

A Window of Opportunity for Aceh, Indonesia Post-Tsunami:
Historic Continuity, Current Points of Interest, and a Pattern

Output of the Cultural Simulation Model



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DISCLOSURE: The content of this report represent an assessment based on a review of data derived from the Cultural Simulation Model. The report is not a result of finely sifted analysis, but is a review of CSM model outputs as it pertains to Aceh in early 2005.

DISCLAIMER: The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

Purpose and Nature of Data:

The current Cultural Construct for Indonesia is an example to demonstrate the prototype operation of the CSM and is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of the Situation in Aceh. IndaSea personnel function in the role of Cultural Analysts as differentiated from an intelligence analyst. As is such, the focus was organizing and offering a preliminary understanding of the Cultural Constructs that the assessment tool, which they invented, produce. No data in the assessment tool was verified beyond web presence. The demonstration is designed to illustrate the complexity, sensitivity and specific cultural context of information able to be handled by the CSM.

NOTE: The Cultural Simulation Model (CSM) is a prototype application currently being developed with support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Threat Anticipation Project.

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Nature of the Contents of this Report

This document is a consolidation of activity from the current and historic news flow as understood by IndaSea's Cultural Simulation Model (CSM) for the Situation in Aceh, Indonesia. The CSM uses news filtering, a knowledge acquisition and contextual memory method, which we refer to as a "Cultural Construct," as well as interaction by modelers, subject matter experts (SMEs), and IndaSea Cultural Analysts as the basis for its output. A Cultural Analyst is someone trained in some aspect of human behavior and able to structure that information in the CSM. The Cultural Construct is not limited in the type of data it can use to represent human behavior including language, actions, personality traits, abstract concepts and the like.

It is important to note that a similar Cultural Construct is possible for any organization and can be coordinated with other Cultural Constructs to show, for example, the interaction of multiple command and control efforts for a particular region. The system can be tuned to look for complimentary and/or conflicting efforts and automatic indication of progress and performance towards a goal can be determined. Multiple scenarios can be managed with priority-based switching as conditions merit. Real time data mining and pattern recognition can support command decisions. Event sequence modeling, including who knew what and when, supports post campaign evaluation and pattern refinement.

In its current iteration the Cultural Construct was tailored to focus on Goals and Threats for each of the participating Actors and for the interaction between Actors in Aceh. For the purpose of this paper, an "Actor" is defined as a subset of the Cultural Construct representing a particular entity that can be a person, group, concept or culture, particularly as it relates to a social Situation. Some examples of Actors in this case are the Achenese people, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), the Indonesian Government, the Indonesian Military (TNI), and NGOs. Each Actor's cultural point of view is represented in the model. The cultural point of view includes how each Actor sees, defines, and responds to a Situation; in essence it is how they perceive and interact with the world.

Currently, the CSM Cultural Construct is comprised of 3400 statements gleaned from literature, news and subject matter experts that are linked and interwoven to form a data mesh to represent the historical and current state of affairs in Indonesia. The statements can be reduced to a set of 1400 concepts or ideas. The statements and concepts describe the behavior and interaction of the 50 Actors that are in the CSM, including the subset of Actors used in the preparation of this Aceh report. The Cultural Construct constantly grows and evolves daily to reflect emerging trends and patterns.

Situation: Aceh, Indonesia- “The Main Points” as Derived by CSM Output

The following points are a combination of forward-looking assessments and facts that comprised the assessment tool’s output for this Situation. The CSM uses news filtering, a knowledge acquisition and contextual memory method, which we refer to as a Cultural Construct, as well as interaction by modelers, subject matter experts (SMEs), and IndaSea Cultural Analysts as the basis for its output.

1. Acehese people are ethnically separate from the rest of Indonesia.
2. Acehese people have fought against foreign domination almost continually since 1873; the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is just the latest manifestation of this cultural trait.
3. The Acehese people consider themselves economically, politically, and culturally dominated by the Javanese.
4. The Acehese people see the Indonesian military's war against GAM as a war against the Acehese people
5. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) does not actively support anti-Western jihadists.
6. The Indonesian military (TNI) will continue their offensive against GAM during the post-tsunami humanitarian crisis.
7. TNI will use any means necessary to portray GAM as a terrorist organization to gain international support.
8. Before the tsunami, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were not allowed in Aceh; a key watch point will be whether or not they are allowed to stay.
9. There is international doubt that aid sent to Aceh truly reaches the Acehese people.
10. US military involvement in humanitarian efforts may be seen by some as a cover for the establishing of a US military presence in the region and future occupation of Indonesia.
11. Anti-American sentiment indicators may be linked to religiously-based activity by Christian NGOs.
12. There is a possible conflict of interest between the reform of TNI and the interests of ExxonMobil, whose subsidiary operates the largest gas field in the world in Aceh.

Situation Aceh, Indonesia: Data

Participating Actors: This section outlines the Actors whose cultural points of view (POV) are represented in this report.

Acehnese People	Indonesian Radical Muslim
Free Aceh Movement (GAM)	International Jihadi
Indonesia Government	NGOs
Indonesia Military (TNI)	US Business
Indonesia People	US Foreign Policy
Indonesian Moderate Muslims	US Military

Other Actors in the CSM but not used to prepare this report on Aceh are:

ASEAN	Mujahideen KOMPAK
Anti-American Sentiment	Muslim Charities
Australia	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
Azahari	Noordin Top
Baasyir	Philippines
China	Pirates
Extremism	Political Islam
Hambali	South East Asia
Indonesian Christians	Salafi Muslims
Indonesia Nationalist Jihadi	Singapore
Indonesian Police	Smugglers
International Organizations	Thailand
Jafar Umar Thalib	Universal Conservative Muslim
Jamaah Islamiyah	Universal Fundamentalist Muslim
Japan	Universal Moderate Muslim
Laskar Jihad	Universal Radical Muslim
MILF	al Qaeda
Malaysia	bin Laden

News Sources

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)
Really Simple Syndication (RSS) internet news feeds
Selected journals and articles by subject matter experts (see bibliography)

Cultural Construct

Currently, the CSM Cultural Construct is comprised of 3400 statements that are linked and interwoven to form a data mesh that represents the historical and current state of affairs in Indonesia. The statements revolve around a set of 1400 concepts or ideas. The statements and concepts describe the behavior and interaction of the 50 Actors that are in the CSM, to include the subset of Actors that were used in this Aceh report. The Cultural Construct constantly grows and evolves daily to reflect emerging trends and patterns.

Explanation of the Main Points

This section offers support to the main points, by expanding the cultural point of view (POV) of the Actor listed as output by the CSM. IndaSea Cultural Analysts also offer a brief explanation of the importance of this CSM output as it relates to understanding the Aceh Situation.

1. Acehnese people are ethnically separate from the rest of Indonesia.

Ramification: Ethnicity matters and this is a factor that affects the social, political, cultural, and economic understanding and activity of the Achenese people.

POV Acehnese people:

- Acehnese is a specific ethnic group among the Malayan peoples
- Islam enters Aceh around 700 C.E. and spread from there through Southeast Asia
- The first Islamic kingdom was in Aceh, established 804 C.E.
- Under Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) Aceh was the most powerful state in the region
- Acehnese defeated the Portuguese fleet at Bintan in 1614
- Achenese feel that they practice a “purer” form of Islam than the Islam practiced by the larger Indonesian population, which is heavily influenced by other religions.

2. Achenese people have fought against foreign domination almost continually since 1873; the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is just the latest manifestation of this cultural trait.

Ramification: The Aceh struggle is not ideological or for the purposes of terror; it is oriented toward independence. History also suggests it also is not going to go away. The sooner it can be resolved, the cheaper the cost overall.

POV Acehnese people:

- Aceh's influence declined after 1641 initiating British and Dutch colonialism
- Acehnese people rebelled against Dutch rule from 1873-1942
- Acehnese people rebelled against Japanese occupation 1942-1945
- The Dutch tried to retake Aceh by military means after the defeat of Japanese, but were defeated by the Acehnese
- Acehnese people rebelled against Javanese rule from 1953-1965 as part of the Darul Islam movement
- Aceh declared an independent country in 1976 by Hasan Tiro (leader of GAM)
- Modern separatist movement began in 1976
- Aceh was under military occupation 1989-present

- Two million people gathered in Banda Aceh November 8, 1999 demanding a referendum on Aceh's Independence from Indonesia

3. The Acehnese people consider themselves economically, politically, and culturally dominated by the Javanese.

Ramification: The Acehnese have been burned many times and their trust of the regional partners is low. More of the same interaction, or a compromised position that suggests autonomy as opposed to independence, is not likely to work; they may require a new type of agreement.

POV Acehnese people:

- Java-based Indonesian government forcibly annexed Aceh as part of UN sponsored Round Table Conference Agreements in 1949
- Sukarno merges Aceh into North Sumatra province in 1950 ending its special status
- Aceh is governed by the five-pillar philosophy of Pancasila imposed by the Jakarta government
- A contract between ExxonMobil and Indonesian government for Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) extraction in Aceh signed on June 12, 1965
- ExxonMobil has extracted approximately \$40 billion worth of LNG from Aceh
- All money ExxonMobil gives to Indonesia from its contract goes to Jakarta, very little ends up in Aceh
- Acehnese are among the poorest Indonesians
- Corrupt regional officials appointed by Jakarta siphon off funds meant for the Acehnese people
- Aceh has been the target of massive government transmigration programs
- Multiple human rights violations have occurred in and around the ExxonMobil installation
- A mass grave has been discovered on land "loaned" to TNI from ExxonMobil
- ExxonMobile is a multipoint pollution source
- TNI exploits Aceh's petroleum, timber, and agricultural resources (marijuana) to fund its operations in Aceh and to line the pockets of individual members of TNI

POV Indonesia government:

- Aceh is a part of Indonesia and separatist attempts to break away from Indonesia endanger the stability of the whole nation, which in turn could lead to a massive human catastrophe
- Aceh is a region that is vital to the national Indonesian economy
- Acehnese people do not want independence from Indonesia
- Aceh is not a sovereign nation and therefore there is no war against Aceh
- The military's actions in Aceh constitute a legitimate counter-insurgency measure taken by a sovereign state against an armed separatist group
- Indonesia is simply restoring its sovereignty over Aceh

4. The Acehese people see the Indonesian military's war against GAM as a war against the Acehese people

Ramification: Experts disagree as to how many of the 4 million Acehese support the goal of independence championed by GAM. Reports cite the presence of about 2 million supporters at an independence rally in 1999. At the very least, the separatist movement cannot be dismissed as the actions of an extreme element of Acehese society.

POV Acehese people:

- Confiscation of property, extortion, beatings, arrests, and massacres are common, dating back to the Darul Islam rebellion 1953-1965
- During the Darul Islam rebellion detention camps were set up to hold relatives of rebels in order to force the men to surrender
- Since 1989 thousands of Acehese civilians have been murdered and tortured, hundreds of women and children raped, hundreds of schools, houses and shops burnt to the ground
- It is difficult to obtain exact statistics on GAM support, since the Acehese fear speaking out to NGOs when asked as they perceive there will be reprisals from TNI

POV Indonesia government:

- The Indonesian government is not fighting against the people of Aceh but against armed separatist rebels
- The people of Aceh demanded the government to extend the Combined Operation for another six months
- The first six months of the Combined Operation has successfully brought about normalcy in Aceh
- Security situation has improved greatly
- Freedom of movement has been restored and people can now freely travel from village to village
- The local economy has recovered and there is no shortage of goods in the market
- Activities to create jobs are currently being carried out, especially in the field of agriculture, plantation, fishery, husbandry, and handicrafts

5. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) does not actively support anti-Western jihadists.

Ramification: Despite attempts at branding by the TNI, GAM cannot easily be identified as a group of terrorists. The global problem of “one person’s terrorist being another’s freedom fighter” cannot be solved by imposing a general definition on GAM, in this case.

POV GAM:

- GAM's goal is independence for Aceh
- GAM is not fighting an ideological war against the West

- The involvement of jihadi groups such as Laskar Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah has been unwelcome, as GAM feels that their message of jihad distracts from the goal of independence
- The actions and words of both the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and the Indonesia Mujahidin Council (MMI) are against the teachings of the Holy Qur'an and the Hadith and contradict the tolerance and faith of Acehnese Muslims

POV TNI :

- GAM members have been involved in a number of terrorist bombings outside of Aceh
- GAM members have been involved in many terrorist attacks in Aceh
- GAM members have been involved in the burning of hundreds of schools
- GAM members have been involved in hijackings and kidnappings in the Malacca Strait

6. The Indonesian military (TNI) will continue their offensive against GAM during the post-tsunami humanitarian crisis.

Ramification: The December 2004 tsunami has stripped away the purposeful obstruction to the public by TNI of the Situation in Aceh and provides a unique opportunity to be truthful. This window of opportunity will not last very long. The forthcoming NGO comments will be invaluable in assessing what is happening on the ground between GAM and TNI.

POV GAM:¹

- TNI has not denied reports of continuing attacks on GAM
- TNI continues to attack GAM fighters and extort and kidnap family members of GAM fighters
- TNI is not active in humanitarian mission to tsunami victims
- The Indonesian government has sent replacements/reinforcements to replace the soldiers who perished in the earthquake and tsunami
- TNI in Aceh do not respect the cease-fire declared by General Endriartono Sutarto
- TNI killed 200 people from December 26 to January 23, 2005

POV TNI:

- GAM is trying to disturb the humanitarian operation
- TNI has been ordered to go into defensive mode
- TNI has killed 200 rebels since the tsunami
- There has been no offensive operation since the disaster

¹ See www.asnlf.net/topint.htm for daily updates from this POV

7. TNI will use any means necessary to portray GAM as a terrorist organization to gain international support.

Ramification: This portrayal, or perceived portrayal, heightens tension between the TNI and GAM.

POV GAM:

- TNI constantly makes statements that refer to the GAM as terrorists, without clarification to local or international press that GAM has a specific separatist goal, rather than an ideological motivation.
- Possible staged ambush of aid trucks by TNI with blame on GAM

POV TNI:

- TNI does not need further justifications for its actions against GAM

8. Before the tsunami, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were not allowed in Aceh; a key watch point will be whether or not they are allowed to stay.

Ramification: The presence of strong and disparate points of view in a closed-to-the-press zone, where NGOs are excluded, heightens the propensity toward disinformation and keeps the players apart. Exposure of NGO points of view on human rights issues due to the tsunami will likely amplify the old roles of TNI and the NGOs, but at the same time provide an opportunity for resolution. Wars of words and propaganda complicate the situation.

POV NGOs:

- NGOs claim they were expelled because they were exposing TNI's continued human rights abuse in Aceh
- NGOs believe their presence and continued reporting from Aceh will help reform TNI's relation to human rights abuse in Aceh.

POV Indonesia government:

- The Indonesia government does not want to be responsible for endangering the safety of international aid workers in Aceh
- Before the tsunami, the government was confident in its capabilities and the availability of sufficient resources, made available by the central government and the rich Province of Aceh, to attend to humanitarian needs in the Province
- While offers for humanitarian assistance are now desperately needed and welcomed, Indonesia remains vigilant and concerned over potential abuses of humanitarian access to Aceh.

9. There is international doubt that aid sent to Aceh truly reaches the Acehnese people.

Ramification: The issue of humanitarian aid is important in the larger context of past manipulation and corruption on the local scene. International opinion of aid plans from the U.S. or the UN will be positively or adversely affected by whether or not there is local transparency and accountability of aid distribution as the reconstruction effort is carried out in Aceh.

POV NGOs:

- Before the tsunami, NGOs complained that only a small portion of aid sent to Aceh reached the Acehnese.
- Local anti-graft activists believe that about 30% of tsunami aid for the recovery could be lost due to corruption, which is approximately the same percentage that they claim disappears annually from the national budget due to corruption.
- TNI is already limiting aid distribution workers from traveling outside of Banda or Medulaboh, Aceh without a TNI escort

POV NGOs, United Nations-specific:

- The United Nations claims they will track the distribution of aid, and to date have seen little evidence that the tsunami aid is being diverted.

POV Indonesia government:

- The government fears that because of a past history of corruption on a local level, the amount of aid donated will fall short of needs because some will hesitate to donate.
- President Yudhoyono, SBY claims he will take personal responsibility for aid accountability.

10. US military involvement in humanitarian effort may be seen by some as a cover for the establishing of a US military presence in the region and future occupation of Indonesia.

Ramification: Indonesia rejected a previous offer by the U.S. military to conduct patrols in the Malacca Strait. Now that the US military is active in that area, Anti-American sentiment among some sectors of Indonesian society and other groups worldwide may increase, especially where there is a history of such sentiment.

POV US Military:

- The US has no intention of establishing a military presence in Indonesia; nor does it plan to occupy Indonesia
- The US Military is in Indonesia to assist in the humanitarian aid effort

POV International Radical Muslims, Jihadists:

- US military involvement in humanitarian effort is a cover for the establishment of a US military presence in the region and future occupation of Indonesia
- US military involvement in Aceh is part of a worldwide war against Muslims
- Images of US troops in Indonesia will increase anti-American sentiment among Muslim radicals and jihadists

POV Indonesia People:

- Indonesian people may perceive their government as giving into the US if US military actions are not restricted
- Anti-US sentiment will rise if it seems that the US is violating the sovereignty of Indonesia

POV US Foreign Policy:

- US Foreign Policy is attempting to make alliances in South East Asia, and negative reporting on the intention of the US in Aceh would be counterproductive to those efforts.

11. Anti-American sentiment indicators may be linked to religiously-based activities by Christian NGOs.

Ramification: This heightens the perception that the Global War on Terror is a religious war. This could shift Islamic moderates to the side of terror and could make them targets of violence.

POV Indonesia People:

- Religiously-based conversion activities by Christian NGOs increases anti-American sentiment

POV Christian NGOs:

- The Christian religion is the one true faith and the only means of salvation

POV NGOs- UNICEF specific:

- UNICEF strictly prohibits adoption of any children in Indonesia since the tsunami

POV Indonesian Radical Muslim:

- Christians NGOs in Indonesia are constantly trying to convert Muslims
- Muslims have a religious duty to defend Muslims against Christian proselytizing
- Jihadists fought against Christians in Maluku and Sulawesi

POV Indonesia Moderate Muslim:

- Ulema Council made threats of dire consequences to any foreign aid group attempting to convert Muslim children to Christianity, and considers this a criminal act

POV Indonesia Government:

- There is a ban on foreign adoption in post-tsunami Aceh

12. There is a possible conflict of interest between the reform of TNI and the interests of ExxonMobil, whose subsidiary operates the largest gas field in the world in Aceh.

Ramification: The Indonesian government does not fully fund the military. As a result the military is left to finance itself using legal and illegal commercial endeavors. The structure and culture of the funding of TNI is inherently corrupt and generates abuse. This is a primary concern for a new US military to TNI relationship. ExxonMobil relies on TNI both for security and to assist in local politics and environmental issues, which could result in an economic conflict of interest.

POV TNI:

- TNI contracts with ExxonMobil for security were extremely lucrative
- Access for TNI to Exxon Mobil's facilities and resources is invaluable
- Kickbacks from ExxonMobil are a significant source of revenue

POV US Business- ExxonMobil Indonesia specific:

- ExxonMobil does not support or condone human rights violations
- ExxonMobil needs to protect its interests in Aceh as a tremendous energy resource

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A Pattern to Avoid: East Timor

The table below shows a generic pattern and an example as it occurred in East Timor. The presence of the pattern is detected by the CSM when news feeds on Aceh are fed into the system.

Indonesian suppression of separatist movement ends with human rights abuses.

GENERIC	OLD	NEW
Separatist movement	East Timor	Aceh
Cross purpose with UN	US ambassador to the United Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan sends message to Kissinger claiming "considerable progress" in blocking UN action on East Timor	Current administration creates idea of a "coalition of giving", circumventing traditional UN aid role.
Acquiescence by US officials reads as tacit approval	Kissinger gives tacit approval of East Timor invasion, President Ford visits without expressing concern.	Powell does not mention GAM ceasefire or negotiations, Wolfowitz hints at renewed ties with focus on structural changes in relationship of TNI to the Indonesian government.
Attack follows lack of NO GO signal from US Dept of State	Attack on East Timor begins in the following days	Attacks continue on Achenese post tsunami, 120 dead.
Foreign nations training Kopassus-Special Forces	Australia trained Kopassus U.S. trained Kopassus	Australia training Kopassus U.S. training Kopassus despite a Congressional ban.
Mil – mil relation	U.S. provides equipment and training	U.S. desires to provide equipment and training
Massive human rights abuse	200,000 population of East Timor killed, 200,000 in refugee camps in W Paupa Extensive use of U.S. equipment	Acehnese people complain of ongoing human rights abuse.
Resource control	Oil resources retained by Indonesia government which contracts to Australia	Indonesia government desires continued control of oil, gas and timber
Independence	Eventual independence of East Timor by President Habibie due to high cost of maintaining control in the region.	Stubborn Achenese have been fighting for centuries

Example Analysis of Future of U.S.-Indonesia Relations

Based on Scenarios and Actor goals and threats in the CSM, these general observations can be made for the future of US-Indonesia relations, as a result of the model output:

US goals in Indonesia include the establishment of a responsible partner for fighting terror and protecting trade routes. At the same time, it seeks establish a clean and stable business environment for current and future commercial enterprise and market development.

US "invasions" of Afghanistan and Iraq and attempts to wipe out international terror networks have contributed to a groundswell of support among persons willing to contribute funds, intelligence, training, and their own lives, to combating this activity. It is well documented that some Indonesian groups fall into this category and have even carried out attacks against targets affiliated with the US and its allies. This poses a constant threat to the U.S. presence in Indonesia and internationally. A success story of the U.S. operating in the Islamic world would decrease anti-American sentiment indicators among some sectors. The perception of a successful relief and reconstruction effort in Aceh may provide that success story.

Indonesia is responsive to international pressure to reform, which is at an all time high. TNI ending its involvement in all commercial interests, both legal and illegal, and thereby removing all conflict of interest for commercial endeavors, would greatly help to establish a mechanism for TNI accountability under the Indonesian government. This is particularly difficult in Indonesia, where the culture has softer boundaries concerning what constitutes conflict of interest.

The historic openness provided by U.S. Congress during the lead up to the Leahy amendment and current Congressional activity reopening the question of TNI funding, is an opportunity to come clean in regards to U.S. involvement in past questionable activities. Willingness to deal with past indiscretions will go a long way to building trust, and decreasing anti-American sentiment in South East Asia.

Support for the Acehnese ceasefire and the proposed negotiations are a possible venue for U.S. support. Aceh is not at high risk of turning into a regionally based sponsor of terrorism should the Acehnese receive concessions, since their focus is not religious jihad.


The following US business-Aceh Scenarios could improve perception of the US:

- Renegotiating the contract between ExxonMobil and Indonesia, perhaps in favor of establishing a three way partnership between Indonesia, Aceh and Exxon
- Using the template for resource rights created by a new contract to find a resolution to the East Timor, Indonesia and Australia oil rights agreement, including a resolution to the international ocean boundary dispute

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- Resolving any holdover issues regarding ExxonMobil's alleged involvement in human rights abuses
- Creating a fund for fair compensation of victims of pollution of water by ExxonMobil and, by implication, the Indonesian state

CSM Map



This map from the CSM that illustrates the relationship of the US, Indonesia government, TNI, ExxonMobil, and the Acehese people.


The statements used in the map are examples of the 3400 statements concerning Indonesia that are currently in the system.

Statements with the same color bar are part of the same behavior sequence.

CSM Map

This is an example showing one of many forward-looking scenarios in the CSM.

Shown is a decrease in the opportunity for conflict resolution in post-tsunami Aceh, because of the interaction of GAM, TNI and NGOs.



The CSM Status

An appropriate use of the CSM would be to support the Strategic Communications initiative written by the Defense Science Board.²

The CSM has reached the stage where it is immediately operational at the project level and its design is capable of fulfilling its global orientation.

A deep understanding of the extremely complex situation in Indonesia has been achieved with a data acquisition effort that was limited in scope. This is indicative of the cost efficient methods of the CSM. It also reflects its collaborative nature where information is accumulated, compounded and synthesized rather than compartmentalized.

A global data acquisition effort would be able to support a wide range of projects.

We would encourage the global data set to include diversified and comprehensive data types including negotiation methods, psychology and cultural literature for thousands of years.

In the case of Indonesia, like elsewhere in the Islamic world, demonstration of improved cultural understanding based on point of view and the perception of all Actors will assist the U.S. in building a trust based relationship with Islamic moderates to provide a lasting path to international peace.

² This September 2004 DSB report can be accessed at: http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf

Bibliography

Everything in the CSM is either currently traceable or designed to be traceable in the future, or as per client specification. Activity in the live news and text feeds to the CSM results in the stimulation of portions of the Cultural Construct. This conceptual activity can be traced back to the source from many downstream points in order to establish verification and degree of relevancy. Here is a partial list of news articles supporting the active portions of the Cultural Construct for the portion relating to the Situation Aceh.

Explanation of Points

1.

POV: Achenese people:

<http://countrystudies.us/singapore/15.htm>

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aceh>

<http://acehnet.tripod.com/where.htm>

<http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit57/aceh.htm>

<http://www.antenna.nl/~daktari/indie/indhis02.htm>

http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/RR_September_2002_feild.cfm

2.

POV: Acehnese people:

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/indonesia/Story/0,2763,960410,00.html>

http://www.kbri-canberra.org.au/s_issues/aceh/aceh_info.htm

http://www.guardian.co.uk/flash/indonesia_aceh.swf

<http://acehnet.tripod.com/where.htm>

http://goasia.about.com/od/indonesia/a/acehbackground_3.htm

<http://acehnet.tripod.com/begin.htm>

<http://www.nross.com/umi/subjectcatalogs/SoutheastAsianStudiesCatalog.pdf>

http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/maps_sumatra_background.php

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0111/p07s01-woap.htm>

<http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit66/lesley2.htm>

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/aceh.htm>

http://workers.labor.net.au/84/letters1_one.html

http://www.newsandletters.org/Issues/1999/Dec/12.99_easttimor.htm

3.

POV: Acehnese people:

<http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=05>

<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1599/MR1599.ch10.pdf>

http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/maps_sumatra_background.php

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/1999/11/991117-aceh3.htm>

<http://www.minorityrights.org/Profiles/profile.asp?ID=22>

http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/maps_sumatra_background.php
<http://www.etan.org/etanpdf/icwa/cg-23.pdf>
<http://acehnet.tripod.com/mobil.htm>
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