



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
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
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
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**VIETNAM:** The joint statement issued at the end of President Podgorny's three-day "unofficial" visit to North Vietnam suggests that differences between Moscow and Hanoi persist.

The talks were characterized as having taken place in an atmosphere of "frankness," whereas during Podgorny's visit last October, the two sides reportedly reached a "unanimity of views." The Soviets promised continuing aid and support and joined with the Vietnamese in condemning "aggressive US actions in Indochina," specifically the "firing on and mining of North Vietnam's ports." Both the promise and the condemnation, however, were couched in relatively restrained language, did not go beyond previous Soviet utterances on these points, and could not have been especially satisfying to the North Vietnamese. Hanoi did not refer to Podgorny's visit while he was in the country, and an editorial in the army daily on the day of his departure made it clear that the North Vietnamese are dissatisfied with the results of the visit.

Prior to the visit, Soviet spokesmen in a number of capitals spread the word that Podgorny would ask the Vietnamese to accept a cease-fire. In the report on the visit, however, the two sides routinely demanded an end to Vietnamization and a return to the Paris talks by the US. They reiterated their view that the Viet Cong's seven points and the "two explanations to them" provide a "constructive basis" for a settlement of the Vietnam question.

Moscow joined with the Vietnamese in hailing the "serious defeats" allegedly being inflicted on US and South Vietnamese forces. The only other authoritative Soviet comment on Vietnamese Communist successes in the South came in connection with the anniversary celebration of the "provisional revolutionary government" of South Vietnam in early June.

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\* \* \* \*

In South Vietnam, the three major battlefields are fairly quiet. North of Hue, the South Vietnamese spoiling operation into Quang Tri Province has encountered only moderate resistance. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Shelling of An Loc remains at a very low level, and the South Vietnamese 1st Airborne Brigade is being moved from there to Saigon for redeployment elsewhere.

Smaller scale Communist military activity persists in scattered parts of the country. The Communists recently have become more aggressive in Quang Ngai Province in MR-1. They shelled Nha Trang in MR-2 on 19 June, and in MR-4, fairly heavy action continues in parts of Kien Tuong, Dinh Tuong, and Vinh Long provinces. [REDACTED]


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


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
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
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