 flight test hours and 15 flights has been conducted;
(B) the Defense Science Board has conducted an independent review of the Block 1 flight test data and reported the results of that review, together with its findings and conclusions, to the Secretary of Defense;
(C) the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation has evaluated the performance of the B-2 aircraft during its Block 1 flight testing with respect to `Critical Operational Issues' and has provided an `Early Operational Assessment' to the Secretary of Defense; and
(D) the Secretary of Defense certifies to the Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives that--
(i) no major aerodynamic or flightworthiness problems have been identified during the Block 1 testing;
(ii) the performance milestones (including initial flight testing) for the B-2 aircraft for fiscal year 1990 (as contained in the B-2 full performance matrix program established under section 121 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180) and section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456)) have been met and that any proposed waiver or modification to the B-2 performance matrix will be provided in writing in advance to such committees;
(iii) the goals of the cost reduction initiatives established for the B-2 program under section 121 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 and section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 will be achieved; and
(iv) the quality assurance practices and fiscal management controls of the prime contractor and major subcontractors associated with the B-2 program meet or exceed generally applicable Department of Defense standards.
(2) Any certification by the Secretary under paragraph (1)(D) shall include a description of any savings that will be realized under the initatives referred to in such paragraph.
(c) Block 2 Requirements.--Funds appropriated for the Air Force for fiscal year 1990 for the procurement of aircraft may not be obligated for the procurement of B-2 aircraft before the commencement of the low-observables portion of the Block 2 testing on B-2 developmental aircraft.
(d) Defense Science Board Assessment.--Of the amounts made available for the Air Force for fiscal year 1990 for the procurement of B-2 aircraft not more than 25 percent may be expended before submission by the Secretary of Defense to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives of a classified report containing the assessments of the Low-Observables Panel of the Defense Science Board as to the progress and problems, if any, encountered during the initial phase of low-observables testing of the B-2.
(e) Efficient Production Rate Funding.--Funds appropriated for the Air Force for fiscal year 1990 for procurement of aircraft may not be obligated for the procurement of B-2 aircraft until the Secretary of Defense certifies that, in the five-year defense program prepared in conjunction with any amended budget request for fiscal year 1991, the Air Force has included sufficient funding for any increase in the production rate of B-2 aircraft required to attain an efficient production rate following the planned acquisition milestone decision authorizing rate production.
(f) Application of Prohibitions.--The prohibitions in subsections (b) through (d) apply only to the three new production B-2 aircraft for which funds for procurement were requested in the President's April 1989 amended budget request for fiscal year 1990.
(g) Certification Requirement.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall certify annually to Congress that the unit flyaway cost for 132 B-2 aircraft measured in constant 1990 dollars does not exceed $295,000,000 per aircraft.
(2) The certification required by this subsection shall be submitted not later than March 15, 1990, and each succeeding March 15 thereafter until the B-2 procurement program is completed. Such certifcation shall be submitted to the Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(3) If the Secretary cannot make the certification required by paragraph (1), the Secretary shall report to Congress the amount that the unit flyaway cost will exceed the amount described in paragraph (1) and submit an explanation of the reasons for such an increase in cost.
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The amendment essentially puts before the Senate the recommendations of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the B-2 program, but certain changes are made because we have already now flown the aircraft. Our committee bill was passed before we had flown the aircraft. So there are changes in the Senate bill reflected in this amendment.
These recommendations include a $300 million reduction in the procurement budget for the B-2 and a series of prohibitions on the obligation of the remaining funds until the B-2 successfully completes a series of flight testing, both in terms of flying qualities and also in terms of the Stealth characteristics which are so essential to the performance of this aircraft as envisioned. These tests will be monitored by independent bodies, and those views will be required as well. Senator warner, I am sure, can speak to that further.
I urge my colleagues to study the committee recommendations carefully since they are incorporated in this amendment. We will debate the B-2 issue in the morning on this amendment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a chart listing the B-2 prohibitions incorporated in this amendment be printed in the Record. These will be referred to as fences.
There being no objection, the chart was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Prohibitions on obligation of procurement funds: no obligation until completion of block 1 test flights, no obligation until independent certification of airworthiness by both Defense Science Board and Director, operational test and evaluation, no obligation of funds until initiation of low-observable testing, no more than 25 percent may be expended before the Secretary of Defense reports on the status of low-observables testing, no obligation if B-2 not funded at efficient rates in five-year plan, and annual certification that flyaway costs do not exceed $295 million.
Committee recommendation fully protects the taxpayers' interest while minimizing disruption to program.
Bottom line: We won't buy any more B-2 aircraft if it fails its flight test program.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, they essentially require that certain tests take place before the funds are obligated for the procurement of the three aircraft.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might have the attention of the distinguished chairman. He used the word `fence.' we referred to it in the committee as `gates,' gates through which this aircraft would pass to meet what we regard as the initial fly-before-buy test. These are clear examples of how the Armed Services Committee desires to have this weapons program and future weapons programs thoroughly tested before we become heavily involved in the production phase.
The distinguished chairman indicated there was $300 million removed from the production account, but I think the chairman will agree with me, that was a trimming mechanism and does not reflect in any way our present thinking that this production should not go forward, assuming the nine gates are timely met by the Department of the Air Force.
Mr. NUNN. The Senator from Virginia is correct. We do believe production should go forward once these gates are met, once the fences have been removed and the B-2 passes through the gates the Senate described in terms of performance and flying. We do put the money up. There is a fundamental difference in the approach done here than what was done on the House. They take the money out, and even if those tests prove to be 100 percent successful in the time required, the production money will not be there which is going to significantly increase the cost of this aircraft. We already have sticker shock with the aircraft. I would hate to take actions there which would increase the costs further.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, again drawing the attention of the chairman, he referred to the tests of the House. My recollection is they did not put tests in; they took money out for the bomber.
Mr. NUNN. I did not mean to imply they did. There will be tests independent of the House action. If those tests are met, according to our definition of meeting the test, the House still would not have the production money there.
Mr. WARNER. Would the chairman agree with me the proposed amendments we sent forward which, really, as you stated is the action of the committee, reflect the President's program as submitted by the Secretary of Defense?
Mr. NUNN. I would not agree it reflects the President's program as submitted because we did put the gates in and did do some trimming. But what we have done is we have tried to make these changes compatible with the President's program so as to have as little effect on the cost escalation as possible while at the same time guarding against going into production on these three aircraft until such time as we are sure the aircraft flies and we are sure the Stealth characteristics are going to be met as advertised.
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Mr. President, the chairman and I have no further business on this bill at this time; is that correct?
Mr. NUNN. That is correct.
Mr. GRAHAM addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Florida.
END