What is IC21?

IC21 is a major review of the roles, function and structure of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC).

• One of the major premises of IC21 is that the IC has been largely, and perhaps inevitably, shaped by the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. This struggle gave shape to a specific set of "intelligence norms," i.e., forms, organizations, products, practices, relationships and ways of doing business that extend throughout the IC. Some of these intelligence norms are likely to be fairly stable, regardless of U.S. national security policy or the international political environment. Others may be outdated and no longer responsive to U.S. national security requirements as we enter the 21st century. IC21 seeks to determine which of these intelligence norms are still relevant, which need to be either revised or replaced, and what alternatives there are to be added.

IC21 has been guided by the following broad concepts:

• The United States continues to need a strong, highly capable Intelligence Community. This need has not diminished with the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the current international setting is, in many ways more complex and more difficult to deal with than was the relatively stable bi-polar Cold War. Thus, although we find our national security less threatened, the United States will need a highly flexible IC capable of responding to increasingly diverse national security concerns. The focus of our national security has changed, but the mission of the IC has not changed: providing timely, assessed intelligence to civil and military policy-makers, supporting military operations and carrying out certain operations - including covert action - as tasked by legally responsible officials.

• A key issue is opportunity, not reform. As noted, U.S. national security interests are less threatened than at any time since 1940. This is a propitious moment in which to review major aspects of our national security apparatus and to update them in an atmosphere relatively free from crises. Although Congress and the Executive continue to deal with issues of the propriety of certain operations, oversight and - occasionally - legality, these are not the main driving issues as they were in the mid-1970s.

• Everything is on the table. There are no sacred cows in terms of organizations, missions or functions. Neither are there any preconceptions as to the "right answer" for the future of the IC.

• IC21 is not an exercise designed to reduce, or even to shape the intelligence budget. The goal is to define the type of Intelligence Community that will best meet U.S. national security needs into the next century. The question of whether the price for this type of Intelligence Community is acceptable can only be decided by Congress and the Executive during their budget deliberations.

• IC21 is not simply an effort to reorganize the Intelligence Community. Any major recommendation for organizational change must come only from well-defined intelligence or policy-maker needs.

• Although the Committee's purview over the Intelligence Community is fairly broad, it is important to keep its primary focus on those issues that might require legislative remedies. Changes that can be carried out by or within the Executive should also be noted, as should findings for which no specific recommendations are made.

• Any changes must result in improved processes or products to be worth the cost of short-lived dislocations.

• To the greatest extent possible, the IC21 process should be public and unclassified One of the goals of IC21 is to renew a national consensus to support a strong and capable Intelligence Community. Such a consensus must rely on an easily accessible body of information. This is an especially important function for, as several witnesses have told the Committee, beyond Congress and the Executive, there is no natural constituency for intelligence in the United States.

• Finally, the focus must be on where the Intelligence Community needs to be in the next 10-15 years, not a snapshot of where we are today.

• The current IC is an ad hoc structure. Each agency or organization makes sense individually, but the IC does not function as a well-integrated whole, working towards an agreed end.

• The IC would benefit from a more corporate approach to its basic functions. Central management should be strengthened; core competencies (collection, analysis, covert action) should be reinforced; and infrastructure should be consolidated wherever possible.

Major Proposals

Role of the DCI

• The DCI should continue to serve at the pleasure of the President, and should continue to have direct control over IC all-source analysis (CIA), clandestine operations (Clandestine Service) and the Community Management Staff.

• In appointing the directors of NFIP Defense agencies, the Secretary of Defense should obtain the advice and concurrence (vice "consultation") of the DCI.

• The DCI should have the authority to transfer limited amounts of money within the NFIP without program managers' approval.

• The DCI should have expanded authority over all NFIP agencies' personnel, including the right to detail as needed.

• The DCI remains the President's principal adviser on intelligence, working under the direction of the NSC. Within the NSC, the CFI should be re-established, to provide the DCI with necessary guidance and feedback. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will chair the CFI; other members are the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Attorney General (for counter-intelligence issues), or their deputies. DDCls

• Create an additional DDCI.

• One DDCI will direct the CIA and, to promote IC corporateness, be responsible for managing all IC production and analysis.

• To further promote IC corporateness, create a DDCI for Community Management (DDCI/CM), who will oversee the Community Management Staff and be responsible for IC-wide collection management, consolidated infrastructure management and acquisition. To address the issues of infrastructure and services of common concern, an Infrastructure Support Office (ISO) will be created under the DDCI/CM.

• The DCI will designate which DDCI will be Acting DCI in his absence. · Both DDCls will be confirmed by the Senate. At no time may more than one of these three officials (DCI, 2 DDCls) be an active duty military officer.

• The Director of DIA is to be designated as DMI, the Secretary of Defense's senior military intelligence officer.

• The DMI, as a senior member of the IC, will be accountable to the DCI in all matters relative to the IC.

• The DMI is to be program manager for the JMIP and program coordinator for TIARA.

CIA

• CIA is the premier all-source analytical agency in the IC. It will house both analysts and 2nd- and 3rd-tier exploiters of the various collection disciplines.

DIA

• DIA's role as the focal point for management of Defense all-source analysis and production should be reinforced. (No legislative change.) INR, DOE/INT, Treasury/OIS

• INR, DOE/INT and Treasury/OIS serve a useful role as the principal intelligence producers for their departmental consumers, and as contributors to IC-wide analyses. (No legislative change.)

Clandestine Service

• The Clandestine Service will be responsible for all clandestine human collection (current CIA/DO and DHS).

• The Clandestine Service to be separate from the CIA, reporting directly to the DCI .

• The Director of Clandestine Service to be selected by the DCI from among intelligence professionals. · There will be a Deputy Director, who is a two-star professional military intelligence officer, responsible for coordination between the Clandestine Service and various military and Defense components.

Technical Collection Agency (TCA)

• SIGINT, IMINT and MASINT will be consolidated in a single agency, the TCA.

• The TCA will be designated a Combat Support Agency (Type 3), as NSA currently is.

• The director of TCA will be either a senior defense or intelligence civilian or a military officer.

Technology Development Office (TDO)

• The TDO will be responsible for IC research & development and procurement of intelligence systems. TDO will comprise portions of the current NRO, DARO, DDS&T et al.

National Intelligence Evaluation Council (NIEC)

• The NIEC is responsible for evaluating IC-wide collection and production -- making sure that means and ends are correlated, working closely with the Community Management Staff.

• The Head of the NIEC to be appointed by the DCI and will report directly to him; NlOs will be part of the CIA.

Congressional Oversight

• Extend or eliminate tenure limits for Members on HPSCI.

• Consider making HPSCI a standing committee.