FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S EFFORTS TO HIRE, TRAIN, AND RETAIN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS

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Executive Summary

Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) operated primarily as a law enforcement agency with a limited intelligence capability. After the terrorist attacks, the FBI recognized the need to improve its intelligence capacity, not only through collecting information but also analyzing it, connecting it to other vital information, and disseminating the results to others. To improve in these areas, during the past 5 years the FBI has significantly increased the number of FBI intelligence analysts. As of September 2006, the FBI had over 2,100 intelligence analysts, split almost evenly between its Headquarters and 56 domestic field offices. The FBI’s analysts perform a critical role in helping transform the FBI into an agency with law enforcement and intelligence capacities, both of which are required in order to meet the FBI’s highest priority of preventing future terrorist attacks.1

Audit Approach

In May 2005, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued an audit report that examined the hiring, allocation, training, utilization, and retention of intelligence analysts.2 In the current review, we examined the FBI’s progress in implementing the recommendations from our May 2005 report, and we also examined the FBI’s continuing efforts to improve its hiring, training, retention, and use of intelligence analysts.

The OIG’s May 2005 report contained 15 recommendations to improve the FBI’s intelligence analysis program. The FBI concurred with all of the recommendations and began addressing many of them. Based on the FBI’s reported actions, we closed 5 of the 15

1 When we use the term “analysts” in this report, we are referring to intelligence analysts. The FBI also has other types of analysts, such as financial analysts.

recommendations. However, as of December 2006, 10 of the 15 recommendations in our May 2005 audit report remained open. The 10 open recommendations generally involve establishing hiring goals for intelligence analysts, developing a threat- or risk-based methodology for determining the number of intelligence analysts needed, allocating intelligence analysts, and improving the training and utilization of analysts.

In performing this follow-up audit, we interviewed 60 intelligence analysts and 16 intelligence analyst supervisors in FBI Headquarters and in 4 field offices to follow up on our survey of all FBI intelligence analysts in our prior audit. We also interviewed FBI officials from the Directorate of Intelligence and the Administrative Services, Training and Development, and Finance Divisions. In addition, we reviewed documents related to the budgeting, hiring, training, utilization, and retention of intelligence analysts.

Results in Brief

This follow-up audit found that the FBI has made progress in improving the hiring, training, utilization, and retention of intelligence analysts, although in some areas the progress has been slow and uneven.

For example, the FBI has made progress in its utilization of intelligence analysts. In our prior audit we found that intelligence analysts too often were assigned to perform routine administrative rather than analytical tasks. In this follow-up review, we found that this underutilization of analysts has largely been corrected. The FBI has also kept the attrition of analysts at a reasonable level and has begun conducting exit surveys that should provide data to help the FBI further improve the hiring, training, utilization, and retention of its intelligence analysts. In addition, the FBI continues to augment the size of its intelligence analyst workforce by hiring qualified candidates. As we found in our prior audit, analysts continue to express high levels of satisfaction with their work assignments and believe they are making important contributions to the FBI’s mission.

Yet, the FBI has made slow progress in successfully implementing several other recommendations of our previous report. For example, the FBI has not:
• used threat- and risk-based criteria to determine the number of analysts needed to meet its mission or to allocate analysts where they are most needed;

• established hiring goals based on the projected need for additional analysts, forecasted attrition, and the FBI’s ability to hire, train, and utilize new analysts;

• assessed which tasks being performed by analysts could be more efficiently performed by other support personnel and, based on that assessment, developed a strategic workforce plan for intelligence support personnel;

• provided training to all special agents on the role and capabilities of intelligence analysts; and

• developed succession and retention plans and strategies for analysts that include measurable goals.

Further, we identified several additional, related concerns in our current audit regarding intelligence analysts:

• Although the FBI continues to make progress in hiring qualified intelligence analysts, it did not meet its hiring goal for analysts in fiscal year (FY) 2006.

• The average time to hire an intelligence analyst has increased from about 19 weeks in FY 2004 to 31 in FY 2006.

• The FBI continues struggling to design a satisfactory training program for its intelligence analysts. For example, we found that the current introductory training for analysts does not stress the specific job skills required to perform the job.

• A strong professional divide between special agents and analysts impedes the collaboration needed to effectively meet the FBI’s mission.

• Sixty-five percent of the analysts we interviewed plan to stay with the FBI for at least 5 years. However, the significant number of analysts who plan to leave or are uncertain if they will stay warrants increased attention to developing retention strategies.
The following sections provide greater details on these findings.

**Hiring Intelligence Analysts**

The FBI has increased the number of intelligence analysts by 54 percent since 2004. Although the FBI remains 400 analysts below its FY 2006 funded staffing level (FSL) of 2,574, the vacancy rate has decreased from 32 percent in FY 2004 to 16 percent in FY 2006.\(^3\) The FBI conducted a hiring “blitz” in early 2005 that used a nationwide recruiting strategy and attracted over 11,000 applicants, of which over 300 were interviewed. During FY 2006, the FBI hired 375 intelligence analysts, bringing the total number of intelligence analysts to 2,174.

By replacing its former decentralized hiring process, the FBI’s nationwide recruitment strategy allowed it to consider and process a greater number of candidates to meet its aggressive hiring goals. In addition, the strategy enabled all candidates to apply to the same job posting rather than to separate postings for vacancies throughout the FBI. In another initiative, the FBI sought experienced intelligence professionals to fill higher-graded positions within Headquarters operating divisions. During this latter hiring initiative, the FBI received about 4,100 applications, interviewed 350, and selected 100. Aiding the FBI’s ability to attract intelligence analysts since our last audit was a legal exemption it received which allowed a higher grade progression for FBI intelligence analysts, placing the FBI on par with other intelligence agencies.\(^4\)

The table below shows the total number of FBI analysts hired and on board from FY 2001 through FY 2007, projected.

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\(^3\) The FSL is the number of positions available in a given year based on that year’s appropriation.

\(^4\) Legislation entitled *Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005, and for Other Purposes*, signed on December 8, 2004, provided the FBI with additional flexibility to hire and retain highly skilled intelligence personnel through an amendment to Title 5 of the U.S. Code.
### Number of Intelligence Analysts Hired and On-board from FY 2001 through FY 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Hired&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>On-board (end of FY)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>1,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>1,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>1,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>2,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>250&lt;sup&gt;projected&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG based on FBI data

Note (a): The number of intelligence analysts includes new hires and transfers from other FBI positions.

However, the speed with which new intelligence analysts can begin work is slowed by the time required to complete the hiring process. Due to the nature of the FBI’s work, all FBI employees must qualify for a top-secret security clearance before they can begin their service. After applicants receive a conditional offer of employment, the background investigation process begins. The investigation includes a drug test, a polygraph, and an extensive investigation into the applicant’s credit history, drug use, personality, and any legal violations. As shown in the table below, we found that from FY 2004 to FY 2006, the average time from when the job announcement closes until the intelligence analyst candidate enters on duty increased from approximately 132 to 217 days. Several FBI managers stated that the lengthy screening process might cause candidates to lose patience and accept employment elsewhere.
Average Number of Days to Hire Intelligence Analysts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Average Number of Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2002</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006a</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG based on FBI data

Note (a): FY 2006 data is through August 29, 2006.

Another concern is the FBI’s lack of threat and risk-based criteria to determine the number of analysts needed to meet the FBI’s mission, as we recommended in our prior report. We also recommended that the FBI base hiring goals on the projected need for additional analysts, forecasted attrition, and the FBI’s ability to hire, train, and utilize new analysts. Although the FBI agreed with these recommendations, it has not yet implemented them. Instead, the FBI bases its hiring goals on the number of positions allowed by the budget, but it does not base its budget request on an objective assessment of the number of intelligence analyst positions required to meet the FBI’s goals.

In addition, the FBI does not use threat or risk assessments to allocate all of the hired analysts throughout the FBI. Once hired, analysts are assigned to various Headquarters divisions or offices or to field offices. We found that the FBI’s methodology for allocating new analysts varies. In Headquarters, the allocation of new intelligence analysts is based on filling any vacancies stemming from the historical budget-driven allocation of positions, modified by managers’ expressed needs and requests for additional positions. The FBI fills field office vacancies similarly. However, additional positions allowed by the budget – known as enhancements – are now allocated based on a threat and risk assessment. We believe that using threat and risk criteria for field office enhancements is a step in the right direction. However, the recommendation in our prior report calls for developing and implementing a threat- or risk-based methodology for allocating intelligence analyst positions across both FBI field offices and Headquarters divisions.
Training Intelligence Analysts

Over the past 5 years, the FBI has struggled to develop a suitable training curriculum for intelligence analysts. In October 2001, the FBI established the College of Analytical Studies (CAS) at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. The first course offered was the 5-week Basic Intelligence Analyst (BIA) course held in FY 2002. As a result of student feedback and poor attendance at the BIA, a new 7-week introductory level course for intelligence analysts, called Analytical Cadre Educational Strategy 1 (ACES-1), replaced the BIA in September 2004. In November 2004, the FBI added ACES 1.5 to train intelligence analysts who had already been on board with the FBI prior to the establishment of the analyst training curriculum.

In FY 2006, the FBI reconfigured the ACES training into a 9-week program, called Cohort, which will replace both ACES courses once all analysts who entered on duty prior to 2005 complete ACES. The first 5 weeks of Cohort is designed for new intelligence analysts, language analysts, and other intelligence professionals who comprise the FBI’s Intelligence Career Service. Immediately following the 5-week program, analysts receive an additional 4 weeks of specialized intelligence training. Included in those 4 weeks is one 4-hour joint training exercise between new analysts and new special agents, which is the only combined training for both groups of employees.

As of August 2006, 2,010 analysts had attended basic training: 885 analysts attended the ACES-1 class, 733 attended the ACES 1.5 class, and 392 attended Cohort.

However, our interviews found continued dissatisfaction with the intelligence analyst training courses. Of the 60 analysts we interviewed, 55 percent said that the basic training does not prepare them to perform the tasks required of their positions, such as writing intelligence assessments or preparing intelligence information reports. Additionally, many of the supervisory analysts we interviewed stated that intelligence analysts need better training in preparing intelligence products and that supervisors spend considerable time revising multiple drafts of analysts’ written work in order for it to be correct.

A senior FBI training official said that the new Cohort class is nearly identical to the ACES course and that instead there needs to be more specialized training in areas such as counterterrorism or criminal investigations. Senior managers within the Directorate of Intelligence also told us that intelligence analyst training is inadequate. The
Intelligence Directorate’s Assistant Director told us he wants to analyze the skills that analysts require and determine what additional training is needed to develop those skills. However, he said he does not want to develop a new course if training is available through other agencies and if FBI employees can attend.

**Divide between Analysts and Agents**

In discussing with intelligence analysts and their supervisors how analysts are being utilized, we found a recurring theme of a strong professional divide between analysts and special agents, and that special agents tend to misunderstand the functions and capabilities of intelligence analysts. Eighty percent of the analysts we interviewed, and all the analysts’ supervisors we interviewed, stated that special agents misunderstand the functions and capabilities of intelligence analysts at least some of the time. Although the data shows some improvement since our 2005 report, analysts still frequently reported that the two groups of employees tend not to interact as professional equals.

A unit chief in the Intelligence Career Management Section told us that field office managers are responsible for stressing to special agents the importance of working effectively with intelligence analysts. Yet, in our prior report we had recommended that all special agents—not just new agents—receive training on the role and capabilities of intelligence analysts. However, other than a brief exposure through one joint exercise in new analyst and new special agent training, FBI special agents receive no formal training in the function and proper utilization of intelligence analysts.

**Retaining Intelligence Analysts**

The FBI has been successful in retaining its intelligence analysts, and we believe the overall attrition rate is reasonable for an organization of the FBI’s size. As shown in the following chart, the attrition rate for intelligence analysts from FYs 2002 to 2004 ranged from 8 percent to 10 percent; for FYs 2005 and 2006, the attrition rate was 6 and 9 percent, respectively.
We found that the attrition rate for intelligence analysts in FY 2006 was higher at Headquarters than in the 56 field offices – 12 percent compared to 5 percent. This difference may be due to greater employment opportunities for intelligence analysts in the Washington, DC, area, but this significantly higher attrition rate warrants the FBI’s attention.

Of the 60 intelligence analysts we interviewed, 65 percent told us they plan on staying with the FBI for at least the next 5 years, which is similar to the finding of 63 percent in our 2005 report. Twenty percent said they are not likely to stay for 5 years, and the remaining 15 percent were uncertain. These percentages were also similar to our prior report (at 22 percent and 14 percent, respectively).

Analysts who said they plan to stay with the FBI cited various reasons, such as they are proud to work for the FBI, they enjoy the work performed, and they are pleased with whom they work. Analysts who said they do not expect to stay cited two main reasons: retirement and career concerns. The following table compares data from our 2005 report to our current audit on the likelihood of analysts remaining with the FBI.
Intelligence Analysts Planning to Stay With the FBI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood of staying for the next 5 years</th>
<th>May 2005</th>
<th>Current</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG interviews of FBI intelligence analysts

Note (a): Does not add to 100 due to rounding.

While the FBI agreed with our prior recommendation to establish formal retention or succession plans with measurable goals, it has not yet acted on this recommendation. An FBI intelligence official told us the Directorate of Intelligence is actively managing the retention of intelligence analysts by monitoring the attrition rate and surveying the analysts to understand their career needs. Also, the FBI has implemented several initiatives to enhance retention, including student loan repayments, bonuses, and the creation of an Intelligence Officer Certification program. Further, the FBI can now offer greater promotion potential to analysts based on a 2005 exemption from statutes limiting the grade structure of intelligence analysts.

Conclusion

The FBI has made progress in improving the hiring, training, utilization, and retention of intelligence analysts since our last review, although in some areas the progress has been slow and uneven.

We found that job satisfaction of analysts remains strong. Most generally believe they are making important contributions to the FBI’s mission. The FBI has also improved the utilization of its analysts, who for the most part no longer are required to perform non-analytical administrative tasks. The FBI’s overall attrition rate is low, and the majority of analysts, as in our last report, indicate that they are likely to stay with the FBI for the next 5 years.

However, we found areas still in need of additional progress. More than 18 months after our original report, the FBI still has not developed (1) threat and risk-based criteria to determine the number
of analysts needed to meet its mission and to allocate all analysts in Headquarters as well as the field offices to where they are most needed, (2) hiring goals based on the projected need for additional analysts, and (3) succession and retention plans and strategies with measurable goals. Moreover, despite the FBI’s ability to hire 375 new intelligence analysts in FY 2006, its shortfall of 400 analysts demonstrates the continuing difficulty facing the FBI in attracting qualified analysts. The lengthening time required to bring analysts aboard – nearly a 3-month increase since FY 2004 – is also troublesome, because it can result in the FBI’s losing qualified candidates.

The training program for analysts, which has continued to evolve, needs further refinement. We agree with those analysts and intelligence managers who believe the training program needs a greater emphasis on the specific skills analysts require in their FBI positions. We also believe that the professional divide between analysts and special agents remains a problem, and that the barriers to acceptance and cooperation between the two groups must be addressed if the FBI is to most efficiently and effectively meet its mission, including its highest priority of preventing terrorist acts. Additional training, leadership, and joint efforts are needed to overcome this divide.

Recommendations

In addition to continuing to monitor the 10 open recommendations from our prior report, based on our current audit we are making 3 additional recommendations to aid the FBI in continuing efforts to improve its hiring, training, retention, and use of intelligence analysts. The three new recommendations are that the FBI: (1) evaluate the hiring and background investigation process to identify ways to accelerate the accession of new intelligence analysts, (2) involve intelligence managers and experienced analysts in curriculum development efforts, and (3) make student and supervisor evaluations of analyst training mandatory, and use the results to identify any needed improvements in the curriculum.

Of the 10 open recommendations, we believe the FBI needs to pay special attention to improving its human capital planning for intelligence analysts, in part by establishing hiring goals based on the forecasted need for intelligence analysts; projected attrition in the analyst corps; and the FBI’s ability to hire, train, and utilize intelligence analysts. In addition, we recommend that the FBI
continue to develop and implement a threat- or risk-based methodology for determining the number of intelligence analysts the FBI requires.
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BACKGROUND

In May 2005, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued an audit report that examined the hiring, allocation, training, utilization, and retention of intelligence analysts. In this follow-up review, we examined the FBI’s progress in implementing the OIG’s recommendations from the May 2005 report, and we also examined the FBI’s continuing efforts to improve its hiring, training, utilization, and retention of intelligence analysts. We undertook these audits because the FBI’s intelligence analyst program is a critical component of the FBI’s efforts to transform itself into an agency with a strong intelligence capacity to help meet the FBI’s post-September 11 priority of preventing future terrorist attacks on the United States.

In performing this follow-up audit, we reviewed documents related to the budgeting, hiring, training, utilization, and retention of intelligence analysts. We also interviewed 60 intelligence analysts and 16 intelligence analyst supervisors in FBI Headquarters and in 4 field offices to gauge any changes since our survey of all FBI intelligence analysts in our prior audit. In addition, we interviewed FBI officials from the Directorate of Intelligence and the Administrative Services, Training and Development, and Finance Divisions.

Roles of FBI Intelligence Analysts

The FBI’s Intelligence Analysts generally perform three roles: (1) all-source analysts, (2) operations specialists, and (3) reports officers. All-source analysts analyze threat information from multiple sources and place that information into context for use by operations specialists. Operations specialists assess the threat information in the context of ongoing investigations and intelligence requirements to evaluate the potential effect on national security. Reports officers act as information brokers by linking the information developed by the all-source analysts and operations specialists to address broader national security implications and intelligence requirements. Intelligence analysts perform their work at FBI Headquarters and in the FBI’s 56

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field offices. Analysts are supervised by either supervisory analysts or by supervisory special agents.  

The overall work products of FBI intelligence analysts within the three roles include the collection and evaluation of available information and the preparation of briefings, reports, and communications for FBI personnel and other intelligence community and law enforcement entities. The FBI has three primary intelligence products: intelligence assessments, Intelligence Information Reports (IIR), and intelligence bulletins. Intelligence assessments may be either strategic or tactical. Strategic assessments support FBI-wide programs, plans, and strategies or provide information to policy-makers. Tactical assessments support FBI cases or operations, or cover specific threats. IIRs contain single-source intelligence that the FBI has not deeply evaluated. Intelligence bulletins are unclassified descriptions of significant developments or trends that are shared broadly within the law enforcement community.

The FBI’s Intelligence Organization

In January 2003, the Director of the FBI authorized the position of Executive Assistant Director (EAD) for Intelligence, and established an Office of Intelligence to manage the FBI’s intelligence program. The EAD for Intelligence was created to manage a single intelligence program across the FBI’s four operational divisions – Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Criminal, and Cyber. Previously, each division controlled and managed its own intelligence program. By creating the Office of Intelligence, the FBI elevated the status of its intelligence operations from a supporting role for investigations to full program status.

In September 2005, the FBI established a National Security Branch (NSB) under an EAD to oversee the national security operations of the Counterterrorism Division, Counterintelligence Division, a new Directorate of Intelligence replacing the Office of Intelligence.
Intelligence, and a new Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate.\textsuperscript{7} The NSB is also responsible for the continued development of a specialized national security workforce, and the EAD is the lead FBI official responsible for coordination and liaison with the Director of National Intelligence and the intelligence community.\textsuperscript{8}

In FY 2006, the Assistant Director, Directorate of Intelligence, initiated an assessment to clarify the Directorate’s mission and the roles of intelligence analysts and other staff. The Acting Deputy Assistant Director told the OIG that the assessment made it clear the field was frustrated about receiving conflicting guidance on intelligence matters from Headquarters entities and that the Directorate needed to ensure that policy, guidance, and processes were consistently developed, understood, and applied across all elements of the intelligence program.

\textbf{The FBI’s Human Resources Management}

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the FBI has taken steps to improve its human capital planning in general and its intelligence program in particular. In September 2003, the FBI issued the \textit{Human Talent for Intelligence Production} Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS). This 2003 CONOPS outlines the strategies that the FBI is planning to implement in the areas of recruiting and hiring, the selection process, workforce development, and training and education for intelligence analysts. It also includes a proposal for integrating intelligence training into the new special agent curriculum. The plan outlines the goal for the FBI’s intelligence analyst cadre to foster a well-educated, highly trained, appropriately sized, and effective analytical work force. In 2004, the FBI issued the \textit{Threat Forecasting and Operational Requirements} CONOPS. This plan includes a Human Talent Requirements Forecast to assess the characteristics of the human talent required to support the FBI intelligence program into the future. However, both of these CONOPs and the supporting plans within those CONOPs have not been fully implemented.

\textsuperscript{7} Details of the mission and organization of the Directorate of Intelligence are displayed in Appendix 2 and 3. Further details of the mission and organization of the NSB are contained in Appendix 4, and a list of the intelligence community members is contained in Appendix 5.

\textsuperscript{8} The Director of National Intelligence is the head of the U.S. Intelligence Community and the principal advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Homeland Security Council on intelligence matters.
In August 2004, the FBI developed a Human Capital Plan to guide its efforts in recruitment and other areas of personnel management. In October 2005, the FBI appointed a Chief Human Resources Officer to oversee recruitment, performance management, talent development, succession planning, compensation, benefits, and awards for the FBI.

According to the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework, an agency should have an explicit workforce planning strategy that is linked to the agency's strategic and program planning efforts. In addition, the workforce planning strategy should identify the agency’s current and future human capital needs, including the size of the workforce, its deployment across the organization, and the competencies needed for the agency to fulfill its mission. OPM states that, to demonstrate that the size and allocation of the workforce is based on mission needs, an agency needs to complete a number of planning steps, including the following:

- Develop a systematic process for identifying the human capital required to meet organizational goals and to develop strategies to meet these requirements.

- Develop a strategic workforce planning model for managers to assess and analyze their workforce. This model should describe agency-specific processes for setting strategic direction, restructuring the workforce through work-flow analysis to meet future needs, developing and implementing action plans, and evaluating and revising the action plans as necessary.

Once an organization identifies its workforce gaps, it needs to develop a strategy to fill the gaps. The strategy should be tailored to address gaps in the number, deployment, and alignment of human capital. The correct number, deployment, and alignment of human capital should allow an agency to sustain the contribution of its critical skills and competencies. OPM suggests that each agency publish a strategic workforce plan that includes mission-critical positions, current needs, projected business growth, future needs by competency and number, and a basic plan to close the gaps identified. Such a human capital planning effort would require the FBI to assess the number and location of intelligence analysts to meet the FBI mission, including its highest priority of preventing future terrorist attacks.
**Funded Staffing Level**

Prior to FY 2005, the FBI was unable to determine the number of intelligence analyst vacancies or the distribution of those vacancies across FBI units because it had not established a funded staffing level (FSL) for analysts. An FSL is the number of positions available in a given year based on that year’s appropriation. However, in FY 2004 the FBI began establishing an FSL for analysts and has since established FSLs annually for both FYs 2006 and 2007 for intelligence analysts by division, field office, and other entities. The FSL is based on the budgeted number of intelligence analyst positions. Also beginning in FY 2005, the FBI tracked the number of intelligence analysts on board compared to the FSL.

**Training**

Prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI did not offer formal classroom training to intelligence analysts. At that time, the FBI had fewer than 200 intelligence analysts and any formal training analysts received was provided outside the FBI.

After the September 11 attacks, the FBI Director assigned the Training and Development Division to immediately coordinate, develop, and implement a professional training program for the FBI’s analysts. In October 2001, the FBI established the College of Analytical Studies (CAS) at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, with the following mission:

- conceptualize analytical training programs,
- identify analytical training resources, and
- administer the CAS with a focus on improving the FBI’s analytical capabilities to meet all the FBI’s present and future investigative responsibilities.

The first course for analysts established at the CAS was a 5-week Basic Intelligence Analyst (BIA) training held in FY 2002. As a result of students’ negative feedback and poor attendance, a new

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9 The CAS also offers specialty courses in a variety of subjects, including analytical methods, denial and deception, Lexis/Nexis, money laundering, and statement analysis. The CAS collaborates with other intelligence community training institutions so that FBI analysts can obtain additional specialized training.
7-week introductory level course for intelligence analysts, called Analytical Cadre Educational Strategy 1 (ACES-1), replaced the BIA in September 2004.

In 2004, the former Office of Intelligence also developed seven core elements for FBI intelligence training, and the ACES-1 class is based on these 7 elements: (1) FBI intelligence mandates and authorities, (2) the intelligence cycle, (3) the United States Intelligence Community, (4) intelligence reporting and dissemination, (5) FBI intelligence requirements and the collection management process, (6) the role of the intelligence analyst, and (7) validating human sources. In addition to applying the generally accepted core elements in developing the curriculum, the FBI contractor that developed ACES-1 consulted with other federal agencies, companies that provide training to intelligence analysts elsewhere, experienced FBI intelligence analysts and academic institutions with intelligence programs.

In November 2004, the FBI added ACES 1.5 to the list of CAS courses. ACES 1.5 is intended to train intelligence analysts who had already been with the FBI prior to the establishment of the analyst training curriculum. This training was created to reinforce the working knowledge of the existing analysts. The ACES-1.5 curriculum included Analytic Tools and Techniques, Classified Materials, an overview of the Directorate of Intelligence, Criminal Discovery, Title III, Grand Jury Information, Privacy Act and Classified Information Procedures Act, Effective Writing of Intelligence Information Reports, the FBI Field Office Intelligence Program, Requirements and Collections Management, and an overview of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

In FY 2006 the FBI reconfigured the two ACES courses into a 9-week merged course and renamed it Cohort. Cohort will completely replace the ACES courses when analysts who joined the FBI prior to 2005 complete ACES. The first 5 weeks of Cohort is designed for new intelligence analysts, language analysts, and other intelligence professionals who comprise the FBI’s Intelligence Career Service. Immediately following the 5-week program, analysts receive an additional 4 weeks of specialized intelligence training covering systems and tools used by intelligence analysts.
Prior Reports on FBI Intelligence Analysts

Office of the Inspector General (OIG)

In May 2005, the OIG issued an audit report entitled The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence Analysts (Audit Report 05-20), which examined the FBI’s efforts to expand and improve its intelligence analyst corps. The OIG audit concluded that the FBI had made progress in hiring well-qualified intelligence analysts by streamlining its hiring process and budgeting the number of positions available. However, the OIG audit also found:

- At the end of FY 2004, the FBI had hired less than 40 percent of its goal of 787 analysts.

- The FBI had not determined the total number of analysts needed to support its intelligence program.

- The FBI made slow progress toward developing a quality training curriculum for new analysts. The initial basic course was not well attended and received negative evaluations.

- Analysts responding to the OIG’s survey were generally satisfied with their work assignments, were intellectually challenged, and believed they made a significant contribution to the FBI’s mission. However, newer and more highly qualified analysts were more likely to respond negatively to these questions.

- The type of work performed by intelligence analysts varied by location, years of employment, and education. The OIG survey found that work requiring analytical skills accounted for about 50 percent of analysts’ time. Many analysts reported performing miscellaneous administrative or other non-analytical duties. Some analysts said that not all special agents, who often supervise analysts, understand the capabilities and functions of intelligence analysts.

- Between FYs 2002 and 2004, 291 intelligence analysts left their positions. About 57 percent left the FBI, including retirements, and the rest took other jobs within the FBI.
About 63 percent of the analysts responding to the OIG survey said they plan to stay with the FBI as intelligence analysts for at least 5 years. Three categories of analysts reported that they were less likely remain as FBI intelligence analysts: analysts located at FBI Headquarters, those hired since 2002, and analysts with advanced degrees.

In its May 2005 report, the OIG made 15 recommendations to help the FBI improve its efforts to hire, train, and retain intelligence analysts. These include recommending that the FBI:

- Establish hiring goals for intelligence analysts based on: (1) the forecasted need for intelligence analysts; (2) projected attrition in the analyst corps; and (3) the FBI’s ability to hire, train, and utilize intelligence analysts.

- Develop and implement a threat-based or risk-based methodology for determining the number of intelligence analysts required and for allocating the positions.

- Integrate testing into the intelligence analysts curriculum and develop a more rigorous training evaluation system that includes the effectiveness and relevance of each instructional block; asks analysts what other topics need to be covered; obtains the views of analysts after returning to work when they can evaluate the effectiveness of training in improving their job skills; and obtains evaluations of training effectiveness from analysts’ supervisors.

- Assess the work done by intelligence analysts and determine what work is analytical in nature and what work is in general support of investigations that can more effectively be performed by other support or administrative personnel.

- Develop a strategic workforce plan for intelligence support personnel, and include in that plan a gap analysis of current investigative support personnel (by position) and the number of personnel (by position) the FBI needs to meet current and forecasted threats.
• Develop retention and succession plans and strategies for its intelligence analysts, including measurable goals, and conduct exit interviews of intelligence analysts who leave the FBI or transfer to other positions within the FBI.

**Government Accountability Office**

In June 2004, officials from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) presented congressional testimony entitled, *The FBI Transformation: Human Capital Strategies May Assist the FBI in Its Commitment to Address Its Top Priorities, GAO-04-817T*. In the testimony, the GAO stated that the FBI had made significant progress in its transformation efforts. The GAO found that the FBI’s organizational changes to enhance its intelligence capability, including its realignment of staff resources to the counterterrorism and counterintelligence priority areas, among other things, was encouraging.

The GAO noted that the FBI had faced difficulties retaining staff and competing with other government agencies and the private sector for staff with intelligence knowledge, skills, and abilities. These difficulties may have resulted in part from the fact that the FBI’s career ladder for intelligence analysts at the time was truncated compared with similar career ladders at other federal agencies. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency maintained a career ladder for their intelligence staff that included both senior executive (managerial) and senior level (non-managerial) positions. While the FBI was moving toward establishing a GS-15 career path for intelligence staff at the time of the hearing, the GAO concluded that this would still not create a level playing field with the rest of the intelligence community given that other agencies maintained higher level positions. The GAO went on to say that should a decision be made to institute senior executive and senior level positions, the FBI would still need to develop and implement a carefully crafted plan that included specific details on how such an intelligence career service would relate into its strategic plan and strategic human capital plan, the expectations and qualifications for positions, and how performance would be measured.

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10 Since this testimony, the FBI has been exempted from Title 5, which prevented it from placing analysts at the GS-15 and Senior Executive Service pay levels. Title 5 contains the personnel statutes that govern most of the federal workforce, including position classification and grading.
The final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) made several observations about the role of intelligence in the FBI as well as its intelligence capabilities. One of the report’s primary observations concerned the FBI’s strategic plan to reshape the way the FBI addressed terrorism cases, which shifted the FBI’s priorities and mandated a stronger intelligence collection effort. The plan also called for a new information technology system to aid in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence and other information.

The FBI’s strategic plan was based, in part, on the FBI creating a professional analytical corps. The 9/11 Commission found that if the FBI had fully implemented the 1998 strategic plan, it would have made “a major step toward addressing terrorism systematically, rather than as individual unrelated cases.” However, the Commission found that the plan was not successfully implemented and attributed that failure to several factors, including the following.\(^\text{11}\)

- The FBI’s practice of hiring analysts from within the agency rather than recruiting individuals with the relevant educational background and expertise contributed to a lack of strategic analysis. In the 9/11 Commission’s field visits, its staff “encountered several situations in which poorly qualified administrative personnel were promoted to analyst positions, in part as a reward for performance in other positions.”

- When the FBI hired or promoted people with appropriate analytical skills and experience, the lack of a long-term career path and a professional training program caused many capable individuals to leave the FBI or move internally to other positions.

- When the FBI hired qualified analysts, FBI managers often did not use them effectively. This was especially true in the field offices. Some field analysts interviewed by the 9/11 Commission said they were viewed as “über-secretaries,” expected to perform any duty that was deemed non-investigative, including data entry and answering phones.

\(^\text{11}\) In commenting on a draft of our May 2005 report, the FBI stated that the Department of Justice rejected its budget requests for the additional personnel necessary to implement the plan.
because FBI Headquarters did not have sufficient staff support. As a result, analysts were often asked to perform duties that were not analytic in nature.
OIG FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Hiring, Training, Utilizing, and Retaining Intelligence Analysts

This follow-up review found that the FBI has made progress in improving the hiring, training, utilization, and retention of intelligence analysts, although in some areas the progress has been slow and uneven. For example, the FBI has improved its utilization of intelligence analysts, and most analysts we interviewed expressed positive job satisfaction. The FBI has also kept the attrition of analysts at a reasonable level and has begun conducting exit surveys that should provide data to help the FBI further improve the hiring, training, utilization, and retention of its intelligence analysts. In addition, the FBI continues to augment the size of its intelligence analyst workforce by hiring qualified candidates.

However, the FBI ended FY 2006 with 2,174 intelligence analysts, a shortfall of 400 based on its hiring goal. Further, the FBI has not fully implemented recommendations from our prior report to (1) base the hiring and allocation of analysts on threat and risk and (2) determine the number of intelligence analysts needed to achieve the FBI’s mission. The hiring process has also been lengthening, with the process taking an average of 217 days in FY 2006 compared to 132 days in FY 2004. The FBI continues to struggle with developing a satisfactory training program for new analysts, with a lack of hands-on training in the skills needed for analysts to perform their work assignments. Also, we found a professional divide between special agents and analysts in which some special agents seem to misunderstand or undervalue the role of intelligence analysts or fail to treat them as professional equals. Lastly, although most analysts said they plan to stay with the FBI as intelligence analysts for at least 5 years, enough analysts plan to leave, especially at the Headquarters level, to warrant increased attention to developing retention strategies.
Hiring and Allocation

In our May 2005 report, we recommended that the FBI use threat- and risk-based criteria to determine the number of analysts needed to meet is mission and to allocate analysts to where they are most needed. Further, we recommended that the FBI establish hiring goals for intelligence analysts based on: (1) the forecasted need for intelligence analysts; (2) projected attrition in the analyst corps; and (3) the FBI’s ability to hire, train, and utilize intelligence analysts.

As discussed in our prior report, instead of establishing formal hiring goals based on threat and risk factors, the FBI uses the number of intelligence analyst positions in its budget appropriation as a hiring goal, which is based on the FSL. In other words, the budget drives the number of hires. A unit chief told the OIG that he believes the numbers of additional appropriated positions are valid hiring goals because the budget process is how government organizations express their resource needs. While we agree with this general proposition, we also believe the budget request should be based on a sound assessment of the number of analysts needed to meet the FBI’s mission using threat- and risk-based criteria.

Hiring Progress

Although the FBI missed its FY 2006 hiring goal by 400 intelligence analysts, it decreased its vacancy rate since our prior report. Between September 2004 and September 30, 2006, the FBI hired 54 percent more analysts, increasing on-board strength to 2,174 from 1,413. The shortfall of 400 analysts, resulting in a 16-percent vacancy rate, represents a significant improvement over the 32-percent vacancy rate in FY 2004. The following table shows the number of hires since FY 2001.
Number of Intelligence Analysts Hired and On-board from FY 2001 through FY 2007\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Hired\textsuperscript{b}</th>
<th>On-board (as of end of FY)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>1,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>1,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>1,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>2,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>250 \textit{projected}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG based on FBI data

Notes:
(a) The FBI has classified the hiring goal for FY 2005, but the goal for 2006 is unclassified. The FBI did not have an FSL prior to FY 2005.
(b) The number of intelligence analysts includes new hires and transfers from other FBI positions.

The FBI’s strides in filling intelligence analyst positions was aided by several initiatives, beginning with a hiring “blitz” in early 2005. According to an FBI official, this recruitment initiative attracted over 11,000 applicants, of whom over 300 were interviewed. In addition, in March 2005, the FBI replaced its decentralized hiring process with a nationwide recruitment strategy that allows it to consider and process a greater number of candidates to meet the aggressive hiring goals established since 2004. In addition, the nationwide strategy enabled all candidates to apply to the same job posting rather than to separate postings for each location’s vacancies.

A more recent hiring initiative in July 2006 sought intelligence analyst candidates for FBI Headquarters positions. According to an FBI official, Headquarters has more openings for analysts than field offices. Headquarters divisions identified the specific skill sets desired for new hires, and the hiring initiative sought experienced applicants to fill General Schedule (GS) 12 through 14 positions. Headquarters divisions then reviewed the applications received and decided which applicants to interview. The FBI received about 4,100 applications for
the Headquarters positions, interviewed about 350 applicants, and selected 100 candidates.

Lengthening Processing Time

The average time required for the FBI to hire intelligence analysts from the closure of the job announcement to entry on duty (EOD) has increased from about 19 weeks in FY 2004 to about 31 weeks in FY 2006. This increased hiring time, according to several FBI managers, might cause some candidates to lose patience and accept employment elsewhere.

Once a candidate receives a tentative offer of employment, an extensive background investigation process ensues and this portion of the hiring process accounts for most of the processing time. According to FBI officials, the primary reason for the delay is the number of candidates that need background investigations at any given time.

Due to the nature of the work performed by the FBI, all employees must qualify for a top-secret security clearance before they can begin service. After applicants for an intelligence analyst position receive a conditional offer of employment, they are placed in “background” status. While in a background status, applicants are investigated to determine whether they are suitable for FBI employment.12 The FBI’s investigation includes a drug test, a polygraph, and an extensive check into the applicant’s credit history, drug use, personality, and any legal violations.

From FY 2004 to FY 2006, the average time it took from the closure of the job announcement to the EOD date for intelligence analysts increased from approximately 132 to 217 days, or 85 days, as shown in the table below. Although we requested information on the reasons for this increase in hiring time, the Administrative Services Division unit chief did not provide an explanation.

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12 At the time of this audit, the FBI conducted its own background investigations. However, The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 addressed the need to streamline the process by which government agencies grant security clearances. While the Act directs the President to select a single entity to conduct all security clearance investigations, the FBI has not yet changed its policy of conducting its own background investigations.
### Average Number of Days from Closure of Job Announcement to Enter-On-Duty Date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Average Number of Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2002</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG based on FBI data


### Quality of New Intelligence Analysts

During our fieldwork for the current audit, we interviewed 60 intelligence analysts and their supervisors regarding the FBI’s hiring practices. Many supervisory intelligence analysts told us that the quality of newly hired intelligence analysts has improved, and that they are qualified in general, think creatively, and are more educated than in the past. For example, we found that at least 34 percent of analysts hired in the last 2 years hold advanced degrees. However, because the FBI told us it did not collect complete data on advanced degrees for this period, we could not compare it to the 56 percent of analysts with advanced degrees hired from FYs 2002 to 2004.<sup>13</sup>

### Allocation of Analysts

We found that the FBI does not use threat or risk assessments to allocate all of the hired analysts throughout the FBI. Once hired, analysts are assigned to various Headquarters divisions or offices or to field offices. The FBI’s methodology for allocating these new analysts varies. In Headquarters, the allocation of new intelligence analysts is based on filling any vacancies stemming from the historical budget-driven allocation of positions, modified by managers’ expressed needs and requests for additional positions. The FBI fills field office vacancies similarly. However, additional positions allowed by the

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<sup>13</sup> Advanced degrees consist of a professional 6-year degree, master’s, doctorate, or juris doctorate.
budget – known as enhancements – are now allocated based on a threat and risk assessment. In its FY 2006 budget, the FBI received an enhancement of 260 intelligence analyst positions. The FBI first filled 51 requested positions at FBI Headquarters and overseas legal attachés. The FBI then allocated the remaining 209 positions to field offices using threat and risk criteria.\textsuperscript{14}

We believe that using threat and risk criteria for the field office enhancements is a step in the right direction. However, the recommendation in our prior report was more comprehensive and recommended developing and implementing a threat- or risk-based methodology for allocating intelligence analyst positions across both FBI Headquarters divisions and field offices.

Furthermore, in response to our prior recommendation to develop and implement a threat- and risk-based methodology for determining the number of analysts required, the FBI stated that forecasting the need for intelligence analysts is part of a long-term goal that it is working toward. However, FBI officials said that because of the complexity of such a model and the need for baseline data over a span of several years, development of such a model is likely 3 to 5 years away from completion. As stated in our prior report, we do not believe that the methodology for determining the number of intelligence analysts needs to involve complex formulas. However, the methodology does need to be supported by data and be consistent with the FBI’s strategic mission.

The overall allocation of the FBI’s intelligence analysts between Headquarters and the field offices has not changed significantly since our previous audit report. About half of all analysts are assigned to field offices and half to Headquarters units. The distribution of analysts among the field offices has changed somewhat, as has the total number of analysts on board. For example, each of the FBI’s five largest field offices – Los Angeles, Newark, New York, San Francisco, and Washington, DC – had 40 or more intelligence analysts during the period of this review compared to 25 in June 2004. The table below compares the overall number and allocation of analysts in FY 2004 to FY 2006.

\textsuperscript{14} The specific allocation is classified.
Allocation of FBI Intelligence Analysts
April 2006 and June 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Unit</th>
<th>Number of Intelligence Analysts</th>
<th>Percent of Total Intelligence Analysts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field offices</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ operational divisions</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other FBI entities</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,119</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,247</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG based on FBI data

Note (a): The total does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

In 2005, we reported that the former EAD for Intelligence had expressed concern that there were too few seasoned intelligence analysts working in FBI field offices. The current Acting Deputy Assistant Director of the Directorate of Intelligence recently stated that FBI Headquarters has as many intelligence analysts as the field offices because it provides national case management, while the field is responsible for local intelligence efforts. He stated that Headquarters puts together the individual pieces of intelligence from the field and is the office of origin for many major cases. Another FBI Headquarters official stated that intelligence analysts are used as case analysts in field offices, but not a lot of intelligence is generated by cases. According to this official, since the majority of strategic intelligence analysis (analysis outside of cases) is performed at FBI Headquarters, the FBI needs a significant number of intelligence analysts at its Headquarters to conduct strategic intelligence analysis.

Consistent with the recommendation in our prior report, we believe the allocation of intelligence analysts needs to be part of an overall human capital planning process in which the number and location of analysts are formally assessed based on factors such as threat, risk, and workload. Further, because there has been no such assessment, the FBI cannot be certain whether there are too few or
too many analysts in FBI field offices, or whether the distribution of analysts among the field offices is appropriate.

In terms of the distribution of analysts by pay grade, we noted in our prior report that analysts in field offices tended to be lower-graded. This follow-up review found a greater balance between the field offices and Headquarters divisions with respect to pay grades of intelligence analysts. The following table shows the change in the distribution of GS grades, by location, from FY 2004 to FY 2006.

**Change in GS Level of Intelligence Analysts by Organizational Unit, FYs 2004 and 2006**
**(in percentages, FY 2004 - FY 2006)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Unit</th>
<th>GS-7</th>
<th>GS-9</th>
<th>GS-11</th>
<th>GS-12</th>
<th>GS-13</th>
<th>GS-14</th>
<th>GS-15</th>
<th>Executive Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Offices</td>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>9-14</td>
<td>56-27</td>
<td>24-33</td>
<td>7-13</td>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ Operational Divisions</td>
<td>4-7</td>
<td>12-26</td>
<td>14-18</td>
<td>13-12</td>
<td>19-15</td>
<td>33-20</td>
<td>4-3</td>
<td>1-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other FBI Entities</td>
<td>2-10</td>
<td>6-16</td>
<td>49-21</td>
<td>12-22</td>
<td>13-13</td>
<td>16-12</td>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>38-23</td>
<td>19-23</td>
<td>12-14</td>
<td>16-14</td>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>0-0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG based on FBI data

The percentage of analysts in the field at the GS-14 supervisory intelligence analysts level increased from 1 percent in FY 2004 to 10 percent in April 2006. In addition, since May 2006 20 GS-14s have been placed in field offices. Therefore, more field office intelligence analysts are being supervised by supervisory analysts instead of by special agents. An FBI official stated that each field office decides if intelligence analysts should be supervised by a more senior analyst or by a special agent, but that more field offices are moving toward hiring additional supervisory intelligence analysts. Analysts told us that they prefer reporting to supervisory analysts who understand their role and capabilities and who can provide more appropriate guidance.

The following chart depicts the change in the field office grade structure between FYs 2004 and 2006.
Training

In FY 2006 the FBI established a 9-week course covering the two ACES courses and renamed it Cohort. Cohort will completely replace the ACES courses when analysts who joined the FBI prior to 2005 complete ACES. The first 5 weeks of Cohort is designed for new intelligence analysts, language analysts, and other intelligence professionals who comprise the FBI’s Intelligence Career Service. Immediately following the 5-week program, intelligence analysts receive an additional 4 weeks of specialized intelligence training covering various systems and tools that analysts can use. Included in this second phase of Cohort is a 4-hour joint exercise involving new analysts and new special agents. At the time of the current audit, however, this exercise was the only formal interaction between special agents and intelligence analysts during training. According to an FBI training official, as of August 2006, 2,010 analysts had attended basic training: 392 intelligence analysts attended Cohort, 885 attended the ACES-1 class, and 733 attended the ACES 1.5 class. Forty-one analysts were still required to attend ACES-1 (some of whom were registered for a September 2006 class), and 127 analysts were still required to attend ACES 1.5 (some of whom were registered for August or September 2006 classes). However, as discussed below, the FBI has not yet established an analyst training program that meets the expressed needs of analysts, their supervisors, or Directorate on Intelligence executives.
Evaluating Analyst Training

During the current audit, 55 percent of the 60 intelligence analysts we interviewed in FBI field offices and Headquarters told us that the analyst training (ACES-1, ACES 1.5, and Cohort) they attended did not meet, or completely failed to meet, their expectations for helping them do their job. Twenty-five percent of the analysts noted that the training lacks the hands-on practical exercises required to help them learn how to perform their daily tasks, such as writing intelligence assessments or intelligence information reports. Underscoring this point, approximately half of the 16 supervisory analysts we interviewed stated that intelligence analysts need better training in writing intelligence products.

In addition, a senior FBI training official said that the new Cohort class is nearly identical to the ACES course, but instead there should be more specialized training, such as in counterterrorism or criminal investigations. She stated that the consequence of the current curriculum is an analytical work force that is not well-prepared and that has to find its own way in learning the job. Further, both the Assistant Director and the Acting Deputy Assistant Director for the Directorate of Intelligence acknowledged that training for the FBI’s intelligence analysts is inadequate. The Assistant Director told us he wants to analyze the skills that analysts require and determine what additional training is needed to develop those skills. However, he said...
he does not want to develop a new course if training is available through other agencies and if FBI employees can attend. Also, he believes 9 consecutive weeks is too long a time to train new analysts, because it disrupts the work and personal lives of those entering duty. The Acting Deputy Assistant Director also stated that intelligence analyst training is lacking. In recognition of the continuing need to improve analyst training, the FBI held meetings in April and August 2006 to better define job roles and shape the training program to better prepare analysts to perform within those roles.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the FBI said it has used subject matter experts and managers throughout the development of all of the FBI’s intelligence analyst training programs. However, even with such input to the curriculum, an FBI training section chief told us that FBI Training and Development Division staff developed the analyst training curricula with little influence from experienced intelligence analysts and supervisors. Moreover, we analyzed the curriculum and found little difference between the ACES courses and Cohort courses. As stated above, FBI officials agreed there was no substantive difference between the two courses. We therefore recommend more extensive involvement of experienced analysts and supervisors in the development of the curriculum for intelligence analysts.

Moreover, in our previous report we recommended that the FBI integrate testing into its training curriculum. We believe that testing students would help instructors assess how well the class understands the concepts presented.

Although the FBI agreed with the recommendation, it has not yet implemented a testing process. However, in its most recent response to our recommendation, the FBI said it has developed testing blueprints and conducted testing pilots with two Cohort classes. Additionally, the FBI said it plans to: conduct a third testing pilot with a Cohort class; work with the Administrative Services Division, the Directorate of Intelligence, and the Office of the General Counsel to develop a human resource policy for how test scores affect conditional hire status; and implement a final testing program. Yet, the FBI did not state a time frame for implementing a testing process, nor did it provide an assessment of the pilot results.

We also recommended in our prior report that the FBI ensure all analyst training classes are full rather than leaving vacancies in the classroom. We closed this recommendation based on documentation from the FBI showing the last four sessions of ACES-1 in 2005 were
full. We confirmed in our current audit that the FBI continues to keep the classes occupied at an adequate level.

We also recommended previously that the FBI develop a more rigorous training evaluation system that includes the effectiveness and relevance of each instructional block; asks analysts what other topics need to be covered; obtains the views of analysts after returning to work when they can evaluate the effectiveness of the training in improving their job skills; and obtains evaluations of training effectiveness from analysts’ supervisors. We closed this recommendation based on documentation showing the FBI developed a training evaluation system for ACES-1.

However, during the current audit we found no evidence that the FBI ensures that all students complete an evaluation or that the data from evaluations is being used to improve the current curriculum. Also, there is no follow-up evaluation by either the student or the supervisor to help assess the usefulness of the training in the real world once the student returns to the workplace. We are therefore replacing the previous recommendation with a new recommendation that the FBI make training evaluations mandatory and to use the results to identify any needed improvements in the curriculum.

Utilization

The 60 analysts we interviewed during the current audit generally said they believed they are contributing significantly to the FBI’s mission: 63 percent of these analysts rated their contribution as “very high” or “high,” and 35 percent said their contribution to the FBI’s mission is “average.” Only 2 percent of the intelligence analysts interviewed rated their contributions as “low.” These results are similar to the results of our more extensive survey discussed in the 2005 report, when 73 percent of analysts perceived their contribution to the FBI as “very high” or “high,” and 23 percent rated their contribution as “average.” The 2004 and 2006 results, while not statistically comparable due to the more limited sample in 2006, indicate continuing general satisfaction by the analysts of their contribution to the FBI’s mission. The chart below shows the extent to which analysts believe they are contributing to the FBI’s mission.
Satisfaction with Work Assignments

The vast majority of intelligence analysts we interviewed during the current audit continue to express satisfaction with their work assignments: 84 percent said they are satisfied, the same percentage as our previous, more extensive survey. The supervisory intelligence analysts we interviewed also said they were satisfied with the work products that intelligence analysts produce. However, as discussed in the Training section of this report, most of the analysts’ supervisors believe there is room for improvement in the analysts’ written products and that more specialized training in completing these products would be beneficial. Again, although the data is not statistically comparable, it indicates that the FBI’s intelligence analysts continue to be generally satisfied with their work assignments.
Intellectual Challenge

Of the 60 analysts we interviewed, 82 percent said their work is intellectually challenging. The result mirrors the results of our prior survey, where 85 percent said they are challenged. The following chart compares data from our 2004 survey and 2006 interviews on the extent to which analysts find their work intellectually challenging.
Expectations

In this follow-up review, we found that the majority of intelligence analysts had expectations for the job that were similar to the work they are performing. The results were similar to the 2004 survey.15

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15 In instances where the expectations did not match, a few of the reasons given were poor placement, less analytical work than expected, and vague job descriptions in the application.
Extents of Non-Analytical Work

In our prior audit, we found that, on average, analysts spent 31 percent of their time on administrative work, and they estimated that one-third of this administrative work was not related to their job. For example, analysts said they were performing a significant amount of non-analytical duties such as escort, trash, watch, or command post duty. However, according to intelligence analysts, supervisory analysts, and other FBI officials we interviewed during the current audit, the utilization of analysts for analytical work has improved. Analysts told us that they do not now typically perform the types of non-analytical duties cited in our prior report. Over 90 percent of the analysts we interviewed told us they spend from no time to under 25 percent of their time on administrative duties not related to their role.\textsuperscript{16}

Still, several analysts reported that in some cases they perform administrative functions. We believe that many of the administrative functions these analysts reported would be better suited for investigative support or intelligence assistance personnel. For example, intelligence analysts in one field office were responsible for uploading data into an intelligence-related database. This routine but

\textsuperscript{16} Our interviews asked for estimates in ranges, not for the specific time spent on administrative duties unrelated to analysts’ job roles. The lowest range was zero to 24 percent.
time-consuming function does not require any analysis and could be performed by an intelligence assistant or other support personnel. While most employees in any organization perform some administrative tasks, we believe – as we recommended in our prior report – that the FBI should systematically examine the duties performed by intelligence analysts to determine whether some tasks might be more efficiently performed by other categories of employees. However, we also noted in our current audit that the FBI is attempting to address this concern by assigning some of the more administrative duties to intelligence assistants, such as compiling and disseminating routine reports, maintaining intelligence databases, and reviewing and analyzing intelligence documents for format and required information.

Professional Differences Between Analysts and Special Agents

Eighty percent of the analysts – and every analyst supervisor – we interviewed stated that special agents misunderstand the functions and capabilities of intelligence analysts at least some of the time. They also told us – and we confirmed – there has been no special agent training on the role and capabilities of intelligence analysts, other than the relatively brief joint exercise involving new analysts and new special agents during Cohort training.

Yet, although our interviews of 60 analysts cannot statistically be compared with our more comprehensive survey reported in 2005, there appears to be some improvement in the analysts belief that agents understand the role of analysts. Eighteen percent of analysts we interviewed said that special agents rarely or never understand the functions and capabilities of intelligence analysts, compared to 27 percent in our prior report.
In our interviews, we heard that prior to September 11, 2001, special agents viewed intelligence analysts as secretaries or administrative support personnel. We believe this perception was partly the result of special agents not receiving specific training on the functions and capabilities of intelligence analysts. In the past, when intelligence analysts were part of the Intelligence Assistant job series (series 134), it became routine to view intelligence analysts as only able to perform administrative duties of a non-analytical nature. However, we found that as a result of the changes in the FBI after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI has made significant improvements in establishing the current cadre of intelligence analysts, with a professional job series (series 132).

Many intelligence analysts believe that some special agents have not changed their perception and continue to view intelligence analysts as administrative support staff rather than equal professional partners. This perception may lead to underutilization of intelligence analysts and to a professional divide. Further, most analysts and supervisors we interviewed told us there is a noticeable segregation of special agents and analysts, particularly in FBI field offices.

As in the May 2005 report, our current audit found that the lack of respect that analysts feel boils down to one concept: analysts are labeled “support” personnel rather than intelligence analyst professionals on par with the FBI’s special agents. Our 2005 report found that there was a wide professional divide between support staff and agents. During interviews for this audit, we asked analysts to tell
us whether the term “support staff” carried a negative feeling when applied to intelligence analysts. In response, 53 percent said “yes.” This is similar to the 60 percent who answered “yes” in our May 2005 report.

However, officials in the Intelligence Career Management Section said they are optimistic that as the intelligence analyst program becomes more developed and embedded in the structure of the FBI, intelligence analysts will be better utilized to perform intelligence analysis and reporting. Intelligence analysts told us that the newer special agents tend to be more willing to assign tasks to them that are analytical in nature, once they understood that an intelligence analyst can and should be utilized in this capacity. However, the analysts told us that some special agents – both supervisory and non-supervisory – continue to view intelligence analysts as just a spin-off of the administrative series and therefore are not open to allowing them to perform intelligence-related work. With our limited sample of analysts and supervisors it is difficult to assess the pervasiveness of this professional divide in the FBI, but enough analysts told us that they still perceive such a divide to make it a significant issue that the FBI needs to address. Consequently, we believe the FBI needs to devote continued attention to breaking down any perceived or actual barriers between special agents and analysts.

Retention

To build an appropriately sized analytical corps, it is especially important that the FBI retain the intelligence analysts it hires. As shown in the following chart, the attrition rate for analysts has ranged between 6 and 10 percent from FY 2002 to FY 2006. During FYs 2005 and 2006, 312 intelligence analysts left the FBI’s analytical corps. Of those who left, 208 left the FBI entirely and 104 took other positions within the agency. We found that the 12 percent attrition rate for intelligence analysts located at FBI Headquarters in FY 2006 was substantially higher than the 5 percent rate in the FBI’s 56 field offices, and is cause for concern.
Sixty-five percent of the 60 intelligence analysts we interviewed during the current audit said they plan to stay with the FBI for at least the next 5 years, 20 percent said they are not likely to stay, and the remaining 15 percent said they were uncertain. Analysts who said they plan to stay with the FBI primarily cited the following reasons: (1) pride in working for the FBI, (2) rewarding work, and (3) co-workers. Analysts who expect to leave in the next 5 years primarily cited the reason as retirement or concerns about their long-term careers with the FBI. The following table compares data from our 2005 report to our current audit on what analysts reported about their plans on staying with the FBI.

### Intelligence Analysts Planning to Stay With the FBI (in Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood of staying for the next 5 years</th>
<th>May 2005</th>
<th>Current</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG interviews of FBI intelligence analysts

Note (a): Does not add to 100 due to rounding.

As discussed below, the FBI now performs exit surveys of all individuals who leave the intelligence analyst position. In addition, to enhance retention the FBI offers student loan repayments, bonuses,
and an Intelligence Officer Certification program.\textsuperscript{17} We believe these are positive efforts that will aid in retaining qualified intelligence analysts.

Further, after requesting and receiving an exemption from legal restrictions, the FBI has increased the intelligence analyst career path to the GS-15 and Senior Executive Service levels, thereby placing the FBI on equal footing with other intelligence agencies to compete for and retain intelligence analysts.\textsuperscript{18} The ability to promote intelligence analysts to non-supervisory senior level positions should contribute to the retention of qualified intelligence analysts.

To achieve a strategic objective of a well-educated, highly trained, and appropriately sized analytical work force, the FBI recognizes that it must retain its well-trained and productive intelligence analysts. The Assistant Director of the Directorate of Intelligence stated that the Directorate is actively managing the retention of intelligence analysts by constantly monitoring the attrition rate and surveying intelligence analysts to better understand their career needs. However, the FBI still has not established formal retention or succession plans as recommended in our prior audit report, although it agreed to do so. A section chief in the Directorate of Intelligence told us that there are not enough personnel to develop formal retention and succession plans. We are skeptical of this explanation, and we continue to believe that the FBI should establish formal retention and succession plans and strategies as a part of its human capital planning effort. Such plans would include forecasts of attrition, incorporating estimated attrition into hiring goals and strategies, and efforts to reduce turnover.

\textit{Exit Survey}

In response to the OIG’s prior recommendation, the Directorate of Intelligence developed an exit survey for all professional support

\textsuperscript{17} The Intelligence Officer Certification is a credential that recognizes achievement in and long-term commitment to the intelligence profession, as demonstrated through experience, education, and training. All special agents, intelligence analysts, language analysts, and surveillance specialists are eligible to participate in the certification program.

\textsuperscript{18} Legislation entitled \textit{Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005, and for Other Purposes}, signed on December 8, 2004, provided the FBI with additional flexibility to hire and retain highly skilled intelligence personnel through an amendment to Title 5 of the U.S. Code.
personnel leaving their positions in the Directorate. In March 2006, the Directorate requested that FBI Headquarters and field offices ensure that all intelligence analysts, language analysts, and physical surveillance specialists leaving their positions complete an automated Personnel Exit Survey before their departure. FBI officials stated that this feedback will be used to continue making improvements in retention, recruitment, training, leadership, and career development, among other areas.

The FBI’s automated Personnel Exit Survey solicits responses from departing employees in the following areas:

- reason for departure
- recruiting and initial expectations
- training and development
- performance management
- management and leadership
- communication
- culture
- working conditions and work-life balance
- policies

Although the data is collected as analysts leave, the FBI reported that the Directorate of Intelligence plans to analyze the survey results biannually. The Directorate’s Intelligence Personnel Resources Unit would then prepare a report of findings and share the results with senior FBI and National Security Branch management.

At the time of our audit, the results of the initial round of surveys had not yet been analyzed by the FBI. However, we reviewed the FBI’s analysis of limited data from its pilot exit survey of 22 analysts who left their positions between July 1, 2005, and January 31, 2006. The reasons cited by the 22 analysts for leaving their positions included:

- unhappy with position — 8
- other career opportunity or interests — 6
- involuntary — 4
- promotion or financial — 2, and
- retirement or medical — 2.

---

19 Although only 22 analysts responded, 45 were contacted. Overall, 88 analysts had left their specific positions during the period, but many could not be reached or had simply changed analyst positions at the FBI.
Conclusion

The FBI has made progress in improving the hiring, training, utilization, and retention of intelligence analysts, but in some areas the progress has been slow and uneven. More than 18 months after our original report, 10 of the 15 prior OIG recommendations remain open, and the FBI is still working on key areas such as the lack of (1) threat and risk-based criteria to determine the number of analysts needed to meet its mission and to allocate all analysts in both Headquarters and field offices to where they are most needed, (2) hiring goals based on the projected need for additional analysts, and (3) succession and retention plans and strategies with measurable goals.

However, the FBI has made progress in hiring additional qualified intelligence analysts since our May 2005 audit report, cut its vacancy rate in half since FY 2004, and improved analysts’ career path to help the FBI better compete with other intelligence agencies in the job market. But its hiring shortfall of 400 analysts in FY 2006 demonstrates the continuing difficulty facing the FBI in attracting qualified analysts. Further, the lengthening time required to bring newly hired analysts aboard – nearly a 3-month increase since FY 2004 – is troublesome because it not only slows the entry of analysts into the FBI workforce but also can result in the FBI losing qualified candidates.

We found that job satisfaction of analysts remains strong. Most believe they are making important contributions to the FBI’s mission. The FBI also deserves credit for improving the utilization of its analysts, who for the most part no longer are required to perform administrative tasks unrelated to their analytical duties.

The FBI has struggled to establish a strong training curriculum for analysts. Our prior report described the growing pains in developing an effective curriculum, and the comments of analysts and Directorate of Intelligence officials during our current audit show that the current program, despite several iterations, is still lacking. We also agree with those analysts and intelligence managers who believe the training program needs a greater emphasis on the specific skills analysts need in their FBI positions. We continue to believe that at least part of the reason for weaknesses in the analyst training program stems from a lack of adequate input by analysts and other intelligence professionals in the curriculum development process. Also, although the FBI established a training evaluation system, it has not been implemented adequately and is not being used for its intended purpose.
of improving the training curriculum. Further, the FBI has not integrated student testing into the curriculum, although the FBI is working on establishing a testing program.

We believe that the professional divide between analysts and special agents may be lessening somewhat, but barriers to full acceptance and cooperation between the two groups should be addressed if the FBI is to most efficiently and effectively apply all its resources to meeting its highest priority of preventing terrorist acts. The FBI’s training program does little to foster an environment of mutual respect between these two categories of professional employees.

We believe the FBI’s 9-percent attrition rate for intelligence analysts is at a reasonable level, although we believe the FBI should examine the causes for the recent rise in attrition of Headquarters analysts. While the majority of analysts we interviewed told us that they plan to stay at least 5 years, the fact that about a third of analysts we interviewed are planning to leave or are not sure they will stay for at least 5 years is cause for concern. We continue to believe that the FBI needs to develop formal retention and succession plans and strategies, including manageable goals.

**Recommendations**

In addition to the 10 open recommendations from our May 2005 audit report to improve its intelligence analyst program, we recommend that the FBI:

1. Evaluate the hiring and background investigation process to identify ways to accelerate the accession of new intelligence analysts.

2. Involve intelligence managers and experienced analysts more extensively in training curriculum development efforts.

3. Make student and supervisor evaluations of analyst training mandatory and use the results to identify any needed improvements in the curriculum.

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20 The 10 open recommendations are listed in Appendix 8.
STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS

We audited the FBI’s management of its efforts to hire, train, utilize, and retain intelligence analysts. As required by Government Auditing Standards, we reviewed management processes and records to obtain reasonable assurance of the FBI’s compliance with laws and regulations that could have a material effect on FBI operations. Compliance with laws and regulations applicable to the FBI’s management of intelligence analysts is the responsibility of the FBI’s management.

Our audit included examining, on a test basis, evidence about laws and regulations. The specific laws and regulations against which we conducted our tests are contained in the relevant portions of:

- U.S. Code Title § 5377, pay authority for critical positions

Our audit identified no areas where the FBI was not in compliance with the laws and regulations referred to above. With respect to those transactions not tested, nothing came to our attention that caused us to believe that FBI management was not in compliance with the laws and regulations cited above.
STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS

In planning and performing our audit, we considered the FBI’s internal controls for the purpose of determining audit procedures. This evaluation was not made for the purpose of providing assurance on the internal control structure as a whole. However, we noted certain matters that we consider to be reportable conditions under the Government Auditing Standards.

Reportable conditions involve matters coming to our attention relating to significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the internal control structure that, in our judgment, could adversely affect the FBI’s ability to manage its intelligence analysts. As discussed in the Findings and Recommendations section of this report, we found that:

- The FBI has not determined the total number of intelligence analysts it needs.
- The FBI did not have a threat-based or risk-based method of allocating intelligence analysts to its different divisions and field offices.
- The FBI does not have a plan to retain current highly qualified intelligence analysts.

Because we are not expressing an opinion on the FBI’s internal control structure as a whole, this statement is intended solely for the information and use of the FBI in managing its intelligence analysts. This restriction is not intended to limit the distribution of this report, which is a matter of public record.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Objectives

The primary objective of the audit was to follow up on our May 2005 report on how effectively the FBI hires, trains, utilizes, and retains its intelligence analysts. To accomplish this objective, we examined the progress the FBI has made in implementing the 15 recommendations from our previous report and the current status of the FBI’s intelligence analyst program compared to our previous report. Specifically, we reviewed:

1. our 2005 audit report on the FBI’s efforts to hire, train, and retain intelligence analysts;
2. current analyst hiring requirements;
3. progress made toward meeting analyst hiring goals;
4. progress made toward establishing a comprehensive training program and meeting the training goals;
5. allocation and utilization of analysts to support the FBI’s mission; and
6. progress toward retaining analysts.

Scope and Methodology

The audit was performed in accordance with the Government Auditing Standards, and included tests and procedures necessary to accomplish the audit objectives. We conducted work at FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC, and four FBI field offices: New York, NY; Detroit, MI; Miami, FL; and Los Angeles, CA. In general, our audit data covered October 1, 2005, through August 31, 2006.

To conduct our audit, we interviewed FBI officials and a sample of 60 intelligence analysts and 16 supervisors in the offices we visited. The FBI officials interviewed were from the Directorate of Intelligence, the Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Criminal Investigative, and Cyber Divisions, as well as the Administrative Services, Training and Development, and Finance Divisions. In addition, we reviewed documents related to the budgeting, hiring, training, utilization and retention of intelligence analysts including various Concepts of Operations published by the Directorate of Intelligence, budget documentation, organizational structures, congressional testimony, and prior GAO and OIG reports.

To analyze how the FBI determines its requirements for intelligence analysts and allocates intelligence analysts, we examined the methodologies the FBI employed to determine the number of intelligence analysts needed, the number of additional analysts requested in the FBI's FYs 2005 and 2006 budgets, and its current and future allocation of intelligence analysts. We
accomplished this by examining Finance Division documents, reviewing the Threat Forecasting and Operational Requirements Concept of Operations Plan, and interviewing officials from the Directorate of Intelligence and the Finance and Administrative Services Divisions.

We interviewed officials from the Directorate of Intelligence about the automated application system now being used by the FBI. We also interviewed other FBI officials about the system previously used to hire intelligence analysts.

To determine the progress the FBI has made in providing introductory training to intelligence analysts, we examined curricula for the ACES 1, ACES 1.5, and Cohort courses, and attendance data for the three courses. We also interviewed officials from the Training and Development Division and the Intelligence Career Management Section in order to learn more about the hiring, training, retention, and selection practices for intelligence analysts. To obtain the perspective of intelligence analysts who have attended the ACES, ACES 1.5, and Cohort courses, we interviewed selected analysts in the field offices we visited. In addition, we questioned intelligence analysts on the topics covered by the courses, suggestions for improvement, and the courses’ ability to prepare intelligence analysts to do their jobs.

To determine how FBI intelligence analysts are being utilized, we interviewed intelligence analysts and their supervisors at FBI Headquarters and the four field offices we visited.

To determine the progress the FBI has made in retaining highly qualified and productive intelligence analysts, we examined the Human Talent CONOPS and attrition data. We also interviewed officials from the Directorate of Intelligence to obtain information about the latest retention initiatives. To determine whether FBI intelligence analysts plan to stay with the FBI, we included appropriate questions in our interviews.
The stated mission of the Intelligence Program is to optimally position the FBI to meet current and emerging national security and criminal threats by:

- aiming core investigative work proactively against threats to U.S. interests;
- building and sustaining enterprise-wide intelligence policies and capabilities; and
- providing useful, appropriate, and timely information and analysis to the national security, homeland security and law enforcement communities.

**Strategic Goals**

The strategic goals of the Directorate of Intelligence are as follows.

- **Intelligence Policy** — Create a common approach to intelligence work through enterprise-wide doctrine, policy, and production standards.

- **Intelligence Processes** — Fill intelligence gaps with a uniformly managed intelligence process.

- **Threat-Based Management** — Align operations and capabilities with the threat environment.

- **Customer Service** — Support internal and external intelligence customers and partners with corporate information sharing and appropriate support strategies.
Intelligence Process

Requirements are identified information needs — what must be known to safeguard the nation. Intelligence requirements are established by the Director of National Intelligence according to guidance received from the President and the National and Homeland Security Advisors. Requirements are developed based on critical information required to protect the United States from National Security and criminal threats. The Attorney General and the Director of the FBI participate in the formulation of national intelligence requirements.

Planning and Direction is management of the entire effort, from identifying the need for information to delivering an intelligence product to a consumer. It involves implementation plans to satisfy requirements levied on the FBI, as well as identifying specific collection requirements based on FBI needs. Planning and direction also are responsive to the end of the cycle, because current and finished intelligence, which support decision-making, generate new requirements. The Executive Assistant Director for the National Security Branch leads intelligence planning and direction for the FBI.

Collection is the gathering of raw information based on requirements. Activities such as interviews, technical and physical surveillances, human source operation, searches, and liaison relationships result in the collection of intelligence.

Processing and Exploitation involves converting the vast amount of information collected into a form usable by analysts. This is done through a variety of methods including decryption, language translations, and data reduction. Processing includes the entering of raw data into databases where it can be exploited for use in the analysis process.

Analysis and Production is the conversion of raw information into intelligence. It includes integrating, evaluating, and analyzing available data, and preparing intelligence products. The information’s reliability, validity, and relevance are evaluated and weighed. The information is logically integrated, put in context, and used to produce intelligence. This includes both "raw" and finished intelligence. Raw intelligence is often referred to as "the dots" — individual pieces of information disseminated individually. Finished intelligence reports "connect the dots" by putting information in context and drawing conclusions about its implications.

Dissemination — the last step — is the distribution of raw or finished intelligence to the consumers whose needs initiated the intelligence requirements. The FBI disseminates information in three standard formats:
Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), FBI Intelligence Bulletins, and FBI Intelligence Assessments. FBI intelligence products are provided daily to the Attorney General, the President, and to customers throughout the FBI and in other agencies. These FBI intelligence customers make decisions — operational, strategic, and policy—based on the information. These decisions may lead to the levying of more requirements, thus continuing the FBI intelligence cycle.
Source: FBI
NATIONAL SECURITY BRANCH (NSB)
MISSION, VISION, AND ORGANIZATION

Mission Statement

The mission of the NSB is to optimally position the FBI to protect the United States against weapons of mass destruction, terrorist attacks, foreign intelligence operations, and espionage by:

- integrating investigative and intelligence activities against current and emerging national security threats;

- providing useful and timely information and analysis to the intelligence and law enforcement communities; and

- effectively developing enabling capabilities, processes, and infrastructure, consistent with applicable laws, Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence guidance, and civil liberties.

Vision Statement

To the extent authorized under the law, build a national awareness that permits recognition of a national security threat, sufficiently early to permit its disruption. This will be a discerning process that promotes the collection of relevant information and minimizes the accumulation of extraneous data that unnecessarily distracts from the analytical process.
National Security Branch Organizational Chart

Source: FBI website
MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The Directorate of National Intelligence acts as head of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The members of the U.S. Intelligence Community include the following organizations and entities:

- Air Force Intelligence
- Army Intelligence
- Central Intelligence Agency
- Coast Guard Intelligence
- Defense Intelligence Agency
- Department of Energy
- Department of Homeland Security
- Department of State
- Department of the Treasury
- Drug Enforcement Administration
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Marine Corps Intelligence
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
- National Reconnaissance Office
- National Security Agency
- Navy Intelligence
## APPENDIX 6

### ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACES-1</td>
<td>Analytical Cadre Educational Strategy 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIA</td>
<td>Basic Intelligence Analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>College of Analytical Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAD</td>
<td>Executive Assistant Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Enter on Duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSL</td>
<td>Funded Staffing Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>General Schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>(FBI) Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIR</td>
<td>Intelligence Information Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSB</td>
<td>National Security Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of the Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of Personnel Management</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Based on our previous audit report survey and field office interviews, during the current audit we compiled a list of questions to ask intelligence analysts (IA) and their supervisors. The questions were intended to obtain information on a limited judgmental sample of analysts and analysts’ supervisors concerning their views, opinions, experiences, demographics, and suggestions on the FBI’s current recruitment, hiring, training, and retention practices. The answers to the questionnaire are in italics.

**Intelligence Analysts Questionnaire**

1. Name:

2. Current grade:
   - GS-7 – 6
   - GS-9 – 13
   - GS-11 – 15
   - GS-12 – 16
   - GS-13 – 6
   - GS-14 – 4

3. Assigned location:
   - Headquarters – 20
   - Detroit – 10
   - Los Angeles – 10
   - Miami – 10
   - New York – 10
4. Current division within the FBI:

Counterterrorism – 21
Counterintelligence – 15
Counterintelligence – 5
Criminal Investigation – 12
Cyber – 4
Directorate of Intelligence – 3

5. Name of supervisor(s): variable

6. Work experience prior to the IA position:

FBI – 19
Government – 8
Military – 3
School – 8
Private Sector – 22
IT – 4
Teacher – 2
Finance – 6
Law – 7
Science – 2
Program Management – 1

7. When did you become a GS-132 intelligence analyst at the FBI?

2006 – 8
2005 – 17
2004 – 15
2003 – 5
Prior to 2002 – 15

8. What was your GS level when you became a GS-132?

GS-7 – 15
GS-9 – 22
GS-11 – 16
GS-12 – 5
GS-13 – 2
9. What is your highest educational level (High School, Associate, Bachelor’s, Master’s, Doctorate, or Law)?

   High School – 4
   Associates – 1
   Bachelor’s – 25
   Master’s – 20
   Doctorate – 2
   Law – 8

10. Do you have any critical language skills? If so, at what language and level? Have you received language testing at the FBI?

    Yes – 12
    Of those who answered yes, 2 were tested.

11. Are you a Presidential Management Fellow?

    Yes – 3

12. Did you have military intelligence experience prior to becoming a FBI Intelligence Analyst?

    Yes – 8

13. Did you have U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) experience prior to becoming an FBI Intelligence Analyst? Is so, where and for how long?

    Of the 9 who answered yes, 5 had prior USIC experience, and 4 worked with the FBI prior to becoming an intelligence analyst.

14. How closely do your expectations of the IA job prior to your start match the work you do now? Feel free to explain (i.e., is the job what you thought it would be).

    Very Closely – 13
    Closely – 16
    Somewhat Closely – 17
    Not Closely – 11
    Not at all Closely – 3
15. In the average month in the last year, what percentage of your time did you spend on each of the following categories of work?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of work</th>
<th>0-24%</th>
<th>25-49%</th>
<th>50-74%</th>
<th>75-100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work requiring analytical skills</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program management</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative duties related to your role (all-source analysts, reports officers, or operations specialists.)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative duties not related to your job role</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
16. How satisfied are you with the types of work assignments you receive?

Extremely Satisfied – 8
Very Satisfied – 18
Satisfied – 26
Unsatisfied – 6
Very Unsatisfied – 2

17. On which of the following have you worked in the last 3 months?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Information Report</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Bulletin</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Assessment</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Terrorism Threat Report</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director’s Daily Report</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) package</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing the approval of a FISA package</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewing FISA take</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat assessment</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset validation review</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Validation</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetting new informants</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Communication (EC) on intelligence topics</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence research to support specific field office cases</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background checks, name checks, and related research</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone analysis</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taskings from the Directorate of Intelligence</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative duties related to your job (please provide examples)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative duties NOT related to your job (please provide examples)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18. How often do you think special agents understand the functions and capabilities of an intelligence analyst?

   Very often – 3
   Often – 12
   Sometimes – 33
   Rarely – 10
   Not at all – 1
   N/A – 1

19. How intellectually challenging is your work as an FBI intelligence analyst?

   Very challenging – 15
   Challenging – 34
   Unchallenging – 8
   Very unchallenging – 3

20. Based on your work as an FBI intelligence analyst, rate your level of contribution to the mission of the FBI.

   Very high – 15
   High – 23
   Average – 21
   Below average – 0
   Low – 1

21. Are there any terms currently used to describe intelligence analysts (such as “support staff“)? If so, do these terms evoke a negative feeling in you when heard?

   Yes – 32
   No – 28

22. Did you attend the introductory analyst training at the FBI’s College of Analytical Studies? Which one – ACES I or II or Cohort?

   ACES – 44
   Cohort – 11
   Introductory class before ACES – 1
   Scheduled to take ACES – 3
   No Scheduled – 1
23. When did you attend the CAS?

Year
2003 – 2
2004 – 7
2005 – 29
2006 – 18

24. How well did the introductory analyst training meet your expectations for helping you do your job?

Greatly exceeded expectations – 1
Exceeded expectations – 2
Met expectations – 20
Did not meet expectations – 21
Completely failed to meet expectations – 12

25. In reference to the introductory analysts training, what should be improved upon?*

Specialized training (specifically job roles) – 8
Practical exercises for practical skills (intelligence analysts’ job tasks) - 24
Length of class was too long – 16
More interaction with special agents – 5
Poor technology – 4
Feedback ignored – 2

26. What was done well?*

Networking – 6
CIA presentations – 14
Overview of FBI presentations – 2
Case Agent/Case Group exercise – 12
IIR training, Title III training – 5

27. What do you remember most from the training?*

Networking – 29
CIA courses – 3
Certain courses – analytical skills, Briggs test, Title III, IIR writing – 20

* Due to the number of different responses, we listed the most common.
28. Do you believe the class was taught by knowledgeable personnel with relevant experience? If not, please explain.

Yes – 36
No – 3
Some – 17

29. How satisfied are you with the promotion process for FBI intelligence analysts?

Extremely satisfied – 3
Very satisfied – 6
Satisfied – 18
Unsatisfied – 10
Very unsatisfied – 9
N/A – 14

30. How likely is it that you will stay with the FBI as an intelligence analyst for the next five years?

Very likely – 26
Likely – 13
Unlikely – 8
Very unlikely – 4
Don’t know – 9
31. If you responded “unlikely” or “very unlikely,” please explain why and what would make you stay. If you responded “very likely” or “likely,” why? If you responded “don’t know,” what are your deciding factors?*

**Reasons to stay**

*Likes working for the FBI – 3
*Satisfying job – 2

**Reasons to leave**

*Lack of career path, career track, career potential – 4
*Intelligence program needs to continue to grow – 2
*Difficulty of transferring to other divisions/units – 2
*Incorrect positioning – 4*

32. With regard to the entire hiring process, including the background investigation, did you experience any problems or complications? If so, please explain.

No – 34
Yes – 26

**Some examples of problems**

*Too long of a process
*Forms/information lost
*FBI did not accept other government clearances
*Difficulty transferring from agent to analyst
*Not informed of duty location until arrival at training (first day on the job)
*Many were misinformed by points of contact (grade level, tuition reimbursement)

* Due to the number of different responses, we listed the most common.
33. How much time did it take from your background investigation until your entry on duty date?

3-5 months – 13
6-8 months – 17
9-11 months – 7
1 year – 5
Already in the government – 13
Could not remember – 5

34. Identify any impediments in the hiring process that affect the FBI’s ability to hire analysts as quickly as possible and the FBI’s ability to hire the best-qualified candidates. How could they be improved?*

Salary – 14
Limited signing bonuses – 3
Unreliable point of contact – 13
Complicated Quickhire – 7
Attitude of “support” – 1
Difficult promotion process – 3
Long background checks – 10
Strict drug policy – 2
Administrative hurdles – 5

35. Are there any additional comments you would like to give concerning the hiring, training, utilization, and retention of intelligence analysts?*

Intelligence analysts not hired in the last couple of years would like to see financial incentives not geared toward new hires – 7
New hires were promised higher grade levels than received - 5
Higher salary – 5
Improved structure of the analyst program and promotion process – 9
Better training – 8
Lack of tools, including IT – 2
Many analysts leave for contractors because of better pay – 1
Poor placement of analysts – 3
Directorate of Intelligence policies and guidance change daily – 1
Better transfer policy – 4

* Due to the number of different responses, we listed the most common.
OPEN RECOMMENDATIONS FROM PRIOR REPORT

In the OIG's May 2005 report, entitled The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence Analysts, we made 15 recommendations to the FBI. Of the 15 recommendations, 5 have been closed. The 10 open recommendations are:

- establish hiring goals, for intelligence analysts based on: a) the forecasted need for intelligence analysts; b) projected attrition in the analyst corps; and c) the FBI’s ability to hire, train, and utilize intelligence analysts;

- develop and implement a threat-based or risk-based methodology for determining the number of intelligence analysts required;

- develop and implement a threat-based or risk-based methodology for allocating intelligence analyst positions across the FBI’s Headquarters divisions and field offices;

- link the methodology for allocating intelligence analyst positions to the Human Talent Requirements Forecast;

- develop a methodology to determine the number of staff needed to teach ACES-1 and a plan to staff ACES-1 with FBI personnel, including experienced intelligence analysts;

- integrate testing into the ACES-1 curriculum;

- require all special agents to attend some mandatory training on the role and capabilities of intelligence analysts;

- assess the work done by intelligence analysts and determine what work is analytical in nature and what work is in general support of investigations that can more efficiently be performed by other support or administrative personnel;

- develop a strategic workforce plan for intelligence support personnel, and include in that plan a gap analysis of current investigative support personnel (by position) and the number (by position) the FBI needs to meet current and forecasted threats; and
• develop retention and succession plans and strategies for its intelligence analysts, including measurable goals.
APPENDIX 9

THE FBI’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

April 16, 2007

TO: Guy K. Zimmerman
Assistant Inspector General, Audit Division
Office of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice

FROM: Willie T. Hulon
Executive Assistant Director - National Security Branch
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Follow-up Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence Analysts

The FBI appreciates the commitment of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to enhancing our national security workforce and the OIG’s acknowledgement of the improvements we have made in our efforts to hire, train, and retain intelligence analysts in order to build an integrated analytic program. As the OIG’s Follow-up Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence Analysts indicates, the development of our analytic cadre has progressed since we initially established the program, and we value this recognition of our work.

We are pleased to note the report’s discussion of the various areas in which we have improved, including the proper utilization of our analytic workforce, the maintenance of an acceptable rate of analyst attrition, the collection of data regarding analysts’ departure from the workforce, and the augmentation of our analytic cadre with qualified candidates. Perhaps most important, we particularly appreciate the OIG’s emphasis that FBI analysts continue to maintain high levels of satisfaction with their work and that they recognize the importance of their efforts to the FBI’s mission of protecting the United States from national security and criminal threats.

We note that all of these improvements are in support of and aligned with the recommendations contained in the OIG’s initial audit on this topic.

While we appreciate the report’s recognition of our improvement, we also recognize, as the OIG has indicated, that several areas in our development of an analytic workforce require additional improvements and enhancements. We concur with the spirit of the OIG’s three main recommendations and acknowledge our need for continued improvement in order to achieve an optimally integrated and functional analytic cadre.

The report’s discussion of the training we offer to FBI intelligence analysts includes a description of our intelligence training program’s evolution and indicates the instruction we
provide is lacking in several areas. However, the OIG may have been able to obtain a more complete picture of our training environment had it been able to incorporate the improvements the FBI has made since August of 2006 when the data collection period for this audit ended. In addition, we concur with the report's recommendation to institute and implement training evaluations, we are hopeful that our ongoing efforts to enhance on Level 1 evaluation process, and to further develop our Levels 2-5 evaluations, will fulfill the OIG's recommendations.

In addition, we appreciate that the report is a follow-up audit that, by design, focuses on our efforts to improve upon areas noted in previous recommendations. We understand that the nature of such follow-up audits precludes interviews with large sample sizes and that the conduct of interviews with the entire FBI analytic cadre would be logistically impossible. However, while we do not dispute the views of the approximately 60 intelligence analysts interviewed in preparation for this report, we believe that your own statement (p.30) that this limited a sample “makes it difficult to assess the pervasiveness of the professional divide in the FBI” also pertains to all of the views expressed by this group. Further, many of the conclusions in the report were based upon information from even smaller subsets of the 60 intelligence analysts who had relevant experience (i.e. only 11 of the 60 attended Cohort). Thus we believe a larger sample size of interviews may have provided a fuller and more balanced picture of the FBI’s environment. In addition, while we recognize the individual opinions presented and cited in the report as valuable comments on the state of our programs, such comments may not be completely accurate representations of the nature of our initiatives.

We look forward to working with and updating the OIG on our efforts to implement these recommendations in order to improve our hiring, training, and retention of intelligence analysts. Based on the progress noted in your review and our current efforts in these areas, we are hopeful any follow-up review will fully reflect the turnaround we are working to achieve.

Recommendation 1: Evaluate the hiring and background investigation process to identify ways to accelerate the accession of new intelligence analysts.

We concur with the OIG and are taking steps to streamline the background investigation process to comply with Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 standards calling for reduced background processing times by 2009. In October 2006, we established procedures to focus on processing priority applicants, including intelligence analysts. In addition, during intelligence analyst hiring blitzes, we have taken steps to ensure greater communication and coordination between key stakeholder groups, including the Human Resources Division, Security Division, and processing field offices, to help achieve greater accountability in the intelligence analyst hiring process. We continue to pursue business process reengineering opportunities, database improvements, and e-government solutions to accelerate the accession of new analysts. We have worked to increase the participation of our field divisions in the hiring process. Through the use of standardized interview questions, we are able to process more candidates while ensuring hiring criteria are consistently applied throughout the FBI. Each of these initiatives has enhanced our ability to bring new intelligence analysts on board more quickly. We are currently developing our 2008 Hiring Plan, which will address such issues as recruitment, critical skills, workforce balance, application processing, and background investigations.
Recommendation 2: Involve intelligence managers and experienced analysts more extensively in training curriculum development efforts.

We concur with this recommendation and believe our past and current efforts demonstrate our commitment to improving in this area. We have consistently involved both subject-matter experts and managers throughout the development of intelligence analyst training, including Basic Intelligence Analysis, ACES 1.0, ACES 1.5, Cohort, and Intelligence Analyst Special Training (IAST). Beginning in December 2001, the FBI has relied on the knowledge and skills of its own analytic and investigative personnel as subject-matter experts. Most recently, the development of ACES 1.0, ACES 1.5, Cohort, and IAST relied heavily on input from subject-matter experts, who were selected for their knowledge of intelligence matters and their expertise in specific topics, such as counterterrorism, counterintelligence, reports writing and collection management. Additionally, subject-matter experts contributed to the development of ACES 1.0, ACES 1.5, Cohort, and IAST and often served as instructors in their areas of expertise. In addition to the basic intelligence courses, subject-matter experts also contributed to the development of both Reports Officer 101 and Managing Analysis. These subject-matter experts now serve as the course’s instructors and facilitators.

We are currently revising our basic intelligence analysis course and anticipate rollout in June 2007. The development of this course is under the direction of the Intelligence Training and Analytic Development Office, headed by a senior-level executive with 30 years of US Intelligence Community experience as an intelligence analyst. The curriculum is being developed with input from Intelligence Community agencies. This training will draw heavily from lessons learned by our US Intelligence Community partners and will be developed by a team of subject-matter experts who will be assigned full-time to its roll-out and the first several course offerings.

We recognize the importance of this recommendation and will reassess how we can better implement it in our current and future efforts.

Recommendation 3: Make student and supervisor evaluations of analyst training mandatory and use the results to identify any needed improvements in the curriculum.

We concur with this recommendation and believe our past and current efforts demonstrate our commitment to improving in this area. We have used Level 1 student evaluations conducted for all blocks of instruction for ACES 1.0, ACES 1.5, Cohort, and IAST to evaluate and change class structure and content throughout each of these courses. These evaluations, which individuals familiar with the process estimate are completed by 98% of students, are analyzed across all programs and are available for review. In addition to the Level 1 evaluations, the Center for Intelligence Training and the Directorate of Intelligence have also instituted formal feedback sessions within each Cohort class to evaluate and refine the curriculum. The information from these feedback sessions was used extensively in refining Cohort. In March 2006, we determined Level 2-5 evaluations would not go forward until the completion of a new job task analysis and competency review, which is scheduled for completion in mid-2007. Upon its completion, we will develop these evaluations and anticipate the implementation of Level 3
evaluations when the revised Intelligence Basic Course has been implemented.

We recognize the importance of this recommendation and will reassess how we can better implement it in our current and future efforts.
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE REPORT

The OIG provided a draft of this audit report to the FBI for its review and comment. The FBI’s written response is included in Appendix 9 of this final report. The FBI concurred with the three recommendations in the audit report and also provided comments regarding some issues examined in the report. Our analysis of the FBI’s response follows.

FBI’s General Comments

In its response, the FBI concurred with the report’s three recommendations and also acknowledged the need for continued improvement in order to achieve an optimally integrated and functional analytic cadre.

In addition, the FBI referred to the OIG’s conclusions regarding deficiencies in its intelligence analyst training program – and stated that the OIG may have been able to obtain a more complete picture of the FBI’s training environment if the OIG had been able to incorporate improvements made by the FBI since August of 2006, when fieldwork for the audit ended. While we agree that the FBI may have made progress since the completion of our fieldwork, we also note that our review found that the FBI had made little progress on our training-related recommendations in the 15 months between the issuance of our May 2005 report and the end of fieldwork.

The FBI’s comments also discussed the OIG’s methodology in conducting our review. The FBI noted that the OIG conducted interviews with a limited sample of approximately 60 intelligence analysts and drew some conclusions based on smaller subsets. However, this audit was a follow-up to our May 2005 report in which the OIG discussed the results of a formal survey it sent to all of the FBI’s intelligence analysts employed at the time (approximately 1,247) and also included interviews of a sample of analysts. A follow-up audit by design concentrates on the actions taken in response to the previous recommendations, provides a general assessment of changes since the last audit, and seeks to identify any new or emerging concerns. While our sampling was more limited in the follow-up audit than in the original audit, we interviewed a significant number of
intelligence analysts and found their responses were similar to the results of our larger sample in the initial audit.

In addition, we believe the judgmental sample of 60 intelligence analysts and 16 intelligence analysts’ supervisors we interviewed provides a fair representation of the overall analyst population. We interviewed intelligence analysts from a variety of grade levels, divisions, and locations and received consistent responses. The selection of the analysts to interview was not biased in any way. Nor do we have any indications that a larger sample would have provided a “fuller and more balanced picture of the FBI’s environment,” as the FBI suggests.

The FBI’s response also stated that individual opinions cited in the report may not accurately represent the nature of its initiatives. However, we believe the insights of the knowledgeable officials we interviewed are important to assessing the progress the FBI has made in improving its intelligence analyst program.

Status of Recommendations

1. Resolved. The FBI agreed with this recommendation. In its response to the draft report, the FBI described the actions it is taking to streamline the hiring process. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that the FBI has identified improvements in the hiring and background investigation process that accelerate the accession of new intelligence analysts.

2. Resolved. The FBI concurred with this recommendation. The FBI also stated that it has consistently used both “subject matter experts” and “managers” throughout the development of intelligence analyst training. The intent of our recommendation was to specifically involve experienced intelligence analysts and supervisory analysts or intelligence managers in efforts to improve the curriculum. The FBI is not now doing so, and we noted little or no difference between the ACES curriculum and the Cohort curriculum that replaced it, despite the involvement of “subject matter experts and managers.” Knowledgeable FBI officials we interviewed told us that intelligence analysts have had limited input to the development of the training curriculum. The FBI’s response also noted that it is currently reviewing the basic intelligence analysis course and anticipates its roll-out in June 2007. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that intelligence managers and
experienced analysts are more extensively involved in the development of the training curriculum.

3. **Resolved.** The FBI concurred with this recommendation. In its response, the FBI described its use of Level 1 evaluations and feedback sessions with each Cohort class to evaluate and refine the curriculum. Additionally, Level 2-5 evaluations will go forward when a new job task analysis and competency review are completed in mid-2007. Further evaluations will be implemented when the Intelligence Basic Course has been revised. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that the FBI has made student and supervisor evaluations of analyst training mandatory and uses the results to identify and make improvements to the curriculum.