Periodic Report on the National Emergency
With Respect to the Threat of Foreign Interference in United States Elections

I hereby report to the Congress on developments and expenditures relating to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13848 of September 12, 2018, with respect to the threat of foreign interference in United States elections. In accordance with section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), this report covers actions taken in the exercise of national emergency authorities under IEEPA, and implementing regulations set forth at 31 C.F.R. part 579 (the Foreign Interference in U.S. Elections Sanctions Regulations). It also covers expenses that are directly attributable to the exercise of those authorities, in accordance with section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (NEA), 50 U.S.C. 1641(c).

IEEPA Reporting (from July 21, 2020, through February 18, 2021)

1. On September 10, 2020, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated three Russians that are employees of the previously designated Internet Research Agency. OFAC also designated Ukrainian Andrii Derkach for attempts to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election.

On September 23, 2020, OFAC designated three individuals and two entities for their activities within previously designated Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s Central African Republic network. Prigozhin is the financier of the Internet Research Agency and is also believed to be the financier behind Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner, a designated Russian Ministry of Defense proxy force.

On October 22, 2020, OFAC designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), along with three media front companies, for attempts to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election.

On January 11, 2021, OFAC designated seven individuals and four entities that are part of a Russia-linked foreign influence network associated with previously designated Andrii Derkach.

2. OFAC did not close any licensing cases (which may take the form of specific licenses, license amendments, “return-without-action” letters, general information letters,
interpretive guidance letters, denial letters, closed without determination letters, or withdrawals),
and received reports of the blocking of five transactions totaling approximately $170, pursuant to
the authorities referenced above.

3. OFAC has discussed this program during its numerous outreach events to the
financial, securities, and international trade communities. Details of this program are available
on the Department of the Treasury’s website.

NEA Reporting (from September 12, 2020, through March 11, 2021)

4. The expenses incurred by the federal government that are directly attributable to the
exercise of powers and authorities conferred by the declaration of a national emergency with respect
to the threat of foreign interference in United States elections are reported to be approximately
$700,000, most of which represent wage and salary costs for federal personnel. Personnel costs
were largely centered in the Department of the Treasury, the Department of State, and the
Department of Justice. This amount reflects only costs associated with the national emergency
declared in Executive Order 13848 of September 12, 2018, and does not include any costs incurred
pursuant to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015, with respect
to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities.

I shall continue to report periodically to the Congress on significant developments as
required by law.

Janet L. Yellen

Department of the Treasury

Dated: March 12, 2021