
Table of Contents

	Page No.
I. Overview	1-1
II. Summary of Program Changes	2-1
III. Appropriations Language and Analysis of Appropriations Language	. 3-1
IV. Decision Unit Justification	4-1
 A. Intelligence	. 4-1
 B. Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence 1. Program Description 2. Performance Tables 3. Performance, Resources, and Strategies a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes 	4-14
 C. Criminal Enterprises and Federal Crimes. 1. Program Description 2. Performance Tables 3. Performance, Resources, and Strategies a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes 	4-36
 D. Criminal Justice Services. 1. Program Description 2. Performance Tables 3. Performance, Resources, and Strategies a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes 	4-59

V. 1	Program Increases by Item	5-1
	Domain and Operations Increases	
	Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative	5-1
	Intelligence Program	5-6
	National Security Field Investigations	5-13
	Mortgage Fraud and White Collar Crime	5-15
	WMD Response	5-19
	Infrastructure Increases	
	Central Records Complex	5-31
	Leveraging Technology	
	3 rd Generation (3G) Wireless.	5-35
	Surveillance Increases	
	Advanced Electronic Surveillance	5-37
	Surveillance	5-38
	Workforce Increases	
	National Security Training / Career Path	5-43
	Overseas Contingency Operations	
	Overseas Contingency Operations	5-47
VI E	xhibits	
	Organizational Chart	
	Summary of Requirements	
	Program Increases by Decision Unit	
	Resources by DOJ Strategic Goal/Objective	
	Justification for Base Adjustments	
	Crosswalk of 2008 Availability	
G.	Crosswalk of 2009 Availability	
H.	Summary of Reimbursable Resources	
I.	J & J	
J.	Financial Analysis of Program Increases/Offsets	
K.	Summary of Requirements by Grade	
L.		
M	. Status of Congressionally Requested Studies, Reports, and Evaluations	

VII. Construction	7-1
Program Increases by Item	7-1
Biometrics Technology Center	7-1 7-4
Exhibits	
A. Appropriations Language	
B. Summary of Requirements	
D. Resources by Strategic Goal and Objective	
F. Crosswalk of 2008 Availability	
G. Crosswalk of 2009 Availability	
L. Summary of Requirements by Object Class	



I. OVERVIEW FOR THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

A. Introduction

Budget Summary: The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 budget request proposes a total of \$7,861,537 in direct budget authority, including 32,883 permanent positions (12,732 Special Agents, 2,956 Intelligence Analysts, and 17,195 professional support staff) and 31,881 full time equivalents (FTE). This request is critical to the FBI's investment strategy to acquire capabilities needed to counter known or anticipated national security threats and crime problems.

Electronic copies of the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Congressional Budget Justifications and Capital Asset Plan and Business Case exhibits can be viewed or downloaded from the Internet using the Internet address: http://usdoj.gov/jmd/2010justification/.

The FBI request includes 1,389 new positions (407 Special Agents, 321 Intelligence Analysts, and 661 professional support staff) and 696 FTE. Additionally, a total of \$581,066,000 in new funding is requested – \$473,461,000 for Salaries and Expenses and \$107,605,000 for Construction. This new funding would support several critical initiatives, including the areas of:

- Cybersecurity;
- Intelligence gathering and analysis;
- Mortgage fraud;
- WMD response capability; and
- National security investigations.

The request also includes a program increase request of \$101,066,000 in Overseas Contingency Operations funding. These resources support FBI operations in Afghanistan, international deployment activities, overtime and hazardous duty pay, and other counterterrorism-related requirements.

In addition to directly appropriated resources, the FBI proposes reimbursable resources in the amount of \$1,903,846,000 and 3,215 FTE for FY 2010. These totals include \$128,783,000 and 769 FTE pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) of 1996. Reimbursable resources also include \$143,412,000 and 874 FTE under the Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement Program and \$324,360,000 and 1,303 FTE for the Fingerprint Identification User Fee and the National Name Check Programs. The remaining reimbursable resources are used to facilitate a number of activities, including pre-employment background investigations, and temporary assignment of FBI employees to other agencies.

The FBI's Mission and Strategic Goals: The mission of the FBI is to protect and defend the United States against terrorism and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners.

Department of Justice

As a component of the DOJ, the FBI's efforts contribute to DOJ's overall strategic goals and objectives in multiple ways. Listed below are the DOJ strategic goals and objectives to which the FBI contributes, along with the total level of resources being requested in FY 2010 (Salaries and Expenses) that will support each of the goals.

Strategic Goal 1: Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security: \$4,585,494,000

- 1.1: Prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur
- 1.2: Strengthen partnerships to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents
- 1.4: Combat espionage against the United States

Strategic Goal 2: Prevent Crime, Enforce Federal Laws and Represent the Rights and Interests of the American People: \$3,133,247,000

- 2.1: Strengthen partnerships for safer communities and enhance the Nation's capacity to prevent, solve, and control crime
- 2.2: Reduce the threat, incidence, and prevalence of violent crime
- 2.3: Prevent, suppress, and intervene in crimes against children
- 2.4: Reduce the threat, trafficking, use, and related violence of illegal drugs
- 2.5: Combat public and corporate corruption, fraud, economic crime, and cybercrime
- 2.6: Uphold the civil and Constitutional rights of all Americans

Organization of the FBI: The FBI operates field offices in 56 major United States cities and over 400 "resident agencies" throughout the country. Resident agencies are satellite offices that support the larger field offices and allow the FBI to maintain a presence in and serve communities that are distant from field offices. FBI employees assigned to field offices and resident agencies perform the majority of the investigative and intelligence work for the FBI. Special Agents in Charge of FBI Field Offices report to the Deputy Director and Director. The FBI also operates 61 Legal Attaché (Legat) offices and 14 sub-offices in 65 foreign countries around the world.

Other major FBI facilities include the FBI Academy, the Engineering Research Facility (ERF), and the FBI Laboratory, all at Quantico, Virginia; a fingerprint identification complex in Clarksburg, West Virginia; and the Hazardous Devices School at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

FBI Headquarters, located in Washington, D.C., provides centralized operational, policy, and administrative support to FBI investigations and programs conducted throughout the United States and in foreign countries. Under the direction of the FBI Director and Deputy Director, this support is provided by:

- The <u>National Security Branch</u>, which includes the Counterterrorism Division, Counterintelligence Division, the Directorate of Intelligence, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate.
- The <u>Criminal, Cyber, Response and Services Branch</u>, which includes the Criminal Investigative Division, the Cyber Division, the Critical Incident Response Group, the Office of International Operations, and the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination.

• The <u>Science and Technology Branch</u>, which includes the Criminal Justice Information Services Division, the Laboratory Division, the Operational Technology Division, and the Special Technologies and Applications Office.

A number of other Headquarters offices also provide FBI-wide mission support:

- The <u>Information and Technology Branch</u> oversees the Office of Information Technology Program Management, the Office of Information Technology Policy and Planning, and the Information Technology Operations Division, the Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer, and the Office of the Chief Technology Officer.
- The <u>Human Resources Branch</u> includes the Human Resources Division and the Training Division.
- <u>Administrative and financial management support</u> is provided by the Facilities and Logistics Services Division, the Finance Division, the Records Management Division, the Security Division, the Resource Planning Office, and the Inspection Division.
- Specialized support is provided directly to the Director and Deputy Director though a
 number of staff offices, including the Office of Public Affairs, the Office of
 Congressional Affairs, the Office of the General Counsel, the Office of Equal
 Employment Opportunity, the Office of Professional Responsibility, the Office of the
 Ombudsman, and the Office of Integrity and Compliance.

B. Threats to the United States and its Interests

National Security Threats

Terrorism Threat: Terrorism, in general, and al-Qa'ida and its affiliates in particular, continue to represent the most significant threat to the country's national security. Al-Qa'ida remains committed to its goal of conducting attacks inside the United States and continues to include proven tactics and tradecraft with adaptations designed to address its losses and the enhanced security measures of the United States. Al-Qa'ida continues to seek to infiltrate overseas operatives who have no known nexus to terrorism into the United States using both legal and illegal methods of entry. Further, al-Qa'ida's access to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material poses a serious threat to the United States. Finally, al-Qa'ida's choice of targets and attack methods will most likely continue to focus on economic targets, such as aviation, the energy sector, and mass transit; soft targets such as large public gatherings; and symbolic targets, such as monuments and government buildings.

The diversity of homegrown extremists and the direct knowledge they have of the United States potentially poses a very serious threat. The radicalization of United States Muslim converts is of particular concern. While conversion to Islam, in itself, does not lead to radicalization, converts appear to be more vulnerable and in situations that put them in a position to be influenced by Islamic extremists.

While much of the national attention is focused on the substantial threat posed by international terrorists to the Homeland, the United States must also contend with an ongoing threat posed by domestic terrorists based and operating strictly within the United States. Domestic terrorists,

motivated by a number of political or social issues, continue to use violence and criminal activity to further their agendas.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: The global Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat to the United States and its interests continues to be a significant concern. In 2008, the National Intelligence Council produced a National Intelligence Estimate to assess the threat from Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) through 2013. The assessment concluded that it remains the intent of terrorist adversaries to seek the means and capability to use WMD against the United States at home and abroad. In 2008, the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism concluded that "the United States government has yet to fully adapt....that the risks are growing faster than our multilayered defenses." The WMD Commission warned that without greater urgency and decisive action, it is more likely than not that a WMD will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. Osama bin Laden has said that obtaining WMD is a "religious duty" and is reported to have sought to perpetrate a "Hiroshima" on United States soil. Globalization makes it easier for terrorists, groups, and lone actors to gain access to and transfer WMD materials, knowledge, and technology throughout the world. As noted in the WMD Commission's report, those intent on using WMD have been active and as such "the margin of safety is shrinking, not growing."

Foreign Intelligence Threat: The foreign intelligence threat to the United States continues to increase as foreign powers seek to establish economic, military, and political preeminence and to position themselves to compete with the United States in economic and diplomatic arenas. The most desirable United States targets are political and military plans and intentions; technology; and economic institutions, both governmental and non-governmental. Foreign intelligence services continue to target and recruit United States travelers abroad to acquire intelligence and information. Foreign adversaries are increasingly employing non-traditional collectors – e.g., students and visiting scientists, scholars, and businessmen – as well as cyber-based tools to target and penetrate United States institutions.

Cyber Threat: Cyber threats come from a vast array of groups and individuals with different skills, motives, and targets. Terrorists increasingly use the Internet to communicate, conduct operational planning, propagandize, recruit and train operatives, and obtain logistical and financial support. Foreign governments have the technical and financial resources to support advanced network exploitation, and to launch attacks on the United States information and physical infrastructure. Criminal hackers can also pose a national security threat, particularly if recruited, knowingly or unknowingly, by foreign intelligence or terrorist organizations.

Regardless of the group or individuals involved, a successful cyber attack can have devastating effects. Stealing or altering military or intelligence data can affect national security. Attacks against national infrastructure can interrupt critical emergency response services, government and military operations, financial services, transportation, and water and power supply. In addition, cyber fraud activities pose a growing threat to our economy, a fundamental underpinning of United States national security.

Criminal Enterprises and Federal Crime Problems

White Collar Crime: The White Collar Crime (WCC) problem focuses on six priorities: (1) Corporate, Security, and Commodities frauds; (2) Financial Institution Fraud (FIF); (3) Public Corruption; (4) Health Care Fraud (HCF); (5) Insurance Fraud; and (6) Money Laundering. Today's most significant white collar issue – mortgage fraud – falls within both Corporate and Financial Institution fraud.

• Corporate and Financial Institution Fraud: The FBI has identified mortgage fraud as the number one problem in these two WCC programs. The number of pending investigations of mortgage fraud against financial institutions has risen from 436 at the end of FY 2003 to over 1,400 by the middle of FY 2008. Many of these investigations involve traditional mortgage frauds where the creditworthiness of the loan applicant is exaggerated by relatively small-time operators attempting to defraud banks or other lending institutions. The FBI also recently initiated 19 corporate fraud cases involving sub-prime mortgage lending companies. In addition to significant financial losses to investors, corporate fraud has the potential to cause immeasurable damage to the United States economy and investor confidence. The FBI is focusing its efforts on cases which involve accounting schemes designed to deceive investors, auditors, and analysts about the true financial condition of a corporation, self-dealing by corporate executives, and obstruction of justice.

Although mortgage fraud will be a major priority, the FBI will continue other investigations to safeguard the integrity and credibility of corporations and the securities and commodities markets, and to identify, disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations and individuals who engage in fraud schemes, which impact financial institutions in the United States.

- <u>Public Corruption</u>: The corruption of local, state, and federally elected, appointed, or
 contracted officials undermines our democratic institutions and sometimes threatens public
 safety and national security. Public corruption can affect everything from how well United
 States borders are secured and neighborhoods protected, to verdicts handed down in courts,
 and the quality of public infrastructure such as schools and roads. Many taxpayer dollars
 are wasted or lost as a result of corrupt acts by public officials.
- Health Care Fraud: It is estimated that fraud in health care industries costs consumers more than \$60 billion annually. Some of the most prolific and sophisticated WCC investigations during the past decade have involved health care fraud. Today, the FBI seeks to infiltrate illicit operations and terminate scams involving staged auto accidents, online pharmacies, Durable Medical Equipment (DME), outpatient surgery centers, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, nursing homes, hospital chains, and transportation services. Besides the federal health benefit programs of Medicare and Medicaid, private insurance programs lose billions of dollars each year to blatant fraud schemes in every sector of the industry.
- <u>Insurance Fraud</u>: There are more than 5,000 companies with a combined \$1.8 trillion in assets engaged in non-health insurance activities, making this one of the largest United States industries. Insurance fraud increases the premiums paid by individual consumers

and threatens the stability of the insurance industry. Recent major natural disasters and corporate fraud scandals have heightened recognition of the threat posed to the insurance industry and its potential impact on the economic outlook of the United States.

 Money Laundering: Money Laundering allows criminals to infuse illegal money into the stream of commerce, thus corrupting financial institutions and the money supply; this provides the criminals with unwarranted economic power. The FBI investigates Money Laundering cases by identifying the process by which criminals conceal or disguise the proceeds of their crimes or convert those proceeds into goods and services.

Civil Rights: The FBI has primary responsibility for investigating all alleged violations of federal civil rights laws. These laws protect the civil rights of all citizens and persons within the United States' territory, and include the four major areas described below:

- <u>Hate Crimes</u>: Hate crimes are the top investigative priority of the Civil Rights Program because they impact not only the victims, but also the entire community. In 2007, 7,624 total incidents were voluntarily reported by local law enforcement to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program. Conservative estimates indicate that the level of voluntarily reported hate crimes is less than half of the actual hate crimes that occur annually in the United States.
- <u>Color of Law (COL)</u>: COL violations are the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
 immunities secured or protected by the United States Constitution by someone in his/her
 official, governmental capacity. The FBI has investigative responsibility for federal COL
 matters involving local and state law enforcement and concurrent responsibility with the
 Office of Inspector Generals for other federal agencies.
- Human Trafficking: The trafficking of persons and violations in the United States is a worldwide human rights crime problem. Human trafficking is a form of modern-day slavery and, although not commonly known, is a significant and persistent problem in America and internationally. Victims are often lured with false promises of good jobs and better lives and then forced to work under brutal and inhumane conditions. Many trafficking victims are forced to work in the sex industry, but trafficking can also take place in labor settings involving domestic servitude, prison-like factories, and migrant agricultural work. Human trafficking cases require extensive outreach and cooperation with local, state, and federal agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations, to properly address the problem.
- Freedom of Access: Under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act, the FBI has the sole investigative responsibility for conducting investigations of potential FACE Act violations. Incidents include murder, death threats, invasions, burglaries, harassing telephone calls, hate mail, assaults, arsons, and other acts of intimidation. The number of FACE Act violations remains relatively low, with occasional spikes during dates which mark significant events in the pro-choice and pro-life movements.

Transnational and National Criminal Organizations and Enterprises: Transnational/National Organized Crime is an immediate and increasing concern of the domestic and international law enforcement and intelligence communities. Geopolitical, economic, social, and technological changes within the last two decades have allowed these criminal enterprises to become increasingly active worldwide, and includes six distinct groups: (1) Eurasian Organizations that have emerged since the fall of the Soviet Union (including Albanian Organized Crime); (2) Asian Criminal Enterprises; (3) traditional organizations such as the La Cosa Nostra (LCN) and Italian Organized Crime; (4) Balkan Organized Crime; (5) Middle Eastern Criminal Enterprises, and (6) African Criminal Enterprises.

Due to the wide range of criminal activity associated with these groups, each distinct organized criminal enterprise adversely impacts the United States in numerous ways. Threats from international organized criminals are covered below.

- International organized criminals control substantial portions of the global energy and strategic materials markets that are vital to United States national security interests. These activities impede access to strategically vital materials, which has a destabilizing effect on United States geopolitical interests and places United States businesses at a competitive disadvantage in the world marketplace.
- International organized criminals provide logistical and other support to terrorists, foreign intelligence services, and hostile foreign governments. Each of these groups is either targeting the United States or otherwise acting in a manner adverse to United States interests.
- International organized criminals smuggle people and contraband goods into the United States, seriously compromising United States border security and at times national security. Smuggling of contraband/counterfeit goods costs United States businesses billions of dollars annually, and the smuggling of people leads to exploitation that threatens the health and lives of human beings.
- International organized criminals exploit the United States and international financial systems to transfer billions of dollars of illicit funds annually.
- International organized criminals use cyberspace to target individuals and United States infrastructure, using an endless variety of schemes to steal hundreds of millions of dollars from consumers and the United States economy. These schemes also jeopardize the security of personal information, the stability of business and government infrastructures, and the security and solvency of financial investment markets.
- International organized criminals are manipulating securities exchanges and perpetrating sophisticated financial frauds, robbing United States consumers and government agencies of billions of dollars.
- International organized criminals corrupt and seek to corrupt public officials in the United States and abroad, including countries of vital strategic importance to the United States, in order to protect their illegal operations and increase their sphere of influence.
- International organized criminals use violence and the threat of violence as a basis for power, and those especially prone to violence are increasingly making inroads in the United States.

In addition to criminal enterprises that are transnational in origin, communities across the United States face challenges from domestic criminal gangs and organizations. Gangs and other American criminal enterprises, operating in the United States and throughout the world, are more violent, more organized, and more widespread than ever before. They pose one of the greatest threats to the safety and security of all Americans.

Finally, the potential for terrorism-related events associated with criminal enterprises is ever-increasing due to the following: Alien smuggling across the southwest border by drug and gang CEs; Columbian based narco-terrorism groups influencing or associating with traditional drug trafficking organizations; prison gangs being recruited by religious, political, or social extremist groups; and major theft criminal enterprises conducting criminal activities in association with terrorist related groups or to facilitate funding of terrorist-related groups. There also remains the ever present concern that criminal enterprises are, or can, facilitate the smuggling of chemical, biological, radioactive, or nuclear weapons and materials.

Violent Crimes: Preliminary Uniform Crime Report statistics for 2008 indicate a 3.5 percent decrease nationally in violent crimes (murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) for the first six months of the year compared to the same period in 2007. This follows a slight decline (1.4 percent) for all of 2007 compared to 2006. The 2008 decline was enjoyed by cities of all sizes and by both metropolitan and non-metropolitan counties, although the decrease for very large cities (one million and over) was less than one percent, perhaps due in part to gang violence.

While this overall trend is encouraging, individual violent crime incidents, such as sniper murders, serial killings, and child abductions remain threats to paralyze whole communities and stretch state and local law enforcement resources to their limits. In addition, crimes against children, including child prostitution and crimes facilitated through the use of the Internet, continue to serve as a stark reminder of the impact of violent crime on the most vulnerable members of society.

Gang Violence: The United States has seen a tremendous increase in gangs and gang membership. Gang membership has grown from 55,000 in 1975 to approximately 960,000 nationwide in 2007. The FBI National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) has determined that there are identified street gangs and gang members in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Thirty-nine of these gangs have been identified as national threats based on criminal activities and interstate/international ties. NGIC estimates the direct economic impact of gang activity in the United States at \$5 billion and the indirect impact as much greater. Furthermore, NGIC identified a trend of gang members migrating to more rural areas. This information would correspond with the increased inquiries from local law enforcement agencies in rural and suburban areas regarding participating in Safe Streets Task Forces. NGIC has also seen an expansion of United States based gangs internationally, with such gangs currently identified in over 20 countries.

Impact of External Drivers and Influences

The FBI's budget builds upon both current knowledge of threats and crime problems and a forward look to how terrorists, foreign agents and spies, and criminal adversaries are likely to adapt tactics and operations in a constantly evolving and changing world. This forward look helps inform and determine the critical operational and organizational capabilities the FBI must acquire over the same time period to remain vital and effective in meeting future threats and crime problems.

When assessing the impact of the external operating environment, United States Government, private industry, and others generally look to global "drivers" — broad factors that can directly or indirectly cause changes in the future threat environment – to guide their thinking and planning. In examining forecasts and assessments of the future, the most likely drivers that the FBI must take into consideration, and some of the likely operational impacts, include the following:

- Global and domestic demographic changes expanded need for operations abroad as more investigations and operations include an international nexus; growth in immigrant and émigré populations within the United States present new language and cultural barriers during investigations;
- Communications revolution advances in communications technology challenge the ability of the FBI to perform court-authorized intercepts; use of encryption and other communications technologies requires closer access to end-nodes; identity theft will make perpetrator identification more difficult;
- Global economic changes terrorism and organized crime converge; greater need for coordinating countermeasures with foreign countries and financial organizations;
- Rising belief in non-material values abroad increasing danger to agents working abroad as anti-Americanism increases and actors disperse; easier acceptance of "suicide" missions among disaffected, alienated individuals;
- Technological and scientific revolutions reduced ability for threat groups or governments to hide undercover identity of agents; increase in espionage and cyber crime against United States corporations; increased opportunity for "bio-terror" as well as "bio-error;" inexpensive computing technology stretches FBI forensic science capacities;
- Revolutions in security technology and practice more "policing" actions abroad by non-government, contract private entities; more espionage against United States defense and contractors; advances in biometric technologies and science permit greater opportunities for positive identification of individuals; and
- Changing role of state and law need to cooperate with more entities; need more methods of cooperation beyond task forces and cases.

Sub-national and non-governmental entities are expected to play an increasing role in world affairs in the coming years, presenting new "asymmetric" and non-traditional threats to the United States. Although the United States will continue to occupy a position of economic and political leadership and other governments will also be important actors on the world stage, terrorist groups, criminal enterprises, and other non-state actors will assume an increasing role in

international affairs. Nation states and their governments will exercise decreasing control over the flow of information, resources, technology, services, and people.

Globalization and the trend of an increasingly networked world economy continue to be more pronounced. The global economy will stabilize some regions, but widening economic divides are likely to make areas, groups, and nations that are left behind breeding grounds for unrest, violence, and terrorism. As corporate, financial, and nationality definitions and structures become more complex and global, the distinction between foreign and domestic entities will increasingly blur. This will lead to further globalization and networking of criminal elements, directly threatening the security of the United States.

Most experts believe that technological innovation will have the most profound impact on the collective ability of the federal, state, and local governments to protect the United States. Advances in information technology, as well as other scientific and technical areas, have created the most significant global transformation since the Industrial Revolution. These advances allow terrorists, disaffected states, weapons proliferators, criminal enterprises, drug traffickers, and other threat enterprises easier and cheaper access to technology to facilitate crime, including computer, communications, and weapons technology. It is essential – but difficult – for law enforcement countermeasures to stay ahead of the increasing use of technology for illegal purposes.

To meet these threats and crime problems and operate successfully in a challenging external environment, the FBI needs to be able to fuse and integrate intelligence and law enforcement. As a member of the Intelligence Community, the FBI has placed an increased emphasis on threat-based, intelligence-driven investigations and operations, especially in the areas of counterterrorism and counterintelligence, and on internal and external information sharing. The FBI must also create an awareness of, and become receptors for, changes in threats and the ability to make immediate corrections in FBI priorities and focus to address those changes. Finally, the FBI must recognize that alliances with others in law enforcement, at home and abroad, are absolutely essential.

C. FBI's 2010 Budget Strategy

Required End-State Capabilities: Since FY 2009, the FBI's budget strategy has been based on the FBI's understanding of current and future national security and criminal investigative threats. From this understanding, the FBI has identified critical, enterprise-wide capabilities needed to perform its mission. This capabilities-based approach to planning the FBI's future resource requirements is necessary since it is not possible to project with certainty who will be the future adversary (e.g., nation, combination of nations, non-state actor, gangs, criminal enterprises, or individuals). In other words, future capabilities are designed to enable the FBI to address the range of expected national security threats and crime problems regardless of who actually perpetrates the acts.

The six enterprise-wide end-state capabilities that have been identified are critical to ensuring the FBI possesses the capabilities and capacities to carry out its national security and criminal investigative missions. The end-state capabilities are:

- A mature enterprise capability for employing intelligence and analysis to identify and understand the national security threats and crime problems challenging America, and developing and executing operational strategies to counter these threats and crime problems;
- Surveillance (physical, electronic, human source) and operational technology capabilities to meet operational requirements;
- An established and productive network of partnerships with local, state, federal, and international law enforcement and criminal justice agencies;
- An enhanced capability for providing forensic, operation technology, identification, training, and criminal justice services to our local, state, federal, and international partners;
- A professional workforce that possesses the critical skills and competencies (investigative, technical, analytical, language, supervisory, and managerial), experiences, and training required to perform our mission; and
- A safe and appropriate work environment and information technology infrastructure to facilitate the performance of the FBI's mission.

As part of its strategic planning process and development the FBI is continuing to refine the definition of end-state capabilities.

Foundation for Achieving the End-State: The foundation of the FBI's budget is supported by four objectives: (1) the application of a Strategy Management System (SMS) to FBI planning; (2) accelerated improvements in program management through the efforts of the SET team; (3) continuation of a multi-year planning process; and (4) a directed-growth strategy aligned to our most critical requirements.

• FBI Strategic Management System: The FBI has implemented a Strategy Management System to guide its strategy development and decision-making. Through the SMS, the FBI will strike the appropriate balance between its national security and criminal missions, and between short-term tactical efforts and longer-term strategic initiatives. Strategic management of the FBI's two greatest assets, its employees and information, will help address both the current mission and position the FBI to meet future challenges.


The SMS is based on the balanced scorecard management tool adapted by the FBI for its own unique structure, culture, and mission. The Strategic Management System will provide a formal method for executing and reviewing strategy, and making that strategy a part of daily activities and decision-making. Specifically, the SMS will:

- ➤ Provide a common framework to ensure that executive leadership clarifies and gains consensus around a single, unified strategy;
- ➤ Link strategic and operational decision-making;
- > Provide a balanced set of measures to monitor strategic performance;
- > Create a vehicle to assign accountability for specific performance objectives and measures;
- ➤ Institute regularly scheduled strategy review meetings to focus executives on strategic objectives/measures and provide a forum for strategy discussions and debates;
- Enable more objective and strategic resource allocation decisions; and

➤ Communicate the FBI's strategy throughout the organization, thereby creating both a common language and a "line of sight" between individuals and the strategy they support.

The FBI Strategy Map consists of 25 strategic objectives. Each objective has between one and three measures and each measure has a target that defines success. Key corporate strategic initiatives have been identified and progress tracked to close any performance gaps. The FBI "enterprise" objectives and measures will eventually cascade down to each part of the organization, including field offices, and executive management will review each component's progress in achieving its objectives through regular strategy review meetings and through the performance appraisal system.

The SMS is a continuous process for driving evolutionary improvements. Reviews will not only track strategic progress, they will examine what is working and not working and what needs to be adjusted. Over time, the Strategy Map and the 25 objectives may change. Initiatives that are not succeeding will be provided with the support they need to succeed or will be eliminated, and other initiatives will be added to address identified gaps. The SMS will provide the flexibility the FBI needs to stay ahead of changing threats and demographic and other trends that impact its mission.



• The Strategic Execution Team (SET): The Strategic Execution Team was created by Director Mueller in September 2007 to build on the FBI's Strategy Management System and accelerate improvements in the intelligence arena. The team is made up of FBI employees in different job roles from both field offices and FBI Headquarters and is supported by McKinsey and Co., a management consulting firm.

SET initiatives and results include:

- ➤ Intelligence Operations: The team has developed a standardized model for field intelligence that can be adjusted to the size and complexity of small, medium, and large offices. It has also developed the Collection Operations Requirements Environment (CORE), an FBI intelligence requirements solution. CORE makes FBI and national intelligence requirements easily accessible to all field office personnel, facilitates completion of FBI forms, and improves information flow between operational squads and the FIGs. It is designed to help generate raw intelligence that is responsive to requirements and to help track progress in meeting those requirements.
- ➤ <u>Human Capital</u>: SET established core intelligence tasks for Special Agents, defined their intelligence career path, and tailored individual development plans. Additionally, SET has worked on refining the Intelligence Analyst career path, including training, experiences, and roles that are required to develop this cadre.
- ➤ <u>Program Management</u>: SET identified six core desired strategic shifts and ways to achieve them (i.e., from criminal vs. intelligence to integrated mission, from limited internal information-sharing to internal/external information-sharing with intelligence community.)
- <u>Multi-year Planning</u>: An increasing number of the FBI's programs and initiatives are multi-year in nature, and require phased development, deployment, and operations/maintenance funding. A multi-year planning approach allows FBI management to better understand the implications of proposed initiatives. This approach is also intended to bring continuity to the FBI's budget.

The FBI's budget is based on four Decision Units that align with the key areas of FBI operations. These four Decision Units, established by the FY 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, are:

- ➤ Intelligence
- ➤ Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence
- > Criminal Enterprises and Federal Crimes
- > Criminal Justice Service

The costs of support functions are prorated to programs in each of the four Decision Units, providing a better picture of the full cost of each of the four major mission areas. These support functions include training, human resources, inspection, security, finance, records management, information technology, and facilities and logistics services. Support costs were allocated to individual programs based on historical information about use of the

services, or by using factors that are primary determinates of the level of use of a particular service, such as the number of employees. Now, support functions are applied to the division within each decision unit responsible for executing those funds. Full program costing links budgets to strategic planning, and enables the development of measures of program performance.

• <u>Directed Growth</u>: The FBI continues to work within its recognized organizational capacities, such as hiring and training, and other internal constraints, such as information technology, facilities, and other infrastructure. The 2010 budget proposes enhancements to grow critical process capacities – such as background investigation adjudicators and polygraphers and training classrooms – to accommodate the proposed personnel requests. Increases are also proposed for other infrastructure requirements, such as the National Security Career Path and Training Initiative and the Central Records Complex.

II. Summary of Program Changes

Item Name	Description	Pos.	FTE	Dollars (\$000)	Page
Salaries and Expenses Enhancemen	its				
	Domain and Operations				
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative	To investigate computer intrusion attacks against critical informational technology infrastructure	260	130	\$61,180	5-1
Intelligence Program	To enhance the FBI's intelligence capabilities, thereby supporting the integration of intelligence and investigative efforts	480	240	69,964	5-6
National Security Field Investigations	To enhance national security field capabilities to investigate threats	231	116	47,993	5-13
Mortgage Fraud and White Collar Crime	To increase the FBI's ability to identify, disrupt, and dismantle mortgage fraud	143	72	25,491	5-15
WMD Response	To enhance the FBI's three core WMD response capabilities: domain awareness, operations/ investigations, and technical/ forensic response	168	84	80,613	5-19
	Infrastructure		1		
Central Records Complex (CRC)	To support the continued development of the CRC, to include inventory and destruction of files currently dispersed among field offices			\$9,000	5-31
	Leveraging Technology		1		
3 rd Generation (3G) Wireless	To ensure the FBI possesses the capability to conduct electronic surveillance on 3G wireless networks			\$20,510	5-35
	Surveillance		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		
Advanced Electronic Surveillance	To support the FBI's Going Dark program			\$9,000	5-37
Surveillance	To increase the surveillance capabilities of the Aviation Program, Special Operations Group, and Special Surveillance Group	75	38	23,531	5-38

Item Name	Description	Pos.	FTE	Dollars (\$000)	Page
	Workforce		ı		
National Security Training / Career Path	To more robustly market and recruit candidates with specific skills, increase the FBI's background investigation capacity, and support the Special Agent and Professional Support Career Path programs	32	16	\$25,113	5-43
Subtotal, Salaries and Expenses En	hancements	1,389	696	\$372,395	
Overseas Contingency Operations	To support FBI operations in Afghanistan, international deployment activities, overtime and hazardous duty pay, and other counterterrorism-related requirements	•••	•••	\$101,066	5-47
Construction Enhancements					
Biometrics Technology Center (BTC)	To support Phase III construction of a BTC at the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division complex in Clarksburg, WV			\$97,605	7-1
FBI Academy Training Facility A&E Study	To conduct an Architecture and Engineering (A&E) study to determine the requirements to expand FBI Academy training facilities on the Quantico Marine Corps Base			10,000	7-4
Subtotal, Construction Enhancemen	•••	•••	\$107,605		
Total, FBI Direct Enhancements		1,389	696	\$581,066	

III. Appropriations Language and Analysis of Appropriations Language

Appropriations Language for Salaries and Expenses

For necessary expenses of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for detection, investigation, and prosecution of crimes against the United States; [\$7,065,100,000] <u>\$7,617,675,000</u>; of which not to exceed \$150,000,000 shall remain available until expended; *Provided*, That not to exceed \$205,000 shall be available for official reception and representation expenses.

For an additional amount for "Salaries and Expenses," \$101,066,000.

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IV. Decision Unit Justification

A. Intelligence Decision Unit

INTELLIGENCE DECISION UNIT TOTAL	Perm. Pos.	FTE	Amount (\$000)
2008 Enacted w/ Rescissions	5,345	5,071	\$1,148,779
2008 Supplemental		•••	39,335
2008 Enacted w/ Rescissions and Supplementals	5,345	5,071	1,188,114
2009 Enacted	6,217	5,906	1,487,262
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	52	308	75,090
2010 Current Services	6,269	6,214	1,562,352
2010 Program Increases	565	282	78,863
2010 Offsets	•••	•••	
2010 Request	6,834	6,496	1,641,215
Total Change 2009-2010	617	590	\$153,953

Intelligence Decision Unit—Information Technology Breakout	Perm. Pos.	FTE	Amount* (\$000)
2008 Enacted w/ Rescissions and Supplementals	204	204	\$282,881
2009 Enacted	246	246	375,546
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	27	27	(9,138)
2010 Current Services	273	273	366,408
2010 Program Increases		•••	
2010 Offsets	•••	•••	•••
2010 Request			

^{*}Includes both direct and reimbursable funding

1. Program Description

The FBI's Intelligence Decision Unit (IDU) is comprised of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), including embedded intelligence functions within Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Cyber, Criminal, and Weapons of Mass Destruction Divisions; Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs); Special Technologies and Applications Office (STAO); Terrorist Screening Center (TSC); Infrastructure and Technology; and Intelligence Training. Additionally, to capture all resources that support these programs, a prorated share of resources from the FBI's support divisions (including Training, Laboratory, Facilities and Logistics Services, Information Technology (IT) Operations, and Human Resources) are calculated and scored to the decision unit.

Directorate of Intelligence

The FBI established the DI as a dedicated and integrated intelligence service. This action responds to executive and legislative direction as the logical next step in the evolution of the FBI's intelligence capability. The DI is the FBI's core intelligence element and one of the four major organizations that comprise the National Security Branch (NSB).

The DI is the FBI's dedicated national intelligence workforce with delegated authorities and responsibilities for all FBI intelligence functions, including information sharing policies, from three legal documents: a Presidential Memorandum to the Attorney General dated November 16,

2004; the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004; and the Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Omnibus Appropriation Bill. The Directorate carries out its functions through embedded intelligence elements at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) and in each field office.

Intelligence Analysts

A goal of FBI Intelligence Analysts (IAs) is to anticipate customer requirements and proactively identify intelligence gaps associated with criminal or national security threats. Intelligence analysis is fundamental to understanding these threats to national security and ultimately to developing a deeper understanding of tomorrow's potential threats. To protect national security, the FBI must focus significant analytic resources to analyze the threat, its nature, potential courses of action, and to then put this threat analysis in the context of ongoing intelligence and investigative operations. The FBI's intelligence analysis capability consists of various resources that involve analyzing information collected from a variety of Confidential Human Sources (CHSs) and reporting this collected information as "intelligence products" to the customers at all levels of government through a variety of information sharing channels. The products generated by intelligence analysis drive FBI investigative and operational strategies by ensuring that these strategies are based on an enterprise-wide understanding of the current and future threat environment.

Field Intelligence Groups

Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) are the centralized intelligence components in the field that are crucial to the integration of the intelligence cycle (requirements, collection, analysis and dissemination) into field operations. In accordance with FBI policy and/or guidance to the field, each FIG is responsible for coordinating, guiding, and supporting the office's activities through the five core intelligence functions, which strengthen these efforts into field operations. These functions are: Domain Management, Collection Management, Requirements-based (sometimes non-case) collection – including human intelligence (HUMINT), Tactical intelligence, and Intelligence Production and dissemination. All five of the core intelligence functions require the FIG to work seamlessly with the operational squads in order to be successful.

FIG Agents

FIG Agents are required to perform one or more of the following primary functions: intelligence collection, collection management, confidential human source coordination, and intelligence and partner relations. FIG Agents' intelligence collection activities include maintaining a CHS base and conducting threat assessments. All Agents assigned to the FIG work closely with analysts on the FIG to report observations indicating new trends in the local environment, and to spot areas and targets for source recruitment. FIG Agents serve to facilitate the handling of cross-programmatic intelligence information obtained from CHS debriefings.

To do this effectively, HUMINT collectors on the FIG must have strong relationships with other collectors and embedded IAs on investigative squads in order to augment their collection abilities beyond reporting on the squad's investigations.

Foreign Language Program

The FBI's success at protecting the U.S. from future terrorist attacks, countering foreign intelligence operations and espionage, and dismantling transnational organized criminal enterprises is increasingly dependant upon a workforce with high quality, robust capabilities in 67 languages. This workforce is managed through the FBI's Foreign Language Program (FLP). Nearly every major FBI investigation now has a foreign language component and the demand for

highly qualified linguists and foreign language and culture training continues to increase. The mission of the FLP is to provide quality language services to the FBI, intelligence, and law enforcement communities, and to maximize the deployment of the linguist workforce, language tools, and technology in line with critical intelligence, investigative, and administrative priorities. The FBI's FLP also promulgates policies and compliance requirements; manages translation and interpreting resources throughout the world; and develops the foreign language skills of employees through on-going training, as well as language testing and assessment.

National Virtual Translation Center

The National Virtual Translation Center (NVTC) was established under the authority of Section 907 of the USA PATRIOT Act to "provide accurate and timely translations of foreign intelligence material to the U.S. Intelligence Community." On February 11, 2003, the Director of Central Intelligence awarded executive agency authority of the NVTC to the FBI. The NVTC is one of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI) controlled multi-agency centers, which was created to provide language services to the 16 agencies in the IC specifically working in national security and intelligence arenas. The NVTC is prohibited from assisting in criminal investigations. The NVTC's mission is to provide translation services and a community portal for accessing language-related tools and a broad range of foreign language materials in translated or vernacular form across security domains; function within the IC System for Information Sharing (ICSIS), which provides a common architecture and promotes interoperability and virtual access to databases across the IC; support continued development and fielding of tools, web-based and other, designed to help process and exploit foreign language text; and develop policies, procedures, and systems for managing NVTC translation requirements and translation services.

Language Analysis

Language Analysis is a critical process in the FBI's effort to acquire accurate, real-time, and actionable intelligence to detect and prevent foreign-originated terrorist attacks against the U.S. The FBI's language analysis capabilities promptly address all of its highest priority CT intelligence translation requirements, often within 24 hours. Language Analysts (LAs) also play a significant role in the FBI's CI and criminal investigative missions.

Communications Exploitation Section (CXS)

The mission of the CXS is "to lead law enforcement and intelligence efforts in the U.S. to defeat terrorism by targeting terrorist communications."

Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)

FTTTF assists in finding, tracking, and removing foreign terrorists and their supporters from the U.S. FTTTF utilizes specialized analytical techniques, technologies, and data access to enhance terrorist identification, tracking, and risk assessment operations.

Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)

The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) is a multi-agency, multi-discipline, globally unique center which supports the FBI, Department of Justice (DOJ), ODNI, and the IC in their ability to detect, deter and disrupt national security threats through their counterterrorism, information and intelligence gathering/analysis/sharing national security missions. TSC accomplishes this through a unique interagency business model which incorporates information technology and information sharing, as well as operational and analytical expertise from interagency operational and IAs, Agents, and data/information technology (IT) analysts/specialists which support law

enforcement at the federal, state, local, territorial, tribal, and international levels. The TSC has assisted law enforcement and screening agencies with the positive identification of 19,308 known or suspected terrorists (KST) domestically as well as globally in FY 2008 alone. Additionally, it has allowed FBI field offices to open 471 KST cases heretofore unknown within the IC and law enforcement community against targets which were previously unknown to be present in the United States.

Special Technologies and Applications Office (STAO)

The mission of STAO is to provide the FBI's investigative and intelligence priorities with technical analysis capability through innovative techniques, tools, and systems. STAO develops and maintains systems that store and provide access, using analytical tools, to FBI Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) electronic surveillance data and data from seized media for analysis and exploitation by FBI and IC Agents, IAs, and linguists.

Infrastructure and Technology

The IDU includes funding for several efforts that are critical enablers for FBI Intelligence Career Service (ICS) Agents, IAs, Language Analysts, and Physical Surveillance Specialists (PSSs). These efforts help to manage, process, share, and protect classified and unclassified information critical to national security. Taken together, these efforts form a comprehensive system of security and efficiency. The secure, or classified, side of the comprehensive system includes secure workspaces, or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs); a secure information sharing capability through the Sensitive Compartmented Information Operations Network (SCION), the FBI's TOP SECRET (TS)/Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)-certified data network; and Intelligence IT, which are the tools used by FBI intelligence personnel to perform their duties. The unclassified side of the comprehensive system includes the FBI's ability to share unclassified information with other federal, state, and local governments and other partners through the Criminal Justice Information Services' Law Enforcement Online (LEO) system and UNet, the FBI's unclassified connection to the Internet.

Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF)

A SCIF is an accredited, room, group of rooms, floors, or buildings where National Security Professionals (NSPs) collect, process, exploit, analyze, dissemminate, and/or store Sensitive Compartmented Information. SCIFs are outfitted with Information Technology, telecommunications, general office machines, and requisite infrastructure to process unclassified through Top Secret information. SCIFs are afforded intrusion detection and access control systems to prevent the entry of unauthorized personnel.

Sensitive Compartmented Information Operations Network (SCION)

SCION is a compartmented network for Top Secret information which is administered by employing increased security measures, enforcing user accountability, and enhancing information assurance methodology.

Law Enforcement On-Line (LEO)

LEO is a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week, on-line (real time), state-of-the-art Internet system that is accredited and approved by the FBI for the transmission of sensitive but unclassified information throughout the world to local, state, and federal law enforcement, criminal justice, and public safety communities. The LEO system provides a vehicle for these communities to exchange information, conduct online education programs, and participate in professional special interest and topically focused dialog. LEO provides law enforcement and criminal justice communities a

secure "anytime and anywhere" national and international method to support antiterrorism, intelligence, investigative operations, send notifications and alerts, and provide an avenue to remotely access other law enforcement and intelligence systems and resources. LEO currently supports a user base of over 134,000 vetted entities that can access LEO through any connection to the Internet such as cable modem, Digital Subscriber Line, Local Area Network, or a dial-up Internet service provider. LEO's secure network is web-based and can be accessed anywhere worldwide without the installation of any additional software. LEO operates as a sensitive but unclassified network under the Federal Information Security Management Act and Privacy Act. LEO provides a common communications link to all levels of law enforcement and criminal justice by supporting broad, immediate dissemination and exchange of information.

Intelligence Training

The FBI strives to ensure that its training programs leverage intelligence training expertise not only within the FBI, but also within the IC, academia, and industry to ensure the best intelligence training and educational opportunities are available to the FBI workforce. Such training also facilitates the identification of adjunct faculty, communicates relevant training and educational opportunities available outside the FBI and permits opportunities for research related to intelligence analysis. FBI Agents and IAs receive specialized training designed to better equip them with doctrine and tradecraft necessary to conduct the intelligence-driven mission of the FBI. Improving and expanding the FBI's training capacity will allow the FBI to conduct its intelligence-driven mission and to make a greater contribution to the USIC. In an effort to train the intelligence workforce and to build a cadre of highly skilled intelligence professionals, the FBI is developing a competency-based career path for Special Agents and Intelligence Analysts. These career paths will ensure the FBI ICS personnel receive the training, experiences, and joint duty assignments appropriate for their position or stage of development. The FBI is re-designing its training curriculum to map to the career path to ensure that all ICS personnel have the training necessary to analyze and disrupt current and future threats to the U.S. Homeland.

PERFORMANCE/RESOURCES TABLE

Decision Unit: Intelligence

DOJ Strategic Goal/Objective: Goal 1: Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security (Objectives 1.1, 1.2, & 1.4) and Goal 2: Prevent Crime, Enforce Federal Laws, and Represent the Rights and Interests of the American People (Objectives 2.1-2.6)

WORKLOAD/ RESOURCES		Final Target		Actual		Projected		Changes		Requested (Total)									
WORK	LUAD/ RESOURCES	FY 2008		FY 2008		FY 2009 Enacted		Current Services Adjustments & FY2010 Changes		FY 2010 Request									
Total Costs and FTE	7	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000								
Total Costs and FTE		5,092	1,188,114	4,760	1,128,304	5,906	1,487,262	590	153,953	6,496	1,641,215								
TYPE / GOAL / STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE	FY 2008	FY	2008	FY 2008		FY 2008		FY 2008		FY 2009 Enacted		Adjustment	Services ts & FY2010 inges	FY 2010	Request				
Performance Measure	% of Counterterrorism FISA collection reviewed by the Language Program:		100% 100% 100%	91% 114% 57%		100% 100% 100%		100%		% -		0%			100% 100% 100%				
Performance Measure: Responsiveness	% of FBI Headquarters finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics (Internally disseminated)		90%	%		100%		90%					90%						
Performance Measure: Responsiveness	% of FBI Field Office finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics. (Internally disseminated)	74%		95%		95%		95%		95%		95%		90%					90%
Performance Measure: Responsiveness	% of FBI finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics. (Disseminated to Intelligence Community)		85%		100%	90%		90%			90%								

TYPE / GOAL / STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE	PERFORMANCE	FY 2008	FY 2008	FY 2009 Requirements	Current Services Adjustments	FY 2010 Request			
Performance Measure: Accuracy	Number of high priority sources put through an enhanced validation process.		This information is classified.						
Performance Measure: Customer Satisfaction	% of users who visit the Law Enforcement Online (LEO) service (which provides intelligence dissemination) more than one month out of each year.	40%	41%	42%		44%			
Efficiency Measure	Staff time (in workyears) saved on asset management activities through changes in the human source business process (via the new "Delta" system).	660	0	1,627		1,627			

Data Definition, Validation, Verification, and Limitations:

- All data are provided by manual records maintained and verified by the FBI's Directorate of Intelligence, except for LEO data which are provided through CJIS Division. No known limitations exist with the available data as currently reported.
- Entry of data into the Delta system by FBI field offices was not completed, and Delta was not fully deployed, by the end of FY 2008, so performance data regarding time savings achieved through Delta were not available for FY 2008. Once the field offices have completed a major effort to enter all relevant data, the FBI will be able to attribute savings in staff time to Delta.

PERFORMANCE MEASURE TABLE

Decision Unit: Intelligence

Performance Report and Performance Plan Targets		FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY	2008	FY 2009	FY 2010
		Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Target	Target	Actual	Target	Target
Performance Measure	 % of Counterterrorism FISA collection reviewed by the Language Program: Audio Text Electronic File 	N/A N/A N/A	N/A N/A N/A	N/A N/A N/A	94% 100% 99%	88% 99% 94%	97% 102% 95%	100% 100% 100%	91% 114% 57%	100% 100% 100%	100% 100% 100%
Performance Measure: Responsiveness	% of FBI Headquarters finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics (Internally disseminated)	N/A	N/A	N/A	57%	86%	94%	90%	100%	90%	90%
Performance Measure: Responsiveness	% of FBI Field Office finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics. (Internally disseminated)	N/A	N/A	N/A	58%	73%	90%	74%	95%	90%	90%
Performance Measure: Responsiveness	% of FBI finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics. (Disseminated to Intelligence Community)	N/A	N/A	N/A	79%	86%	92%	85%	100%	90%	90%
Performance Measure: Accuracy	Number of high priority sources put through an enhanced validation process.	This information is classified.									
Performance Measure: Customer Satisfaction	% of users who visit the Law Enforcement Online (LEO) service (which provides intelligence dissemination) more than one month out of each year.	N/A	N/A	N/A	45%	39%	26%	40%	41%	42%	44%
Efficiency Measure	Staff time (in workyears) saved on asset management activities through changes in the human source business process (via the new "Delta" system).	0	0	0	0	0	0	660	0	1,627	1,627

2. Performance, Resources, and Strategies

The Intelligence Decision Unit contributes to DOJ's first two Strategic Goals: Goal 1, "Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security" (Objectives 1.1, 1.2, & 1.4) and Goal 2, "Prevent Crime, Enforce Federal Laws, and Represent the Rights and Interests of the American People" (Objectives 2.1-2.6). In addition, this decision unit ties directly to the FBI's ten priorities: Priority 1 – Protect the United States from terrorist attack; Priority 2 – Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage; Priority 3 – protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes; Priority 4 – Combat public corruption at all levels; Priority 5 – Protect civil rights; Priority 6 – Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises; Priority 7 – Combat major white-collar crime; Priority 8 – Combat significant violent crime; and Priority 9 – Support federal, state, local and international partners. Priority 10 – Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI's mission.

The mission of the Intelligence Program is to optimally position the FBI to meet current and emerging national security and criminal threats by aiming core investigative work proactively against threats to U.S. interests; building and sustaining enterprise-wide intelligence policies and capabilities; and providing useful, appropriate, and timely information and analysis to the national security, homeland security, and law enforcement communities. The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) is responsible for managing all projects and activities that encompass the FBI's Intelligence Program and for prioritizing those functions through the formulation of budgetary requirements. The Directorate carries out its functions through embedded intelligence elements at FBI HQ and in each field division.

a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes

Performance Measure: % of Counterterrorism Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) collection reviewed by the language program.


FY 2008 Target: 100% for Audio

100% for Text 100% for Electronic

File

FY 2008 Actual:

91% for Audio 114% for Text 57% for Electronic File



Discussion: The FBI now possesses sufficient translation capability to promptly address all of the highest priority counterterrorism intelligence, often within 24 hours. The FBI's prioritization and triage processes are helping reduce the accrued backlog. The Text review percentage can be greater than 100% due to progress against the accrued backlog. At current resource levels, linguists normally address close to 100% of Counterterrorism FISA. Although we continually strive to reach the target, there will always be some amount of work collected in languages for which there is a very low density of human resources available or in languages which have yet to be identified. In addition, work

collected near the end of the reporting cycle may not be addressed within that cycle and will be carried over to the next period.


The FBI did not reach the target for Electronic File review due to complications arising from a large workload stemming from a single case. At one point, searches associated with this case loaded over 100,000 files into the EDMS surveillance database. The audio review rate is at 91% due to Misur collection on English FISAs. The field offices responsible for these cases are aggressively addressing all backlog.

FY 2009 Target: 100% for each category 100% for each category

Performance Measure - Responsiveness: % of FBI Headquarters finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics (Internally disseminated)

FY 2008 Target: 90% **FY 2008 Actual:** 100%

Discussion: This measure illustrates the Intelligence Program's responsiveness to Intelligence Community (IC) intelligence priorities (i.e., whether or not the finished intelligence produced by the FBI is filling important, high priority intelligence gaps). Because the FBI has some regional or local priorities to fulfill, there will always be some intelligence reports filed that are of interest to the Bureau and its law enforcement colleagues but are not responsive to national-level NIPF topics.



Accordingly, the maximum attainable percentage for this measure was estimated at 90%.

FY 2009 Target: 90% **FY 2010 Target:** 90%

Performance Measure - Responsiveness: % of FBI Field Office finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics. (Internally disseminated)

FY 2008 Target: 74% **FY 2008 Actual:** 95%

Discussion: See *Discussion* re: Reports responsive to NIPF topics, above. The maximum attainable percentage for this measure was estimated to be 74% (less than the maximum for FBI Headquarters reports because Field Offices are more likely to be involved in regional or local events than the national headquarters office).

FY 2009 Target: 90%

FY 2010 Target: 90%

Performance Measure - Responsiveness: % of FBI finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics. (Disseminated to Intelligence Community)

FY 2008 Target: 85% **FY 2008 Actual:** 100%


Discussion: See *Discussion* re: Reports responsive to NIPF topics, above. The maximum attainable percentage for this measure is estimated at 85%.

FY 2009 Target: 90% **FY 2010 Target:** 90%

Performance Measure -- Customer Satisfaction: % of users who visit the Law Enforcement Online (LEO) service (which provides intelligence dissemination) more than one month out of each year out of the total user base of over 134.000 vetted members.

FY 2008 Target: 40% **FY 2008 Actual:** 41%

Discussion: This measure serves as a proxy for customer satisfaction. Repeated use of LEO is a strong indication that customers (other intelligence agencies, state and local law enforcement, etc.) find the information they are obtaining on the site useful. Targets for this measure are increased at a conservative rate (2% per year) because of the many factors that influence this number. Note that FY 2005 actual performance is considered uncharacteristically high-usage numbers were artificially driven



up by the occurrence of the London subway bombings and a domestic emergency response training exercise in 2005. Future targets were set without assuming any repeat event-based surges in user levels, but, if future performance continues to trend high, the targets will be adjusted at that time. The program is currently on-track to meet its FY 2009 target.

The FBI has developed new customer satisfaction surveys for its finished and raw intelligence products, which will ultimately provide data to replace the current customer satisfaction measure. Complete automation of the surveys is expected by the end of FY09. Currently, the FBI is evaluating the degree of customer response with the finished intelligence survey instrument and is working to make the raw intelligence survey instrument available to all customers. FBI will track initial data collections to see if sufficient feedback is captured. When the FBI feels that the administration of the surveys


gets a sufficient volume of feedback, the FBI will use the data provided to replace the current customer satisfaction measure. Until then, the current measure based on LEO data will be used for reports to DOJ and ODNI.

FY 2009 Target: 42% FY 2010 Target: 44%

Efficiency Measure: Staff time (in work years) saved on source management activities through changes in the human source business process (via the new "Delta' system).

FY 2008 Target: 660 **FY 2008 Actual** 0

Discussion: The FBI has deployed the "Delta" system that facilitates implementation of a major change in the FBI's Confidential Human Source (CHS) management business process. Delta automates administrative and management functions that Special Agents (SAs) and support personnel would normally perform for CHS operations. Delta includes user requirements and design functions, such as standardized forms, calendar reminders of Source-related activities, secure storage of Source information, workflow and electronic approval features, pre-populated data fields, pop-up ticklers, and role-based access. This automated application



extensively reduces employees' work time, eliminates burdensome paperwork, and increases compliance with requirements and guidelines for handling CHSs. In addition, Delta promotes intelligence information sharing among agents and other members of the Intelligence Community, provides greater protection of source identities, and improves internal source reporting between SAs and selective support personnel.

The projected time savings in work productivity for Delta's initial years of full operation are anticipated to be 1,627 workyears based on the added forms, additional features and less error prone workflow.

The Delta system reached initial operating capability and was deployed to all field offices in July 2008. Entry of data into the Delta system by FBI field offices was not completed, and Delta was not fully deployed, by the end of FY 2008, so performance data regarding time savings achieved through Delta were not available for FY 2008. Once the field offices have completed a major effort to enter all relevant data, the FBI will be able to attribute savings in staff time to Delta.

FY 2009 Target: 1,627 **FY 2010 Target:** 1,627

b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes

The FBI Intelligence Program was created by Congressional and Presidential mandate to provide centralized management of the nation's domestic intelligence efforts; no other federal, state or local program shares the FBI's specific authorities and responsibilities for domestic intelligence collection. With respect to broader intelligence collection and analysis authorities, including foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, Executive Order 12333 governs the division of responsibility between FBI and other Intelligence Community members in order to ensure coordination and prevent duplication of effort. Managers of the Intelligence Program also work extensively with external partners to ensure that the FBI's program is not redundant or duplicative of other efforts, both public and private. In some instances, this involves the active co-location of groups so that activities and policies can be better coordinated. For example, many of the FBI's Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs), which manage the FBI's intelligence functions in each Field Office, include members of state and local law enforcement and other intelligence agencies. Additionally, in 39 of the FBI's Field Offices, personnel assigned to the FIGs are members of regional Fusion Centers, and work alongside members of state and local law enforcement and other intelligence community personnel. In other instances, special inter-agency committees have been created to allow senior leaders to monitor and minimize any redundancy between programs. The FBI Director or other senior managers sit on the Justice Intelligence Coordinating Council (JICC), GLOBAL Intelligence Working Group, and the National Intelligence Analysis and Production Board (NIAPB), just to name a few.

B. Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Decision Unit

COUNTERTERRORISM/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE	Perm.	FTE	Amount
DECISION UNIT TOTAL	Pos.		(\$000)
2008 Enacted with Rescissions	11,675	11,144	\$2,759,251
2008 Supplementals	•••	•••	53,976
2008 Enacted w/ Rescissions and Supplementals	11,675	11,144	2,813,227
2009 Enacted	12,480	12,121	2,884,041
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	(3)	240	74,193
2010 Current Services	12,477	12,361	2,958,234
2010 Program Increases	547	273	183,247
2010 Offsets	•••	•••	•••
2010 Request	13,024	12,634	3,141,481
Total Change 2009-2010	544	513	\$257,440

Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Decision Unit	Perm.	FTE	Amount*
Information Technology Breakout	Pos.		(\$000)
2008 Enacted w/ Rescissions and Supplementals	357	357	\$331,255
2009 Enacted	367	367	335,100
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	69	69	43,493
2010 Current Services	436	436	378,293
2010 Program Increases		•••	
2010 Offsets		•••	•••
2010 Request		•••	

^{*}Includes both direct and reimbursable funding

1. Program Description

Below are the unclassified descriptions for the programs included in the Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence (CT/CI) Decision Unit. Please refer to the Classified Addendum for more details on these programs.

The FBI's CT/CI Decision Unit is comprised of the Counterterrorism Program, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD), the Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) Program, a portion of the Cyber Computer Intrusions Program, the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), and the portion of the Legal Attaché (Legat) Program that supports the FBI's CT and CI missions. Additionally, to capture all resources that support these programs, a prorated share of resources from the FBI's support divisions (including Training, Laboratory, Security, Information Technology Operations, administrative divisions, and staff offices) is calculated and scored to the decision unit.

Counterterrorism Program

The mission of the FBI's CT program is to prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur; to pursue the appropriate sanctions for those who have conducted, aided, and abetted those engaged in terrorist acts; and to provide crisis management following acts of terrorism against the U.S. and U.S. interests. This mission is accomplished by gathering intelligence from all sources and using intelligence and analysis to enhance preventive efforts and exploit links between terrorist groups and their support networks. Threat information is shared with all

affected agencies and personnel to create and maintain efficient threat mitigation response procedures and provide timely and accurate analysis to the Intelligence Community (IC) and senior policy makers.

The FBI is committed to stopping terrorism at any stage, from thwarting those intending to conduct an act of terrorism to investigating the financiers of terrorist operations. All CT investigations are managed at FBI Headquarters, thereby employing and enhancing a national perspective that focuses on the CT strategy of creating an inhospitable terrorist environment.

The FBI aims to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks by disrupting terrorists' ability to perpetrate harm. Training, finances, recruiting, logistical support, pre-attack planning, and preparation are all required components of terrorist operations. These requirements create vulnerabilities, and the FBI focuses on creating a comprehensive intelligence base to exploit these vulnerabilities.

To develop a comprehensive intelligence base, the FBI employs its Model Counterterrorism Investigative Strategy, focusing each terrorist case on intelligence, specifically on identification of terrorist training, fundraising, recruiting, logistical support, and pre-attack planning.

Under the leadership of Director Mueller, the FBI has moved aggressively to implement a comprehensive plan that has fundamentally transformed the FBI. The FBI has overhauled its counterterrorism operations, expanded its intelligence capabilities, modernized its business practices and technology, and improved coordination with its partners. The FBI is no longer content to concentrate on investigating terrorist crimes after they occur; it is dedicated to disrupting terrorist plots before they are executed. The FBI's CT Program has five priorities:

- To detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist sleeper cells in the U.S. before they act;
- To identify and prevent acts of terrorism by individuals with a terrorist agenda acting alone;
- To detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist support networks, including financial support networks:
- To enhance its capability to quickly ascertain the reliability, implications and details of terrorist threats and to improve the capacity to disseminate threat-related information to local, state, and federal agencies, and to the private sector as needed; and
- To enhance its overall contribution to the IC and senior policy makers in government by providing timely and accurate in-depth analysis of the terrorist threat and other information of value on an on-going basis.

To implement these priorities, the FBI has increased the number of Special Agents assigned to terrorism matters. The FBI has also established a number of operational units and entities that provide new or improved capabilities to address the terrorist threat. These include the around-the-clock Counterterrorism Watch and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) to manage and share threat information, the Terrorism Financing Operation Section to centralize efforts to stop terrorist financing, document/media exploitation squads to exploit material found both domestically and overseas for its intelligence value, deployable "Fly Teams" to lend counterterrorism expertise wherever it is needed; the 24/7 Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and

Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)¹ to help identify terrorists and keep them out of the U.S., the Terrorism Reports and Requirements Section (TRRS) to disseminate FBI terrorism-related intelligence to the IC, and the Counterterrorism Analysis Section to "connect the dots" and assess the indicators of terrorist activity against the U.S. from a strategic perspective.

Re-engineering efforts are making the FBI more efficient and more responsive to operational needs. The FBI has revised its approach to strategic planning and refocused recruiting and hiring efforts to attract individuals with skills critical to its counterterrorism and intelligence missions. The FBI has also developed a comprehensive training program and instituted new leadership initiatives to keep its workforce flexible.

The FBI has divided its CT operations into branches, each of which focuses on a different aspect of the current terrorism threat facing the U.S. These components are staffed with Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts (IAs), and subject matter experts who work closely with investigators in the field and integrate intelligence across component lines. This integration allows for real-time responses to threat information and quick communication with decision-makers and the field.

The FBI has also established strong working relationships with other members of the IC. From the Director's daily meetings with other IC executives, to the regular exchange of personnel among agencies, to joint efforts in specific investigations and in the NCTC, the TSC, and other multi-agency entities, to the co-location of personnel at Liberty Crossing, the FBI and its partners in the IC are now integrated at virtually every level of operations.

With terrorists traveling, communicating, and planning attacks all around the world, coordination with foreign partners has become more critical than ever before. The FBI has steadily increased its overseas presence and now routinely deploys Special Agents and crime scene experts to assist in the investigation of overseas attacks. Their efforts have played a critical role in successful international operations.

FBI Headquarters CT management was responsible for a vital disruption of a plot to bomb US-bound airplanes from the United Kingdom (U.K.) in July 2006. The experience of the Counterterrorism Field Agents on 18-month temporary (TDY) assignments provided the critical workforce at FBI Headquarters that was needed to accomplish the intelligence-based investigations that detected and prevented recent terrorist act/s from occurring against the U.S. and its interests. The disruption and arrests in the U.K. are a testament to the FBI's partnership with British intelligence.

The FBI recently realigned and consolidated existing WMD and counterproliferation initiatives, formerly managed in multiple divisions, under a single organizational entity, the WMD Directorate. The strategic focus of this Directorate is to prevent and disrupt the acquisition of WMD capabilities and technologies for use against the U.S. homeland by terrorists and other adversaries, including nation-states. The WMD Directorate integrates and links all of the necessary counterterrorism, intelligence, counterintelligence, and scientific and technological components to accomplish the FBI's overall WMD mission. The WMD Directorate is organized to provide a mechanism to perform the following essential capabilities:

-

¹ Please note that while the TSC and the FTTTF are part of the FBI's CT Program, their resources are scored to the Intelligence Decision Unit.

- Intelligence
- Countermeasures
- Preparedness
- Assessment and Response
- Investigative
- Science and Technology Support
- Policy and Planning

The WMD Directorate provides flexibility for growth and development and represents a flexible structure to leverage federal resources and coordinate with interagency partners. The Directorate addresses the identified essential capabilities through the establishment of three new sections which reside in the Directorate. These include: Countermeasures and Preparedness Section (CPS), Investigations and Operations Section (IOS), and Intelligence and Analysis Section (IAS). The WMD Directorate also has components to address policy, planning, budget, administrative, detailee matters and other functions which serve the entire Directorate. A joint reporting relationship with the Laboratory Division (LD) and the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) exists.

Foreign Counterintelligence Program

The description of the Foreign Counterintelligence Program is contained entirely in the Classified Addendum.

Dedicated Technical Program

The FBI's Dedicated Technical Program (DTP) administers resources to provide technical support as well as research and development activities through which the FBI ensures that investigative tools keep pace with evolving investigative requirements and private sector technologies. In compliance with Executive Order 12333 - United States Intelligence Activities and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) requests/guidance, the DTP deploys technical systems in support of foreign intelligence requirements of other IC entities. The DTP provides support enabling achievement of the following strategic goals:

- Identify, prevent, and defeat intelligence operations conducted by any foreign power within the U.S. or against certain U.S. interests abroad that constitute a threat to U.S. national security.
- Prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations.

Cyber Program

Pursuant to the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace signed by the President of the United States, the Department of Justice and the FBI lead the national effort to investigate and prosecute cyber crime. The FBI is also a key partner in the threat comprehensive multi-agency response to cyber-based threats to our national security. The FBI's Cyber Program consolidates Headquarters and field resources dedicated to combating cyber crime under a single entity. This allows the Cyber Program to coordinate, supervise and facilitate the FBI's investigation of those federal violations in which the Internet, computer systems, or networks are exploited as the principal instruments or targets of terrorist organizations, foreign government-sponsored intelligence operations or criminal activity. Included under the purview of the Cyber Program within the CT/CI DU are CT and CI computer intrusion investigations.

Critical Incident Response Program

The Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) facilitates the FBI's rapid response to, and management of, crisis incidents. CIRG was established to integrate tactical and investigative resources and expertise for incidents requiring an immediate law enforcement response. CIRG furnishes distinctive operational assistance and training to FBI field personnel as well as state, local, federal, tribal and international law enforcement partners. CIRG personnel are on call around the clock to respond to crisis incidents.

CIRG's continual readiness posture provides the U.S. Government with the ability to counter a myriad of CT/CI threats—from incidents involving WMD to a mass hostage taking. The FBI's crisis response protocols are built upon lessons learned from past incidents. They include a tiered response, streamlined command and control, standardized training, equipment, and operating procedures, and coordination with other partners. To counter the range of potential crises, an integrated response package that brings command and control, aviation, and technical and tactical assets under a unified structure is essential; CIRG encompasses all of these elements.

Legal Attaché (Legat) Program

Legats are the forward element of the FBI's international law enforcement effort and often provide the first response to crimes against the U.S. and its citizens that have an international nexus. The counterterrorism component of the Legat Program is comprised of Special Agents stationed overseas who work closely with their foreign counterparts to prevent terrorism from reaching into the U.S., help solve crimes, and assist with the apprehension of international terrorists who violate U.S. laws.

Management and Support Services

In addition to the CT, FCI, Cyber, CIRG, and Legat Programs, which make up the core elements of the CT/CI Decision Unit, the FBI's various human resources, administrative and security programs provide essential support services. A prorated share of human resources, administrative and support services is scored to the CT/CI Decision Unit based on the percentage of the FBI's core functions that contain CT/CI core elements.

The FBI's human resources and administrative programs lead the FBI through the challenges and changes that are continuously presented to federal law enforcement; provide direction and support to investigative personnel; and ensure that adequate resources are available to address the FBI's criminal investigative, national security, and law enforcement support responsibilities. A prorated share of the resources associated with the Finance Division, Human Resources Division, Inspection Division, Office of Equal Employment Opportunity Affairs, Office of Public Affairs, Office of Congressional Affairs, Office of General Counsel, and Office of Professional Responsibility support the CT/CI Decision Unit.

The FBI's Security Program enables the FBI to serve and protect the American people and protecting and keeping secure FBI employees, information, operations and facilities by providing services that enable the FBI to achieve its mission. The FBI's Security Program seeks to prevent and/or neutralize the possibility of the hostile penetration of the FBI by foreign intelligence services (FISs), terrorist groups, or other persons/organizations, and is responsible for the oversight and national coordination of the FBI's efforts to protect national security information (NSI) and sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information within the FBI. The program develops policies and guidelines relative to the FBI's security functions and oversees field security activities.

The mission of the FBI's Training Program is to lead and inspire, through excellence in training and research, the education and development of FBI personnel. The FBI's Training Program provides training to FBI personnel and the law enforcement community. The cornerstone of FBI training efforts is the New Agent training program, which provides comprehensive instruction to ensure entry level Special Agents possess the basic knowledge and skills required to serve the American public.

The FBI also recognizes a continuing need to provide training and development courses for FBI personnel. This training maintains and enhances the professional skills of FBI personnel in their current assignments, equips personnel to handle investigative and administrative requirements, and develops the leadership and management skills of potential managers and executives.

The FBI Laboratory, one of the largest and most comprehensive criminal laboratories in the world and the only full-service civilian federal forensic laboratory in the U.S., performs examinations of evidence for all duly constituted federal, state, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies in the U.S. upon request. The FBI Laboratory is recognized as the leader in the scientific analysis and solution of crime in the U.S. The successful investigation and prosecution of crimes requires the collection, examination, and scientific analysis of evidence recovered at the scene of the incident and obtained during the course of the investigation. Prosecutors frequently use physical evidence to demonstrate the guilt, either directly or circumstantially, of the person on trial. In other instances, evidence can exonerate individuals wrongly accused of crimes.

The mission of the FBI's Information Technology (IT) Program, which includes the Office of the Chief Information Officer, the Office of IT Policy and Planning, the Office of the Chief Technology Officer, the Office of IT Program Management, and the IT Operations Division, is to provide secure information management and information technology services for the FBI's worldwide operational and administrative activities. This organizational model, which is based on best practices within industry and the federal government, ensured that all FBI IT functions work closely with each other in implementing full life cycle management of all FBI IT systems, programs, and projects. The Information Technology Program develops and procures systems capable of performing effective and efficient case management, information analysis, and intelligence sharing, both internally and with other law enforcement entities. The program is responsible for maintenance of over 50 FBI computer systems, computer data centers, and information technology centers.

The mission of the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division is to reduce terrorist and criminal activities by maximizing the ability to provide timely and relevant criminal justice information to the FBI and qualified law enforcement, criminal justice, civilian, academic, employment, and licensing agencies concerning individuals, stolen property, criminal organizations and activities, and other law enforcement-related data. The CJIS Division has several major program activities that support this mission including the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), National Crime Information Center (NCIC), National Instant Criminal Background Check System, Uniform Crime Reporting, and Law Enforcement Online (LEO).

PERFORMANCE/RESOURCES TABLE

Decision Unit: Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence

DOJ Strategic Goal/Objective Goal 1: Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security (Objectives 1.1, 1.2, & 1.4)

·	WORKLOAD/ RESOURCES	Final Target FY 2008			Actual FY 2008		ojected 7 2009 irements	Changes Current Services Adjustments		Requested (Total) FY 2010 Request		
Workload - Numbe	er of Cases		†	38,763		†		†			†	
Total Costs and FTE		FTE 11,144	\$000 2,813,227	FTE 10,471	\$000 2,710,039	FTE 12,121	\$000 2,884,041	FTE 513	\$000 257,440	FTE 12,634	\$000 3,141,481	
TYPE/ STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE	PERFORMANCE	FY 2008		,	FY 2008		FY 2009 Requirements		Current Services Adjustments		FY 2010 Request	
Program Activity/	1. Counterterrorism (CT)	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	
1.1; 1.2 Performance Measure	Terrorist acts committed by foreign nationals against U.S. interests (within U.S. borders)	5,848 1,604,883		5,511	1,523,265	7,011 1,677,081		181 146,713		7,201 1,790,491		
Performance Measure	Catastrophic Acts of Domestic Terrorism		0		0		0				0	
Performance Measure	Positive encounters with subjects through screening process		20,000	19,306		20,250			250		20,500	
Performance Measure	Number of participants in the JTTF		3,625	4,163		4,040		480		4,520		
Performance Measure	Percentage of CT personnel completing training within competency profile		80%	N/A		80%		5%		85%		
Performance Measure	Percentage of CTD human sources validated		100%		100%		100%				100%	
Efficiency Measure	Percentage of human sources reporting on Tier 1 groups		42%		44%		45%		5%		50%	
Program Activity/ 1.4	2. Counterintelligence	FTE 4,717	\$000 1,064,737	FTE 4,416	\$000 1,045,730	FTE 4,275	\$000 1,001,679	FTE 184	\$000 90,373	FTE 4,456	\$000 1,100,941	
Performance Measure	Percentage of offices that have sufficiently identified Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) activities	This information is Classified.										
Performance Measure	Percentage of field offices with adequate coverage of known or suspected intelligence officers				Т	his informa	tion is Classifie	d.				
Performance Measure	Percentage of field offices satisfactorily engaged in strategic partnerships with other USIC entities				Т	his informa	tion is Classifie	d.				

PERFORMANCE/RESOURCES TABLE **Decision Unit:** Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence DOJ Strategic Goal/Objective Goal 1: Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security (Objectives 1.1, 1.2, & 1.4) Percentage of field offices that have satisfactorily Performance demonstrated knowledge of and liaison with vulnerable This information is Classified. Measure entities within their domain Percentage of field offices that have identified and Performance This information is Classified. documented priority threat country operations Measure Cost savings through the Interactive Multimedia 3,043 3,871 3,252 3,252 **Efficiency Measure** Instruction and Simulation Program (\$000) Program Activity/ FTE \$000 FTE \$000 FTE \$000 FTE FTE \$000 \$000 3. Cyber Program (Intrusions) 1.1 579 143,607 543 141,043 835 205,281 148 20,354 977 249,999 Performance Number of Priority Criminal Computer Intrusion 29 31 31 2 33 Measure Investigations Successfully Satisfied **Efficiency Measure** Cost savings from online Cyber training (\$000) N/A 511 567 29 596 Performance Computer Intrusion Program Convictions/Pre-trial †† 129 †† †† †† Measure diversions

PERFORMANCE/RESOURCES TABLE

Decision Unit: Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence

DOJ Strategic Goal/Objective Goal 1: Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security (Objectives 1.1, 1.2, & 1.4)

Data Definition, Validation, Verification, and Limitations:

- For purposes of FBI Counterterrorism program performance measures, terrorist acts concern the "unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85). The FBI defines a terrorist act as an attack against a single target (e.g. a building or physical structure, an aircraft, etc.). Acts against single targets are counted as separate acts, even if they are coordinated to have simultaneous impact. For example, each of the September 11, 2001 acts (North Tower of the WrC, the Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania crash site) could have occurred independently of each other and still have been a significant terrorist act in and of itself. The FBI uses the term terrorist incident to describe the overall concerted terrorist attack. A terrorist incident may consist of multiple terrorist acts. The September 11, 2001 attacks, therefore, are counted as four terrorist acts and one terrorist incident.
- Other Counterterrorism measures are provided through records kept by the FBI's Counterterrorism Program, including the Terrorist Screening Center. The count of JTTF participants erroneously did not include part-time participants until FY 2008, but will henceforth include them. No other known data limitations exist.
- Counterintelligence measures are based on records kept by the FBI's Counterintelligence Program. These records are based upon the results of field reviews of CI squads done on a periodic basis. Since the end of March 2007, all FBI field offices have undergone at least one CI field review. Percentages are updated based upon the most recent field review. IMIS cost savings data are based upon estimates of cost savings per student taking an online course, compared with an in-service training. No known data limitations exist.
- The data source for successful computer intrusion cases and conviction/pre-trial diversion data is the FBI's Integrated Statistical Reporting and Analysis Application (ISRAA) database. The database tracks statistical accomplishments from inception to closure. Before data are entered into the system, they are reviewed and approved by an FBI field manager. They are subsequently verified through FBI's inspection process. Inspections occur on a two to three year cycle. Using statistical sampling methods, data in ISRAA are tracked back to source documents contained in FBI files. FBI field personnel are required to enter accomplishment data within 30 days of the accomplishment or a change in the status of an accomplishment, such as those resulting from appeals. Data for this report are compiled less than 30 days after the end of the fiscal year, and thus may not fully represent the accomplishments during the reporting period. Previous data subject to this limitation were revised during FY 2005.
- Data for the cost savings for Cyber training are maintained by the Cyber Education and Development Unit. These data are based on estimated cost savings for each student taking an online course compared to inservice training. No known data limitations exist.
- † Due to the large number of external and uncontrollable factors influencing these data, the FBI does not project numbers of cases.
- †† FBI does not set targets for investigative output data.

PERFORMANCE MEASURE TABLE

Decision Unit: Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence

Decision Cint.	Counterterrorism/Counterintenig	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY	2008	FY 2009	FY 2010
Performance 1	Report and Performance Plan Targets								<u> </u>		
		Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Target
Performance Measure	Terrorist Acts Committed by Foreign Nationals Against U.S. Interests (within U.S. borders)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Performance Measure	Catastrophic Acts of Domestic Terrorism	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Performance Measure	Positive encounters with subjects through screening process	N/A	N/A	5,396	15,730	19,967	20,500	20,000	19,306	20,250	20,500
Performance Measure	Increase the number of participants in the JTTF	N/A	2,394	3,163	3,714	3,540	3,600	3,625	4,163	4,040	4,520
Performance Measure	Percentage of CT personnel completing training within competency profile	N/A	3%	10%	15%	74%	77%	80%	N/A	80%	85%
Performance Measure	Percentage of CTD human sources validated	N/A	3%	10%	0%	0%	55%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Efficiency Measure	Increase the percentage of human sources reporting on Tier 1 groups	N/A	15%	35%	34%	33%	34%	42%	44%	45%	50%
Performance Measure	Percentage of offices that have sufficiently identified Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) activities										
Performance Measure	Percentage of field offices with adequate coverage of known or suspected intelligence officers										
Performance Measure	Percentage of field offices satisfactorily engaged in strategic partnerships with other USIC entities				Th	is informatio	on is Classifi	ed.			
Performance Measure	Percentage of field offices that have satisfactorily demonstrated knowledge of and liaison with vulnerable entities within their domain										
Performance Measure	Percentage of field offices that have identified and documented priority threat country operations										

PERFORMANCE MEASURE TABLE

Decision Unit: Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence

Decision Chief Counterter of thing Counter intelligence											
Performance Report and Performance Plan Targets		FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY	2008	FY 2009	FY 2010
		Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Target
Efficiency Measure	Cost savings through the Interactive Multimedia Instruction and Simulation Program (\$000)	209	272	706	1,210	2,746	4,388	3,043	3,871	3,252	3,252
Performance Measure	Number of Priority Criminal Computer Intrusion Investigations Successfully Satisfied	N/A	N/A	N/A	34	24	27	29	31	31	33
Efficiency Measure	Cost savings from online Cyber training (\$000)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	331	N/A	511	567	596
Performance Measure	Computer Intrusion Program Convictions/Pre-trial diversions	108	99	86	80	118	107	N/A	129	N/A	N/A

2. Performance, Resources, and Strategies

The Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence decision unit contributes to the Department's Strategic Goal 1: Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security, Objectives 1.1, 1.2, & 1.4. This decision unit also ties directly to the top three FBI priorities: Priority 1 – Protect the United States from terrorist attacks; Priority 2 – Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage; and Priority 3 – Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes.

Counterterrorism

a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes

The FBI is committed to stopping terrorism at any stage, from thwarting those intending to conduct an act of terrorism to investigating the financiers of terrorist operations. All CT investigations are managed at FBI Headquarters, thereby employing and enhancing a national perspective that focuses on the strategy of creating an inhospitable environment for terrorists. As the leader of the nation's CT efforts, the FBI must understand all dimensions of the threats facing the nation and address them with new and innovative investigative and operational strategies. The FBI must be able to effectively respond to the challenges posed by unconventional terrorist methods, such as the use of chemical, biological, radiological, explosive, and nuclear materials. When terrorist acts do occur, the FBI must rapidly identify, locate, and apprehend. As part of its CT mission, the FBI will continue to combat terrorism by investigating those persons and countries that finance terrorist acts.

Under the leadership of Director Mueller, the FBI has moved aggressively to implement a comprehensive plan that has fundamentally transformed the FBI. The FBI has overhauled its CT operations, expanded its intelligence capabilities, modernized its business practices and technology, and improved coordination with its partners. The FBI is no longer content to concentrate on investigating terrorist crimes after they occur; it is dedicated to disrupting terrorist plots before they are executed.


The FBI has also established strong working relationships with other members of the Intelligence Community (IC). From the FBI Director's daily meetings with other IC executives, to regular exchange of personnel among agencies, to joint efforts in specific investigations and in the National Counterterrorism Center, the Terrorist Screening Center, and other multi-agency entities, to the co-location of personnel at Liberty Crossing, the FBI and its partners in the IC are now integrated at virtually every level of operations. Finally, to develop a comprehensive intelligence base, the FBI will employ its Model Counterterrorism Investigative Strategy focusing each terrorist case on intelligence, specifically on identification of terrorist training, fundraising, recruiting, logistical support, and pre-attack planning.

Performance Measure: Terrorist Acts Committed by Foreign Nationals Against U.S. Interests (within U.S. Borders)

FY 2008 Target: Zero terrorist acts. FY 2008 Actual: Zero terrorist acts.

• *Discussion*: No incidents falling into this category were reported in FY 2008.

FY 2009 Target: Regardless of terrorist activity, the target will always remain the same: zero terrorist acts.



FY 2010 Target: Zero terrorist acts.

Performance Measure: Catastrophic Acts of Domestic Terrorism


FY 2008 Target: Zero terrorist acts.

FY 2008 Actual: Zero terrorist acts.

• *Discussion*: No incidents falling into this category were reported in FY 2008.

FY 2009 Target: Regardless of terrorist activity, the target will always remain the same: zero terrorist acts.


FY 2010 Target: Zero terrorist acts.



Performance Measure: Positive encounters with subjects through screening process.

FY 2008 Target: 20,000 FY 2008 Actual: 19,306

Discussion: Identifying terrorists and preventing their entry into the U.S. is the function of the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a joint venture with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The TSC was started in December 2003, and consolidates the U.S. Government's approach to screening for individual terrorists



by creating a single comprehensive database of known or appropriately suspected terrorists. A positive encounter is one in which an encountered individual is positively matched with an identity in the Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB).


The TSC's FY 2008 projection of 20,000 positive matches from encounters fell just short, at 19,306. There is no empirical data indicating a technological, policy or procedural issue with the target adjustments. The TSC simply processes submissions resultant from encounters by law enforcement and screening agencies domestically and internationally. The more encounters by these entities increases the probability of more positive encounters.

FY 2009 Target: 20,250 FY 2010 Target: 20,500 **Performance Measure:** Number of participants in the Joint Terrorism Task Force.

FY 2008 Target: 3,625 **FY 2008 Actual**: 4,163

Discussion: The FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force participants serve as the "operational arm" of the U.S. Government's domestic Counterterrorism strategy, and partner FBI personnel with hundreds of investigators from various federal, state, and local agencies in field offices across the country and are important force multipliers aiding our fight against terrorism.

With the report on FY 2008 data, the FBI will include part-time JTTF task force members in its total count. These data were originally meant to be included in the measure, but were erroneously omitted in previous data reports. As of February 2009, there were a total of 4,450 participants, which includes 3,834 full-time and 616 part-time JTTF task force members. The FBI and the NJTTF are actively working with each of the local JTTF's through Executive Board meetings and Law Enforcement Outreach programs to highlight the necessity and benefit of JTTF participation.



FY 2009 Target: 4,450 **FY 2010 Target:** 4,520

Performance Measure: Percent of CTD personnel having completed competency profile training.

FY 2008 Target: 80%

FY 2008 Actual: N/A (see discussion below)


Discussion: CTD, in conjunction with the FBI's Training Division, has developed a competency profile for CT Special Agents. In FY 2008, "CT proficiency" was redefined for Special Agents. All CT Special Agents are required to complete CT courses with a passing grade in Stage II and Stage III in the CT Career Path before being considered "CT proficient." There are currently 4 stages in the CT Career Path. Director Mueller and Congress have mandated the FBI to provide additional CT training to FBI personnel. CTD has identified a need for additional CT courses to be developed and implemented for all CTD personnel. Once the courses have been developed they will be incorporated

into the Special Agent Career Path Program and the CT proficiency levels will be revised

once again.

As determined by the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, JTTF members are required to complete JTTF-specific web-based training. The proficiency standards will be revised as the JTTF training program and CT training program is expanded.

CTD is currently unable to calculate the percent of CT personnel having completed competency profile training. The CT Special Agent proficiencies



were revised in FY 2008. The percent of CTD personnel having completed competency profile training reported in previous years was calculated using proficiency standards different than the standards determined in FY 2008. The proficiency requirements have been revised multiple times in recent years. In FY 2008, the proficiency requirements were made more stringent, requiring Special Agents to complete more Counterterrorism courses in each Career Path Stage. By 2010, Special Agents will be required to complete approximately 5 courses in Stage II, approximately 3 courses in Stage III, and approximately 2 courses in Stage IV. Additionally, due to staffing needs and attrition, the majority of current CTD personnel are new to CTD in FY 2008. Most of the new CTD personnel have not attended CT training, and, therefore, they will need to fulfill their Career Path requirements at the beginning of Stage II.


Until the Training Division, Virtual Academy Unit, and Human Resources Division, Special Agent Career Path Unit formalizes and implements a Counterterrorism development plan CTD cannot accurately determine new percentages of proficient CTD personnel.

FY 2009 Target: 80% FY 2010 Target: 85%

Performance Measure: Percentage of CTD human sources validated.

FY 2008 Target: 100% FY 2008 Actual: 100%

Discussion: Gathering intelligence from all sources to stop terrorism requires CTD to ensure the validity, reliability, and productivity of all CTD human sources. Source validation is a process which allows CTD to measure value and manage risks associated with the operation of a confidential human source. It also serves as a check against the



inherently secretive nature of Human Source activities ensuring that sources are who they say they are, free of external control. The validation of human sources is an essential component of CTD human intelligence that is used to further CTD investigations and contribute to intelligence gathering that protects the nation from terrorists.

The Directorate of Intelligence oversees the Human Source Validation Unit. On December 13, 2006, the Attorney General issued new guidelines concerning use of confidential human sources (CHSs) and directed the FBI to implement them by June 13, 2007. These new guidelines require all CHSs go through an annual validation process. Since the release of these new guidelines, the DI has adapted the validation of its CHSs to a phased approach. Phase I incorporates the FBI's Directorate of Intelligence's May 25, 2006 mandate that all FBI Field Offices provide their top two CT sources for validation. As of the end of FY 2007, 60% of the CHSs identified during Phase I had been validated.


FY 2008 figures show that 100% of Phase I validation reviews were completed. The Human Source Validation Unit has made strides in accomplishing much of the Phase I validations. As the validations are thorough and time consuming, the validation unit has requested additional work space and personnel to accomplish its mission.

FY 2009 Target: 100% FY 2010 Target: 100%

Efficiency Measure: Percentage of human sources reporting on Tier 1 groups.

FY 2008 Target: 42% FY 2008 Actual: 44%

Discussion: In December 2002, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division (CTD) completed a comprehensive national assessment of the terrorist



threat to the U.S. homeland based on comprehensive intelligence and priority groups were identified. The groups were prioritized by their intent to harm the US homeland, their links to al-Qa'ida, and their capabilities.

CTD is reviewing the manner in which it categorizes its priority areas for concentration of human source coverage.

FY 2009 Target: 45% FY 2010 Target: 50%

b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes

As the leader of the nation's counterterrorism efforts, the FBI must understand all dimensions of the threats facing the nation and address them with new and innovative investigative and operational strategies. The FY 2010 budget request directly addresses these threats and assists in pursuing the FBI's missions and objectives. The FBI must be able to effectively respond to the challenges posed by unconventional terrorist methods, such as the use of chemical, biological, radiological, explosive, and nuclear materials. When terrorist acts do occur, the FBI must rapidly identify, locate, apprehend, and prosecute those responsible. As part of its counterterrorism mission, the FBI will continue to combat terrorism by investigating those persons and countries that finance terrorist acts. The FBI will aggressively use the money laundering and asset forfeiture statutes to locate and disrupt the financial sources of terrorist organizations. The FBI will also work to effectively and efficiently utilize the tools authorized by Congress in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. While the ultimate goal is to prevent a terrorist act before it occurs, the FBI must be able to respond should an act occur. The FBI's efforts in this area include improved intelligence gathering and sharing, improved analytical capabilities, and enhanced training and liaison.

Counterintelligence

a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes

The FBI has adopted several performance measures related to the review of field operations conducted by the Counterintelligence Program. As of March 31, 2007, all FBI field offices have gone through this review at least once. Data will continue to be updated as field offices undergo reevaluations.

Data based upon Counterintelligence Program reviews of field operations are classified, and can not appear in unclassified budget reports.

Efficiency Measure: Cost savings through the Interactive Multimedia Instruction and Simulation (IMIS) Program (\$000)


FY 2008 Target: 3,043

FY 2008 Projected Actual: 3,871

Discussion:

Cost savings based upon number of students completing online course, compared to costs incurred from traveling to attend in-service platform instruction. The FBI's Counterintelligence Training Center exceeded the FY 2008 target.

FY 2009 Target: 3,252 FY 2010 Target: 3,252



b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes

The FBI's CI Program has completed a thorough and wide-ranging internal review of its operations and has a comprehensive Counterintelligence strategy. The CI program is actively carrying out this strategy, which is predicated on the need for a centralized national direction that facilitates a focus on common priorities and specific objectives in all areas of the country. It also recognizes the need for collaboration with other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community. This new strategy will enable the program to more effectively combat the intelligence threats facing the U.S. The FBI needs to maintain its resources that are currently directed against the CI symmetrical threat, while concurrently obtaining resource enhancements to deploy against the CI asymmetrical threat throughout the CI domain fieldwide.

Computer Intrusions

a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes

The Computer Intrusion Program (CIP) is the top priority of the FBI's Cyber Division. The mission of the CIP is to identify, assess and neutralize computer intrusion threats emanating from terrorist organizations, state sponsored threat actors, and criminal groups targeting the national information infrastructure.

New performance measures for computer intrusions were created in FY 2008. These measures are being presented for the first time in this section of the FBI's performance report.


Performance Measure: NEW MEASURE: Number of Criminal Computer Intrusion

Investigations Successfully Completed

FY 2008 Target: 29 **FY 2008 Actual:** 31

Discussion:

This measure counts the amount of times where the FBI has achieved a successful result in a case primarily involving a computer intrusion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1030. This type of investigation relates to computer intrusions that occur under the following circumstances, using the following methods or having the following characteristics:



Attack Impact:

• Destruction of information, alteration of information, theft of information, denial of service.

Special Circumstances:

Computer affecting the administration of justice or national security, threat to
public health or safety, causation of physical injury, impaired or modified medical
treatment.

Method:

 e.g., Unauthorized access, exceeding authorized access, malicious code, denial of service, botnets, phishing, illegal wiretap, social engineering, physical access, network recon.

Currently, FBI Cyber Division reports automated conviction data for these accomplishments, which will be the basis of the baseline data for this measure. As the FBI implements reporting of these accomplishments through use of the FD-801 form, other criteria for determining the successful closing of a case based on a §1030 violation will be defined.


FY 2009 Target: 31 **FY 2010 Target:** 33

Efficiency Measure: NEW MEASURE: Cost Savings from Online Cyber Training

FY 2008 Target: N/A FY 2008 Actual: \$511,360

Discussion:

The FBI's Cyber Program is progressing towards providing training for conducting cyber investigations via online training courses. The student population for the majority of these classes is quite broad, including FBI Special Agents, support employees and state and local law enforcement or intelligence partners. These classes are primarily



introductory-level training classes that provide students with basic cyber concepts and investigative strategies. Introductory-level classes do not involve significant hands-on interaction with hardware, software or networking devices. For Special Agents on the Cyber Career Path, they are core classes which are required before continuing on to take more technically advanced courses. Knowledge of cyber basics, and the mission and priorities of the Cyber Division throughout the FBI is desirable and aids the program.

In addition to offering online training via the FBI Virtual Academy (the FBI's closed system intranet training system), training is also offered over the Internet, via a CENTRA Server. These online training options allow the FBI to offer courses to employees in remote locales, to state & local investigators with little to no cost, and to FBI employees who would not ordinarily have been selected for attendance at classroom-based training due to prohibitive travel costs or a low selection priority for available seats.


FY 2009 Target: \$567,189 **FY 2010 Target:** \$595,548

Performance Measure: Computer Intrusion Program Convictions/Pre-Trial Diversions

FY 2008 Target: In accordance with Department guidance, targeted levels of performance are not projected for this indicator.
FY 2008 Actual: 129

Discussion: Computer intrusion convictions are expected to rise as a result of increased investigations and level of agent expertise.

FY 2009 Target: N/A FY 2010 Target: N/A



b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes

In FY 2010, the FBI anticipates addressing an ever-increasing caseload and hence changes in the amount of subsequent convictions/pre-trial diversions. The strategies to accomplish these outcomes includes; continuing and enhancing the alliances with the Intelligence Community (IC), the coordination of intelligence across the IC, and the most critical – increased international liaison and partnerships. This key factor includes initiatives to develop cyber crime law enforcement strategy, leverage international cooperation between governments, law enforcement, and private industry, share information and training, share and develop new tools, and educate the public. Given the transnational nature of cyber crime, it is imperative to establish effective international cooperation and develop appropriate and consistent legislation. As cyber crimes cross national boundaries, international law enforcement cooperation is crucial. Because most laws and agencies operate within national borders, gaps exist in international legal coverage and harmonization of offences, and agencies seek (or provide) international assistance only when a crime impacts their interests. A lack of staff with sufficient technical skills to effectively assist in investigating cyber crimes compounds this situation.

C. Criminal Enterprises and Federal Crimes Decision Unit

CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES AND FEDERAL CRIMES DECISION UNIT TOTAL	Perm. Pos.	FTE	Amount (\$000)
2008 Enacted with Rescissions	11,034	10,967	\$2,176,416
2008 Supplementals		•••	9,270
2008 Enacted w/ Rescissions and Supplementals	11,034	10,967	2,185,686
2009 Enacted	10,850	10,596	2,275,754
Adjustments to base and Technical Adjustments	(37)	102	32,285
2010 Current Services	10,813	10,698	2,308,039
2010 Program Increases	269	137	100,490
2010 Offsets	••••	••••	•••
2010 Request	11,082	10,835	2,408,529
Total Change 2009-2010	232	239	\$132,775

Criminal Enterprises and Federal Crimes Decision Unit - Information Technology Breakout	Perm. Pos.	FTE	Amount* (\$000)
2008 Enacted w/ Rescissions and Supplementals	258	258	\$238,871
2009 Enacted	257	257	253,137
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	66	66	13,493
2010 Current Services	323	323	266,630
2010 Program Increases		•••	
2010 Offsets		•••	
2010 Request	•••	•••	•••

^{*}Includes both direct and reimbursable funding

1. Program Description

The Criminal Enterprises and Federal Crimes (CEFC) decision unit (DU) comprises all headquarters and field programs that support the FBI's criminal investigative missions. The DU includes:

- 1) The FBI's Organized Crime, the Gang/Criminal Enterprise (G/CE), and the Criminal Intelligence programs;
- 2) The Financial Crime, Integrity in Government/Civil Rights, and Violent Crime programs;
- 3) The Public Corruption and Government Fraud programs which investigate state, local and federal government acts of impropriety, including the rising level of federal and state legislative corruption;
- 4) The criminal investigative components of the Cyber Division's programs, such as the Innocent Images National Initiative (IINI) and the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3); and
- 5) A share of the FBI's Legal Attaché (Legat) program.

Additionally, the decision unit includes a prorata share of resources from the FBI's support divisions (including Training, Laboratory, Security, Information Technology Operations, and the administrative divisions and offices).

The structure of the FBI's Criminal Intelligence Program maximizes the effectiveness of resources, improves investigation and intelligence gathering processes, focuses on threats from criminal enterprises, and promotes the collection, exchange and dissemination of intelligence throughout the FBI and other authorized agencies.

Public Corruption/Civil Rights

The Public Corruption and Government Fraud programs involve sensitive and complex cases where the FBI is the only law enforcement agency primarily charged with investigating legislative, executive, judicial, and significant law enforcement corruption. The FBI is the only law enforcement agency that targets federal campaign finance violations and ballot fraud, most obstruction of justice violations, and Foreign Corruption Practices Act (FPCA) violations.

Criminal Enterprises

Through the Organized Crime and the Gang/Criminal Enterprise programs the FBI seeks to dismantle criminal organizations by employing the enterprise theory of investigation to identify, investigate, and prosecute members of the groups. Within these programs, the FBI's investigative mission is to disrupt and dismantle the local, regional, national, and transnational criminal enterprises that pose the greatest threats to the economic and national security of the United States.

The FBI's Violent Gang and Major Theft programs have combined efforts to increase the number of investigations and cases, sharing equitable intelligence resources in similar areas of interest and providing leadership to state and local law enforcement agencies.

To challenge the growing narcotics industry, often controlled by violent gang elements, the FBI provides resources to major Department of Justice (DOJ) initiatives such as the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) initiative. Both programs work closely with other federal law enforcement agencies in addition to state and local government authorities.

The FBI has developed a comprehensive counter-drug strategy designed to investigate and prosecute illegal drug traffickers and distributors, reduce drug related crime and violence, provide assistance to other law enforcement agencies, and strengthen international cooperation. The strategy focuses the FBI's counter-drug resources on 52 international organizations identified on DOJ's Consolidated Priority Organizational Targets (CPOT) list. These organizations are associated primarily with the Colombian, Mexican, and Caribbean drug trafficking organizations that have the most adverse impact on United States national interests.

The FBI will maintain focus on organized criminal enterprise groups, including the Eurasian criminal enterprises; Asian criminal enterprises; La Cosa Nostra/Italian organized crime groups; Balkan/Albanian organized crime groups; Middle Eastern criminal enterprises; and African criminal enterprises. These organized criminal enterprise groups are engaged in a myriad of criminal activities including racketeering activity, extortion, murder, money laundering, prostitution, human trafficking, alien smuggling, and drug trafficking.

Violent Crime

Through the Violent Crime Program, the FBI investigates a wide range of federal criminal violations, including crimes against children; crimes on federal reservations/property (including Indian reservations); assaults against public officials; unlawful flight to avoid prosecution; and manufacturing and distribution of child pornography.

In addition to responding to reports of individual crimes, the FBI participates in groups that employ proactive investigative techniques, such as joint agency violent crime Safe Streets Task Forces; wire intercepts; the Indian Gaming Working Group; and undercover operations. The current major areas of focus for the Violent Crime Program are crimes against children and child abductions.

Financial Crime

Through the Financial Crime Program, the FBI investigates a myriad of financial crimes including health care fraud, public corruption, financial institution fraud, insurance fraud, securities and commodities fraud, telemarketing fraud, bankruptcy fraud, money laundering, and intellectual property rights violations. In addition, the program facilitates the forfeiture of assets from those engaging in federal crimes.

In the United States, citizens and businesses lose billions of dollars each year to criminals engaged in non-violent fraudulent enterprises. The globalization of economic and financial systems, advancement of technology, decline of corporate and individual ethics, and sophistication of criminal organizations have resulted in annual increases in the number of illegal acts characterized by deceit, concealment, or violations of trust. The loss incurred as a result of these crimes is not merely monetary. These crimes also contribute to a loss of confidence and trust in financial institutions, public institutions, and industry.

The scope and impact of these financial crimes has become more evident with the economic downturn that began in 2007. The economic downturn revealed significant criminal activity in regards to the sub-prime mortgage industry with mortgage fraud Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) expanding to 63,173 in FY 2008 from 35,617 in FY 2006 and sub-prime related corporate fraud investigations growing from nearly 20 at the end of FY 2008 to 42 by February 2009. With the economic downturn, high yield investment schemes and Ponzi schemes have been exposed and fraud cases involving the tens of billions of dollars are now being investigated. These three major areas of financial crimes have resulted in losses measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

The FBI also recognizes the risks of fraud and abuse associated with the various Federal economic recovery programs. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the Termed Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) each pose risks of corporate fraud and malfeasance requiring additional attention by law enforcement and regulators.

Cyber Program

The FBI's Cyber Program consolidates Headquarters and field resources dedicated to combating cyber crime under a single entity. This allows the Cyber Program to coordinate, supervise and facilitate the FBI's investigation of those federal violations in which the Internet, computer systems, or networks are exploited as the principal instruments or targets of criminal activity. Included under the purview of the Cyber Program within the CEFC DU are criminal computer intrusion investigations; intellectual property rights-related investigations involving theft of trade

secrets and signals; copyright infringement investigations involving computer software; credit/debit card fraud where there is substantial Internet and online involvement; online fraud and related identity theft investigations; and the Innocent Images National Initiative.

Legat Program

Legats are the forward element of the FBI's international law enforcement effort, and often provide the first response to crimes against the United States that have an international nexus. The criminal component of the Legat program provides for a prompt and continuous exchange of information with foreign law enforcement and supports the FBI's efforts to meet its investigative responsibilities.

Management and Support Services

In addition to the Criminal Investigative, Cyber, and Legat programs that make up the core elements of the CEFC DU, the FBI's various administrative and other security programs provide essential support services.

Program Objectives

- Provide a rapid and effective investigative response to reported federal crimes involving the victimization of children; reduce the vulnerability of children to acts of sexual exploitation and abuse; reduce the negative impact of domestic/international parental rights disputes; and strengthen the capabilities of federal, state and local law enforcement through training programs and investigative assistance.
- Infiltrate, disrupt and dismantle violent gang activities by targeting groups of gangs using sensitive investigative and intelligence techniques to initiate long term proactive investigations.
- Reduce the economic loss associated with the theft of United States intellectual property by criminals.
- Reduce the incidence of public corruption within targeted sectors of local, state, and federal government.
- Deter civil rights violations through aggressive investigation of those crimes wherein the motivation appears to have been based on race, color, religion, or ethnic/national origin; reports of abuse of authority under color of law; reports of slavery and involuntary servitude; and reports of the use of force or the threat of force for the purpose of injuring, intimidating, or interfering with a person seeking to obtain or provide reproductive health services and through proactive measures such as the training of local law enforcement in civil rights matters.
- Identify, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle major criminal enterprises, including violent gangs.
- Continue to support the Southwest Border Initiative, which focuses the FBI's efforts on the most significant criminal enterprises operating along the southwest border.
- Reduce the amount of economic loss and market instability resulting from corporate fraud committed by both individuals and enterprises.
- Minimize the economic loss due to mortgage fraud by identifying, investigating, and disrupting fraudulent activity.
- Minimize the amount of economic associated with fraud related to Federal economic recovery programs.
- Identify, disrupt, and dismantle money laundering industries and confiscate criminal assets associated with said industries.

- Reduce the economic loss attributable to fraudulent billing practices affecting private and public health care insurers.
- Minimize economic loss due to crimes such as check fraud, loan fraud, and cyberbanking fraud in federally-insured financial institutions.
- Reduce the amount of reported economic loss due to fraud and abuse in federally funded procurement, contracts, Electronic Benefits Transfer, and entitlement programs.
- Reduce the amount of economic loss to the insurance industry due to fraud, both internal and external.
- Reduce economic loss to investors due to fraud in the investment marketplace, bogus securities, and Internet fraud.
- Reduce the amount of United States economic loss due to national and international telemarketing fraud and Internet fraud.
- Reduce the amount of economic loss caused by fraudulent bankruptcy filings throughout the United States.
- Provide timely and coordinated responses to violent and serious crimes in connection
 with the FBI's investigative mandate in Indian Country and strengthen the capabilities of
 Indian Country law enforcement investigators through training programs and
 investigative assistance.

PERFORMANCE/RESOURCES TABLE

Decision Unit: Criminal Enterprises/Federal Crimes

DOJ Strategic Goal/Objective Goal 2: Prevent Crime, Enforce Federal Laws, and Represent the Rights and Interests of the American People, Objectives 2.2-2.6.

Workload / Resources		Final Target		Actual		Enacted		Changes		Requested (Total)		
		FY 2008		FY 2008		FY 2009		Current Services Adjustments & FY 2010 Program Changes		FY 2010 Request		
Workload # of cas	Workload # of cases investigated (pending and received)		†		92,964		†		†		†	
Total Costs and FTE	The LC of the Party		\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	
Total Costs and FTE		12,766	2,185,686	11,934	2,137,572	10,596	2,275,754	239	132,775	10,835	2,408,529	
TYPE/STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE	PERFORMANCE	FY	2008	FY	FY 2008		FY 2009 Enacted		Current Services Adjustments		FY 2010 Request	
Program Activity/	1. White-Collar Crime/Cybercrime	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	
2.3, 2.5		5,758	1,002,750	5,383	979,943	4,779	1,043,290	108	60,869	4,887	1,104,159	
Workload # of cas	es investigated (pending and received)	†		35,446		†		†		†		
Performance Measure	Restitutions & Recoveries / Fines (\$000) Intellectual Property Rights Violations Public Corruption White-Collar Crimes (all other)		††	260,219 / 320 676,889 / 37,136 18,502,635 / 2,114,424		††		††		††		
Performance Measure	Convictions/Pre-Trial Diversions (total) Intellectual Property Rights Violations Public Corruption White-Collar Crimes (all other)	††		116 987 3.834		††		††		††		
Performance Measure	Number of Criminal Enterprises Engaging in White-Collar Crimes Dismantled	150		211		160				160		
Performance Measure	Number of Major Corporate Fraud Cases Successfully Investigated		50		57		55				55	
Efficiency Measure (Revised Measure)	% of Major Mortgage Fraud Investigations to all pending		60%		63%	65%				65%		

TYPE/ STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE	PERFORMANCE	FY	2008	FY 2008			FY 2009 Requirements		Current Services Adjustments		FY 2010 Request	
Performance Measure	Number of Children Depicted in Child Pornography Rescued by the FBI	120		187		150				150		
Performance Measure (Discontinued Measure)	Number of Child Pornography Websites or Web Hosts Shut Down	1,000		1,474			N/A			N/A		
Performance Measure	Number of high-impact Internet fraud targets neutralized	11		11			12				13	
D A -4::4/ 2 2	2 Criminal Enterprises/Civil Bights	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	
Program Activity/ 2.2, 2.4, 2.6			1,182,936	6,551	1,157,629	5,817	1,232,464	131	71,906	5,948	1,304,370	
Workload # of cases investigated (pending and received)		†		57,518		†		†		†		
Performance Measure	Convictions/Pre-trial Diversions Organized Criminal Enterprises Gangs/Criminal Enterprises Crimes Against Children Civil Rights	††		595 2,242 246 208		††		††		††		
Efficiency Measure	% of FBI OCDETF Investigations with links to CPOT-linked DTOs		12%	15.47%		12%				12%		
Performance Measure	CPOT-Linked DTOs • Disruptions • Dismantlements	30 15		50 18		30 15		 		30 15		
Performance Measure	Number of Organized Criminal Enterprise Dismantlements	34		38		36				36		
Performance Measure	Number of Gangs/Criminal Enterprises Dismantlements*		111	114		99				99		

Data Definition, Validation, Verification, and Limitations:

- Disruption means impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted organization, as indicated by changes in organizational leadership and/or changes in methods of operation, including, for example, financing, trafficking patterns, communications or drug production. Dismantlement means destroying the organization's leadership, financial base, and supply network such that the organization is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself.
- The Executive Office of OCDETF may sometimes edit CPOT disruptions/dismantlements data after submission of the President's Budget Submission to Congress. These changes are reflected in the current tables.
- Accomplishment and caseload data are obtained from the FBI's Resource Management Information System (RMIS), which houses the Integrated Statistical Reporting and Analysis Application (ISRAA) and Monthly Administrative Report (MAR) applications that report these data. Data are verified by an FBI field manager before being entered into that system and are subsequently verified through the FBI's Inspection process. Other non-standardized data are maintained in files by their respective FBIHQ programs.
- FBI field personnel are required to enter accomplishment data within 30 days of the accomplishment or a change in the status of an accomplishment, such as those resulting from appeals. Data for this report are compiled less than 30 days after the end of the fiscal year, and thus may not fully represent the accomplishments when reported close to the end of the fiscal year.
- The data source for IINI program data is a database maintained by FBI personnel detailed to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, as well as statistics derived by the FBI's Cyber Division's program personnel. Limitations on these data are explained in the Discussion of the measure.
- Internet Fraud data come from a record system maintained by the IC3. The list of targets is updated each year. Targets are determined by subject matter expert teams at the IC3 and approved by the Unit Chief. IC3 staff maintains the list and determine when a target has been the subject of a take-down. There is some possibility of underreporting of accomplishments resulting from referrals to state, local, and other federal law enforcement organizations. This underreporting is possible where investigations resulting from IC3 referrals do not involve the FBI.
- * Revisions were made to the data collected for this measure in FY 2008, and to previous annual data going back to FY 2005. The Major Theft program is no longer included among the dismantlements being counted for this measure. See Discussion of this measure for further details.
- † FBI does not project targets for case workload data.
- †† FBI does not set targets for investigative output data.

PERFORMANCE MEASURE TABLE **Decision Unit:** Criminal Enterprises/Federal Crimes FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual **Target** Actual Target Target Performance Restitutions & Recoveries (\$000) Measure • Intellectual Property Fraud 46,106 205,120 115,967 432,316 111,877 238,832 N/A N/A N/A 260,219 Public Corruption 157,440 28,223 1,631,692 101,647 1,116,266 321,815 N/A 676,889 N/A N/A • White-Collar Crimes (all other) 13.056.937 7,799,218 19.516.406 18.502.635 9.113.549 8,433,421 7.881.151 N/A N/A N/A Performance Measure Fines (\$000) • Intellectual Property Fraud 203 1,053 208 538 1,005 6,587 N/A 320 N/A N/A • Public Corruption 10,792 3.293 22,657 25,500 29.542 73,710 N/A 37.136 N/A N/A • White-Collar Crimes (all other) 501,380 362,396 532,496 757,113 1,363,711 1,252,963 N/A 2,114,424 N/A N/A Convictions/Pre-Trial Diversions (total) Performance Measure • Intellectual Property Fraud 104 121 194 110 116 136 N/A 116 N/A N/A • Public Corruption 650 579 661 812 929 943 N/A 987 N/A N/A • White-Collar Crimes (all other) 6,783 5.022 4.368 3.976 3,707 3.347 N/A 3.834 N/A N/A Efficiency % of Major Mortgage Fraud Investigations to Measure N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 56% 60% 63% 65% 65% (Revised all pending Measure) Number of Criminal Enterprises Engaging in Performance White-Collar Crimes Dismantled 49 Measure 73 137 163 231 277 150 211 160 160 Performance Number of Major Corporate Fraud Cases Successfully Investigated Measure 18 58 35 45 64 57 55 55 46 50 Performance Number of Children Depicted in Child Pornography Rescued by the FBI 37* N/A 73 120 187 150 150 Measure N/A N/A N/A *only partial year data available for FY06 Performance Measure Number of Child Pornography Websites or 18 201 2.638 2.088 906 1.667 1.000 1.474 N/A N/A (Discontinued Web Hosts Shut Down Measure) Number of high-impact Internet fraud targets Performance 5 10 9 11 12 13 N/A 11 11 Measure neutralized Performance Convictions/Pre-Trial Diversions: Measure Organized Criminal Enterprises 714 824 572 897 674 693 595 N/A N/A N/A • Gangs/Criminal Enterprises 5.284 4.089 2.923 4.292 2.070 2.218 N/A 2.242 N/A N/A • Crimes Against Children 205 154 145 164 170 207 N/A 246 N/A N/A

195

163

155

139

195

207

N/A

208

N/A

• Civil Rights

N/A

Performance Report and Performance Plan Targets		FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY	2008	FY 2009	FY 2010
		Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Target
Efficiency Measure	% of FBI OCDETF Investigations with links to CPOT-linked DTOs	N/A	N/A	N/A	11%	13%	14%	12%	15.47%	12%	12%
Performance Measure	CPOT-Linked DTOs										
	DisruptionsDismantlements	30 16	41 15	27 12	25 18	36 17	45 15	30 15	50 18	30 15	30 15
Performance Measure	Number of Organized Criminal Enterprise Dismantlements	17	17	29	34	36	43	34	38	36	36
Performance Measure	Number of Gangs/Criminal Enterprise Dismantlements [#w/ Major Theft included]	185	138	112	138 [149]	119 [135]	144 [156]	111	114 [125]	99	99

2. Performance, Resources, and Strategies

The Criminal Enterprises/Federal Crimes decision unit contributes to the Department's Strategic Goal 2: Prevent Crime, Enforce Federal Laws, and Represent the Rights and Interests of the American People, Objectives 2.2-2.6. This decision unit also ties directly to six FBI priorities: Priority 3 – Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes; Priority 4 – Combat public corruption at all levels; Priority 5 – Protect civil rights; Priority 6 – Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises; Priority 7 – Combat major white-collar crime; and Priority 8 – Combat significant violent crime.

Organized Criminal Enterprises & Gangs/Criminal Enterprises

a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes

In FY 2004 and the first three quarters of FY 2005, the Criminal Investigative Division (CID) at FBI Headquarters reorganized several of its programs. Future performance data will be reported to reflect the realigned focus of the FBI towards these types of criminal enterprises. In May 2006, CID changed the name of the Transnational Criminal Enterprises Program back to its original name, the Organized Crime Program, and the Americas Criminal Enterprises Program to the Gangs/Criminal Enterprise Program.

Organized Criminal Enterprises

Investigative subprograms that focus on criminal enterprises involved in sustained racketeering activities and that are mainly comprised of ethnic groups with ties to Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe are consolidated into the Organized Criminal Enterprise program. Organized criminal enterprise investigations, through the use of the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization statute, target the entire entity responsible for the crime problem. With respect to groups involved in racketeering activities, the FBI focuses on: the La Cosa Nostra and Italian organized crime groups, Russian/Eastern European/Eurasian organized crime groups, Balkan/Albanian Organized crime groups, Middle Eastern criminal enterprises, Asian criminal enterprises and Nigerian/West African criminal enterprises. Each of these groups is engaged in a myriad of criminal activities.


Performance Measure: Organized Criminal Enterprises Dismantled

FY 2008 Target: 34 FY 2008 Actual: 38

Discussion:

The Organized Crime Program met its performance targets for FY 2008. Notable accomplishments are listed below.

• An FBI investigation targeted a large-scale Polish criminal enterprise involved in the interstate transportation of stolen motor



vehicles, international distribution of ecstasy, the trafficking of counterfeit U.S. currency, mortgage fraud, and sale of false driver's licenses and passports. The case was worked jointly

- with FBI's New York office, a Chicago High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)/Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Task Force, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and investigators from the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB). A total of 10 subjects were charged, arrested, and convicted as a result of the investigation. Four vehicles, 10,000 ecstasy pills, \$95,000 in counterfeit bills, and \$826,000 was recovered during the investigation. On June 19, 2008, Piotr Misiolek, who was arrested in Prague, was sentenced to a 45 year prison term for conspiracy to traffic narcotics.
- V.P. Nguyen was a member of a violent Vietnamese gang named the "V" based out of San Jose, CA, who extended his criminal enterprise to Minneapolis, MN. Nguyen began to distribute large amounts of narcotics to Asian Organized Crime members such as the Vietnamese Crazy Boys and the Red Cambodian Blood in Minneapolis, as well as other associates in Iowa. During a meeting in which underlings of Nguyen attempted to collect the debt of the narcotics, a gun fight ensued and three individuals were shot, including two members of the Red Cambodian Blood. The shooter was ultimately arrested and a search warrant at his residence revealed 2,000 pills of ecstasy sent from Nguyen to distribute in Minneapolis. Subsequent to a controlled purchase of 10,000 ecstasy pills from Nguyen in San Jose, as well as a seizure of an additional 12,000 pills in Minneapolis, Nguyen was arrested. Prior to his arrest, Nguyen also attempted to obtain weapons to conduct a home invasion in the Minneapolis area. This investigation resulted in the conviction of four individuals, including Nguyen, as well as the disruption of the Vietnamese Crazy Boys and the Red Cambodian Blood. These convictions were also the result of coordination with the DEA.

FY 2009 Target: 36 **FY 2010 Target:** 36

Gangs/Criminal Enterprises

The mission of the FBI's Gangs/Criminal Enterprise Program is to disrupt and dismantle the domestic cells (local, regional, national, and transnational) of criminal enterprises with ethnic ties to North, Central, and South America that pose the greatest threats to the economic and national security of the U.S. This will be accomplished through the FBI's Violent Gang and Drug Programs, increased involvement in the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program (OCDETF), and support and leadership of HDTA initiatives. In recent years, the FBI has concentrated anti-gang efforts in the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) National Gang Task Force, which supports, coordinates, and facilitates the development of local, state, federal, and international investigations of the MS-13 and 18th Street transnational criminal gangs into national and international level investigations and prosecutions.

The National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) supports this mission by sharing, and coordinating information with both state and local law enforcement as well as other federal law enforcement agencies. The NGIC analyzes gang information from a broad spectrum to identify migration patterns and current trends involving gangs.


The Gang Targeting and Coordination Center (GangTECC) focuses on enhancing gang investigations of all federal agencies by acting as a deconfliction and case coordination center. It facilitates operations across agency lines and promotes the complete dismantlement of national and trans-national violent gangs. Tactical and strategic intelligence is shared between law enforcement agencies in conjunction with the NGIC.

In FY 2005, this measure started to include, and set targets for, dismantlements for activities covered by the FBI's Major Theft program. In FY 2008, program responsibility for Major Theft was moved from the Gang/Criminal Enterprise Program to the Violent Crime Program. Therefore, beginning with the budget submission for FY 2010, the FBI has revised this measure and the data reported for previous years to reflect the number of dismantlements without Major Theft included.

Performance Measure:

Gangs/Criminal Enterprises
Dismantled
Note: These measures do not
include CPOT-linked
dismantlements, which are recorded
below.

FY 2008 Target: 111
FY 2008 Actual: 114 (revised total; total is 125 including Major Theft)



Discussion:

The Gangs/Criminal Enterprises

program exceeded its target for FY 2008. However, the target for future years has been reduced because of the removal of the Major Theft statistics, as discussed above.

The FBI has identified the following recent trends in its investigations of national gangs:

- Conversion of neighborhood-based gang members to national gangs after serving prison sentence.
- Use of codes and cryptology.
- Use of Internet (e.g., MySpace, instant messaging, online chat).
- Women playing a larger role in gangs.
- Migration from larger cities to smaller communities.
- Ties between Hispanic gangs and International Drug Trafficking Organizations.

Among its notable accomplishments during FY 2008, the FBI established 16 new Safe Streets Task Forces, recording successes in gang investigations such as the conviction by a federal jury in the Southern District of California against seven defendants who were charged with participating in a Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) conspiracy involving the Mexican Mafia. Following a trial that lasted more than two months, a jury in the Southern District of California convicted seven defendants charged with participating in a RICO conspiracy involving the Mexican Mafia. The Government presented evidence that the defendants, all of whom were Mexican Mafia members and associates, committed murder, attempted murder, robbery, extortion, drug trafficking, and money laundering on behalf of the notorious Mexican Mafia prison gang. Originally, 22 Mexican Mafia members and associates were indicted for RICO conspiracy. Following the verdict on January 4, 2008, all 22 defendants were convicted. Seven defendants were given life sentences. Because of the significance of the Mexican Mafia, the Safe Streets Unit prepared a proposal to designate this violent gang as a Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) within the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program. The proposal was accepted by the committee, making it the first recognized domestic gang designated as a priority threat within the OCDETF Program.

The FBI also recorded several successes across the nation in its investigations on MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. In June 2008, a federal grand jury in Charlotte, NC, charged 26 members of MS-13 with racketeering, narcotics, extortion and firearms violations occurring in the United States and El Salvador. The 55-count indictment carries penalties up to 20 years in prison for those charged. In October 2007, a Federal Grand Jury in Los Angeles, CA, charged 19 members and associates of the 18th Street gang in an 8-count narcotics conspiracy indictment. In November 2007, a Federal Grand Jury in Los Angeles, CA, charged 19 members of MS-13 with federal drug and immigration violations. The result of the work conducted by FBI Los Angeles has had a significant effect on MS-13 and the Rampart area. On July 11, 2008, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Crime Analysis Detail (CAD) provided information that the LAPD Reporting Districts that contain the areas controlled by MS-13 have shown a 53 percent decrease in violent crime in the first six months of 2008.

FY 2009 Target: 99 **FY 2010 Target:** 99

Gangs/Criminal Enterprises - Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOT)

With respect to criminal enterprises engaged in drug trafficking, the DOJ has developed a single national list of major drug trafficking and money laundering organizations. This list of targets, known as the CPOT list, reflects the most significant international narcotic supply and related money laundering organizations, poly-drug traffickers, clandestine drug manufacturers and producers, and major drug transporters supplying the U.S. The FBI tracked its own priority list, the National Priority Threat List (NPTL), before DOJ established the CPOT list in FY 2003.


The FBI has developed a comprehensive counter-drug strategy that is designed to investigate and prosecute illegal drug traffickers and distributors, reduce drug related crime and violence, provide assistance to other law enforcement agencies, and strengthen international cooperation. The strategy focuses the FBI's counter-drug resources on 51 identified CPOTs associated primarily with Colombian, Mexican, and Caribbean drug trafficking organizations that have the most adverse impact on U.S. national interests.

Performance Measure: CPOT-linked Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) dismantled

FY 2008 Target: 15 FY 2008 Actual: 18

Discussion:

The FBI exceeded its target for this measure in FY 2008. However, in FY 2009, the FBI's OCDETF program did not receive annual cost-of-living adjustments for its base funding, resulting in a decrease of 25 OCDETF Agent positions. For this reason, future setting and achieving performance targets for investigations of CPOT-linked. DTOs will likely be affected.



The FBI's leading OCDETF initiative is known as "Operation Panama Express," which concentrates on maritime drug transportation. The FBI's effectiveness is largely attributable to its partnership in this initiative with the DEA, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the United States Coast Guard and the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, which is comprised of both law enforcement and Department of Defense counterparts. During FY 2008, Operation Panama Express has been responsible for the seizure of approximately 80 tons of cocaine and scores of arrests. The amount of cocaine seized in this investigation has increased steadily over time and the operation has also produced numerous second, third, and fourth-tier indictments due to the cooperation obtained from many of the defendants. The stellar results of Operation Panama Express have had a direct impact on criminal organizations who distribute cocaine in the United States. Intelligence reporting indicates that there has been a disruption to cocaine availability in many U.S. drug markets, resulting in higher prices for cocaine.

FY 2009 Target: 15 **FY 2010 Target:** 15

Performance Measure: CPOT-linked Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) disrupted

FY 2008 Target: 30 **FY 2008 Actual:** 50


Discussion:

The FBI exceeded its target for this measure in FY 2008. See the measure related to CPOT dismantlements, above, for a discussion of the impact of budget changes upon this measure.

FY 2009 Target: 30 FY 2010 Target: 30


Performance Measure: Percentage of FBI OCDETF Investigations with Links to CPOT-linked DTOs

FY 2008 Target: 12% FY 2008 Actual: 15.47%



Discussion: The FBI, in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Executive Office of Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) strives to increase the proportion of investigations that are linked to CPOT targets. Reclassification of organizations listed on the CPOT List can potentially have an impact on the accomplishments reported. The CPOT Working Group diligently reviews proposals from the OCDETF member agencies for additions to and deletions from the CPOT List.

In reviewing the data for this measure, the FBI has determined that intelligence gathering cases should not be used to calculate this performance measure, as they are not approved OCDETF cases, even though these matters impact OCDETF cases related to CPOTs. Thus, the FBI did a review of the data as collected for this measure since FY 2005, and now reports the caseload comparison with the data in this fashion. The changes resulting from this review were relatively minor: FY 2005 reported a change of 1% of the overall OCDETF caseload, and FY 2006 reported a change reflecting 2% of that caseload. No changes to the overall targets for this measure



were made as a result of this review, and the program is on-track to meet the FY 2008 target. See the measure related to CPOT dismantlements, above, for a discussion of the impact of budget changes upon this measure.

FY 2009 Target: 12% **FY 2010 Target:** 12%

b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes

Asian criminal enterprises (ACEs) are involved in criminal violations that include organized crime activities, such as murder, alien smuggling, extortion, loansharking, illegal gambling, counterfeit currency and credit cards, prostitution, money laundering, drug distribution, and various acts of violence. Loosely knit, flexible and highly mobile, ACEs have become more sophisticated, diverse, and aggressive in directing their activities, and profiting through legitimate and illegitimate businesses to avoid law enforcement attention and scrutiny. Russian/Eastern European/Eurasian criminal enterprise groups (ECEs) in the United States are engaged in traditional racketeering activity such as extortion, murder, prostitution, and drugs. Both ECEs and Middle Eastern criminal enterprise organizations are also deeply involved in large-scale white-collar crimes, such as gasoline excise tax scams, fraudulent insurance claims, stock fraud, and bank fraud. The strategy for the FBI's Criminal Enterprise Program, encompassing both the Organized and the Gang/Criminal Enterprise programs, emphasizes the development and focusing of resources on national targets, the use of the Enterprise Theory of Investigations, the enhanced use of intelligence, and the exploitation and development of FBI technical capabilities.

To address the threat that violent urban gangs pose on a local, regional, national and even international level, the FBI established a National Gang Strategy to identify the gangs posing the greatest danger to American communities, to combine and coordinate the efforts of local, state, and federal law enforcement in Safe Streets/Violent Gang Task Forces throughout the U.S., and to utilize the same techniques previously used against organized criminal enterprises. In particular, the increasingly violent activity of Mara Salvatrucha-13 (MS-13), a primarily El Salvadorian gang, has prompted an FBI initiative that will assure extensive coordination between all field offices involved in the investigation of MS-13 matters. Additionally, due to a significant number of MS-13 gang members residing in Central America and Mexico, liaison with international law enforcement partners abroad will be a key part of the FBI's strategy against this gang threat. In FY 2005, Congress approved funding for a National Gang Intelligence Center, which is being used as a mechanism for gathering

data on violent gangs. In FY 2006, DOJ and DHS established the National Gang Targeting Enforcement Coordination Center (GangTECC), a multi-agency initiative anti-gang enforcement, deconfliction, coordination and targeting center headed by an experienced DOJ criminal division prosecutor staffed with representatives from ATF, BOP, DEA, FBI, ICE and the USMS.

In order to make the most progress with the resources available, the FBI concentrates counter-narcotics resources against DTOs with the most extensive drug networks in the U.S. As entire drug trafficking networks, from sources of supply through the transporters/ distributors, are disrupted or dismantled, the availability of drugs within the U.S. will be reduced. To assess its performance in combating criminal enterprises that engage in drug trafficking, the Gang/Criminal Enterprise program works in tandem with DEA and the Executive Office for OCDETF to track the number of organizations linked to targets on DOJ's CPOT list.

White-Collar Crime

a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes

To track its performance, the White-Collar Crime (WCC) program uses performance measures that concentrate on priority programs such as Corporate Fraud and Mortgage Fraud, as well as traditional accomplishment data such as convictions and pre-trial diversions and the level of recoveries, restitutions, and fines generated by the WCC program.


Performance Measure: Number of Criminal Enterprises Engaging in White-Collar Crimes Dismantled.

FY 2008 Target: 150 FY 2008 Actual: 211

Discussion: The FBI surpassed its FY 2008 target for Criminal Enterprises engaging in White Collar Crimes that were dismantled.

Notable accomplishments for FY 2008 include the following:

• National Century Financial Enterprises (NCFE):



NCFE was one of the largest healthcare financing companies in the United States until they filed for bankruptcy in November 2002. Seven former executives of NCFE were charged with conspiring to defraud investors by lying about how the investors' funds would be used, diverting the funds, and then hiding the shortfall by moving money back and forth between subsidiaries' bank accounts. The NCFE executives were also accused of creating phony reports and records to cover up the scheme. On August 6, 2008, Donald H. Ayers (Ayers), former Vice Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, and four of his co-conspirators were ordered to jointly pay approximately \$2.384 billion in restitution. The

judged ordered a forfeiture money judgment of approximately \$1.7 billion. To date, four of the five former executives who have pled guilty have been sentenced, including a sentence of 15 years incarceration for Ayers. Lance Poulsen, former NCFE President, Chairman and Director, is scheduled to begin trial in October 2008. In a related witness tampering case, Poulsen and his co-conspirator, Karl Dommler, were convicted on charges of conspiracy and witness tampering. Poulsen was sentenced to 10 years incarceration and Dommler is awaiting sentencing. The seventh NCFE executive is scheduled to begin trial December 1, 2008.

• Peregrine Systems, Inc. (Peregrine):


Peregrine is a computer software company that, in May 2002, announced a restatement of earnings for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 in the amount of approximately \$250 million. Peregrine officers and employees conspired to develop schemes to fraudulently manipulate the sales and earnings of the company by recording income from fraudulent sales, back-dating transactions, and providing side letters and contingencies to buyers of Peregrine products. A total of nine former Peregrine executives and two associates have pled guilty and are cooperating in the investigation. The executives who pled guilty include the President and Chief Operating Officer, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Controller, and Treasurer. Sentencing for the executives and associates are expected in November and December of 2008. The investigation also resulted in a forfeiture count of \$53 million.

FY 2009 Target: 165 FY 2010 Target: 165

Performance Measure: Number of Major Corporate Fraud Cases Successfully Investigated.

FY 2008 Target: 50 FY 2008 Actual: 57

Discussion: The FBI surpassed its FY 2008 target for this measure. The FBI continues to record substantial successes in the Corporate Fraud program, even as resources have dropped precipitously. Agent resources have declined 34% going from 132 Agents in FY 2004 to 87 Agents dedicated to Corporate Fraud violations during FY 2008.



During the same period, the FBI's number of labor-intensive Corporate Fraud investigations has risen 61% since FY 2004 when the FBI was investigating 332 Corporate Fraud matters as compared to 536 Corporate Fraud investigations as of September 2008.

FY 2009 Target: 55 *FY 2010 Target:* 55


Efficiency Measure: REVISED

MEASURE: Percentage of Major Mortgage

Fraud Investigations to all Pending

FY 2008 Target: 60% FY 2008 Actual: 63%

Discussion: The FBI's White-Collar Crime program modified its efficiency measure to concentrate specifically on a subclass of Financial Institution Fraud (FIF), mortgage fraud. Since the spring of 2007, the mortgage industry in the United States has been experiencing severe problems, with late payment defaults and foreclosures significantly increasing. For several months, this has threatened the stability of



the economic markets. In some regions of the country, foreclosures have increased over five times what they were in the previous year. Government and industry sources agree, mortgage fraud is a significant crime problem and a major contributing factor in the amount of foreclosures and bad loans involved in the ongoing housing crisis. Mortgage fraud investigations are overwhelming many FBI field offices.

By the end of FY 2008, there were over 1,640 pending mortgage fraud investigations. Of these investigations, 63% were major cases of \$1 million or more in financial loss. The Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) regarding mortgage fraud increased from 6,936 in FY 2003 to 63,713 in FY 2008.

FY 2009 Target: 65% FY 2010 Target: 65%

Performance Measure: Convictions/Pre-Trial Diversions in White Collar Crime

FY 2008 Target: N/A **FY 2008 Actual:** 3,771

Discussion: In accordance with Department guidance, targeted levels of performance are not projected for this indicator.

FY 2009 Target: N/A *FY 2010 Target:* N/A

Performance Measure: Recoveries, Restitutions, and Fines in billions.

FY 2008 Target: N/A **FY 2008 Actual:** 3,771

• Recoveries & Restitutions:


\$19,179,523,600


• Fines:

\$ 2,114,424,343

Discussion: In accordance with Department guidance, targeted levels of performance are not projected for this indicator.

FY 2009 Target: N/A *FY 2010 Target:* N/A





b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes

In FY 2010, under the leadership of the Corporate Fraud Task Force, the FBI will continue to identify and target fraud schemes such as corporate fraud. The FBI will also continue to pursue health care fraud, money laundering, financial institution fraud, insurance fraud, and securities/commodities fraud, which threaten to undermine our nation's financial institutions. The FBI will aggressively utilize the money laundering and asset forfeiture statutes to ensure that fraudulently obtained funds are located and proper restitution is made to the victims of fraud. The enforcement strategy is a coordinated approach whereby the FBI will continue to work with other federal agencies to identify and target fraud schemes by successfully investigating, prosecuting, and obtaining judgments and settlements.

In the area of Public Corruption, the FBI will address the problem through: (1) increasing awareness of the significant harm caused by public corruption and thus interest in combating it; (2) making public corruption investigations top priority; and (3) holding training events for state, local, international and other federal law enforcement.

One of the key strategic goals in the FBI regarding public corruption is the increased awareness and pursuit of international matters, including U.S. contract corruption and violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The current caseload of investigations is not indicative of the true extent of the problem, but is an indication of the difficulty of pursuing these inquiries. Unfortunately, investigation of U.S. crimes in foreign jurisdictions may present legal and diplomatic problems with the host country. In addition, foreign countries oftentimes do not have the financial or personnel resources, political structure, or subject matter expertise to provide significant assistance on such matters. However, the FBI is making a concerted effort to gain intelligence into such activities to support its own investigations.

Cyber Crime

a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes

The changing economy and the emergence of Internet technology have created an unprecedented flow, exchange, and production of data. They have also created new arenas and techniques for criminal transactions. Three priority areas of concern with the new vulnerabilities in the era of the Internet's emergence are the online exploitation of children, computer facilitated theft of intellectual property, and Internet fraud. In June 2002, Director Mueller approved the organizational structure of the new Cyber Division. The Cyber Division addresses cyber threats in a coordinated manner, allowing the FBI to stay technologically one step ahead of the cyber adversaries threatening the U.S.

Innocent Images National Initiative

Background/Program Objectives: Facilitation of crimes against children through the use of a computer and the Internet is a national crime problem that is growing dramatically. The Innocent Images National Initiative (IINI), part of the Cyber Division, uses the following performance measure to track its progress in combating the exploitation of children through the Internet. The FBI will continue to make efforts to apprehend those who commit sexual exploitation offenses against children, including those who traffic in child pornography.

The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (the "PROTECT Act"), Pub. L. No. 108-066, 117 Stat. 650, was signed into law by President Bush on 04/30/2003 to enhance federal child exploitation laws in several significant ways. This law updated Title 42 USC §13032 - Reporting of Child Pornography by Electronic Communication Service Providers, which created a mandatory reporting requirement for electronic communication service providers, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and remote computing service providers, to report violations of federal child pornography laws to any law enforcement agency and/or the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). This law comes with a penalty of civil fines up to \$50,000 per day per infraction that is not reported.


Performance Measure: NEW MEASURE: Number of children depicted in child pornography


rescued by the FBI

Note: FY 2006 data in chart are incomplete: data were only collected for part of that year.

FY 2008 Target: 120 **FY 2008 Actual:** 187

A child "rescued" by the FBI is defined as a child identified as a victim of a crime involving child pornography. A child is considered rescued if, after identification, the FBI, either on its own or with the assistance of other law enforcement organizations, brings the child to safety away from the control or influence of the person(s) exploiting him or her.






Performance Measure: DISCONTINUED MEASURE: Number of Child Pornography Websites or Web Hosts Shut Down

FY 2008 Target: 1,000 **FY2008 Actual:** 1,474

The FBI is exploring alternative methods to track accomplishments in the fight against child pornography and those who use computers to commit sexual exploitation offenses against children. In FY 2008 update to the FBI's Cyber Program proposed a replacement for this measure,



based upon children saved from child pornography exploitation as a result of FBI investigations.

FY 2009 Target: N/A FY 2010 Target: N/A

Internet Fraud

Background/Program Objectives:

Internet fraud is any scam that uses one or more components of the Internet to present fraudulent solicitations to prospective victims, conduct fraudulent transactions, or transmit the proceeds of fraud to financial institutions or others that are connected with the scheme. Identity theft and Internet auction fraud are problems that plague millions of U.S. victims, and the threat of illegitimate online pharmacies exposes the American public to unregulated, often dangerous drugs.

The FBI uses synchronized, nation-wide takedowns (i.e., arrests, seizures, search warrants, indictments) to target the most significant perpetrators of on-line schemes. In addition, the FBI and National White Collar Crime Center partnered in May 2000 to support the Internet Crime Complaint Center (ICCC or IC3), a national repository for receipt and exchange of federal and industry Internet crimes data. The IC3 allows for an enhanced capability for intelligence development to assist in these multi-divisional investigations.


Performance Measure: Number of high-impact Internet fraud targets neutralized

FY 2008 Target: 11 FY 2008 Actual: 11

Discussion:

The FBI met its FY 2008 target for this measure. Notable cases in FY 2008 included the following:

 The "Luca Brazzi" case is an ongoing, multi-year investigation of a multimillion dollar Internet auction fraud ring that operates out of Chicago and has origins in Romania. There have



been several indictments and guilty pleas and verdicts obtained in this case, with several of the subjects having been sentenced in federal court. Throughout the course of the investigation, the IC3 has provided nearly 1,500 victim complaints to Chicago, and the overall loss amount exceeds \$5 million. On March 19, 2008, the FBI and ICE received information a subject of interest in this investigation was en route to New York on an Amtrak train from Canada; however, no warrant was on hand for the subject. The Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) indicated his support for quickly obtaining a criminal complaint and arrest warrant for the subject. As such, the AUSA requested information regarding possible fraud transactions by the subject. The FBI provided the IC3 with several known aliases of the subject, which resulted in the IC3 immediately identifying and providing the AUSA with 56 IC3 complaints representing \$164,000 in losses to the victims. A criminal complaint and arrest warrant were obtained, and the AUSA authorized the arrest of the subject as he entered the U.S. He is currently in custody in New York pending a preliminary hearing and bond hearing.

• Operation Cyber Jive is an investigation into Jive Network, Inc. (JIVE), an Internet company based in Daytona Beach, FL, which was run by Jude Lacour. JIVE was involved in the illegal sale of both controlled and non-controlled prescription drugs over the Internet. From February 25, 2002 through April 19, 2005, JIVE coordinated the distribution of approximately 1,000,000 on-line prescriptions, almost 70 percent of which were for controlled substances. Thirty-six pharmacies from throughout the U.S., one from the Bahamas, and one from Ireland filled prescriptions for JIVE. Twenty-one doctors were involved in the criminal enterprise by approving prescriptions for JIVE's customers. In each case prescriptions were issued based solely on an on-line questionnaire, and no doctor-patient relationship was ever established.

By January 12, 2007, almost \$14 million had been seized in Operation Cyber Jive, and an additional \$1.5 million in a Bermudian bank account belonging to JIVE had been restrained. On May 7, 2008, a 73-count sealed federal indictment was returned against 11 defendants. On the same day, defendant

Jude Lacour was arrested in Portland, OR; defendants Jeff Lacour and Hudsen Smith were arrested in FL; medical doctor/defendant Alexis Roman-Torres was arrested in San Juan, PR; and medical doctor/defendant Akhil Baranwal was arrested in Boston, MA. On May 12, 2008, pharmacist Guennet Chebssi was arrested in Baltimore, MD. Additional arrests in this case are pending.

FY 2009 Target: 12 **FY 2010 Target:** 13

b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes

In its effort to thwart the online exploitation of children, the FBI will prioritize those investigations involving organizations, e-groups, or enterprises that exploit children for profit. The second priority will be cases involving travelers. The third priority will be the producers, distributors, and possessors of child pornography. These priorities will be addressed by expanding current UCOs and undercover techniques to target and identify sexual predators and enterprises. The FBI also will develop and implement proactive initiatives designed to identify child victims and prevent exploitation before it can occur.

The FBI has formed the Innocent Images International Task Force (IIITF), where investigators from more than five countries are assigned to the Innocent Images program within the US. These international investigators are helping the FBI address this global crime problem. The current focus on several large international cases draws upon extensive resources, thus potentially diminishing the attention to shutting down individual websites.

The FBI's IPR program is in the process of building the FBI HQ capacity to support field divisions with HQ-driven undercover operations. While field offices should tackle the IPR crime problem where it exists, this centralization will allow the FBI to target the heads of organizations that have tentacles throughout the U.S. and the world, and then give those cases back to the division or country with jurisdiction.

The FBI's main mechanism to address Internet fraud is the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3). The IC3 receives and analyzes Internet fraud complaint data and serves as a "one-stop-shop" for Internet crime referrals. IC3 started strongly, and needs to continue building on its strength to combat the steadily growing criminal activity on the Internet. By acting as a central hub that links the FBI to the American public to private industry to local law enforcement, the IC3 is quickly becoming an invaluable tool for sharing and relaying information among these sources. As the IC3 continues to develop, it is accumulating a tremendously valuable asset: a centralized repository of Internet crime data. If properly maintained and analyzed, this body of information is likely to yield significant insights about trends, technologies, prevention, and combating techniques for Internet fraud and crime.

D. Criminal Justice Services Decision Unit

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES DECISION UNIT TOTAL	Perm. Pos.	FTE	Amount (\$000)
2008 Enacted with Rescissions	2,157	2,167	\$409,043
2008 Supplementals	•••	•••	3,541
2008 Enacted w/ Rescissions and Supplementals	2,157	2,167	412,584
2009 Enacted	1,947	1,920	418,043
Adjustments to base and Technical Adjustments	(12)	(8)	(1,388)
2010 Current Services	1,935	1,912	416,655
2010 Program Increases	8	4	9,795
2010 Offsets			•••
2010 Request	1,943	1,916	426,450
Total Change 2009-2010	(4)	(4)	(\$8,407)

Criminal Justice Services Decision Unit - Information Technology Breakout	Perm. Pos.	FTE	Amount* (\$000)
2008 Enacted	2,188	2,188	\$398,754
2009 Enacted	2,199	2,199	575,565
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	(13)	(13)	(65,407)
2010 Current Services	2,186	2,186	510,158
2009 Program Increases	•••	•••	•••
2010 Offsets	•••	•••	•••
2010 Request	•••	•••	•••

^{*}Includes both direct and reimbursable funding

1. Program Description

The Criminal Justice Services (CJS) Decision Unit is comprised of all programs of the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division, the portion of the Laboratory Division that provides criminal justice information and forensic services to the FBI's state and local law enforcement partners, and the state and local training programs of the Training Division. Additionally, to capture all resources that support the CJS program, a prorated share of resources from the FBI's support divisions (Security, Information Technology Operations, and the administrative divisions and offices) are calculated and scored to this decision unit.

CJIS Division

The CJIS Division provides timely and relevant criminal justice information to the FBI and to qualified law enforcement, criminal justice, civilian, academic, employment, licensing agencies regarding individuals, stolen property, criminal organizations and activities, and other law enforcement data. The CJIS Division includes several major program activities that support this mission, all of which are described below.

Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS): IAFIS provides timely and accurate identification services in a paperless environment 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The system identifies individuals through name, date-of-birth, other descriptors, and/or fingerprint image comparisons, and provides criminal history records on individuals for law enforcement and civil purposes. IAFIS is designed to process criminal fingerprint submissions in two hours or less and civil submissions in 24 hours or less. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, the FBI conducted over 35.4 million fingerprint background checks. As of February 25, 2009, the FBI had conducted over 17.6 million fingerprint background checks.

National Crime Information Center (NCIC): The NCIC is a nationwide information system that supports the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in their mission to uphold the law and protect the public. The NCIC allows for the compilation, dissemination, and exchange of timely and critical criminal justice and law enforcement information, such as criminal history records available from IAFIS, wanted person information, stolen vehicle information, and other data. In FY 2008, the NCIC processed over 6.2 million transactions per day. As of February 25, 2009, the NCIC is averaging over 6.2 million transactions per day.

National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS): The NICS is a national system established to enforce the provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. The NICS allows Federal Firearms Licensees to determine whether receipt of a firearm by a prospective purchaser would violate state or federal law. The system ensures the timely transfer of firearms to individuals who are not specifically prohibited and denies transfer to prohibited persons. In FY 2008, the NICS processed over 11.8 million inquiries. The FBI conducted approximately 5.4 million of these checks, resulting in 67,921denials to prohibited persons. The remaining 6.4 million checks were conducted by individual states. As of February 25, 2009, the NICS had processed over 6.5 million inquiries. The FBI conducted approximately 3.2 million of these checks, resulting in 36,360 denials to prohibited persons. Approximately 3.3 million checks had been conducted by individual states.

<u>Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR)</u>: The UCR Program collects, analyzes, and publishes nationwide crime statistics based on crime data submitted from more than 17,000 state and local law enforcement agencies. The program produces the official measure of crime in the United States. Through the use of this data, policy makers can study crime trends and strategically allocate resources.

Laboratory Division

A portion of the Laboratory Division programs that provide forensic services to the FBI's state and local law enforcement partners is scored in the CJS Decision Unit.

The successful investigation and prosecution of crimes require the collection, examination, and scientific analysis of evidence recovered at the scene of the incident and obtained during the course of the investigation. Without such evidence, many crimes would go unsolved and unpunished. At the same time, forensic examination of evidence exonerates individuals wrongly accused of crimes.

The FBI Laboratory, established in 1932, is the only full-service civilian federal forensic laboratory in the United States. The FBI Laboratory was accredited in August 2008 by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors – Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD-LAB) for meeting or exceeding the requirements for *international* accreditation (ISO/IEC 17025). Examinations support investigations that cross all FBI investigative programs, international, federal, state, and local boundaries. Examinations of evidence for duly constituted United States law enforcement agencies, whether federal, state or local, and foreign law enforcement unable to perform the examinations at their

own facilities are performed, free of charge. In addition to the actual processing and analysis of physical evidence, the FBI Laboratory provides comprehensive technical reports, training, and expert testimony to federal, state, and local agencies. The FBI Laboratory is located at Quantico, Virginia.

In addition to providing forensic analysis services, the FBI Laboratory also provides operational response capabilities with respect to chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological and explosive devices/incidents and evidence collection. Biometric identification services are provided through the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) and the Federal Convicted Offender Program (FCOP). The FBI Laboratory is the executive agent for the Terrorist Explosive Devices Analytic Center (TEDAC), a multi-agency center that forensically and technically exploits terrorist improvised explosive devices and related materials and generates actionable investigative and intelligence information for use by the United States law enforcement, the Intelligence Community, the United States military, and other partners.

The Laboratory at Quantico, which spans nearly 500,000 square feet, has significantly improved the FBI's forensic capabilities since it began operating in 2003. The facility includes 5 floors for specialized laboratories and offices, a 900-space parking garage, and a stand-alone central utilities plant. The advanced design of the FBI Laboratory features a multi-building concept that incorporates both a laboratory and a main office building. The unique design emphasizes the secure transfer, handling, and processing of evidence, with specified paths for the acceptance, circulation, and return of evidence. Laboratory work space is separated from offices and public areas to avoid evidence contamination and to provide examination areas free of distractions.

In FY 2008, the FBI Laboratory conducted approximately 830,000 forensic examinations (FBI, other Federal, state, and local). The Laboratory estimates that it will conduct approximately 850,000 forensic examinations in FY 2009 and 850,000 in FY 2010.

Training Division

The state and local law enforcement training programs of the Training Division (TD) are scored in the CJS Decision Unit. Additionally, to capture the administrative resources required to support the CJS program, a prorated share of other TD and field training resources are scored in this decision unit.

The FBI provides instruction for state and local criminal justice practitioners, both at the FBI Academy and throughout the United States at state, regional, and local training facilities. The principal course for state and local law enforcement officers is the FBI National Academy, a 10-week multi-disciplinary program for officers who are considered to have potential for further advancement in their careers. In FY 2008, there were an estimated 1,108 state and local law enforcement officers will participate in the National Academy program at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. The FY 2009 estimate for National Academy participants is 1,081.

In addition to sessions offered at the FBI Academy, the FBI conducts and participates in courses and seminars at state, regional, and local training facilities. These training sessions cover the full range of law enforcement training topics such as hostage negotiation, computer-related crimes, death investigations, violent crimes, criminal psychology, forensic science, and arson. In FY 2008, an estimated 97,000 criminal justice personnel will receive training from FBI instructors at state, regional, and local training facilities. TD estimates that it will train 97,000 criminal justice personnel in FY 2009.

Due to the increasingly global nature of many of the FBI's investigative initiatives, the FBI has in recent years emphasized the need to train its foreign law enforcement partners through the International Training and Assistance Program. In FY 2008, the FBI provided training to an estimated 5,014 international police officers and executives representing 99 countries. It is expected that there will be 5,000 international police officers trained in FY 2009.

Management and Support Services

In addition to CJIS and other investigative support divisions which make up the core elements of the CJS Decision Unit, prorated portions of the FBI's various administrative and other support programs that provide essential services are scored to the CJS Decision Unit. The administrative programs lead the FBI effectively through the challenges and changes that are continuously presented to federal law enforcement; provide effective direction and support to investigative personnel; and ensure that adequate resources exist to address the FBI's criminal investigative, national security, and law enforcement support responsibilities. A prorated share of resources associated with the Finance Division, Human Resources Division, Inspection Division, and other administrative entities support the CJS mission.

Program Objectives

- Reduce criminal activity by providing timely and quality criminal justice information to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
- Provide new technologies and address critical shortfalls in forensic investigative capabilities including latent fingerprint, firearms/toolmark, explosive, trace evidence, DNA, and training of personnel.
- Lead and inspire, through excellence in training and research, the education and development of the criminal justice community.

PERFORMANCE/RESOURCES TABLE

Decision Unit: Criminal Justice Services

DOJ Strategic Goal/Objective Goal 2: Prevent Crime, Enforce Federal Laws, and Represent the Rights and Interests of the American People (Objective 2.1: Strengthen partnerships for safer communities and enhance the Nation's capacity to prevent, solve, and control crime)

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		Final	Target	Act	tual	Proj	ected	Cha	inges	Requesto	ed (Total)
WO	WORKLOAD/ RESOURCES		FY 2008		FY 2008		FY 2009 Enacted		Services ents & FY Changes	FY 2010	
IAFIS fingerprint b	packground checks		26,657,126		35,499,089		56,343,419		16,503,387		72,846,806
NCIC transactions		2,	326,201,704	2,	295,454,966	2	,570,909,502	3	08,509,207	2,	879,418,709
by the Combined I	deral, state, and local investigations aided DNA Index System (CODIS)		†		17,961		†		†		†
National DNA Inde	rensic and offender matches identified at the ex System (NDIS), State DNA Index d Local DNA Index System (LDIS)		†		21,037		†		Ť		†
		FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000
Total Costs and F	Total Costs and FTE		412,584	3,251	401,744	1,920	418,043	(4)	(8,407)	1,916	426,450
TYPE/ STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE	PERFORMANCE	FY	2008	FY	2008	FY 2009 Requirements				FY 2010	Request
Efficiency Measures	IAFIS: % of electronically submitted fingerprint identification requests: Criminal: • General checks completed w/in 2 hours • DHS checks completed w/in 72 hours Civil: • General checks completed w/in 24 hours • DOS checks completed w/in 15 minutes	98.8% N/A 98.8% N/A			97.9% N/A 98.5% N/A	95.0% 95.0% 99.0% 97.0%				95.0%	
Performance Measure	NCIC: • System availability • Downtime in minutes		99.5% 2,635		99.8% 1,138	99.7% 1,440				77.770	
Performance Measure	NICS: % of NICS checks with an Immediate Determination		90.0%		91.7%		90.0%				90.0%

TYPE/ STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE	PERFORMANCE	PERFORMANCE FY 2008 FY 2008		FY 2009 Requirements	Current Services Adjustments	FY 2010 Request
Performance Measure	Student-weeks of Instruction at the Hazardous Devices School (HDS)	2,775	2,605	2,668		2,668
Performance Measure (Discontinued)	Number of Accredited Bomb Squads	482	471	N/A	N/A	N/A

Data Definition, Validation, Verification, and Limitations:

- IAFIS Response Times are captured automatically from in-house developed software code residing on the Electronic Fingerprint Transaction Standard (EFTS) Fingerprint Conversion (EFCON) System. The software that captures this information, time stamps all incoming and out-going transactions and produces a report that calculates transaction response times. The developed code for this requirement was rigorously tested through System Integration and Test (SIT) prior to being put into operations. The information produced by EFCON was validated using Transaction Status (TS), a contractor developed statistical capture program that runs on the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. The data collected from EFCON is imported into a spreadsheet to calculate the average response time and percentage for electronic criminal and electronic civil responses. CJIS Division staff review this information prior to release.
- NCIC Transaction Volumes are captured similarly to the IAFIS Response Time statistics in that they are also capture automatically from developed code. This program was developed as a requirement by a contractor during the development of the NCIC 2000 system. The developed code for this requirement was also rigorously tested through System Integration and Test (SIT) prior to being put into operations. The information produced in the NCIC reports is also validated by CJIS Division staff prior to release.
- System Availability data are collected manually from System Management Center (SMC) logs. System Availability is based on the time that a system is out of service until it is returned to service as recorded by SMC personnel. CJIS Division staff input the information into spreadsheets that calculate percent averages. The algorithms used within the spreadsheets were validated prior to being used by in-house personnel. The System Availability figures are tracked closely on a weekly basis by Systems Managers and the Section Chief in charge of the operations and maintenance of the CJIS Division's systems.
- HDS data are maintained in central files and databases located at the HDS. The HDS Program Administrator reviews and approves all statistical accomplishment data for dissemination.
- † DOJ is no longer requesting estimates for these data. Actual data will be reported as current workload only during the Budget Submission to the Congress.

PERFORMANCE MEASURE TABLE

Decision Unit: Criminal Justice Services

Performan	Performance Report and Performance Plan Targets		FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008		FY 2009	FY 2010
			Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Target
	IAFIS: % of electronically submitted fingerprint identification requests:							3		3	3
Efficiency Measures	Criminal: General checks completed w/in 2 hours DHS checks completed w/in 72 hours	90.3% N/A	91.6% N/A	94.8% N/A	96.5% N/A	97% N/A	98.0% N/A	98.8% N/A	97.9% N/A	95.0% 95.0%	95.0% 95.0%
	Civil: • General checks completed w/in 24 hours • DOS checks completed w/in 15 minutes	98.9% N/A	97.5% N/A	99.2% N/A	99.2% N/A	98% N/A	98.8% N/A	98.8% N/A	98.5% N/A	99.0% 97.0%	99.0% 97.0%
Performance Measure	NICS: % of NICS checks with an Immediate Determination	77.40%	91.23%	91.85%	91.45%	91.46%	91.63%	90%	91.66%	90%	90%
Performance Measure	NCIC: • System availability • Downtime in minutes	99.5% 2,497	99.7% 1,788	99.7% 1,606	99.7% 1,602	99.8% 1,277	99.8% 1,267	99.5% 2,635	99.8% 1,138	99.7% 1,440	99.7% 1,440
Performance Measure	Student-weeks of Instruction at the Hazardous Devices School (HDS)	1,963	2,245	2,304	2,593	2,614	2,159	2,775	2,605	2,668	2,668
Performance Measure	Number of Accredited Bomb Squads	421	444	455	458	469	471	482	471	N/A	N/A

2. Performance, Resources, and Strategies

The Criminal Justice Services decision unit contributes to the Department of Justice's Strategic Goal 2, "Prevent Crime, Enforce Federal Laws, and Represent the Rights and Interests of the American People." Within this goal, the resources specifically support Strategic Objective 2.1, "Strengthen partnerships for safer communities and enhance the Nation's capacity to prevent, solve, and control crime." This decision unit ties directly to the FBI's ninth priority: Support federal, state, local, and international partners.

a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes

Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System

Fingerprint Identification, which includes the processing of fingerprint submissions and criminal history records, has been a responsibility of the FBI since 1924. With an ever-increasing demand for fingerprint services, the FBI set out to automate its fingerprint identification operations, and on July 28, 1999, it launched the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). Since its inception, the IAFIS has dramatically improved the processing of fingerprint submissions, reducing typical response times for electronic criminal and civil submissions to two hours and twenty-four hours, respectively. Today, CJIS receives more than 50,000 fingerprints submissions daily.

The FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia manages the IAFIS. The IAFIS is a national fingerprint and criminal history system. The IAFIS provides automated fingerprint search capabilities, latent searching capability, electronic image storage, and electronic exchange of fingerprints and responses, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.


Performance Measure: NEW MEASURE: Percentage of criminal electronic fingerprint identification checks submitted by the Department of Homeland Security completed within 72 hours

FY 2008 Target: N/A

Discussion:

In December 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the FBI agreed that criminal fingerprint submissions from ports of entry would be processed within 72 hours. Presently, these account for 20.7% of the daily criminal workload.

FY 2009 Target: 95% FY 2010 Target: 95%



Performance Measure: NEW MEASURE: Percentage of civil electronic fingerprint

identification checks submitted by the Department of State completed within 15 minutes


FY 2008 Target: N/A

Discussion:

In November 2007, the Department of State and the FBI agreed that civil submissions from consulates would be processed within 15 minutes. Presently, these account for 13.9% of the daily civil workload.

FY 2009 Target: 97% FY 2010 Target: 97%

Hazardous Devices School




Two key elements of domestic preparedness are expertise in hazardous devices and emergency response capabilities to address threats such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The HDS is the only formal domestic training school for state and local law enforcement to learn safe and effective bomb disposal operations. The HDS prepares bomb technicians to locate, identify, render safe, and dispose of improvised hazardous devices, including those containing explosives, incendiary materials, and materials classified as WMD.

Performance Measure: State and Local Bomb Technicians Trained (# of student-weeks) at the Hazardous Devices School (HDS)

FY 2008 Target: 2,775 **FY 2008 Actual:** 2,605

Discussion:

HDS estimates that approximately six pilot courses and a proof of concept course will be run in FY 2009 to transition to the newly offered HDS Electronics Countermeasures (ECM) course full-time in FY 2010, which will be operated out of this standalone FBI Secure Training Facility. The reason for the shortfall in the amount of



training in FY 2008 was the one year delay in the rollout of a new training course until mid-2009. This course was originally expected to begin in mid-2008.

FY 2009 Target: 2,668 FY 2010 Target: 2,668


Performance Measure:

DISCONTINUED MEASURE: Number of Accredited Bomb Squads


> **FY 2008 Target:** 482 FY 2008 Actual: 471


Discussion:

In accordance with the OMB **PART Quality Improvement** Review for FY 2008, the FBI is discontinuing this measure after the current fiscal year.



requests for the formation of new bomb squads dropped significantly. The decrease in these requests can be attributed to tougher U.S. Department of Homeland Security grant funding authorizations for new squads, which consequently has affected the overall level of accredited bomb squads.






b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes

Through its Laboratory Division, the FBI strives to provide timely, high-quality forensic science services (i.e., examinations, reports, testimony, and support to law enforcement partners across all levels of government) to its customers consistent with the FBI's priorities. As the presence of terrorist cases persists, the Laboratory Division's workload increases not only in terms of the examination of the volume of evidence, but in the administrative aspects associated with the volume of physical evidence. The FBI Federal Convicted Offender Program (FCOP) was expanded to comply with the USA Patriot Act of 2001, which requires persons convicted of terrorist acts and crimes of violence to be included in the National DNA Index System (NDIS). In addition, NDIS includes an index for DNA profiles from relatives of missing persons and known reference DNA profiles of missing children.

The FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services Division (CJIS) provides law enforcement and civil identification and information services with timely and critical information that matches individuals with their criminal history records, criminal activity (e.g., stolen property, gang or terrorist affiliation, fugitive status, etc.), and latent fingerprints, and provides information used for employment, licensing, or gun purchase consideration. To meet future demand, such as civil fingerprint-based background checks for employment, licensing, and border entry, CJIS needs to



significantly increase its systems capacity. Automation and computer technology inherently require constant upgrading and enhancement if such systems are to remain viable and flexible to accommodate changing customer requirements.

The FBI Hazardous Devices School (HDS) provides state-of-the-art technical intelligence to state, local, and federal first responders in five separate courses regarding the criminal and terrorist use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and the tactics, techniques, and procedures to render these hazardous devices safe. As the U.S. Government's only civilian bomb disposal training facility, HDS provides training on emerging threats targeting the United States and its interests. This training includes countermeasures targeting suicide bombers, vehicle borne IED's, stand-off weapons, WMD devices, and radio-controlled IED's. To meet future demand for the training of first responders, HDS needs to add additional courses and increase student capacity to significantly impact the preparedness of our first-responder public safety bomb squads throughout the country. HDS is meeting the FBI's number one priority of terrorism prevention.

Item Name: Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative

Budget Decision Unit(s): <u>All</u>

Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1, 1.2, 2.3

FBI SMS Objective(s): A-01, A-02, P-03, P-04, P-05, P-06

Organizational Programs: <u>Cyber, Counterintelligence, Intelligence, Operational</u>

Technology, Special Technologies and Applications,

Security

End State Capability: <u>Domain and Operations</u>

Program Increase: Positions <u>260</u> Agt <u>107</u> IA <u>42</u> FTE <u>130</u> Dollars

\$61,180,000 (\$13,786,000 non-personnel)

Please refer to the classified addendum for additional information on this request.

Description of Item

The FBI requests 260 positions (107 Agents, 42 Intelligence Analysts, and 111 Professional Support) and \$61,180,000 (\$13,786,000 non-personnel) in support of the investigative, intelligence, and technological requirements to combat cyber attacks. Resources will increase investigatory strength for counterterrorism (CT), counterintelligence (CI), and criminal computer intrusions, with particular emphasis on intrusions with a CI nexus. The requested resources will ensure that the FBI has the technological infrastructure to conduct these investigations and to turn seized network information into actionable intelligence products that can be used across the Intelligence Community (IC) to allow the government to move from a reactive to a proactive cyber attack response.

Cyber Threat Impact on the U.S. Economy and National Security

The cyber threat to the U.S. and its allies is increasingly sophisticated, effective, dangerous, and broad in scope. Cyber-based attacks and intrusions directed at networks and networked systems continue to increase, resulting in substantial economic losses. The U.S. has suffered substantial loss of critical intelligence as a result of cyber exploitation, much of which may be by state sponsors. This is demonstrated concretely by foreign intrusions spanning U.S. government, academia, military, industry, financial, and other domains, causing incalculable damage. Information related to U.S. government sensitive research, including military contractor research, has been compromised. The Internet has provided Foreign Intelligence Services with routine and immediate access inside otherwise well-guarded facilities, and the ability to quickly exfiltrate massive quantities of data.

The U.S. Response

In January 2008, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive-23/National Security Presidential Directive-54 (HSPD-23/NSPD-54) establishing the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). This Directive establishes the goals of the national strategy, identifies all major federal agencies possessing capabilities essential to implementing the strategy, and assigns responsibilities to each agency.

The FBI Role

The FBI has major roles in executing the national strategy. It is the only federal agency with the statutory authority, expertise, and capabilities to combine CT, CI, and criminal resources to counter cyber threats domestically. For this reason, HSPD-23/NSPD-54 designated the FBI as the executive agent for the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF). The NCIJTF works to mitigate and neutralize cyber threats by coordinating and integrating the activities of its 19 member agencies, including CI, CT, intelligence, and law enforcement entities.

Mission Requirements

To meet the demands of the cyber threat, the FBI needs to develop significant new assets and capabilities and move the FBI's efforts from reactive investigations to a proactive mitigation of threats before they cause harm. To accomplish these objectives, the FBI must expand in the following areas:

- 1. Investigatory Capabilities;
- 2. Cyber Intelligence Collection;
- 3. Science and Technology Tools to Enhance Investigatory and Intelligence Collection Capabilities; and
- 4. FBI IT Information Assurance.

1. Investigatory Capabilities - 164 positions (99 Agents) and \$38,123,000 (\$5,784,000 non-personnel)

The FBI must expand its investigatory capabilities in order to meet projected increases in cyber intrusions as technology becomes more sophisticated and the intrusions more frequent. Therefore, the FBI requests 98 Agents (93 Field, 5 Headquarters) and 61 support positions to conduct cyber intrusion investigations.

Because of the extensive skill sets required to conduct computer intrusion investigations, this request includes five positions (one agent and four support) and \$5,784,000 in non-personnel resources for Cyber training. The personnel will assist in developing curriculum and preparing for cyber courses. The courses educate investigators on current technologies, computer system operations, network vulnerabilities, and the methods used in intrusions, with a particular focus on intrusions with a national security nexus.

Non-personnel resources will be used for Cyber training (equipment, travel, and tuition). An average of \$13,636 is required for each of the 99 Agents requested for advanced cyber training (travel and tuition) beyond the training resources included in the cost module, for a total of \$1,350,000. \$1,434,000 is required to provide cyber training for state and local law enforcement, foreign law enforcement, prosecutors, security service agencies, as well as Cyber agents currently on-board who require advanced Cyber Career Path training. This request would train an additional 130 students at an average cost of \$11,030 per student (travel and tuition). Finally, the FBI's Cyber training program requires \$3,000,000 for computer hardware, software, and networking equipment, including stand-alone and rack-mounted workstations and servers with Thin Client technologies. This technology provides a cost-effective, easy-to-maintain, and extended lifecycle solution.

- 2. Cyber Intelligence Collection 56 positions (1 Agent, 42 IAs) and \$6,928,000 (all personnel) As the FBI collects more intelligence during the course of Cyber investigations, the FBI's need for Cyber IAs continues to grow. Not only is tactical analysis required to assist Agents with intelligence requirements for specific cases, but strategic analysis is also vital so that the FBI can analyze the computer intrusion threat across the entire nation.
- 3. Science and Technology Tools to Enhance Investigatory and Intelligence Collection Capabilities 36 positions (7 Agents) and \$12,653,000 (\$5,002,000 non-personnel)

 In order for the FBI to expand its' investigatory and intelligence gathering capabilities, the FBI's ability to intercept data, develop technical tools, and conduct data analysis of networks and seized hardware must expand as well.

4. FBI IT Information Assurance - 4 positions (all support) and \$3,476,000 (\$3,000,000 non-personnel)

In addition to combating cyber attacks against the private sector and other public sector IT infrastructure, the FBI must also ensure that its own IT infrastructure is secure from attack.

The requested positions and non-personnel resources would support multiple ESOC initiatives, envisioned as joint operations with the NCIJTF.

<u>Impact on Performance (Relationship of Increase to Strategic Goals)</u>
Please refer to the classified addendum for additional information on this request.

Funding

Base Funding

FY	2008 E	nacted ((w/resc./supps)	FY 2009 Enacted					FY 2010 Current Services			
Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)	Pos Agt FTE \$(000)			Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)		
89	33	45	\$39,000	300	68	195	\$74,648	300	68	300	\$79,131	

Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Type of Position	Modular Cost per Position (\$000)	Number of Positions Requested	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (change from 2010) (\$000)
Investigatory Capabilities		164	\$32,339	\$2,389
Cyber HQ Agents	\$270	3	810	(28)
Cyber Field Agents	270	78	21,060	(736)
Cyber Investigative Support	97	19	1,843	1,379
Cyber Clerical Support	76	30	2,280	928
Cyber IT Support	119	3	357	333
Cyber Professional Support	95	3	285	207
Counterintelligence HQ Agents	270	3	810	(28)
Counterintelligence Field Agents	270	15	4,050	(142)
Counterintelligence Investigative Support	97	4	388	290
Counterintelligence Clerical Support	76	6	456	186
Cyber Intelligence Collection		56	\$6,928	\$3,592
HQ Agent	270	1	270	(9)
HQ Intelligence Analysts	135	17	2,295	1,295
Field Intelligence Analysts	135	25	3,375	1,904
Clerical Support	76	13	988	402
Science and Technology Tools		36	\$7,651	\$1,331
Data Intercept - Electronics Technicians	216	2	432	48
Data Intercept - Electronics Engineers	208	2	416	205
Data Intercept - Professional Support	95	2	190	138
Cryptology - HQ Agents	270	2	540	(19)
Cryptology - Electronics Technicians	216	1	216	24
Cryptology - Mathematician	150	1	150	59
Cryptology - Electronics Engineer	208	1	208	102
Field Technical Personnel - TTA	337	3	1,011	28
Field Technical Personnel - CART Agents	343	2	686	19
Field Technical Personnel - Electronics Technicians	216	14	3,024	339
Field Technical Personnel - CART Forensic Examiners	217	2	434	184
Field Technical Personnel - Investigative	97	1	97	73
Field Technical Personnel - Clerical	76	2	152	62
TRIAD - Professional Support	95	1	95	69
Information Assurance - IT Support	\$119	4	\$476	\$444
Total Personnel		260	\$47,394	\$7,756

Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (Change from 2010) (\$000)
Investigatory Capabilities			\$5,784	•••
Cyber Training - Agent Travel	\$8,345	99	826	
Cyber Training - Agent Tuition	5,291	99	524	•••
Cyber Training - Student Travel	5,646	130	734	•••
Cyber Training - Student Tuition	5,385	130	700	•••
Cyber Training - Blade Server System	2,033,386	1	2,034	
Cyber Training - Uninterruptible Power Supply Protection Unit	149,049	1	150	
Cyber Training - Fiber Switch System	648,358	1	649	
Cyber Training - Laptop PCs	2,374	30	72	
Cyber Training - LCD Monitors	5,000	19	95	
Consolidated Collections/Data Intercept Services	n/a	n/a	2,500	•••
Cryptology/Remote Operations			2,502	•••
Equipment	n/a	n/a	375	•••
Contract Services	n/a	n/a	2,127	•••
Information Assurance - Contract Services	n/a	n/a	3,000	
Total Non-Personnel			\$13,786	•••

Total Request for this Item

	Pos	Agent	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)
Current Services	300	68	300	\$49,436	\$29,695	\$79,131
Increases	260	107	130	47,394	13,786	61,180
Grand Total	560	175	430	\$96,830	\$43,481	\$140,311

Item Name: <u>Intelligence Program</u>

Budget Decision Unit(s): <u>All</u> Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1, 1.2

FBI SMS Objective(s): P-01, P-04, P-05, P-06, P-07

Organizational Program: <u>Intelligence</u>

End State Capability: <u>Domain and Operations</u>

Program Increase: Positions 480 Agt 41 IA 279 FTE 240 Dollars \$69,964,000

(\$7,764,000 non-personnel)

Please refer to the classified addendum for additional information on this request.

Description of Item

The FBI requests an enhancement of 480 positions (41 Agents, 279 IAs, and 160 Support) and \$69,964,000 (\$7,764,000 non-personnel) to enhance the FBI-wide intelligence capability that integrates intelligence activities into all investigative efforts through some key core intelligence functions: domain management, collection management, requirements-based human intelligence (HUMINT) collection, tactical intelligence, and intelligence production and dissemination. Collectively, all of the resources requested under this initiative will, over time, enable the field offices and HQ to better leverage investigative and analytic capabilities to develop and maintain a common understanding of the threat issues they currently face. Moreover, the requested resources will allow the FBI to better identify emerging threats, assess those threats, and act against them. This enhancement request will also allow the intelligence program to drive structural changes based on the extensive Strategic Execution Team (SET) assessment. These changes will enable the FBI to create and strengthen capabilities and authorities, build upon the strengths of the organization's culture, and establish an accountability framework that guides individual and institutional behavior. The enhancement will specifically address intelligence leadership and personnel and training.

Justification

In May 2007, Director Mueller undertook an extensive review of the FBI's intelligence performance with the objective of moving its transformation into an intelligence-led organization at a faster pace. The Director formed the SET in September 2007 to build on and accelerate the FBI's efforts to perform its national security mission, identify significant challenges facing the FBI's intelligence components, and offer recommendations to improve the critical areas of operations, human capital, and project management. These recommendations, which necessitate fundamental reforms to the sharing of intelligence, emphasize the standardization of the field intelligence structure and work roles to ensure principal intelligence functions—domain management, collection management, HUMINT collection, tactical intelligence, and production and dissemination—are performed consistently and effectively and provide employees with the benefit of common roles, tools, practices, and procedures. The recommendations also provide for the development of the HQ analysis components' quantitative assessments of the threats facing the nation, which will supply decision makers with an overview of the distribution of threats.

<u>Intelligence Leadership and Personnel – 472 positions (36 Agents, 279 IAs, 44 Staff Operations Specialists (SOS), and 113 Support) and \$60,622,000 (all personnel)</u>

HQ Strategic Analysis – 57 positions (43 IAs and 14 Support) and \$6,912,000 (all personnel) Please see Classified Addendum for details on this portion of the request.

FIG Restructuring and Standardization – 415 positions (36 Agents, 236 IAs, 44 SOS, and 99 Support) and \$53,710,000 (all personnel)

Intelligence is not solely the responsibility of the Field Intelligence Group (FIG) or individual programs; instead, all field office and HQ components must play a role in supporting the FBI's intelligence mission. All field office and HQ personnel—whether they work criminal or national security matters, and whether they are Agents or Support—must contribute to and benefit from the field office's intelligence activities. While intelligence is integrated into the work of the entire field office, it is the responsibility of the FIG to coordinate, guide, and support the office's activities as the single strategic coordinating component. In order to implement the standard FIG model needed to perform critical field intelligence functions, the FBI requires additional Reports Officer, Operations Specialist, All-Source Analyst, SOS, and Agent positions. The FY 2010 request for the field includes 36 Agents, 236 IAs, 44 SOSs, and 99 other support positions to begin to implement consistency across the field for all key functions.

Reports Officers

The FBI requests 99 positions—including 75 IAs/Reports Officers and 24 ratio support positions—to enhance the organization's production of raw intelligence reporting in the form of Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs). Reports Officers are responsible for ensuring field offices and HQ produce accurate, timely, and professional raw intelligence products in order to facilitate the sharing of intelligence and case information across the organization and with the FBI's intelligence and law enforcement partners. Reports Officers are integral to the collection management function and the intelligence production and dissemination function.

The FBI is implementing a series of internal and external processes to further improve and measure the value of its raw intelligence reporting. Additional Reports Officers are needed to enhance the quality of the FBI's raw reporting and facilitate the direct dissemination of IIRs from the field. The FBI's Reports Officer request was benchmarked against other Intelligence Community partners performing similar roles.

All-Source Analysts

The FBI requests 10 IA/All-Source Analyst positions and 3 ratio support positions to provide administrative support. All-Source Analysts identify knowledge gaps by reviewing available intelligence and source coverage capabilities, preparing intelligence products to guide closure of collection gaps and focus domain awareness efforts, and producing intelligence products on vulnerabilities and threats. All-Source Analysts are essential to the domain management, collection management, and intelligence production and dissemination functions. The FBI's All-Source Analyst staffing numbers were benchmarked against other Intelligence Community partners performing similar roles.

Operations Specialists

The FBI requests 115 IA/Operations Specialist positions and 37 ratio support positions to provide administrative support. Operations Specialists review all information collected or generated from investigations; prepare IIRs; provide tactical analysis that guides investigations; and participate in source, witness, and subject interviews. Operations Specialists play a vital role in the field offices' tactical intelligence function while also contributing to the intelligence production and dissemination function. The requested personnel enhancements—including the FBI's FY 2011-2014 requests—will ensure there are a minimum of two Operations Specialists per operational squad.

Staff Operations Specialists (SOS)

The FBI requests 44 support SOS positions in FY 2010. SOSs guide, coordinate, and support domestic and overseas intelligence collection and investigations at an entry level of execution, enabling IAs to focus on critical strategic functions. SOSs play an essential role in the field office's performance of the tactical intelligence function, and this request will ensure operational squads have either an SOS or another investigative support position available to fulfill this function. The requested personnel enhancements—including the FBI's FY 2011 through FY 2014 requests—will ensure there is a minimum of one SOS or Investigative Support Specialist per operational squad.

HUMINT Collectors

The FBI requests 30 Agent/HUMINT collector positions and 20 ratio support positions to provide administrative support for the collection of HUMINT. Personnel assigned to the requested new Agent/HUMINT collector positions will develop, recruit, and exploit sources and will leverage relationships with external partners in order to collect intelligence to fill the most critical field office collection gaps. In addition, HUMINT collectors will generate IIRs based on source reporting to meet the needs of other squads and divisions, local partners, or the IC. HUMINT collectors are integral to the requirements-based intelligence collection function.

Regional Intelligence Staff

The FBI requests 57 positions (6 Agents, 36 IAs, 15 Support) to establish a regional management structure that enables the organization to compile individual field office domain pictures into a comprehensive understanding of the domain for each of six regions of the country. This regional structure will tie together the field offices' assessments of their discrete threats and vulnerabilities to provide comprehensive regional domain awareness, resulting in an improved understanding of potential indicators for criminal and national security issues.

This intelligence program structure requires an appropriate span of control across the field, regional, divisional, and national levels. New resources for the FIG will provide a thorough understanding of each field office's domain, and the regional and national resources will tie together FBI knowledge on specific targets across all programs. This network will enable the FBI to examine current program collection activities, identify collection gaps, and target collection against these gaps. This collaborative effort will increase information sharing within the FBI and with IC partners.

<u>Training – 8 positions (5 Agents and 3 support) and \$9,342,000 (\$7,764,000 non-personnel)</u>

Intelligence Collection Training and Travel

The FBI requests \$1,450,000 in non-personnel funding for training and travel to support the Regional Management System implementation. The training will provide critical information regarding Intelligence Collection Program definitions, legal policy, and operational procedures as well as instruction on how to perform desk functions to include desk roles and responsibilities, products, intelligence requirements, collection management, and gaps in collection identification.

The FBI requests non-personnel funding to conduct annual national group training sessions per desk (equaling 20 per year) and six Regional Group Training sessions per year. These group training sessions will be attended by applicable IAs and Agents working intelligence matters. The national group training session will allow the staff in each Regional Management Structure to meet with their USIC, regional, program, and field counterparts to discuss new trends, issues, collection efforts, and intelligence collection, as well as to develop annual goals and objectives per desk. This liaison is crucial for coordination and deconfliction of intelligence throughout the USIC and across the FBI. These group training sessions provide optimal opportunity for strategic learning, information sharing, and collaboration in a concentrated subject setting that would foster a more cohesive approach to understanding, managing, and analyzing foreign intelligence.

Intelligence Training Section

The FBI requests 8 positions (5 Agents, 3 Support) and \$1,234,000 in non-personnel funding to facilitate the full establishment of the FBI School of Intelligence within the FBI's Training Division. This initiative will provide intelligence tradecraft training for IAs, Agents, and other appropriate personnel. The request will enable the FBI to create three distinct units within the section: Basic Intelligence, Advanced Intelligence, and HUMINT Training. The Basic Intelligence Training Unit will introduce all employees to the general concepts of intelligence and the authorities granted to the FBI to collect intelligence for national security. The Advanced Intelligence Training Unit will provide intelligence professionals with an in-depth understanding of the art of intelligence as it is practiced both within the FBI and throughout the broader IC. This unit will also be responsible for administering and instructing the Intermediate, Subject-Matter Expert, Supervisory IA, and Agent intelligence classes. The HUMINT Training Unit will familiarize collectors with HUMINT collection requirements and procedures as they relate to intelligence-gathering techniques and operations within the FBI and the broader IC.

Domain Management and Awareness Training

The FBI requests \$1,500,000 non-personnel in training and travel funds to develop and deliver training on the tradecraft and approach of domain management and awareness for new Agents and for personnel specializing in this area. Increasing the FBI's domain awareness training capability will support the larger IC by contributing more systematically to national domain awareness initiatives.

National Defense University, Leadership, and Career Path Training


The FBI requests \$3,580,000 in non-personnel funding to support FBI attendance of the National Defense University's National Security Management Program. The funds will allow the FBI to send 52 FBI GS-14 and GS-15 Supervisory Agents to this 11-month program and will enable others to attend the National Defense University's shorter programs. The training will be offered

to candidates who successfully compete for hard-to-fill supervisory positions at HQ. Leadership training will be provided in FY 2010 to analysts, collectors, and managers of the intelligence workforce via courses that are currently under development. The Analytic Tradecraft for Managers, HUMINT Tradecraft for Managers, and Managing the Intelligence-Driven Organization courses will provide critically needed leadership learning to the current workforce and will dovetail into the newly launched Leadership Development Initiative effort within the FBI.

The program will require participants to commit to longer three-year duty assignments at HQ, which will provide needed management continuity and ensure that the organization gets maximum benefit from its investment in this training. The program will involve joint-study programs with IC participants, consistent with the Director of National Intelligence's emphasis on joint-duty assignments and will complement the Agent career path. After a successful evaluation, the program will be extended to Supervisory IAs.

Impact on Performance (Relationship of Increase to Strategic Goals)

This request supports Goal 1, "Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security." The FBI has embarked on a significant initiative to improve and expedite its performance within the intelligence environment. To this end, thousands of hours have been invested in studying the challenges that the FBI faces, identifying and testing solutions, and developing and delivering a program to awaken the workforce to the changes necessary to ensure the FBI's success in its national security mission. The FBI's mission focuses on prevention, which requires specific approaches to identify bad actors before they can inflict damage to the community. The FBI must find these individuals early and assess their intent, their skills, their capabilities, and their use of known tradecraft, finding ways to penetrate their organizations and dismantling their operations before significant damage is achieved. The strategy established by the FBI and currently being executed by the SET initiative will fall short of expectations if additional resources are not provided to enhance the intelligence apparatus. New human capital resources will be invested in understanding the FBI's domain, focusing on identifying and collecting against priority gaps in its knowledge, and evaluating those identified in the process to ensure the organization protects the homeland from national security threats. If these resources are not obtained, the priority planned enhancements noted on the diagram below will not be achieved, and the FBI will be at significant risk of falling short on achieving its mission requirement of preventing a major national security breach.



Funding

Base Funding

			008 Enac esc./supp		FY 2009 Enacted			FY 2010 Current Services				
Initiative	Pos	Agt	FTE	(\$000)	Pos	Agt	FTE	(\$000)	Pos	Agt	FTE	(\$000)
IA Field	1,300		1,300	\$110,500	1,342		1,321	\$115,541	1,342		1,342	\$121,134
IA HQ	355	•••	355	38,340	380	:	367	40,786	380		380	43,582
SOS Positions	179	•••	179	19,332	179	•••	179	19,893	179	•••	179	20,529
FIGs	435	435	435	68,730	435	435	435	74,857	435	435	435	77,120
HQ Agt					62	35	31	6,539	62	35	62	13,497
Total	2,269	435	2,269	\$236,902	2,398	470	2,333	\$257,616	2,398	470	2,398	\$275,862

Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Type of Position	Modular Cost per Position (\$000)	Number of Positions Requested	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011Net Annualization (change from 2010) (\$000)
Agent, Field	\$270	36	\$9,720	(\$339)
Agent, HQ	270	5	1,350	(47)
SOS	95	44	4,180	3,043
IA, Field	135	236	31,860	17,979
IA, HQ	135	43	5,805	3,276
Clerical Support for Agent/IA	76	101	7,676	3,124
IT Support for Agent/IA	119	7	833	777
Investigative Support for Agent	97	8	776	581
Total Personnel		480	\$62,200	\$28,394

Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (Change from 2010) (\$000)	
Domain Awareness Training	\$1,500,000	1	\$1,500		
National Security Graduate Program	47,733	75	3,580		
Intelligence Training Section Contractor support	154,250	8	1,234		
Regional Management Training and Travel	\$1,450,000	1	1,450		
Total Non-Personnel			\$7,764	•••	

Total Request for this Item

	Pos	Agent	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)
Current Services	2,398	470	2,398	\$271,728	\$4,134	\$275,862
Increases	480	41	240	62,200	7,764	69,964
Grand Total	2,878	511	2,638	\$333,928	\$11,898	\$345,826

Item Name: <u>National Security Field Investigations</u>

Budget Decision Unit(s): <u>All</u> Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.4

FBI SMS Objective(s): P-03, P-04, P-05, P-06, P-09

Organizational Program: Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence

End State Capability: <u>Domain and Operations</u>

Program Increase: Positions 231 Agt 105 IA ... FTE 116 Dollars

\$47,993,000 (\$3,536,000 non-personnel)

Please refer to the classified addendum for additional information on this request.

Description of Item

The FBI requests 231 positions (105 agents) and \$47,993,000 (\$3,536,000 non-personnel) to augment its national security field investigations capabilities.

Funding

Base Funding

FY 20	FY 2008 Enacted (w/resc./supps)			FY 2009 Enacted				FY 2010 Current Services			
Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)	Pos Agt FTE \$(000)			Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)	
2,615	1,357	2,615	\$450,622	2,698	1,407	2,640	\$476,750	2,698	1,407	2,698	\$489,985

Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (Change from 2010) (\$000)
Classified Non-Personnel Costs	n/a	n/a	\$3,536	
Total Non-Personnel			\$3,536	•••

Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Type of Field Position	Modular Cost per Position (\$000)	Number of Positions Requested	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (change from 2010) (\$000)
Field Agents	\$270	105	\$28,350	(\$945)
Clerical	76	41	3,116	1,271
Information Technology	119	3	357	333
Investigative	97	26	2,522	1,898
Field Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) Examiners	217	32	6,944	2,944
Attorneys	\$132	24	3,168	2,688
Total Personnel		231	\$44,457	\$8,189

Total Request for this Item

	Pos	Agt	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)
Current Services	2,698	1,407	2,698	\$429,180	\$60,805	\$489,985
Increases	231	105	116	44,457	3,536	47,993
Grand Total	2,929	1,512	2,814	\$473,637	\$64,341	\$537,978

Item Name: Mortgage Fraud and White Collar Crime

Budget Decision Unit(s): All
Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 2.5

FBI SMS Objective(s): P-07, P-04, A-02

Organizational Programs: Criminal Investigative and Records Management

End State Capability: <u>Domain and Operations</u>

Program Increase: Positions 143 Agt 50 IA ... FTE 72 Dollars \$25,491,000

(\$3,469,000 non-personnel)

Description of Item

The FBI requests 143 positions (50 Agents) and \$25,491,000 (\$3,469,000 non-personnel) to combat the dramatic increase in mortgage fraud. These resources would enhance the FBI's field investigative capability, provide Forensic Accountants to aid in increasingly complex financial investigations and preparation of evidence for prosecution, and increase the number of Mortgage Fraud Task Forces.

Justification

The sub-prime mortgage crisis resulted from a culmination of factors and circumstances that included historically low interest rates, rising real estate values and Wall Street's increasing demand for mortgage backed securities (MBS), especially high-yielding securities that were backed by sub-prime loans. As the industry relaxed its underwriting standards for the "no doc, low doc" and Alt-A loans, it provided an environment that allowed mortgage fraud to become pervasive across the country. As real estate values retract from the elevated levels of the past few years, the extent of mortgage fraud that has taken place during the past decade becomes increasingly apparent, as evidenced by the historic number of home foreclosures and the exponential increase in mortgage fraud investigations. However, the aforementioned fraud is intertwined in the larger mortgage cycle whereby the fraudulent loans became part of loans that were bundled together and utilized as collateral for MBS(s) and later collateralized debt obligations (CDO).

Since the spring of 2007, fraud associated with mortgages originated by sub-prime lenders, financial statements of the sub-prime lenders, and investments derived from the sub-prime lender market have threatened to exacerbate the uncertainty and loss associated with the shaken global economic markets. During FY 2008, publicly traded financial institutions wrote-down over \$232² billion due to losses associated with the sub-prime mortgage industry. These factors, coupled with decreasing home values across the country, will continue to create an environment conducive to retail mortgage and corporate fraud.

Although regulation reform may begin to curtail future fraud, these reforms are slow to take place and do not have any impact on the mortgage fraud schemes that have already occurred and will generate long term investigations for several years. In addition, the perpetrators of mortgage fraud are adapting to increased law enforcement and regulatory scrutiny and are utilizing new schemes, such as foreclosure scams, in order to defraud the American public.

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² Subprime Losses Reach \$232 Billion with UBS, Deutsche, by Yalman Onaran, Bloomberg.com, April 1, 2008.

The exponential increase in mortgage fraud activity that has plagued the United States' real estate market has strained the FBI's White Collar investigative resources. As of February 14, 2009, the FBI was investigating over 1,911 mortgage fraud cases and 44 corporate fraud matters related to the mortgage industry. The above cases are complicated White Collar investigations that are resource and time-intensive. These cases have a dramatic impact on the American public, with losses measured in the billions.

In response to the growing crime problem in the sub-prime mortgage industry, as of February, 2009 the FBI has dedicated over 248 Agents to investigate the above mortgage fraud matters in addition to numerous Agents assigned to sub-prime mortgage related corporate fraud investigations. The FBI's primary focus is to identify, disrupt, and dismantle mortgage fraud criminal enterprises. However, the current resource level equates to approximately eight mortgage fraud investigations per Agent, and a mortgage fraud investigation can take a few months to several years if it goes through trial to sentencing.

Based on the rise in Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) filed by financial institutions, the number of mortgage fraud matters is only going to increase in the coming months. In FY 2005, the FBI received 21,994 mortgage fraud related SARs; in FY 2008 the number of SARs increased to 63,173. During the above timeframe, the number of FBI mortgage fraud investigations has increased from 721 at the end of FY 2005 compared to 1,912 by February 2009.

SAR loss estimates in FY 2008 already exceed \$1.5 billion despite only seven percent of the 63,173 SARs initially reporting losses. Only seven percent of SARs report the estimated loss due to the time lag between identifying a suspicious activity and liquidating the property through foreclosure and then calculating the loss amount.

Based on the increase of mortgage fraud SARs, it is anticipated that the number of FBI mortgage fraud investigations will grow to over 2,000 cases in FY 2009. The current FBI personnel level is insufficient to address the burgeoning crime problem as the average case inventory of complex, time-intensive investigations per Agent doubles. In addition, as the mortgage market and Wall Street firms are examined with additional scrutiny from regulators and independent accountants, it is believed that further corporate malfeasance will come to light and the number of corporate fraud investigations will continue to increase.

To meet this growing fraud crisis, the FBI request 50 additional Special Agents and 61 Forensic Accountants. The additional personnel would be stationed in the country's mortgage fraud threat areas and address the anticipated 200 percent increase in mortgage fraud caseload. The FBI also requests an additional \$185,000 for training and operational travel related to the growing number of mortgage and corporate fraud investigations.

The FBI also requests \$560,000 to fund current and future Mortgage Fraud Task Forces/Working Groups. Currently, the FBI leads or participates in 48 Mortgage Fraud Task Forces/Working Groups. The FBI anticipates that each of its respective 56 field offices will continue or commence working in a task force environment as the mortgage fraud crime problem continues to grow exponentially. As such, the FBI is seeking \$10,000 per task force in each field office.

The FBI also requests \$724,000 for system implementation and non-personnel operating costs to transition to a litigation information management software package, which will be utilized to increase productivity and efficiency. The United States Attorney's Offices and the FBI's regulatory partners, including the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), utilize *Concordance* to organize and process the often massive document productions that occur in complex White Collar Crime cases. The FBI does not currently possess a robust document management package compatible with the system employed by its partner agencies.

The FBI also requests \$2,000,000 to support the Document Conversion Laboratory (DocLab), the center for paper to electronic document conversion. FBI paper case files are scanned and made readily available in electronic format world-wide for search and analysis capability. The enhancement would augment the workforce with 25 contractor positions to increase throughput by an additional estimated minimum of 3,000,000 pages per year. The contractors will perform prepping, scanning, quality assurance, and reassembly of documents, all of which will ensure investigators have the data they need, when they need it. At present, some field offices ultimately seek more expensive and less secure external contractors to provide responsive services and support with seized documents because the volume of paper files is significantly above DocLab's capacity of 15,000,000 images per year.

Impact on Performance (Relationship of Increase to Strategic Goals)

This request is in direct support of the DOJ Strategic Goal 2.5, "Combat public and corporate corruption, fraud, economic crime, and cyber crime." Without additional resources, the FBI will be unable to make a significant impact in either originator based or financial institution based mortgage fraud. Using a low conversion rate of SARs to cases, an FBI mortgage fraud Special Agent will have over 15 complex, long-term cases on average in FY 2010 (for reference, a non-criminal investigative Agent typically has between five to six cases). This explosion in workload requires additional Agent and analytical personnel and the technical equipment to begin to significantly address the problem. Without these resources, state and local law enforcement will be left alone to deal with the weight of the mortgage fraud crisis without the needed tools or jurisdictional scope that only the FBI can provide.

Funding

Base Funding: Mortgage Fraud

FY 2	2008 Er	acted (w/resc./supps)	FY 2009 Enacted					FY 2010 Current Services				
Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)	Pos Agt FTE \$(000)				Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)		
159	150	159	\$25,866	217	175	188	\$36,595	217	175	217	\$38,071		

Base Funding: Document Conversion Laboratory

FY	2008 Er	nacted (w/resc./supps)	FY 2009 Enacted					FY 2010 Current Services				
Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)	Pos Agt FTE \$(000)				Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)		
124		120	\$10,920	120 120 \$11,237				120		120	\$11,596		

Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Type of Position	Modular Cost per Position (\$000)	Number of Positions Requested	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (change from 2010) (\$000)
Special Agent	\$270	50	\$13,500	(\$450)
Clerical Support	76	19	1,444	589
Information Technology Support	119	1	119	111
Investigative Support	97	12	1,164	876
Forensic Accountant	\$95	61	5,795	4,209
Total Personnel		143	\$22,022	\$5,335

Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (Change from 2010) (\$000)
Task Force Funding	\$10,000	56	\$560	
Litigation Management System	n/a	n/a	724	
Operational Travel and training	n/a	n/a	185	
Contract support for document processing	\$80,000	25	2,000	
Total Non-Personnel			\$3,469	•••

Total Request for this Item: Mortgage Fraud

	Pos	Agent	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)
Current Services	217	175	217	\$35,747	\$2,324	\$38,071
Increases	143	50	72	22,022	1,469	23,491
Grand Total	360	225	289	\$57,769	\$3,793	\$61,562

Total Request for this Item: Document Processing Lab

	Pos	Agent	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)
Current Services	120		120	\$11,596	\$	\$11,596
Increases					2,000	2,000
Grand Total	120	•••	120	\$11,596	\$2,000	\$13,596

Item Name: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Response

Budget Decision Unit(s): <u>All</u> Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1

FBI SMS Objective(s): A-01, A-02, A-04, T-02, P-03, P-04, P-05, P-06, P-07, P-08,

P-09, P11

Organizational Programs: Weapons of Mass Destruction, Laboratory,

Critical Incident Response Group

End State Capability <u>Domain and Operations</u>

Program Increase: Positions 168 Agt 91 IA ... FTE 84 Dollars \$80,613,000

(\$46,566,000 non-personnel)

Please refer to the classified addendum for additional information on this request.

Description of Item

The successful discharge of the FBI's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) responsibilities, as set forth in various federal statutes, executive orders, and national implementation plans, requires the Bureau to achieve three core capabilities:

I. <u>Domain Awareness</u> - \$7,196,000 (all non-personnel)

First, the FBI must achieve a domain awareness capability to detect, deter, and prevent terrorists and other adversaries from acquiring a WMD or WMD-related materials and know-how.

II. <u>Operations/Investigations</u> - 62 positions (41 Agents) and \$15,445,000 (\$2,570,000 non-personnel)

Second, the FBI must achieve an operational and investigative capability to disrupt and dismantle terrorist groups and other adversaries' actions to acquire, move, or use a WMD or WMD/CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive)-related materials and know-how.

III. <u>Forensic/Technical Response</u> - 106 positions (50 Agents) and \$57,972,000 (\$36,800,000 non-personnel)

Finally, the FBI must achieve a tiered, distributed forensic and technical response and attribution capability for a WMD/CBRNE incident.

Justification

I. Domain Awareness - \$7,196,000 (all non-personnel)

Domain awareness is critical to being able to detect, deter, and prevent terrorists and other adversaries from acquiring a WMD or WMD materials and know-how. This is achieved by working with other government agencies, the private sector, academia and others to build relationships and put into place trip-wires and other processes to learn at the earliest moment of an individual's or group's interests or actions to acquire WMD knowledge and materials. Domain awareness is also reached by identifying and assessing the vulnerabilities of key sources of WMD materials to potential theft by terrorists. Domain awareness is also achieved by working with potential foreign sources of WMD materials through U.S. Government counterproliferation initiatives.

Critical to achieving domain awareness is acquiring and maintaining WMD and WMD-related subject matter expertise, intelligence analysis capabilities, and policy/planning expertise for

guiding FBI WMD initiatives and activities. For FY 2010, \$7,196,000 is requested to build and strengthen FBI WMD domain awareness. This funding includes: \$2,376,000 for policy/planning and subject matter expertise; \$804,000 for training/exercises; \$2,894,000 for counter-proliferation/ countermeasures; \$158,000 for increased intelligence analysis capability; and \$964,000 for vulnerability assessments of high-risk targets and sources of WMD materials.

Policy and Planning/Subject Matter Experts - \$2,376,000 all non-personnel This funding will allow the FBI to hire approximately eight subject matter experts (SMEs) to support the development of an integrated body of experts who will support Policy and Planning, Training and Exercises, Countermeasures, Intelligence, Assessment, Investigations, Tiered Deployment and Render Safe. These SMEs will be recruited from national labs, academia, other government agencies, and industry. Their expertise will support the policy and planning activities of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD).

The WMDD is tasked with the development and implementation of internal and national WMD policies and strategies. The WMDD works closely internally, as well as with components in the Laboratory Division and the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), ensuring that national and interagency WMD policies support and are consistent with the FBI's authorities, mission, roles and initiatives. As part of this requirement, the WMDD participates in over 100 policy groups, including White House-led interagency policy coordinating committees (PCCs) and other interagency WMD working groups. The additional SMEs expands the FBI's participation in the PCC's and increases the FBI's involvement and information-sharing capabilities.

Training and Exercises - \$804,000 all non-personnel

The requested resources will enable the continuation and expansion of Table Top Exercises (TTX), Command Post Exercises (CPX), and Field Training Exercises (FTX). Additional resources will allow the FBI to provide approximately four additional training exercises per year and allow for increased FBI participation in international outreach activities under the auspices of the Global Initiative (GI). It is anticipated that the scope and complexity of GI activities will increase as more countries become involved and increase their own respective levels of participation.

Countermeasures - \$2,894,000 all non-personnel

Intelligence - \$158,000 all non-personnel

Vulnerability Assessments – \$964,000 all non-personnel

Any detection of a WMD within the United States by a Federal civil authority will immediately activate a protocol to contact the nearest FBI field office, which in turn notifies the WMDD. WMDD maintains the responsibility to conduct the National Threat Assessment Process for all activities involving WMD. The additional resources will allow the FBI to hire six contractors who will conduct vulnerability threat assessments.

The FBI response to all domestic WMD incidents, as well as assistance to WMD responses and investigations overseas, is coordinated through the Federal Government Interagency Threat Credibility Assessment process. Upon the identification of a WMD threat or incident, WMDD will assemble the appropriate assessment team from within the FBI and other agencies to determine the technical feasibility; operational practicality; behavioral resolve; operational response; and investigative response. Historically, WMDD handles in excess of 1,000 leads/assessments annually. While assessment numbers currently remain consistent, the WMDD will realize additional assessments through outreach by the full-time coordinators.

<u>II. Operations/Investigations-</u> 62 positions (41 Agents) and \$15,445,000 (\$2,570,000 non-personnel)

The operations/investigations element is focused on expanding the FBI's field office-level investigative capability to disrupt and dismantle terrorist groups and other adversaries who are attempting to acquire, move, or use a WMD or WMD-related materials and know-how. Through domain awareness activities, the FBI will be able to detect terrorist and other adversary attempts to acquire WMD. Once detected, the operations/ investigations element will focus on removing the threat through disruption and dismantlement. Disruption and dismantlement can involve traditional investigative methods, the use of undercover and/or sources, or a high-risk tactical operation. The capacity to perform WMD operations and investigations depends upon the FBI possessing a core WMD investigative workforce, along with sufficient specially-trained tactical operators. This funding includes: 50 positions (30 Agents) and \$804,000 in nonpersonnel funding to continue building a core field WMD investigative workforce; and 12 positions (11 Agents) and \$1,766,000 (non-personnel) to continue a multi-year initiative begun in FY 2009 to staff the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and provide related tactical program requirements:

WMD field personnel - 50 positions (30 Agents) and \$804,000 all non-personnel These positions will enhance the FBI's field capacity for addressing the WMD threat. The additional field agents will build the relationships with other government agencies, the private sector, academia, and the research community that are critical in fostering timely, coordinated, and effective investigations and response to WMD incidents. Additionally, the field agents will help address counterterrorism and counter-proliferation cases. The FBI is currently involved with over 300 CT-related WMD cases, and 600 CP-related WMD cases. The requested enhancement will permit more comprehensive management of complete WMD cases generated across the FBI enterprise. This request builds upon the initial enhancement request for WMD field coordinator personnel in the FY 2009 budget.

Tactical Operations - 12 positions (11 Agents) and \$1,766,000 all non-personnel Eleven Operators are requested to increase HRT Operator strength to its required end state. One position for medical support for HRT deployments is also requested.

In addition, \$688,000 is requested to bring the Tactical Services Administration Building on-line with operations and maintenance funding. The Tactical Services Administration Building will house the HRT Operators and their essential equipment. It was constructed through funding provided in a FY 2007 appropriation and its scheduled completion date is FY 2010.

The FBI is the lead agency in an operational response to a terrorist threat or incident, including attacks using WMD; it also has the primary responsibility for the recapture and recovery of nuclear weapons for which control has been lost within the continental United States. The HRT is the only full-time civilian asset of the U.S. Government with the enhanced manpower, resources and authority to confront the most complex tactical threats within the United States. In addition, HRT elements have deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries to provide force protection to FBI personnel, and to conduct intelligence gathering activities at the request of the Department of Defense (DoD) Special Forces Units.

Field Negotiators and Field SWAT team members are the first on the scene of a crisis situation; \$1,078,000 for travel funding is requested for their response to incidents as well travel to exercises.

<u>III. Forensic/Technical Response</u>- 106 positions (50 Agent) and \$57,972,000 (\$36,800,000 non-personnel)

In the event of a WMD/CBRNE incident, the FBI must have the capability to provide a technical and forensic response. A primary goal of the technical and forensic response is the attribution of the incident to the individuals, group, or state that committed the attack. The FBI is adopting a tiered, distributed approach to technical and forensic response. This approach will require enhancing field office resources (e.g., Evidence Response Teams, Hazardous Materials Response Teams, Special Agent Bomb Technicians, and others) so they possess the skills, knowledge, and equipment to provide immediate on-site response. To improve deployment of specialized equipment and resources, a series of regional deployment centers are being established. These centers will house some specialized equipment and assets and provide a more agile, distributed response capability. Finally, at the national level there will be more technically proficient assets capable of rendering-safe devices, consistent with the FBI's growing render-safe mission. In support of its response/attribution mission requirements, the FBI requests a) 78 positions (42 Agents) and \$15,775,000 non-personnel for its forensic response, and b) 28 positions (8 Agents) and \$21,025,000 non-personnel for its technical response.

III. a) Forensic Response to WMD/CBRNE incidents- 87 positions (42 Agents) and \$33,153,000 (\$15,775,000 non-personnel)

The FBI requests funding to achieve a tiered capacity for providing a timely forensic response to CBRNE incidents and analysis of CBRNE evidence, as well as advanced crime scene processing technologies and training to field Evidence Response Teams and field offices. The FBI has developed five strategies to respond to WMD/CBRNE incidents, including the processing, collection, transport, examination, and storing of evidence collected from crime scenes. The first strategy is to ensure FBI field office capacity for initial on-site forensic response; the second, to utilize a network of five regional advance deployment centers for more specialized equipment and assets; the third, to provide a capacity at the FBI Laboratory capacity for deploying national-level forensic assets; fourth, to establish and maintain a capacity for the examination of CBNRE evidence; and finally to establish a capacity for the pre- and post- storage and maintenance of contaminated (hazardous) evidence.

Enhancing field office capacity for initial on-site forensic response- 35 positions (21 Agents) and \$3,650,000 all non-personnel

Enhanced Staffing for Existing Hazardous Materials Response Teams (HMRT): The FBI requests 35 positions (21 Agents) and \$3,650,000 non-personnel to enhance field office capacity for initial on-site forensic response to CBRNE incidents. The positions would provide 11 full time Senior HMRT Team Leaders, 10 full time ERT Senior Team Leaders, and 14 support positions to provide regional team support. The growing complexity of the missions and responsibilities of the field HMRTs has necessitated the establishment of a full-time Team Leader position. In order to carry out the comprehensive and critical nature of the HMRTs missions, it is necessary for the teams to be comprised of at least eight highly trained and skilled HazMat response members. Currently, the HMRT Team Leader position is a collateral duty; however, there are numerous areas of HMRT responsibility that require a full-time Team Leader position in order to provide the proper oversight, management, and accountability of team operations. The HMRT Team Leader also works closely with the field division's WMD Coordinator in assessing potential WMD incidents, providing the field division's WMD Coordinators, local police and fire agencies with technical expertise in the handling of the numerous WMD incidents. The majority of the Emergency Response Team (ERT) Leaders also perform the Team Leader function as a collateral duty. The expansion of non-collateral duty field personnel to serve as ERT Senior Team Leaders would provide a vital link between the field offices and the Laboratory. As the number of ERT call-outs has increased, the team leaders responsibilities have increased, oftentimes forcing the Team to choose between case work responsibilities and ERT Team Leader responsibilities: By providing full-time ERT Senior Team Leaders, workloads will be more manageable as competing prioritizes can be minimized.

New Hazardous Materials Response Teams:

The request for \$3,650,000 would provide \$650,000 to establish the first of five new HMRT's, and \$3,000,000 to begin establishing mini-deployment centers for each field office with an HMRT.

An HMRT program expansion would address vulnerabilities identified throughout the US, particularly along the southwest border. San Diego is the only field office with an HMRT along the southwest border, leaving thousands of miles from Arizona to Texas without a local hazardous materials response capability. The FBI Laboratory is responsible for providing each HMRT with the equipment, supplies and training to maintain an HMRT. The requested funding will provide for team travel, response vehicles, equipment, standard and specialized training, and the annual operational for each HMRT member.

Hazardous Materials Response Team Storage Space:

The field HMRTs maintain large caches of gear to include vehicles, personal protective equipment, and monitoring/detection meters. At the present time, the HMRTs do not have dedicated space within their field divisions to store this sensitive equipment in a temperature controlled environment. As such, equipment is currently housed in FBI vehicles where it is subject to extreme temperatures, which can melt or crack suits and plastics associated with the gear. Additionally, when deployed to crisis sites, the HMRTs

are faced with a lack of space on-site. The HMRTs have no such space to conduct further assessments of the material. Dedicated HMRT space would solve both of these problems. The \$3,000,000 would enable four field offices to acquire space to establish local deployment capability.

Regional Advance Deployment Centers - 12 positions (6 Agents) and \$6,500,000 non-personnel

The request would provide \$1,500,000 to establish a regional advance deployment center in New York, 12 positions and \$1,500,000 for staffing and operations and maintenance funding of the previously established centers in Los Angeles, Dallas, and Chicago, and \$3,500,000 for operational mobility requirements.

New York Deployment Center/Staffing for Four Locations:

By adding a network of pre-deployed specialized equipment and materials, the FBI would be capable of more timely responses and assessments of situations. In FY 2008 the FBI plans to complete construction of its first regional advance deployment center in Los Angeles. Initially, the facility will provide space to maintain equipment and supplies for response to a CBRN/WMD incident. The FBI also plans to initiate build-out of its second and third regional advance deployment centers in Dallas and Chicago, providing the same capabilities from mid-west deployment locations. With the 2010 enhancement, the FBI Laboratory would build the fourth center in New York and would begin staffing each location with permanent staff. The HMRT's are not authorized to conduct any unilateral HazMat operations; they must operate in coordination with an approved certified HazMat Officer. By staffing each regional advance deployment center with personnel capable of on-scene command and safety authority, the HRMTs will be able to begin on-scene assessments and evidence collection more quickly.

Command and Control Equipment:

The regional advance deployment centers will provide the FBI Laboratory with the ability to respond to major incidents in a timely manner provided these facilities are equipped with the major command and control and response equipment necessary to support large scale operations as a major incident scene. The FBI requests \$3,500,000 to provide the infrastructure to support an on-the-scene base of operations center for response personnel to provide real-time assessments and management of high hazard crime scenes involving hazardous materials, including biological, chemical, or nuclear (WMD), as well as incidents involving confined space, structure collapse, and trenching operations. These mobile Base of Operations Platforms are required to bring together all of the technologies into one control point to allow response personnel to assess data and provide an accurate overall assessment. The base of operations vehicles would provide an operational platform that integrates remote hazmat/WMD sensors from fixed, vehicle, and robotic mounted platforms; and weather stations, hazmat search cameras, hazmat robotic cameras, and chemical/biological response systems. On-scene personnel would have the ability to receive and transmit information both in secure and non-secure modes via land-line, cellular and satellite communications links on the vehicle to FBI management and/or collaborative agencies.

National level CONUS response team - 31 positions (15 Agents) and \$2,500,000 non-personnel

The requirement would provide 17 positions (6 Agents) to establish a second CONUS deployment team, 3 positions (1 Agent) to provide deployment team support, 1 mission manager, and 10 positions (8 Agents) and \$2,500,000 for the establishment of a CBRNE Underwater Search and Evidence Response Team (USERT) capability.

The establishment of a second CONUS response team would provide the FBI with the capability to respond to two simultaneous CONUS events, while maintaining the required National Capital Region (NCR) response capability for a WMD incident. Response teams are comprised of a Special Agent Team Leader, HazMat Officers, HazMat paramedics, scientific staff, examiners, and evidence response personnel to process and document the scene, and transport the evidence to a secured location for examination. Deployment team support and mission managers would provide logistic and management support for all deployment teams.

The FBI requests 10 positions and \$2,500,000 non-personnel to expand the USERT capability to include a specialized USERT capability to support under water CBRNE post-incident response operations. A full time eight person USERT capability will be necessary to address the technical and training requirements associated with a hazardous underwater environment. Two support positions will be required to provide logistical and management support for the USERT program.

Examination of CBRNE evidence - \$3,125,000 all non-personnel

The request for \$3,125,000 would enable the FBI to establish and maintain a capacity for the examination of CBNRE evidence. The FBI is working to establish a robust capability to rapidly and effectively obtain forensic detection, identification, and attribution analysis of a broad range of biological, chemical, and radioactive materials by establishing partnerships with other government laboratories to acquire or develop analytic methods and to develop a comprehensive database providing a single information point for organized technical information of chemical agents. The range of CBRNE material includes: human select agents and toxins, high consequence livestock pathogens, and listed plant pathogens; chemical warfare agents and other highly toxic precursors and their analytes; and radiological and nuclear materials.

The FBI Laboratory has also established a partnership with other federal laboratories for the analysis and characterization of trace nuclear materials. Funding received in FY 2009 will provide the FBI Laboratory with the capability to address 10 samples per year. Therefore the FBI is seeking additional funds to augment this capacity by 33 additional samples in 2010.

The FBI Laboratory relies on its forensic staff to perform conventional forensic examinations on hazardous evidence as members of the Hazardous Evidence Examination Team (HEAT). Staffing increases for the HEAT Team are requested in a separate initiative; however; that request will not provide funding for the equipment, supplies, personal protective gear, and training needed to meet the needs of the program. Initial training for examiners consists of 19 days, and annual recertification requires 9

days. Examiners must be certified by the partner laboratory where they will conduct examinations; this requires travel to the laboratory to complete and maintain certification.

HSPD-17 Annex 4 requires that the FBI Laboratory ensure that any non-forensic laboratory used for forensic examinations meet the standards of a traditional forensic laboratory. Oversight of current partner laboratories is insufficient to determine whether quality standards are being met. The FBI Laboratory has developed a Partner Laboratory Quality Assurance Manual, which is required as part of all contracts and interagency agreements; however, until a formal audit program to include facility inspections can be established the FBI will not be able to provide effective oversight and ensure the partner laboratories are in compliance with forensic laboratory standards.

The FBI does not have a permanent storage site for hazardous evidence. Such evidence cannot be stored permanently at partner laboratories, nor can it be returned to field offices for storage in bulky file exhibits. The requested funding for FY 2010 would enable the FBI to conduct a study to assess storage needs.

III. b) Technical Response to WMD/CBRNE incidents: 19 positions (8 Agents) and \$24,819,000 (\$21,025,000 non-personnel)

Regional Special Agent Bomb Technician (SABT) Teams:

Funding requested will support program oversight and the establishment of one regional Special Agent Bomb Technician (SABT) Team to conduct advanced assessment, diagnostics, and transmission of critical technical information in support of National Render Safe Assets. Funding will also support the acquisition of detection, diagnostic and access equipment, Electronic Countermeasures (ECM), and specialized technical training. There will be three enhanced SABT Teams at each of five separate regional locations by FY 2014. Each team will be equipped with communications equipment allowing the response elements to communicate with FBIHQ, DOE National Triage System, and National Assets. The position breakouts of the teams are given below.

Program Oversight- 4 positions (1 Agent)

- 1 Supervisory SABT Program Manager
- 2 Logistic Management Specialists
- 1 Management and Program Analyst

Regional Team Makeup-10 positions (7 Agents)

- 1 Supervisory SABT at location
- 6 SABT
- 3 Telecommunication Specialist
- 5 Ratio Positions

The field SABTs are integral components of the Render Safe mission. While initial training on conventional and improvised devices is conducted at the HDS, additional advanced and specialized training for chemical, biological, and low end radiological devices is necessary to maintain a technological advantage over our adversaries.

Funding is necessary to support the Electronic Countermeasures Program and the Hazardous Devices Secure Training Center. Funding will be used to initiate a resident training program for ECM at the Hazardous Device School secure training facility in support of the ECM field program and transform the current "pilot" program into an operational capability by fielding the ECM equipment in strategic locations throughout the United States. Of the 51 ECM sets, 20 are for public bomb squads and 26 are for FBI field offices and 5 are for FBIHQ.

Emergency Response Aircraft

The National Security Council (Principal's Committee Summary of Conclusions dated 12/19/2006) tasked the FBI to develop a plan whereby the FBI could decrease the response time for National Render Safe Assets to deploy in response to a WMD incident. After a series of meetings, the Principals approved the FBI's Domestic WMD Response concept plan and directed that the FBI execute the approved plan. This decision increases the "Emergency" WMD Render Safe deployment capacity within the USG and reduces the response time to the West Coast. Annual recurring costs are required to maintain this capability.

• Aircraft Lease "Wet Lease" (\$14,480,000) - This includes the annual cost to base the aircraft for the period of performance and a flight hour cost which will be applied to hours flown throughout the period of performance. This aircraft option is only offered to include aircraft, crew, maintenance, insurance, and fuel. The offer also includes an aircraft capable of meeting the stringent response time and provides a backup aircraft within 40 minutes of the staging base, in the event the primary alert aircraft becomes inoperable. Insurance provided for the aircraft includes aircraft hull and passenger liability insurance, a crew capable of meeting the established call out, maintenance conducted in accordance with FAA maintenance standards and a maintenance technician based with the aircraft. Approximately 500 hours of air hours (annually) for use in support of Render Safe deployments are included.

Impact on Performance (Relationship of Increase to Strategic Goals)

This request supports Goal 1, "Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security." WMD is an extraordinarily complex issue. Successful development and integration of the eight capabilities will ensure the FBI appropriately fulfills its mission to defend the United States against a WMD attack. These capabilities, taken together provide a comprehensive multidisciplinary, integrated approach to preventing and, in necessary, responding to grave threats. These enhancements will optimize the FBI WMD program and improve national security. If any one of these capabilities were not as robust as requested, the FBI's WMD program would be incomplete and not resourced to meet mission requirements.

Funding

Base Funding

FY 200	FY 2008 Enacted (w/resc./supps)					9 Enact	ed	FY 2010 Current Services				
Pos	Agt	FTE	(\$000)	Pos Agt FTE (\$000)				Pos	Agt	FTE	(\$000)	
540	265	540	\$212,844	672	328	606	\$268,171	672	328	672	\$270,174	

Personnel Increase Cost Summary

			Modular			FY 2011 Net
			Cost per	Number of	FY 2010	Annualization
			Position	Positions	Request	(change from
Capability	Strategy	Type of Position	(\$000)	Requested	(\$000)	2010) (\$000)
Operations/	WMD field			•		
Investigations	investigations	Field Agent	\$270	30	\$8,100	(\$270)
Operations/	WMD field					
Investigations	investigations	Clerical-Ratio	76	12	912	372
Operations/	WMD field					
Investigations	investigations	Investigative- Ratio	97	7	679	511
Operations/	WMD field					
Investigations	investigations	IT- Ratio	119	1	119	111
Operations/	Tactical					
Investigations	operations	HQ Agent	270	11	2,970	99
Operations/	Tactical	Professional				
Investigations	operations	Support	95	1	95	69
Technical/Forensic	Forensic					
Response	response	Field Agent	270	33	8,910	(297)
Technical/Forensic	Forensic					
Response	response	Field Agent	270	9	2,430	(81)
Technical/Forensic	Forensic					
Response	response	IT – Ratio	119	1	119	111
Technical/Forensic	Forensic					
Response	response	Clerical-Ratio	76	17	1292	527
Technical/Forensic	Forensic					
Response	response	Investigative- Ratio	97	10	970	730
Technical/Forensic	Forensic	Non-Agent				
Response	response	Responder	309	8	2,472	816
Technical/Forensic	Forensic	Forensic				
Response	response	Examiner/Scientist	150	6	900	354
Technical/Forensic	Forensic	Professional				
Response	response	Support	95	3	285	207
Technical/Forensic	Technical					
Response	response	Field Agent	270	8	2,160	(72)
Technical/Forensic	Technical	Professional				
Response	response	Support	95	3	285	207
Technical/Forensic	Technical	Non-Agent				
Response	response	Responder	309	3	927	306
Technical/Forensic	Technical					
Response	response	Clerical-Ratio	76	3	228	93
Technical/Forensic	Technical			-		
Response	response	Investigative- Ratio	\$97	2	194	146
Total				168	\$34,047	\$3,939

Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Capability	Strategy	Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (change from 2010) (\$000)
Domain	Domain					
Awareness	awareness	Policy/Planning SME	n/a	8	\$2,376	
		Training/Exercises	n/a	4	804	
		Countermeasures	n/a	n/a	2,894	•••
		Intelligence	n/a	n/a	158	
		Assessments	n/a	n/a	964	
Operations/ Investigations	WMD field investigations	Case funds	n/a	n/a	804	
	Tactical operations	HRT building O/M	n/a	n/a	688	
		SWAT travel	n/a	n/a	1,078	
Technical/Forensic Response	Forensic response	HMRT expansion	650	5	650	
		HMRT mini-deployment centers	750	4	3,000	
		Regional deployment centers	1,500	1	1,500	
		Regional deployment center O/M	500	3	1,500	
		Base of operations vehicles	3,500		3,500	
		CBRNE underwater search ERT	2,500	n/a	2,500	
		CBRNE projects	3,125	n/a	3,125	
	Technical response	SABT training/travel	n/a	n/a	480	
		ECM systems	75	51	3,825	
		ECM training at HDS	n/a	n/a	2,240	
		Emergency Response Aircraft	14,480	1	\$14,480	
Total					\$46,566	•••

	Pos	Agent	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non- Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)
Current Services	672	328	672	\$107,055	\$163,119	\$270,174
Increases	168	91	84	\$34,047	46,566	80,613
Grand Total	840	419	756	\$141,102	\$209,685	\$350,787

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Item Name: <u>Central Records Complex (CRC)</u>

Budget Decision Unit(s): <u>All</u>

Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6

FBI SMS Objective(s): P-01, R-01

Organizational Program: Records Management

End State Capability <u>Infrastructure</u>

Program Increase: Positions ... Agt ... IA ... FTE ... Dollars \$9,000,000

(all non-personnel)

Description of Item

The FBI requests \$9,000,000 (all non-personnel) to support the continued development of the permanent FBI Central Records Complex (CRC). In preparation for the relocation of records to the CRC, a tremendous amount of work is necessary to prepare these records to be universally-searchable, accessible, and useful intelligence and investigative tools. The \$9,000,000 will provide the necessary funding to prepare an additional 18 linear miles of records for the transition including \$6,800,000 for contractor support to perform records indexing, appending metadata, and bar-coding files currently located in field offices and the Alexandria Records Center; \$1,216,000 for overtime costs of field office and headquarter personnel who will be required to assist with the project; \$700,000 for travel expenses for temporary field office assignments; \$160,000 for TRIM licenses and maintenance, which is a document record management software program used to input the file data collected during the inventory process that will interface with the Automated Storage and Retrieval System software and Sentinel; and \$124,000 for supplies needed to store and transport the files.

Justification

Approximately 178 linear miles of FBI records are decentralized in 265 locations around the world, which causes inefficiencies for the entire FBI on both an operational level and a financial level. Critical case and administrative data is contained in these files, which could be used for intelligence and investigative purposes. However, since file descriptive data (metadata) has not been captured, the content of the files is not fully known and therefore the data cannot be effectively searched or fully utilized. Currently, knowledge of a file's content is typically limited to the person who physically has that file. Time required to access files is long (typically 48 hours), and file access between field offices is difficult and rare. Records occupy significant floor space in the field, and in many cases expand well beyond the designated records storage spaces.

In addition to the under-utilization of data, long access times, and space issues with the current state of the files, none of the current file locations meet new National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) federal records standards, effective October 1, 2009. Records are currently exposed to adverse environmental conditions, are inadequately protected from fire, and are not properly safeguarded due to the condition of the storage facilities.

In order to reach the end-state vision of the CRC, the FBI's paper records currently sitting on shelves in over 265 dispersed locations worldwide must undergo an extensive inventory and purging process. The FBI is requesting additional resources for the critical next stage of the

CRC project, which will allow the files to be CRC-ready upon completion of the CRC construction planned for March 2012. As shown below, current typical FBI File Storage is far from being CRC-ready.



Alexandria Records Center (ARC)



Field Office files (Washington Field Office)

A series of processes are required in order for the files to be CRC-ready. An Inventory Team will extract metadata to make all of these records searchable, and proactively convert those paper files with a high probability of being requested by agents and analysts into electronic images. Completing these activities will drastically enhance the FBI's ability to perform its mission.

With the requested resources, files ready for relocation to the CRC will look like those shown in the photograph below. While the improved physical state, i.e, neatness and organization is easily visible, the work required to make these files the accessible intelligence and investigative tools that they will become through the development of the CRC is less apparent.




Files Prepared for Relocation to the CRC

The requested funding will support the time-intensive task of preparing the records of ten additional field offices to allow effective search-ability functions, and ultimately unprecedented accessibility upon relocation to the CRC. Specifically, the \$9,000,000 will allow for an additional 18 linear miles of records to be inventoried, sorted for appropriate disposition, barcoded, and most importantly, indexed to collect the metadata necessary for enhanced searchability and efficient records management.

Forty-three linear miles, which is equivalent to approximately 24.2 percent of the total amount of records, will be CRC ready by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2009. FY 2010 base funding will provide for the preparation of an additional 19 linear miles (10.6 percent). The requested \$9,000,000 will enable preparation of an additional 18 miles (10.2 percent) of the records, for a total of 80 linear miles (or 44.9 percent of the 178 total miles) prepared by the end of FY 2010, as shown in the chart below:

With requested resources, and full recurral through FY 2012, the FBI will accomplish file preparation requirements for anticipated opening of the CRC in 2012.



Impact on Performance (Relationship of Increase to Strategic Goals)

The CRC request supports DOJ Strategic Goals I and II. The primary purpose of the CRC is to consolidate all of the FBI's records in a single facility to allow for a rapid and thorough search and dissemination process. This enhancement will allow for the activities involved in the preparation of records to continue until all records that are to be relocated to the CRC are appropriately inventoried, bar-coded, and indexed. This preparation process is required in order to have a universal search capability and file accessibility. If the FBI does not receive the enhancement, the records inventory process will be delayed, which will impede the functionality of the CRC, and negatively impact the FBI's ability to support investigations, prosecutions, and intelligence sharing.

Funding

Base Funding

	FY 2008 Enacted (w/resc./supps)					FY 200	9 Enact	ed	FY 2010 Current Services			
	Pos	Agt	FTE	(\$000)	Pos Agt FTE (\$000)				Pos	Agt	FTE	(\$000)
Γ								\$5,060				\$7,997

Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (Change from 2010) (\$000)
Other Services (Contractor Support)	\$161,904	42	\$6,800	•••
Travel	n/a		700	•••
TRIM licenses and maintenance	n/a		160	•••
Supplies	n/a		124	•••
Overtime	n/a	n/a	1,216	•••
Total Non-Personnel			\$9,000	•••

	Pos	Agent	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)	
Current Services					\$7,997	\$7,997	
Increases					9,000	9,000	
Grand Total	•••	•••	•••	•••	\$16,997	\$16,997	

Item Name: 3rd Generation (3G) Wireless Networks

Budget Decision Unit(s): <u>Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence</u>

Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1, 2.3

FBI SMS Objectives(s): P-05, T-06, T-07

Organizational Program: Operational Technology
End State Capability Leveraging Technology

Program Increase: Positions ... Agt... FTE ... Dollars \$20,510,000 (all non-

personnel)

Please refer to the classified addendum for additional information on this request.

Description of Item

The FBI requests \$20,510,000 (all non-personnel) to ensure the FBI's capability to develop wireless tracking and intercept technologies for 3rd Generation (3G) wireless networks.

Justification

Without a proactive approach the FBI's ability to perform electronic surveillance (ELSUR) collection will be severely crippled because of the rapid evolution of advanced telecommunication technologies and the explosion in data and Internet Protocol (IP) based-communications and services (e.g., Voice-over-IP, Broadband Access, Peer-to-Peer, Wi-Fi). The complexity and volume of communication services and technologies available world-wide, in addition to the use of data security technologies widely available to national security and criminal targets (i.e., encryption, steganography), have increased dramatically in recent years and are expected to continue for the foreseeable future. The FBI is moving to an era rapidly shifting electronic surveillance collection requirements.

To address the imminent 3G wireless network technology gap, the FBI is coordinating with other Departments and agencies on the following areas:

- Developing wireless intercept and tracking techniques for 3G wireless communications networks.
- Providing field offices with advanced tools and techniques to enable 3G wireless intercept and tracking and ensure technicians and investigators are trained on the use of 3G wireless intercept and tracking systems.
- Providing 3G access, collection, and dissemination systems required to comply with the FBI's requirement to collect and disseminate intelligence across the Intelligence Community (IC).
- Strengthening liaison efforts with U.S. and foreign government agencies, as well as with commercial providers of wireless technologies.
- Developing more robust wireless exploitation capabilities.

<u>Impact on Performance (Relationship of Increase to Strategic Goals)</u>

These resources are directly related to DOJ Strategic Goal 1, "Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security." Electronic surveillance capabilities once enjoyed in the 2G wireless generation are no longer effective in the 3G generation. The service providers and equipment

manufacturers have already deployed new 3G capabilities as a way to generate additional revenue in the competitive telecommunications market. The release of the second generation Apple iPhone is a good example. The first release was a 2G model that did not possess the capabilities to stream video and high bandwidth content. With the release of the 3G model, additional capabilities allow the users to capitalize on features only available in the 3G world. The impact to the IC is severe. New features degrade the FBI's ability to track the movement of target handsets; degrade ability to access call content and data transmissions in a tactical environment; and, degrade ability to obtain identifying information of new handsets uses by targets. These capabilities are essential to conduct intelligence investigations, locate and apprehend criminals, and perform essential national security activities.

Funding

Base Funding

FY 2	FY 2008 Enacted (w/resc./supps)			FY 2009 Enacted				FY 2010 Current Services			
Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)	Pos Agt FTE \$(000)				Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)
			***	\$4,050							\$4,050

Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (Change from 2010) (\$000)
Engineering Services	n/a	n/a	\$20,510	
Total Non- Personnel			\$20,510	

	Pos	Agent	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)
Current Services					\$4,050	\$4,050
Increases					20,510	20,510
Grand Total	•••	•••	•••	•••	\$24,560	\$24,560

Item Name: <u>Advanced Electronic Surveillance</u>

Budget Decision Unit(s): All
Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1, 2.3

FBI SMS Objectives(s): A-01, A-02, P-05, T-06, T-07 Organizational Program: Operational Technology

End State Capability <u>Surveillance</u>

Program Increase: Positions ... Agt ... FTE ... Dollars \$9,000,000

(all non-personnel)

Please refer to the classified addendum for additional information on this request.

Description of Item

The FBI requests \$9,000,000 (all non-personnel) for Advanced Electronic Surveillance, otherwise known as the FBI's Going Dark Program. This program supports the FBI's electronic surveillance (ELSUR), intelligence collection and evidence gathering capabilities, as well as those of the greater Intelligence Community (IC).

Funding

Base Funding

FY 20	008 Ena	cted (w	v/resc./supps)		FY 2009 Enacted				FY 2010 Current Services				
Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)	Pos Agt FTE \$(000)				Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)		
119	15	119	\$223,446	133	15	126	\$233,370	133	15	133	\$233,932		

Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (Change from 2010) (\$000)
Engineering Services	n/a	n/a	\$7,000	
Equipment	n/a	n/a	2,000	•••
Total Non-Personnel			\$9,000	•••

	Pos	Agt	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)
Current Services	118	15	133	\$18,889	\$215,043	\$233,932
Increases		•••		•••	9,000	9,000
Grand Total	118	15	133	\$18,889	\$224,043	\$242,932

Item Name: <u>Surveillance</u>

Budget Decision Unit(s): <u>All</u>

Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1, 1.4, 2.3

FBI SMS Objective(s): A-01, P-04, P-05, P-06, T-01, T-02, T-05, T-06, T-07
Organizational Program: Critical Incident Response Group, Counterintelligence

End State Capability: <u>Surveillance</u>

Program Increase: Positions 75 Agt 12 IA ... FTE 38 Dollars \$23,531,000

(\$10,050,000 non-personnel)

Please refer to the classified addendum for additional information on this request.

Description of Item

The FBI requests 75 positions (12 Agents) and \$23,531,000 (\$10,050,000 non-personnel) to enhance and support the surveillance capabilities of the Special Operations Group (SOG), the Special Surveillance Group (SSG), and the Aviation Program.

With full law-enforcement powers and abilities, SOG Agents provide surveillance coverage of counterterrorism and criminal matters in instances where the potential for violence or the need to stop, intercede, or detain subjects may occur. Twelve Agent positions and associated equipment funds are requested to address un-worked surveillance requests, by placing a SOG team in both the Los Angeles Field Office (LA) and Washington Field Office (WFO).

The Aviation Program serves as a force multiplier for the SOG and SSG ground surveillance teams. Aviation assets also provide an irreplaceable alternative when ground surveillance is not possible, or where a high probability of counter-surveillance exists. Resources are requested for critical shortfalls in the Aviation program, to include aircraft maintenance and Gulfstream-V fuel/maintenance.

Justification

The purpose of the Surveillance and Aviation Program is to provide surveillance and mobility capabilities to FBI investigations. These capabilities are provided by ground surveillance teams of SSG/SOG supported by aviation assets used as force multipliers. Each program within the FBI requires surveillance support to some degree during the intelligence collection and investigative process.

Operational Requirements - \$4,900,000 (all non-personnel)

Physical surveillance teams require fuel and equipment to perform their jobs. As the need for surveillance increases, it is important to have fuel and equipment funding to meet those requirements. Additionally, due to the number of requests for surveillance and the lack of personnel to perform them, overtime funding is required to allow existing teams to perform additional and extended shifts.

Special Operations Group (SOG) – 12 Agents

Each SOG team is composed of nine Agents: six ground Agents and three Agent-pilots. The FBI allocates its SOG resources to field offices to ensure they are quickly available to address priority threats anywhere in the country.

The enhancement request of 12 SOG Agents will allow for six SOG Agent positions each to be placed in the LA and Washington Field Offices, adding one ground team each. LA and WFO are two of the FBI's largest offices with the greatest surveillance gaps across all investigative programs. Statistics indicate that 52.3 percent of the LA office's surveillance needs are unaddressed and 24.6 percent of WFO's surveillance needs are unaddressed.

The requested resources would be leveraged for maximum benefit through a deployment strategy that emphasizes concentration of SOG teams in larger field offices. There is a greater demand for surveillance in the larger offices, and concentrating SOG resources would also allow flexibility in supporting the surveillance needs of smaller field offices. The proportional effect on overall surveillance capabilities is more easily handled by offices with a greater number of personnel at their disposal.

Special Surveillance Group - Please refer to the Classified Addendum

SSG resources are strategically placed throughout the country to ensure effective, timely, and robust responses in support of the FBI's and the Intelligence Community's (IC) most significant and sensitive investigations.

Surveillance-Aviation Program - \$5,150,000 (non-personnel)

Aircraft surveillance has become an indispensable intelligence collection and investigative technique which serves as a force multiplier to the ground teams. Utilization of the FBI's 115 surveillance aircraft is leveraged between support of the SOGs and SSGs based on priorities set by the program offices. This request of \$2,000,000 for aircraft maintenance and \$3,150,000 for Gulfstream-V fuel and maintenance addresses critical shortfalls of the FBI's Surveillance-Aviation program.

The FBI's current fleet of 90 Cessna 180/210 aircraft is an average of 25 years old. The older the aircraft, the more down-time an aircraft requires for proper maintenance and attention. For example, an aircraft a 25 years is unavailable 30 percent of the time due to the required maintenance, and therefore the annual cost of maintenance grows with age. These aircraft are required to undergo flight hour maintenance cycles to meet safety standards for FAA certification; these safety inspections are required at the 25, 50, and 100 hour intervals. Additionally, every 2,000 flight hours requires an engine overhaul. An increase of \$2,000,000 is required to meet FAA standards and ensure the safety of pilots flying those aircraft.

The FBI also requests \$3,150,000 to establish a base to operate the Gulfstream (G-V) on an annual basis with fuel, maintenance, and pilot training. Aviation missions transport personnel for counterterrorism operations throughout the world, and increasing usage of the G-V has placed a strain on available maintenance/fuel funds necessary to successfully carry out crucial missions. The requested funding would allow the FBI to continue these deployments. The following are the costs included for the annual operation and maintenance of the G-V:

- Fuel, \$2,000,000: 500 gallons per flight hour at 800 hours at \$5 per gallon
- Maintenance, \$932,000: \$432,000 for Corporate Care engine maintenance (\$540 per flight hour at 800 hours), plus the annual estimate of \$500,000 for airframe maintenance
- Training, \$218,000: Ten pilots at \$21,840 each

Impact on Performance (Relationship of Increase to Strategic Goals)

The FBI's surveillance programs directly relate to DOJ Strategic Goal 1, "Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security," and Goal 2, "Prevent Crime, Enforce Federal Laws and Represent the Rights and Interests of the American People." Surveillance is required in high priority national security and criminal investigations. Without the requested resources, gaps will continue to exist in the FBI's surveillance programs. These gaps are detailed below.

*GAP: Special Operations Group and Special Surveillance Group*Please refer to the classified addendum for additional information on this request.

GAP: Surveillance-Aviation Program

In FY 2007, HQ aircraft received 1,131 flight requests, flew 676 flights (60 percent) and could not fly 455 flights (40 percent). Also in FY 2007, field aircraft received 10,596 flight requests, flew 2,009 flights (19 percent) and could not fly 8,587 flights (81 percent) due to a lack of manpower, aircraft, and the required operational funds.

The above requested items in support of the FBI's Surveillance and Aviation Program address critical gaps, and addressing these will in turn help address the surveillance needs and shortfalls of the FBI. Physical surveillance enhanced through aircraft provides more effective direction of resources due to the ability to surveil a larger area at once and gather more data points for the best use of resources. Integrating ground and aviation teams allows for fewer people than would otherwise be required. Moreover, there is greater physical and operational security with the decreased chance of detection. The SOGs and SSGs are required to maintain a 24/7 capability which requires three teams on 8-hour shifts. Without sufficient aviation maintenance and vehicle fuel, these surveillance teams will not have sufficient resources to sustain or increase surveillance capabilities.

SOG/SSG resources are required to be deployed on TDY around the country to augment priority cases, understaffed field offices, or those with no established SOG/SSG resources. In field offices with more than one SOG/SSG team, with the increased demand on surveillance resources to support other field offices these teams are unable to adequately support "home based" cases.

SOG and SSG teams are heavily integrated in the FBI's most sensitive Counterintelligence, Counterterrorism, and Criminal investigations. The impact of SOG/SSG not getting the resources requested is that more critical surveillance requests will go unaddressed or underaddressed. This also results in increased TDY costs for the FBI's operational divisions. The program can not provide sufficient personnel on a permanent basis and can only deploy the existing personnel on a temporary basis to the locations with highest priority cases.

Funding

Base Funding

FY 2008 Enacted (w/resc./supps)					FY 20	009 Enac	ted	FY 2010 Current Services				
Pos	Agt	FTE	(\$000)	Pos	Pos Agt FTE (\$000)				Agt	FTE	(\$000)	
1,022	53	1,007	\$127,073	1,108	1,065	\$164,199	1,108	53	1,108	\$161,031		

Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Please refer to the classified addendum for further information on this request.

Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (Change from 2010) (\$000)
Equipment	n/a	n/a	\$200	(\$150)
Fuel	n/a	n/a	4,121	•••
Overtime	n/a	n/a	579	•••
Aircraft Maintenance	n/a	n/a	2,000	•••
Gulfstream-V fuel	n/a	n/a	2,000	•••
Gulfstream-V Maintenance and Training	n/a	n/a	1,150	•••
Total Non-Personnel			\$10,050	(\$150)

	Pos	Agt	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)
Current Services	1,108	53	1108	\$107,046	\$53,985	\$161,031
Increases	75	12	38	13,481	10,050	23,531
Grand Total	1,183	65	1,146	\$120,527	\$64,035	\$184,562

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Item Name: <u>National Security Training / Career Path</u>

Budget Decision Unit(s): <u>All</u>

Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6

FBI SMS Objective(s): T-02, T-04, T-07

Organizational Program: Training, Human Resources, Laboratory, and Security

End State Capability: Workforce

Program Increase: Positions 32 Agt 1 IA ... FTE 16 Dollars \$25,113,000

(\$21,898,000 non-personnel)

Description of Item

The FBI requests 32 positions (1 Agent) and \$25,113,000 (\$21,898,000 non-personnel) to support the National Security Training and Career Path Initiative. The FBI requests \$21,898,000 in non-personnel to accomplish strategic hiring goals and objectives and implement Career Path training for Special Agents (SAs) and Professional Support, including Intelligence Analysts (IAs). Included in this request is \$1,000,000 and 2 positions (1 Agent) in support of the FBI Laboratory's development of forensic career path training as well as 25 additional positions to process the increasing background investigation (BI) workload and 5 positions to address the projected 3,500 Post Adjudicative Risk Management (PARM) cases.

Justification

The FBI's focus on enhancing national security capabilities and the prevention of terrorism has required significant changes in its recruitment and training strategies. It is the goal of the FBI to recruit and hire the most qualified candidates and provide those new hires with the appropriate virtual and classroom training programs that help ensure a highly trained and qualified workforce to combat asymmetric threats from terrorists, cyber criminals, and foreign counterintelligence operations. Currently, the FBI's base funding is not sufficient to conduct the robust marketing and recruiting required for critical FBI positions. In addition, further resources for employee training will ensure that once hired, employees will acquire the ability to become experts in their respective program areas and gain the proficiency needed to fulfill the FBI's new mission and priorities.

Strategic Recruiting – \$4,908,000 (non-personnel)

The FBI's focus on enhancing national security capabilities and prevention of terrorism has required substantial changes in its recruitment plan since September 11, 2001. This initiative will fund more robust marketing of FBI employment opportunities through print, Internet, radio ads, conferences, and career fairs. In addition to attending conventions and career fairs throughout the United States, funding is requested to expand the FBI's Collegiate Marketing and Recruitment Program. With university and college partnerships, the FBI will be able to provide program participants with a valuable and informative experience, and encourage students to consider the FBI. This request will also increase the supply of new recruits possessing particular skills in areas such as intelligence, computer science, engineering, foreign languages, and science.

Background Investigations – 25 positions and \$2,375,000 (all personnel)

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 mandates that 90 percent of all background investigations be completed within 60 days by 2009. The capacity of the current permanent workforce of 174 Personnel Security Specialists is 18,270 background

investigations cases per year. The FY 2008 hiring initiative required the temporary reassignment of approximately 70 personnel from other critical Security program priorities to process applicant cases. This realignment created a backlog of approximately 7,000 other background investigations (contractors, Other Government Agency personnel, reinvestigations, Joint Terrorism Task Force and Other Task Force Officers). An increase in personnel resources is essential to successfully meet IRTPA mandates, perform external FBI responsibilities, support joint task forces, and achieve the hiring requirements of the FBI.

Post Adjudicative Risk Management (PARM) Program – 5 positions and \$475,000 (all personnel) The FBI is requesting five positions for internal security risk assessment. After the initial hiring process, this program will monitor high risk employees and contractors who have foreign influence, complex adverse financial situations, or other risks that impact clearance retention and access to national security information. The current processing capacity of existing staff, without the enhancement, is approximately 500 cases per year. By FY 2010, the PARM caseload is anticipated to be 3,500 due to the current first-generation American hiring initiative. Based on FY 2010 projections, the FBI will also be unable to process 9,850 background investigations and will risk violation of the IRTPA.

Career Path Training – \$15,774,000 (non-personnel)

The Professional Support (including Intelligence Analysts) and Special Agent Career Path Development Programs are the FBI's primary tools for building a cadre of more highly skilled employees and leaders within the FBI. Through the Career Path Programs, employees will have the opportunity to identify and plan which positions are in their career path, determine what type of competencies they need to develop for performance and career advancement, and receive the appropriate training to leverage their skills and attain their career goals. The Career Paths will also facilitate career development both vertically and horizontally within the FBI. Unfortunately, current funding levels for training are not sufficient to meet the growing need for career development plans. Below is a chart showing the overall gap, by Career Path, measured by the total training requirement less the current base funding:

Career Path	Ва	ase Funding	F	Funding Requirement	F	Y10 Request
Special Agent Career Path Program						
Agent - Counterintelligence	\$	7,547,579	\$	9,948,356	\$	2,400,777
Agent - Counterterrorism	\$	6,676,788	\$	9,190,463	\$	2,513,676
Agent - Intelligence	\$	23,482,500	\$	24,350,148	\$	867,648
Agent - Criminal	\$	2,303,022	\$	4,853,708	\$	2,550,686
Agent - Cyber	\$	10,844,082	\$	11,880,459	\$	1,036,377
Sub-total	\$	50,853,971	\$	60,223,134	\$	9,369,163
Professional Support Career Path Pr	ogr	ram				
Intelligence Career Service	\$	12,883,325	\$	13,768,469	\$	885,144
Administrative	\$	1,583,575	\$	4,270,085	\$	2,686,510
Communications and Public Affairs	\$	111,394	\$	181,034	\$	69,640
Facilities & Logistical Support	\$	163,194	\$	247,657	\$	84,463
Finance & Budget	\$	261,506	\$	642,380	\$	380,873
Human Resources	\$	156,976	\$	524,308	\$	367,332
Information Technology	\$	13,562,335	\$	13,987,449	\$	425,115
Investigative Support & Analysis	\$	4,400,643	\$	5,093,431	\$	692,789
Legal & Acquisition Services	\$	388,148	\$	739,651	\$	351,503
Science & Technology	\$	2,033,733	\$	2,270,129	\$	236,396
Security	\$	2,355,594	\$	2,515,945	\$	160,351
Trades	\$	225,171	\$	289,893	\$	64,722
Sub-total	\$	38,125,594	\$	44,530,431	\$	6,404,838
TOTAL ALL CAREER PATHS	\$	88,979,565	\$	104,753,565	\$	15,774,000

The above funding requirement for each of the Special Agent or Professional Support Career paths was projected based on four criteria: required courses, recommended courses, commercial courses, and Distance Learning/Virtual Academy. A sufficient base funding source must be established in order to address the annual requirements for training and career development of FBI employees.

Forensic Analysis Specialty Career Path Training – 2 positions (1 Agent) and \$1,365,000 (\$1,000,000 non-personnel)

The FBI anticipates a growing demand for forensics and crime scene training services as a result of emerging national security threats. This request is the first step toward providing forensic training and implementing a Science and Technology career path for the FBI operational response and forensic analysis workforce by 2012. The Laboratory Division will be required to provide forensics and crime scene training as well as training associated with the Evidence Response Team, Hazardous Materials Response Team, and Underwater Search and Evidence Response Team work specialties. The Science career development program will require \$1,000,000 in FY 2010 to allow acquisition of contract services to assist in applying identified core competencies. This support will help agents become more adept at recognizing and collecting evidence, and become informed and educated users of the FBI Laboratory services.

Impact on Performance (Relationship to Strategic Goals)

The success of the FBI's mission depends upon the ability to recruit the appropriate candidates with mission-critical skills, investigate those hired, and provide training and career development for all personnel. Without this enhancement, the FBI will not be able to meet its aggressive hiring goals for Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, and Professional Support staff. Without additional funding, the FBI will not be able to fully pursue a workforce renewal strategy based on building relationships with universities and with other targeted groups, which will provide significant cost savings in overall salary and benefits.

The FBI's ability to review and investigate all BI anomalies that are indicators of risks to national security and the FBI information, systems, and facilities would be limited without the enhancement. The increase in caseload without additional resources would adversely impact the FBI's ability to comply with proactive security measures identified in the Webster Commission and Rand Report.

If the enhancement is not received, the FBI would be delayed in the development of more highly skilled employees and leaders within its Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Counterterrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction subprograms that comprise the FBI's National Security Branch, and within the Criminal and Cyber subprograms that comprise the Criminal, Cyber, Response and Services Branch.

Absent a Career Path for the science workforce, the FBI Laboratory risks losing trained and experienced Forensic Examiners and Scientists to other agencies and the private sector. Loss of these specialized personnel would adversely affect FBI operations due to lack of resources (experienced Special Agents, Forensic Examiners, and Scientists) needed to fight terrorism and protect the citizens of the United States. A formal Science Career Path is a necessary investment to ensure both the retention of existing personnel and the recruitment of new employees.

Funding

Base Funding

FY 2008 Enacted (w/resc./supps)				FY 2009 Enacted				FY 2010 Current Services			
Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)	Pos Agt FTE \$(000)				Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)
389	23	389	\$166,221	407	23	398	\$175,609	407	23	407	\$177,718

Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Type of Position	Modular Cost per Position (\$000)	Number of Positions Requested	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (change from 2010) (\$000)
HQ Special Agent	\$270	1	\$270	(\$9)
Professional Support	2,945	31	2,945	2,139
Total Personnel		32	\$3,215	\$2,130

Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (Change from 2010) (\$000)
Advertising	n/a	n/a	\$1,500	•••
Career Fair/Liaison/Partnerships	n/a	n/a	450	•••
EdVenture Partners Program	n/a	n/a	774	
Training	n/a	n/a	1,615	
Contractor Support	95,000	6	569	
Career Path Training	12,174,000	1	12,174	
Distance Learning	3,600,000	1	3,600	
Science Career Path Services	n/a	n/a	1,000	•••
Career Path IT Planning Factor	n/a	n/a	216	
Total Non-Personnel			\$21,898	•••

	Pos	Agt	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)
Current Services	407	23	407	\$40,530	\$135,940	\$176,470
Increases	32	1	16	3,215	21,898	25,113
Grand Total	439	24	423	\$43,745	\$157,838	\$201,583

Item Name: Overseas Contingency Operations

Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1, 1.2, 1.4

FBI SMS Objective(s): A-01, P-01, P-03, P-04, P-05, P-06, P-07, P-08, P-09, P-12,

T-02, T-05, T-06, T-07

Organizational Program: Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Intelligence, Critical

<u>Incident Response Group, Office of International Operations,</u> Operational Technology, Facilities and Logistics Services,

Training, Criminal Justice Information Services

Program Increase: Positions ... Agt ... IA ... FTE ... Dollars \$101,066,000 (all

non-personnel)

Description of Item

The FBI requests \$101,066,000 (all non-personnel) to sustain FBI efforts previously supported through annual supplemental appropriations.

Justification

The FBI is responsible for supporting counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and other international locations. This request includes funding to support FBI operations in Afghanistan, international deployment activities, overtime and hazardous duty pay, and other counterterrorism-related requirements.

Impact on Performance (Relationship to Strategic Goals)

These resources are directly related to DOJ Strategic Goal 1, "Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security" and will enable the FBI to continue to provide strategic support to overseas operations.

Funding

Base Funding


FY 2008 Enacted (w/resc./supps)			FY 2009 Enacted			FY 2010 Current Services					
Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)	Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)	Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)
			\$106,122				\$82,600				\$82,600


Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (Change from 2010) (\$000)
Overseas Contingency Operations	n/a	n/a	\$101,066	

	Pos	Agt	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)
Current Services					\$82,600	\$82,600
Offset					(82,600)	(82,600)
Increases					101,066	101,066
Grand Total	•••	•••	•••	•••	\$101,066	\$101,066

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION





Item Name: Biometrics Technology Center (BTC)

Budget Decision Unit(s): <u>All</u>

Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1, 2.1, 2.2

FBI SMS Objective(s): T-5; A-1; A-2; A-3; A-4

Organizational Program: <u>Criminal Justice Information Services</u>

End State Capability <u>Infrastructure</u>

Program Increase: Positions ... Agt ... IA ... FTE ... Dollars \$97,605,000 (all

non-personnel)

Description of Item

The FBI requests \$97,605,000 to support Phase III construction of a BTC at the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division complex in Clarksburg, WV. Of this amount, \$30,000,000 will be provided by the Department of Defense (DoD) for the joint DoD/DOJ/FBI project. The BTC will be a collaborative effort between the FBI and DoD to serve as the center for biometric research and development. Efforts to collect and search biometric information by utilizing biometric tools and services are critical in the war on terror. The BTC will house new CJIS information technology and biometric initiatives, to include the Biometric Center of Excellence, which will coordinate biometrics research and development efforts for the FBI, and accommodate an alternate Continuity of Operations Plan for many FBIHQ personnel. The BTC will also house the DoD Biometrics Fusion Center (managed and funded by DoD). The BTC will provide 300,000 square feet for the FBI and 60,000 square feet for DoD which will provide the infrastructure support (e.g., utilities, central plant, parking areas) for these critically needed biometric capabilities.

Once complete, the BTC will provide the infrastructure support to unify an overarching biometrics strategy serving the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, the DoD, the Intelligence Community, state and local law enforcement partners, and international partners. Including both DoD and FBI personnel, the BTC will house almost 2,000 personnel.

Justification

Biometric technologies and services are critical to operations throughout law enforcement and terrorism prevention. Emphasis on terrorism and intelligence capabilities is driving requirements beyond the established field of fingerprints to include such modes as face and iris. However, much research and coordination, including evaluation of interoperable large-scale multi-modal systems and consideration of societal concerns, must be accomplished to ensure varying biometrics technologies can be deployed in a cost-effective manner. These emerging biometrics technologies are hampered by the lack of space at the current FBI facility. The BTC will fill this gap. The new BTC will allow the FBI to expand its current operations, while expanding into new fields of biometrics. The center will also allow for product certification, training programs, standards development, privacy rights, as well as research and development of emerging biometric technologies.

Current efforts with outside agencies include the FBI and DoD collaboration in the Middle East, where they have been collecting and searching biometric information together for several years. This effort has shown the critical role emerging biometric technology has played in the war against terrorism. Information collected in Iraq and Afghanistan is transmitted via mobile biometric devices to global databases at the FBI CJIS Division main facility, which houses the

largest centralized collection of biometric information in the world. This biometric information is searched and matching results are relayed to units back in the field to assist in their operations and investigations.

That is just one example of how the FBI is working with outside agencies; but without further support, rapid advances in biometric technologies threaten to outpace the FBI's capabilities. The construction of the BTC will provide the following benefits: 1) safety and integrity of the FBI's systems, equipment, records, and personnel; 2) two biometric operations will be jointly located in one facility; 3) expansion capabilities; 4) COOP facility; 5) ensure the FBI continues its recognition as a leader in biometrics identification; 6) consolidate the Science and Technology (S&T) Branch (biometric) tasks to collectively exploit projects to the customers; 7) consolidate the efforts of the S&T Branch to support intelligence, investigative, and criminal environments by providing on target biometrics services; 8) spearhead biometrics collaboration with other government agencies; 9) address FBI strategic priorities; and 10) ensure more efficient and effective operations.

The FBI is utilizing the following incremental approach for the completion of the BTC:

Phase I: Design Services: This phase is currently under way and included the award of an Architect, Engineering, and Planning (AEP) contract, which will provide full design service package, programming, concept, schematic, and construction documents. During this phase, the requirements (i.e., space, building, site, and infrastructure) for the BTC were defined. In addition, the concepts portion of this phase developed potential sites and building schemes. From this phase, the FBI approved a concept for the BTC and the AEP firm will continue schematic development. Preliminary scaled plan sketches, building outlines, and details of the facility will be developed in this phase, including facility configuration, building, structural, electrical, mechanical, and plumbing systems. Finally, in the construction documents portion of this phase, the preparation of project design drawings, specifications, and bidding documents will be delivered.

Phase II: Preliminary Site Work: Preliminary site work will begin in this phase and is expected to be completed by FY 2010. This preliminary work will include parking areas, site work and support services.

<u>Phase III: Actual Construction:</u> This phase includes actual construction of the BTC. The requested funding of \$97,605,000 (\$30,000,000 provided by the DoD for the joint DoD/DOJ/FBI project) is critical toward project completion.

<u>Impact on Performance (Relationship of Increase to Strategic Goals)</u>

This request supports Goal 1, "Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security," and Goal 2, "Prevent Crime, Enforce Federal Laws, and Represent the Rights and Interests of the American People." Without a newly constructed building, co-location of the two agencies' biometric operations, the DoD's Biometrics Fusion Center and the FBI's Biometric Center of Excellence, will not occur. Lack of a combined effort will directly debilitate advanced centralized biometric services (e.g., facial scans, retina scans, DNA, etc.) that will be provided to other agencies. Also, without additional funding, schedule slippages would occur, delaying the construction of the BTC. As with most large dollar construction projects, a number of years are required to complete programming, environmental, design, and construction stages. Without this funding, project costs would increase due to inflation, passage of new regulations and/or

environmental laws, and worldwide shortages of construction material, most notably steel and wood. In addition, without additional funding, the FBI will not be able to ensure the security and safety of FBI personnel and its records and the FBI will be unable to accommodate the expansion of existing programs and the development of new initiatives. For example, additional space is needed for the major upgrade or replacement of the current IAFIS, referred to as Next Generation Identification (NGI), including the infrastructure and personnel to design, program, maintain, and work on the system.

Funding

Base Funding

FY	2008 E	nacted ((w/resc./supps)	FY 2009 Enacted					FY 2010 Current Services				
Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)	Pos Agt FTE \$(000)				Pos	Agt	FTE	\$(000)		
4		4	\$86,340	4		4	\$350	4		4	\$361		

Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (Change from 2010) (\$000)
Construction Work In Progress	n/a	n/a	\$97,605	
Total Non- Personnel	n/a	n/a	\$97,605	

Total Request for this Item

	Pos	Agent	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)
Current Services	4		4	\$361		\$361
Increases					97,605	97,605
Grand Total	4		4	\$361	\$97,605	\$97,966

Item Name: FBI Academy Training Facility A&E Study

Budget Decision Unit(s): All
Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): All

FBI SMS Objective(s): R-02, T-01, T-02, T-03, T-04, T-05, T-06, T-07
Organizational Program: Training, Facilities and Logistics Services Divisions

End State Capability: <u>Infrastructure</u>

Program Increase: Positions ... Agt ... IA ... Dollars \$10,000,000 (all non-

personnel)


Description of Item

The FBI requests \$10,000,000 to conduct an Architecture and Engineering (A&E) study, to determine the requirements to expand its FBI Academy training facilities on the Quantico Marine Corps Base. This A&E design effort would ensure that the proposed building meets Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) silver requirements, and would include an infrastructure review to determine that the new building will not exceed the infrastructure capacity (sewage, electrical, water, etc.) of the FBI Academy.

The FBI needs to expand its training facilities to provide additional lodging and classroom space. Construction of the new facilities, based on the results of the A&E study, would result in cost savings by accommodating students on campus rather than at off-site hotels. In advance of official A&E cost estimates, it is anticipated that this facility would include:

- 250 rooms (500 beds)
- 12 secure classrooms (50 students each)
- 8 secure classrooms (25 students each)
- 10-15 breakout rooms (8-10 students each)
- 250 student conference room
- 500 student cafeteria (dining hall and kitchen)

Proposed Quantico Training Facility Timeline



Justification

The FBI Academy is at maximum capacity. The FBI Academy began its legacy at the Quantico Marine Corps Base in 1940, complete with firing ranges, two classrooms, dining, and a dormitory for 64 students. In 1972, the FBI expanded the Academy to include two dormitories and more classroom space. By 1988, another dormitory was added to increase the bed space at the Academy to 910 beds. Since 1988, the available bed-space at the Academy has remained at 910 beds or less, during renovations of older buildings and rooms. With the extensive growth of the FBI's mission and workforce since 9/11, the lack of Academy capacity has necessitated the use of temporary classroom structures at Quantico or in private sector space, with students being housed in local area hotels.

Training Volume Continues to Increase

The charts below show the growth in the overall FBI workforce and in key occupational categories. However, not only has the size of the FBI's workforce increased in recent years, so has the length of the training programs such as new Agents and Intelligence Analysts (IA). This has significantly increased the total training weeks per year, and creates scheduling constraints at the Academy.

FRI'c	Incressing	Workforce:	FV	2001-2009
T DI 5	mer casing	WOLKIULCE.	T I	4001-400 <i>7</i>


	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Special Agent	10,344	10,531	11,035	11,539	11,915	12,212	12,213	11,945	12,325
Intelligence Analyst	1	1,156	1,323	2,140	2,314	2,402	2,402	2,376	2,635
Professional Support	14,315	13,641	14,247	15,156	15,810	16,742	16,744	15,890	16,534
Total	24,659	25,328	26,605	28,835	30,039	31,356	31,359	30,211	31,494


The below chart shows the combined impact of the increase in workforce size and longer training classes that are necessary to prepare new Agents and IAs for the challenges they face.

	N	EW AGE	NTS	INTEL	ANALY	STS- IBC	
Year	# Agents Trained	Length of Training	Training Weeks Per Year*	# IAs Trained	Length of Training	Training Weeks Per Year*	TOTAL NAT/IA TRAINING WEEKS PER YEAR
1995	708	16	11,328	-	-	-	11,328
2006	728	18	13,104	365	6	2,190	15,294
2008	950	20	19,000	240	11	2,640	21,640

^{*} Training Weeks Per year = Number trained x Length of training

As the size and length of FBI training grows, near full occupancy creates scheduling conflicts amongst the competing student groups and has become a significant concern at the FBI Academy. The below pie charts are FBI Academy lodging and classroom capacity reports for an averaged five month period (1/14/08 - 6/16/08). Due to the age of the facilities, scheduled and unplanned renovations account for eight percent of space for both beds and classrooms. Although the Academy is at maximum capacity, a "vacancy" still occurs because 100 percent occupancy is a scheduling impossibility.






For a recent example, during the week of 5/5/2008 there were eight New Agent classes, a National Academy class, and two Intelligence Basic Courses (IBCs) for IAs all being trained simultaneously at the FBI Academy. These "core" requirements took up 787 of the 910 available beds; taking into account the 81 beds down for renovations left only 42 beds available for other training.

Lodging Capacity

The 910 bed capacity at the FBI Academy is not sufficient for the training demand; therefore many training courses are pushed out onto the local economy ("regionals"). Adding a 500 bed dormitory would ensure that core requirements which receive scheduling priority, such as entrylevel training (New Agents, IBCs, Staff Operations Specialists, National Academy, and Counterintelligence) can be accommodated on-campus. The remaining balance of the beds would be used to host Career Path / regional training, most of which is currently conducted off-campus.

The below graph shows that at present, core requirements are narrowly able to all be accommodated at the Academy (falling below the red capacity line), and a few of these entry-level classes may be pushed out into local hotels depending on the Academy schedule's timing. The graph shows that without the addition of a 500 bed dormitory, a significant amount of the FBI's "other" training (non-entry level, i.e. Career Path, conferences, etc.) falls above the red capacity line and therefore cannot take place at the Academy. The 500 bed dormitory would ensure that there is sufficient lodging space for all entry-level training, as well as "other" (non-core) training to take place at the Academy.



Lodging Requirements

To put the "core" (must take place at Academy) versus "non-core" (could take place at Academy) training volume into perspective, the below (Chart A) shows the number of training weeks required by each core training area, to explain the lack of bed space at the Academy for regional/other training (Chart B).

Chart A.		FY 2008			FY 2009			FY 2010		
PROGRAM	TOTAL STUDENTS TRAINED	LENGTH OF TRAINING (Weeks)	TOTAL BED WEEKS / YEAR	TOTAL STUDENTS TRAINED	LENGTH OF TRAINING (Weeks)	TOTAL BED WEEKS / YEAR	TOTAL STUDENTS TRAINED	LENGTH OF TRAINING (Weeks)	TOTAL BED WEEKS / YEAR	
New Agent	950	20	19,000	1,200	20	24,000	1,300	20	26,000	
Intel Analyst (IBC)	240	11	2,640	576	11	6,336	576	11	6,336	
Staff Op. Specialist	100	4	400	300	4	1,200	450	4	1,800	
National Academy	1,100	10	11,000	1,100	10	11,000	1,100	10	11,000	
Counterintelligence	688	2	1,376	688	2	1,376	688	2	1,376	
Renovations	80	52	4,160	80	52	4,160	80	52	4,160	
Misc. (set aside)	10	52	520	10	52	520	10	52	520	
Core Training Bed Weeks/Year			39,096			48,592			51,192	

Chart B.	F'	FY 2008			FY 2009			FY 2010 and beyond		
TRAINING WEEKS / YEAR	Currer (910 bed		_		Current (910 beds)	_		Current (910 beds)	_	
Available Bed Weeks (Beds X 50 weeks)	45,5	00	70,500	П	45,500	70,500	П	45,500	70,500	
Minus: Core Requirements (QT)	39,0	96	39,096		48,592	48,592		51,192	51,192	
Available bed weeks for regional training	6,4	04	31,404		(3,092)	21,908		(5,692)	19,308	

The above demonstrates that for FY 2008, with 910 beds, there were only 6,404 bed weeks available for "other" regional training to take place at the Academy. With the 500 bed addition, there would be 31,404 bed weeks available. By 2010, without the 500 bed addition, 5,692 bed weeks for the "core" requirements (i.e. New Agents) will be pushed out of the Academy and into local hotels. With the 500 bed addition, there would be 19,308 bed weeks available to bring in regional training to the Academy. From 2005 to 2008, there has been a 200.97 percent increase in the number of regional training events (19,851 to 39,894). With the bed and classrooms that this proposed Training Facility provides, it would be possible to host more of these regional training events at the FBI Academy campus. This results in cost-savings which are outlined in Appendix A.

Classroom Capacity

Currently the FBI Academy has (12) 50-student, and (4) 24-student secure classrooms. These resources allow the Academy to support a maximum of (12) 50 student classes (i.e. 9 New Agent classes and 3 Intelligence Basic courses) concurrently. The (4) 24-student classrooms are used as breakout rooms for the Intelligence Basic Courses. New Agent Training (NATs) and IAs follow different curriculums and each course is on a different training schedule. As a result, the Academy can currently only have (9) NATs and up to (3) IAs compete for the same limited resources at the same time.

The proposed facility would increase classroom capacity with an additional (12) 50-student and (8) 25-student secure classrooms, in addition to (10-15) smaller breakout rooms for these classes. This would allow the Academy to support a total of (24) 50-student classes and (8) 24- student classes simultaneously. Beginning in FY 2009, the IA-IBC doubled in class size (from 24 to 48). This has made it even more critical to accommodate more 50-student classrooms, in order to avoid scheduling conflicts.

The proposed 250-student conference room would be equipped with air-walls, allowing the possibility of up to (5) 50-student classrooms. This conference room is intended to also draw in regional training which is currently hosted around the country due to a lack of conference space at the Academy. On average, the FBI hosts (40) 100-person regional conferences per month. With more bed space, and the 100-person conference room, more in-services could be held at the Academy.

Classroom Requirements

The proposed training space will be equipped with more up-to-date technology and training equipment, as shown below. In particular, the proposed classrooms reflect the FBI's increased requirement for thin-client classrooms, which are secure computer rooms which permit both Trilogy and internet to run on the same computers. These secure classrooms will alleviate scheduling constraints for the NAT, IA, and other classes who require this technology during their training.

Then	Now
Unsecure lecture rooms	 Secure classrooms, and entire Secure floors
Overhead and movie projectors	 DVD projectors
Chalkboards	 Magnetized whiteboards
Workstation: basic computer	 Workstation: FBInet and Unclassified Internet
Only several hours of computer training in one	Secure FBInet and Internet computer training
CBT (Computer Based Training) room	(92% IA, 56% NAT in thin-client)

Cafeteria

The proposed cafeteria and dining hall is designed to serve 500 students. The existing FBI Academy cafeteria was designed to serve two shifts of 360 (total of 720 students), but the addition of the 1988 Jefferson Dormitory (250 beds) forced the Academy to add an extra shift. Therefore it now serves three shifts of 325 (total of 975 students). The existing cafeteria is over its limit, and will not be able to serve the students from the new Training Facilities on campus. Therefore, a 500 person cafeteria is a fundamental structure to serve the additional students on campus.

Impact on Performance (Relationship of Increase to Strategic Goals)

The FBI Academy's three dormitories, two dating from 1972 and one from 1988, have not received the industry standard renovation attention they require despite their age. The increased and continuously high training and lodging levels at Quantico have strained FBI Academy infrastructure, as it has not allowed needed down-time for upkeep of these older buildings. However, these buildings have reached the age where a comprehensive renovation is unavoidable, for required upgrades to include: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) standards, fire protection system requirements, and Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems to meet environmental standards to become more energy efficient. Once the proposed FBI Training Facility is completed (estimated FY 2013), this would relieve the stress on the existing dormitories, which could then be temporarily taken off-line to receive critical renovations.

Over the past few years, the increased training requirement for New Agents, IAs, and other National Security priorities has resulted in the FBI adding temporary classroom capacity at the FBI Academy. This has allowed the FBI to maintain a minimally adequate infrastructure in the short term to hold required training at the Academy. Although classroom capacity has increased somewhat, housing space remains the same, resulting in the utilization of local hotels at a high cost to the FBI.

Funding

Base Funding

FY	2008 E	nacted ((w/resc./supps)		FY 2	009 Ena	cted	FY	FY 2010 Current Services		
Pos	Agt	FTE	Non-Pers	Pos	Agt	FTE	Non-Pers	Pos	Agt	FTE	Non-Pers
			\$(000)				\$(000)				\$(000)
			\$				\$				\$

Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2010 Request (\$000)	FY 2011 Net Annualization (Change from 2010) (\$000)
Training Facility	n/a	n/a	\$10,000	(\$10,000)

Total Request for this Item

	Pos	Agent	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)
Current Services					\$	\$
Increases					10,000	10,000
Grand Total					\$10,000	\$10,000

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
A. Appropriations Language and Analysis of Appropriations Language

Appropriations Language for Construction

For necessary expenses to construct or acquire buildings and sites by purchase, or as otherwise authorized by law (including equipment for such buildings); conversion and extension of Federally-owned buildings; and preliminary planning and design of projects; [\$153,491,000] \$142,796,000 to remain available until expended.

A: Organizational Chart

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



B: Summary of Requirements

Summary of Requirements

Federal Bureau of Investigation Salaries and Expenses (Dollars in Thousands)

CASS			2010 Requ	iest
2005 1905			ETE	Amount
100 100	2009 Found duth Position direct only			
Table 2009 Exacted (with Receivolous affered with) 1909 September 1909 (1909 September 1909		30,211	29,349	
2000 Ensert (with Recisions, after only) 2000 Septembra 2000 Septemb				
1905 Spekeneths 1906 Speke	10tal 2008 Enacted (with Rescissions and Supplementals)			
Total 2009 Fasterfot (with Recissions and Symplementals) 3,497 7004 700		31,494	30,543	
Algaments to Base Increase: Bingrapes				
Second S	Total 2009 Enacted (with Rescissions and Supplementals)	31,494	30,543	7,147,700
2011 Pay Raine (20%)				
Assansization of 2008 Positions				
Annulization of 2009 Positions				
Annalization of Jan. 2009 Pag Raise (3.9%)				
Capital Security Cort Sharing (CSCS)			642	
DIS Security				
Employees Compensation Fund				
Heath Insurance Premiums				
CASS				
Possage				3,640
Printing and Reproduction				
Retail Payments OGSA				
Retirement				96
Security Investigations				
Working Capital Fund ATB				3,485
Subtotal Increases				81
Decreases	Working Capital Fund ATB			240
Non-recurral of FY 2009 Positions	Subtotal Increases		642	300,923
Subtotal Decreases	Decreases:			
Total Adjustments to Base	Non-recurral of FY 2009 Positions			(120,743)
2010 Current Services 31,494 31,185 7,327,880 Program Changes	Subtotal Decreases			(120,743)
Program Changes Increases: In	Total Adjustments to Base		642	180,180
Increases: Domain and Operations 1,282 642 285,241 Workforce 32 16 25,111 Surveillance 75 38 32,531 Infrastructure 9,000 Leveraging Technology 9,000 Overseas Contingency Operations 1,389 696 473,461 Offsets: FY 2009 Bridge Supplemental 9,000 Subtotal Increases 1,389 696 473,461 Offsets 9,000 Subtotal Operations 1,389 696 473,461 Offsets 9,000 Subtotal Operations 1,389 696 473,461 Offsets 9,000 Total Program Changes 9,000 Subtotal Operations 1,389 696 473,461 Offsets 9,000 Subtotal Operations 9,000 Subtotal Operations 1,389 696 473,461 Offsets 9,000 Subtotal Operations 9	2010 Current Services	31,494	31,185	7,327,880
Domain and Operations	Program Changes			
Workforce 32 16 25.113 Surveillance 75 38 32.511 Infrastructure	Increases:			
Surveillance 75 38 32,531 Infrastructure	Domain and Operations	1,282	642	285,241
Infrastructure	Workforce	32	16	25,113
Leveraging Technology	Surveillance	75	38	32,531
Leveraging Technology	Infrastructure			9,000
Overseas Contingency Operations				20,510
Subtotal Increases 1,389 696 473,461 Offsets: (82,600 FY 2009 Bridge Supplemental (82,600 Subtotal Offsets (82,600 Total Porgram Changes 1,389 30,861 2010 Total Request 32,883 1,818 7,718,741				101,066
Offsets: 5 Y 2009 Bridge Supplemental (82,600 Subtotal Offsets (82,600 Total Program Changes 1,389 696 390,861 2010 Total Request 32,883 31,881 7,718,741				473,461
FY 2009 Bridge Supplemental				
Subtotal Offsets (82,600 Total Program Changes 1,389 596 390,861 2010 Total Request 32,883 1,818 7,718,761				(82,600)
Total Program Changes 1,389 696 390,861 2010 Total Request 32,883 31,881 7,718,741				(82,600)
2010 Total Request 32,883 31,881 7,718,741				
				7,718,741
				571,041

B: Summary of Requirements

Summary of Requirements Federal Bureau of Investigation Salaries & Expenses (Dollars in Thousands)

		8 Appropriation E cissions and Supp			2009 Enacted			2010 ents to Base ar Adjustments			2010 Current Service	es		2010 Increases			2010 Offsets			2010 Request	
Estimates by budget activity	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount
Intelligence Decision Unit	5,345	5,071	\$1,188,114	6,217	5,906	\$1,487,262	52	308	\$75,090	6,269	6,214	\$1,562,352	565	282	\$78,863				6,834	6,496	\$1,641,215
Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Decision Unit	11,675	11,144	2,813,227	12,480	12,121	2,884,041	(3)	240	74,193	12,477	12,361	2,958,234	547	273	183,247				13,024	12,634	3,141,481
Criminal Enterprises Federal Crimes Decision Unit	11,034	10,967	2,185,686	10,850	10,596	2,275,754	(37)	102	32,285	10,813	10,698	2,308,039	269	137	100,490				11,082	10,835	2,408,529
Criminal Justice Services Decision Unit	2,157	2,167	412,584	1,947	1,920	418,043	(12)	(8)	-1,388	1,935	1,912	416,655	8	4	9,795				1,943	1,916	426,450
Total	30,211	29,349	6,599,611	31,494	30,543	7,065,100		642	180,180	31,494	31,185	7,245,280	1,389	696	372,395				32,883	31,881	7,617,675
FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations			\$0			\$0			\$0			\$0			\$101,066						\$101,066
FY 2009 Bridge Supplemental			\$0			\$82,600			\$0			\$82,600			\$0			(82,600)			\$0
Grand Total	30,211	29,349	6,599,611	31,494	30,543	7,147,700		642	180,180	31,494	31,185	7,327,880	1,389	696	473,461			(82,600)	32,883	31,881	7,718,741
Reimbursable FTE		3,255			3,152						3,152			63						3,215	
Total FTE		32,604			33,695			642			34,337			759						35,096	
Other FTE:																					
LEAP		2,986			3,081						3,081			102						3,183	
Overtime		470			488	-		9			498			11						510	
Total Comp. FTE		36,060			37,264			651			37,916		-	872						38,789	

C: Program Increases/Offsets By Decision Unit

2010 Program Increases/Offsets By Decision Unit Federal Bureau of Investigation Salaries & Expenses

(Dollars in Thousands)

	Location of Description by		Int	telligence				CT/CI				CEFC				CJS		
Program Increases	End State Capability	Pos.	Agt.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	Agt.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	Agt.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	Agt.	FTE	Amount	Total Increases
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI	Domain & Operations	62	2	30	11,207	146	81	73	27,600	52	24	27	20,920				1,453	61,180
Intelligence Program	Domain & Operations	480	41	240	40,917				14,563				12,522				1,962	69,964
National Security Field Investigations	Domain & Operations	5		3	6,368	216	105	108	28,744	8		4	11,677	1		1	1,203	47,993
Mortage Fraud	Domain & Operations				3,309				7,133	143	50	72	14,338				711	25,491
WMD Response	Domain & Operations	11	6	6	7,552	101	55	49	46,989	52	28	27	24,055	4	2	2	2,018	80,613
Central Records Complex	Infrastructure				1,935				3,452				3,066				547	9,000
3G Wireless	Leveraging Technology								20,510									20,510
Advanced Electronic Surveillance	Surveillance				450				7,500				1,050					9,000
Surveillance	Surveillance				1,811	72	10	37	17,309	3	2	1	4,023				388	23,531
National Security Training / Career Path	Workforce	7		3	5,314	12		6	9,447	11	1	6	8,839	3		1	1,513	25,113
Overseas Contingency Operations	N/A				N/A				N/A				N/A				N/A	101,066
Total Program Increases		565	49	282	78,863	547	251	273	183,247	269	105	137	100,490	8	2	4	9,795	473,461
	Location of Description by			IDU				CT/CI				CEFC				CJS		
Program Offsets	End State Capability	Pos.	Agt./Atty.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	Agt./Atty.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	Agt./Atty.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	Agt./Atty.	FTE	Amount	Total Offsets
FY 2009 GWOT Supplemental Funding Offset	N/A				N/A				N/A				N/A				N/A	(82,600
Total Offsets																		(82,600

D: Resources by DOJ Strategic Goal and Strategic Objective

Resources by Department of Justice Strategic Goal/Objective

Federal Bureau of Investigation Salaries & Expenses (Dollars in Thousands)

	2008 Appropri w/Rescissions and		2009 Enacted w/ Suppler		2010 Curr	ent Services		20	10		2010	Request
							Inc	reases	Of	fsets		
	Direct, Reimb. Other FTE	Direct Amount \$000s	Direct, Reimb. Other FTE	Direct Amount \$000s	Direct, Reimb. Other FTE	Direct Amount \$000s	Direct, Reimb. Other FTE	Direct Amount \$000s	Direct, Reimb. Other FTE	Direct Amount \$000s	Direct, Reimb. Other FTE	Direct Amount \$000s
Goal 1: Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security												
1.1 Prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur	9,628	2,652,353	13,507	3,308,796	14,023	3,438,494	483	300,174		(48,811)	14,506	3,689,857
1.2 Strengthen partnerships to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents	28	41,293	302	115,701	299	117,603	3	9,980			302	127,583
1.3 Prosecute those who have committed, or intend to commit, terrorist acts in 1.4 Combat espionage against the United States	6,908	1.381.850	3.522	717.591	3,571	738,566	60	29.881		(393)	3,631	768.054
Subtotal, Goal 1	16,564	4,075,496	17,331	4,142,088	17,893	4,294,663	546	340,035		(49,204)	18,439	4,585,494
Goal 2: Prevent Crime, Enforce Federal Laws and Represent the Rights and Interests of the American People 2.1 Strengthen partnerships for safer communities and enhance the Nation's capacity												
to prevent, solve, and control crime	3,208	413,280	3,552	674,127	3,539	677,965	92	30,697		(22,173)	3,631	686,489
2.2 Reduce the threat, incidence, and prevalence of violent crime	4,592	910,829	5,564 61	1,092,359 28,366	5,532 61	1,103,275 24,370	10	36,940		(8,702)	5,542 61	1,131,513 24,370
Prevent, suppress, and intervene in crimes against children Reduce the threat, trafficking, use, and related violence of illegal drugs	1,219 1,551	237,409 124,261	1,195	177,731	1,193	169,510	8	25,289		(107)	1,201	194,692
2.5 Combat public and corporate corruption, fraud, economic crime, and cybercrime 2.6 Uphold the civil and Constitutional rights of all Americans 2.7 Vigorously enforce and represent the interests of the United States in all matters	5,176 294	789,844 48,492	5,662 330	969,470 63,559	5,783 336	993,970 64,127	101 2	39,038 1,462		(2,378) (36)	5,884 338	1,030,630 65,553
over which the Department has jurisdiction												
2.8 Protect the integrity and ensure the effective operation of the Nation's bankruptcy												
system Subtotal, Goal 2	16,040	2,524,115	16,364	3,005,612	16,444	3,033,217	213	133,426		(33,396)	16,657	3,133,247
GRAND TOTAL	32,604	\$ 6,599,611	33,695	\$ 7,147,700*	34,337	\$ 7,327,880	759	\$ 473,461		(\$82,600)	35,096	\$ 7,718,741

*Note: This amount includes \$82.6 million of FY09 GWOT Supplemental Funding.

E. Justification for Base Adjustments

Justification for Base Adjustments

Federal Bureau of Investigation

2010 pay raise. This request provides for a proposed 2.0 percent pay raise to be effective in January of 2010 This increase includes locality pay adjustments as well as the general pay raise. The amount requested, \$55,492,000, represents the pay amounts for 3/4 of the fiscal year plus appropriate benefits (\$42,729,000 for pay and \$12,763,000 for benefits). Any change to the pay raise percentage will require a recalculation of the requested amount to ensure the pay raise is fully funded.

Annualization of 2009 pay raise. This pay annualization represents first quarter amounts (October through December) of the 2009 pay increase of 3.9 percent included in the 2009 President's Budget. The amount requested \$32,923,000, represents the pay amounts for 1/4 of the fiscal year plus appropriate benefits (\$25,351,000 for pay and \$7,572,000 for benefits).

Annualization of additional positions approved in 2008 and 2009. This provides for the annualization of 1,110 additional positions appropriated in 2008 and 1,283 additional positions appropriated in 2009. Annualization of new positions extends to 3 years to provide for entry level funding in the first year with a 2-year progression to the journeyman level. For 2008 increases, this request includes an increase of \$44,715,000 for full-year payroll costs associated with these additional positions. For 2009, this request includes a decrease of \$120,743,000 for one-time items associated with the increased positions, and an increase of \$115,104,000 for full-year costs associated with these additional positions, for a net decrease of \$5,639,000.

	2008 Increases (\$000)	Annualization Required for 2010 (\$000)	2009 Increases (\$000)	Annualization Required for 2010 (\$000)
Annual salary rate of 1,110 new positions	62,090	57,294		
Annual salary rate of 1,283 new positions	-		79,374	95,564
Less lapse (50 %)	31,045	28,647	39,687	47,782
Net Compensation	31,045	28,647	39,687	47,782
Associated employee benefits	17,435	16,068	21,458	26,504
Travel	5,852	-	7,914	765
GSA Rent	-	-	-	8,584
Rental Payments to others	-	-	60	60
Transportation of Things	5,229		6,191	(4,727)
Communications/Utilities	3,649	-	2,934	2,391
Printing/Reproduction	3,712		2,101	(2,085)
Other Contractual Services:	-	-	-	-
25.1 Advisory and Assistance Services	366	-	476	1,447
25.2 Other Services	32,967	-	37,050	(21,966)
25.3 Purchase of Goods and Services from Government Accts.	-	-	109	-
25.4 Operation and Maintenance of Facilities	6,834	-	13,948	(13,948)
25.6 Medical Care	-	-	3,771	(2,973)
25.7 Operation and Maintenance of Equipment	974	-	1,440	(396)
25.8 Subsistence and Support of Persons	-	-	204	(184)
Supplies and Materials	4,030	-	9,232	(3,022)
Equipment	55,052		62,785	(43,871)
TOTAL COSTS SUBJECT TO ANNUALIZATION	167,145	44,715	209,360	(5,639)

Retirement. Agency retirement contributions increase as employees under CSRS retire and are replaced by FERS employees. Based on U.S. Department of Justice Agency estimates, we project that the DOJ workforce will convert from CSRS to FERS at a rate of 3 percent per year. The requested increase of \$3,485,000 is necessary to meet our increased retirement obligations as a result of this conversion.

Health Insurance. Effective January 2008, this component's contribution to Federal employees' health insurance premiums increased by 2.1 percent. Applied against the 2009 estimate of \$176,000,000, the additional amount required is \$3,640,000.

Employees Compensation Fund. The \$484,000 increase reflects payments to the Department of Labor for injury benefits paid in the past year under the Federal Employee Compensation Act. This estimate is based on the first quarter of prior year billing and current year estimates.

General Services Administration (GSA) Rent. GSA will continue to charge rental rates that approximate those charged to commercial tenants for equivalent space and related services. The requested increase of \$36,456,000 is required to meet our commitment to GSA. The costs associated with GSA rent were derived through the use of an automated system, which uses the latest inventory data, including rate increases to be effective in FY 2010 for each building currently occupied by Department of Justice components, as well as the costs of new space to be occupied. GSA provided data on the rate increases.

<u>DHS Security Charges</u>. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will continue to charge Basic Security and Building Specific Security. The requested increase of \$4,949,000 is required to meet our commitment to DHS, and cost estimates were developed by DHS.

Postage. Effective May 12, 2008, the Postage Service implemented a rate increase of 2.5 percent. This percentage was applied to the 2007 obligations of \$2,354,000 to arrive at an increase of \$59,000.

Security Investigations: The \$81,000 increase reflects payments to the Office of Personnel Management for security reinvestigations for employees requiring security clearances.

Printing and Reproduction. The Government Printing Office (GPO) provides an estimate rate increase of 2.0 percent. This percentage was applied to the FY 2009 estimate of \$4,813,000 to arrive at an increase of \$96,000.

WCF Rate Increases. Components in the DC metropolitan area use and rely on the Department's Working Capital Fund (WCF) for support services including telecommunications services, computer services, finance services, as well as internet services. The WCF continues to invest in the infrastructure supporting the telecommunications services, computer services, internet services. Concurrently, several security initiatives are being implemented and additional resources are being directed to financial management in an effort to maintain a clean audit status. Funding of \$240,000 is required for this account.

International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS). Under the ICASS, an annual charge is made by the Department of State for administrative support based on the overseas staff of each federal agency. This request is based on the initial \$2,540,000 billing for post invoices and other ICASS costs.

Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS). The Department of State is in the midst of a 14-year, \$17.5 billion embassy construction program, with a plan to build approximately 150 new diplomatic and consular compounds. State has proposed that costs be allocated through a Capital Security Cost Sharing Program in which each agency will contribute funding based on the number of positions that are authorized for overseas personnel. Funding of \$659,000 is requested for this account.

F: Crosswalk of 2008 Availability

Crosswalk of 2008 Availability

Federal Bureau of Investigation Salaries & Expenses (Dollars in Thousands)

							200	08/2009 G	WOT									
	2008 Ena	cted Withou	t Rescissions		Rescission	ıs	5	Suppleme	ntal	Reprogr	ammings	/ Transfers	Car	ryover/ R	ecoveries	2	2008 Availabi	lity
Decision Unit	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount
Intelligence	5,379	5,106	1,279,827						39,335			9,454			115,543	5,379	5,106	1,444,159
Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence	11,706	11,175	2,702,900						53,976			19,965			244,019	11,706	11,175	3,020,860
Criminal Enterprises Federal Crimes	10,969	10,901	2,101,719						9,270			15,525			189,744	10,969	10,901	2,316,257
Criminal Justice Services	2,157	2,167	409,043						3,541			3,021			36,929	2,157	2,167	452,534
TOTAL	30,211	29,349	6,493,489		••••	••••		••••	106,122			47,965		••••	586,234	30,211	29,349	7,233,810
Reimbursable FTE		3,255															3,255	
Total FTE		32,604															32,604	
Other FTE																		
LEAP		2,986															2,986	
Overtime		470															470	
Total Compensable FTE		36,060						••••									36,060	

Supplementals: The FBI received \$106,122,000 in supplemental funding for the Global War on Terror.

 $Transfers:\ The\ FBI\ transferred\ \$85,045\ to\ HIDTA,\ \$7,080,220\ to\ DOJ\ for\ Narrowband,\ and\ \$40,800,000\ to\ the\ DOJ\ WCF.$

Unobligated Balances: The FBI carried forward \$558,518,410 from funds provided in FY 2007, \$13,752,872 from funds provided in FY 2006, and \$13,962,498 from funds provided in FY 2005.

G: Crosswalk of 2009 Availability

Crosswalk of 2009 Availability

Federal Bureau of Investigation Salaries & Expenses (Dollars in Thousands)

	2	009 Enacted	I	R	escissions		2009 Bri	dge Supplei	mental	Reprogran	nmings / T	ransfers	Carryo	ver/ Recov	eries	20	09 Availabil	ity
Decision Unit	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount
Intelligence	6,217	5,906	1,487,261						2,887			4			62,272	6,217	5,906	1,552,424
Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence	12,480	12,121	2,884,041						50,560			7			120,756	12,480	12,121	3,055,364
Criminal Enterprises Federal Crimes	10,850	10,596	2,275,755						16,030			6			95,287	10,850	10,596	2,387,077
Criminal Justice Services	1,947	1,920	418,043						13,123			1			17,504	1,947	1,920	448,671
TOTAL	31,494	30,543	7,065,100	••••			••••	••••	82,600	••••	••••	18		••••	295,818	31,494	30,543	\$7,443,536
Reimbursable FTE		3,152															3,152	
Total FTE		33,695						••••			••••			••••			33,695	
Other FTE																		
LEAP																		
Overtime																		
Total Compensable FTE		33,695						••••			••••			••••			33,695	

Supplemental: The FBI received \$82,600,000 in supplemental funding for the Global War on Terror.

Transfers: The FBI transferred \$18,275 for HIDTA.

Unobligated Balances: The FBI carried forward \$295,818,061 from the funds provided in FY 2008.

H: Summary of Reimbursable and Transfer Resources

Summary of Reimbursable and Transfer Resources

Federal Bureau of Investigation Salaries and Expenses (Dollars in Thousands)

		2008 Enac	ted		2009 Plan	ned		2010 Requ	uest	Inc	rease/Dec	rease
Collections by Source	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount
Interagency Crime Drug Enforcement (ICDE)*	899	899	137,700	874	874	140,600	874	874	143,412			2,812
Asset Forfeiture Fund			52,851			138,000			140,760			2,760
Fingerprint Identification User Fee	1,014	1,014	134,259	1,014	951	230,000	1,014	1,014	234,600		63	4,600
Name Check Program	289	289	77,345	289	289	88,000	289	289	89,760			1,760
Background Investigations	19	19	3,824	19	19	15,000	19	19	15,300			300
Loan of Personnel	61	61	7,997	61	41	17,000	61	41	17,340			340
FBI/DEA Co-Location at FBI Academy	18	18	5,079	18	18	7,000	18	18	7,140			140
State Department			4,127			22,000			22,440			440
Department of Justice			15,354									
Victim Witness Program	113	113	12,580	113	113	35,000	113	113	35,700			700
Narrowband Radio Communication			38,229			55,000			56,100			1,100
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)	78	78	254,423	78	78	300,000	78	78	306,000			6,000
Working Capital Fund			139,932			200,000			204,000			4,000
All Other (Reimbursable Year Only)			36,176			47,000			47,940			940
Name Check (NY)			3,918			34,000			34,680			680
Fingerprint Identification User Fee			204,414			292,000			297,840			5,840
Victim Witness Program (NY)			732			11,000			11,220			220
Working Capital Fund (NY)						14,400			14,688			288
Office of Justice Programs (NY)						22,533			22,984			451
Telecommunications (NY)			90			55,000			56,100			1,100
State Department (NY)			505									
Health Care Fraud (NY)	769	764	125,155	769	769	126,258	769	769	128,783			2,525
All Other (NY)			8,157			16,725			17,060			335
Budgetary Resources:	3,260	3,255	\$1,262,847	3,235	3,152	\$1,866,516	3,235	3,215	\$1,903,846		63	\$37,330

^{*}Resources in this line include funding for the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program.

Justification of Increase/Decrease: Increases were calculated using the inflation factor of 2% and changes to user fee structure.

I: Detail of Permanent Positions by Category

Detail of Permanent Positions by Category

Federal Bureau of Investigation Salaries & Expenses

	2008 w/Res	scissions and									
	Supple	ementals	2009 I	Enacted				2010	Request		
										Total	
	Total	Total	Total	Total		Program	Program	Total	Total	Reimbursable	Total
Category	Authorized	Reimbursable	Authorized	Reimbursable	ATBs	Increases	Decreases	Pr. Changes	Authorized	Pr. Changes	Reimbursable
Criminal Investigative Series (1811)	11,945	1,082	12,325	1,057		407		407	12,732		1,057
Intelligence Series (0132)	2,376	176	2,635	176		321		321	2,956		176
Fingerprint Identification (0072)	187	238	187	238					187		238
Security Specialists (0080)	630	62	702	62		38		38	740		62
Miscellaneous Operations (0001-0099)	434	30	434	30					434		30
Social Sciences, Econ, & Psychology (0100-0199)	159	113	159	113					159		113
Personnel Management (0200-0299)	332	11	332	11					332		11
Clerical and Office Services (0300-0399)	6,122	765	6,354	765		273		273	6,627		765
Biological Sciences (0400-0499)	87	6	124	6		2		2	126		6
Accounting and Budget (0500-0599)	501	21	524	21					524		21
Medical (0600-0699)	63	2	63	2					63		2
Engineering/Architecture (0800-0899)	704	63	727	63		20		20	747		63
Attorneys (0905)	185	1	185	1		24		24	209		1
Paralegals / Other Law (0900-0999)	907	30	907	30					907		30
Information & Arts (1000-1099)	810	21	860	21		2		2	862		21
Business & Industry (1100-1199)	393	92	393	92		61		61	454		92
Forensic/Physical Sciences (1300-1399)	173	7	187	7		2		2	189		7
Library (1400-1499)	360	30	360	30					360		30
Mathematics/Computer Science (1500-1599)	96	3	96	3		35		35	131		3
Equipment/Facilities Services (1600-1699)	40	1	40	1					40		1
Miscellaneous Inspectors Series (1802)	295	245	295	245					295		245
Supply Services (2000-2099)	137	8	137	8					137		8
Information Technology Mgmt (2210)	1,120	145	1,158	145		23		23	1,181		145
Education/Training (1700-1799)	106	4	106	4					106		4
General Investigative (1800-1899)	1,505	52	1,657	52		181		181	1,838		52
Quality Assurance (1900-1999)	30	4	33	4					33		4
Transportation (2100-2199)	21	1	21	1					21		1
Motor Vehicle Operations (5703)	24	2	24	2					24		2
Other Positions	469	45	469	45					469		45
Total	30,211	3,260	31,494	3,235		1,389		1,389	32,883		3,235
						_					
Headquarters (Washington, D.C.)	10,915	1,493	11,415	1,493		414		414	11,829		1,493
U.S. Field	19,026	1,767	19,806	1,742		975		975	20,781		1,742
Foreign Field	270		273						273		
Total	30,211	3,260	31,494	3,235		1,389	••••	1,389	32,883		3,235

J: Financial Analysis of Program Changes

Financial Analysis of Program Changes Federal Bureau of Investigation Salaries & Expenses (Dollars in Thousands)

		Intellig	gence		Co	unterterrorism/0	Counterintellig	gence	Cı	iminal Enterprises	and Federal	Crimes		Criminal Ju	stice Services		Overseas C		FY09 GWOT S	Supplemental		
	Inc	rease	Offset	t	In	crease	Offse	et	I	ncrease	O	ffset	In	icrease	Of	fset	Incr		Funding	Offset	Program (Changes
Grades:	Pos.	Amount	Pos.	Amount	Pos.	Amount	Pos.	Amount	Pos.	Amount	Pos.	Amount	Pos.	Amount	Pos.	Amount	Pos.	Amount	Pos.	Amount	Pos.	Amount
SES																						
GS-15	5	822			9	1,467			8	1,303			1	232							23	3,824
GS-14		67			2	222			1	155											3	444
GS-13	1	135			4	497			5	606				52							10	1,290
GS-12	8	943			41	4,526			4	501				28							53	5,998
GS-11	377	41,200			29	2,561			87	7,692			3	210							496	51,663
GS-10	49	5,331			251	27,234			105	11,243			3	256							408	44,064
GS-9	9	766			60	5,011			23	1,888				32							92	7,697
GS-8					55	3,944															55	3,944
GS-7	116	6,528			96	5,394			36	2,050			1	37							249	14,009
GS-5																						
Total positions & annual amount	565	55,792			547	50,856			269	25,438			8	847							1,389	132,933
Lapse (-)	(284)	(27,896)			(275)	(25,428)			(133)	(12,719)			(4)	(424)							(694)	(66,467)
Other personnel compensation																						
Total FTE & personnel compensation	282	27,896			273	25,428			137	12,719			4	424	****						696	66,467
Personnel Compensation																		20,000				20,000
Travel and transportation of persons		8,977				22,285				6,874				489				3,888		(16,147)		26,366
Transportation of things		863				1,541				1,368				244								4,016
Rent, Communications, and Utilities		629				1,123				997				178				5,128		(1,142)		6,913
Printing		565				1,009				896				160								2,630
Other Contractual Services		19,896				75,857				35,547				4,953				52,224		(23,059)		165,418
Supplies and materials		1,798				4,985				2,734				263				6,903		(11,371)		5,312
Acquisition of Assets		360				510				1,493				138				1,630		(9,076)		(4,945)
Equipment		17,879				50,509				37,862				2,946				11,293		(9,064)		111,425
Land and Structures																				(12,741)		(12,741)
Total, 2010 program changes requested	282	\$78,863		\$0	273	\$183,247		\$0	137	\$100.490		S0	4	\$9,795		\$0		101,066		(82,600)	696	\$390,861

K: Summary of Requirements by Grade

Summary of Requirements by Grade

Federal Bureau of Investigation Salaries & Expenses

	2008 En w/Rescissio Supplem	ons and	2009 E	nacted	2010 R	equest	Increase	/Decrease
Grades and Salary Ranges	Pos.	Amount	Pos.	Amount	Pos.	Amount	Pos.	Amount
Executive Level II	1		1		1			
SES, \$111,676 - \$168,000	287		287		287			
GS-15, \$110,363 - 143,471	1,198		1,198		1,221		23	
GS-14, \$93,822 - 121,967	3,623		3,625		3,628		3	
GS-13, \$79,397 - 103,220	8,929		9,000		9,010		10	
GS-12, \$66,767 - 86,801	4,977		5,018		5,071		53	
GS-11, \$55,706 - 72,421	3,293		3,393		3,889		496	
GS-10, 50,703 - 65,912	1,524		1,832		2,240		408	
GS-9, \$46,041 - 59,852	1,891		2,202		2,294		92	
GS-8, 41,686 - 54,194	2,394		2,656		2,711		55	
GS-7, \$37,640 - 48,933	1,305		1,305		1,554		249	
GS-6, \$33,872 - 44,032	256		444		444			
GS-5, \$30,386 - 39,501	132		132		132			
GS-4, \$27,159 - 35,303	5		5		5			
GS-3, \$24,194 - 31,451								
GS-2, \$22,174 - 27,901								
GS-1, \$19,722 - 24,664								
Ungraded Positions	396		396		396			
Total, appropriated positions	30,211		31,494		32,883		1,389	
Average SES Salary		\$157,040		\$161,437		\$164,666		
Average GS Salary		\$79,545		\$82,647		\$84,300		
Average GS Grade		11.60		11.60		11.60		

L: Summary of Requirements by Object Class

Summary of Requirements by Object Class

Federal Bureau of Investigation Salaries and Expenses (Dollars in Thousands)

	2008 Ac	etuals	2009 En	acted	2010 Re	equest	Increase/D	ecrease
Object Classes	FTE	Amount	FTE	Amount	FTE	Amount	FTE	Amount
11.1 Direct FTE & personnel compensation	29,349	2,225,000	30,543	2,467,003	31,881	2,655,693	1,338	188,690
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	,	18,000	,	14,974		15,269	,	295
11.5 Total, Other personnel compensation		360,000		349,509		380,707		31,198
11.8 Special personal services payments				·				0
Total	29,349	2,603,000	30,543	2,831,486	31,881	3,051,669	1,338	220,183
Other Object Classes:								
12.0 Personnel benefits		954,000		1,039,091		1,110,879		71,788
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons		184,000		195,316		233,671		38,355
22.0 Transportation of things		18,000		24,943		26,128		1,185
23.1 GSA rent		450,000		553,887		603,875		49,988
23.2 Moving/Lease Expirations/Contract Parking		39,000		26,389		26,393		4
23.3 Comm., util., & other misc. charges		139,000		150,282		159,300		9,018
24.0 Printing and reproduction		8,000		4,624		6,513		1,889
25.1 Advisory and assistance services		128,000		460,506		480,385		19,879
25.2 Other services		1,207,000		874,955		929,100		54,145
25.3 Purchases of goods & services from Government accounts (Antennas, DHS Sec. Etc)		1,000		17,734		18,393		659
25.4 Operation and maintenance of facilities		78,000		42,610		41,931		(679)
25.5 Research and development contracts		33,000		14,521		14,521		
25.7 Operation and maintenance of equipment		58,000		51,995		56,986		4,991
25.8 Subsistence and Support of Persons				504		457		(47)
26.0 Supplies and materials		128,000		137,332		144,066		6,734
31.0 Equipment		615,000		617,348		685,831		68,483
32.0 Land and Structures		130,000		21,018		27,018		6,000
42.0 Insurance Claims and Indemnities		5,000		489		489		
91.0 Unvouchered				70		70		
Overseas Contingency Operations						101,066		101,066
FY 2009 GWOT Supplemental Funding				82,600				(82,600)
Total obligations		\$6,778,000		\$7,147,700		\$7,718,741		\$571,041
Unobligated balance, start of year		(454,000)		(294,520)				
Unobligated balance, end of year		294,520						
Recoveries of prior year obligations		(3,924)						·
Total DIRECT requirements		7,530,444		7,442,220		7,718,741		
Reimbursable FTE:								
Full-time permanent	3,255		3,152		3,215		63	

M. Status of Congressionally Requested Studies, Reports, and Evaluations

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Salaries and Expenses (Dollars in Thousands)

Status of Congressionally Requested Studies, Reports, and Evaluations

- 1. The Report accompanying the FY 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Division B Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (P.L. 110-161), page 34, directs the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to submit a report on the status of delayed Name Checks. Response transmitted to Committees April 3, 2009.
- 2. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Omnibus Appropriations Act of FY 2009, Division B Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (H.R. 1105), page 34, directs the FBI to submit a report, within 60 days of enactment, on how the FBI will engage in foreign intelligence collection without duplicating or conflicting with activities already underway at other agencies with longstanding foreign intelligence missions. Target response to Committees TBD.
- 3. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Omnibus Appropriations Act of FY 2009, Division B Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (H.R. 1105), page 34, directs the FBI to submit a report, within 60 days of enactment, on the steps being taken to reduce and prevent third party National Security Letter errors. Target response to Committees TBD.
- 4. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Omnibus Appropriations Act of FY 2009, Division B Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (H.R. 1105), page 34, directs the FBI to develop more discrete, quantifiable end-state goals and to submit those goals to Appropriations Committees together with the FY 2010 budget request. The FBI is currently developing more discrete and quantifiable end-state goals and results are pending.

B: Summary of Requirements

Summary of Requirements

Federal Bureau of Investigation Construction (Dollars in Thousands)

	2	2010 Req	uest
	Perm. Pos.	FTE	Amount
2008 Enacted (with Rescissions, direct only)			\$164,200
2007 Supplementals			
FY 2005 Appropriation Enacted	#REF!	#REF!	#REF!
Reduction applied to commerce Justice State appropriation (0.465%).			(496)
Government-wide reduction (0.59%).			(627)
Total 2008 Enacted (with Rescissions and Supplementals)			164,200
2009 Enacted (with Rescissions, direct only)			153,491
Total 2009 Enacted (with Rescissions and Supplementals)			153,491
Adjustments to Base			
Decreases			
FBI Academy Construction			(7,800)
TEDAC Expansion			(41,000)
Biometrics Technology Center			(69,500)
Subtotal Decreases			(118,300)
Total Adjustments to Base			(118,300)
Total Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments			(118,300)
2010 Current Services			35,191
Program Changes			
Increases			
Biometrics Technology Center			97,605
FBI Academy Training Facility Architecture & Engineering Study			10,000
Subtotal Increases			107,605
Total Program Changes			107,605
2010 Total Request			142,796
2009 - 2010 Total Change			(10,695)

	2008 Appropriation Enacted w/Rescissions and Supplementals		2009 Enacted		2010 Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments		2010 Current Services		2010 Increases			2010 Offsets			2010 Request						
	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount
Construction			\$164,200			\$153,491			(\$118,300)			\$35,191			\$107,605					****	\$142,796
Total			\$164,200			\$153,491			(\$118,300)			\$35,191			\$107,605						\$142,796

D: Resources by DOJ Strategic Goal and Strategic Objective

Resources by Department of Justice Strategic Goal/Objective

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Construction
(Dollars in Thousands)

		riation Enacted nd Supplementals		r/Rescissions and ementals	2010 Curr	ent Services	2010 Increases Offsets				2010 Request	
Strategic Goal and Strategic Objective	Direct, Reimb. Other FTE	Direct Amount \$000s	Direct, Reimb. Other FTE	Direct Amount \$000s	Direct, Reimb. Other FTE	Direct Amount \$000s	Direct, Reimb. Other FTE	Direct Amount \$000s	Direct, Reimb. Other FTE	Direct Amount \$000s	Direct, Reimb. Other FTE	Direct Amount \$000s
Goal 1: Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security 1.1 Prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur 1.4 Combat espionage against the United States		50,915		5,361				6,443 1,100				6,443 1,100
Subtotal, Goal 1	••••	50,915		5,361	••••			7,543				7,543
Goal 2: Prevent Crime, Enforce Federal Laws and Represent the Rights and Interests of the American People 2.1 Strengthen partnerships for safer communities and enhance the Nation's												
capacity to prevent, solve, and control crime		113,113		148,130		35,191		95,967				131,158
Reduce the threat, incidence, and prevalence of violent crime Reduce the threat, trafficking, use, and related violence of illegal drugs Sombat public and corporate corruption, fraud, economic crime, and								1,700 300				1,700 300
cybercrime		172						1,995				1,995
2.6 Uphold the civil and Constitutional rights of all Americans Subtotal, Goal 2		113,285		148,130		35,191	•••	100 100,062				100 135,253
GRAND TOTAL		50,915		5,361				7,543				7,543

F: Crosswalk of 2008 Availability

Crosswalk of 2008 Availability

Federal Bureau of Investigation Construction (Dollars in Thousands)

	FY 2008 Enacted Without Rescissions			Rescissions			Supplementals			Reprogrammings / Transfers			Carryover/ Recoveries			2008 Availability		
	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount
Construction			\$164,200												\$45,383			\$209,583
TOTAL		••••	\$164,200	••••	••••			••••	••••				••••	••••	\$45,383	••••	••••	\$209,583

Unobligated Balances. The FBI brought forward \$44,383,000 from funds provided in prior years for the Central Records Complex, Quantico firearms range modernization, CIRG A&E construction CIRG HRT Space,

G: Crosswalk of 2009 Availability

Crosswalk of 2009 Availability

Federal Bureau of Investigation Construction (Dollars in Thousands)

	FY 2009 Enacted Without Rescissions		Rescissions			Supplementals			Reprogrammings / Transfers			Carryover/ Recoveries			2009 Availability			
	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount	Pos.	FTE	Amount
Construction			\$153,491												\$176,089			\$329,580
TOTAL		••••	\$153,491	••••	••••	••••	••••	••••	••••	••••	••••	••••		••••	\$176,089	••••	••••	\$329,580

Unobligated Balances. The FBI brought forward \$175,089,000 from funds provided in prior years for the Central Records Complex, Quantico firearms range modernization, CIRG A&E construction, CIRG HRT Space, Center of Intelligence Training, SCIF Program, TEDAC Expansion, and Biometrics Technology Center.

L: Summary of Requirements by Object Class

Summary of Requirements by Object Class

Federal Bureau of Investigation Construction (Dollars in Thousands)

	FY 2008	Actual	FY 2009	Enacted	FY 2010 I	Request	Increase/I	Decrease
Object Classes	FTE	Amount	FTE	Amount	FTE	Amount	FTE	Amount
11.1 Direct FTE & personnel compensation								
11.3 Other than full-time permanent								
11.5 Total, Other personnel compensation								
Overtime			••••		••••			
Other Compensation								
11.8 Special personal services payments								
Total								
Other Object Classes:								
12.0 Personnel benefits								
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons		32						
22.0 Transportation of things								
23.1 GSA rent								
23.2 Moving/Lease Expirations/Contract Parking								
23.3 Comm., util., & other misc. charges								
24.0 Printing and reproduction								
25.1 Advisory and assistance services								
25.2 Other services				2,000		13,199		11,199
25.3 Purchases of goods & services from Government accounts (Antennas								
25.4 Operation and maintenance of facilities								
25.5 Research and development contracts								
25.7 Operation and maintenance of equipment		6,633		5,571		2,368		(3,203)
26.0 Supplies and materials		130						
31.0 Equipment		4,932		28,971		12,317		(16,654)
32.0 Land & Structures		22,342		116,950		79,721		(37,229)
Total obligations		34,069		153,491		107,605		(45,886)
Unobligated balance, start of year		(44,383)		(175,089)				
Unobligated balance, end of year		175,089						
Recoveries of prior year obligations		575						
Total DIRECT requirements		\$164,200		(\$21,598)		\$107,605		