[Page: H1132]
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 127 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 1750) to implement the Bipartisan Accord on Central America on March 24, 1989, and the first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points of order against the bill and against its consideration are hereby waived. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and which shall not exceed four hours, to be equally divided and controlled by Representative Foley of Washington and Representative Michel of Illinois, or their designees, the bill shall be considered as having been read for amendment under the five-minute rule. No amendment to the bill shall be in order except the amendments recommended by the Committee on Appropriations, which may be offered en bloc and shall be considered as having been read, which shall be debatable for not to exceed ten minutes, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Appropriations, or their designees, and which shall not be amendable or divisible in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. All points of order against the amendments are hereby waived. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit, with or without instructions, only if offered by Representative Michel of Illinois, or his designee, and said motion shall be debatable for not to exceed twenty minutes.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mineta). The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior] is recognized for 1 hour.
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Mr. BONIOR. The Speaker, before I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] for purposes of debate and reserve the time for myself, I yield for purposes of debate only to my colleague, the gentleman from Hawaii [Mr. Akaka], who wishes to make a statement with regard to a matter of concern to him.
I yield 1 minute to my friend, the gentleman from Hawaii [Mr. Akaka].
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Akaka was allowed to speak out of order.)
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. Speaker, on Saturday, April 15, the people of Hawaii and Belgium will commemorate the centennial of the death of one of the greathearted humanitarians of all time.
The Blessed Reverend Joseph Damien Deveuster, in 1873, made a voluntary sojourn to live among the lepers at Kalaupapa on the island of Molokai.
Father Damien, who we commemorate in the Capitol's Statuary Hall, was the rarest kind of man. To the amazement of his bishop and his peers, he could not walk away from the apathy, and rotting flesh that he found in Kalaupapa, a place that was called a `living graveyard.'
Instead, Father Damien established the Philomena Church. For 16 years he ministered to the physical and spiritual needs of Hansen's disease victims until he succumbed to the disease at age 49.
Those afflicted with Hansen's disease were banished from the conscience of society, yet Father Damien opened his heart, his eyes and his arms to their needs and sufferings. By living among them and restoring their dignity he also uplifted mankind's dignity.
It gives my joy that we continue to revere Father Damien 100 years after his death.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 127 is a closed rule providing for consideration of H.R. 1750, the legislation to implement the bipartisan accord on Central America of March 24, 1989.
The rule provides for 4 hours of general debate to be equally divided and controlled by the majority leader, Mr. Foley and the minority leader, Mr. Michel or their designees. After general debate, the bill shall be considered as having been read for amendment under the 5-minute rule.
The rule waives all points of order against the bill and against its consideration.
No amendments are made in order under this rule except the amendments recommended by the Committee on Appropriations which shall be offered en bloc. These are technical amendments which are necessary to ensure that the budgetary impact of this legislation will be neutral.
The en bloc amendments shall be debatable for no more than 10 minutes to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Appropriations or their designees. These amendments shall not be divisible in the House or in the Committee of the Whole, and all points of order are waived against them.
Finally, the rule makes in order one motion to recommit, with or without instructions, if offered by Mr. Michel or his designee. This motion to recommit shall be debatable for up to 20 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, on March 24, the Democratic and Republican leadership of both the House and Senate joined President Bush in signing a bipartisan agreement on Central America.
The agreement, I believe, signals a major change in U.S. policy toward the region. For the first time in over 7 years of war, the administration has expressed its full support for the Central American peace process.
The administration has acknowledged that the military approach has failed and has actively embraced the diplomatic approach to the region's problems. With this agreement, the administration has foresworn military aid for the Contras and has, instead, stated that it is the goal of United States policy to reintegrate them into the democratic process inside Nicaragua. For the first time, the administration expresses support for the voluntary reintegration and regional relocation of the Contras in a manner consistent with the Central American peace accords.
The bipartisan accord calls for a continuation of the cessation of hostilities now in effect between the Contras and the Nicaraguan Government. Secretary of State Baker has assured the House leadership that the United States will provide no assistance to any member of the resistance who is engaged in offensive military actions or who is involved in human rights abuses. The Secretary of State and I have discussed this issue at great length, and I have been assured that a letter affirming these commitments will be forthcoming.
This bipartisan agreement has wide support among the leaders in central America. President Oscar Arias, of Costa Rica, has hailed the agreement. Of this agreement, Arias has said: `Realism and pragmatism have prevailed. Now I feel a sincere support for the peace plan, something I never found in the past.' Arias went on to underscore the point: `For a very long time we have been insisting to the world that dialog has to replace the military path. We're seeing an end to a warlike policy and support for the peace plan * * * .'
The legislation we have before us today has been crafted pursuant to this bipartisan agreement. It has the support of the leadership on both sides of the aisle. It provides for a simple extension of nonlethal assistance to the Contras at the current rate, and in current form from March 31, 1989, until February 28, 1990.
The only addition in the definition of `humanitarian assistance' from last year is the sitpulation that funds may be provided for voluntary reintegration and regional relocation of the Contras. The delivery of this assistance will be arranged solely by AID in a manner that is consistent with the bipartisan accord. That accord makes it clear that, when the Central American Presidents develop their plan for reintegration and relocation of the Contras, these funds will be available to support such reintegration and regional relocation.
This legislation explicitly repeals all expedited procedures as well as every other reference to the provision of military aid. It does contain, however, a clear prohibition on the provision of military assistance, on the delivery of military assistance, and on the provision of any additional assistance not explicitly authorized by law.
Finally, in a side agreement, the administration has agreed that, no funds can be spent after November 30, 1989, without the written approval of the House and Senate authorizing and appropriations committees. This provision, which will be spelled out in a letter from Secretary Baker to the Congress, will allow the relevant committees to review the administration's implementation of the bipartisan accord and the extent of its support for the peace process in Central America.
Mr. Speaker, I believe the bipartisan agreement represents an important step forward in the effort to achieve peace and democracy in Central America.
It sends a clear signal to the leaders of Central America that we are willing to support the peace agreements that they have so carefully worked out. And it sends a clear signal to the Contras that it is time to begin the process of peacefully reintegrating themselves into the democratic process in Central America.
I hope this body will join in the effort to forge a policy for the United States that is, at long last, supportive of the peace process in Central Amercia.
Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of the rule and H.R. 1750.
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[TIME: 1020]
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I might consume.
Mr. Speaker, this is the second time this week I have come before the House to urge support, particuarly from my side of the aisle, for a proposed rule.
Yes, it is true that we have before us today a modified closed rule; and as the Members know, I and other Republicans are usually critical of this kind of rule. But the House will be considering today in extraordinary piece of legislation, which is the product of extraordinary negotations between the White House and a bipartisan group of leaders from both Houses of Congress.
The leadership of both parties in the House have requested this specific rule. H.R. 1750 is a very delicately-balanced bill. And the leadership of both parties, considering the unusual and intense negotiations which wrote the bill, have thought it wise to preserve the bill against amendment.
The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior] has accurately described this rule, but I would just now reiterate a couple of points in the rule.
First, it provides for 4 hours of general debate. That should be enough time to allow all concerned Members to be heard. And certainly there is no intention under this rule, despite it closed nature, to deny any Member the right to be heard.
Second, the rule provides the minority; namely, the minority leader or his designee, the right to offer a motion to recommit with or without instructions.
Under the unusual circumstances attending H.R. 1750, this is an appropriate rule--at this point I will not take the time to argue the merits of the Contra aid package but I will be strongly supporting the Contra package later in the debate.
I urge all Members to support this rule.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Foglietta].
(Mr. FOGLIETTA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the rule and I also oppose the bill.
First, I would like to say I believe that the bipartisan accord represents a significant achievement on the part of the leadership of this body. I would especially like to note the great work of the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. David Bonior, the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. David Obey, the gentleman from Washington, our leader, Mr. Tom Foley, and Speaker Jim Wright in bringing this bipartisan agreement on Nicaragua. I would like very much to be able to support this legislation. However, I cannot and will not support the bill as it now stands.
This legislation would allow the United States, or could allow the United States to be a positive force in this war torn region, but only if it specifically states that these funds be used to reintegrate the Contras into Nicaraguan society.
[TIME: 1030]
As it stands now, reintegration is listed as No. 6 of a `maybe' voluntary six possible uses for the money in H.R. 1750.
Yesterday I sought the opportunity to introduce an amendment to this bill mandating that at least 20 percent of these funds be used for resettlement and repatriation of the Contras. There is a consensus in this Congress and among the Presidents of the Central American nations that continuing to support the Contras as a military force would derail the peace process.
Maintaining a standing army in Honduras is dangerous and destabilizing. It is not in the spirit of this bipartisan accord. However, as this legislation stands now, I fear we may be doing just that, keeping the Contras in place and intact for another year.
This bill does not say that 1 cent of the money must be used for resettlement. This bill does not say that the ultimate goal of this legislation is the reintegration of the Contras back into the political process in Nicaragua. This bill does not say that United States money cannot go to armed bands of Contras still inside of Nicaragua.
Thus, this accord hinges on winks, nods, and handshakes.
I would like to say, I really would like to say that I can trust this new administration, the Bush administration to implement a program of resettlement of Contras. But how can I? How can I when I read on the front pages of the newspaper just today that the then-Vice President Bush played a significant role in providing covert aid to the Contras after denying vehemently that he played such a role?
My colleagues today my strong desire would be to vote for this bill, for a bill, for reintegration and for peace, but not for a bill full of `maybes.'
I urge my colleagues to join me in voting against this rule and against H.R. 1750.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, today we are considering passage of an agreement between the leadership of this Congress and President Bush that I greatly hope will keep the possibility of a democratic Nicaragua alive. In seeking an end to the repression brought about by the Sandinista party, supporters of democracy inside and outside Nicaragua have always faced a difficult choice--either pursue the means to overthrow their oppressors by force or trust the Sandinistas to actually allow democracy in that country. Through passage of this agreement today, we will choose the second route and will again take Sandinista promises at face value. This bipartisan agreement in fact has its very roots in the Sandinistas so called commitments to democratization under the Central American Peace Plan and in their recent commitment to at last hold truly free elections.
I will support this agreement today, despite serious reservations I have over its structure, because it provides the men and women of the resistance with the means they vitally need to remain an organized force pending fulfillment of these latest Sandinista promises. If I am skeptical of the Sandinistas' intentions, however, I believe I simply share the outlook of a great many Nicaraguans--Nicaraguans who in many cases have already participated in an election of sorts by voting with their feet and escaping from Nicaragua by bus, car, boat and plane. We might, in fact, ask ourselves here today whether the present Nicaraguan regime might win free elections in that country next year simply because so many Nicaraguans who would have voted against them had already fled.
My reading of the press reports out of Nicaragua over the course of the last year leave me with the impression that there remains little belief among the Nicaraguan people that life under the Sandinistas will ever really change.
For one thing, the Sandinistas' economic policies have made life in Nicaragua almost intolerable for the average working Nicaraguan. But it is not just the economy that is driving Nicaraguans to give up hope of meaningful change in their country--it is a broad range of actions taken by the Sandinistas last year while most of us here focused on their talk of peace.
For the sake of the Nicaraguan people's future, I think it is right and proper that we today take a long look at these Sandinista actions. First of all, let's not overlook some mysterious murders that were carried out in Nicaragua last year. What were the real circumstances surrounding the murders of Conservative Party official Eliazar Herrera and Independent Liberal Party official Francisco Aguilera? And what about the several dozen reports of Sandinista political assassinations of alleged resistance supporters throughout the countryside, some of which the Americas Watch organization stated were: `numerous enough to suggest tolerance or complicity by higher authorities.'
Do we here really believe that the Nicaraguan people's hope in Sandinista promises of democracy were encouraged by Sandinista mob attacks on political gatherings? Sandinista harassment, arrests, and firings of striking trade unionists and similar job attacks on their meetings certainly didn't contribute to that hope.
Over the last year, we have witnessed numerous Sandinista closings of private radio stations, which are supposed to have uncensored operations under the peace plan. And why is it still impossible for Nicaraguans to be allowed to watch a privately owned television station? Nearby El Salvador, despite its on-going war, not only has four private TV stations, but Salvadorans watch hours of broadcast interviews with armed Salvadoran guerrillas. And why is it still so difficult for the last remaining opposition newspaper, `La Prensa,' to get newsprint?
Is this continuing censorship, inflicted at whim by the Sandinista commandantes, supposed to encourage our belief in their democratic intentions? If there is true freedom of expression under the Sandinistas, why did they harass Catholic priests who dared last year to raise the subject of hunger in their sermons?
We recently saw the release of Nicaraguan national guardsmen held in prison these last 10 years. We have to ask, however, what has become of the many Nicaraguans sentenced to prison by political courts since 1979? Where are they? Have they been freed? And what has been the fate of those Nicaraguan civilians reportedly arrested last year in areas from which the resistance was forced to withdraw?
The Sandinistas continue to conscript young Nicaraguan boys into their party's army, often cordoning off entire neighborhoods and dragging the young men off. This continues despite the many demonstrations and protests against it and despite last year's truce. Why is such forced conscription necessary if there is to be peace? In fact, why is the Nicaraguan army run by one political party and not by the Nicaraguan people?
Mr. Speaker, this is just a short list of such actions taken by the Sandinista last year. I urge my colleagues to consider these facts and questions today as we consider this bill. Let's truly hold the Sandinistas to their promises for democracy this time!
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
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[TIME: 1040]
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to my distinguished colleague on the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Derrick].
(Mr. DERRICK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, well, here we are. We have been here dealing with this issue I do not know how long. If I stay in Congress another 10 years, we will still be dealing with it, I guarantee it, and the argument will be basically the same that I hear this morning.
What has happened here is that the Democrats here in Washington have looked deep through the eyes into the soul of Secretary Baker and President Bush and have found in their wisdom that they want to end the hostilities in Nicaragua. They want to end them. And as all inside-the-Beltway settlements, it is done at taxpayers' expense. This is not a settlement in Nicaragua. This is a political settlement here in Washington.
I have heard and I have heard, I remember one time, I think it was back in 1985, that we voted humanitarian aid to send down to the Contras. As I recall, sometime after that we asked for an accounting and we found a substantial portion of that money in banks in Switzerland, banks in Miami. I suggest to Members that if we are so foolish as to send $68 million or $50 million or whatever it comes out to down there, a large part of this will once again end up in the banks of Switzerland, the banks of Miami.
When are we going to learn as a Nation about Central and South America? We have certainly had enough lessons over the years. The problem down there is a low standard of living and we can send this kind of money down there for the next 50 years. We can send military aid or whatever, and we are going to still be faced with the same problem that we are faced today. No one truly believes that this is humanitarian aid in the strict sense of the word. This money is sent to Nicaragua to keep afloat a group of desperadoes that have found a way to live way above the average standard of the average Nicaraguan family in Nicaragua, which the average per capita income, I think for the region is around $900, and at least for the Contra family income this comes out to around $4,800 or 900.
Sure, I could tell Members that we could setup one of those things here in the United States and get all sorts of volunteers. When are we going to learn that we cannot throw money at problems like this and walk away? That is exactly what we intend to do. We think here inside the Beltway that we can salve our conscience by sending $50 million down, and we are going to be able to turn around and walk away, but let me say that we are going to be here next year and next year and next year. We have spent $360 million down there. If we send this money, what has it done except to bring disgrace and shame upon this great country of ours?
I ask Members to vote against the legislation. I ask Members to vote for the rule, however. I think that the rule is well structured, and it will get a fair opportunity for everyone in the House with 4 hours of general debate and a couple of amendments to address themselves on that issue, but as far as the legislation is concerned, please let us think about this thing very, very strongly before we send another $50 million down there. Who will benefit, if Members are so strong against the Sandinistas, whose economy do Members think this money is going in? They are having all these problems down there, but what Members are really doing is helping the Sandinistas. That is going right into that economy, a large part of it, that part that does not end up in Miami and Switzerland.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The previous speaker in the well talks about the moneys in this bill as being foreign aid. The gentleman, I think, may or may not know that in the 11 years I have been in this Congress I have voted against the foreign aid package bill 10 out of the 11 years. I do not know how I happened to make a mistake in one of the years.
Nevertheless, Members have to look at what has been happening around the world. I mentioned earlier that communism has never been thrown out of a country by election. But when we look around the world it is what is happening today, and look at Mr. Gorbachev and look at the glasnost and look at perestroika and Members have to ask, what is happening out there? Is Mr. Gorbachev really sincere? Is he really truly about peace?
Well, I just did a study looking at the Soviet economy over the last 20 years and Members can really see what is happening there. Communism is a failed philosophy which will not work. The Soviet economy 7 years ago was racing along at about 3 1/2 percent growth rate. Just in the last couple of years, it dropped to 1 1/2 percent, and this last year, the Soviet economy growth rate is down to one-half of 1 percent. Does that tell Members something? Does that tell Members why Mr. Gorbachev is now running around the world telling Angola and telling Cuba and telling Nicaragua and other countries that we cannot afford to keep giving all these arms and tanks and planes? The reason is, communism does not work. It is failing in all of the countries over there behind the Iron Curtain. We can see it in Hungary, we can see it in Georgia, the Ukraine, and yes, now is the time for Members to push democracy across this world and especially right here in Nicaragua.
The ranking Republican member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield], he and his staff and his committee have done an exhausting study, and I wish Members would take the time, we do not have the time, I know, as individual Members, but in this committee report there is a 10-year exhaustive study of what has been happening down there. Now is the time for Members to act, to pass this bill, because this is not foreign aid for foreign countries. This is aid for American democracy. It is protecting our democracy.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].
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Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I look across the aisle at my colleagues and I see disdain, I guess, because once again we are debating an issue with which of course they disagree with this side. But I think this time, today, most of them who have been supportive of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and opposing the Contras feel like they have won a victory.
It is unfortunate that the gentleman from South Carolina, spoke of the Contras calling them a bunch of rogues, bandits, and a number of other things. At the same time I noticed he not once mentioned that the Sandinistas are Communists. He did not mention once that there is severe repression in Nicaragua, that the people do not want it. He did not mention once that there is 30,000 percent inflation and the people that used to have a fairly decent standard of living have no standard of living at all anymore because of the Communist Sandinista government. He did not mention once the Communist threat to the neighbors of Nicaragua.
I was in Chalatenango Province in El Salvador and talked to captured guerrillas that showed us weapons that they said came through Nicaragua.
[TIME: 1050]
They told us their training camps were just outside Managua in Nicaragua. But that was not mentioned once. He did not mention once the freedoms that have been lost in Nicaragua that were promised in Esquipulas, at Sapoa, and in 1979 to the OAS. Freedoms that were promised by the Sandinistas to the people of that country that have not been realized.
The Communists have broken promise after promise after promise, but that was not mentioned. There is no freedom of the press, there is no freedom of religion--there is no freedom of assembly. There are no true political parties that can participate in free elections. They talk about free elections, but we all know that is a ruse, used to confuse and divide us.
He did not mention the political torture that takes place in the prisons. He did not mention the people that have been incarcerated without trial or due process, many of whom are still there. He did not mention the beatings that have taken place.
When I was down there, I went to Leon and spoke to about 4,000 people in that little town who came out in spite of the Sandinista threats, to tell us of their problems and how they abhorred the Communists that have taken over that country. They told us of the beatings that have taken place and the torture that has been perpetrated upon people who took issue with that government. I talked to wives of political prisoners who had been promised that they would see their husbands or their sons, and told that they would be released, but they were not released. One woman who complained with others in a demonstration had her clothes torn off of her in public, and she was beaten. I brought her clothing back to the well of the House and showed it to the Members of this body. It did not have much of an impact. But those stories are not told by Members on the other side of the aisle.
They talk about the terrible Contras. What are the Contras? Most of them are campesinos who have gone to the hills with their families and are living in squalor and who want to fight for freedom down there. But they cannot do it with sticks, and they cannot do it with rocks, and you know that. Time and again you have cut off the military assistance they need to fight the Communist Sandinistas; those who have an expansionist policy and who want to expand their revolution throughout Central America and up into Mexico.
We know that in Afghanistan the Mujaheddin have driven out the Soviets. They have driven out one of the greatest military forces in the world. We know how and why they drove them out. They drove them out because the United States of America gave them military assistance. We gave them stingers, surface-to-air missiles to shoot down Hind helicopters, and because of that the Soviets left with their tail between their legs.
The same thing would happen in Central America. They could drive the last vestiges of communism out of our hemisphere if you guys had the same guts you showed when we gave support to the Afghan freedom fighters. But you do not have that. You want those people fighting for freedom in Nicaragua to use sticks and rocks. They cannot win that way, and you know it.
So I think the facade should be cut away. The fact
of the matter is that you support the Sandinista government; you do not want them driven out of power, and because of that you are indirectly supporting a Communist movement that threatens the very existence of those other democracies and ultimately that of the United States as well. There is peace in Nicaragua today, but there is no freedom, and one thing that should be said clearly time and again is that peace without freedom is not peace, it is slavery. Peace without freedom is slavery, and because we are not helping those people who want freedom in Nicaragua, we are signing on to a slave state.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Bosco].
Mr. BOSCO. Mr. Speaker, we have had many visions for the Contras here in the Congress and from time to time we get together to mold them.
There have been times in this room when we envisioned the Contras as a fighting force. We've given them the wherewithal to shoot down helicopters, take over villages, perhaps topple the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. And there have been other times when we've waited them to go away altogether and we have left them stranded in the jungles without guns or butter. Today we have a compromise between these two visions--neither a fighting force nor a thing of the past--the Contras will be sent to summer camp--spending their days drinking beer and playing volleyball in the jungles of Honduras. Standing neither vertical as soldiers nor horizontal as vanquished they will be suspended at a 45 degree compromise angle--the beneficiaries of bipartisan accord.
During the hearing at the Foreign Affairs Committee, I asked Deputy Secretary Eagleburger what the Contras actually do on an average day. Although Mr. Eagleburger didn't know for sure himself, another witness said they remained remarkable cohesive and did exercises. There are some 10,000 of them with their families, whiling away the time in Honduras. Abandoned by their leaders, there are peasants, campesinos most of them young. Remaining cohesive isn't hard to figure out--the stipend of the equivalent of $4,000 or $5,000 each from United States taxpayers is far more than their countrymen make, either in Nicaragua or elsewhere in Central America. While the legislation envisions the possibility of relocation, one would have difficulty finding a rationale for any of these poor peasants to get off the U.S. gravy train.
Blessed are the peacemakers, and all of us are sincerely grateful for the hard work of the Speaker and Mr. Bonior and others who put this compromise together. It does mark that historic moment when the Contra's go from being a fighting force `the equivalent of our own Founding Fathers' to being yet another American Entitlement Program. This metamorphosis effective ends a sad and misguided chapter of United States foreign policy, but I think we would be wiser today to close the book and let these poor people make their way home without perpetuating the myth that they will play a role in the peace process initiated by the people of Central America themselves.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer].
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend, the gentleman from Michigan, for his generosity of spirit and time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise against this rule because it does not allow for amendment to the bill, amendments which could cut its costs or put further restrictions on the Contras, or move us more quickly toward peace, amendments such as Mr. Foglietta had asked to be made in order.
So I shall vote against this rule and I do appreciate being given time by Mr. Bonior and by Mr. Foley during the general debate, to speak against the bill.
I would like to use this time to state why I will be voting and working against this compromise and in doing so set the stage for those who will speak in opposition to Contra aid during the general debate.
Yesterday I met two of the world's most innocent victims--Dora Lopez, 22, and Eric Lopez, her son, age 4. Last year, during the time when there was no military aid or lethal aid allowed by Congress to the Contras, Dora was taking her infant son to the hospital.
The truck was attacked by the Contras; 12 people were killed, among them Dora's infant son. Dora lost her leg and sight in one eye. Four-year-old Eric suffered permanent damage to his face and an AK-47 blew open his shoulder.
This my colleagues during the period of nonmilitary or humanitarian aid.
This picture is worth a thousand words and Dora sits outside this House Chamber praying that we vote this compromise down.
How many others faced the same fate as Dora and her familiy since so-called humanitarian aid has been in place?
According to Witness for Peace from June 1988 until March 1989 about 600 civilian killings, woundings, and kidnapings have taken place. And that is only a report of those verified by this very reputable organization.
So don't kid yourself, you can call it by any other name, nonlethal, nonmilitary, defensive military, humanitarian, call it anything but it's still murder, kidnap and maiming.
Now we have a lot of problems in our country today.
Our Secretary of Housing Jack Kemp is trying as hard as he can to bring basketball into housing projects.
Maybe he should rename these housing projects Contra villages, Contra villages have volley ball, here's a picture that shows it. There's volley ball and other sports, there's food and housing, it's not luxury by any means but it is sustenance, unfortunately more sustenance than many of our American families have today. Here's a photo of a homeless family, mother and son, more and more the faces of the homeless look like this. This mother would like food and shelter and volleyball for her son. His mother would stand in line to get the $5,000 per year each Contra will be receiving; $5,000 per Contra, in an area where the average income is $900 a year.
I have no question of the motivation of many of my colleagues who will support this package. Many feel it is a step toward peace. But what do the Contras say?
On March 26, before they got the PR line on how this would be sold they said and I quote.
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This is a major step forward. It will keep us together as a fighting force.
I ask my colleagues to stand up and be counted on this issue again today. Let us not have to witness any more Doras or Erics. Let's not lavish millions on a failed policy.
Let us vote `no' on this plan and allow the peace process to continue.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter], a real freedom fighter in his own right.
(Mr. HUNTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. HUNTER. My colleagues, I was going to talk about the fact that I am also going to vote no on this package for very different reasons than the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer]. I am going to vote no because I think that the hope for freedom is lost in Nicaragua. The Contras as a fighting force have been effectively destroyed by the vote that was made by the Congress on February 2 of last year. We are really giving the American people false hopes in making them think that somehow, having lost the only leverage that we have really had to achieve any part of movement on the part of the Sandinistas, and that is the military force of Contras, somehow hardcore Marxists like Bayardo Arce and Tomas Borge, the head of the secret police in Nicargua, and other hard-core Marxists are going to watch C-SPAN to pick up the niceties of democracy and are going to voluntarily turn over power if they are voted out of office.
However let me, having had the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] precede me, let me just make one comment about her remarks that I think needs to be addressed by the American people. We have a State Department report that was put out reviewing the statements and the interviews of a man named Baldazon. Baldazon was one of the top lieutenants of Tomas Borge when Tomas Borge was head of the secret police, and Baldazon gave us indepth interviews on the inside of the communist Sandinista operations.
One thing that he talked about was deceiving visiting international delegations, and he mentioned that Borge read the Bible regularly even though he was a hardcore Marxist, so that, when church groups came in, he could quote the Bible to them.
He precedes this by telling about times in which Tomas Borge ordered executions and personally stood by while innocent people in Nicaragua were machinegunned.
So, Mr. Speaker, we are talking about a very hard, very brutal head of the Sandinista gestapo, Tomas Borge, and yet he knew that propaganda is important. He knew that giving a good image to these well-thinking Americans coming down on these tours was important, so he read the Bible, and he would quote Bible phrases to them. He would have biblical pictures in his office.
In one incident that Baldazon mentioned particularly, Borge would ask Baldazon and others to have him in the act of doing nice things for poor people when these visiting delegations walked in, and maybe he would be giving a prosthetic device to a peasant that he called in off the street, and then they would shoo him out after the visiting delegation left.
One time he even asked to get an accordion for an old man who liked to play the accordion, and he was in this process of playing this accordion for the peace delegation. Of course, as soon as the delegation left, they took the accordion away from the old man and kicked him back in the street.
Mr. Speaker, I think that it is unfortunate that Americans have not read between the lines, have not really looked in great depth at the enormous propaganda that comes out through the Sandinista government.
Mr. Borge also sent what he called his chance-encounter teams out when these peace groups would tour the country, and he would have people that were dressed up like
peasants just happen to bump into the American peace delegation, and they, of course, would report to him that the Contras had participated in great atrocities, and the peace delegation would come back and hold a press conference in the United States and basically carry that information, and Mr. Borge considered those operations to be very, very successful.
Mr. Speaker, let me go to the bottom line for the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer]. The Soviet Union has pumped over $500 million worth of weapons, and ammunition, and arms, and killing machines into Nicaragua in the last year for their side, the Sandinistas, after we in the House of Representatives cut off our side without any bullets. We said, `You can fight for freedom, but you can't have bullets.'
In this ensuing package that we are going to talk about we are going to take away their opportunities to even engage in battles, albeit unequal battles.
I have heard very few speakers from the other side associate those killing machines like the Hind helicopters that can fire 6,000 rounds per minute, the tanks, all of the Kalashnikov rifles, and the millions of rounds of ammunition. I have heard from very few people who are anti-Contra comment on the relationship between those Russian killing machines and people who lose their legs or lose their limbs.
Let me simply assure my colleagues that I have gone into the United Nations refugee camps unannounced, unescorted and not telling anybody whether I was a Democrat, Republican, liberal or conservative. The last time I was there I had about 100 people come up to me.
I said to the first man, `Why are you here?'
He said, `The Sandinistas cut my throat,' and he pulled down the bandage around his neck, and he had a bayonet mark all the way around his throat.
The next man said, `The Sandinistas killed my brother and hung him on a coffee bush,' and this was in the Jacaleapa United Nations camp in Honduras.
The next person said, `They hooked up electrodes to my head and to my legs.'
[Page: H1138]
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I will try to yield at the end, but I have some things I want to say, and I would appreciate the gentlewoman from Calfornia [Mrs. Boxer] suffering me.
The point is that everybody that I talked to with that camera, out of those hundreds of people picked randomly, all talked about Sandinista atrocities.
Now 2 weeks ago I was down at Brownsville, TX, where Nicaraguans are streaming across the border. I might note that Nicaraguans are streaming across the border after we cut off aid to the Contras. Now theoretically everything was going to be fine after we cut off aid, but it has not been. Every one of them talked ill of the Sandinistas.
The Miami Herald reporter who was given great respect by people who read that particular publication, who took the trip all the way from Nicaragua up here with a band of refugees coming north, said, `Nobody in their private conversations said anything good about the Sandinistas.'
[TIME: 1110]
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HUNTER. I cannot yield on that point, because I only have about a minute left.
The point that I want to make is this. I think we are fooling the American people. I think that we are putting off the real moment of truth, because the Sandinistas, the same Sandinistas who machinegun their enemies, who killed George Salazar, who was the one person who could have been a president of a free Nicaragua in 1981, are not going to voluntarily turn over the reins of power with absolutely no mechanism or lever for enforcement.
We are giving up, and we gave up in February of 1988, that only mechanism of enforcement that we had, and that was the Contras, the Democratic Resistance.
The last point I want to make to the gentlewoman from California is this. There are not 8 or 10,000 men down there that the gentlewoman points to. There are about 40,000 family members. There are old women. There are old men. There are amputees. There are children. The Contra force, in fact, are people who have been dispossessed by Nicaragua, created by the brutality of the Sandinistas, not created by the United States.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for just half a second?
Mr. HUNTER. I am happy to yield to the gentlewoman from California.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, I agree with the gentleman that violence from the left and violence from the right must be condemned. What we want is to stop the violence from all sides.
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman. I wish she could come up with a blueprint for keeping the $500 million worth of military aid that the Soviet Union is stuffing into Nicaragua to their side over the next year, because without stopping that we are going to see continued oppression by the Sandinistas, and I hope that I have more than rhetorical support from the gentlewoman for that.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield one additional minute to the gentleman.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, this problem is not going to be resolved until the American people get involved.
I have the same feeling that I had when we had the S&L crisis come up the first time. We said we were going to vote a $5 billion package and everything is going to be fine, and people forgot about it and it became a catastrophic crisis and one that we had to deal with on a much higher level.
There is a catastrophe in Central America. Nicaragua is lost. Freedom is gone and there is no chance of having free and fair elections where you have the requirement of giving up power by people who have told us they will not give up power.
Mr. Gorbachev stated in Cuba that he is not going to cease the aid that we appealed him to cease before he visited Castro a few weeks ago.
We need military aid, and that is why I am voting no when the substantive question comes up.
Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield to me?
Mr. HUNTER. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman's point about violence is an appropriate one. Let me just observe that when the Sandinistas commit violence against innocent victims, they are probably committing that violence with Soviet weapons. When the Contras commit violence against innocent victims, and indeed they do, unfortunately they do it with bullets paid for by us, and that is what we object to.
Mr. HUNTER. The difference is that we punish the people who commit violence on our side, just as we court martial our soldiers. The Sandinista state condones the machinegunning of individuals by the head of the Secret Police and the Secretary of the Interior, Tomas Borge.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my friend, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support the rule and allow the debate, but to oppose and will oppose the Democrat compromise.
The simple truth is, in my opinion, we spend too much time worrying about Central America and not enough about Uncle Sam.
For those of you who may not realize this, there were 20,000 murders in this country last year; 55,000 people killed on our highways; street crime is exploding, and we are going to vote for the 70th time to send new humanitarian aid to Nicaragua.
I say today it is time to vote on humanitarian aid for America, for Cleveland, for Detroit, for Chicago, for Pittsburgh, for Philadelphia, for Youngstown, for Los Angeles.
You know, one thing the Iran Contra scam should have taught us, what Robert Owens said in that private memo, he said that sending money to Nicaragua is like pouring it down a sinkhole. We do not want to send it. We want to push it down there by Federal Express now. We have not had enough.
In the 8 years they have been there, these Contras do not control one crossroad, have not had one major military accomplishment.
Let us face facts. We are here today worried about the Soviets and Castro, and that is valid, but I think it is time for our President, Mr. Bush, to say, `Read my lips. Get out.'
What we are saying is, `Read my pocketbook. There is a problem and we are going to cure it. We will give you some money.'
Look here. We have a $300 billion defense budget shoved down our throats every year, and I do not like it. We have F-16's. We have tanks.
Mr. Speaker, it is time to tell these Communists that we do not fund this $300 billion defense budget to go toward a neighborhood crime watch. It is time to tell these Communists to get out. It is time for President Bush to say, `Read my lips.'
The greatest freedom fight going on today is not in Central America. It is in America with frustrated citizens who cannot own a piece of the rock, and God forbid when they get a chance they have to import it from Mount Fuji.
I am tired of having here in the House the 70th vote on this issue.
I am not taking issue with any Republican. I believe you mean well, but I believe the people in Indianapolis need more aid than the people in Central America.
We are not going to buy respect, folks. They are still saying, `Uncle Sam, Yankee go home, get out. Quit meddling.'
I am not going to yield. I lost 55,000 jobs in my district. I want a Democrat compromise that says we are going to help you with those jobs. When we do some work on jobs and stop talking about the Sandinistas, start talking about soybeans, stop talking about Contras and campesinos, start talking about jobs, America will be safer because our greatest threat is not a missile. It is not the Sandinistas. It is this economy where the American citizens are frustrated and some of our cities are literally out of control.
I want some help for jobs in my area. That is what I am talking about today. I want help for jobs in Youngstown and Warren, OH.
[Page: H1139]
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me. I did not plan to say more in this particular part of the debate on the rule, but since my honorable colleague, the gentleman from Ohio, mentioned my particular city and me--I would ask the gentleman not to leave yet--I thought I ought to respond.
We are all concerned about jobs and we think that the first priority of this Congress ought to be the people of the United States of America. I agree with that; but there is one other thing that I think ought to be taken into consideration, and that is why we have debated this time and again and again. Many of us believe there is a Communist threat, not only to Nicaragua, but to all of Central America and ultimately Mexico. If we do not help those people who are fighting for freedom down there, as we did the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, then what we fear is that one day the Communist sphere of influence will spread all the way up into Mexico and we will have to send our boys down there to spill their blood in a needless war.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Indiana has expired.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I would like to say this, that we had a lot of valiant American soldiers die in Vietnam, supposedly fighting Communism. The soldiers fought, Congress did not. We have too much rhetoric here.
I do not disagree, I am not questioning the gentleman's integrity. I believe the gentleman means well and he might be right, but I would like to see us start worrying about America.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, the fact of the matter is that many of us feel there is a threat down the road that is very real and if we do not help those people who are fighting for freedom down there right now, we are going to reap the whirlwind.
I think it is improper for people to come to this body then to say that we do not care about American jobs, that we do not care about our districts, because that is our No. 1 priority; but I am also concerned about the future of this Nation and the possibility of young men and women having to spill their blood in a needless war in Central America because we do not do what is necessary today by helping the freedom fighters in Nicaragua.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, just in closing in the 1 minute remaining, I just point out to the gentleman from Washington, and I do not question his integrity, either, he is a fine Member of this body; but you know, when communism takes over a country, as it always has, you always have 15 percent of those people fleeing from that Nation. In the past when they came from Vietnam, they came by boat.
[TIME: 1120]
If they fall in Central America and we get 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 million aliens coming into this country, legal and illegal, just think what that is going to do to this economy.
We are a humane nation. We are a democratic people. We love our neighbors. We love people all over the world. But how much can we do for them, and what kind of a strain would that place on us?
I would just remind the gentleman from Youngstown, OH, that I have some unemployment and factory shutdowns in my district, too. I am concerned about it, and I do not want the situation to get worse. I want it to get better around the world. That is why I am reluctantly supporting this package. I am not satisfied with it either, but I think it is the only thing we have, and I am going to support it.
Mr. Speaker, I would appreciate it if everybody else would support the rule.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute, the remainder of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I believe the accord in this legislation signals a major change in U.S. policy toward the region.
For the first time in over 7 years of war the administration has fully expressed its support for the Central American peace process. They have acknowledged publicly that the military approach of the past has failed. They have actively embraced the diplomatic approach to the region's problems.
They have, indeed, before us in the committees and the legislation forsworn military aid and, instead, have stated that it is the goal of United States policy to reintegrate the Contras into the Democratic process within Nicaragua.
Mr. Speaker, this is a dramatic change. It behooves all of us, I think, to look at it in light of the fact that it is, indeed, a change.
This agreement and the legislation has been hailed by literally every Latin American leader. I would hope we could work together on this issue and hopefully within the next 10 months we will see progress on the democratic side in Nicaragua; that we will see a cessation or, at least, a beginning of a cessation of arms flows from the Soviet Union into Cuba, and we will, indeed, see the reintegration of the Contras back into the normal flow of Nicaraguan life.
Mr. Speaker, with that, I end my remarks.
Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mineta). The question is on the resolution.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 127 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 1750.
[TIME: 1125]
Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 1750) to implement the Bipartisan Accord on Central America of March 24, 1989, with Mr. McCloskey in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley] will be recognized for 2 hours, and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel] will be recognized for 2 hours.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley].
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield, for purposes of debate only, 37 1/2 minutes to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell]; following that, I yield 37 1/2 minutes to the chairman of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey]; and following that, I yield 45 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer].
[Page: H1140]
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. Chairman, it is our understanding that there are 4 hours of debate, 2 hours to this side, 2 hours to that side, and that 1 hour of the minority time was going to be yielded to the ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 1 hour to the Appropriations ranking minority member. I do not now quite understand what they are doing over there. How does that affect our time?
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, if I may be heard, I assume that the Chair is following its usual practice of alternating recognition back and forth among those who are controlling time on each side of the aisle. What I was proposing to do and doing was to yield the control of the debate of the 2 hours on our side to the three Members en bloc that I mentioned in my statement: the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell], the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey], and the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer]. Obviously, their time is subject to the usual alternate recognition between each side.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, as a further parliamentary inquiry, we assume that the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell], is going to lead off with how much time?
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might say that the Chair will alternate recognition from side to side in the appropriate way.
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, it is typical in our debates that the Chair will recognize, I assume, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell], who will either speak or yield time for so many minutes, and then the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield], I assume, or the distinguished leader, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel], to speak or recognize for a certain number of minutes on their side, and back and forth and back and forth.
After the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell] has controlled his full 37 1/2 minutes of time, the transfer will be made to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey], who will then control 37 1/2 minutes of time on our side, again, alternately with Republican recognition and, finally, the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] will control 45 minutes of time under her direction, alternately with Members on the Republican side.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I assume that is the intention of the Chair. Just for our own benefit, over on this side of the aisle, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield] was prepared to carry the first hour, but the gentleman is going to be shifting it to his Appropriations Committee after 37 1/2 minutes, so I guess that the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Conte] had better be prepared after 37 1/2 minutes to be around here so we can just keep things together.
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, that is the judgment, I might say, for the Republican leadership to make.
Mr. SOLOMON. We have no objection.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, might I be recognized?
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, I apologize, first, to the Chair and to my distinguished colleague for my tardy entrance to the floor, feeling that there was probably going to be a vote on the rule.
It is my understanding that the distinguished majority leader has laid out how the debate would unfold on his side. On our side the time would be divided equally between the distinguished minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield], and the distinguished member of our Appropriations subcommittee, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Edwards].
I would expect, if the distinguished majority leader is going to lead off the debate on his side, that I would probably then request of my distinguished colleague permission to do likewise on our side so that we might have the two positions laid out quite clearly at the front of the debate, and then let it flow from there.
I thank the Chair for its indulgence.
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, in answer to the gentleman, I intend to make a very, very brief statement stating my support for this resolution and then yield the time as I have indicated.
[TIME: 1130]
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley].
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this is a most important bill which comes to the floor after what may well be an historic agreement between the leadership of Congress on both sides of the aisle and the President of the United States acting through the Secretary of State. It has been the most contentious and difficult, in some ways the most devisive issue that has reached the Congress in many years, and it has, more than any other, with the possible exception of disagreements over policy toward South Africa, been an item of dispute between the majority of our two parties on each side.
I hope this bill which brings together the policy on a common basis for the first time in many years will attract a majority of support on both sides so that we can have a strong majority of the whole House for this legislation.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel], the minority leader.
(Mr. MICHEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman,
on March 24, 1989, the President of the United States and the bipartisan, bicameral leadership of Congress joined in announcing the bipartisan accord on Central America.
Today we debate the legislation that will, among other provisions:
Continue the authority to provide assistance at prior authorized levels until February 28, 1990.
Authorize the transfer of $49,750,000 in DOD funds to AID for humanitarian assistance, as well as $4,166,000 for the Medical Program and $5,000,000 for AID operating expenses.
This legislation is intended to unite Americans in, and I quote from the accord: `* * * support of democracy, peace and security in Central America * * *.'
When we say democracy, we mean real democracy,--not just a facade of democratization behind which lurks the armed power of a brutal totalitarian state.
When we say peace, we mean real peace--not the peace of the grave, or the peace where military power can be brought into play by only one party.
When we say security, we mean real security--not some temporary arrangement to protect human rights that can be withdrawn when it pleases the Sandinistas.
The accord states:
To be successful the Central American peace process cannot be based on promises alone. It must be based on credible standards of compliance, strict timetables for enforcement, and effective, ongoing means to verify both the democratic and security requirements of those agreements. We support the use of incentives and disincentives to achieve these U.S. policy objectives.
The accord says the funds provided must `also be available to support voluntary reintegration or voluntary regional relocation by the Nicaraguan Resistance.'
The key word is `voluntary'. That means without coercion, without even the semblence of pressure from any quarter.
As part of this process Secretary Baker sent a letter to the chairman of House and Senate Authorization and Appropriations Committees, and the Senate and House leadership.
The letter says that the assistance will not be obligated beyond November 30, 1989, except in consultation with the appropriate House and Senate leaders and committee chairmen. In order for aid to continue past that date, there must be a letter of affirmation from all of those same leaders.
The letter goes on to state:
This bipartisan accord on Central America represents a unique agreement between the Executive and the Legislative Branches. Thus, it is the intention of the parties that this agreement in no way establishes any precedent for the Executive or the Legislative Branch regarding the authorization and appropriation process.
That is about as clear as you can get. In no way does this letter set any kind of precedent concerning the future ability, the limits or the right of the President to conduct foreign policy in line with his constitutional rights, prerogatives and obligations.
Mr. Chairman, Secretary of State Jim Baker deserves great credit for putting together this legislation.
He spent 40 hours on the Hill, talking face to face with the bipartisan leadership. He was candid in letting us know exactly what is at stake, what he believes is needed and how far the administration was willing to go to get an agreement they could in all good conscience live with.
To those on my side of the aisle who have reservations about this legislation, I say: `President Bush didn't create the conditions in which this legislation was forged.'
I wish he had been given a better hand to play. I wish we could do more for the Nicaraguan resistance. But you know as well as I do that the question here is not one of military aid versus humanitarian aid. It is a question of supporting the democratic resistance now or for all practical purposes abandoning them now.
Let me now speak to the four entities affected by this legislation:
To the leaders of the democracies of Central America I say: This legislation will not conflict with the Esquipulas accord. The peace, freedom and very survival of your nations depend upon your willingness to hold the Sandinistas to their sworn agreements.
The time for pious platitudes from the region is past. The time for insistence on `credible standards of compliance, strict timetables for enforcement, and effective, ongoing means to verify' Sandinista compliance has arrived.
To the Nicaraguan resistance I say: I wish from the bottom of my heart that we could help you more than we can in this bill. But this is the best we can do at the present--and I believe it will help you to continue to work for real democracy in your country.
To the Sandinistas I say: Don't think for one moment that you can get by with gestures, media events, and rhetoric. This legislation demands results, not gestures. No more destabilization and subversion of neighbors. No more `Potemkin Village' reforms.
The accord states:
[Page: H1141]
The United States need not spell out in advance the nature of type of action that would be undertaken in response to threats to U.S. national security interests. Rather it should be sufficient to simply make clear that such threats will be met by any appropriate constitutional means.
Let the Sandinistas heed those words. They are not mere rhetoric. They are a bipartisan pledge by the United States to act in ways it deems appropriate against any kind of threat to national security that might arise from the situation in Central America--any kind.
To my colleagues I say: I hope there will be big majorities on both sides of the aisle in support of this legislation. What it lacks in perfection, it makes up in real, effective help for the cause of democracy, justice, and progress in Nicaragua and in Central America.
As I said, I wish we could do better. But as legislators, it is not given to us to act only when conditions are perfect. We must do all that is possible within the framework of the limitations imposed upon us by the makeup of our two Houses of Congress.
What we have done, if its principles are put into practice, can, I believe, help the cause of democracy in Nicaragua and Central America.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield] for yielding me this time at the outset of the debate. I appreciate it.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell] is recognized for 37 1/2 minutes.
[TIME: 1140]
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1750. At the outset I would like to commend the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior] as well as the majority leader, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley], the Speaker, and other members of the leadership both of the majority and the minority, who have devoted untold time and effort to addressing the difficult issue of United States policy toward Nicaragua.
I would also like to thank my ranking Republican, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield]. In committee we moved expeditiously, but thoroughly, with considerable discussion and debate on the issue. We had a strong bipartisan vote in the Committee on Foreign Affairs in support of this bill, 6 negative votes and 32 affirmative. It is obvious that there is a broadbase of support at long last in the Congress with regard to a consensus policy on Nicaragua.
Now, I am not speaking here to try to convince anybody. I have better sense than that. I just want to relate basically what has happened and why I think it is important for us to support this bill.
The issue, and the resolution of the issue, has evaded us the last decade. There obviously are strong differences of opinion, honestly and sincerely held, that give rise to tremendous emotions with regard to the solution of the problem or what the solution should be.
All of that is good in a democratic society, but we have seen the adverse effect that a division has, even though it is honestly and sincerely and strongly held, on the implementation of a policy. It does no good, in my judgment, and this is one man's opinion, to go back and point fingers about what we should have done or did not do.
I think that there are lessons to be learned. One of the major lessons as far as I am concerned as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, one which I have reiterated over and over again not only on this issue but on other major foreign policy issues in which the United States has played an important part, and that is that no President, no Government, can or should commit the sovereignty and the power of the United States on a narrow, split, weak division among the American people and the American Congress.
You just cannot do that. It is no victory for a policy decision to be based on a margin of a few votes, and to raise the issue constantly time and time again with the same result.
I would hope that we--the American people, the Congress and all Administrations--would never forget that lesson. No Foreign policy can be maintained or implemented successfully unless the American people throughly understand and support it. This must be a matter of very careful
consideration for us in the Congress as well as for any President.
This is the major lesson as far as I am concerned. And I say again I am not trying to convince anybody. I think the time has long since passed to argue the merits or the demerits of past policy, or to point the finger, although I am sure that is a lot of fun for a lot of people and it will continue in this body of ours since this is a democratic institution and everybody has their own ideas of what they think should be done, what ought to be done, and what ought to be said. But at last we have what seems to be more than a narrowly based majority on trying to deal with the issue.
It also appears to me that, while some people will say the administration has won a great victory, I do not think that is the issue either, whether the administration has won a great victory or lost, although that is certainly a fair measuring stick for anybody who wants to measure something here.
The point is that we have had a change in policy which has been agreed upon, albeit reluctantly by some on both sides. Whether you are on the right or on the left or in the middle, we have to admit there has been a change which holds out a hope.
Now that is an important factor. The other factor that we ought to recognize is that at long last the leaders of the area, themselves, have undertaken the responsibility for dealing with the problem. What they have been looking for, for a long time has been the support of the United States in their efforts, and they now have that. That is the reason they support the concepts of this legislation which gives them the further opportunity to move forward. There is no assurance it is going to solve all the problems. What it indicates, however, is the political support of the U.S. Government to the efforts of the Presidents of Central America who have stepped out on their own to see if they could deal with the difficult problems of the turbulence--political, military, economic--that exist in Central America.
That is why I believe it is very important to support this legislation, to give substance to the efforts of the negotiators.
I certainly want to pay my respects to the Secretary of State and others who worked very, very hard with the leadership both in the other body and in this body, in order to forge a broad base consensus which is supportable, both on the Republican side of the aisle and on the Democratic side of the aisle.
The support it does not have to be unanimous, Mr. Chairman; I realize that. There is no way that it could be, unfortunately.
But it is certainly a policy which is better based, has a better foundation, because of the fact that it was not narrowly arrived at. That is the important thing.
Yes, we can debate it, and there will be strong debate here, and, yes, there will be strong differences of opinion. But what we need is a strong vote on my side of the aisle and on the other side of the aisle so that we can demonstrate that the administration and the Congress have a broad consensus to try to bring stability and peace to this tragic area. We can then go on to other steps that are absolutely essential to give people political opportunity where they do not have the opportunity to participate politically. Regardless of our position on this issue, we are all strong believers--are we not--in the process of self-determination. I would hope that most people could support the concept that people have the right to determine the political rationale of their own Government and that participatory democracy is far better than a dictatorship, regardless of the color of the dictatorship, whether it is red, blue, pink, left, or right. Having talked to every single member of the Sandinista Directorate over a long period of time.
I would opt for something different myself, I do not have any illusions. However, I would say that if the other leaders in Central America can bring about a change in that torn country, a policy which the United States now can support, I think it is a major step forward and well worthy of support.
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As I say, I not only talked to the director, I talked to the original junta and a lot of leaders in that government, and I do not have any doubt about what they would do if they were left to their own devices. They would simply consolidate their power. However, because the other Central American leaders have gotten together and made it possible to pull in the leadership of the Sandinista government, there appears to me, at least, to be a better opportunity now to deal with those problems.
I remind Members, this Congress has not been blind to the underlying problems that exist in Central America. We have supported economic change. We have supported political change. When the Kissinger report came in with a recommendation of $8 million in additional economic, educational, and health assistance to the countries of Central America, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, with a broad spectrum of political opinion, quickly authorized that money, $8 billion over a period of 5 years.
We approved that and the Committee on Appropriations under the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Obey, provided the money. So while there is a lot to be criticized, I just wanted to be sure that we get in the Record the fact that we have in the past and even now are not blind to the underlying root causes of the difficulties in the region.
I can sum it up by saying that when there is 70 or 80 percent of the people of any country who are illiterate, who are ill-fed, who are ill-housed, who are ill-clothed, and who have no future in terms of participating in their country, you have got an underlying problem, and it does not make any difference what the political ideology is at the top.
We in the United States have taken the position, and I think rightfully so and we ought not to be ashamed, although we can argue about it, that we will support the efforts of people for self-determination. We will try to provide assistance where it is appropriate. Not only that, we will try to foster, encourage, and inculcate, if necessary, those concepts that we hold dear that deal with human dignity.
The last paradox, if you will, Mr. Chairman: we have on occasion been known to fight for what we believe in, and therefore, while it is easy to take potshots at other people, I find it sometimes a little awkward, myself, to do that. I think people have a right to fight for their ideals, and so I am not ready to castigate folks who want to do that. I think Members have to be very careful, very selective, Mr. Chairman. I think this bill represents an important change in policy. It has broad based support. It is an agreement between the Congress and the President to allow the people in Central America to move forward along their own concepts, not ours.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. BROOMFIELD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, for 10 years now, the Sandinistas have had an unwitting accomplice in their efforts to eliminate political opposition and secure their own dictatorship. That accomplice has been a divided American Government.
With full acceptance of this bipartisan accord, the American Government is saying with one voice that it will no longer tolerate Stalinist rule in Central America.
I am sure there are very few Members on this floor who don't have at least a few reservations about the accord. That is in the nature of compromise.
The important thing is that we now have a policy that has the support of those on both sides of the issue. Hopefully, the policy will enjoy the broad support of the American people.
Yet it would be a mistake to agree on a policy simply because it promotes domestic political harmony. If the accord is to truly deserve all of the praise that accompanied its announcement last month, it must achieve real changes in Nicaragua.
It must put Daniel Ortega on notice that the United States Government is serious about political reform in Nicaragua and that we fully intend to ensure that such reform is implemented.
Secretary Baker wisely included incentives and performance standards in the plan to encourage the Sandinistas to make the necessary reforms and to judge their success or failure. This plan is policymaking at its best.
I hope that Congress will have the good sense and strength of purpose to see it through to a successful resolution of the whole Central America issue.
President Bush and Secretary Baker have achieved an important breakthrough. I sincerely hope that the majority party allows this policy accord an opportunity to work. No President can sustain a foreign policy initiative, no matter how sound, in the face of unrelenting criticism.
I am, in fact, more hopeful than in several years, that with this accord we have started down the path of true bipartisanship which will lead us to our ultimate objective of bringing peace, democracy, and security to Central America.
I must say that I remain deeply concerned that the Sandinistas will live up to their side of the deal.
Since 1979, the Sandinistas have repeatedly made commitments to implement democratic and political reforms. They have made these commitments to the OAS, the Contadora nations, the other Central American countries, the Nicaraguan resistance, and implicitly, to the United States.
In actual deeds, however, the Sandinistas, while partially complying with the provisions of Esquipulas II, have left a trail strewn with broken promises, unfulfilled commitments, and, at times, outright deceit.
In that vein, I would urge every Member to read the additional views of the committee on this bill which include an exhaustive study analyzing the record of the Sandinistas in fulfilling their commitments in all of the agreements they have entered into over the past 10 years.
We should strongly support the bipartisan accord which implements a policy emphasizing diplomatic initiatives through which a negotiated, political settlement in Nicaragua and in the region can be achieved. However, we should never lose sight that progress toward our goals and objectives in the region depends primarily on future Sandinista behavior.
The Sandinistas should fully understand that we will proceed with the carrot offered, but they should always know that, if necessary, the stick can and will be used.
Several of my colleagues have registered concern over the nature of the agreement we are discussing today. I share their concern. Yet, I can never recall in my 33 years in Congress a foreign policy situation that is as difficult, as divisive as the legislative standoff on the issue of continuing funding for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. This legislative impasse has created a necessity for an unusual, unique form of compromise. I believe Secretary Baker has made the best of the truly impossible situation.
There is no question that I am concerned about the proposed side letters that were read into the record at Tuesday's markup at the Foreign Affairs Committee. I am not sure about the status they have in the mind of members; certainly they have little or no legal standing. Yesterday in the Rules Committee hearing similar concerns were expressed. Yet I do understand that they were necessary to bring about the accord.
I would like to draw the attention of my fellow Members to the proposed draft letter from Secretary of State Baker to the chairmen of the House and Senate Authorization and Appropriation Committees and Senate and House leadership. It states in part:
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This bipartisan accord on Central America represents a unique agreement between the Executive and the Legislative Branches. Thus, it is the intention of the parties that this agreement in no way establishes any precedent for the Executive or the Legislative Branch regarding the authorization and appropriation process.
I believe any reasonable person reading the last paragraph of this letter would understand the meaning of the Secretary of State's statement.
We are in a difficult situation that calls for some creative diplomacy between the executive and legislative branches. I believe the Baker plan is not just the best, but it is the only solution possible at this time.
[TIME: 1200]
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 11 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I have opposed our Contra program ever since it began, and when the Speaker some weeks ago showed me the original compromise which had been worked out between the Senate and the administration, I opposed it. But I am supporting this compromise today, and I would like to explain why.
I am supporting it for a couple of very simple reasons. No. 1, I think this compromise essentially ends the Contra war. Second, it expressly provides that this Government is going to, for the first time in this whole sorry business, have a unified policy here at home.
I think this compromise today is much less directed to what is happening in Nicaragua and much more directed to the question of how this country ought to proceed with respect to any foreign policy.
Mr. Chairman, my views on the Sandinistas, I think, are well known. I have minimum high regard, to put it politely, for the intentions, the techniques of governance, or any other techniques associated with the Sandinistas. But I think that the Sandinistas are a very visable manifestation of the failure of American policy in this hemisphere for the last 60 or 70 years. Because in my judgment, had the United States been sufficiently identified with the needs of the working classes in Central and Latin America, had we been sufficiently attentive to the rights of those classes, the Sandinistas would not have come to power in the first place. The Sandinistas came to power because we backed for too long a discredited Somoza regime, and moderate forces left the country because they gave up hope of being able to work out a decent relationship with Somoza or to forestall the coming to power of the Marxists.
So I do not like the fact that the Sandinistas are in Nicaragua. I do not like the Sandinista government, but neither do I think that it makes sense for the United States to go to war with every government we do not like, even if it is a proxy war. It seems to me, however, that the best way for America to defend our legitimate interests in this hemisphere and the best way for us to limit the opportunities that Marxism or any other foreign ideology has in the region is to support the aspirations, the legitimate aspirations of the vast majority of people in that part of the globe. I think our Contra policy got in the way of that, if for no other reason than the fact that many of the leaders involved in the Contra operation were so hopelessly tarred with their past association with the Somoza regime and the national guard that enforced its existence, that in fact that the Contras were never a credible alternative.
I think the virtue of this package is that it recognizes two realities: No. 1, we have anywhere beween 55,000 and 65,000 Contras and their dependents who are being fed and clothed by U.S. resources at this point. And whether we like the policy or not which led to our moral obligation to these people, we do have a moral obligation to see to it that those people do continue to have adequate food and adequate clothing while the process by which they may be reintegrated into the Nicaraguan society is still being worked out.
The second reality that I think this package recognizes is that the Contras have no remaining military utility. I think this proposal today recognizes that reality. The virtue of this package is that it, for the first time in my view, puts the United States Government and the United States administration specifically on record in support of, rather than in opposition to--as was the case in the past--the efforts at negotiation being engaged in by the Central American Presidents. And that means that it is going to be a force for both peace in the region and for democratization throughout the region, hopefully including Nicaragua. It recognizes in my judgment that the best way for us to do that is through economic and diplomatic rather than military pressure.
People will say, `Well, why should you trust this administration when you didn't trust the last one?' I have hearing records of my subcommittee at this table, and if anyone cares to look at them, they will see that it is obvious that my committee was lied to by representatives of the previous administration when it came to Contra policy. Newspaper reports in the last 2 weeks make that quite clear. But the fact is that I do believe that Secretary Baker and the others with whom we have talked are on the level in their intention to be supportive of that Central American peace process.
Now, we could be wrong. If we are, we have a safety valve, because we have that much maligned side agreement which Secretary Baker and a number of us negotiated, under which we will simply have the opportunity to review the manner in which the administration is expending this money. And if we conclude that the administration is performing in a manner inconsistent with the assurances given the Congress, then we have an ability to cut off that money at the end of November. I do not expect that that is going to happen because I think we have achieved a clear understanding of how the administration is going to proceed.
But to those who suggest that that agreement represents an effort on the part of the Congress to unfairly invade the administrative prerogative of the executive branch, I would simply say that that is not correct. I think, given the bleak record of the previous administration in terms of providing the truth to this Congress, we have a fiduciary responsibility to the taxpayer to maintain a short leash until it can be demonstrated with certainty that the administration is in fact abiding by the understandings
which have led to the appropriation of this money in the first place. So I made absolutely no apology for that side agreement because it is what has enabled us to move forward. And I would follow up on what the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee said. We all have widely different views about how we ought to proceed in Central America, and as I said, I do not believe one whit in providing aid to the Contras, but the one thing that I kept hearing from every major source in Central America as I traveled down there was this: They would say, `Look, what matters to us is not so much what your policy is; what matters to us is that you have a policy that we can understand and follow, and that America has a policy which is supported by a majority of both parties so that it can be sustained through a series of administrations and so that it does not constantly lurch from one extreme to another.'
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`We would like to be able to find you where we left you'; that is what they said to me. And I think the virtue of this policy, in addition to effectively ending the war, is that that is what this agreement is going to do today. And I think it is terribly important in this and all other future foreign policy endeavors, that we truly do have a bipartisan majority and support of whatever initiatives are taken in all regions of the world. That is the only way that we can institutionally, over a long period of time, sustain needed administration foreign policies whether they be popular or not.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Lagomarsino], the vice chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman will state her point of order.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, could it be explained to me when our people will get called for the time to oppose? We have 45 minutes. In what rotation will we be called?
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair's understanding is to alternate. Both sides are tracking the time. If and when the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] wants to be recognized in a proper order, please stand.
Mrs. BOXER. Could I say to the Chairman that that is not the way it was explained to me by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley], that it was going to be alternated, and I would like to be recognized at this time because we have 45 minutes, and we have not even had our first.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would say to the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer], that the last speaker was on the Democratic side.
It is true that the parameters changed a little bit since the beginning of the debate, but, the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield] now, and the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] will duly be recognized next.
(Mr. LAGOMARSINO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1750, legislation implementing the bipartisan accord on Central America and while it does what I would prefer if it were not for the agreement remained in strong opposition to the Dornan motion to recommit.
The fact that House and Senate Democrats and Republicans have been able to agree on a common stategy to work toward solving the crisis in Central America is a significant step toward peace in the region. It reflects the strong commitment of the Bush administration to work cooperatively with the Congress in developing effective foreign policies which protect and promote U.S. national security interests. It also reflects a commitment by the Congress to meet responsibly the challenges and threats to United States interests in Central America represented by forces opposed to democracy--and it helps and encourages our allies in the area.
The bipartisan agreement reflects the imperative for the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua to make irrevocable progress toward instituting democratic reforms as called for in the peace agreement signed by the Central American Presidents in El Salvador on February 14, 1989. The great benefit of this bipartisan accord is the fact that it represents an agreement among the congressional leaders, both Democratic and Republican, on the requirement for the Sandinistas to move toward democracy. If the Sandinistas do not make the necessary reforms to make their government a democracy, they should no longer have leaders in this Congress ignoring their own promises. The Sandinistas won't be able to count on American legislators to make excuses for them in their failure to live up to their commitments to make Nicaragua a democracy.
When I spoke with Costa Rican President Oscar Arias when he was in town last week, I asked him about his view on the need for the Sandinistas to make democratic reforms. He told me he was concerned not only about the process but also about the results in Nicaragua. He truly wants to see democracy in Nicaragua. I also asked President Arias his views on continuing humanitarian aid for the Contras, and he told me directly that he supported continued humanitarian aid, as provided for in this bipartisan accord and that it is in compliance with the Tesoro agreement.
I am sure each of us would offer some differing provisions in this agreement which we feel would enhance U.S. interests. But, I do not believe we could arrive at an agreement in a different form which would represent the kind of bipartisan consensus we have achieved with this accord.
I strongly urge my colleagues to resist the impulse to support the motion to recommit with instructions. I know most of us on this side would like to see those changes, but to approve them would be to kill the bipartisan agreement and we would be worse off than before. The administration opposes the motion to recommit, and I urge my colleagues to reject it. To approve it would give at least the impression of bad faith and would undermine the authority of the President.
I believe President Bush and Secretary of State Baker deserve high praise for their commitment in seeking a policy that the majority in the Congress can support and which finally offers the promise of achieving peace in Central America.
I urge my colleagues to give their strong support to this legislation and to the bipartisan accord on Central America.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan].
Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Chairman, this morning, a Federal court is hearing a crucial case on national security. There is a case in the Federal courthouse not too far from here that deals with years of deception and lying to Congress about policies in Central America.
Recent newspapers have suggested that the head of the new administration was involved in one way or another with respect to some of the deception that may have gone on with the U.S. Congress. That is the backdrop in which we debate Central American policy.
The new Secretary of State and the new administration come to us and say, `We have a new policy. Trust us.'
Some of us say, `Show us.'
They say, `We have got a new policy,' and some of us say, `Well, it's not really very new at all.'
If my colleagues were to refinish furniture, they will start stripping layers, and they will strip some varnish and paint, and all my colleagues understand that. I say to my colleagues, `What do you have when you get done? You have the same core, the same wood.'
Mr. Chairman, I think the policy here is pretty much the same policy, once the rhetoric and embellishments are stripped away. What did the administration want when it started? Money to fund the Contra soldiers. What does it get under this agreement? Money to fund the Contra soldiers, who have committed untold numbers of crimes against the civilian population.
Now it is a given that we do not like the Sandinistas. Look, all of us in this Chamber think the Sandinistas behave badly.
The question is not whether we like the Sandinistas or the Contras. The question is: What kind of interest does this country have in the region, and how do we develop policies that further our interests?
Mr. Chairman, we have a legitimate disagreement on that. How do we craft something that furthers this country's interest in the region and especially helps the people of that region? How do we do that?
I think in that region, those of us who have been there, and that is most of us, have found people who are desperately poor, hungry, and sick. We ought to send food and medicine to that region. I am a big supporter of sending the right things that help people in that region reclaim hope and rebuild their economies.
Mr. Chairman, last year I thought we were kind of turning the corner. We enacted a children's survival fund with funding equal to Contra aid. Two hundred young people now have arms and legs because we helped them. These are people who lost their arms and legs in the fighting between the Contras and Sandinistas. We were starting to do the right thing.
But once again almost all of our help today is not for people, but for armies, and that is the wrong direction.
Let me mention also some other policies that I am concerned about. The Contras are the evidence of failed policies. They are not the real refugees in the region. This administration has not changed its policy with respect to refugees from Salvador. If someone is a refugee from Nicaragua, it is, `Come on in. You get asylum; just apply for it.' For Salvador, it is, `Sorry, no dice.'
Mr. Chairman, I told this story before, but I am going to tell it again. There was a young woman picked up in this country by the Immigration Service, thrown in jail in Prince Georges County. She had two young children, young boys under 5, and she was nursing a third, a 6-week-old baby, breast-feeding a 6-week-old baby with a viral infection, and they threw her in Prince Georges County jail.
I helped get her out, and sad to say that she is not getting asylum here. She is a Salvadoran, raped in front of her family as a young woman, afraid to go back. Canada fortunately has taken that family because this administration's policies prevent that.
Mr. Chairman, those are the policies we ought to be talking about on this floor. We ought to be changing those policies and helping the people through a strategy that sends money to procure shelter, medicine, and food to help the people of Central America recover from years of war.
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Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Miller].
(Mr. MILLER of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, 20 years ago in the midst of the Vietnam folly, Senator George Aiken recommended that we declare victory and go home.
Today, in the midst of the Central American policy, a policy which the administration admits has not worked, we are asked to declare failure, and spend another $67 million.
My friends, George Aiken was right, and this bill is wrong. This bill is not designed to save the Contras. Clearly, the Bush administration obviously has decided to jettison them. This bill is designed to supposedly save the credibility of this administration. It represents an acknowledgement that the policy of subverting the Sandinistas through the Contra war is an utter failure.
At least in the past they have come to the Congress and sought Contra aid on the fallacious assumption that the policy was working. It never was and it never will. Now they come to us, admitting failure, admitting that the Contras cannot win, that the Contras are not a threat to the Sandinistas, that the underlying policy is a failure, admitting that the killing and the economic destruction in Nicaragua was futile. But what did they want? They want another $67 million to take care of the care and the feeding of the Contras in Honduras.
How often have we heard on the floor of this House and in the Budget Committee of this House and in the Appropriations Committee of this House that we have got to make tough choices because of the unprecedented problems of our national deficit? Every year we tell Americans, older Americans, working Americans, students, the homeless, infants, and the disabled, that we have to cut back essential policies to take care of them, that we cannot even afford to invest in successful programs that help the elderly and the young of this Nation because we are short on money.
So while we are trying to figure out how to help these individuals in this country, along comes Secretary of State Jim Baker and asks for a $67 million gift for a policy which he has admitted time and again is a failure.
If we are choosing priorities, I think we could do much better. I think we could do much more good for the American people than to spend this $67 million for the Contras. Instead, we are told that the best interests of our Nation lie in bankrolling the failure of the Contras.
I, for one, will remember this debate very well when we bring to the floor important legislation later this year on child care, on education, on nutrition, and when we debate these programs, which are not failures, but which are successes, which save lives, which educate our children, which improve the health of the elderly, I will remember that when those programs are not able to meet the needs of our constituents, the needs of our citizens, I will remember that the Congress voted to send $67 million down to a group of people who are there because of illegal acts of this Government, who are there in violation of the charters and the treaties to which we are signatories.
I will remember when we tell the elderly that we cannot afford their health care and when we tell working parents that we cannot afford to help them out with child care that we could afford the care of the Contras, and so should you. So should all Americans, because this is no longer about some viable policy to free Nicaragua from communisim. This is about how does George Bush get off stage, because he recognizes that the Contras have failed. Do we really have to pay $67 million for the President to say what his Secretary of State has already said, the policy is a failure and should not be continued.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] stand in the place of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield] for the purpose of yielding time?
Mr. HYDE. In his absence, Mr. Chairman, I am going to try to fill his shoes, and I yield myself 5 1/2 minutes.
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am certainly going to support this legislation. I think it has several desirable aspects, but the bottom line is it is like chemotherapy. It makes you sick to take it, but it just might save your life.
What we are doing is we are fighting for time. The gentleman from California may well have this analyzed properly. It does keep the Contras surviving.
Jesse Jackson, a great Democratic leader from whom we shall hear more in the next election I am sure, coined a phrase, `Keep hope alive.'
Well, it is a wonderful phrase. I think the $47 million, I did not know it was $67 million, but I will accede to the gentleman's higher number, will keep the Contras surviving, keep them not in bullets, God knows we have cut them off in February of 1988 from any military assistance in the naive credulous hope that if we cut them off, that would demilitarize the contest and there would be no more shooting, no more killing, and perhaps we could negotiate our way toward freedom. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union, which is an important player in this entire equation, poured in 500 million dollars' worth of military aid, plus $400 million in economic aid during the year. We put an antiseptic immunization on giving any military assistance to the Contras; so the playing field got more unlevel and more tilted but we are here today not asking for money to arm the Contras, although the armed Contras are the reasons the Sandinistas came to the bargaining table in the first place; but like an alcoholic fighting for the next half hour of sobriety, we are fighting for the next 7 months, the next 9 months, to keep the Contras alive, body and soul together, people who trusted us as the leader of the free world, to support them in their struggle for freedom; so we will keep them together, hopefully, and not forcibly repatriate them as we did to Soviet refugees after World War II in Operation Keelhaul, one of the darkest chapters in this country's history; but the Contras can go back home with assistance, if indeed democracy, utopia, Valhalla, Camelot ever develops inside Nicaragua.
Now, I frankly am skeptical that Leninists, and that is what the Sandinistas are, they are not Socialists in a hurry, which some of you may think they are, they are Sandinista Communists on the Cuban model, I am very skeptical that free and fair elections can never be had in a country where the army belongs to a political party, where the media belongs to the same political party.
How would you like to go into your town and vote with the Republican army on each street corner, the police being Republicans, access to the media having to go through the Republicans? Control of the newsprint by the government?
How do you have elections without a free press, without access to the media?
Well, we hope that is going to happen. We hope we will have a fair supreme court. We hope we will have a supreme electoral commission that is fair.
You know, this country and the Democratic Party takes justifiable pride in the Voting Rights Act of 1975. It is a marvelous act and it shows a sensitivity to people's right to vote.
Let me tell you, I hope we have one-tenth as much concern about the people's right to vote in Nicaragua as we continue to isolate the Contras and move them toward refugee status.
President Ortega said 2 months ago that the changes brought by the revolution are irreversible; so the notion, as I say, of free elections in the next few months is a triumph of credulity over experience.
The trail of broken promises by the Sandinistas is from here to San Francisco. The OAS agreement in 1979, the Contradora agreements of 1983, the Esquipulas I and II, the Sapoa agreement of 1988, and soon the Tesoro Beach agreements of 1989 join a litany of shame.
But keep hope alive. I believe in redemption. Who would have thought the ethnic uprisings in the Soviet Union would occur but yet they are occurring? A year ago one would never expect to see the Estonians marching with their national flag, but they are marching.
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[TIME: 1230]
Change can happen. I believe in redemption. I believe as we keep the Contras alive, as we keep them together, they will serve as an option. They will serve as therapy for the Sandinistas as they continue in their magnificent con game of promising the world free and fair elections, and so I support this bill on the theory `If you cannot get dinner, take a sandwich, and yes, keep hope alive.'
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, a critical turning point has been reached in the conduct of American foreign policy in Latin America. Today we bury the past, 8 years of bitter partisan effort that ultimately left us divided, Democrats from Republicans, legislative branch from executive, and Americans from Latin Americans.
Mr. Chairman, here today we are considering a bill to implement the bipartisan accord on Central America agreed to by the President and congressional leaders on March 24. It is a new beginning, a bipartisan approach toward dealing with the problems of Central America.
Make no mistake about it, a bipartisan approach is an indispensable requirement for the conduct of successful foreign policy. America must speak with one voice on foreign affairs.
While the Bush administration was off to a slow start in addressing the problems of Central America, the agreement of March 24 is a good one. However, it is only a first step in an effort to put together a comprehensive policy toward not just Central America but toward all of Latin America itself. The first part of the policy includes a good-faith effort on the part of the Bush administration to make the Arias peace plan work, the Esquipulas accords, the Sapoa agreements, and the latest agreements by the Central American Presidents on February 14 in El Salvador. That is why there will be no request for military aid this year.
Mr. Chairman, a good-faith effort is not enough. A well-formulated plan is also indispensable, one that has the support of the various players in the administration, the support of Congress and, equally important, the support of our friends in Latin America.
The key elements of a well-formulated plan include humanitarian assistance to the Contras, encouragement of democratic elements inside and outside Nicaragua to get ready for the elections next February, and a genuine United States support of the efforts of Latin American countries to resolve the problems of their regions.
A fourth and critical element of such a well-formulated plan must call for getting the Soviets to cut military aid to Nicaragua. This is important. We must make the point that U.S. assistance with perestroika, in terms of credits and trade, is tied to Soviet support of the peace process in this hemisphere.
Let it be known that the spotlight of this hemisphere will be on the Soviets and their actions. Now that we have the absence of military conflict in Nicaragua, the effort will be to promote a genuine democratic opening, using the diplomatic and political tools provided by the various agreements.
Mr. Chairman, last year the Congress voted for peace in Central America. Today we are voting for democracy. Woodrow Wilson once talked of making the world safe for democracy. That was a grand vision that proved to be illusory, but making the Western Hemisphere safe for democracy is a goal within our reach. If we are to promote both peace and prosperity and, most of all, democracy in this region, we must do these things. We must pass this bill.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].
(Mr. BURTON of Indiana asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] said earlier today this will end the Contra war. It probably will. It is intended to end the Contras, that is for sure, and relocate or repatriate them, and it probably will.
Members of the liberal side of the aisle, on the left, are to be congratulated. They put us in a real trick bag. If we do not vote for this package, the freedom fighters die now. If we do vote for it, they die in 7 months. Why do I say 7 months? Because the letter of agreement that was signed by the President and the people who concocted this idea mandate that all nine of the leaders and the committee chairman involved have to send a letter in 7 months OK'ing the additional aid for the last 3 months between November and the end of February when the elections take place, and many of those leaders have never ever voted for Contra aid.
Mr. Chairman, what is to lead us to believe they are going to vote for Contra aid by sending this letter in November? I do not believe they will. The Contras will die as a force in all probability, as I said, in the next 7 months, and they will for sure if the aid is cut off after that.
What can the other Central American leaders do besides talk about this? Their combined armies, the combined armies of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica, are smaller than the Communist Sandinista army. All they can do is talk. This does not even take into consideration that those armies, if they were as big as the Sandinistas', cannot meet them in firepower, because the Soviets have sent literally billions of dollars of weaponry in there over the last several years, $1.5 billion in the last 18 months, which amounts to thousands of tons of war materials.
The Sandinistas have said time and again that they will never give up power that they have gained out of the barrel of a gun even though there is an election process. They are not going to give it up to the election process. They told us that. The elections will be a farce.
The Sandinistas constitution says that even if there are elections, they will still retain control over the military. If they have control over that military, any election is a farce, because they will still retain power. They will not give up.
Major Miranda, who was one of the top leaders down there as assistant to one of the comandantes, defected to the United States. He told us that they were building a 600,000-man army; that was their goal. I talked to Bayardo Arce, one of the nine comandantes, at the Managua airport, and he told me that was absolutely correct. This little country of 3 million people is going to build a 600,000-man army. Does that sound like they want peace? Does that sound like they want democracy?
They continue to export revolution to El Salvador and the surrounding countries. The Soviets continue to pour in military assistance.
We cannot give the freedom fighters military assistance like we gave the Afghan freedom fighters, who drove the Soviets out of Afghanistan with their tails between their legs, but the Soviets can continue to give military assistance to the Communists.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell] said that it makes no difference who is in charge if there is poverty, people cannot have homes or jobs or education, but it does make a difference, because when they are under the shackles or held by the shackles of communism, there is no hope. It is so repressive that the people cannot throw off the chains of communism. People in other countries have overthrown totalitarian governments, but we do not see Communist regimes overthrown, because the Soviets and her surrogates make sure it does not happen.
We cannot expect the freedom fighters to have been successful, because we cut off their aid time and again. We did not cut off the aid to the mujahedin in Afghanistan. We did cut off the aid to the freedom fighters down there, and it was that side of the aisle that did it time and again.
They cannot whip a Soviet helicopter with a stick. They cannot beat a gun with a rock.
Mr. Chairman, I want to end up by just asking a few questions. First of all, is it wise or is it constitutional to allow nine Members of these two bodies to have the ability to cut off aid that is granted today? That is exactly what is going to happen in November. The last 3 months before the elections, the aid will be cut off, because they will not all sign that letter, and every one of them has to.
Mr. Chairman, what is to keep the Sandinistas on track, if they were going to anyhow, if there is no Contra force the last 3 months before the election?
Our Secretary of State has indicated we would use the carrot-and-stick approach to get compliance from the Sandinistas.
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I see a carrot to the Sandinistas. The aid is going to be cut off in November, and there will be no viable opposition, in my view, after that to the Communists down there. But what is the stick? I see no stick, and it concerns me.
For those who agree to the voluntary repatriation, I would like to put that in quotes, voluntary repatriation provision, need to tell us what that means. Does that mean that they will be encouraged to return to Nicaragua even if the Sandinistas once again do not keep their commitment, like they did not in 1979 and they did not in Esquipulas and in Sapoa? Or will they be brought to the United States of America? It is clear the other Central American leaders do not want to be left holding the bag without United States military support for the Contras. So does voluntary repatriation really mean forced relocation back into Nicaragua, into the Soviet-style gulags, or does it mean we are going to bring them to the good old United States, another 25,000 people who want to stay in their own country and fight for freedom?
Many say give peace a chance. What about giving freedom a chance? What about giving freedom a chance?
I hope everybody in this body will remember one statement: Peace without freedom is not peace, it is slavery. Peace without freedom is not peace, it is slavery.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Weiss].
(Mr. WEISS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, what is wrong with this legislation and the so-called bipartisan compact is underscored by the fact that the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] and I have both concluded that it ought not be approved, and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] have both concluded that it ought to be approved. Why? How can people who have been on diametrically opposite sides during the long tragic history of this issue suddenly find themselves on the same side? Because this compact was drafted deliberately to give different impressions to different people; to be able to be interpreted differently and by different people.
It is the view of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] that this legislation means the demise of the Contras. It is my view and interpretation that this legislation means the continuation and the survival of the Contras. Mr. Obey believes that the agreement terminates the Contras as a military force, Mr. Hyde believes it keeps them alive. The Bush administration likes this confusion. It wants each of us to believe exactly as we do, because that puts them in a position where 6 months from now, 8 months from now or 9 months from now, they can do as they please--terminate or reinvigorate the Contras.
We have had a policy, up to this point at least, where the policy of the Reagan administration and the policy of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] was to support the Contras in their efforts to undermine and overthrow the Nicaraguan Government. Most of the Democrats opposed that policy, believing that it was not the appropriate role of the United States to create and fund a military force to overthrow another sovereign government. Now in the name of so-called bipartisanship we have joined together to do that which nobody really understands. It is wrong to be in this kind of position.
I do not question the motivation of the Democratic leadership. They see it as a way of bringing the war in Central America to an end. But whatever the good intentions of those who drafted the legislation, it preempts and stifles the efforts of the Central American presidents to bring peace to that war-torn region.
The Central American presidents provided in an agreement that there would be a plan to voluntarily repatriate and demobilize the Contras. We asked at the hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee why that language was not tracked in this legislation, and we were told that the administration would not go along with it. So what we have is so-called voluntary reintegration and regional reintegration.
What does that mean? Does that mean that Honduras is going to have to continue to allow the Contras to subsist on its soil indefinitely?
This is a terrible agreement, because it is so wide open it confuses everybody as to what it is about.
We had a remarkable hearing in the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs earlier today. The distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Crockett] chairman of the committee, had four people from Nicaragua participate, two representing the opposition parties and two from the Government itself. The remarkable thing was that all of them agreed that the economic embargo ought to be brought to an end because it was destroying Nicaragua. But by the terms of this agreement the embargo continues. We ought to be working with the Central American Presidents to bring peace to that strife-torn area, not keeping the situation so argue that the Contras can be revived to start the war up all over again.
I urge a no vote on this package.
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Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Durbin].
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, for 8 years many in this House have argued with conviction that the Reagan-Contra strategy was wrong. We have argued that the future of the region should not be tied to the whims of the superpowers, but rather to the aspirations of those who live in Central America.
We have condemned the violence and the barbarism of the Contras, and we have wept openly for the innocent children who have been maimed and murdered by the failed strategy of the Reagan administration. These principles which have guided many of us in opposing the Reagan Contra strategy have been endorsed by the overwhelming majority of the American people we represent.
Now, today, even George Bush knows the American people are right about Central America. President Bush knows the Reagan Contra strategy has failed. He wants out, but he has asked the Democrats for $67 million to save face, $67 million to bankroll the Contras for just 1 more year.
This agreement is a significant departure for the Republicans, but it is also a significant departure for the Democrats. Our goal today, simply stated, is bipartisanship. Bipartisanship in foreign policy is valuable, but it should never be our only goal. bipartisanship should be the natural outgrowth of consensus on principles we share, principles that rise above party.
Unfortunately, the goal of bipartisanship, the goal of face-saving, today overshadows the many principles we have stood and fought for for years. Today, putting an end to the violence of the Contras is secondary to ending the divisive political debate in Washington over Nicaragua. Finding a tenuous middle ground for U.S. political leaders is valuable. Today it is valued more highly than fully supporting the negotiations of our allies.
This aid package may provide protection for American politicians, but not for the peasants living in Nicaragua, caught in the cross-fire of a United States-sponsored civil war. Thanks to our millions of dollars, the Contra forces stand poised and ready to attack, and attack they will.
Those who argue that we are disarming the Contras by merely giving humanitarian assistance should have met Dora Lopez, a Nicaraguan peasant who came to Washington, a few days ago with her 4-year old son still maimed by a Contra attack, and told us of losing a 10-month old son, a baby in her womb, and her left leg to a Contra attack. Keeping the Contras in the field with their record of bloody violence may temporarily solve our problems at home, but it will not bring peace to Dora Lopez and the other helpless victims of Contra atrocities.
In Washington we will bury the hatchet, but in Nicaragua they will continue to bury their children.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Studds].
Mr. STUDDS. Mr. Chairman, although I respect deeply many of those involved in negotiating the accord this legislation today will implement, I will vote `No' on this bill.
I will do so, first, because we are considering a plan whose announced purpose is to support democracy under procedures which, by the standards of this House, are fundamentally undemocratic.
We have held no hearings on this proposal. We have established virtually no legislative record. We have not been allowed to offer amendments. And we have been asked to take on faith a series of supplementary commitments by the administration that are either vague or unwritten or both.
Second, this bill does not establish a new policy towards Nicaragua. It freezes in place the old one. All the rhetoric aside, the central principle embodied in this bill is still that we, here in the United States, have the right to cosponsor a counterrevolution against Nicaragua if Nicaragua's domestic polical system is not to our liking.
That is not a right we would extend, in analogous circumstances, to the Soviet Union, to Iran, to Libya, or to any other country. And it is not a right we can legally or morally assume for ourselves.
Third, according to State Department testimony, a significant portion of the money in this agreement will be used to provide cash payments to as many as 3,000 armed Contras inside Nicaraguan territory. These payments will not contribute to peace; they will not be subject to any meaningful controls; and they cannot be reconciled with the Central American peace agreement this legislation is intended to advance.
Fourth, we have no assurance that any of the money in this bill will be used to demobilize, repatriate or relocate the Contras. Those purposes are at the heart of the Central American peace plan, but they are given equal weight in this bill with the need to replace old Contra radio batteries.
Fifth, the bipartisan accord being celebrated today would never have been reached if not for the so-called gentlemen's agreement that will allow Congress to review actions taken under this bill next November. But there is nothing in this bill that would prevent every dime we appropriate from being spent before that review even begins.
Sixth, and last, the total price tag of this proposal is $66 million. I, for one, would rather use that money to help build housing or provide health care or build schools for Americans, than to prolong the life of a Contra force whose very existence we owe to one of the most wrong-headed and immoral foreign policy mistakes of my lifetime.
Finally, let me say that although I oppose this bill, I also share many of the sentiments that have been expressed by those who support it. The new administration has done more in 3 months to promote a genuine spirit of bipartisanship in foreign policy than the previous administration did in 8 years. It has expressed its desire to win the support of Central American leaders--not by bribing or coercing them--but by working with them. It has promised to use real diplomacy, not gunboat diplomacy, to promote democracy in Central America.
If those words are backed up by actions; if those promises are kept; the new era in foreign policy so many already claim to see will indeed have arrived, and no one will be more relieved, more grateful, or more astonished than I.
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Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller].
(Mr. MILLER of Washington asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this agreement because it offers a glimmer of hope, and I underline the word `glimmer,' for peace and democracy in Nicaragua. There is a sad history of broekn promises by the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime, broken promises about press freedom, labor freedom and elections, promises that have been broken despite diplomatic agreements. But this agreement offers a glimmer of hope.
For the first time we have bipartisan support for a strategy that combines diplomacy with at least the possibility, the threat of military as well as economic measures.
We have an agreement that will keep the democratic resistance in Nicaragua alive until those elections are held. We have an agreement that implies that if those elections are not held, that democratic resistance force will be there to try to make the Sandinistas live up to their promises.
I support this agreement because we cannot abandon the democratic resistance of Nicaragua until there is democracy in Nicaragua.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Donald E. `Buz' Lukens].
(Mr. DONALD E. `BUZ' LUKENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. DONALD E. `BUZ' LUKENS. Mr. Chairman, the dictatorial Marxist-Sandinista government of Nicaragua is at the bargaining table today because of one reason: force and the threatened use of force by the Contra freedom fighters. The Marxist Sandinistas are at the bargain table because they fear losing their dictatorial Communist power.
Mr. Chairman, throughout history people have been willing to fight and if necessary, die for their freedom and the freedom of their country. We are living in a time where freedom is on the march throughout the world.
Freedom from Marxist tyranny cannot be negotiated from a position of weakness. It must be negotiated from a position of strength. We supported the Mujahidin freedom fighters in Afghanistan until the Soviet Marxists were forced to negotiate a withdrawal of their oppressive forces from Afghanistan. We supported UNITA in Angola to assist the freedom fighters there against imported Marxist-Cuban troops and forced a negotiated withdrawal.
The Marxist-Sandinistas in Nicaragua came to the negotiating table as a result of our support of the Nicaraguan resistance. But now is not the time to abandon the resistance freedom fighters. Now is the time to renew our resolve to support them in the face of Marxist-Sandinista oppression and violation of past agreements.
The Marxist-Sandinistas have signed numerous agreements. These agreements appear, however, only to have been made in order to buy themselves time to consolidate both their economic and military positions. Daniel Ortega in this matter as in others has followed Lenin's strategy of `two steps forward, one step back' perfectly I don't want to see us playing the role of Lenin's useful idiots in the Marxist-Sandinista's struggle to permanently establish a dictatorial Communist state in Nicaragua.
From the moment the Marxist-Sandinistas took power in 1979 through to the present they have broken agreements: In their letter to the Organization of American States in 1979; as signatories to the Contadora peace plan; as signatories to Esquipulas II; and in the Sapoa cease-fire agreement, the Marxist-Sandinistas pledged their commitment to implement freedom for the press, freedom of religion, freedom of union organization, free elections, the end of support to external subversion, a halt to illegal arms trafficking, reduction of armament and troop levels, cessation of aid to all guerrilla groups and to allow unrestricted freedom of expression. The Marxist-Sandinistas have broken every one of these promises. Now, in the so-called peace accord of February 14, 1989, the Marxist-Sandinistas have promised pluralism, democracy, national reconciliation, freedom of the press for the opposition, release of political prisoners, an end to aiding guerrilla movements, et cetera--and we are supposed to believe that they will follow through with these promises.
The British Lord Acton once said `Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.' The Marxist-Sandinistas are in power and they are corrupt. I believe that without the threat of the Contra forces the Marxist-Sandinistas will not relinquish any of their powers and will continue to be a growing cancer in our hemisphere.
The Marxist-Sandinistas have talked much about democracy and have promised to implement democratic reforms. They have failed to follow up on their promises. Mr. Speaker, the Marxist-Sandinistas lied before they ever achieved power in Nicaragua, they have lied to their own people, they have lied to our Government, they have lied to the OAS, they have lied to other Central American nations. And now we are supposed to believe that they are acting in all sincerity.
Mr. Chairman, I along with many others pray that the Marxists will finally fulfill their promises and follow through on holding free democratic elections. But, I don't believe this will happen without our support of the Contras. I do not want to see this country taken for a ride down the street of Marxist-Sandinista broken promises once again.
I believe that the only way that the Marxist-Sandinistas will respond and follow through with their promises is by our ensuring that the only true instrument to ensure change, the Contras, remains a viable freedom fighting force. This cannot be accomplished by leaving the Contras hanging, waiting dependently week by week to see which way the winds are blowing in the U.S. Congress. This is an extremely demoralizing situation, not only for the freedom loving members of the Resistance but to freedom loving people across the globe who look toward our great Nation as the leading light of freedom in our age.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. McHugh], a member of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the Committee on Appropriations.
Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this bill. As many of my colleagues know, I have opposed providing aid to the Contras in the past.
I did so because I believed that aid was being provided to support a policy of the Reagan administration that emphasized a military solution to the problems in Central America, and in Nicaragua in particular.
I also opposed such aid because it was a costly policy, not only in monetary terms, but it was costly in terms of human suffering and death. These terrible costs were justified on the grounds that this war would ultimately bring peace and democracy to Nicaragua. From the very beginning, however, it was a policy that had no reasonable prospect of achieving its goals.
It deeply divided our people and our Government. In a democracy like ours, no foreign policy can be sustained if it does not enjoy the understanding and support of the American people.
It was also a policy that deeply divided the people and governments in Central America. Indeed, it was a policy that was inconsistent with the express terms of the agreements reached by the Central American Presidents themselves.
Under these circumstances, it was a mistake to think that the war could be effectively waged or sustained.
Moreover, while the Reagan administration's policy certainly put pressure on the Sandinistas and imposed hardship on the Nicaraguan people, it was unlikely to ever result in meaningful democratic reforms in that country. In fact, the state of siege gave the Sandinistas a plausible excuse not to open up the political process and implement real democratic reforms.
It was for these reasons that the Central American Presidents called for an end to the Contra military effort and for a refocusing of policy on peaceful change.
Given all of these reasons for opposing Contra aid in the past, one can certainly ask, why is it now reasonable to support this bill? I think these are several reasons.
First, because this aid supports a fundamentally new policy, one that emphasizes not a military solution but has as its centerpiece the principle of peaceful change, as laid out and agreed to by the Central American Presidents.
This new policy recognizes that the Contra war is over, and I commend President Bush and Secretary Baker for accepting this reality and seeking to build a new bipartisan policy.
Unlike past assistance to the Contras, this aid is truly non-lethal in nature and will not be used to promote war. Much of our previous assistance was administered by the Central Intelligence Agency. This aid will be administered by the Agency for International Development.
Unlike past assistance, the funding in this bill can be used for voluntary repatriation and resettlement; in passing this bill, we encourage the Contras to return home to Nicaragua to take part in the elections scheduled for February.
Unlike past assistance, an extraordinary side agreement between the administration and the congressional leadership permits any one of a number of congressional committees to terminate this aid prematurely if it is not being used for peaceful purposes.
In short, this aid is different because it recognizes and facilitates the end of the Contra war in Central America.
It is for this reason that Central American Presidents, such as President Arias of Costa Rica, support it. It is for this reason that the Sandinista government, while registering public objection, is nonetheless moving ahead with the release of prisoners and says it will implement the democratic reforms it long resisted while the war was on.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, this aid is different for one other, important reason. For the first time in 8 years, it enjoys the bipartisan support of both the administration and a large majority in Congress, of both Republicans and Democrats. This is no mean accomplishment.
While bipartisanship for the mere sake of bipartisanship is hollow, bipartisanship in support of a sound, constructive American policy is a real service to our Nation.
I support this new bipartisan policy because it will not only facilitate a final end to the Contra war and send a clear signal to our neighbors in Central America that we once again speak with one voice on this issue, but because this agreement offers the realistic hope that we can work together on other aspects of our policy in Central America, so that together we can more effectively promote the goals we all seek there: peace, justice and democracy.
I know that some of my colleagues have genuine reservations about this bill, as do some of our constituents, but I urge a yes vote. It is the best opportunity we have had in a long time to start afresh in Central America, and to begin reconstructing a more positive, effective policy for ourselves and our neighbors to the south.
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Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Lewis].
Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my colleague, the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] for yielding time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak for peace and an end to the violence and killing in Central America.
You can call it what you may, humanitarian aid, or nonmilitary assistance. But, with this so-called bipartisan accord--under this broad umbrella, we would still be supporting and assisting the Contras.
We don't have a moral nor legal obligation to send $67 million to keep this rag-tag bunch together. We do have a moral obligation to help our people here at home.
My people in Georgia need money for education, money for child care, money for affordable housing, and money to improve access to health care. We need money to stop the flow of illegal drugs into our communities.
Here in Congress, we must work to redirect the priorities and the tremendous resources of this Nation, not to oppress, but to uplift; not to divide, but to bring together; and not to enslave, but to set free.
This one Member, with one vote, is not willing to send one penny in support of the Contras.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my friend and colleague, the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi].
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to commend my colleague, the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] for taking out this time for Members, both those who want to speak out for futher aid to the Contras and those Members who want to speak out against continuing the failed policy of the previous administration in continuing aid to the Contras.
I rise in opposition to H.R. 1750 which provides $67 million through next February for aid to the Contras. The previous speaker, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Lewis], mentioned no matter what it is called, it is still aid to the Contras. I oppose it because it does not put enough emphasis on where we are supposed to be at this stage on the resettlement. I think that all the money in this legislation should go for resettlement. Resettlement is just included. It is permissive, but it is not mandated.
The Central American presidents have agreed that the Contras should be disbanded. This does not disband the Contras. One of our colleagues, the gentleman from Illinios [Mr. Hyde], mentioned ealier, `keep hope alive.' That is exactly what we do not want to do with the Contras, to keep hope alive for a military victory in Nicaragua. What we are trying to do is have measures for peace in Central America.
Many Members in this Chamber and in this body have visited Central America. We have seen the suffering that our own policy and our Federal dollars, Federal dollars much needed for our own domestic needs and programs, our own Federal dollars have brought. I promised myself when I was there, and the children that I saw, that I would do everything I could to end the suffering. After I was elected a Member of Congress, I promised my constituents I would do everything I could to end the suffering in Central America and in Nicaragua. Voting for this legislation will not end the suffering. It will continue casualties. We are not passing a measure for peace in Nicaragua. We are passing a measure for peace with an administration.
I urge my colleagues not be worn down. I urge my colleagues to vote against this legislation.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Montana [Mr. Williams].
Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman. I want to first commend those who have put the package of peace together. Those both in this Chamber and throughout Central America who have worked to bring peace to this war-torn country and war-torn area are to be commended and I do so.
This war in human terms is tragic, and in my opinion it was politically goofy. It is over now, and Members are glad of that. I support the measures, but I want to oppose this particular proposal, this particular amount of money, and in doing so ask this question. How long do the American taxpayers have to keep paying for our military adventures? Whether they are good wars or bad wars, whether we win them or lose them, how long does the American taxpayers have to keep the fiscal hose connected to these countries and rush their dollars through?
Everyone remembers Grenada. Well, the Grenada military action is ended, but in 1987 the taxpayers tapped in $15 million of their scarce dollars for Grenada. Fiscal year 1988, another $9 million. This year, another $4 million for Grenada. So far, to the Contras, Central America, we have given $472 million. Now they want $50 million more tax dollars. That is $5,700 an hour of tax money. Do we have an obligation to the Contras? Well, I do not think so. I respect those Members who do think so, but I want to ask Members this. Do we have an obligation to America's poor young children who want to get in Head Start and cannot get in? Eighty percent who want in Head Start cannot get in. If we have $5,700 extra to spend, I suggest we spend it on 18,769 additional young people and put them in Head Start this year. If we have $5,700 an hour to spend, I suggest we take 2,893 young Americans out of the ghettos and put them into Job Corps. If we have this kind of money to spend, some of us have other places to spend it.
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Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my good friend the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder].
Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from California for her leadership on this, and I, too, will vote `no' on this package.
Let me just build a bit on what the gentleman from Montana was saying. Here we are thinking that we are supposed to take care of every single person in the world, when they are fighting for their own freedom. I do not get that. Nevertheless, people who are American citizens, they are short-changed every day shrugging shoulders every day and saying, `Oh, there is a deficit.' This really does not make sense.
Second, as we send money to all these people, whether we call them Contras, freedom fighters or whether we call them guerrilla movements, we, then, become copartners with them.
[TIME: 1310]
It is amazing how many times they trample all over the human rights that we are telling the taxpayer they are fighting to preserve. One of the things that troubles me about the Contras is the large number of people who have been kidnaped by them in the name of humanitarianism and equal rights. They have been kidnaped by them, and we cannot find any information about it. I am going to put the names of five different people in the Record on this subject. Most of them were doctors or farmers, and one of them was running an association founded by the Swedes. They were kidnaped by the Contras, and the Contras will not tell anyone of their whereabouts or they will not release them. These are the names of these five people:
Maria De Los Angeles Gonzalez Herrera, Age 16; worked at home, barefoot doctor assistant.
Jorge Dolores Rodriguez Garcia, Age 45; farmer; community organizer; barefoot doctor for over 7 years.
Martine Chavarria, Age 16; peasant farmer.
Felipe Artola Mendex, middle aged; UNAG--Farmers and Ranchers Association storekeeper (funded by Swedish Government).
Rafael Artola Mendez, Age 15 (son of Felipe); farm boy.
If we start funding the Contras or continue to fund the Contras, we are coconspirators in this. How can we also say that is a fight for freedom. We cannot say the ends justify the means. Yet this keeps happening, and at the same time the dreams that so many Americans have are being put on hold, as the gentleman from Montana pointed out. They are being put on hold, because we say, `We are really sorry, but we can't give you those opportunities.'
Mr. Chairman, I think we have got to back off and really think about this. This is an important area of the world, and we must make sure real freedom comes and not something else.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder].
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Oberstar].
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding this time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to Contra aid, particularly in the form represented in this legislation, because it fundamentally means a continuation of the armed conflict in war-torn Nicaragua and Central America. This $66 million-plus will in fact sustain the contras as a military fighting force, and that will only extend the violence and the violations of human rights in Central America.
If this money were committed only to relocation and repatriation of the contras under some broad-based peace plan approved by the Central American presidents, I could approve such aid. But this plan subverts the Arias peace process and, compounding the misery, takes funds away from many other domestic and foreign programs and humanitarian and economic needs where our money could be so much better invested.
Mr. Chairman, we would do well to vote this plan down and support real peace in Central America by ending the Contra threat.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf].
(Mr. WOLF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this package, but first I want to talk about something else.
This package really is not enough. It is only one side of the coin, and we have to look at the other side. I would propose that we put together a bipartisan program in which a Republican and a Democratic Member on every weekend, beginning in May, would go to Nicaragua to emphasize to the Sandinistas that free elections must be held. We could call this program Operation Democracy. We would visit Nicaragua to encourage the democratic loyal opposition and to advise how to run a democratic election.
Mr. Chairman, there has not been democracy in Nicaragua for years. There was not democracy under Somoza, and there is not democracy under the Sandinistas. If we as Republicans and Democrats, could go there, we could encourage the Democratic opposition. We could meet with Cardinal Obando y Bravo and let him know there are people in the United States who care. We could meet with Violetta Chamorro, the editor of the newspaper La Prensa, and we could encourage her efforts; we could pressure the Sandinistas.
Mr. Chairman, we could perhaps even bring with us election registrars from our States and counties to meet with the Democratic opposition to instruct on how we run elections in our country.
Mr. Chairman, in our weekend trips we could pressure the Sandinistas on human rights issues and make sure the rights of every Nicaraguan are respected. We could join hands with the Democratic opposition with Members of both sides of the aisle in our group. We could walk through the barrios and the marketplaces and shake hands and let people know there is caring and concern on the part of the United States.
I would even think it would be appropriate if the committee chairman, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell], the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey], the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield], and the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Edwards] could lead a delegation to Nicaragua. We have all read the articles about the Nicaraguan situation in the newspaper, but I have visited there two times, and when you see it first hands, it is a totally different story.
Both times when I was there, the opposition said:
We want you to come down. We are glad you are here. We want you to come and see what is going on. We appreciate the fact that someone cares.
Mr. Chairman, I have sent a letter to Secretary Baker about this proposal and I would hope that this Congress on a bipartisan basis could put together such a program. This is the letter I wrote to the Secretary:
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, March 16, 1989.
Hon. James A. Baker III,
Secretary of State,
Washington, DC.
[Page: H1152]
Dear Jim: I appreciate your efforts to secure peace and democracy in Central America. Having been to Nicaragua twice and El Salvador three times I am aware of the challenges that region presents.
I'd like to share with you an idea that I have been informally discussing with my House colleagues which I believe could help secure democracy in Nicaragua and ensure that the basic human and political rights of the people of Nicaragua are respected.
The idea simply is to have at least one member of Congress and his or her staff visit Nicaragua each weekend. Members could be accompanied by representatives of their local press and the national press as well. The purpose of the visits would be to send a strong message to the democratic opposition in Nicaragua that we in the United States care very deeply about democracy, freedom and fair and free elections and that we have not forgotten them.
The visits would also be designed to help ensure that elections are carried out in a fair and effective manner and are free of corruption. To assist in the election process, members might bring their local Board of Elections registrar or other election officials who could offer advice and assistance to the democratic opposition about how to run an election campaign and how to function as an opposition party. The people of Nicaragua have never in modern times lived in a society that operated under a democratic system and such assistance will be necessary to ensure the election process works.
During these visits, members would meet with Sandinista officials and officials of the opposition as well as church groups and human rights groups. These repeated visits would help to stress the high level of importance the United States places on basic freedoms. The visits would also serve as a human rights enforcement mechanism as such violations would receive widespread attention because of the presence of the member and the press.
Most importantly, this program would let the Nicaraguan opposition know that the American people are concerned, interested and supportive. They would see not just a U.S. congressional delegation every few months, but instead a visit every weekend.
A State Department employee could set up the necessary appointments so that when the members arrive in Nicaragua on Friday evening an itinerary would be set and time would be effectively used. When the congressional delegation left on Sunday, the State Department employee would begin arranging appointments for the next week and would follow up on issues that had been previously raised.
There would be many benefits from this program. More members would be visiting Nicaragua and would be able to experience the situation there first hand. It is one thing to read or see a news report. It's another thing to meet with opposition leaders such as Mrs. Violetta Chamora and to hear the details of Sandinista repression. This is an eye opening experience.
Such a program, perhaps called `Operation Democracy,' could be successful in demonstrating deep concern and encouraging the opposition as well as putting the U.S. on record as seeking democracy. To work, it is essential that this be a bipartisan effort in Congress.
Again Jim, I appreciate your efforts in Central America. I would appreciate your consideration of this idea.
With best regards.
Sincerely,
Frank R. Wolf,
Member of Congress.
This would offer encouragement to the democratic opposition. They would know we care. It would also put pressure on the Sandinista government.
Best wishes.
Mr. Chairman, we should not just talk about what is going on in Nicaragua. We should not just stay here. Let us go down there and see what is happening. We would all learn from it, and become educated about it. Then, Mr. Chairman, when we had to deal with this problem again come February, we would all have been there. We could all say, `I have talked with Cardinal Obando y Bravo, I have talked to the Sandinistas, I have talked to Violetta Chamorro, I have talked to the opposition,' and then, Mr. Chairman, we could put pressure on Nicaragua to assure that we could have a free and democratic election there.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Kyl].
(Mr. KYL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. KYL. Mr. Chairman, while almost everyone is trying to put the best possible face on it, the agreement which underlies this resolution does not represent a victory for democracy in Nicaragua. It was premised on three assumptions. First, that a majority in Congress would not support any military assistance to the Contras. Second, because the Central American Presidents had created a `peace process,' the administration needed time to determine how to try to regain some degree of control or influence over the situation--including pressuring the Soviets to curtail their $1 billion-a-year aid to the Sandinistas government of Nicaragua. Third, Secretary of State Baker believed we would have greater success with all parties if our Government presented a united front, rather than the division that has characterized our previous policy.
The administration's idea of the plan was to keep the Contras alive and well in Honduras, not to disband them, because of the possibility that they would have to fight another day if the Sandinistas again failed to keep their promise. At the same time, the Sandinistas would have an opportunity to provide that they could keep their promises to permit freedom and establish democracy in Nicaragua, including elections next year.
One of the fundamental problems with this agreement is that there is no clear meeting of the minds--a prerequisite for any really meaningful agreement. The liberal Members of this body hope to use the plan to disband the Contras by repatriation to Nicaragua. Under no circumstances do they ever see the Contras as a fighting force again, regardless of whether the Sandinista government complies with its promises or not.
I am skeptical about what this plan, and, therefore, this resolution can accomplish; and am dubious that it was, as asserted by the administration, the best we could do.
There is no reason whatsoever to believe that the Sandinistas intend to keep this latest round of promises. They haven't kept their many promises up to now; they have every incentive to cheat as they have done each time before--no Marxist government has ever voluntarily relinquished power; indeed, the only force which ever had any effect in persuading the Sandinistas to loosen their grip on power was the Contras, who are now precluded from fighting.
The bottom line is that this plan is a one-way street: there are no sanctions whatsoever if the Sandinistas go back on their promises. There is no back-up plan, no method of applying any pressure that could force them to comply. We are again relegated to relying strictly on the good will of a ruling junta which has never shown any good will in its 10-year history.
President Ortega, in 1987, promised Costa Rican president Oscar Arias that he would grant freedom and create democracy in Nicaragua in a grand gesture that won the Nobel Peace Prize for Arias. After a few superficial publicity stunts, everything returned to its previous status.
Then in February 1988, Congress with cries of `give peace a chance,' voted to end military aid on the explicit assurances of Ortega, to you, Mr. Speaker, that this time he meant it--real democracy and freedom, soon. We wait nearly 2 years later, for signs that Ortega really intends to take his chances at the ballot box. To be sure, some political prisoners have been released after 10 years of what we would call in this country false imprisonment, but according to the Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights, around 7,000 remain behind bars. There is no other indication that Ortega intends to create the free and open society that must exist for valid elections to occur. Harassment of all opposition continues apace.
The administration sells this plan to conservatives by arguing that if the election scheduled for February 1990 is not valid, we might somehow muster the indignation to finally resume military support for the Contras. I'm still waiting for the outcry of world opinion that Nobel laureate Oscar Arias said would come if the Sandinistas did not comply with the Central American peace accords. The plan is sold to liberals on the basis that it finishes the Contras as a fighting force. I seriously doubt that the majority leadership in this body considers rearming the Contras even a remote possibility.
It is more likely that the combination of a hopeful Congress and a biased media will find some way to dub the election a good start and continue to rationalize the continuing failures of the Sandinistas. It is hard to imagine a set of circumstances that would cause us to resume support for the only kind of pressure that has ever worked with the Sandinistas--providing military help to Nicaraguans willing to fight for their own freedom. If Ortega's broken promises, murders, rapings, silencing of dissent, attacks on the churches and synagogues, support for Marxist guerrillas in neighboring countries, and other depredations have failed to move us, what makes us think a rigged election will do so?
These criticisms do not even touch the details of the plan itself, which relegates undue veto power to four separate committees of Congress over any aid after November of this year.
There are other criticisms, but what is the alternative? There will never be adequate support for the democratic resistance of Nicaragua unless the American people and Congress understand the rationale and need for it. And that understanding will never come about if there is no debate; if rather, differences are merely papered over in the name of bipartisanship. That is why I reluctantly speak out today, in honest criticism of my President's plan. Bipartisan support for a plan which is nothing more than a Band-aid over extreme differences is nothing more than a recipe for mediocrity and eventually, failure. Moreover, if, as it appears in this case, the bipartisan accord is a one-way street, it is bipartisan only because one side gave in to the other. And, finally, the Sandinistas are not stupid--they know that deep divisions still exist and the accord would disintegrate in a minute if President Bush really pushes them for real democratic results or even requested military support for the Contras in the event they fail to produce those democratic results.
A better approach would have been to present a short-term humanitarian aid package to sustain the Contras. Such a plan would have had plenty of support and would provide aid almost as long as the unconditional aid under the resolution, which, after all, is only good for 7 months. It would be obvious in 3 or 4 months whether the Sandinistas were serious about freedom and elections, and it is doubtful the Contras would have been abandoned just before the time the elections are supposed to be held.
If the Sandinistas failed to fulfill their promises and the administration and others were really serious about that failure, the President could then have requested military support. Can anyone doubt that would get the attention of Daniel Ortega?
Mr. Chairman, it is time for a plan which puts the burden on the Sandinistas to democratize Nicaragua, and fixes responsibility and consequences when they again refuse freedom.
In the meantime, the President and others should explain what is at stake; why the Sandinistas are not likely ever to give up power unless forced to do so; and that only the threat of the Contras--coupled with a cut-off of Soviet aid--can create the conditions for a true democratic and pluralistic society in Nicaragua. Coincidentially, while it could not pass Congress today, a new round of military aid for the Contras might have convinced the Soviets that they are backing a losing cause--today, they have no direct incentive to cut their considerable aid. It totally defies logic that the Soviets have a right to pump $1 billion in aid to the Government in Nicaragua, every year, much of it military aid, while we have to sell our soul to get approval from this Congress to send just $40 million to Nicaraguans living in Honduras--just to stay alive.
Freedom will never be won in Nicaragua if its Marxist government continues to be propped up by the Soviets while our hands are tied. Unless the issues surrounding this controversy are debated and unless the President uses the moral force of his office to influence that debate, the unfortunate people of Nicaragua will never know the freedoms we enjoy in the United States.
The bipartisan accord is reminiscent of the attempt to negotiate `peace with honor' in Vietnam. One hopes the plan will somehow work, but it is impossible not to be highly skeptical.
To support my President, I will vote `aye' on the resolution; but I will also support a motion to recommit the resolution for further work by this body.
[Page: H1153]
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEwen].
Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me. Mr. Chairman, the President of Honduras, Mr. Azcona, said, `Ladies and gentlemen, there will never be development in Central America until there is democracy in Nicaragua.'
People will not invest and put people to work and establish a factory as long as the Soviet Government is spending hundreds of millions of dollars giving the greatest killing machines in the history of mankind, Soviet Hind helicopters, along with bombing supplies and other destablizing military equipment, to attach anyone who would hope to put the people of Central America to work.
We have heard here today those references to Southeast Asia, to Grenada, and to other locations where America stood for freedom in asking the question: How long must we rescue these people? There are Members, Mr. Chairman, who are willing to laugh and scoff at families who are drowning in leaking boats, trying to escape 1 more day of Communist tyranny in Southeast Asia. There are those who laugh at the killing fields of Cambodia and who close their eyes to the Marxist starvation in Ethiopia. Yet I say to the Members of the House that we can no longer just close our eyes to what the Soviets are doing on our doorstep in Central America.
[TIME: 1320]
In Central America, if we do not care, we will have to hold our ears just as those who hear the cries for help of a mugging victim in the street will turn up the TV set, and pull down the shades and hope that the screams will go away because they do not care and refuse to help. Under this legislation we ask merely for an eyedropper of aid, a mere token, to establish America's position in support of freedom.
Mr. Chairman, we have received one more cry for help today from Violetta Chamorro, the general director of the newspaper La Prensa, in which he says in today's letter:
The situation is serious and most urgent. The other official newspapers circulating in the country count on donations received from socialists countries, tax exemptions, subsidies and preferences which allowed them to operate with 14 pages and supplements. In addition to government ads and those of state-owned enterprises, to which the Sandinista government has prohibited ad publications in La Prensa, placing us in precarious situation and evident disadvantage.
Our last and only appeal is an international campaign asking governments and democratic institutions for donations of news printing paper for La Prensa, and acknowledging your vocation for a peaceful solution in Nicaragua, in which La Prensa plays a very important role. It is our belief that your great international prestige could help us in this campaign to save La Prensa and with it the democratic process for Nicaragua.
My colleagues, the time has come for America to recognize the privilege that it has as a spokesman of the free world. For those who do not care, for those who care not, if one more nation, be it Cuba, be it North Korea, be it Nicaragua, be it Ethiopia, be it some nation that the people are crushed once again below the streamroller of tyranny; for those who do not care, they can vote no. But for those who care about freedom, who care about the hope of democracy, that want to give freedom a chance, they can vote aye.
Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell] I yield 2 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Guarini].
Mr. GUARINI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the bipartisan compromise on Central America. Today the United States speaks with one voice. We support the Central American diplomacy. We support peace. We support democracy. We stand with our friends in the region, and we shall stand together, Democrats and Republicans, the President, and Congress. That is what we are voting for today.
Mr. Chairman, I want to applaud two people who have made this new policy possible, Secretary of State Jim Baker who has invested his time, his energy, his talent and his credibility for a new policy based on new thinking. Hopefully we can build on his efforts and forge a broad bipartisan policy on the great foreign policy issues facing our country today, and I applaud also our Speaker, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wright].
Mr. Chairman, Jim Wright is a true friend of Latin democracy. Jim Wright is a courageous advocate of human rights, democracy, and peace throughout Latin America.
Finally I warn the Sandinistas: Take this policy seriously. Negotiate in good faith. Act in good faith. Comply.
Mr. Chairman, as we debate, the Sandinistas and the political opposition are negotiating a new law on democratization. To the Sandinistas I say this: Congress is watching. The President is watching. Latin America is watching. The democratic world is watching. Seize this historic opportunity, and do not make this historic mistake of acting in bad faith once again.
Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I urge support of the bipartisan accord and for a new day in American policy toward Latin America.
[Page: H1154]
Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell], I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Crockett].
Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Chairman, I am going to vote against this legislation. There are too many significant questions to which we do not and cannot know the answers in this rush to judgment that we are engaged in this week.
This legislation was ordered reported out of committee on Tuesday, less than 24 hours after it was introduced, and here it is on the floor. What is the necessity for this 3-day rush? I suspect there are enough earmarked funds in the pipeline to take care of the Contras until the end of the 90-day period provided in the El Salvador agreement worked out by the Central American presidents. If there is not, we could pass another month's worth of money. Why the rush to preempt the peace process?
This procedure leaves no time for hearings. Many Members--and the public, too--would like us to hold hearings on this matter. Honduras has turned completely around since it signed the El Salvador agreement--from a position of insisting on Contra removal and resettlement, to one of acquiescing in the Contras' indefinite presence. Why? Apparently because we sent Under Secretary of State Kimmit down there to make a deal. The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, which I have the honor to chair, has requested Mr. Kimmit's testimony. He has declined to appear. Why? Shouldn't we look into this?
According to the press, many Nicaraguan opposition figures feel the continued existence of the Contra army will hinder their ability to effectively challenge the Sandinistas in next year's election. Some of them feel that, by maintaining the Contras, the United States is maintaining a force that has an interest in the collapse of the electoral process, in hopes that such a collapse will bring renewed military aid. As one opposition leader has said, `Everyone knows that our loss is the Contras' gain.' Shouldn't we explore these questions in public hearings before we act?
What happens if, at the end of this aid program, the Contras still don't want to go back to Nicaragua? Do they come to the United States? The Ambassador of Honduras told me last week that it was his government's understanding that the term regional resettlement could include resettlement in the United States. He said if the Contras don't want to return to Nicaragua and no one else in Central America will take them, then the United States will have to take them. I assume this disturbs my colleagues, many of whom I know hope the Contras will end up in someone else's State. If we had time for hearings, I would want to know the administration's views on this.
What happens if the situation in Nicaragua is not settled to everyone's satisfaction by the end of this program, as is extremely likely? What do we do then? Continue this program indefinitely? Is that part of the deal with Honduras? Or do we go back to war and military aid? Is there is any understanding on that?
In fact, what are the side agreements that were made by the small, ad-hoc group that negotiated this deal, but were not written down? What is the real agreement--as opposed to the published agreement, which says nothing?
Press accounts say Secretary Baker showed the leadership a list of illustrative steps--both positive and negative--that the United States might be prepared to take in response to various possible Nicaraguan actions. As we act today, how many of us know what those steps are? Shouldn't we know before we act?
For all these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I believe that this highly unusual procedure we are following is both unwarranted and unwise. I urge the House to defeat this measure; then let us deal with this issue through our normal processes.
[TIME: 1330]
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. Byron].
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 1750, the Bipartisan Accord on Central America Act of 1989.
This important legislation will provide over $49 million in humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance through February 28, 1990. This means that the resistance will be able to receive much needed clothing, food, shelter, medical services, medical supplies, replacement batteries for existing communications equipment, and nonmilitary training for health and sanitation.
This is truly a bipartisan effort. I have visited Central America several times in the last few years, and it is very clear to me that these basic necessities are desperately needed. To me, Nicaragua is a very poor country, with enormous problems. The assistance that we can provide today will enable the Nicaraguans to overcome these terrible deficiencies. This country as divided as it is, is still Nicaraguans.
This bill also provides additional economic assistance to the democratic countries of Central America, to promote the economic stability, expand educational opportunities, foster progress in human rights, bolster democratic institutions and strengthen institutions of justice.
Mr. Chairman, we have urged the democratic process. We have urged the peace process. We have urged security in Central America, and today I urge my colleagues to support democracy, to support peace, to support security in Central America, and vote for this proposal.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, at this point I am simply representing the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell], who wanted to yield time to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery]; so I yield 2 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery].
(Mr. MONTGOMERY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this agreement because I think we have an obligation to the Contras. We created them, and provided both humanitarian and military aid in the past as they fought to overthrow the Sandinistas. I do not think we can desert them now.
In early March, of this year, I led a congressional delegation to Honduras to meet with the Contras and their leaders in their base camps along the Nicaraguan border. When they had military equipment, and were engaged in the fighting, the Contras had control of about 75 percent of the country.
Since there is no military aid now, the Contras with whom we spoke were not optimistic about returning to Nicaragua as long as the Sandinistas are in power.
I hope the peace process works, and that Nicaragua can have fair and open elections, as well as restoration of other basic human rights. But most of the Contras we saw in those base camps were displaced farmers. Their land was taken away by the Sandinistas. They want the land back and they want assurances that they can return to their farms without fear of government interference. They do not trust the Sandinistas.
I think this humanitarian aid package is the very least we can do to support the freedom fighters. Our congressional delegation discussed several options with regard to the future of the Contras. Some of them are not very appealing.
We could bring them to the United States. That would include about 60,000 men, women and children. And probably 60,000 more would say they, too, were Contras to have the chance to get to the United States. Another option would be to abandon the Contras and let them fend for themselves in Honduras or back in Nicaragua. Neither of those options is desirable, in my opinion.
We could restore military aid and support efforts to regain control of Nicaragua. I favor providing military aid, but I recognize that this humanitarian aid package is the best we can get at this time.
I hope the peace agreements can lead to more freedom and democracy in Nicaragua. But I would again point out that we created the Contras and I think we have an obligation to continue to provide aid to them. I support this resolution.
[Page: H1155]
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. DeFazio].
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, this is bad legislation at the worst possible time. What is bad is that we are about to endow the corrupt leadership of the Contras with a gift of $54 million of our hard-earned tax dollars.
What is worse is that we give this $54 million without any accounting of past aid, the missing millions stashed in bank accounts in the Bahamas. We give this money with less restrictions than last year. It may be used for relocation. Maybe not. It may be used for defensive military purposes.
Are the bullets and mines that have torn the limbs of thousands of innocent children or Ben Linder from Oregon, are those offensive or defensive bullets and mines? It made no difference to the dead, dying and maimed. They have suffered enough.
Make no mistake, aid to an army in the field is military aid in support of this disastrous war.
The ultimate travesty and the one for which we should be called to account is that the highest priority of the 101st Congress of the United States and the new President is aid to the Contras. Before we fund education for our youth, shelter for the homeless, medical care for our seniors, before the Congress votes on a single program to meet the needs of the American people, we are going to dump another $54 million in the laps of the Contras so they can continue to subvert the peace process agreed to by all the Presidents in this region.
Mr. Chairman, it is time to just say no.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time and commend her for her leadership here.
Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to this package, but I think my colleague, the gentleman from Oregon, was a little bit too harsh when he said the President was doing this instead of helping the homeless. The President said he would help the homeless, and he is. I am pleased to see him following through. I had not expected the largest federally funded homeless shelter to be in Honduras. Perhaps the President having decided to shelter the homeless in Honduras, which costs about $60 million, will think the principle might be extended to the United States.
I believe that this is a concession of defeat on the part of those who would continue to fund the war by proxy.
The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], a very distinguished Member of this House, said before that if he could not eat a meal, he would eat a sandwich. I think, to be honest, that the administration is eating a sandwich here. It is a crow sandwich. My problem is that the price of crow has gone up, $65 million at a time when fundamental needs are being denied is too much.
I understand the need for comity, a word that only Members of this body use, private citizens never use it.
[TIME: 1340]
I understand trying to let things down easily, but we are paying too much here to allow the architects of a disastrous Contra policy to save face. No one genuinely believes that the Contras will again be a military force, nor should they be.
I must say there is one substantive problem I have with the resolution, and that is it argues that we would have a right, if we did not like the internal democracy quotient of Nicaragua, to finance a war against them. I believe we ought to be very tough on people who are undemocratic. I wish this administration, as with the previous one, showed a little more concern about the repression in the People's Republic of China. This administration too often looks the other way when people are repressive. I do not think we have a right to send guns in there. I am not for arming the African National Congress, and I am not for arming the Tibetans, and I am not for arming people who are victims of a lack of democracy internally. I am for providing them moral support. I think there is an inconsistency here with an administration that often looks the other way with regard to this sort of thing.
Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FRANK. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. I recall last year the gentleman said that it was his surmise that there was not a Member in this House who was opposed to sending over $650 million a year to the seven Mujahidin groups fighting in Afghanistan. So that is the one exception where the gentleman believes violence is proper for freedom?
Mr. FRANK. Right, because in Afghanistan, and I was responding to what seemed to me to be a preposterous notion that there were 100 Members secretly opposing that when the record did not support it.
I appreciate the gentleman keeping track of what I say. I sometimes forget what I say, and it is nice to know that I can get the gentleman from California to keep track for me.
In that case we had clear-cut aggression across international borders. The march of the Russian Army into Afghanistan made this different than the repression that we get in the People's Republic of China and elsewhere. I think there is a clear difference there.
Mr. Chairman, I admire, in general, the work the leadership of this House did, the Speaker of this House and others, in getting this administration to admit defeat. I regret the fact that it is costing us $60 million to extricate themselves.
Mr. Chairman, I did particularly want to give attention to one important aspect here, and that is the device, that I believe the gentleman from Wisconsin get some credit for this, and he deserves a lot, whereby letters will have to be sent to keep this going.
Mr. Chairman, we have had the far right trying to make constitutional theory into the form of rigid theology with which they are most at home, and they have tried very hard to say that there should not be flexibility in relations between the executive and legislative branches, and thanks to some very thoughtful work by the gentleman from Wisconsin backed up by our leadership, we have gotten around that rigidity. We have a situation here where the administration acknowledges it will need the support of committees of this House to keep going.
Mr. Chairman, I think that is a good precedent.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Washington [Mrs. Unsoeld].
Mrs. UNSOELD. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague, the gentlewoman from California, for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, it rolls off the tongue so easily: `This is a bipartisan agreement.' But what are we really being asked to do? To throw money at a failed policy.
I urge my colleagues to vote no. We should not be spending millions and millions of dollars to keep the Contras together as a fighting force. We should honor the plan of the Central American Presidents to dismantle the Contras.
What does this package mean? About $400 a month for each Contra. Do the Members know how that compares to other wages in that country, in Nicaragua? Doctors receive about $70 a month, teachers $25 a month, and we are going to pay about $400 a month. Are we encouraging impoverished individuals to become Contras, to become mercenaries? Are we making these people dependent on a standard of living they cannot hope to achieve in their own country?
This Nation is not so wealthy that we can squander our taxpayers' dollars on a failed policy. We should vote no today.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] has 13 1/2 minutes remaining.
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Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. AuCoin].
(Mr. AuCOIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, for 5 years, while the Contras have been assaulting farms, schools, and clinics in Nicaragua, their supporters here in Washington have been assaulting the English language.
Contra supporters call them the democratic resistance. But the Contras were never elected to anything, except by the CIA.
Contra supporters call them freedom fighters. But no one has ever explained why freedom fighters have millions of dollars worth of remedial training in human rights.
Contra supporters say the Contras have applied military pressure to the Sandinistas. But no one has bothered to explain what military pressure really means. So let me tell you.
Six months ago a woman named Dora Lopez hitched a ride on a coffee truck to take her sick infant son to the doctor. The Contras ambushed the coffee truck--a coffee truck--killed her child and severely wounded Dora and another son, Erick.
I guess if one gets humanitarian aid instead of military aid, that means one does not attack military targets, they attack coffee trucks?
Just once in my life I would like to see those who talk about military pressure, those who understand this lofty concept and all the nuances of political science that it represents, just once I would like to see those sit down and explain their concept of military pressure to a woman who has held a bullet-ridden child in her arms.
Well my friends, we have that chance today, because Dora Lopez and her son Erick are with us here today, watching this debate.
Mr. Chairman, this aid package may be bipartisan, but that does not make it wise, and it does not make it just. I urge my colleagues to defeat this bill.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Ravenel].
Mr. RAVENEL. Mr. Chairman, come on, now, the folks talking against this bread, water, and aspirin bill for the Contras, they know as well as I do that Danny Ortega and gang are not any bunch of downtrodden farmers. They are old-fashioned rule-the-world Communists, and they would not be talking peace today if there were no Contras.
Maintaining them and their families with humanitarian aid is the care vote that encourages a lasting peace in Central America. If Members really are for peace in that region, be for this bill.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter].
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, Nicaragua is lost. Hope of freedom is gone. The dark curtain of the Sandinista Gestapo has fallen over Nicaragua. At this point only force of arms will unseat the Sandinistas, precisely because the Sandinistas have been installed and maintained by the Soviet Union as a military regime.
Mr. Chairman, I am voting against this accord because it gives false hopes to the American people.
After this debate, 10-second sound bites are going to go out from this hall to television sets across the country in which we will hear words like hope, peace, democracy, and elections, but, in fact, the only mechanism that was capable of ensuring those good things, the military forces of the Contras, has already been doomed to destruction by the Democrat leadership of this House in February 1988.
[TIME: 1350]
The people of the United States have the right to know certain facts about the desperate situation in Nicaragua, and it is a very desperate situation. These are the facts that the American people have a right to know about.
No. 1, there is no freedom in Nicaragua. Nobody on the other side has gotten up to argue that there is freedom under the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
No. 2, the Nicaraguan economy is in desperate straits, at least as bad as Cuba.
No. 3, since we cut off military aid to the Contras in February 1988, since then thousands of Nicaraguans have streamed across our border and are continuing to come north.
No. 4, the Soviets will not take their guns out of Nicaragua, and they have told us so as recently as 2 weeks ago.
No. 5, the Sandinistas are unpopular. They have told us they will not give up political power no matter who wins these elections.
No. 6, by votes of Democrats in this Congress, we have cut off the ammunition to our side. The Soviet Union has put in $500 million worth of military power, and we have cut off the ammunition to our side.
All of the great words I hear, hopeful statements from my colleagues, who I very greatly respect, about the possibility for democracy in Nicaragua, depends on one thing happening: The Sandinistas peacefully relinquishing power in the same way that Jose Duarte is relinquishing power peacefully to the opposition in El Salvador. That means that Tomas Borge, head of the secret police, who oversees machinegun executions, is going to relinquish power peacefully. Mr. Borge is as unpopular as Mr. Somoza was. He probably cannot win without the full weight of the police state protecting him. He is not going to relinquish power. He is a hard core Marxist.
Commander Juan Jose Ubeda, who organized the assassination of the one person who could have been president and could have beaten the Sandinistas in 1981, Jorge Salazar, will have to bow to electoral opinion and step from power. He will not do that.
Nobody who promotes this plan can show us one mechanism or one lever whereby we can ensure that these Sandinistas, these very hard people will step from power, and that is the problem. The problem is that the Sandinista regime is a military regime. It is installed and it is maintained by the Soviet Union, by military might, and only by force of arms are we going to be able to move the Sandinistas out of Nicaragua, which incidentally, for the lady who has been mentioned several times who comes from Nicaragua, is the request, the almost unanimous request of every Nicaraguan refugee whom I have met in the Red Cross camp in Brownsville, TX. Nobody coming from Nicaragua says anything good about the Sandinistas, except the people that they promote by this chance encounter group that has been put together by Tomas Borge of tell untruths.
I think, my colleagues, we are evading the major question. The major question is how can we move the Sandinistas out of power when they refuse to move out of power peacefully and will only do so under force of arms. We are evading that question. The American people are going to have to face it. The contest of wills between us and the Soviet Politburo has been won by the Soviet Union, and the American people have a right to take us to task for that loss.
I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
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Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I would simply like to say in response to the comments of the last speaker that I think that he has finally got it right. The fact is that I agree with him, that it is highly unlikely that the Sandinistas are ever going to be removed from power by any force except military.
The question is whether or not the U.S. Congress ought to feel an obligation to conduct military operations against every government that we want to see out of power. That is where the difference really lies. Some of us over here feel that is not what we ought to do, whether we do it directly or by proxy.
So I would simply suggest that I fully share the gentleman's evaluation of the Sandinistas. I have as much disregard for them as he has. It simply seems to me that the question is how we best effect their conduct. And it seems to me that the Bush administration has now correctly seen that the best way to do that is in concert with, rather than in opposition to, other democratic forces in the region, using political, diplomatic, and economic pressure, which is fully legitimate, if the Sandinistas do not do what they ought to do. This has never really been, I think, a question that is divided between people who are in favor of the Sandinistas and people who are not. It has been a question which has divided people on the basis of whether they are a realist or a hopeless, naive optimist.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm].
(Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I am rising to express my support for the Central American peace process and my endorsement of H.R. 1750 providing continued humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters.
This legislation is extremely significant because it sends a crystal clear message to the Sandinistas that the United States of America is truly united on several key principles. First and foremost, America believes that there can be no real peace without democracy. The Central American Presidents have recognized the linkage between these two concepts and have setup a series of deadlines for democracy in their most recent communique to help assure the achievement of peace.
For my colleague's reference, I am submitting for inclusion in the Record a `Dear Colleague' letter I coauthored along with my colleagues, Congressmen Skelton, Spratt, Stallings, Richardson and Lancaster. This document contains a translation of the communique along with a summary of the deadlines for democracy contained in the agreement.
The Sandinistas must understand that we are united as a nation, Democrat and Republican, Congress and executive branch, in support of this agreement and will be closely monitoring compliance with all deadlines. It is both fitting and symbolic that we are voting today, Thomas Jefferson's birthday, on legislation which will contribute significantly to the nuturing of democracy in Nicaragua. Jefferson understood well that freedom cannot tolerate the continuation of tyranny. The Sandinistas must understand that our vote today is putting them under intense observation by the Congress and the entire free world in which their compliance with the Central American agreements will be closely monitored and will neither be ignored or forgotten.
This legislation sends another message which is every bit as important. The United States of America does not and will not abandon its friends. It continues our support for the freedom fighters who have been in the forefront of the fight for democracy in Nicaragua. We are standing by our friends in maintaining the Contras as a viable force and making it clear to the Sandinistas that failure to comply with the deadlines for democracy which they have agreed to will have real costs.
Finally, the Soviet Union must understand that continued military assistance to the Sandinistas is unacceptable. Soviet aid threatens to doom the peace accords and the chance for democracy in the region by encouraging Sandinista intransigence and is viewed by the entire Congress as a direct threat to our national interests. Overall United States-Soviet relations cannot improve as long as this aid continues.
In conclusion, I urge my colleagues to support democracy, to support peace, to stand by our friends and defend American security by voting for this legislation.
The letter referred to follows:
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C., March 29, 1989.
Dear Colleague: The communique issued by the 5 Central American Presidents on February 14th following the conclusion of their summit contains a framework for the achievement of regional peace. The communique revitalized the Arias peace process by setting a timetable for democratization which is essential for peace in the region. The communique must be viewed as a composite whole which builds upon and includes the Esquipulas and Sapoa Agreements. It can only succeed if there is compliance with all deadlines and conditions, not a select few. The key dates and conditions are listed below along with relevant quotations from the communique.
Sincerely,
RICHARD H. STALLINGS.
BILL RICHARDSON.
JOHN M. SPRATT, JR.
CHARLES W. STENHOLM.
H. MARTIN LANCASTER.
IKE SKELTON.
February 14th--Communique issued by 5 Central American Presidents (translation on reverse side).
April 25th--Does require implementation of all reforms guaranteeing individual and political rights and equality prior to this date.
Does commence 4 month period of political preparation, organization and mobilization.
(`Once reforms have been made in electoral legislation and laws regulating expression, information and public opinion in such a way as to guarantee political organization and action in the broadest sense for political parties. Then an initial four month period for preparation, organization, mobilization of the parties will be opened.')
May 15th--Does require formulation of plan for voluntary demobilization, repatriation or relocation of Contras.
Does Not set deadline for implementation of `demobilization' plan.
Does implictly link implementation of any `demobilization' plan with deadlines for democratization of Nicaragua.
(`the Central American Presidents commit themselves to formulate, within a period of no more than 90 days, a joint plan for the voluntary demobilization, repatriation or relocation in Nicaragua and in third countries of Nicaraguan resistance members and their families.')
August 25th--Does begin 6 month campaign period in Nicaragua.
Does Not permit Sandinistas to reverse any of earlier required reforms.
(`Immediately following the expiration of the said period (four month period for preparation, organizatioin and mobilization of the parties), a new six month period of political activity will begin.')
February 25th--Does require democratic elections in Nicaragua no later than this date.
(`At the end of this six month period, elections for President, Vice President and representatives to the National Assembly, municipalities, and Central American Parliament will be held. Elections should take place no later than Feb. 25, 1990, unless the Government and opposition poltiical parties mutually agree that they should be held on another date.')
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I will reserve the balance of my time to yield to the Speaker of the House to close debate at the appropriate time.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dymally].
Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, to be successful, a U.S. accord seeking to assist and promote the Central American peace process must be based on several essential requirements. Any plausible agreement must provide for a credible standards of compliance, strict timetables for enforcement, and an effective on-going means to verify both the democratic and security requirements of the people in the region.
To this end, the proposal being offered today does not include the necessary ingredients for furthering the peace process. It does not include a reliable mechanism by which to track the nearly $60 million that will be made available to the Contras. Ironically, the package undermines the Central American peace process by keeping the Contras in place as a military unit for another year.
Additionally, I find it most troubling that the measure permits the continuation of programs to provide cash to the Contra fighters in Nicaragua and to Contra leaders and their families in the United States, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Although the bill prohibits aid from being used for military operations, there is no guarantee that these cash payments will not be used for the purchase of arms.
Furthermore, the bill does not contain one requirement for diplomatic initiatives and no fund to address the serious economic and health needs of Central America. At a time when serious attention is needed to focus on human rights and the economic development of the region, any possible legislative remedy for a long term peaceful solution to Central America must, at the very least, address and assist in the promotion of these fundamental principles. The absence of these principles compels me to register a `nay' vote during today's consideration of the package.
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Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Martinez].
Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to a wolf in sheep's clothing--humanitarian aid.
Mr. Chairman, in the 7 years I have been here, I have heard justification after justification for the continued support of the killing machine known as the Contras. What it really boils down to is a tremendous fear of communism that drives some beyond any point of understanding the mentality of those seeking power in countries where government is not stable.
In stable democracies such as ours, there is an exchange of power in an orderly manner. In unstable government, it's usually done by force. That is the reality and history of South and Central America. That is the situation in Nicaragua. The Contras are not freedom fighters--the leaders are cut-throats and gangsters. Unlike the young compasinos who are there because there is nothing else to do or they are idealistic or perhaps to them the risk of death is not as great as the pangs of hunger.
What these young people don't understand is that the Contras want power for the wealth it can bring to the leadership. Like the Sandinistas, the Contras are interested in power for what it can do for the few not the many. And it's only the blind who believe these thugs are patriots. The real patriots are inside the country trying to change the attitude and direction of the country. They and the innocent victims of the Sandinistas and Contras should get the humanitarian aid--but the Sandinistas refuse to allow the aid until the United States stops its support of the Contras.
And so the Contras get the aid and they continue to kill their countrymen, women, and children. And we call that humanitarian aid. I ask how can we call that humanitarian aid? And I also ask, `Why waste the money on such a futile effort when we have great need right here at home?' There are the poor, the homeless, and hungry right here at home who need humanitarian aid. What happened to the great dream of a kinder, gentler America?
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Applegate].
Prior to yielding, Mr. Chairman, I would make this inquiry of the Chair: I believe I would have 4 minutes left after the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Applegate] is through so would it be possible for me to reserve that time until the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Edwards] has finished his time and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield] has concluded and before the Speaker concludes?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman is correct, she may reserve her time.
Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Chairman.
Mr. APPLEGATE. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
I have just a moment here. Mr. Chairman, I do not know anybody could take a look at this package and vote for this waste of money. They talk about democracy in Nicaragua. Certainly it is not based on our track record down there. The United States has been involved in Nicaragua since 1915. We went along and we have killed and we stole everything until 1935. We have put the Somoza family in and we thought that we would clean up the act. He has been in ever since then. He went out in 1979. He killed more and stole more.
So what do we gain by it? Is this how Nicaraguans look upon democracy?
I have other reasons, too, because I think this is a fallacy. I think we ought to take a look at our own human rights problems that we have in this country, our own economic problems. I believe that charity begins at home.
What about the homeless and the hungry, which I have heard people talk about?
I am just saying let us vote against this bill.
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New Hampshire [Mr. Douglas].
(Mr. DOUGLAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today because I am speaking in support and hope that you will support a motion to recommit this bill to the committee.
When you look at the bill on page 2 it has an appropriation. That appropriation says it will remain available until February 28, 1990. That is a lie because there is a side agreement. There is a gentleman's agreement that will be written by the Secretary of State after we leave here today and it says that that money will not be obligated beyond November 30 of this year unless certain Members of this body write a letter to the Secretary of State.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to that deal because I think it violates article I of the Constitution.
The letter that Secretary Baker intends to send to the chairman of the House and Senate authorizing and appropriations committees and to the House leadership indicates that any one of nine individuals in the House and the Senate has the power to stop a line item in a bill that we will be voting on.
Now that is supposed to help keep the aid flowing after November. We are supposed to trust that these 9 individuals who each represent 500,000 people, the same number of people that I represent, are somehow given this extraordinary power to determine when an appropriation by the Congress of the United States will end.
I think that is clearly unconstitutional. Back in 1986 Mike Synar and certain other Members of this House challenged the Gramm-Rudman law. The Supreme Court of the United States in that opinion said that the Constitution does not `contemplate an active role for Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts.'
If Congress chooses to enact legislation that will provide discretionary funds to the President, it can do so. If we want to terminate those funds in November, we can do so. But we have to do it in accordance with article I.
That means a vote in this body, yes or no, and then a vote in the Senate. That is what our Constitution is meant to control. This type of arrangement was struck down in the case of Bowsher versus Synar. That was based on the opinion in Immigration and Naturalization Service in Chadha case 3 years earlier, and I will quote from that case. `Once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends.' The Supreme Court went on to say, `Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectly--by passing new legislation.'
Now the executive branch cannot give away nor empower to others its power of veto and its power to execute the laws. Some will say this is not really a legislative veto because it is not part of the legislation. Well, it is part of the deal. We have the draft letter. Everyone in this body knows what the deal is. And it is obvious it is unconstitutional. The separation of powers is being frustrated by giving a certain select group in this body a vote in November that I will not have. The people of my State elected me. New Hampshire in November will not be voting on whether Conta aid continues because neither of New Hampshire's Congressmen happen to be part of this little gang of seven who will be voting in November by writing a letter.
I think it is an outrage, it is wrong for this body to be involved making a deal like this. I think it is wrong for the executive branch, and I urge that we recommit with instructions that that appropriation that is stated right in this bill on page 2 that we are going to be voting for, means exactly what it says, that that money is available through February 28 of 1990. I cannot agree to have this bill voted on without a recommittal.
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Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].
Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I am the designee of the minority side of the aisle to offer the motion to recommit at the end of this long debate today.
[TIME: 1410]
I will not take this valuable 3 minutes to explain what is in the motion to recommit, however, because the prior speaker, the distinguished gentleman from New Hampshire, who at one time was the youngest State supreme court justice in the United States, a topnotch constitutional lawyer, Mr. Chuck Douglas, has already done an excellent job of laying that out.
What I would like to try and cover, and it is almost impossible so I may ask for more time, are just 5 points.
One, that no investment or true peace, and I repeat, no investment or true peace will truly go down to this part of North America, whose geographic name is Central America, north of the Panama Canal, fellow North Americans, Norte Americanos down there, will not have jobs, growth or economic prosperity, and this has been told to me by all four of the elected Central American presidents, plus the free people that are struggling against Noriega in Panama, plus the people in the small former British colony of Belize know that there will be no investment by the United States or Europe until the Communist thugs are out of Nicaragua. That is a fact.
Two, the elections. The first free elections we will see coming up, after the free election in El Salvador, is the one coming up in Honduras on November 26, 4 days before any 1 of 9 Members of Congress by an act of omission, can cut off the aid to the Contras, during the last 3 months before the election in Nicaragua which is supposed to take place on February 25 of next year. There is not a guarantee that the Nicaraguan elections will not be canceled completely, postponed or corrupted during that process because there will be no force in being, to excise restraint upon the nine Communist thugs in the directorate down there.
Human rights, there is no time in this debate, today, to go over the major human rights violations in this hemisphere of our time. There are thousands of innocent people, political prisoners, with no judicial rights whatsoever, distributed through 16 major camps, spread all over Nicaragua. Prison camps are the major growth industry in that country. In fact, most of the Cuban and Russian economic aid has gone in the building up of these prison camps. Zona Franca has several thousand political prisoners all by itself.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DORNAN of California. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana 20 seconds.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. How many prisons were there before the Sandinistas took Congress?
Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, two. One small one before Somoza ran the operation, and one of these large prisons that has been expanded five times in size, and more than five times in the number of prisoners.
Let me come back to those elections again. The elections that are taking place with single-term, truly elected Presidents in Costa Rica, is a 1 term for 4 years; in Honduras, 1 term 4 years; Guatemala, 1 term 5 years; and in El Salvador, 1 term 5 years. All of these people will be new by November 1990, a year from this November. But if Noriega's candidate wins a stolen, fraudulent, corrupted election, he will be there for another 6 years of tyranny and another 6 years after that, because if Members look at the elections coming up in Panama, May 4, and take the time to really study what this drug-running thug Noriega is doing, they will realize how fraudulent Panamanian elections have become. For example, Noriega thugs rented every car in the country this week and locked them in parking lots so the press, the world press, could not even travel around and validate the election. All of that will take place in Nicaragua and more with the extra muscle of Communist tyranny. Without Southern Command forces in the Canal Zone, Noriega and the Sandinistas will have a field day.
The true human rights violations are right under our nose. The policy of President Reagan did not fail. It was a handful of radicals in this Congress who drove the liberals, moderates and conservatives crazy with their dedication, inexplicable as it is, to the Communist thugs in Managua. I will go to my grave never understanding why Congressmen and women got up in this House and made the case for communism for 8 years with all of the results of human rights abuses.
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Weber].
Mr. WEBER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in genuinely sad and very reluctant but rather determined opposition to the proposal that is before us today, and I say sad and reluctant sincerely, because I have always supported the Contras. I believe that their cause is a just cost, and I believe that their policies have served America's foreign policy interests and would in the future, if we were allowed to get them adequate support.
Many of my colleagues have and will continue to express themselves on that point of view that the Contras are valuable to America's foreign interests, so the cause is just. I believe that. I would support adequate aid to the Contras. I have no problem with that whatsoever.
I am not going to address myself further to that, though, because despite the fact that I share those views, I come to a different conclusion than many of my best friends on the Republican side in that I do not believe this agreement permits our ultimate support.
I will not take a lot of time because I know there are others who want to speak, but basically I have two overriding concerns that I would like to express. First of all, I do believe we are seriously weakening the President in his ability to conduct foreign policy through the side agreement that has been put together through which 6 individuals, individuals, have the ability basically to abrogate this bipartisan understanding. This is not, my friends, a simple reprogramming. This is not a routine conferring with the Congress. There is a fundamental foreign policy vital to America's interests, and we are giving unprecedented, in my view, veto power to certain individuals in the Congress over that vital and important foreign policy. I do not blame the administration. They think that this is the best deal they can get. But let me say, I blame Members in the Congress. We are to blame for a serious long-term weakening of America's ability to conduct foreign policy and the implementations of that long-term weakening we can foresee today.
Many of my colleagues have expressed themselves on how it could affect directly in Central America. I understand that, but concern beyond that for the years to come that once this body has injected itself into the foreign policy decisionmaking process as it did in this agreement, there is no turning back, and we will do ourselves great damage as a country, and it is our fault, the fault of the Congress, not the fault of the administration.
Second of all, I must say that I disagree with the statement that we have achieved a bipartisan policy toward Central America. None of our Membership wants anything other than that. We do not have a bipartisan policy. I say to my friend, oh, we have an agreement, all right, but I have listened to my leaders on the Committee on Appropriations and elsewhere and the Democratic and the Republican Parties, express themselves in support of this agreement. I have listened to my leader, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey], express himself in support of an agreement which he believes facilitates the end of the Contras, and I have listened to my friend and leader, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Edwards], express himself in support of the agreement, precisely because it presents the end of the Contras and maintains them as a military option in Central America.
Friends, if we have a bipartisan policy, it means that somewhere along the line the proponents of this policy would agree on the objectives. Let us not fool ourselves. This is not a bipartisan policy. We are covering over those deep divisions that existed and continue to exist today, and in the long term that will not work.
Like all my colleagues, I deplore the lack of a bipartisan consensus on Central America. I agree it hurt our country, and I would like Members to come up with an agreement that genuinely forms consensus in our approach to that troubled region of the world, but this is not that agreement, and in the absence of that kind of agreement, the least we can do is protect the prerogatives of the President to conduct American policy and communicate honestly to the American people about the unwillingness of this Congress to support him in doing so.
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[TIME: 1420]
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter].
(Mr. HUNTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I completely endorse the remarks of the last speaker. I think the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Weber] had some very important points and some important truths that this Congress is going to have to face up to very shortly.
Let me say to my friends that a number of Members have said to me on the floor and on other occasions, `We realize the Sandinistas are bad. They are bad for this hemisphere, and they are bad for American security, but we want to use means other than military means to get rid of them.'
Let me simply say this: That is a nonstarter, because the Sandinista regime is a military regime. It enforces its power through the barrels of its guns. We cannot force politicians to step down as a result of public pressure when they do not read the newspaper. The Sandinistas do not read the newspaper to see if they are popular. They count the number of rounds on their bandoliers to see if they are powerful. That is what they care about. That is what this Congress is failing to confront and failing to face.
Nobody disagrees now with the fact that the Sandinistas are in fact spreading terrorism throughout Central America. We have enormous evidence now that the FMLN, which has assassinated now nine mayors in El Salvador, is supplied through the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas have seen the completion of the bomber base at Punta Huete built by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union does not build bomber bases that it does not intend to ever use.
The Soviet Union has engaged itself in a match of wills with the United States Congress, with this body right here, on two fronts: One in Afghanistan. There we faced them and we did what was necessary. We gave weapons to our side, not words but weapons, and we won the match of wills and the Soviet Union has left Afghanistan.
We faced the Soviet Union in a match of wills in our own hemisphere, interestingly, and we lost because we went to $100 million, they went to $400 million in aid to their side, we went to $25 million, they went to $400 million, and we went to nothing and they went to $500 million. They want to win. They want power, and there is nothing in this package that will act to take that power away from them.
To my friends who say that this is the best we could get and it was necessary to do these things to get a few months sustenance for the Contras, let me simply say this: That is like a doctor saying, `The only way I could give the patient survival through September 30 or November 30 was by giving control of the plug to his respirator to five of his worst enemies and giving them the power to pull the plug on November 30.'
Mr. Chairman, I cannot accept that as a proposition. I do not think that the Democratic membership of this House would starve the Contras regardless of conditions.
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Rhodes].
(Mr. RHODES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. RHODES. Mr. Chairman, our old friend, `bipartisan,' is getting a real workout here this afternoon. I think this is a very remarkable sort of agreement that we are dicussing here. I think it is remarkable for many reasons.
About 18 months ago President Arias was asked, `What will you do if the Sandinistas don't live up to their promises?'
He said, `I don't have to do anything. The white hot glare of world opinion will focus on the Sandinistas and force them to act.' We have seen what the white hot glare of world opinion means to the Sandinistas. It means nothing to them; they do not care.
Here today we have heard it said that this agreement will show the Sandinistas that the U.S. Congress is watching them, that the President is watching them, that the people of this country are watching them, and that freedom-loving people all over the world are watching them. Those entities have been watching them for a long time. They have done nothing. They do not care.
The Contras are also watching them, and they do care about the Contras watching them. The Contras have been continually the one force in this world that has in fact been able to get, keep, and hold the attention of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
What is remarkable about this agreement? It is bipartisan. It is remarkable because the majority of the Members in this House who supported aid to the Contras in the past have reluctantly--and I include myself in that reluctance--concluded in fact that this for the time being is the best we can do for the Contras. But the one remarkable thing, perhaps the most remarkable thing implicit in this agreement, is, I think, recognition by the leadership of the Democrats in this House who have consistently opposed aid to the Contras of the fact that the continued existence of the Contra force in Central America is in fact the one thing that can make the white hot glare of public opinion on the Sandinistas effective. The combination of that white hot glare and our implicit agreement that the Contras will remain as a force and the implicit threat that if the Sandinistas do not observe that white hot glare of world opinion, we will continue and perhaps even expand that support, is the remarkable thing about this agreement. That is the remarkable message that it sends to Managua, that this Congress not only is watching but is prepared to back up its resolve with its money, its will, and its courage.
That is what is remarkable about this. That is why I and, I think, many of my colleagues on the Republican side are going to support the President, the leadership on both sides, and the people in Central America and Nicaragua.
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, before I yield further time, let me say that it is my hope that after I yield time to perhaps one or two more speakers, the other side of the aisle will begin to use its time so we are able then to exchange speakers as we go along.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DeLay].
(Mr. DeLAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. DeLAY. Well, Mr. Chairman, here we are. Once again we will have another vote on the Contras, on Nicaragua and Central America, and I am totally frustrated. I am not happy today. I am not happy because I am so frustrated, frustrated when I remember the first time that we lost a vote on this floor the day after I got back from Managua and a grandfather with tears in his eyes begged us not to forget his grandchildren.
I am frustrated when I remember and think about the oppression that I have seen in Nicaragua, not just the radio and television and the lack of ability to print a newspaper, but real oppression, with the thousands that are in prisons, not prisons like our prisons but with people living and eating in their excrement, with hundreds living in cells that were designed for 20 or 30. I am frustrated by an inflation rate that has essentially made useless in a country that has the elite shopping in a dollar store for any and all kinds of American articles while the people they have oppressed cannot even buy food off the streets. I am frustrated when I think about people living in that squalor while the Sandinistas have stolen everything of value in that country.
I am frustrated when I think about the time I was with the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Tallon] and saw people having their heads bashed in and thrown into trucks and taken off to jail.
But what are the cards that are dealt us? What are our options? We could stand here, as some have, and deplore the violence on both sides, we could wish that it would go away, but no amount of speaking in this well can make the violence go away. We can make these wonderful glowing speeches about peace, but speeches do not create peace.
We could have a vote for military aid, but I say to the Members on my side that we do not have the votes. We could spend our time debating about legislative veto and constitutional law and all that kind of stuff, and we could demand military assistance after February of next year, but those are not the cards that are dealt us.
The options that are before us are laid out in this accord. The option is to once again believe in the promises of the Sandinistas who have been lying to the Congress for 10 years. OK, so be it. We will believe in them for another year. The accord makes the United States a player in these negotiations. OK, I can go along with that. We can maintain a force there, the only leverage that could give us any chance of success or of peace in the region. I could go along with that. But I say, especially to the Members on the right with whom I claim to have a membership, that the choice to me is a very simple one. The choice is this: Do I want to participate in the destruction of support for those brave men and families who are fighting to return to a country where all they want to do is just farm their little piece of land, raise their families, and worship their God? Those who are sitting there today in Honduras and in other countries tell us that is all they want. They have seen their families killed, they have been run off their land, and they have been drafted into an army they do not want to serve in. But that is the choice.
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[TIME: 1430]
I cannot subscribe to the idea that, if we make it bad enough in Central America, the American people will wake up. I am from Texas. I am on that border. It is closer to Managua from Houston than it is from Houston to Washington, DC. I cannot afford to make it bad enough in Central America so that the American people will wake up. The only option I have today is to vote for this accord. The only option I have today is to vote for the Contras, to keep them as a viable force in Honduras, as leverage against the Sandinistas, because, my colleagues, if we vote this accord down today and they start dispersing the Contras tomorrow, what do my colleagues think the Sandinistas will do? We will have that holocaust which my colleagues are talking about that they want in order to wake up the American people.
Mr. Chairman, we cannot afford that. What we can afford is to swallow our pride, swallow our frustration. We can swallow that gut feeling that is way down deep inside of us about what is happening down there and vote for the accord.
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Buechner].
Mr. BUECHNER. Mr. Chairman, I have before me a chronology of what has taken place in this Chamber and down the hall since November 16, 1981. There are 62 separate legislative initiatives that have been passed into law dealing with Nicaragua. It is an amazing chronology to take a look at how this Congress has ebbed and flowed in its support for democracy, and, if one were to accumulate the speeches that have been given, the pages on pages, the thousands, maybe even millions of words that have been spoken, we are brought to this juncture today to decide whether or not democracy and freedom are the same thing as peace.
I have been in Nicaragua. I took part in a demonstration for the domestic resistance, not the Contras, but men and women who live in the city of Managua who wanted to have the opportunity to have a free press, to have free religion, to be able to do the things that people in a democracy are supposed to be able to do, to be able to do the things that the Sandinistas pledged they would allow them to do. The young woman that marched alongside of me, who has since been in prison twice, fainted. She did not faint from the Sun. She did not faint from a lack of water or food. She fainted from injuries that she sustained while kneeling in front of a church when disturbance Sandinista terrorist gangs attacked her, and I carried her for a few blocks until we could get to the shade.
I wonder today what she thinks about the accord and about this debate. I wonder if she is cynical. I wonder if the young men and women that are in the jungles, I wonder if they are cynical.
We say, and I support what we are doing today, that this is the only chance that we have to give them an opportunity to stay together, to keep the pressure on the Sandinistas. I believe what the administration is doing is the only thing left to do, but I wonder what they are thinking in Honduras and Nicaragua. I wonder what the message is.
Sixty-two different actions. This Congress has changed, and we are changing again today. But the message that we send to the world is a mixed message. What we are getting out of this agreement is better than what we have, and for us in politics that is the best thing we can do. It is compromise. It is facilitation. But do my colleagues realize that it is a sad message because we have let those people down? We let them down many times within those 62 resolutions, and today, hopefully, what we are saying is that this is the best deal we can make.
However to those soldiers, to those believers in democracy, I know that they are on their knees praying that what we are doing today is not the best that can happen because the best thing that can happen is for the Sandinistas to be pressured into doing what they said they will do, what Oscar Arias and the other Presidents have said they want them to do, and that is to guarantee a modicum of democracy, not a full democracy, not a freely elected congress like we have here today, not one in which the people can come, and sit, and watch and believe in truth and freedom, but just the bare, bare bones of a democracy. Simple things.
So what we are going to do, and I ask that we do it, and I will vote for it, is to approve the 63d change. May God be our judge that we are doing the right thing and that it will go beyond this because, if it is simply another piece of legislation coming from the U.S. Congress sending another mixed message, then we will have done some of the most dangerous things that a democratic body can do, and that is to deny hope.
We have denied hope, but they have overcome it with their prayers, and their dedication and their belief in freedom and justice. Maybe to a point beyond what this body does, beyond what we who come from the freest place in the Earth have promised, we have denied them, and we have denied them hope, but this agreement is better than what exists right now because there is no hope with what exists now.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Levine] for the purposes of a colloquy.
(Mr. LEVINE of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
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Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] for yielding time. I do have some questions that I would like to ask him, and I will be interested in his reponse.
It is my understanding that the administration will withhold funds to any Contras engaged in military attacks. Does the gentleman agree?
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, yes, the gentleman from California [Mr. Levine] is correct. This issue was discussed at length in our meetings with the Secretary of State. The bipartisan agreement of March 24, 1989 between the President and Congress states that it is United States policy to encourage the Government of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Resistance to continue the cessation of hostilities currently in effect.
Section 7(a) of H.R. 1750 states that no funds will be provided to the Nicaraguan resistance to support military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.
In addition, Secretary Baker has agreed to submit a letter to the leadership of the House and Senate stating clearly that no funds will be used to support any individuals engaged in offensive military operations.
Mr. LEVINE of California. Would the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] agree that a Contra attack on a civilian community or cooperative, resulting in the killing, wounding and kidnaping of civilians constitutes an `offensive military operation?'
Mr. OBEY. Yes, I would.
Mr. LEVINE of California. What assurances are provided in this legislation to prevent Contra forces from engaging in human rights abuses?
Mr. OBEY. Section 7(b) of H.R. 1750 states that no assistance under this act may be provided to any group that retains in its ranks any individual who has been found to engage in either gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or drug smuggling or significant misuse of public or private funds.
This matter is also treated in the letter from Secretary Baker which states that no funds will be used to support any member of the Resistance judged to be a violator of human rights.
Mr. LEVINE of California. Would you consider the killing of civilians and the kidnaping of civilians by Contra forces inside Nicaragua or in Honduras to a `gross violation of internationally recognized human rights?'
Mr. OBEY. Most certainly.
Mr. LEVINE of California. Is it the gentleman's understanding that any funds, including the cash-for-food program for members of the Resistance inside Nicaragua, would be terminated to any Contra forces committing such acts against Nicaraguan civilians?
Mr. OBEY. Yes, that is my understanding of section 7(b) of this legislation.
[TIME: 1440]
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].
(Mr. BURTON of Indiana asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, the colloquy that we just heard points out all the reasons why aid in November can be cut off to the Contras. The question was not asked what do we do if the Soviets continue to send thousands of tons of war material into Nicaragua, if the Communists in Nicaragua continue to violate human rights, if they continue not to live up to the commitments they made at Esquipulas, at Sapoa, and at the OAS in 1979, nothing was said about that, because the fact of the matter is the Communists can do anything they darn well please, but the people who went to the mountains who are fighting for freedom down there are hamstrung. The people on this side of the aisle, the nine people who are going to be signing that letter that has to be sent to the President in order for aid to continue beyond November, any one of them can stop that aid from continuing between November and when the elections are supposed to take place in February. That colloquy indicates that there is going to be a myriad of reasons or allegations that could be raised to cut off that aid.
I fully expect one of them, any one of them, to say, `Hey, wait a minute. I'm not going to send anymore aid to those people.'
So there will be a 3-month hiatus when there will be no aid for the freedom fighters. They will die on the vine and the Communists will be able once again to take steps to solidify their position in Nicaragua, thus enabling them to expand their revelution beyond their borders, as they promised, into the surrounding countries, those fledgling democracies that cannot and will not be able to defend themselves against the tremendous military power that the Communist Sandinistas have that has been given to them by the Soviet Union.
The Sandinistas will not live up to free and fair elections. They have said time and time again they will not give up power that they gained out of the barrel of a gun, and the constitution they have in that country says very specifically that even if they were to lose an election, they would keep control of the military apparatus, and with a 125,000- to 150,000-man active army, what elected official would argue with them?
In El Salvador the Communist guerrillas have said to many elected officials, `You got 48 hours to get out of town,' elected officials, and if they do not get out of town, they kill them, but we do not hear much about that. So how would an elected official who opposes the Sandinistas, even if he were to win, stand up to them?
The Contras must be cut off in November, as I said, 3 months before free elections. Even though the Communists will not live up to their free election commitment, there should be some way to put pressure on them. If the aid is stopped in November, there will be no opposition left at the end of February, when the Communists are likely once again to show their true colors.
This agreement talks about voluntary repatriation. What is voluntary repatriation? Nobody has talked about that. Voluntary repatriation could mean you send them back to Nicaragua, even if there are not free and fair elections, and if they do not want to do that, the Contras will have no place to go except the United States, because without support from the United States those fledgling democracies are not going to keep the Contras in their country.
We need to remember that the Nicaraguans want that revolution to expand. The problem will not go away. The Communists will just not go away. They are committed to exporting revolution throughout that region and up into Mexico. Everywhere the Communists take power, at least 15 percent of the population leaves that country and goes to a free country or some other country.
It is estimated that if the Communists make good their commitment to spread their revolution throughout
that region and up into Mexico, we will get between 5 and 20 million refugees. That means we would have an increase in unemployment in this country of between 5 and 7 percent. For each 1 percent of unemployment, it costs the taxpayers of this country $35 billion. So put a pencil to that and you see hundreds of billions of dollars of additional deficits we would have to face if we let this get out of control. So we have an economic problem to face as well.
The border between us and Mexico, which I call the soft underbelly of America, is 1,980 miles long. Make no mistake about it, if the Communists do spread that revolution, as they have promised they are going to do to Ronald Reagan and others, then we will have to defend that soft underbelly of America and it will cost a lot of money and it will cost a lot of American lives.
The Communists down there use the text that every Communist nation has used to train their young people. For 10 years they have been teaching their young people to add and subtract using imperialist body counts, machineguns and handgrenades.
This is a first grade textbook that I am holding, coming out of Nicaragua. Our kids are taught to add and subtract using apples and oranges. They use AK-47 machineguns and handgrenades.
These things, these facts need to be told to the American people. A lot of people say, `Why should we be involved in another country, a banana republic?'
Well, nobody wants to do that. Nobody wants to spend our money doing that, but the fact of the matter is, this is not halfway around the world. It is on our front door. If we do not help people fighting for freedom in Nicaragua, as we did in Afghanistan with the Mujahidin, who drove the Soviets out, if we are not willing to do that here, we will reap the whirlwind. At some point in the future, our kids will be down there defending freedom in our hemisphere, and we must think about that.
We can either pay now by helping people fight for their own freedom, or we can pay later, and yet these people up here want to sell them outright now and are doing it.
We have no choice but to support this today. We have got to keep the Contras alive, so we will support this.
This problem is not going to go away. We need to keep the Communist Sandinistas' feet to the fire, to make them live up to their commitments of freedom in that country. If we do not do it now, we are going to pay the price later.
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Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from New York [Mrs. Lowey].
(Mrs. LOWEY of New York asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Mrs. LOWEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I have been a longtime opponent of the Contra war in Nicaragua. I am horrified by the bloodshed, violence and suffering that has resulted from this war. I have always believed that this conflict must be resolved by diplomatic rather than military means.
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Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Lewis].
(Mr. LEWIS of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express to my colleagues the same frustration that you have heard expressed over and over. We have come together today to discuss our support and some limited opposition to a bipartisan accord which is an effort to take one last step on behalf of freedom in Central America.
This agreement between the President, between Democrats and Republicans alike, is an agreement that was not written by the President. Indeed, it was not written by the Republicans in this House. It is an agreement that I have come to the floor to reluctantly support, because it is so full of holes that it forces me to support it with very little faith.
Indeed, today we are faced with a circumstance where there is a last gasp effort to promote democracy and freedom in Central America, namely, in Nicaragua. We in this House forget so easily, so quickly, what history has to teach. In the last 10 years, how many times have we come to this floor to discuss the same subject?
I remember one of my first experiences when I arrived in 1979 was to sit here on the floor and watch Members of the House involved in an intensive debate regarding Nicaragua. That debate related to our need to back freedom and hope in Central America. The debate suggested that it was time for America to get in line and put their money and their energy where their mouths and their faith was. Our debate centered around the suggestion that we ought to oust the then Dictator Somoza from Nicaragua. It was suggested that there were freedom fighters in Nicaragua who would take his place, who would promote the opportunity for democracy, for free speech, for a free press in Central America once again.
[TIME: 1450]
How quickly, how quickly we forget. Indeed, America decided to make that change. We pressured Somoza to leave. The Sandinista took over the Government of Nicaragua. Shortly, those of great faith became Nicaraguan citizens of little hope. Business people, coffee plantation workers found their freedoms eliminated. Their press was destroyed. A dictatorship of another form was established, and those people who had hoped found their faith and their friends departing to the hillside.
How many times do we have to listen to this story? During the last Congress we spent our time, our energy with debate swirling around the Arias agreement, the accord that caused the democracies in the region to come together and suggest there was a new chance for freedom in Nicaragua. The Sandinista Government was about to come to the table.
I am here today to comment once again on another failure. The Sandinistas took us into their spider web, and we fell for their trap. It was not long, Members, before the Sandinistas once again were violating their word, their agreement, their commitment to freedom.
The democrats of Central America did not hold that firm line that they said they would hold against the Sandinistas. Instead, they kind of walked away and rolled over and said, `We ought to hope again,' and we find ourselves here today once again with an ever stronger Communist establishment in Nicaragua that is controlling the lives and the futures of their people in a fashion that is unacceptable in our hemisphere.
I am here to support this last-gasp effort only for this reason: It is time that at least once again we get the President of the United States back into the foreign-policy business in Central America. Since early 1988 when the democrats ended our efforts in Central America, America has not been involved in foreign policy in that region. The Sandinista has been dominating the policy. This agreement is a wish and a promise that we can pressure this regime once again to move down a path toward free elections, another chance for democracy, we say.
Mr. Chairman, I am supporting this agreement with very, little faith. We have drawn some lines that call for a credible standard of compliance, suggesting that some way, somehow, the Sandinista may comply to the words of this agreement. We talk of voluntary repatriation. I would suggest that we should pay very careful attention to the word voluntary, for, indeed, if those people who have been on the hillsides are forced to go back to their home country in hope for election and for freedom and for democracy, clearly their lives could be at stake: voluntary relocation.
In turn, let us remember that the real reason for supporting this agreement at this pointg is that far-out, very slim line of possible hope, a chance for freedom. If nothing else, the least that we have done is give the President a chance to carry on a foreign policy in Central America once again. I hold for President Bush great praise and prayers.
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEwen].
Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Chairman, again, I briefly rise in support of this legislation for all of the reasons that those who support democracy, those who are democrats, believe that something should be done for the cause of freedom.
As Mr. Ortega, the man who hijacked the revolution of the Sandinistas some years ago, was speaking recently of economic and social problems in Nicaragua, he said:
We will not renounce our ideology. We are not renouncing any programs for socialist orientation. This is the way to continue building socialism in Latin America. We, Sandinistas, we, as Marxists, as Marxist-Leninists, we as anything else you want to add, understand that we are applying this revolutionary program.
How are they doing it? By hundreds of millions of dollars of Soviet aid within 3 hours of my hometown. The Soviet Union is involved in oppressing the poor people of Central America. There are those who approve of that, those that think that is good, those that want to close their eyes and hold their ears and allow them to do it. There are those on the other hand, who are democrats, those who believe in democracy, those who believe in freedom, those who believe that our governments should be elected by the people and not imposed upon them by Soviets and Soviet surrogates in Havana. Those who believe in that option will want to support the possibility that maybe these dear, poor people who are subjected to the mercies of the Soviet Hind helicopters and Soviet troops and Cuban troops and advisers and hundreds of millions of dollars of Soviet aid, that just perhaps they will have an opportunity for election.
If that is the possibility, let us not miss this opportunity, this chance to make it work.
A colloquy was held moments ago that causes me concern. I would ask if the ranking member on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Broomfield, would be willing to assist me in clarification of a question that I have before voting for this legislation. It is my understanding that this bill before us does not change any existing authorities, that it provides for continued humanitarian aid for the 7 to 10 months under the same restrictions that are contained in the current humanitarian aid program enacted in title IX of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal 1989 in the 100th Congress; in other words, there is nothing in this bill that supersedes or prevents the continuing program that is currently in existence for the Agency for International Development as well as title IX of the Defense Appropriations Act?
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Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McEWEN. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, that is my understanding.
Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan for that clarification to make sure that all of us who want to give peace a chance, all of us who want to give freedom a chance, those of us who after 10 years are refusing to close our eyes and refuse to face reality, to understand that as President Azcona said, of Honduras, there can never be opportunity, there can never be the destruction of poverty in Central America until there is the restoration of democracy in Nicaragua, that as long as the Soviet Union will destroy any chance of anyone to invest, to put people to work, to build a hotel, to put in a water system, as long as the Soviets will finance their destruction, then those people will continue to live not only in poverty but also in slavery.
Mr. Chairman, some approve of that; some rejoice. Some will stand on their chairs and applaud if that is allowed to continue, but hopefully today we will draw a curtain on that period of our brief history, the period that began in February of last year.
We can have a bipartisan effort to say that America stands for democracy. America stands for elections. America stands for freedom of the press. America stands for freedom of speech. American stands for freedom of assembly, and whether it be here or whether it be in Iran or whether it be in Central America or anywhere else, that America does stand for something.
We will support those who stand with us, and so I encourage the Members to join us in support of this glimmer of hope that freedom will have a chance in Central America.
Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hayes].
(Mr. HAYES of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. HAYES of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, as a firm believer and supporter of charity begins at home, I state for the Record my opposition to this piece of legislation.
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dreier].
(Mr. DREIER of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Chairman, throughout this decade we have seen our friends on the other side of the aisle say that Ronald Reagan and the Republicans were doing nothing but putting M-16's into the hands of 16-year-olds in Nicaragua. Frankly, we have throughout this decade pursued the diplomatic process, believe it or not. We have pursued diplomacy through the Contadora process, and I remember who walked away from the table there. It wasn't the United States. We have pursued the diplomatic process with the Esquipulas agreements. We pursued the diplomatic process with the Sapoa agreement and, unfortunately, we have not seen a great deal of success with diplomacy.
Mr. Chairman, we have now gotten to the point where virtually everyone agrees that we are continuing to pursue the diplomatic process, and I cannot help but think, Mr. Chairman, of the statement that former President Reagan made time and time again, `Name one totalitarian Communist regime which has ever negotiated itself out of existence.'
[TIME: 1500]
But, Mr. Chairman, we are all sitting here, Republicans and Democrats alike, holding out that little bit of hope that this will be the first time that we see that happen.
Nevertheless, I am very concerned because I will never forget on December 13, 1987, when Daniel Ortega said:
If by chance we were to see the Sandinistas lose an election we would give up the government, but we would never give up power.
I am going to vote in support of this package, and I am pleased that we are using every means possible to try and convince the Soviets that they must extricate themselves from this Isthmus in Central America. But it is going to be a struggle. It is going to be difficult.
I look for that little silver lining in the dark cloud that hangs over us in Central America, and that silver lining to me is the prospect of elections, the prospect of free and fair elections. That is what the people were promised back in July 1979 by the Sandinistas, free and fair elections, an end to human rights violations, a nonaligned foreign policy and political pluralism. Those are the four promises that the Sandinistas made to the people of Nicaragua and to the Organization of American States. Tragically, we know that they have been violated.
On March 19, I was privileged to go to El Salvador to witness the historic election there where we saw for the first time in the history of El Salvador the transition of one democratically elected government to another democratically elected government. Mr. Chairman, I hope and pray that we will see the same kind of election take place in Nicaragua on February 25 of next year. I hope very much that that will be the case.
The people of El Salvador made a great sacrifice to exercise that right to vote. The people of El Salvador in the tiny town of Neuvo Concepcion were told that if they voted the FMLN Communist guerrillas would kill them. They were told that if they voted and they were found to have that little black spot of ink on their finger, that their finger would be cut off. Yet people walked 15, 20, 25, 30 kilometers to exercise that precious right to vote. And Mr. Chairman, in El Salvador on March 19, with that kind of threat posed on the people of El Salvador, they had a greater voter turnout than we in the United States of America had in last November's election.
I believe that the people of Nicaragua want to do the same thing between now and February of next year, and I hope and pray that this bipartisan package which has been put together will bring that about because, as I said, Mr. Chairman, I continue to hold out that little bit of hope that even though no totalitarian Communist regime has ever negotiated itself out of existence, that this will, in fact, be the first one.
I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.
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Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. BROOMFIELD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, the administration has gone more than halfway to meet the concerns of Congress--in particular, the majority leaderhsip--to bring about a bipartisan accord that advances democracy in Central America.
President Bush and Secretary Baker are to be commended for their determination to cauterize the gaping, rift that has plagued the national debate on policy toward Nicaragua.
As we reassess our policy, let's hope, and indeed insist, that the Soviets will do the same.
The Soviets should terminate all military aid to the Sandinista regime, and their support for guerrilla insurgencies in the region, and demand a halt to the export of revolution.
As President Arias stated last week, we have entered a new era for democracy in Central America and Castro and Daniel Ortega are living in the past. Their policies are not the future of Central America.
The Soviets have no legitimate security interests in the Western Hemisphere. I disagree with those who acknowledge a Soviet right to project any military influence in this hemisphere.
The people of Central America do not want communism--they want democracy. That is our ultimate objective as well. Peace, democracy, security for all in Central America.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the bipartisan leadership effort that made this accord possible.
Speaker Wright, my Republican leader, Bob Michel--working in conjunction with Majority Leader Tom Foley and the leaders of the Senate--Senator Dole and Majority Leader Mitchell, who had the courage to attempt this effort to embark upon a new course of bipartisanship in Central America are all to be highly commended.
Let's hope that together with the administration we can maintain this commitment to advance democracy in this hemisphere.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield] has consumed 2 minutes.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of the time alloted to me.
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Smith].
Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I have been involved in not only voting on this issue but obviously in dealing with the issue for quite some time now. It seems to me that over the course of the last 6 years we have had a significant number of alternatives presented to us at different times, and we have tried to take advantage each time of the best possible interests of the United States, and at the same time try to serve the best possible interests of the people of Nicaragua, not the government of Nicaragua, but the people of Nicaragua.
Each time somehow we have fallen short of the mark. Each time somehow we have been unable to effectively deal with the problems that existed in that country, or effectively deal with the government of that country.
The previous speakers have mentioned Sapoa and Esquipulas and Contadora and all of the other initiatives that have gone on. None have laid out, of course, any of the individual items in each of those, but it is clear that over the course of the last few years the Sandinista government has agreed to a number of items in those particular agreements that were reached. They have signed some of those accords only later to back away from them.
There are those in this House on both sides who while bemoaning the fact that we should be placed in a position of having a force like the Contras being supported by us, being somewhat created by us, by the same token they
are extremely, those Members and myself, concerned about what would happen if there were no such pressure. And when ultimately the agreements are reached and then breached, we are concerned that we cannot seem to get to the bottom of it or find a way to get a key to unlock the door.
The Sandinistas breached agreements that they made, representations that they made in 1979 when the United States recognized them, and at one time, I do not know it this has been mentioned in the debate, the Sandinista government was the recipient of more foreign aid per capita than any other country in the world from the United States, in the hopes that the revolution was in fact going to bring democracy.
They made representations to the United States, to the OAS, and their own people. They breached them. They clamped down harder. They took away more rights than had been taken away previously, and the bottom line was the people suffered.
When they signed their agreement, Contadora, they did not live up to it. They closed down the radios, they closed down the press, they debilitated the opposition to the point where it could not exist. There was no pluralism, there was no right of free assembly. The church complained. The Cardinal himself was the subject of scathing attacks by the government.
They made another set of agreements, most of which they breached. Now we are here today, we are looking at mercifully probably the closest thing to a bipartisan approach we have really had on this issue to date, and thank goodness.
But the problem remains what resolve do we have and what resolve do the Presidents of the five Latin American countries have if this fails as well? Are we going to let ourselves go to the brink again and then, when the Sandinistas refuse to do what is expected of them, are we just going to sit by and cluck our tongues and wring our hands and say, `Oh, well, we failed again'? Because if we are, the Sandinistas are going to somehow sense that beforehand and doom is written into this resolution, failure is going to be an inevitable byproduct.
I believe we should make ourselves clear now as this policy is enunciated on a bipartisan basis and on the basis that it is something shared in common between this country and the other countries in the region that are concerned; we should make clear now that we will no longer allow them to wiggle out, that it in fact they do not comport themselves as a nation allowing human rights, allowing free suffrage, allowing free and fair elections, allowing freedom of the press, public assembly, and the like, they will be pinned to the wall for it and there will be retribution.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Smith].
Mr. SMITH of Florida. I thank the gentleman for yielding further.
The only way this agreement is going to work is if the United States and the countries involved, Honduras, Guatemala, and certainly Costa Rica, and Mr. Arias and the others will say that now they are prepared to sanction Nicaragua to the extent necessary if they do not hold up their end of what is otherwise a significant opening for them to join the normal family of nations.
We all have our doubts, we are all skeptics, but we have to back up what we say in this bipartisan agreement with a policy that will once and for all put the Sandinistas on notice, they either do right or suffer the consequences.
Up to now I do not believe they believed that we will do that. If we do it now, maybe this agreement will work.
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Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully ask unanimous consent to reclaim the time that I just recently returned.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of that time to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Edwards].
The CHAIRMAN. It is the Chair's understanding that the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Edwards] has 14 minutes remaining.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire of the Chair are we about to begin the close of this debate for each of the four parties here? Let me ask: How much time is left for each party?
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair advises that the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Edwards], as the Chair just stated, has 14 minutes remaining; the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] has 5 1/2 minutes remaining; the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell] has 8 1/2 minutes remaining; and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] has 13 minutes remaining.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute to explain the situation.
Mr. Chairman, if I could have the attention of the Members from California: I have one speaker left on my time, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell] has one speaker left, the Speaker of the House; the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Edwards] has one speaker left, himself, and the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer], as I understand it, is the only remaining speaker.
So all of the time that we have will not be used.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Illinois [Mrs. Collins]; then I will take the remainder of the time.
Mrs. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding this time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today to voice my vehement disapproval and dissent with the current Contra aid agreement. As this agreement now stands, the Contras will receive $50 million in humanitarian aid over the next 10 months. Unfortunately, aid that has been labeled as humanitarian has ended up in the hands of some groups in Nicaragua who have used this money for hostile, violent purposes.
I have been consistent when it comes to Contra aid, and I shall not waver now. This Contra currency is money that could be used here in the United States--to supplement better child care facilities, begin more drug rehabilitation clinics, or at the very least, reduce our Federal deficit. We have unfortunately been the unwilling victims of a babbling, incoherent Central American policy that began with Ronald Reagan and seems to be on the same course with George Bush. Why don't we, dear colleagues, give peace a chance? This money will only allow more killing to once again become the norm, while providing a real disincentive to peaceful negotiations.
Now is not the time for the craven, the weak, nor for the vacillator unwilling to take a stand. Now is the time for the ethical, the moral, the righteous to take a stand for peace, justice, equality, and harmony in Central America. That stand is to vote against any and all further Contra aid and to encourage peaceful negotiations. Further aid to the Contras in any size, shape or form is not conducive to harmony in Nicaragua. Paraphrasing Winston Churchill, sometimes it is not enough for us to do our best; sometimes we need to do what needs to be done. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to do what is so desperately needed for Central America and vote no to all Contra aid.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the leadership again for the generosity of time that they did give me to speak and to organize the Democratic Members who are in opposition to this compromise.
Once more, in closing this debate I want to show you the images of this debate. I did this this morning when I debated the rule, and I would like to do it again.
The first image, the wounded civilians, the mothers, the fathers, the babies that have been hurt by the Contras. Hundreds and hundreds of these innocents that have gotten hurt under the banner of so-called humanitarian aid. You can call it what you will, you can call it nonlethal, you can call it humanitarian aid, but it has resulted in this little Eric Lopez getting his shoulder blown off and his face disfigured for life and his mother, Dora, at 22 years old, with one leg and without an eye.
Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Mrs. BOXER. I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. Miller].
Mr. MILLER of California. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
As I listened to the debate today already we are starting a revisionist hearing of the role of the Contras in this struggle. It has been suggested today that we are doing nothing more than terminating or maintaining the freedom fighters against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.
In fact, let us remember what the record of these individuals is. They have gone through the Nicaraguan countryside, shooting civilians, shooting children, blowing up trucks with farm workers on their way to work, on their way to market, they destroyed coffee pickers and coffee plantations, they have burned civilian targets all in the name of so-called freedom fighters. I do not think that is the kind of people that the U.S. Government ought to be supporting.
Today as we speak of them as freedom fighters, they hold hundreds of individuals that they have kidnaped from the Nicaraguan countryside, they continue to terrorize Honduran villagers and citizens of Honduras where they have occupied those lands; they continue raids against Honduran coffee growers, they continue raids against Honduran families, they do engage in kidnaping, in molesting of women. These are the people that we are sending $67 million to in the name of humanitarian assistance. Something is terribly wrong with this debate if my colleagues on the Republican side of the aisle believe that these rapists and these murderers and these molesters are humanitarian and deserve U.S. taxpayer dollars.
Mrs. BOXER. Let me just say to the gentleman that I am glad that he brought this debate back to reality. It is not a pleasant reality, but it is one that we have to face, disguise it though we will with nice words.
I want to show the other image of this debate that many of the colleagues on my side of the aisle have brought up today. The faces of the homeless, the homeless children, the needs of the people in our own country who would give a lot to get $5,000 in 1 year. They need health care.
The gentleman from California [Mr. Miller] founded the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, and we know what is happening out there. We understand the needs that are out there. We should not be sending $67 million to the Contras.
Last, the picture of the Contras playing volleyball at a time in our history when Jack Kemp, the Secretary of HUD, has to fight to get basketball nets in housing projects.
So those are the images of this debate.
I do not question my colleagues who feel again that this is a step toward peace. But I felt it was very important in this debate to give voice to those of us who are once again standing up and being counted and saying, `No more.'
Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield again?
Mrs. BOXER. I yield to the gentleman from California.
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Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, we have come to the end of the portion of our time. I just want to on behalf of many of us who have fought this policy for many, many years, and I hope this is the last time we will be engaged in this kind of debate, I want to thank the gentlewoman for her efforts to organize this debate today, to give voice to our concerns about this policy and hopefully, whether we win or lose, this will start the diminishment of the violence and the terror in Central America.
I want to thank the gentlewoman from California for all of her support througout these many agonizing years as we have tried to defeat this horrible policy of the Reagan administration and now this last hangover from the Bush administration.
[TIME: 1520]
She made amazing contributions with her energy and with her convictions to this debate and to the rest of the Members who have tried to work against this policy, and I just want to thank the gentlewoman for her efforts.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 1750, the Implementation of the Bipartisan Accord on Central America Act of 1989. The spirit of bipartisanship exhibited in this legislation sets a constructive tone for the myriad foreign policy issues which remain on the international agenda.
The issue of appropriate, effective foreign policy toward Central America, and particularly for Nicaragua has been a focal point of contention between the legislative and executive branches for nearly a decade.
This legislation is significant because it represents two positive developments:
First, it demonstrates the firm commitment of the Bush administraiton toward congressional consultation on important foreign policy initiatives.
Second, it reflects the recognition of the President and Congress that diplomatic initiatives are the most appropriate avenue through which a negotiated political settlement in Nicaragua can be achieved.
This legislation underscores the importance of Sandinista compliance with the provisions in Esquipulas II, Sapoa, as well as the latest peace accord signed by the Central America nations in El Salvador on February 14, 1989.
Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I am in strong support of this legislation.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 7 minutes.
I rise to make a number of points in closing. First of all, I would like to address the question of cost. The fact is that there is absolutely no cost to the taxpayer today from this legislation, because every dollar which is being expended under this bill is being financed by a reduction in funds in the military budget. We are, in fact, transferring and rescinding enough appropriations for the Defense Department to fully pay for every dollar expended under this bill, so the bill is budget neutral.
Second, I would simply like to say, as one who has opposed the Contra policy with every ounce of energy at my command since the day that policy commenced, because I thought it was misguided and not in the best traditions of our country, I am supporting this agreement today because I think it effectively does end the war. It ends the killing which has been referred to by a good many Members on this side of the aisle. I, frankly, do not mind at all that a good many Democrats are indicating their continued unhappiness with this proposition. I think that sends a proper message to the administration that this package is being supported with the greatest tenuousness, and I think it makes quite clear that any departure from the understandings that were arrived at would put in jeopardy any further cooperation on this issue, which would be a tragedy.
This legislation simply ties down the fact that the war is over. The question is what do we do now? Well, the first thing that is supposed to happen is that the President of Honduras and the President of Nicaragua are supposed to negotiate or supposed to finish negotiating by May 15, the process by which the Contras may be reintegrated into their own country. That is No. 1.
It is supposed to be focusing our understanding on the fact that American policy from now on will be focused upon diplomatic and economic tools to achieve stability in the region, and, we hope, move toward democratization within Nicaragua itself.
I hope it also leads to a newfound focus in this country on the true causes of political instability in this hemisphere. I hope it does focus on the fact that unless we put our great weight and great prestige on the side of efforts to deal with health and education and social misery in this hemisphere, we will not be making much progress. Most of all, it will require that we pay attention to the real threat to the United States' security interests in the Western Hemisphere, most especially what is happening in Mexico, most especially the economic conditions, and the Third World debt pressures which are putting great negative pressures on democracies throughout the continent.
The last thing I would like to do is simply to congratulate a number of people for having helped to bring everyone to this moment. First of all, to the distinguished Democratic deputy whip, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior], who has held countless meetings to try to work this process through to a successful conclusion. I think he has performed an
immense service on the part of the taxpayers and anyone who believes in peace. Second, I would like to congratulate President Arias, because it was his gutsiness and his leadership that enabled the Central American Presidents to get together in an effort to take responsibility for what happens in Central America on the shoulders of Central Americans. Third, I would like to congratulate Secretary Baker. As one Member of the majority side of the House who has on a number of occasions seen his own patriotism questioned every time we have opposed the specific policy being followed by the administration, it is a pleasure to see that we have as Secretary of State, someone who understands that there are good, solid patriots on both sides of this question, and that the only question at issue here is how we best defend the interests of the United States and the values which we all hold dear. I congratulate the Secretary for also recognizing that if we are to have a foreign policy that works, it has to be one which is supported by a majority of both parties, not 100 percent of one party and 10 percent of the other. That is not bipartisanship. That is by definition, a policy based on a politically unstable situation, and that kind of policy cannot last. I think that this kind of policy today can last.
Fourth, I would like to congratulate the Speaker of the House. I remember when he was first invited by the White House to participate in a new effort to try to bring peace to the area. I think the previous administration underestimated how seriously the Speaker took his responsibilities, and I think all Members recognize that if the Speaker had not been so steadfast in his support of the Arias peace efforts, we would not be at this point today. I think this country owes the Speaker a tremendous debt of gratitude, and I think the cause of peace will be forever in his debt.
Lastly, I would like to congratulate every Member in this House who has given any thought at all to this issue over the last 8 years. One of the great things about the House of Representatives is that, eventually, no matter how personally we sometimes take those arguments, and no matter how passionately we disagree, eventually most people in the House come to recognize that when we do disagree we are doing it out of firm conviction and not because we are trying to do in each other politically or because we are trying to gain a political edge.
[TIME: 1530]
Mr. Chairman, this is by definition a House of conflict, but in the end it also has to be a House of consensus, and hopefully we are building one today.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
(Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
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Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding this time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the bipartisan package we are considering today. This package of humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance represents the best opportunity in years for Congress and the executive branch to establish a bipartisan consensus on an issue that, for too long, has divided this country. I commend the Democratic leadership in the House and the administration specifically Senator Baker for their efforts to assemble this important agreement. In particular, I hope my colleagues will recognize the critical role Speaker Wright played in crafting this legislation. His leadership was a significant factor in making it possible for the negotiations, which resulted in this agreement, to be conducted in a bipartisan atmosphere.
Regrettably, there are still a number of Members in this body on both ends of the spectrum who seem intent on disrupting the potential this agreement holds for American foreign policy in Central America. There are those who cling to the contentious policy of the previous administration, which repudiated diplomacy and opted, instead, for a military solution. There are also those who want only to drive a stake through the Contras, while refusing to acknowledge the repressive nature of the Sandinista regime.
Both of these views have been at the center of the paralysis that characterized our Central American policy throughout the Reagan administration. They have dominated the headlines at the expense of American credibility and stability in the region. But perhaps most importantly, both have undermined the fundamental objective of our policy toward Nicaragua, which should be the establishment of a government based on democratic principles.
Today, however, we have an opportunity to depart from the partisan rancor of the past. This package will allow the United States to work with our neighbors in the region, and to speak with one, clear voice.
By adopting this bill, the resistance will be sustained in their camps in Honduras while the Nicaraguan Government prepares for free elections next February as promised. The Sandinistas have long complained that the military threat posed by the Contras has prevented them from democratizing their country. This bill prohibits the use of United States funds by the resistance for the purpose of carrying out military activities against the Nicaraguan Government. There should be no reason for the Sandinistas to renege on their promises for free and fair elections next February, at which point the resistance can be fully reintegrated into the social and political life of Nicaragua.
Mr. Chairman, throughout the debates about United States policy toward Nicaragua that have taken place in this body, I have supported humanitarian aid to the resistance as one source of pressure on the Sandinistas to reach a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties to the conflict in that country. But while we fought over how much or how little military aid the Contras should receive, prospects for serious negotiations for democracy in Nicaragua were ignored, and the regional problems facing other countries in Central America were left unattended.
By adopting this bill today, we can refocus our attention on Central America. We must continue to push for a free and democratic government in Nicaragua, for as Costa Rican President, Oscar Arias, has so persuasively argued, `Without democracy, there can be no peace in Central America.' but the rest of Central America deserves our attention and our support.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to avoid the misguided arguments that so often have dominated this issue and to support this important piece of legislation.
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Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
The CHAIRMAN. Evidently, a quorum is not present.
Members will record their presence by electronic device.
The call was taken by electronic device.
The following Members responded to their names:
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[TIME: 1558]
The CHAIRMAN. Three hundred ninety-six Members have answered to their names, a quorum is present, and the Committee will resume its business.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Edwards].
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Coughlin].
(Mr. COUGHLIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, to conclude the debate on our side, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, today at last, at long, long last, the Congress and the President, Republicans and Democrats, speak with one voice in support of democracy and security in Central America. If there is any hope that this will lead to democracy in Nicaragua, if there is any hope for an end to Sandinista subversion and the destabilization of Nicaragua's neighboring democracies, if there is hope for an end to the Soviet bloc's military support of Nicaragua and its threats to its neighbors, then none of this, none of it could have been possible without our support for the Nicaraguan resistance.
Try to think back to the time when the Contra forces had grown to nearly 20,000 men and women who operated freely in over half of Nicaragua and when Nicaraguans took to the streets of Managua to protest against the Sandinista regime. It was the Contras who helped to bring the Sandinistas to the bargaining table with their Central American neighbors, and later to meet with the resistance leaders themselves face to face at Sapoa. It was the Contras who had made it more difficult for the Sandinistas to arm and train Communist guerrillas in El Salvador and in Guatemala.
Today by supporting this Bipartisan Accord on Central America, we are keeping the Contras as a part of the solution.
[TIME: 1600]
I repeat to my friends, the Members on this side of the aisle, by supporting this bipartisan accord, we are keeping the Contras as a part of the solution. We are signaling to the world that we are not abandoning these brave men and women who have fought for freedom and democracy in their country, and we are signaling that we are committed to seeing to it that if the Contras choose to return home they will return to a safe, a peaceful, and a democratic Nicaragua.
Mr. Chairman, let me speak to those on my side who have doubts about this agreement. I cannot stand here today and tell them that I have much faith in the peace process. The track record of the Sandinistas has been abysmal, one broken promise after another. Offers of United States economic aid in 1979 did not stop the Sandinistas from supporting Marxist insurgencies; and economic embargo and denial of multilateral bank loans did not prompt Nicaragua to hold free elections or to allow greater political expression. Our support for fragile democracies in Central America has not slowed the flow of Cuban, Soviet, and East European arms and advisers into Nicaragua.
For this new attempt to be successful, the Central American peace process must be based on more than simple promises. It must be based on credible standards of compliance, strict timetables for enforcement, effective means to verify both the democratization process and the security requirements of these agreements, and it must require that the Contras be in place.
We have a collective obligation to push for progress toward election of civilian leadership, that the defense of human rights, maintaining the rule of law, effective judicial systems, and a free, open, safe political process in which all
groups and individuals can fairly compete for political leadership.
Let me present to the Members a short possible scenario: It is now February 1990; the Sandinistas, having broken their word yet once more, have failed to hold elections. There has been no electoral reform, no real democracy. All of this has happened because the Contras have not received one penny of American aid since April 1989. Then who will have abandoned the Contras? Then who will have eliminated the best and perhaps the only option for bringing democracy to Central America? It will be those people in this Chamber, including those who consider themselves friends and supporters of the Contras, who because they cannot give the Contras everything, choose to give them nothing at all, who, afraid that the Contras may be abandoned in the 7 months or 10 months, choose to abandon them now.
Do not be the ones who because they are afraid that later the plug will be pulled on the Contras, do not be the ones to pull the plug on them today. We have the opportunity today to turn the spotlight on, not away from, Nicaragua, and those who choose to vote against this bill will be voting to kill our chances for democracy in Nicaragua. Those who vote against this bill had better understand this: Tyranny and repression are the true sources of bloodshed in Central America. The Contras did not create the bloodshed. The Contras are fighting for freedom. Tyranny and repression are the reasons that there is war in Central America.
Mr. Chairman, I will say to my colleagues that any who have been to Central America and who have seen the young men and women who risk their lives for freedom would not consider this a moment for idle chatter.
To bring peace and democracy to Central America, our unified voice is vital, and at last we have at least a unified voice. I urge every Member to vote for this bipartisan agreement to keep the Contras alive.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
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Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time, 8 1/2 minutes, to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wright].
Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, the goal of U.S. foreign policy for the last 45 years has been generally bipartisan. In most areas of the world the Congress and the administration have worked together. We have done what the late Senator Arthur Vandenberg suggested, and that is to unite our voice at the water's edge.
Even during these last few years of bitter, divisive quarrel about Nicaragua, over most of the rest of the world we have been united--in the Middle East, in the Philippines, in the Persian Gulf.
I and other members of my party have stood and spoken for such initiatives of the Reagan administration as the Caribbean Basin Initiative.
[TIME: 1610]
Even in the terrible debacle of Lebanon, nobody on my side of the aisle rose to take advantage in any partisan way because the loss was a national loss. It was not a partisan issue and should not ever be.
Arthur Vandenberg also said something which I think is applicable in this instance. He said to then-President Harry Truman, `if you want us with you on the landing, you need to have us with you on the take-off.'
I want to express my personal appreciation to Secretary of State Jim Baker and to the administration of President George Bush. They have been at some pains to try to help create an atmosphere conducive to bipartisanship in Central America. And Members on my side have tried very earnestly to assist in this endeavor.
As I say, throughout the world with only two exceptions, foreign policy has been bipartisan, or, if you please, nonpartisan. Those two exceptions have been South Africa and Nicaragua, not Central America but just Nicaragua.
Many of us on this side of the aisle have joined in a bipartisan effort to show our support for local, non-violent self-determination as we agreed to support the Rio Treaty in the case of El Salvador. I think in this bipartisan way we are trying to achieve the objectives that all of us truly desire.
I think everybody, Democrat and Republican, the administration and Congress, all reasonable people, really do want peace in Central America. We would like for this process which has been set in motion by the Central American presidents themselves to succeed. And I think all of us, Democrats and Republicans alike, really do want democracy to occur in all of the countries of Central America, including Nicaragua, and also including Panama, Chile and Paraguay.
This bill tries to set in motion a united, single voice policy that has a chance to achieve both of those objectives. I do not know if it will work, but I really do believe it is the best that we can do. It ends military involvement in covert efforts to overthrow governments in our hemisphere. By that we are saying, look, we are going to be straightforward, we are going to be upfront, we are going to tell you the truth. We are not going to hide beneath a covert cover. What we are going to do in the arena is what we say we are doing. We are going to say to Nicaragua that we are very earnest about your fulfilling these commitments that you have made to internal democratization. And we hope they will be fulfilled to the end that when your election is held in February 1990, conditions in your country will be free and safe for those who were engaged in this internecine war. They will return and take part in the reconstruction of that battered, damaged country, that cruelly bloody country, and give it a chance.
I do not know who will win the election. I have choices. I will tell my colleagues quite frankly if I had been making a choice in El Salvador I guess I would have wanted the Christian Democratic Party to win because of my great admiration for President Jose Napoleon Duarte and what he has been trying to do. El Salvador had a vote, and so far as I am concerned it was a free vote and a fair vote, and they elected the spokesman for the other party, the Arena Party. And I have to confess that when I and others of us met Alfredo Cristiani, I was very much impressed with his sincerity and with his earnest desire to provide true human rights in his country and to reform the judicia. I think he is sincere.
I come to the point of saying it is not up to me to say whom the Salvadorans should elect. It is up to them, and our position has to be that we support the process of free elections, and we support the results of
that election, just as we expect them to support the results of our elections.
Now if that does apply in El Salvador, there is a chance that it may be made to apply in Nicaragua and elsewhere. If we could get this painful era behind us and stop draining off so much of the slender patrimony of those smitten lands for warfare and bloodshed, maybe they could begin the painful, arduous task of reconstruction so essential to creating a framework in which democracy can survive. The tree of individual liberties, I believe, only will thrive when it is planted in the soil of economic growth and watered by the gentle rains of social justice.
The average citizen in Latin America makes an annual income one-fourteenth that of the average citizen of the United States. In other words, the average one of us makes more in a month than the average Latin American makes all year.
Democracy will thrive and survive when it can demonstrate that it is able to address the legitimate social and economic objectives of the people, and do it better than would be done by sacrificing political liberties and following a dictator of either the right or the left. The people in Latin America whom I have talked with, including President Arias whose plan this supports, are delighted that the Congress and the President will be speaking with one voice.
So let us give it a chance. Let us try to unite if we can. Let us try to put to rest all of these charges and countercharges that we have heard and made against one another. Let us give to each, one to the other, the assumption of good faith.
I believe that my Republican colleagues do want peace in Central America, and I think most of them believe that most of my Democratic colleagues do want democracy and personal liberty and human rights observed. So let us try to work together and give substance by our vote today to the hope that we can demonstrate to all of the world that this country of ours can lay aside past disagreements, vitriolic, venomous though they may have been on occasion, and unite on a common course.
I believe that is what we are trying to do today, and I hope that this will pass by a big vote, and each of us can begin to put to rest the old hostilities and the mistrust which has pervaded our own government and should not do so, just as it has pervaded relations between friends and neighbors in Central America.
Maybe we can begin that day sought by Aristophanes who walked among the ruins of the Greek temples, destroyed by the Peloponnesian Wars, and uttered this prayer:
From the murmur and subtlety of suspicion with which we vex one another, give us rest. Make a new beginning, mingle again among the kindred of the nations with the alchemy of love, and with some finer essence of forbearance temper our minds.
It is a chance for a new beginning, and let us give it a chance.
[TIME: 1620]
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read for amendment under the 5-minute rule.
The text of H.R. 1750 is as follows:
[Page: H1178]
SECTION 1. POLICY.
The purpose of this Act is to implement the Bipartisan Accord on Central America between the President and the Congress signed on March 24, 1989.
SEC. 2. ADDITIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
(a) Transfer of Funds: The President may transfer to the Agency for International Development, from unobligated funds from the appropriations accounts specified in section 6--
(1) $49,750,000, to provide humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan Resistance, to remain available through February 28, 1990;
(2) such funds as may be necessary to provide transportation in accordance with section 3 for assistance authorized by paragraph (1); and
(3) not to exceed $5,000,000 to `Operating Expenses of the Agency for International Development' to meet the necessary administrative expenses to carry out this Act.
(b) Definition: For purposes of this section and section 3, the term `humanitarian assistance' means--
(1) food, clothing, and shelter;
(2) medical services, medical supplies, and nonmilitary training for health and sanitation;
(3) nonmilitary training of the recipients with respect to their treatment of civilians and other armed forces personnel, in accordance with internationally accepted standards of human rights;
(4) payment for such items, services, and training;
(5) replacement batteries for existing communications equipment; and
(6) support for voluntary reintegration of and voluntary regional relocation by the Nicaraguan Resistance.
SEC. 3. TRANSPORTATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
(a) In General: The transportation of humanitarian assistance on or after the date of enactment of this Act which, before such date, was specifically authorized by law to be provided to the Nicaraguan Resistance, or which is authorized to be provided by section 2, shall be arranged solely by the Agency for International Development in a manner consistent with the Bipartisan Accord on Central America between the President and the Congress signed on March 24, 1989.
(b) Prohibition on Mixed Loads: Transportation of any military assistance, or of any assistance other than that specified in 2(b), is prohibited.
SEC. 4. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE.
The President may transfer to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development from unobligated funds from appropriations accounts specified in section 6, $4,166,000, to be used only for the provision of medical assistance for the civilian victims of the Nicaraguan civil strife to be transported and administered by the Catholic Church in Nicaragua.
SEC. 5. UNITED STATES POLICY CONCERNING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR CENTRAL AMERICA.
As part of an effort to promote democracy and address on a long-term basis the economic causes of regional and political instability in Central America--
(1) in recognition of the recommendations of groups such as the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, the Inter-American Dialogue, and the Sanford Commission;
(2) to assist in the implementation of these economic plans and to encourage other countries in other parts of the world to join in extending assistance to Central America; and
(3) in the context of an agreement to end military conflict in the region;
the Congress encourages the President to submit proposals for bilateral and multilateral action--
(A) to provide additional economic assistance to the democratic countries of Central America to promote economic stability, expand educational opportunity, foster progress in human rights, bolster democratic institutions, and strengthen institutions of justice;
(B) to facilitate the ability of Central American economies to grow through the development of their infrastructure, expansion of exports, and the strengthening of increased investment opportunities;
(C) to provide a more realistic plan to assist Central American countries in managing their foreign debt; and
(D) to develop these initiatives in concert with Western Europe, Japan, and other democratic allies.
SEC. 6. SOURCE OF FUNDS; DEFERRAL OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Source of Funds: The appropriations accounts from which funds may be transferred pursuant to sections 2 and 4 are the following accounts in amounts not to exceed the following:
(1) Missile Procurement, Army 1988, $3,500,000.
(2) Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army 1987, $12,739,000.
(3) Other Procurement, Army 1988, $761,000.
(4) Aircraft Procurement, Air Force 1987, $3,408,000.
(5) Missile Procurement, Air Force 1987, $4,515,000.
(6) Missile Procurement, Air Force 1988, $9,975,000.
(7) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force, 1988, $1,902,000.
(8) Weapons Procurement, Navy 1989, $2,000,000.
(9) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy, 1989, $24,000,000.
(10) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force, 1989, $3,816,000.
(b) Deferral.--The following appropriations shall not be available for obligation or expenditure until October 1, 1989, in amounts as follows:
(1) Other Procurement, Army, 1988, $7,320,000.
(2) Other Procurement, Navy, 1988, $5,735,000.
(3) Missile Procurement, Air Force, 1988, $12,350,000.
SEC. 7. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF CERTAIN FUNDS.
(a) Military Operations: No funds available to any agency or entity of the United States Government under this Act may be obligated or expended pursuant to section 502(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 for the purpose of providing funds, materiel, or other assistance to the Nicaraguan Resistance to support military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.
(b) Human Rights and Other Violations: No assistance under this Act may be provided to any group that retains in its ranks any individual who has been found to engage in--
(1) gross violations of internationally recognized human rights (as defined in section 502(B)(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961); or
(2) drug smuggling or significant misuse of public or private funds.
SEC. 8. STANDARDS, PROCEDURES, CONTROLS, AND OVERSIGHT.
(a) Accountability Standards, Procedures, and Control: In implementing this Act, the Agency for International Development, and any other agency of the United States Government authorized to carry out activities under this Act, shall adopt the standards, procedures, and controls for the accountability of funds comparable to those applicable with respect to the assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance provided under section 111 of the joint resolution making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1988 (Public Law 100-202) and title IX of Public Law 100-463. Any changes in such standards, procedures, and controls shall be developed and adopted in consultation with the committees designated in subsection (b).
(b) Congressional Oversight: Congressional oversight within the House of Representatives and the Senate with respect to assistance provided by this Act shall be within the jurisdiction of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(c) Extension of Previous Provisions: The provisions of the Act of April 1, 1988 (Public Law 100-276), contained in subsections (b), (d), and (e) of section 4 and in section 5 shall apply to the provision of assistance under this Act except that section 4(d) shall not apply to the Intelligence Community.
SEC. 9. PROHIBITION.
Except as provided in this Act, no additional assistance may be provided to the Nicaraguan Resistance, unless the Congress enacts a law specifically authorizing such assistance.
SEC. 10. REPEAL.
Title IX of Public Law 100-463 is hereby repealed.
SEC. 11. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
The Secretary of State shall consult regularly with and report to the Congress on progress in meeting the goals of the peace and democratization process, including the use of assistance provided in this Act.
The CHAIRMAN. No amendments to the bill are in order except amendments offered by the Committee on Appropriations, which may be offered en bloc and shall be considered as having been read. Said amendments are debatable for 10 minutes, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority members of the Committee on Appropriations, or their designees, and are not amendable or divisible.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the Appropriations Committee amendments en bloc.
The text of the Appropriations Committee amendments en bloc is as follows:
Amendments offered by the Committee on Appropriations:
1. In Sec. 2.(a)(1) immediately before `49,750,000' insert the following: `up to'
2. In Sec. 2(a)(3), immediately after the word `Act', insert the following: `, to remain available through March 31, 1990'
[Page: H1179]
3. In Sec. 4. immediately after the word `transfer' insert the following: `, in addition to funds transferred prior to March 31, 1989,'
4. Further amend Sec. 4. by inserting immediately after the words `section 6,' the following: `up to'
5. Strike Sec. 6 and insert the following:
SEC. 6. SOURCE OF FUNDS; AND RESCISSION.
(a) Source of Funds: The appropriations accounts from which funds may be transferred pursuant to sections 2 and 4 are the following accounts in amounts not to exceed the following:
(1) Missile Procurement, Army 1988, $3,500,000.
(2) Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army 1987, $12,739,000.
(3) Other Procurement, Army, 1988, $761,000.
(4) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force, 1988, $1,902,000.
(5) Weapons Procurement, Navy 1989, $2,000,000.
(6) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy, 1989, $13,400,000.
(7) Other Procurement, Air Force, 1987, $32,300,000.
(b) Rescission: Of the funds available for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy, 1989, $10,600,000 is hereby rescinded.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] will be recognized for 5 minutes and the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Edwards] will be recognized for 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey].
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, there is no need to take the 5 minutes. Let me simply say this amendment does two simple things: It clarifies the effective dates, and it simply guarantees that this bill is going to be budget neutral.
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I have a 20-minute speech on this, but it is noncontroversial and it is fine with us.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the Appropriations Committee amendments, en bloc.
The Appropriations Committee amendments en bloc were agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. McCloskey, chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1750) to implement the bipartisan accord on Central America of March 24, 1989, pursuant to House Resolution 127, he reported the bill back to the House with sundry amendments adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.
Under the rule, the Chair will put the question on the committee amendments engros.
The question is on the Committee amendments en gros.
The committee amendments were agreed to.
The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.
Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. DORNAN of California. I am, Mr. Speaker, in its present form.
The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Dornan of California moves to recommit the bill H.R. 1750 to the Committee on Appropriations with instructions to report the same to the House forthwith with the following amendment:
At the end of the bill, add the following:
SEC. 12. REQUIREMENTS FOR TERMINATION OF ASSISTANCE.
Subject to section 7(b) of this Act, humanitarian assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance pursuant to section 2(a) of this Act shall continue through February 28, 1990, unless a law enacted after the enactment of this Act expressly requires the termination of such assistance.
SEC. 13. CONSIDERATION OF REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE IF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS NOT HELD IN NICARAGUA AS SCHEDULED.
(a) Presidential Certification and Request for Additional Assistance: If the President certifies to the Congress either--
(1) that the elections scheduled by the Government of Nicaragua for February 25, 1990, have been cancelled or postponed, or
(2) that those elections were not free, fair, and in
accordance with all agreements entered into by the Government of Nicaragua, that certification may include a request for budget and other authority to provide military or other assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance.
(b) Sources of Transferred Funds To Be Specified: If a request of the President under subsection (a) proposes the transfer of funds, the request shall specify the accounts from which the funds are proposed to be transferred.
(c) Additional Assistance Authorized if Joint Resolution Enacted: The President shall be granted the budget and other authority requested pursuant to subsection (a) if the Congress enacts a joint resolution approving such authority.
(d) Definition of Joint Resolution: For purposes of this section, the term `joint resolution' means only a joint resolution introduced on the first day on which the respective House of Congress is in session after the date on which the Congress receives the request submitted by the President pursuant to subsection (a)--
(1) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `That the Congress hereby approves the additional authority and assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance that the President requested pursuant to the Act entitled `An Act to implement the Bipartisan Accord on Central America of March 24, 1989'.';
(2) which does not have a preamble; and
(3) the title of which is as follows: `Joint resolution to authorize additional assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance.'.
(e) House Procedures: (1) This subsection applies with respect to the consideration of joint resolutions in the House of Representatives.
(2) Any joint resolution shall, upon introduction, be referred to the appropriate committee or committees.
(3) If all of the committees to which the first joint resolution introduced has been referred have not reported such joint resolution by the end of the 10-day period beginning on the date on which that joint resolution was introduced, any committee which has not reported such joint resolution shall be discharged from further consideration of that joint resolution, and such joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House.
(4) On any day after a joint resolution has been placed on the calendar in the House of Representatives, it is in order for any Member of the House of Representatives (after consultation with the Speaker as to the most appropriate time for consideration) to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the joint resolution.
(5) The motion that the House resolve itself into the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of a joint resolution is highly privileged and is in order even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to. All points of order against the joint resolution and against its consideration are waived. If the motion is agreed to, the joint resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the House until disposed of.
(6) Debate on the joint resolution shall not exceed 10 hours, which shall be divided equally between a Member favoring and a Member opposing the joint resolution. A motion to limit debate is in order at any time in the House or in the Committee of the Whole and is not debatable.
(7) An amendment to the joint resolution is not in order.
(8) At the conclusion of the debate on the joint resolution, the Committee of the Whole shall rise and report the joint resolution back to the House, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final passage without intervening motion.
(f) Senate Procedures.--(1) This subsection applies with respect to the consideration of joint resolutions in the Senate.
(2) A joint resolution introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the appropriate committee of the Senate.
(3) If the committee to which a joint resolution is referred has not reported such a joint resolution at the end the 10-day period beginning on the date on which the joint resolution was introduced, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of such joint resolution.
(4) When the committee to which a joint resolution is referred has reported, or has been discharged (under paragraph (3)) from further consideration of, a joint resolution, it is in order at any time thereafter (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the Senate to move to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution, notwithstanding any rule or precedent of the Senate, including Rule 22. All points of order against the joint resolution (and against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion is not debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. A yea and nay vote shall occur on the motion. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution is agreed to, the joint resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the Senate until disposed of.
(5) Debate on the joint resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally between the majority and the minority leaders or their
designees. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to, a motion to postpone, a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the joint resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.
(6) Immediately following the conclusion of debate on a joint resolution, and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the Senate, the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall occur.
(7) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate to the procedure relating to a joint resolution shall be decided without debate.
(8) If, before the passage by the Senate of a joint resolution of the Senate, the Senate receives from the House of Representatives a joint resolution, then the following procedures shall apply:
(A) The joint resolution of the House of Representatives shall not be referred to a committee.
(B) With respect to a joint resolution in the Senate--
(i) the procedure in the Senate shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the House; but
(ii) the vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution of the House.
(C) Upon disposition of the joint resolution received from the House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the joint resolution originated in the Senate.
(9) If the Senate receives from the House of Representatives a joint resolution after the Senate has disposed of a Senate originated joint resolution, the action of the Senate with regard to the disposition of the Senate originated joint resolution shall be deemed to be the action of the Senate with regard to the House originated joint resolution.
(g) Rulemaking Powers of Congress.--Subsections (e) and (f) are enacted--
(1) as an exercise in the rulemaking powers of the House of Representatives and Senate, and as such they are deemed a part of the rules of the House and the rules of the Senate, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in the House and the Senate in the case of joint resolutions under this section, and they supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent with such rules; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of the House and the Senate to change their rules at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of the House or Senate, and of the right of the Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives to report a resolution for the consideration of any measure.
[Page: H1180]
Mr. DORNAN of California (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the motion to recommit be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan] will be recognized for 10 minutes, and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] will be recognized for 10 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].
Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 9 1/2 minutes, reserving 30 seconds for closing.
Mr. Speaker, in the interest of your President Harry Truman's quote about being in at the landing and considering this as our umpteenth beginning, the landing may be a hard one after the election in Nicaragua of February 25, if in fact it does take place, is not canceled or postponed, and the landing may be a hard one because all the odds are, given the conduct of the Communist in Managua over the last decade, that they will corrupt the election process as surely as the drug-running thug Noriega is corrupting the process of the election that is supposed to take place May 4 in the nation of Panama.
My motion to recommit, Mr. Speaker, with instructions is divided into two parts, which address what I believe are the two most glaring problems with H.R. 1750 and the related side agreements.
I repeat there are two parts, part A, the side agreement, the letter exchange, the so-called gentleman's agreement which does not go into effect until after we vote, it enables any one of nine Members, yourself included, Mr. Speaker, to terminate this humanitarian aid that we are voting on today to the Nicaraguan resistance, the so-called Contras. It enables any one of nine Members of this body and the other Chamber 87 days before the election that we are all hoping for, to cut off the Contras and to begin their starvation process. In other words, this agreement allows a pocket veto by any one of nine Members by simply not sending a letter of affirmation.
Nine select Members of Congress must take a positive step to write a letter that will be on the President's desk before November 30, saying that they believe the aid, $4.5 million a month for the remaining 87 days up through the election, will stay in effect.
And three of these Members, the distinguished majority leader on the other side, the distinguished head of the Appropriations Committee on the other side and the distinguished head of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the other body, have never so much as voted a nickel of aid to any young freedom fighter in Central America. A change of heart by these three in November is a lot to hope for.
Part B, there exists in what we are doing today, this bipartisan accord, no insurance policy whatsoever in the case of Sandinista Communist do not comply with their commitments to democracy through a free and fair election. And, of course, the Sandinista Communists have not conformed with a single commitment that they have made over the last 10 years, at least nothing beyond a few days for some good press stories only to later undo their relaxation against the Catholic radio station, the free press, free religion, and for the right to assemble.
[TIME: 1630]
Why should we trust the Sandinistas now? I ask my colleagues, all men and women of honor, why? Why are we allowing this bipartisan accord to pass without an insurance policy?
Now the crafters of this bipartisan accord on Central America, and Mr. Speaker, I would advise Members that a vote on this motion to recommit with instructions enabling Members to vote for the bipartisan accord a few minutes later, with assurance, with political cover in the best sense of those words, that if the Sandinistas stick Members in the eyes again, in February, Members will be able to stand proudly at a townhall meeting and say we were ready for this eventuality.
This is why some of the newer Members coming on the floor are telling me that the White House people themselves, in the halls, are saying they have no objections to these instructions on my motion which would solidify Presidential powers under the Constitution. After all, as an aside here, let me ask Members, is the gentleman's agreement accompanying this bill at least constitutionally dubious? Is it not true that this letter exchange circumvents a legislative process? If the gentleman's agreement that will be enacted this afternoon were put in the body of the language of this bipartisan accord that we are about to vote on, it would be blatantly and shamelessly unconstitutional.
I charitably use the word dubious, even though it is a written gentleman's agreement, a gentleman's agreement agreed to as an afterthought. We need to ask ourselves if we really want to set us a precedent, not just for this President, in the first of what I hope will be 8 years for this courageous man, but whether we want future relations between any executive branch and the Congress to be clouding this case law precedent.
Now my motion to recommit with instructions challenging these two fatal flaws in the bipartisan accord, does the following: First, it makes any cutoff in humanitarian aid to the Contras before February 28 impossible unless a law is enacted to do so. In other words, unless we vote in November, and that is what we are paid to do here, we have only had one other significant vote this year and it was not a vote for freedom, it was a vote for remuneration for the Members of both Chambers, Federal workers and Federal judges. This is the most significant vote on liberty this session of the 101st Congress, and it falls on the birthday of Thomas Jefferson, no less.
A vote on a military aid package, if the President certifies it, is the other thing we are requesting. That does mean he gets it. It means, again, we do what we are paid to do, come and vote next March if the Sandinistas are laughing in the face of all the nations of the free world that they have pulled off a second 6-year term, for the Ortega brothers and the other seven Communists on that directorate, we will be able to at least, by promise, give the President a vote.
If our President determines those elections have been totally corrupted by police tactics, and we will get to see the model of how that is done again next May in Panama, as it was done in 1984 in Nicaragua, then we will come back, debate this more fully, and I hope with a little more passion than the debate today, with the exception of a few Members on each side of the aisle, and that is what we are elected to do.
Why is my motion to recommit with instrucitons a reasonable request? In the first place, I am assured that those Members of Congress with extraordinary powers that in my 12 years around here I have never seen before, to cut off aid, I am assured they will not do this in November. I am told the only reason we have this agreement is because the Democratic leadership of Congress does not trust the new administration. This is absurd on its face. If the Members of the respective committees and the leadership on both sides on both sides involved in this letter exchange have verbally committed themselves not to cut off humanitarian aid for 87 days prior to the Nicaraguan elections, then why do they then insist on the right to do so? This November review makes no sense unless one of the nine intended to deliver, the coup de grace to the Campesino peasants who have tried to fight for their freedom. This will take place while the Soviet Union, of course, pumps in another $2,745,000,000 of direct military aid over the last decade, through the next decade.
I do pray, Mr. Speaker, that I am wrong.
[Page: H1181]
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DORNAN of California. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I very strongly support this motion to recommit for the simple reason that the Sandinistas are a military regime. They are empowered by the weapons that the Soviets send them and by their own military. In the past when they had political opponents they have simply killed those opponents, executed them, executed a member that many liberals they have liked, Jorge Salazar, in 1981, because he threatened to be a leader who would threaten, their political ambitions.
I think we have to have a military stick, and because of that I very strongly support this motion to recommit.
Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, to talk about relocation of the Contras, prior to democratization, is obviously putting the proverbial cart before the horse. My motion is a plan to ensure peace, peace which every one of us wants, with democracy. That is the whole object of this exercise here by honorable men and women. Peace with democracy. We are not fighting for the peace like death that descended over Cambodia's killing fields, or the execution of 68,000 people in Vietnam by slow execution, two and three, village to village, all over the four corners of Vietnam. Why were they killed? Because they had befriended Americans and trusted in this great leading Nation of the free world.
My motion to recommit is an effort to diminish our reliance on the good will of the Soviet Union and Gorbomania, and the Cubans, and to stop the Cubanization of Nicaragua, if we do not have these insurance instructions embodied in my motion to recommit.
My motion to recommit, in closing, Mr. Speaker, will point out the discrepancies between administration's interpretations of the bipartisan accords and the interpretation by House and Senate liberals. The administration assures us that H.R. 1750 keeps the Contras intact as a viable option to be used when the Sandinistas do not comply with their commitment to democracy, and we know they will not.
The SPEAKER. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan] has one-half minute remaining.
The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] is recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I will not take the 10 minutes, but I do think it is important that we understand the content of the recommittal motion. It is a relatively minor recommittal motion. All it does is gut the agreement before Members this afternoon.
It does this in two ways. First of all, it restores the expedited procedures for the purpose of again resurrecting military assistance. I find it interesting that the minority usually expresses a great deal of fealty to the regular procedures of the House, and I find this an interesting exception.
Second, it eliminates the abilities of the Congress to assure that the dollars appropriated under this act will be expended in accordance with the understandings which produced the congressional appropriation in the first place by eliminating the ability of Congress to review how this money is being used and the policies in support of which it is being used, before the end of November.
[TIME: 1640]
The gentleman who offered the motion is correct in describing what that side agreement does. It does in fact mean that if any one of the committees cited in that letter declines to send the letter that is required to allow the obligation of funds after the end of November, in fact the funds will not then be obligated. That is correct. What is not correct is to suggest that that is an impingement upon executive power. It is a device to insure than Congress retains the ability to protect the taxpayer against the improper expenditure of taxpayers' money. It is similar to the widely used reprogramming process which is used a hundred times a session by a great number of committees.
The alternative of that procedure would not be greater administration power; it would be less, because we would not have an agreement to extend the aid past this fiscal year. I think it is important for Members to understand that.
Mr. Speaker, I am happy now to yield to the minority leader for whatever remarks he chooses to make.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, it may seem strange for me to rise in opposition to the motion to recommit. As the Members know, during the course of my tenure as leader over here, I have always tenaciously fought for the preservation of the motion to recommit for the minority. I have always instructed the folks who act in my behalf in may absence to never, never give away that motion to recommit as a Member of the minority party. That is our last bit of protection.
When the rule was constructed, there was some supposition that maybe there would be an amendment made in order; for lack of any better terminology, it would have been an amendment from this side and an amendment from the other side, and one would maybe be more liberal and one would maybe be more conservative, for lack of any better definition than that. But it was concluded that maybe we did not have to go through that procedure, and quite frankly, if it were not for the fact that Members wanted to speak for some measurable period of time, we could have considered the bill under suspension of the rules, which would require a two-thirds majority. But since we have an agreement between the two parties and the two Houses and the administration and since we want to give to our neighbors to the south a demonstration of bipartisan support of what we have agreed to, nevertheless we agreed to have the time to talk, as we have done this afternoon.
And, of course, the rule provided that, at the designation of the leader, the leader could make the motion to recommit at his choice. The gentleman from California was chosen to offer that amendment on our side. He makes a very good compelling case for his point of view and for that of his colleagues, and it is a point of view that ought to be expressed in this body.
But having said that, as the gentleman from Wisconsin has said, it does considerable violence to what was agreed to in those painstaking negotiations that went on for a considerable period of time between the distinguished Secretary of State, his colleagues, and the Members of both Houses and of both parties.
So I would make the point here today that while I respect the gentleman's point of view and the point of view of those who will follow him in voting for the motion to recommit, I personally hope that there will be a good measure of those on my side who perhaps for the
first time would vote against a motion to recommit. But even for those who do support the gentleman's motion to recommit on my side, after having their day supposedly in court for this very limited period of time, I would hope they would see the merit and the value of this bill and if it is within their conscious to do so, I would ask them to help us pass this ultimate bill with a good majority on this side and on that side to give a clear message to our neighbors to the south that this is truly a bipartisan agreement.
[Page: H1182]
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel], and I simply would like to make one other point.
The reason this agreement is here is because as chairman of the Subcommittee on the Committee on Appropriations responsible for the overseeing of money which we appropriate, I feel a particular responsibility to protect the institution of the Congress. The newspaper reports of the last 2 weeks will make clear to anyone who cares to read this report that the Congress has in the past been consistently lied to in terms of this policy. This device of this so-called sidebar agreement is simply a device by which we assure that this will not happen again. We have listened to President Reagan, who has told us, `trust, but verify.'
The SPEAKER. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan] has 30 seconds remaining.
Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, let me say that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel] is truly a parliamentary scholar, a gentleman, and a good friend.
Our good friend, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior] has said quite simply that this is an admission by the administration that the military opposition has failed. My good friend, the gentleman from Michigan, sees this is a relocation package, and he will determine its success by the degree to which the administration has successfully stuffed the young freedom fighters back into a decaying Nicaragua.
There is a fundamental compatability of goals between voting for the motion to recommit with instructions and for the bipartisan accord.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back 10 seconds, and I move the previous question on the motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER. The gentleman's time has expired, and actually the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] has 3 minutes remaining.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the remainder of my time.
The SPEAKER. Without objection, the previous is ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 5 of rule XV, the Chair announces that he will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the period of time within which a vote by electronic device, if ordered, will be taken on the question of the passage of the bill.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 94, noes 329, not voting 9, as follows:
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[TIME: 1705]
The Clerk announced the following pairs:
On the vote:
Mr. Denny Smith of Oregon for, with Mr. LaFalce against.
Mr. Courter for, with Mr. Towns against.
Mr. CHAPMAN changed his vote from `aye' to `no.'
Mr. OXLEY changed his vote from `no' to `aye.'
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced above recorded.
The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER. The Chair reminds members that this is a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 309, nays 110, not voting 13, as follows:
[TIME: 1714]
The Clerk announced the following pair:
On the vote:
Mr. LaFalce for, with Mr. Towns against.
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
END