


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
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
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


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16 June 1972

# Central Intelligence Bulletin

## CONTENTS

VIETNAM: Situation report. (Page 1)


USSR - MIDDLE EAST: Soviets have no new proposals to break the impasse. (Page 2)

CYPRUS-GREECE: Makarios' cabinet reshuffle should end his recent skirmishing with Athens. (Page 6)

USSR-US: Draft Soviet treaty on air piracy (Page 8)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



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~~TOP SECRET~~

**VIETNAM:** The heavy fighting of the past five days in the northern Mekong Delta region has slacked off.

Enemy activity in Tuyen Binh District of Kien Tuong Province has decreased sharply, but some action continues around the provincial capital at Moc Hoa. The attacks, carried out by units of the Communist 5th Division, have caused about 90 percent of Moc Hoa's population to flee the town. Enemy prisoners taken during the fighting claim that the 5th Division's mission is to overrun the entire province and to open the way for more enemy troops to enter the delta.

Such a plan may account for the sharp resistance encountered by South Vietnamese Rangers operating in nearby Cambodia. Earlier this week, a ranger battalion suffered heavy losses while breaking out of a two-day enemy encirclement near the Kien Tuong - Kien Phong provincial border area.

\* \* \* \*

The North Vietnamese apparently have conducted a recent review of their war policy. A Soviet "commentator" article broadcast by Moscow Radio on 14 June refers to a "new analysis of the situation" by the Viet Cong and asserts that "the situation has also recently been examined by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." Several North Vietnamese articles have mentioned assessments of the "new situation" in Vietnam and have noted that North Vietnam's Council of Ministers recently convened to discuss various policy problems. Most of Hanoi's top politburo members have been out of public view for the last two weeks.

16 Jun 72

*Central Intelligence Bulletin*

1

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USSR - MIDDLE EAST: THE SOVIETS HAVE NO NEW PROPOSALS TO BREAK THE ARAB-ISRAELI DEADLOCK.

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS TOLD THE FRENCH DURING CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK THAT ALL APPROACHES TOWARD A SETTLEMENT WOULD BE "FUTILE" UNTIL THE ISRAELIS AGREE TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. THE SOVIETS APPEARED UNHAPPY WITH THE CURRENT IMPASSE BUT RESIGNED TO A CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO IN VIEW OF ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE. THEY WERE SKEPTICAL OF THE VALUE OF INTERIM TALKS ON A SUEZ CANAL SETTLEMENT AND CONSIDERED THE UTILITY OF FOUR POWER TALKS TO BE SIMILARLY LIMITED.

THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE MIDDLE EAST PORTION OF THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE, WHICH REAFFIRMED SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 OF NOVEMBER 1967 AND FOR THE JARRING MISSION. THE SOVIETS STATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE US, AS THE ONLY POWER CAPABLE OF MAKING THE ISRAELIS SHIFT THEIR POSITION ON THE VITAL ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL, IS THE KEY TO ANY EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT. THE SOVIETS HITHERTO HAVE STATED PUBLICLY THAT THEY WOULD PARTICIPATE, ALONG WITH OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IN ANY INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES FOR A SOLUTION BASED ON THE RESOLUTION.

MOSCOW NEVER HAS BEEN SANGUINE THAT THE US AND ISRAEL WERE PREPARED TO MAKE THE NECESSARY CONCESSIONS TO ARRANGE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS AND, IN VIEW OF ITS ASSESSMENT, PROBABLY DOES NOT INTEND TO GET OUT IN FRONT OF THE ARAB NEGOTIATING POSITION.

ON OCCASION IN THE PAST, THE SOVIETS HAVE REVEALED CONSIDERABLE MISGIVINGS OVER THE DOMINANT US ROLE IN ARRANGING AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT OR PROXIMITY TALKS. BECAUSE OF THEIR OPPOSITION TO A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE DEADLOCK, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY SEE NO OTHER COURSE THAN TO GIVE THE ARABS THE IMPRESSION THAT MOSCOW IS TAKING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE PURSUIT OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

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16 Jun 72

Central Intelligence Bulletin

2

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THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT THE RISKS IN THE AREA ARE MANAGEABLE. THEY EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT SADAT'S STAYING POWER AND CONSIDERED RELATIONS WITH BOTH IRAQ AND SYRIA TO BE EXCELLENT. NEVERTHELESS, IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE FRENCH, THE SOVIETS DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT EGYPTIAN MILITARY LEADERS COULD PUSH SADAT INTO A RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]


16 Jun 72

*Central Intelligence Bulletin*

3

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16 Jun 72


*Central Intelligence Bulletin*

4

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16 Jun 72

*Central Intelligence Bulletin*

5

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CYPRUS-GREECE: President Makarios' new cabinet announced yesterday should end his most recent and serious round of skirmishing with Athens. Mutual antipathy and suspicion will continue to cloud relations between the two governments, however.

In the last cabinet reshuffle in July 1970, Makarios added new faces to his administration in an attempt to silence criticism that his ten-year-old cabinet had become corrupt. By this move, Makarios was also able to get rid of a few strong-minded cabinet officials who were not malleable.

The 1970 cabinet changes increased Makarios' power, and Greece, already disenchanted with the way things were going on the island, objected to the Archbishop's increasing control. Greek objections peaked in February when Athens demanded that Makarios broaden his cabinet, presumably to eliminate some of these yes-men. The cabinet announced ostensibly has been approved by Greek officials, but most of the new men are close associates of Makarios and are unlikely to cause him any trouble.

The Greeks will probably go along with Makarios' changes because they are preoccupied with getting the island's intercommunal talks moving again; the talks are now in recess after the formal opening on 8 June. [REDACTED]

Despite these gestures, Athens' failure to fill its ambassadorial post on the island suggests continued Greek unhappiness with the Archbishop. Nonetheless, Makarios seems to believe that he will

16 Jun 72

*Central Intelligence Bulletin*

6

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enjoy a respite from Greek pressure and is turning his attention to the problem of General Grivas, who still favors Cypriot union with Greece. Grivas' failure to act has caused many supporters to desert him, but there remain a few gunmen close to the general who could still move against Makarios. The Archbishop will probably try to reduce this threat now that the cabinet has been reshuffled. [REDACTED]

16 Jun 72

*Central Intelligence Bulletin*

7

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USSR-US: The Soviet Foreign Ministry is drafting a proposal for a US-USSR treaty to combat air hijacking. Claiming that such a treaty would enhance the favorable post-summit atmosphere and serve as an example to other countries, the official in charge of this project implied that the thrust of the Soviet proposal will be toward mandatory extradition of hijackers. The official reiterated standard Soviet opposition to authorizing a "supra-governmental" body to enforce agreements that combat hijacking. The Soviets, however, are supporting a UN Security Council consensus statement on air piracy and have indicated a willingness to consider other US initiatives. [REDACTED]

16 Jun 72

*Central Intelligence Bulletin*

8

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board has approved the following national intelligence estimate:

NIE 61-72 "The Outlook for Morocco"

16 Jun 72


*Central Intelligence Bulletin*

9

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