

MI PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

January-June 2025
PB 34-25-1



**SEMIANNUAL
ONLINE
COLLECTION**



U.S. soldiers assigned to 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, supporting the 4th Infantry Division (4ID), alongside soldiers assigned to the Royal Lancers, Prince of Wales Troop, and Polish soldiers assigned to 15th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, all assigned to NATO eFP Battle Group Poland, provide rear security while breaching a building during a multinational urban assault exercise at Elk, Poland, 2 March 2023. The 4ID's mission in Europe is to engage in multinational training and exercises across the continent, working alongside NATO allies and regional security partners to provide combat-credible forces to V Corps, America's forward deployed corps in Europe. (Photo by Sgt. Lianne M. Hirano, U.S.Army)

Ivy Intelligence (IVI) Large-Scale Combat Operations Targeting

Sergeant First Class Christian R. Ramsey, U.S. Army

Editor's Note: This article is reprinted with permission from Military Review, The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It was originally published in the November 2024 Online Exclusives on 6 November 2024. It has been modified to match MIPB's style and format.



The 4th Infantry Division G-2 Strike Cell operates “live” in Poland during a NATO multinational exercise on 15–19 April 2023. (Photo courtesy of 4ID Public Affairs Detachment)

Intelligence support to targeting at the division level faces several substantial challenges in large-scale combat operations (LSCO). First and most importantly, intelligence nodes often struggle to locate and identify high-payoff targets in the division’s deep area. This fact is in large part a consequence of a habitual overreliance by the division’s intelligence apparatus to leverage—near exclusively—its organic collection capabilities at the expense of other collection methods. This habit has almost certainly been formed and stabilized through twenty years of experience in the Global War on Terrorism. Second, Warfighter exercises (WFX)—the primary means through which a division headquarters executes its collective training—exacerbates this issue by failing to properly simulate otherwise available information derived through national technical means (NTM). By design, WFXs emphasize division organic collection to feed the division’s targeting cycle. For instance, training audiences in a WFX enjoy the virtual video feed of an MQ-1C Gray Eagle but cannot obtain basic, satellite-provided electro-optical, infrared, or synthetic-aperture radar imagery. Third, the majority of analysts are not intimately familiar with the capabilities or duties of their single-source or all-source counterparts. As a result, the timeliness with which potential targets are verified and disseminated is diminished, ultimately allowing high-payoff targets to escape prosecution. Through a series of training and real-world experiences, the 4th Infantry Division (4ID) demonstrated that division G-2s can, in fact, mitigate these challenges by

successfully incorporating and relentlessly exploiting NTM-derived information during its targeting process. This article argues that diversifying the types and levels of collection (i.e., tactical, theater, and national) results in a more robust and effective division collection capability—one that better facilitates situational understanding and targeting in support of the commander’s objectives in a contested environment.

4ID currently employs a “strike cell” construct. The primary function of the strike cell is to leverage multiple intelligence disciplines to accomplish the “detect” phase in the Army’s “Decide, Detect,

Deliver, and Assess” process.¹ A secondary function is to feed the division’s analysis and control element with timely and accurate information to inform the division’s common intelligence picture. 4ID accomplishes these objectives by staffing the strike cell with signals intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and all-source intelligence analysts. These individuals are co-located in a mobile, modular command post trailer with no physical barriers to encourage cross-communication, rapid synchronization, cuing of information, and prioritization of targets (see figure 1). The analysts are managed and controlled by a strike chief, typically a chief warrant officer 2 all-source technician. The strike chief is responsible for validating and coordinating targets with the field artillery intelligence officer prior to their submission to the joint air-ground integration cell (JAGIC) for prosecution (see figure 2). To continue refining intelligence support to targeting and to better train analysts across the division, 4ID stood up an intelligence reach operations cell (IROC). The IROC is staffed by personnel from across Fort Carson, Colorado, which provides opportunities to all analysts, ranging from battalion intelligence shops to the division G-2. This mixture of experiences and skill levels provides a perfect test bed to innovate, experiment with, and validate the division’s targeting procedures prior to implementation. Additionally, the diversity of knowledge provides multiple solutions to problems, which in turn typically results in the most effective selection process.

*Proximity of all sources of intelligence collection and processing enables rapid deconfliction and corroboration resulting in decreased prosecution timelines.




Figure 1. 4th Infantry Division Strike Cell Layout (Figure by author)

Problem Statements

When polling junior GEOINT soldiers and noncommissioned officers across the division, a common response is that after advanced individual training (AIT), most GEOINT professionals have limited or no exposure to NTM—the only exceptions are service members who enjoyed an initial tour of duty within an Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) unit. It is true GEOINT soldiers are taught processing, exploitation, and dissemination of imagery in AIT, but proficiency in this task is limited, especially when it is not prioritized during collective or section training events at home station. The typical response for the inclusion of this type of intelligence is “white card injects,” which afford insignificant training value to the analysts and provides commanders with unrealistic expectations of the quality and confidence of the intelligence provided. The prioritization of ground moving target indicator and full-motion video is heavily encouraged due to the availability of simulations to support this training and the control offered at the division level. Currently, no such training tools are geared toward imagery processing, exploitation, and dissemination or other echelons above division collection. CW4

John R. Livesey III shares this sentiment in his article discussing geospatial intelligence support to targeting. Livesey writes, “GEOINT support to targeting primarily consisted of following targets with unmanned aircraft systems and conducting drone strikes. The Army, and joint forces, will require revitalized and refined GEOINT to support future multidomain operations.”² Additionally, ground moving target indicator is commonly desynchronized from other war simulation inputs, leading to erroneous analysis and bad practices. In previous 4ID exercises, the strike cell has tipped-and-cued full-motion video assets (Gray Eagle) to positively identify ground moving target indicator detections and was surprised to find nothing in the immediate vicinity.

Separately, as the Army has transitioned to LSCO and multidomain operations, the division must ensure it is utilizing all aspects of collection to generate and maintain an accurate common intelligence picture regardless of what organic assets may be available. With operations conducted against peer adversaries, it is highly likely that airspace will be heavily contested and not easily traversed by unmanned aircraft and unarmed surveillance aircraft. This is echoed in CW3 Trent




Figure 2. Intelligence Support to Targeting Flow Chart (Figure by author)

Taylor and WO1 Evan Lipp’s publication on information collection support to targeting, in which they state, “Army forces will also contend with peer threats capable of employing long-range fires and denying freedom of airspace, compounded by the potential of a disconnected, intermittent, and limited communications environment.”³ Since many assets that divisions currently utilize may be ineffective in the initial stages of LSCO, there will be a gap in the common intelligence picture at that echelon. 4ID has had some success in supplementing its organic capabilities with NTM. The primary user of NTM at the division level is the SIGINT section. Analysis of SIGINT emissions can greatly increase the effectiveness of other NTM collection efforts by focusing search areas into a manageable sector that can quickly cue other intelligence disciplines, thereby reducing the amount of time required to positively identify critical targets. This is especially true of GEOINT analysts who are typically “snail trailing” through large images in search of possible targets. While the use of SIGINT to tip GEOINT does not completely remove the need to thoroughly exploit images, it does provide a much shorter sensor-to-shooter timeline. This increases the likelihood of successful strikes, especially when targeting highly mobile pieces of equipment such as surface to air missile systems. Cross-confirming with GEOINT is not always required depending on target selection standards and rules of engagement but is highly beneficial when target location errors (TLEs) are immature and require additional refinement to determine an acceptable aimpoint.

Last, through over three years of leading a division G-2 strike cell and IROC in both exercises and real-world operations, one thing has become abundantly clear to me: junior analysts and

noncommissioned officers are not fully aware of the capabilities and duties of their counterparts. This has been true of over thirty individuals, many of whom were not on their initial contract. All-source analysts may obtain a baseline understanding of the other intelligence disciplines as a byproduct of their day-to-day activities. However, compartmented, single-source intelligence analysts are often limited in their opportunities to interact (and thus learn from) their peers.

Signals Intelligence

The challenges in operationalizing SIGINT at the division level are arguably the simplest to solve. Most SIGINT analysts at division are already practiced on drawing NTM-derived information, given the fact that division headquarters do not possess organic signals collection equipment. This creates a dependency on either the brigade organic Prophet system or NTM collection. By prioritizing NTM, division analysts can fill gaps when brigade elements are maneuvering or when their systems are nonmission capable. SIGINT sections at division can maximize situational awareness and understanding by leveraging NTM to look beyond the division deep area, providing additional information that will assist the analysis and control element in determining future enemy courses of action.

Notably, 4ID has had success utilizing a SIGINT-specific LSCO training pipeline developed by the Fort Carson Foundry platform, which included classes such as the Basic SIGINT Analyst Course (SI302), Advanced Threat Emitters Course (SI308), SIGINT Support to Counter-UAS (SI313), and Electro-Magnetic Preparation of the Battlefield (SI320). These courses, in conjunction with appropriate command and control, enabled SIGINT to be a more active participant in the targeting process.

Additionally, co-locating GEOINT and SIGINT personnel facilitated a free flow of information, greatly contributing to increased productivity and reduced timelines to develop and submit complete and accurate target packets.

4ID SIGINT primarily utilized the Fusion Analysis and Development Effort (FADE)/Multi-Intelligence Spatial Temporal (MIST) tool suite to conduct SIGINT support to targeting. While there were other programs used for refinement and additional context, most of the mission requirements were met with FADE/MIST. The interoperability of FADE/MIST enabled the importation of multiple data sets that informed assessments and provided additional context to emissions. 4ID SIGINT also utilized electronic order of battle analysis to feed the composition/disposition of enemy displayed on the common intelligence picture.

Another area in which SIGINT enabled success was cross-training all-source and GEOINT analysts on implementing and using FADE/MIST tools. This greatly increased the entire section's ability to locate and cross-cue potential targets with multiple intelligence disciplines, thereby increasing the strike cell's capability and capacity.

Geospatial Intelligence

In general, GEOINT imagery analysts receive the majority of their intelligence support to targeting training during AIT. Within the last year, analysts graduating from AIT enjoy the opportunity to pursue certification in target mensuration only and collateral damage estimation—two certifications paramount for targeting operations. That said, two classes that proved critical to 4ID operations but were (and still are) not part of the standardized training pipeline include Synthetic Aperture Radar Exploitation 1 and 2. The exploitation of synthetic aperture radar imagery is indeed a component of the AIT curriculum, with a specific focus on tactical identification at the onset of training. However, depending on whether the soldier is assigned to a Forces Command (FORSCOM) or INSCOM/Special Operations Command (SOCOM) formation upon graduation, the extent of synthetic aperture radar and electro-optical/infrared imagery exploitation and tactical identification training he or she receives varies significantly. FORSCOM-destined soldiers who attend a FORSCOM-specific training pathway later in AIT receive considerably more exposure to those skills than their INSCOM/SOCOM-destined peers. This reality ensures a large portion of AIT-graduates are considerably less practiced at perhaps the most important capability an imagery analyst provides during LSCO.

Decision-makers regularly discount synthetic aperture radar imagery due to the low-confidence assessments commonly associated with its exploitation. Numerous assessments employ confidence call language, such as “probable” or “possible” primarily because imagery analysts often cannot definitively specify the model or variant of equipment. 4ID

has had success in utilizing visual aids such as measurements and side-by-side comparisons to further add validity to their analyst's assessments. Additionally, by utilizing other intelligence disciplines to bolster assessments, many “probable” pieces of equipment have been accepted by the JAGIC or higher headquarters for prosecution. This continuous fight to gain trust with the commander or decision-maker is not specific to intelligence support to targeting but can be the linchpin that separates an effective dynamic targeting cell from an ineffective one.

Processing, exploitation, and dissemination of imagery is one of the most time-intensive requirements in intelligence. Many images cover massive pieces of terrain that require considerable attention to detail and discipline to properly exploit. 4ID currently employs equal parts SIGINT and GEOINT imagery analysts due to a modified table of organization and equipment; however, it would be highly beneficial to staff two imagery analysts per SIGINT analyst to maximize the effectiveness of their coordination. While 4ID was able to complete the majority of its image exploitation before time limits set by target selection standards were met, some images past acceptable decay standards and were only exploited for situational awareness. Increasing the number of imagery analysts available would help to mitigate this issue. Additionally, having SIGINT cue GEOINT into search areas based on target location errors was highly beneficial and maximized the number of targets that could be confirmed via multiple sources. When prospective targets have been confirmed by multiple sources, the JAGIC is more likely to prosecute.

All-Source/Fusion Intelligence

All-source analysts in 4ID have acted as the connective tissue of the targeting cell. All-source analysts are expected to know the capabilities of equipment, the composition and disposition of enemy forces, and where the enemy is most likely to employ its critical systems. By integrating with the GEOINT and SIGINT sections, all-source analysts can effectively convey this information quickly. This leads to increased cross talk within the cell, further increasing the base skills shared by all analysts. 4ID SIGINT has had success in developing electronic order of battle to directly inform the composition and disposition of enemy forces in a combat scenario. The SIGINT personnel will analyze emissions and assess the likely location of accompanying equipment. If unable to identify the equipment via emissions, the GEOINT and all-source analysts will utilize imagery or reporting to provide additional corroboration. If the unit can be successfully identified, battle damage assessment can be properly allocated, enabling an accurate representation of enemy combat power and further informing the commander's targeting priorities. Additionally, identifying how the enemy forces employ key systems informs the electronic order of battle and order of battle, accounting for changes as adversarial forces improve their tactics, techniques, and procedures with inputs from

their successes and failures.

Additionally, all-source personnel in the strike cell provide direct input to the analysis and control element, which results in increased awareness of disposition of forces for future assessments. The simplest way to accomplish this is by generating message data in U.S. message text format and populating it into the intelligence fusion server. Targets that are under prosecution by the JAGIC are sent as an S305, a target intelligence data message; and equipment that is not actively targeted is sent as a S303, an enemy observation report; S309, enemy situation report; or a tactical report. Utilizing the U.S. message text format and populating it on the intelligence fusion server maximizes reach and provides a record to conduct in-depth analysis of movements over time.

Finally, the utilization of open-source intelligence (OSINT) will be necessary in a peer or near-peer contested environment. Adversarial actions may degrade organic collection assets and NTM to the point where intelligence gaps prevent the production of accurate assessments. OSINT will likely be available due to the sheer number of sensors providing information that are available and will likely serve as the primary resource used to fill these gaps. Multiple real-world conflicts have shown the prevalence of civilians reporting on military operations. This, in conjunction with poor operational security enforcement, results in a fairly accurate depiction of objectives and force posture via OSINT reporting. While some personnel serving within the 4ID strike cell and IROC have OSINT certifications (OS301/302), the operational tempo of the mission set often precluded full utilization of these tools by analysts already consumed with performing their primary occupational tasks. Additionally, OSINT-trained personnel should be included in a targeting cell's staff to enable additional avenues for collection and target information corroboration.

Conclusion

Overall, there are multiple ways that a division G-2 can diversify its collection efforts to better enable its intelligence support to targeting and to increase its analytic potential. Leveraging existing collection capabilities at echelons above division will mitigate gaps caused by a lack of organic assets or possible degradation cause by enemy actions. To fully utilize these assets, analysts should attend formal training and seek out opportunities to attend a live-environment training, or, if possible, stand up an IROC. Staffing the IROC from multiple organizations on a rotational basis will mitigate risk to the unit's day-to-day missions while simultaneously enabling enhanced intelligence training objectives. This also serves to broaden the knowledge and skillset of participants and facilitates the testing of new and more efficient solutions. Additionally, the more time analysts spend learning the duties and capabilities of their cross-discipline counterparts, the more agile and informed their analytic output will be.

This will provide the commander or decisionmaker with the best assessment available and continue to improve the trust relationship that is so critical to the intelligence profession.

An ancillary but not insignificant benefit regarding 4ID's IROC initiative deals with soldier retention. Because 4ID's IROC allowed for the exploitation and processing of real-world data, analysts felt they were doing the job they signed up to do. Removing physical and cognitive barriers to streamline information sharing heightened cohesion within the cell. The potential to contribute to real-world missions likewise enhanced a common sense of purpose. Perhaps most importantly, analysts could visibly see their skillset proficiencies improve, bolstering confidence and pride in work performance. All of these factors underpinned not only an elevated level of job satisfaction among 4ID intelligence professionals (and retention rates) but contributed to the division becoming a faster and more lethal organization as an outcome.

During visits with multiple U.S. Army senior leaders, a singular, common question prevailed: "Why aren't other divisions doing this?" The easy answer is unit operational tempo. Most divisions are juggling operational deployments, training requirements, staff exercises, military intelligence training standards, and more. Justifying the removal of low-density military occupational specialty soldiers to attend a live environment training or stand up an IROC is a vexing task. However, 4ID has found it is possible through strong leadership and calculated manning decisions—namely by (1) establishing a ninety-day rotational cycle for IROC participants, (2) incorporating IROC experiences as part of standing military intelligence training standards requirements, and (3) resourcing participation from across multiple commands so that just one does not bear the entire burden. To be sure, 4ID continues to identify gaps in capabilities as it encounters new requirements or problem sets. However, its experience with its strike cell and IROC demonstrate the potential to improve division lethality beyond historic norms.

Notes

1. Field Manual 2-0, *Intelligence* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, October 2023), 3-20.
2. John R. Livesey III, "Geospatial Intelligence Support to Targeting," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 49, no. 1 (April 2023): 3, <https://mipb.army.mil/articles/spt-targeting-spec-ed/livesey-geojoint>.
3. Trent Taylor and Evan Lipp, "Information Collection Support to Targeting," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 49, no. 1 (April 2023): 2, <https://mipb.army.mil/articles/spt-targeting-spec-ed/taylor-information-collection>.

SFC Christian R. Ramsey, U.S. Army, is the 4th Infantry Division analysis and control element noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). His assignments include two deployments to Afghanistan as an intelligence analyst and one deployment to Poland as the Fusion NCOIC. Ramsey has served as the 4th Infantry Division strike chief for two years, in addition to previously serving as the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade S-2 NCOIC and as a fusion analyst in the 3rd Cavalry Regiment.

If I were a lieutenant today in the 101st Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI)

I WOULD work hard to “LEAD BY EXAMPLE!”

Lt. Col. James R. Riser

Editor's Note: In continuation of the historical retrospective that began with our 50th Anniversary Commemorative Compilation, every quarter, the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin will highlight an article from the past that is still relevant today. This article first appeared in the July–September 1985 issue. The doctrinal and regulatory publications referenced in this article have either been superseded or rescinded.

WITH REGARD TO MY ARMY AND PROFESSIONALISM

I WOULD feel personally honored to serve my country as an officer in the United States Army.

I WOULD always remember that my mission is to provide intelligence support to the 1st Infantry Division. I would make sure that my troops know the critical importance of their contributions to the division's combat readiness and that they are physically and mentally prepared to go to war at any time.

I WOULD know the doctrine prescribing how intelligence “works” within a division. (Get copies of, and read, FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*; FM 34-80, *Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*; and FM 34-103, *Division Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*.)

I WOULD spend a part of each day studying some aspect of the proud institution in which I serve, the United States Army. (Read some history about our country and our army at war. It will give you some perspective on why intelligence and unit readiness are so vital. Start with *The Leavenworth Papers* from the Combat Studies Institute, Command and General Staff College: Number 3. *Not War, But Like War: The American Intervention in Lebanon* and Number 5. *Fighting the*


Russians in Winter. Additionally, S.L.A. Marshall's books are super. Try *Battles in the Monsoons* to get an accurate picture of combat in Vietnam.)

I WOULD get my own personal copy of FM 27-1, *Legal Guide for Commanders*, and study up on the administration of military justice and administrative law at the company level. Also study, and get for each of your soldiers, FM 27-14, *Legal Guide for the Soldier*.

I WOULD acknowledge that senior officers and many NCOs have already experienced many of my problems, so I would seek their advice and help. (Make sure, however, their advice and help is based on a correct understanding of *your* particular problem.)

I would inspect myself thoroughly and frequently:

- ◆ Do I need a haircut? (Lieutenants should get haircuts before they need them – it helps in making captain.) If I wear a mustache, is it properly trimmed?
- ◆ Are my boot heels run down? (Good lieutenants and lieutenant colonels should wear out lots of boot heels. We need to replace them often.) Does my uniform fit? Buttons, nametags, patches okay? Hatbill clean? Field gear—would I



be in uniform if I went to the field today? Overweight? Out of shape?

- ◆ How is my military bearing—do I stand up straight? How do I “shape up” as an officer? Good? Not so good? (Remember: Your troops are inspecting you whenever you are in their presence. You are expected to and must set the example. You can start with AR 670-1, *Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia*. Also be aware of and comply with appropriate command policy letters.)

I WOULD establish and maintain an open line of communication to my company first sergeant and my battalion command sergeant major. (These professional soldiers can take a lot of misery out of your life if you will let them.) I would not take myself too seriously nor get bogged down with worry. (No one will shoot you if you display a fleeting imperfection once in awhile.) I would have a pen or pencil and a notepad with me at all times and I'd develop a habit of writing notes to myself. I would write down good ideas as I thought of them or when someone else mentioned one. (Then you should use all the good ideas you have notes on, if you can. It also helps to jot down bad habits you might need to work on.)

I WOULD assemble my own up-to-date working tools for immediate use: ARs, FMs, SOPs, DA pamphlets, checklists, policy letters, and soldiers manuals. (Also get copies of IG and Command Inspection reports to see if your areas of responsibility passed or flunked—good place to start work. Also get appropriate policy letters published by higher headquarters—at least to division level. You can tell which ones you need by reviewing lists of published letters. Your company commander and battalion adjutant can help you on this one. Also, frequently review DA Pam 310-1, *The Consolidated Index to Publications and Forms*, to see if a new publication or change is available to help you in your work.)

I WOULD strive to become technically proficient in my principal and additional duties. I would, in addition to my principal duty, organize each of my additional duties with a mini-chain of command to ensure that each duty is, in fact, fully carried out. (Know the purpose of each additional duty and who or what the target is. Check feedback to see if your additional duty is on target.) I would coordinate with battalion staff officers having functional responsibility for my principal and additional duties to make sure I am meeting their requirements and expectations. I would also get with the IG inspector for each of my duties for guidance, direction, sympathy, or whatever help I may need. At the very least, I would get the list of references (to include dates of publication) used to inspect each area. (This works well for all duties, and it helps to show your commander that you've got it together and are professional.)

I WOULD not “look the other way” if I saw a uniformed soldier improperly dressed, sloppy, or who didn't salute. I'd correct him on the spot and report it to his commander if appropriate. Never pass by a mistake! I would require all subordinates to practice good military courtesy in my presence (for example, “Yes, Sir” or “No, Sir,” proper responses

to my questions, standing up when addressed by me, and so forth). I would not allow junior soldiers of any rank to call me by my first name or nickname. I would insist on military courtesy. (And don't address your subordinates or superiors by their first names. Use correct military titles in your professional dealing with others.)

I WOULD position myself to the left of any senior officer with whom I might be walking and I would require subordinates walking with me to do the same. (This is an old Army custom. Do your part to keep military traditions and customs alive in our Army.) I would return subordinates' salutes with a cheerful and hearty verbal greeting as well as a snappy return salute. (Remember, your soldiers expect you to speak when meeting them and how you speak is their clue to your attitude.)

I WOULD make sure that my word is my bond. I would take pride in having a reputation for truthfulness and honor that would allow my troops to say, “It has to be true, Lieutenant... said so.” (Follow through with anything you tell your troops you will do and ensure feedback gets to them. Your credibility is in jeopardy if you don't.)

I WOULD be “up front” with my evaluations of subordinates. Don't “lay back” and let your subordinates think they are doing just fine and then destroy them with poor OERs or EERs. You must develop the courage to constructively inform others of their shortcomings. Do this in a timely manner so your subordinates will have time to react before an evaluation is written.

I WOULD recognize that I won't be a lieutenant very long and that I need to scope out my future on a time line. Career planning and development should be a topic of discussion with MILPERCEN and with senior officers in my branch. (Include your family development. Your family will have a big impact on your career as it progresses.) (A current list of MI Branch contacts was printed in the

April–June Issue of *Military Intelligence*. You should personally visit MILPERCEN at your earliest opportunity and establish an “eyeball” relationship with your assignment officer.)

I WOULD keep handy, and frequently review, a list of leadership actions which I should be accomplishing as a professional leader. I would, at the very least:

- ◆ Lead by example.
- ◆ Be considerate.
- ◆ Tend to the needs of soldiers.
- ◆ Maintain loyalty up and down.
- ◆ Make quality a habit.
- ◆ Build “staying power.”
- ◆ Cultivate credibility.
- ◆ Reward the deserving.
- ◆ Develop pride.
- ◆ Follow through.
- ◆ Be ready.

Look beyond these “bullets” for the *meaning*—then develop your own operating style which lets you carry out the actions in a way which is natural to your personality. Read your feedback constantly and carefully; it'll show you where you need to do some work in the leadership area.

I WOULD maintain a personal working file on all finance and personnel actions that pertain to myself. (You might want to put your important papers in a commercial depository for safekeeping.) I would make sure my checking account stayed straight and that I could do basic arithmetic. (Don't be careless with your finances and be especially watchful if a joint account is involved.) I would program periodic leave and take it. (Encourage your subordinates to do likewise. They need to “get away from it all” once in awhile just as you do.)

I WOULD continuously evaluate my professional strengths and weaknesses as a participating member of my own chain of command. I would ask myself, “Have I gained the trust and respect of my soldiers?” I would recognize that I have only

four categories of resources: people, equipment, time, and operating funds. (Most of your resources are fixed at your level. Your professionalism will be measured by how efficiently and economically you convert your resources into mission accomplishment.)

I WOULD not intentionally embarrass a fellow soldier in public. (Let the Individual know in advance when you plan to bring up a matter pertaining to his area of responsibility.) I would carefully avoid saying or writing anything I wouldn't want quoted back to me later. (And don't allege more than you can prove—you may be asked to do so someday.) I would understand that I live in a "fishbowl." Both my on-duty and off-duty conduct must be impeccable and beyond reproach at all times.

I WOULD learn how to write. I would be embarrassed professionally if my boss had to rewrite my correspondence. (Get AR 340-15, *Preparing Correspondence*; AR 310-50, *Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes*; and a good dictionary and a good thesaurus. Use them all. Other useful books: **Harbrace College Handbook**, 7th Edition, and **Elements of Style**, 3rd Edition. I would require my subordinates to develop good writing techniques and I would proofread everything before sending it forward. (Extra training may be required; if so, lay it on.)

I WOULD make sure that I (and a spouse, if applicable) learned basic social graces, such as "RSVP" and "Regrets only." (Several books are available to help you in this area; check with your company commander or battalion adjutant. DA Pamphlet 600-60, *A Guide to Protocol and Etiquette for Official Entertainment*,

contains good information and an excellent bibliography.) I would teach my spouse basic Army organization, the names of key people, and something about my job. I would keep my spouse informed and encourage social participation.

I WOULD evaluate my civilian education and seek opportunities for improvement, keeping in mind that my first goal is to be a good, solid leader.

I WOULD ensure that my personal affairs are kept in order, including finances, personnel records, will, and emergency data card. (JAG officers can help you with this one. Also, commercial organizations can be of great help. Carefully evaluate your own situation to determine if you need assistance. DA Pamphlet 360-531, *Your Personal Affairs—A Checklist*, should be part of your package.)

WITH REGARD TO MY COMPANY

I WOULD thoroughly know my company Emergency Deployment Plan, as well as the installation Emergency Deployment OPLAN, and be sure my subordinates know the plan and can execute it in a professional manner.

I WOULD fully and openly support the company commander and first sergeant, even if I might privately disagree. (You may express disagreement in private but, if overruled, then give 100 percent support. After all, they just might be right. And then, *issue orders in your own name*. Don't tell your troops they have

to do something because "the old man" is making it happen. You lose respect and authority if you don't issue orders as if they were of your own initiative.)

I WOULD openly honor and respect the position of the company first sergeant. (He doesn't outrank you, but his unique title and position warrant your special professional consideration.)

I WOULD learn as much about the company structure that supports my platoon as I could. (To be really effective, you need to know about your unit supply,

motor pool, orderly room, training, NBC, arms room, reenlistment, safety, and so forth.)

I WOULD make sure that what I think I am supposed to be doing is what my boss thinks I'm supposed to be doing. (Then see that you're "doing more doing" than "thinking about doing." A periodic joint review of your OER Support Form 67-8-1 can be helpful here.)

I WOULD actively support the unit sports program, both as a participant and observer, when possible.

WITH REGARD TO MY PLATOON

I WOULD use troop welfare, morale, pride, and esprit de corps as common denominators for every action I took in leading my troops. I would work hard to maintain an excellent working relationship with my platoon sergeant and I would openly support him. (You set the standards and policies to guide him, then let him function as an NCO. Ask for and consider his advice in your decisionmaking process and don't ever

"put down" your platoon sergeant in front of your soldiers.)

I WOULD know what my NCOs are supposed to do, then I would see to it that they do it in a professional manner. (Don't do it for them—let them earn their titles and pay.) I would ensure my NCOs are maintaining high levels of order, discipline, and cleanliness in my troop work and billet areas. (Be especially attentive to the billets on weekends

and holidays—a few uncaring soldiers can make billet living an unpleasant experience. Don't let that happen in your platoon—check it personally and frequently.)

I WOULD pay special attention to NCOs in section sergeant level positions and help them in their leadership roles. (Many of your junior sergeants are in their first leadership positions and will need help. Don't assume they know a

great deal—they may not, and it is simply a function of experience. Be patient, but make them study and work hard at being good leaders.)

I WOULD get my own copy of AR 623-105 and AR 623-205. (These ARs prescribe the evaluation reporting systems for officers and enlisted soldiers. Study them and evaluate your subordinates properly. Also, know how *you* are being evaluated.) I would establish and watch closely the rating scheme and submission times of OERs and EERs for my subordinates. (You can quickly get behind in this area. Pay attention to the paperwork aspects of your personnel management actions—most key personnel moves will generate multilayer EER or OER requirements.)

I WOULD insist on absolute control over the people and property allocated to me by the MTOE for my mission responsibilities. I would then lay out my platoon organization, match my people and property to it, and firmly fix responsibility and accountability for both through my chain of command. I would have secure areas constructed to store my platoon equipment. Field gear for off-post personnel would have to meet the same availability, cleanliness and storage criteria as for on-post personnel. (If you don't provide space and an SOP, field gear will be all over the place and much of it will get lost.)

I WOULD sort out my platoon equipment and make sure I have trained and licensed principal operators for every piece of equipment and that licensed back-up operators are available or in training. Reluctant soldiers, those not wishing to be honored with a military driver's license, would receive intensive extra training to help them obtain a license. (Don't let your equipment be dispatched without your control over it—could be that some untrained operator will "save" his equipment and ruin yours.)

I WOULD conduct frequent open-ranks and equipment layout inspections to

verify that my chain of command has already achieved and is maintaining my high standards. (Make sure you are in line with the company and battalion SOP. Also keep in mind that we no longer have a simple "uniform" but rather "multiform" when it comes to individual dress for our soldiers, for example, male, female, maternity, cooks' whites, and jungle fatigues.)

I WOULD study FM 22-5, *Drill and Ceremonies*, in detail and insist that drill and ceremonies conducted by my platoon were done properly. (Do it right and do it sharply.) I would learn how to prepare my platoon for inspection and how to report to a senior officer that my platoon was prepared for inspection. (Don't forget to actually prepare your platoon for inspection—you must personally check it out if you want to avoid embarrassment some day.)

I WOULD make sure my soldiers have appropriate soldier's manuals for their MOS and grade and that my sergeants know and can do everything their soldiers are supposed to know and do as outlined in the manuals. (Also ensure trainer's guides for each MOS in your platoon are on hand or on requisition and that they are being used by your trainers.) I would be able to personally do all the common tasks identified in FM 21-2 and FM 21-3. (If you don't know how to do some of the tasks, your troops will be proud to teach you if you let them. Don't worry about loss of respect if you tell them you don't know how to do something—they probably already know.)

I WOULD see that section chiefs and squad leaders make good use of available job books and, if a job book for an MOS in my platoon is not available, I would design one myself. I would get a copy of, and use, the division HIP Pocket Training Handbook. (Ensure that each of your leaders uses it too!)

I WOULD learn *The Army Maintenance Management System* (TAMMS) as it applies to my platoon. (Get TM 38-750,

The Army Maintenance Management System, DA Pam 750-1, *Organizational Guide For Leaders*, and FM 29-2, *Organizational Maintenance Operations*, as a minimum and you can get a good start on your organizational maintenance program. Also get and read the monthly issues of *P.S. Magazine*. Read FM 10-14-1, *Commander's Handbook For Property Accountability At Unit Level*, to help you understand unit supply.) I would get a copy of the "DASH 10" operator's manual for each major item of equipment in my platoon and be fully capable of performing proper Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) on that item. (The automotive and communications technicians, as well as the unit armorers, will be glad to help you.) I would ensure that when my platoon is at the motor pool, I am also at the motor pool (teaching maintenance techniques to my soldiers and ensuring the health of my PMCS program).

I WOULD set very high standards and demand compliance by my chain of command members first and then by every member of my platoon. (Don't worry about whether your soldiers like you at this point. Your first job is to set and achieve high standards. In the long run, your troops will respect you if you do.)

I WOULD try to have the same chain of command for mission accomplishment as for billeting control and personnel accountability, such as reporting in company formations. For example, I would want a maintenance section sergeant to be accountable and responsible for his section equipment and for what each member of his section does or fails to do. *His* promotion would depend on how well both technical and troop leading duties are carried out.

I WOULD inspect my chain of command personnel on every contact and initiate corrective action on the spot. I would require that persons ordered to take corrective actions report back to me at a specified time and place to verify compliance. I would not hesitate to lay

extra training on any person under my command who was slow to shape up. I would stand in the last rank of my platoon occasionally to check the receiving end of verbal information—Accusative? Inspiring? (Think morale.)

I WOULD meet with each new soldier on the day he is assigned to my platoon, ensure his immediate needs are met (family settled, bunk assigned, bedding issued, meal card issued), and ensure he is familiar with the post recreation services. (Don't "lose" a soldier due to neglect during his inprocessing—first impressions are important.)

I WOULD vigorously seek appropriate school quotas for my soldiers and ensure they are ready to attend school. (Use recent attendees to get programmed attendees ready. Develop and have ready an Order of Merit list so if one of your troops can't make it, you've got the next in line alerted and ready to take his place. This reduces no-shows and failures.)

I WOULD know how to communicate in a tactical situation—for example, how to use automated CEOI, how to prepare and operate FM radio sets in secure and unsecure modes, and how to lay in a field telephone system.

I WOULD personally inspect my platoon members' weapons. (Include the crew served weapons and check out the level of crew training. Remember, this is not the armorer's job, it's that of the chain of command.) I would take care of and clean my own assigned weapon.

I WOULD take PT with my platoon and watch closely the attendance of every soldier. I would see to it that everyone could pass the PT test unless medically excused. I would enforce the Army Weight Control Program.

I WOULD be tough on discipline, personal appearance, soldier training, and

organizational equipment maintenance. I would be alert for and prohibit fraternization which might be detrimental to the morale of my platoon. (Watch out for *perceived* fraternization—it can do as much harm as the real thing. Be especially careful yourself—working late with only another soldier present, riding in POVs, innocent social affairs, and so on. All of these can create a perception of fraternization. Be alert and watch your own actions.) I would keep in mind that superior or subordinate fraternization can be just as devastating as sexual fraternization. (Make sure those in your chain of command keep their professional distance from subordinates, but balance professional distance with professional friendliness; this increases respect for everyone.)

I WOULD be alert for evidence of sexual harassment. Keep in mind targeted soldiers may be reluctant to complain for fear of reprisal. Offenders won't commit sexual harassment in your presence, only in the presence of targeted soldiers. Also, don't use or condone the use of obscene language by either sex. I would also be alert for sexual discrimination. (You might have a key person who deprives a subordinate of organizational and personal justice simply because the subordinate happens to be a member of the opposite sex. Racial discrimination can follow the same pattern. You must stay alert for both forms, caution everyone against them, and take swift and thorough action when you detect discrimination. Your job here is to ensure that *all* persons under your control have equal chances to succeed.)

I WOULD watch my platoon chain of command for evidence of drug and alcohol abuse. (Remember, mind altering substances of any sort do not mix with leadership. And if you drink and have had "a few at the club," don't go to the barracks at night and try to be someone

you aren't. Go home and behave yourself. Caution sergeants living in the barracks—they are more likely to bump into such situations than you are.)

I WOULD get involved in military discipline actions pertaining to any member of my platoon and strive for absolute justice. (Take the time to discover the truth about what happened or allegedly happened—don't allow an innocent soldier to be punished.)

I WOULD know, and watch closely, the promotion process in my platoon, especially the Promotion Eligibility Roster (SIDPERS C-01). No member of my platoon would be promoted nor go before a promotion board without my personal approval and I would personally make sure that every soldier knew and understood the platoon/company promotion process. (Include NCO and warrant officer input in your decisions to promote or not to promote. Follow through and ensure your soldiers know why you did whatever you did. Keep in mind that promotions are as important to individual soldiers as your promotion is to you.) I would know how promotion points are accumulated by my soldiers and then help the deserving ones. (For example, certificates of achievement from a lieutenant colonel are worth five points, but only a total of 10 points may be used in this category, and so on.)

I WOULD know the re-enlistment status of everyone in my platoon. If I had an undesirable soldier, I would initiate action to get him barred from re-enlisting and administratively removed from the Army, if appropriate. I would then vigorously encourage every satisfactory soldier in my platoon to stay *in the Army*. I would be dissatisfied with myself if I let a good soldier leave my platoon without knowing I had done everything possible to get him to stay in the Army.

WITH REGARD TO MY SOLDIERS

I WOULD be constantly on the alert for their safety—both on the job and where they live. (Be tough, insist on safety in everything you and your troops do.) I would seek to understand my soldiers in terms of what drives and motivates them. (Soldiers represent the best that America has to offer. Get to know yours well.)

I WOULD keep my soldiers informed of everything that affects them. (This is perhaps the biggest problem at platoon/section level—don't let it happen in your unit. Soldiers need to make plans for future events just as you do. You need to let them know how and when their time is going to be affected by your plans. Be careful about how you execute changes to your plans—big potential for morale problems.)

I WOULD teach my soldiers something about personal money management. (Find out who is broke two days after payday—chances are some help is needed. Also, check your soldier's Leave and Earning Statements for problems such as pay withheld or incorrect deductions. Pass on some of your smarts, demonstrate your concern for your soldiers' welfare. If you are broke two days after payday. You may also need some help.) I would recognize that soldiers have but two resources while in the Army—their

free time and their money. I would not deprive my soldiers of either resource without full justification nor would I allow anyone else to do so. (UCMJ punishment locks in on these two resources—make sure personal, organizational, and military justice prevails.)

I WOULD ensure that my soldiers are receiving constructive counseling and I would personally review their counseling statements. I would frequently visit my soldiers in their billets during off-duty hours and take the time to stop and chat with them. I would make sure that I spent time “listening with them” rather than “talking at them.” I would frequently visit and eat meals in the dining facility. (Sit down, chat, and have your meal with your soldiers. Although your presence might give them indigestion, it also gives them something to write home about. And don't “buck the line.” Your own soldiers may be on a tighter schedule than you are. Bucking the chow line is no way to win friends and influence people—especially your own.)

I WOULD be aware of signs of alcohol and drug abuse in my soldiers. (If abuse is detected, take immediate action, remembering to balance disciplinary action with professional medical help, as appropriate.)

AND FINALLY...

I WOULD recognize that the above “I woulds” deal with setting high standards for myself and my soldiers. And, Lieutenant, always remember that the day you compromise a standard, you've set a new one—lower. ✨

Lt. Col. James R. Riser graduated from Pennsylvania Military College as a distinguished military graduate in 1967. Commissioned as a second lieutenant in Military Intelligence, he initially served a two-year combat arms detail in Armor. His previous assignments have included: Tank Platoon Leader and Battalion S2, 1/13th Armor, 1st Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Cavalry Platoon Leader, 2/17 Cavalry (ABN), 101st Airborne Division, Vietnam; Special Security Officer, HQDA, the Pentagon; Assistant Brigade S2, 2nd Brigade and Assistant Division G2, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Ky.; Detachment Commander, 2nd MI Detachment, 2nd Infantry Division, Korea; Senior Combat Intelligence Instructor, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA.; Research and Development Project Officer, Center for Systems Engineering and Integration, Fort Monmouth, N.J.; Battalion Executive Officer and Battalion Commander, 501st Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI), 1st Armored Division, Ansbach, Germany; Chief, Intelligence Division (ASIC), G2, VII Corps, Stuttgart Germany. Riser is a graduate of the airborne and Ranger courses, Armor Officer Basic Course, MI Officer Advanced Course, and the Command and General Staff College. He received a master's degree in Public Administration from Western Kentucky University in 1975. Riser currently serves as commander of the 101st MI Battalion (CEWI), 1st Infantry Division (M), Fort Riley, Kansas.



These tips were adapted from a similar version originally authored by Col. Robert H. Pratt who developed them as a guide for his officers in 1982.

LEVERAGING IMAGERY COLLECTION AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

BY MAJOR JUSTIN T. DELEON
AND CAPTAIN FREDERICK ELVINGTON



Discussion of the commercial products and services in this article does not imply any endorsement by the U.S. Army, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, or any U.S. government agency.

Introduction

During the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center's (JPMRC's) Rotation 24-01, the 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 25th Infantry Division (ID) sought to operationalize and exploit commercial imagery in a large-scale combat operation fight. The goal was to leverage commercial imagery as a dependable collection platform to cue other sensors to support brigade targeting and decision making. Several challenges and obstacles emerged, among them a time-intensive request process through multiple bureaucracy chains and self-imposed barriers to dissemination that made it difficult to harness commercial imagery's advantages. This article discusses the 3rd BCT attempt to use commercial imagery at the tactical level. Moreover, it illuminates the challenges encountered and provides recommendations to aid future use of commercial imagery to gain a relative advantage during large-scale combat operations.

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) are the two organizations that manage satellite imagery collection requirements for the Department of Defense (DoD). The NGA drives collection efforts and ensures collection aligns with national intelligence requirements; the NRO then allocates space-based assets and ground systems to meet those requirements.¹ During the Global War on Terrorism, it was routine for units to receive satellite imagery consistently as tactical priority intelligence requirements were often nested with national intelligence requirements. However, with the operational shift from counterinsurgency to large-scale combat operations, relevant satellite imagery has become more difficult to obtain at the tactical level as units struggle to tie fluid local collection requirements to national level requirements.

The DoD incurs no added financial cost to obtain national technical means imagery, but competing priorities limit their ability to fulfill dynamic requests. Commercial imagery, however, has become widely available and increasingly relevant on the contemporary battlefield, so a solution to the challenge of competing priorities is to purchase imagery from these commercial entities. The DoD has contracts to purchase commercial imagery with requests using the same submission process as requests to obtain national technical means imagery.

Companies such as MAXAR Technologies, Planet Labs, and Black Sky are leading providers of commercial imagery solutions. Using these products can bring transparency and awareness to the battlefield, making it difficult for disinformation campaigns to be successful.² This effect has been demonstrated in the Russo-Ukraine War, where MAXAR has consistently provided services that facilitate Ukraine's targeting of Russian Forces.³ These commercial imagery solutions have enabled Ukraine to stay ahead of, or at least keep pace with, its adversary.

The power of modern-day commercial imagery is twofold. First, the scaling of commercial satellite constellations allows almost continuous observation with visual, radar, and electromagnetic sensors, which enables the industry to provide low-latency coverage.⁴ Second, commercial imagery is inherently unclassified and can be shared rapidly across echelons and with allies and partners.⁵ When used properly, commercial imagery can greatly enhance targeting and awareness across the joint and combined force.

Exercise Preparation

In preparation for the JPMRC 24-01 rotation, the 3rd BCT, 25th ID sought to leverage commercial imagery to enhance situational awareness and targeting operations. Lessons learned from Ukraine and the Middle East were the driving

force of this initiative. The brigade required access to low-latency imagery to aid the commander's decision making and support the targeting process as an initial cueing sensor. The plan was for the brigade to develop a direct relationship with MAXAR Technologies, allowing it to request imagery directly from the provider and receive timely support.

The intelligence team, however, was unable to execute this plan for several reasons:

- ◆ Establishing a direct request relationship with MAXAR could violate NGA or intelligence oversight policies.
- ◆ The cost of commercial imagery collection was more significant than anticipated.
- ◆ NGA's imagery collection requests were likely to take priority over the brigade's requests.

Instead, the 3rd BCT obtained low-latency imagery of JPMRC exercise training areas using the 25th ID collection management team, following the established request process. The brigade initiated requests for collection 60 days before JPMRC 24-01 began.

Certified collection managers do not typically reside below the division level. To acquire a geospatial intelligence collections account and the required credentials, requestors had to complete up to four months of training across multiple installations. Once submitted by the brigade, the imagery requests traveled through an arduous chain of vetting and validation at the division, corps, army command, and combatant command levels before making their way to the NGA where the final determination about support for the requests was made.

Knowledge gaps in the request process across echelons degraded awareness of the status of the 3rd BCT's requests. Typically, the NGA notifies users when to expect support for collection requests; however, during JPMRC 24-01, this information never reached the tactical level. One week before the exercise, the brigade still did not know whether its requests would receive support. As a result, the brigade could not incorporate commercial imagery in its collection and targeting plan. While the NGA did elect to support some of the 3rd BCT's collection requests and imagery began to populate weeks before the exercise, collection management teams across echelons were unaware that the imagery was available until a few days before the exercise.

Exercise Execution


Upon confirmation of the imagery's availability, the 3rd BCT attempted to retrieve it for processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) with the aim of using perishable information from the low-latency imagery to help drive operations and targeting. However, once the 25th ID conducted its initial PED, only individuals with an approved nondisclosure list (NDL) account were authorized to view the imagery due to interpretations of DoD intelligence oversight policies regarding collecting information on U.S. persons, complicated by training on U.S. soil. The 3rd BCT immediately submitted applications for the NDL accounts, and, in the meantime, the division collection team obtained an exception to policy that allowed the 3rd BCT's intelligence Soldiers to view the commercial imagery that fell within the 25th ID's purview.

PED operations proved to be slow and cumbersome. The large-scale combat operations environment in which the 3rd BCT found itself was extremely fluid, and the commercial images provided little value to decision making and targeting. Moreover, inconsistent receipt of commercial imagery added to the challenge. For example, the brigade might receive images of half of the training areas one day and none on another day. This made using the imagery as a sensor or cueing apparatus complicated. As before, knowledge gaps across echelons made it difficult to anticipate when the brigade could expect support.

The final challenge the 3rd BCT encountered involved the classification of the imagery the team received. Commercial imagery is inherently unclassified; however, all the imagery received was classified. An investigation revealed that the imagery collected to support JPMRC was derived from national technical means instead of commercial assets. The team discovered this occurred because the imagery requests 3rd

BCT sent stated that either national technical means or commercial imagery collection would satisfy the requirements. As a result, the division only received national technical means imagery, which unfortunately limited the team's ability to share imagery with partner forces participating in the exercise.

Moreover, the brigade worked almost entirely on a secure but unclassified-encrypted enclave, making it increasingly complex to share



classified imagery with subordinate elements. Operations officers and commanders throughout the brigade did not have regular access to the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network. Therefore, even if the imagery had been more relevant to decision making, the classification barrier alone would have disrupted the brigade's ability to share it promptly with key players across the team.

A Way Forward

While commercial satellite imagery has the potential to provide tactical formations with a pivotal advantage, adversaries that are willing to pay can leverage similar capabilities. For example, in 2020, Iran purchased low-latency commercial imagery to enable its targeting of Ain al-Asad Air Base in Iraq following the killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps General Qassem Soleimani. The subsequent attack resulted in over 100 American Service members injured. Reporting does not identify the company from which Iran purchased the imagery; however, we know that Iran acquired the imagery on the same day as the attack.⁶ The bottom line is that by using commercial imagery, an organization with fewer barriers and the means to pay can maintain real-time awareness to help drive operations and targeting.

Solutions to these challenges are worth exploring, as finding a path that effectively manages this resource at the tactical level could prove critical on the future battlefield.

Recommendations for the BCT. The following are recommendations for using and exploiting commercial imagery at the BCT level in the future.

Request Access for Brigade Collection Managers. Although it takes time and training, brigade collection managers should be encouraged to obtain the credentials to request commercial imagery. This training does not currently decrease the request chain requirements, but it allows brigade-level intelligence professionals to advocate more effectively for their commanders' information requirements.

Close the Knowledge Gap. Battalion-, brigade-, and division-level intelligence professionals should educate themselves on the current imagery request process. Understanding this process can help intelligence professionals manage their commanders' expectations and better identify the lead times required for imagery requests. Many U.S. Army divisions have NGA representatives attached to their organizations. They are a wealth of knowledge and can play a pivotal role in closing knowledge gaps within organizations.

Communicate a Shared Understanding of the Required Imagery Classification. The tactical element requesting imagery should clearly communicate its need for national technical means or commercial imagery and the desired classification level of the product. Once analyzed and exploited, even commercial imagery can become classified above the end user's clearance,

making sharing with partners on the ground difficult. All parties must understand whether they should distribute an intelligence product or only basic imagery. The requesting element needs to systematically describe and fully justify its collection requirements. This offers a further rationale to authorize requesting capabilities at the brigade level.


Train Intelligence Analysts and All-Source Intelligence Technicians. Division, brigade, and battalion intelligence analysts should receive training on accessing and disseminating commercial imagery. They should also be well versed in using NGA and NRO tools such as iSpy⁷ and learn how to quickly access and disseminate unclassified imagery. If tactical formations are going to use commercial imagery to drive tactical targeting, they cannot depend solely on the two or three brigade-level geospatial intelligence imagery analysts to meet all needs.

Recommendations up and out. The following are recommendations for using and exploiting commercial imagery at levels above the BCT in the future.

Treat National Technical Means and Commercial Imagery Requests Differently. It may be valuable to begin differentiating national technical means from commercial imagery. Currently, the process for requesting national technical means support and commercial imagery support is the same. Establishing separate request processes for national technical means and commercial imagery might allow tactical formations to use commercial imagery more effectively.

Shorten the Request Chain. The current multi-layered review process for tactical formations to request imagery through NGA is lengthy and cumbersome. While it serves an essential purpose, auditing the process to determine where it could be shortened would enhance tactical formations' ability to leverage the resource. Additionally, as the battlefield becomes more fluid, tactical formations may require more direct communication with commercial imagery companies to keep pace with proficient adversaries. These commercial imagery requests may not require the same level of vetting as national technical means.

Conclusion

The 3rd BCT, 25th ID's efforts during JPMRC 24-01 illuminate the current obstacles to operationalizing commercial satellite imagery. Although the 3rd BCT received several packages of national technical means imagery during its JPMRC rotation, the information needed to be more timely to be of operational value to decision makers. A challenging request, dissemination, and classification process made it difficult for imagery to support decision making and targeting on a fluid battlefield. Nonetheless, with informed intelligence professionals, refined processes, and mitigated systemic barriers, commercial imagery is a resource that could provide a relative advantage. This may be critical as tactical formations look to outpace adversaries on an increasingly transparent battlefield. 

Endnotes

1. "About Us," National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, last modified October 30, 2024, 11:20, https://www.nga.mil/about/About_Us.html; and "About the National Reconnaissance Office," National Reconnaissance Office, <https://www.nro.gov/About-NRO/>.
2. Maxar Technologies, "New Documentary on Ukraine Underscores the Importance of Maxar's Commercial Satellite Imagery and Capabilities," *Maxar Technologies Blog: Earth Intelligence*, March 02, 2023, <https://blog.maxar.com/earth-intelligence/2023/new-documentary-on-ukraine-underscores-the-importance-of-maxars-commercial-satellite-imagery-and-capabilities>.
3. Ibid.
4. Gary Dunow, "The Game-Changing Role of Commercial Satellite Imagery and Analytics in Ukraine," *Maxar Technologies Blog: Earth Intelligence*, April 12, 2023, <https://blog.maxar.com/earth-intelligence/2023/the-game-changing-role-of-commercial-satellite-imagery-and-analytics-in-ukraine>.
5. Sandra Erwin, "U.S. Military and Allies Get a Feel for the Value of Commercial Satellite Imagery," *Space News*, August 13, 2023, <https://spacenews.com/u-s-military-and-allies-get-a-feel-for-the-value-of-commercial-satellite-imagery/>.

6. Nathan Strout, "Report: Iran Used Commercial Satellite Images to Monitor US Forces Before Attack," *C4ISR Net*, March 1, 2021, <https://www.c4isrnet.com/intel-geoint/2021/03/01/report-iran-used-commercial-satellite-images-to-monitor-us-forces-before-attack/>.

7. Adam Goodman, "NGA Brings Products Closer to Action in Middle East," *CHIPS*, March 2, 2020, <https://www.doncio.navy.mil/CHIPS/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=13225>. iSpy is "a web-based, image-viewing application that provides tools for imagery analysis and exploitation."

MAJ Justin DeLeon is the S-2 for the 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 25th Infantry Division (ID), Schofield Barracks, HI. He previously served as a plans officer for the 25th ID, an intelligence officer in the 1st Cavalry Division, and a rifle platoon leader in the 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade. His service includes overseas tours in Germany, the Republic of Korea, and Afghanistan. He holds a master of science in management, strategy, and leadership from Michigan State University, a master of military studies from the Marine Corps University, and a master of arts and military operations from the School of Advanced Military Studies.

CPT Frederick Elvington is the S-2 for the 2nd Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, 25th ID, Wheeler Army Airfield, HI. He enlisted in the Army in 2013 and served as a 35F, Intelligence Analyst, with the 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne). As a commissioned officer, CPT Elvington has served as rifle platoon leader and brigade collection manager in the 3rd BCT, 25th ID. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from the University of Tampa.



Republic of Korea Army (ROK) Army Soldiers assigned to 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-U.S. Combined Division secure simulated intelligence after conducting a company-sized attack on objective at Twin Bridges Training Area, South Korea.

Introduction

According to the *2022 National Defense Strategy*, close collaboration with allies and partners is essential for advancing U.S. national security interests and bolstering collective capacity to confront traditional challenges while managing recent threats.¹ Military operations will rarely be unilateral, especially in response to opposition from the People's Republic of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations.² Establishing defense relationships with allies and partner nations is crucial for accomplishing national security objectives, preempting conflict, and mitigating risks to U.S. military forces engaged in conflict.³

The U.S. Army should expect that all future operations will be multinational.⁴ Intelligence will drive those operations, and they, in turn, will enable intelligence.⁵ Successful multinational and combined intelligence at the division level requires executing the intelligence process in collaboration with mission partners. The opportunities presented by this collaboration, including legitimacy, cultural awareness of the operational environment, unique capabilities, and an added perspective on complex problems, can far outweigh the challenges.⁶

The United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have conducted combined operations since the Korean War. Their lessons learned and methods of operating as a multinational force can provide understanding to others working in mature alliances, as well as to those planning and implementing new organizations. Unlike the partnership between the International Security and Assistance Force and the Afghan National Security Force during Operation Enduring Freedom, which focused solely on information sharing, the 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-U.S. Combined Division (2ID/RUCD) conducts comprehensive multinational intelligence operations as a combined team.

The 2ID/RUCD provides timely, relevant, and tailored intelligence to supported commanders by recognizing a shared

purpose, using a combined workspace, employing a mature mission partner environment (MPE), and capitalizing on the capabilities of both nations' higher and adjacent headquarters. The insights and lessons in this article can benefit other divisions that conduct intelligence operations with multinational partners.

Definitions and Doctrine

Discussing combined intelligence in Korea requires understanding key definitions: multinational, combined, and alliance. Multinational operations are "conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken in the structure of a coalition or alliance."⁷ Combined is an older term used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the ROK that shares the multinational definition.⁸ An alliance is "the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members."⁹ Within Korea, 2ID/RUCD is a combined headquarters operating under the *Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea; October 1, 1953* and a 2014 memorandum of agreement between the U.S. Forces Korea/U.S. Eighth Army and the ROK Army Chief of Staff.

The doctrine that guides U.S. military forces employed in multinational operations is Joint Publication 3-16, *Multinational Operations*. It describes the strategic context, nature, and tenets of multinational operations at the joint level.¹⁰ This publication also describes various command and coordination relationships and outlines how commands can conduct multinational operations in all domains.¹¹

Army doctrine for multinational operations is Field Manual 3-16, *The Army in Multinational Operations*, which describes the fundamentals of multinational operations as they relate specifically to the Army. It includes considerations for command and control, intelligence, planning, sustainment, medical support, special operations, civil-military operations, and other operational considerations.¹²

Field Manual 3-16 identifies several concerns relating to intelligence in multinational operations including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synchronization, information sharing, and intelligence architecture.¹³ The manual includes a checklist of questions that staff should be capable of answering while participating in multinational operations, such as:

- ◆ Has the military decision-making process been employed?
- ◆ Have liaison officers been identified and established?
- ◆ Have processes for intelligence exchange been determined?
- ◆ Have rules of engagement relating to intelligence aspects of the operation, such as human intelligence, been established?¹⁴

Combined Intelligence Operations

Since 2014, 2ID/RUCD has been a combined division with the infrastructure of a mature theater to accommodate its multinational operations. Its C-2 succeeds at combined intelligence operations for several reasons, including:

- ◆ The analysis and control element (ACE) fully integrates the ROK Soldiers, specifically in the areas of fusion, targeting, and collection management.
- ◆ The network architecture enables collaboration for operations and intelligence.
- ◆ The U.S. and ROK forces both leverage higher and adjacent headquarters.
- ◆ The liaison officers (LNOs) are a priority for all combined theater exercises.
- ◆ The ROK Soldiers integrate easily into the division.

The combined division conducts at least three division or higher exercises yearly, so there are frequent opportunities for staff, command post, and digital crew process training. The ROK Soldiers within the C-2 are critical to executing all stages of the intelligence process.

Analysis and Control Element

U.S. and ROK officers in the 2ID/RUCD ACE share workspaces during armistice and exercises. They jointly conduct intelligence analysis and production, knowledge management, information management, collection management, and intelligence architecture support. They also have a workspace



in the headquarters specifically for combined intelligence operations, which includes workstations for the fusion cell, geospatial intelligence cell, and collection management. Additionally, all ROK Soldiers assigned to 2ID/RUCD are fluent in English and hold the appropriate security clearances, reducing barriers to sustaining rapid intelligence analysis. The ROK Army's investment in interoperability demonstrates its organizational commitment to the success of 2ID/RUCD. As a combined team, the C-2 updates the armistice intelligence estimate, with the U.S. and ROK analysts alternating weekly to provide a situation development brief to the division commander.

To plan and direct intelligence, the C-2 sections use the shared workspace and, as a team, produce intelligence preparation of the operational environment products to support the combined staff's military decision-making process. The ACE's ROK Soldiers have a better understanding of the threat, so their input is crucial to the C-2's ability to achieve situational understanding; however, both the ROK and U.S. Soldiers participate in planning briefings for the commander and staff. This ensures shared understanding within the ACE and guarantees equity in producing intelligence products that inform the commander's decision points. Any differences in analytical judgments and assessments are considered during intelligence production and are presented as necessary; however, disagreements are typically resolved through fair-mindedness and intellectual empathy.

U.S. and ROK Soldiers in 2ID/RUCD can leverage their nations' intelligence enterprises as well as other members of the combined staff. For example, when 2ID/RUCD was preparing for a division warfighter exercise, the area of operations (AO) differed from the AO in which 2ID/RUCD usually operates. The C-2 ROK officers were able to coordinate with adjacent ROK units to acquire existing products relating to the new operational environment.

Another area where the combined ACE team integrates well is in support of the targeting process and battle damage assessment (BDA). The ROK members coordinate with higher and adjacent headquarters to develop the high-value and high-payoff target lists, ensuring that 2ID/RUCD aligns its analysis for enemy units and systems. Additionally, the combined team cooperates on the ACE's BDAs, especially when developing and executing the mechanism through which the

ACE evaluates the target system assessment during division exercises. The combined team then provides an accurate correlation of forces and means analysis daily during the commander's update assessment that helps inform senior leaders' decision making.

Network Architecture

Another critical component of multinational operations is the MPE, and one of its key components is the mission partner network (MPN). The MPE is "an operating framework enabling command and control and information sharing for planning and execution."¹⁵ The MPN is "a network portion of an MPE and is a specific partnership or coalition-wide area network, planned and implemented using standards and protocols agreed to by participants."¹⁶ Each mission command and intelligence system exists on an MPE that the C-2 uses daily and during theater exercises. 2ID/RUCD operates daily on a robust MPE and architecture that enables combined intelligence.

2ID/RUCD executes the intelligence process on a single combined network. This greatly enhances its ability to analyze, collaborate, produce, and disseminate products to U.S. and ROK subordinates and higher and adjacent units. While an MPE can be limiting when working with networks of higher classification, the C-2 uses cross-domain solutions and cross-domain chat programs to process and disseminate data. This allows single-source cells within the ACE to quickly collect and process releasable reporting. The 2ID/RUCD ACE refined its knowledge and information management procedures to operate effectively within an MPE. It established sources and delivery methods for information and data to analyze and update intelligence estimates, situation templates, event templates, common intelligence pictures, and BDA.

Organizational Coordination and Liaison Officers

Another strength of the combined intelligence team is its ability to leverage higher and adjacent military headquarters and intelligence agencies from each nation. The ROK Soldiers communicate directly with other ROK units to inform intelligence estimates and update the common intelligence picture and the intelligence portion of the common operating picture. The team quickly establishes intelligence handover lines with other ROK Army headquarters, allowing 2ID/RUCD to better posture its collection and targeting capabilities. Our nations' respective intelligence communities have unique capabilities and focus; through our combined efforts, the C-2 can better answer intelligence requirements.

A critical aspect of 2ID/RUCD's ability to coordinate with adjacent and higher units is its employment of LNOs. 2ID/RUCD provides personnel during command post exercises, including intelligence warfighting function representatives. These LNOs integrate with their supported headquarters to facilitate information collection planning and intelligence

report dissemination and to provide both headquarters with a shared understanding of intelligence assessments. The adjacent and higher headquarters with whom 2ID/RUCD coordinates do not all have the same access to information and intelligence that is critical for large-scale combat operations. Since MPEs are not guaranteed to exist within some partner tactical command posts, LNOs are postured to share releasable intelligence, such as intelligence reports from division collection assets and finalized intelligence products.

Recommendations

Recognizing that multinational operations are a realistic probability for U.S. Army divisions in the future, Army divisions should prepare to conduct multinational intelligence during the planning and preparation phase. Integrating into similar militaries should be a focus during planning for multinational operations, and divisions should perform regular assessments during enduring operations. Challenges such as language, interoperability, culture, caveats, and authorities are obstacles to address early. Overcoming them will make multinational intelligence possible.

Critical Thinking. Critical thinking is an essential skill that must be developed in a multinational team. When conducting multinational intelligence, differences in doctrine, culture, equipment, and history can impact the ability of a combined intelligence organization to share knowledge and build consensus.¹⁷ Logical fallacies, such as fallacies of relevance, can lead to poor assessments and cause friction within a multinational team.¹⁸ Specifically, the genetic fallacy (claiming that a report or assessment is right or wrong because of its origin) and an appeal to tradition (asserting that an idea must be accurate because one has always believed it) can make working in a multinational team delivering assessments to a commander more difficult.¹⁹ To address this, a multinational intelligence team must value the essential intellectual traits of fair-mindedness and intellectual empathy.²⁰

Military intelligence professionals should strive to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of reasoning from the point of view of others, especially those from a nation that may be closer to the threat or who have studied the threat longer than U.S. Soldiers.²¹ Additionally, one must actively consider assessments from different perceptions and strive to reconstruct the reasoning behind those assessments.²²

Write for Release. Another recommendation is that the Army must prioritize writing for release as it increasingly operates with unified action partners.²³ Army Techniques Publication 3-16.02, *Write for Release*, outlines the importance of this practice, as it improves shared understanding with a partnered force, makes sharing information faster, can be adaptable to sharing requirement changes, and facilitates MPE usage.²⁴ The 2ID/RUCD C-2 creates a releasable version of all intelligence products when possible. Writing for release is essential to

creating shared understanding among the combined staff. Because it writes for release, 2ID/RUCD can better integrate ROK units into the division and rapidly enter a command or support relationship with a higher ROK headquarters.

Although both Army and joint doctrine emphasize the importance of writing for release,²⁵ it is not a widespread practice. However, an intelligence organization *must* write for release. Finalized intelligence reports or information collection reporting often cannot be shared within 2ID/RUCD because external organizations do not write for release when even a single sentence tear-lined report can enable a combined headquarters to create shared understanding.²⁶

One way to improve writing for release is reviewing and revising how the U.S. intelligence community classifies open-source reporting. Intelligence agencies, combatant commands, and Army Service component commands regularly publish open-source intelligence (OSINT) reports with restrictive distribution caveats. For example, unclassified open-source reports on relevant threats to 2ID/RUCD that can inform the commander's decision-making process often have restricted distribution caveats that inhibit production and dissemination. Every request for release for an OSINT product has been approved, but it takes time, and often there are no changes to the original report. OSINT regularly answers 2ID/RUCD's intelligence requirements, but restrictive distribution caveats impact collaboration and the ability to have shared understanding.²⁷

Prioritize Use of the Mission Partner Environment/Network.

During multinational operations, as much of the intelligence process as possible should exist on an MPN. Establishing an MPN can be costly, time-consuming, and difficult due to compatibility and security issues.²⁸ Additionally, the functionality of MPNs can be limited solely to information dissemination rather than allowing collaboration. Nevertheless, the Army should prioritize intelligence systems capability and fielding on MPNs. Intelligence systems are often established first on U.S.-only networks with little initial consideration for MPNs. These systems, however, have limited use in 2ID/RUCD's combined environment. The Army must consider MPEs when testing and fielding new digital systems—2ID/RUCD provides an excellent testing environment for MPE implementation of new intelligence systems. The division's C-2 is postured to provide the best bottom-up refinement as it operates daily on an MPN and conducts up to three division- or theater-level exercises yearly.

Conclusion

The integration of multinational and combined intelligence at the division level, as demonstrated by 2ID/RUCD, is crucial for the future of Army operations. Successfully executing the intelligence process with mission partners ensures prompt, relevant, and tailored intelligence support to commanders, which

is essential for shared understanding and operational success in a multinational context. The experiences and methodologies of 2ID/RUCD highlight the importance of shared workspaces, mature MPEs, and leveraging higher and adjacent headquarters to enhance intelligence capabilities. Divisions can foster a collaborative and effective multinational intelligence team by proactively addressing challenges such as language barriers, interoperability, and cultural differences. Additionally, prioritizing writing for release and integrating it into MPNs are pivotal for facilitating collaboration. As the Army prepares for the complexities of future operations, these insights and recommendations may aid divisions in collaborating with multinational partners to achieve mission success. 🌟

Endnotes

1. Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 27 October 2022), 14. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1183514.pdf>.
2. *Ibid.*, 2.
3. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, *Multinational Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 01 March 2019), I-5. Change 1 was issued 17 June 2024.
4. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 01 October 2022), 2-13.
5. Department of the Army, FM 2-0, *Intelligence* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 01 October 2022), xi.
6. *Ibid.*, 2-13.
7. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, I-1.
8. Department of the Army, FM 3-16, *The Army in Multinational Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 15 July 2024), vii.
9. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, I-1.
10. *Ibid.*, ix-x.
11. *Ibid.*, II-1.
12. Department of the Army, FM 3-16, *Army in Multinational Operations*, iii-iv.
13. *Ibid.*, 43-45.
14. *Ibid.*, 47-48.
15. Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 6-02.61, *Expeditionary Mission Partner Network Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 06 December 2023), 1-1.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Department of the Army, FM 3-16, *Army in Multinational Operations*, 2-2; and Department of the Army, ATP 2-33.4, *Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 10 January 2020), 9-7.
18. Department of the Army, ATP 2-33.4, *Intelligence Analysis*, B-9.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*, B-7.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, B-8.

23. Department of the Army, ATP 3-16.02, *Write for Release* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 26 September 2023), vii.

24. *Ibid.*, 1-2.

25. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, VI-3; and Department of the Army, ATP 3-16.02, *Write for Release*, 1-2.

26. Department of the Army, FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, A-6.

27. *Ibid.*

28. Todd C. Lopez, "Mission Partner Environment Cuts Decision Making, Kill Chain," News, Department of Defense, November 29, 2021, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2854238/mission-partner-environment-cuts-decision-making-kill-chain/>.

MAJ Ed Pecoraro is the executive officer for the 524th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion, 501st MI Brigade in Camp Humphreys, Korea. He previously served as the analysis and control element chief for the 2nd Infantry Division/Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Division (2ID/RUCD) and in multiple intelligence and planning positions at 2ID/RUCD, U.S. Army Cyber Command, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, and 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). MAJ Pecoraro holds a master of arts in military operations from the Advanced Military Studies Program at the School of Advanced Military Studies and a master of operation studies from the Command and General Staff Officer Course.



INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO SUSTAINMENT

by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander D. Corbin,
Captain Ariel Ayala,
Captain Tyler Eagan,
and Captain John Seman

Introduction

In today's volatile geopolitical climate, it is crucial to emphasize intelligence support for sustainment operations when building partner capacity. In conflict, tactical sustainment elements are likely to be near the front lines, where partners may not have the same level of protection as that provided by large coalition forces. In these circumstances, intelligence analysts use threat reporting to provide sustainment forces with updates necessary to mitigate the threat. Intelligence drives sustainment operations by providing timely and accurate analysis so that sustainment forces can effectively and efficiently reduce risk and increase operational success. Integrating intelligence into sustainment operations is a strategic requirement of today's complex and dynamic geopolitical landscape. Organizations like the U.S. Army Sustainment Command (ASC) have a multi-echeloned perspective on maintaining global situational awareness of impacts on sustainment. Within organizations that are force providers like ASC, intelligence support to sustainment requires situational awareness from the strategic to the tactical level.

ASC, a two-star major subordinate command of U.S. Army Materiel Command, is headquartered at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois. It is not just a logistics integrator but also manages

sustainment operations worldwide. Its global footprint consists of 7 Army field support brigades (AFSBs) in 20-plus countries and 32 states committed to sustaining Army, joint, and multinational forces through adaptive logistics.

The scope and complexity of ASC's responsibility is a testament to its crucial role in global logistics. Field Manual 4-0, *Sustainment Operations*, states:

ASC integrates and synchronizes the delivery of [U.S. Army Materiel Command] USAMC and materiel enterprise capabilities at echelon from the theater strategic level of warfare to the operational level of warfare. ASC delivers materiel readiness, force generation, and power projection and sets the conditions for future readiness at home station. ASC forward-stationed capabilities provide command and control to all USAMC assets in theater, shape the logistics environment, and help set the theater to accelerate force reception into theater. Deployable logistics support elements (LSEs) provide expeditionary corps and divisions the ability to rapidly integrate into the theater delivery of USAMC capabilities at echelon for responsive support to Soldier priorities...It is responsible for integrating logistics support with strategic partners and links the national sustainment base with the expeditionary Army. Major mission areas include logistics synchronization in support of the Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model, [Army pre-positioned stocks] APS, materiel management, and the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). Mission execution is through a global network of organizations to include the ASC staff, Army field support brigades (AFSBs), Army field support battalions (AFSBns), logistics readiness centers (LRCs), and LSEs embedded at the division and corps levels.¹




Figure 1. Threats to the Global Sustainment Enterprise

ASC G-2 Intelligence Support Element

With a mission that has global implications, the ASC G-2 intelligence support element provides ASC leadership with insights concerning threats to sustainment operations. Notable threats to the global logistics enterprise *and* ASC operations include near-peer threats (i.e., China, Russia, and Iran), labor disputes and strikes, political instability, and terrorism. For example, increased Chinese aggression since the January 2024 Taiwanese elections could result in new operational requirements for ASC. Furthermore, labor disputes or strikes at notable ports or border crossings can delay vital shipments to the intended recipients, which could impact the sustainment enterprise.

The ASC G-2 intelligence support element provides comprehensive intelligence products, delivering timely, accurate, relevant, and tailored intelligence analysis and assessments to the ASC commanding general, headquarters staff, and subordinate units to mitigate these threats. To aid command decision making, the intelligence support element produces strategic and operational intelligence that addresses both lines of effort and priority intelligence requirements, while prioritizing

the most important issues with potential wide-ranging impacts on the sustainment operational environment. These products can include the assessment of critical regional and national actor capabilities, intentions, and strategies, as well as emerging enemy capabilities likely to affect logistics operations, economic stability, and foreign trade and development. The intelligence support element also provides intelligence and threat data supporting the command's antiterrorism, force protection, operational security, and training programs.

The intelligence support element conducts in-depth research and detailed analysis to integrate intelligence from all intelligence community sources. It then meticulously filters the intelligence through a sustainment operations "prism" to prepare its analytical products. The intelligence support element's intelligence production is not focused solely on threats to manning, arming, fueling, maintaining, transporting, and protecting sustainment forces but also emphasizes threats to sustainment operations from the point of embarkation to the point of need, underlining the inherent complexity of their task.




Figure 2. Materiel Distribution System

While not robust in number, the intelligence support element is task-organized to provide global intelligence support. Company-grade officers and noncommissioned officers conduct in-depth analysis of threats to ASC operations within the combatant commands (CCMDs), collaborating with organic sustainment organizations such as theater or expeditionary sustainment commands to provide tailored support for CCMD intelligence analysis. Additionally, the intelligence support element provides intelligence support to ASC plans and operations through daily updates to decision makers on the impact to current operations. This support comes in the form of tailored briefs covering geopolitical effects on current operations and predictive analysis of potential operational requirements that could result in presidential directives for materiel support. The intelligence support element can also provide topographic and terrain analysis support to ASC leaders through its geospatial engineer in the form of maps and graphics.

Intelligence Support to Sustainment

AFSBs have specific mission sets that focus on providing a link between the generating force and the operational force within their assigned areas. AFSBs are also crucial to coordinating strategic capabilities from the Army Materiel Command and the ASC to the operational force while supplying Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) support throughout all phases of operations.

AFSB S-2s have a unique intelligence mission set as they provide pertinent information to the brigade commander, emphasizing sustainment and power projection. AFSB S-2s must deliver more than the traditional threat action reporting; they also must provide predictive analysis on possible LOGCAP or Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) requirements. The reachback support they receive from the intelligence support element and the S-2's connection with their respective theater or expeditionary sustainment commands enables this analysis. By synchronizing with the theater or

expeditionary sustainment commands and ASC, the AFSB S-2s can understand the sustainment picture within their area of responsibility to focus on predictive analysis rather than reactive analysis.

The Power of Open-Source Intelligence

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) has recently become a discipline vital for information and intelligence collection within ASC because it provides opportunities for real-time updates on operational impacts such as maritime traffic, port delays, and rail information. Additionally, due to ASC's unique structure and sizable civilian workforce, most of whom do not have access to classified networks, disseminating analytical products at an unclassified level maximizes the intelligence support to the available audience and allows the intelligence support element to serve most ASC personnel better. Accordingly, the intelligence support element utilizes OSINT in support of sustainment operations in several ways:

- ◆ Situational Awareness: Publicly available information and OSINT allow analysts to monitor real-time information. This provides context and a comprehensive understanding of threats to global military logistics.
- ◆ Risk Assessment: Publicly available information databases provide information on potential risks to military logistics, allowing ASC to mitigate risk and maintain operational continuity.
- ◆ Geopolitical Analysis: Analytical data on international relations, global crises, and regional tensions can inform ASC leaders of potential impacts to military sustainment operations. This analysis is essential for mitigating risk and strategic planning.
- ◆ Predictive Analysis: OSINT can provide analysts with historical context and current public sentiment, enabling intelligence professionals to provide predictive analysis on future sustainment support requirements.

As OSINT has become established as an intelligence community discipline, ASC increasingly utilizes it to create daily intelligence products focused on global threats to logistics in the form of a daily intelligence summary and a global update, which the intelligence support element disseminates to over 500 personnel within Army logistics organizations and a myriad of organizations that focus on threats to logistics, including Transportation Command, Development Command, and sister services. Upon establishing its OSINT mission and authorities, ASC broadened its scope of intelligence product dissemination to the greater intelligence community as the only Army organization focused solely on intelligence support to sustainment.

Intelligence Support to the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

LOGCAP provides sustainment, minor construction, and other services through Army contractor assets to CCMD commanders, joint operations, allies, and federal agencies. Typically, LOGCAP provides tailorable packages of base logistics services in austere or hostile environments with little or no Army support infrastructure to enable military operations. Some previous LOGCAP operations include:

- ◆ Base logistics support to the U.S. Central Command in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.
- ◆ Exercise support to the U.S. Africa Command.

- ◆ Mission and installation support to the U.S. European Command.
- ◆ Mission and installation support to the U.S. Northern Command at the National Training Center.
- ◆ Construction and operations support for five living areas during Operation Allies Welcome, a noncombatant evacuation operation.

The intelligence support element enables LOGCAP operations by providing support through predictive analysis to identify threat activities and trends that could impact the mission. These efforts inform the intelligence products produced for LOGCAP leaders and planners. These products can range from topographic imagery analysis and identification of potential threats to proposed LOGCAP site locations to threat briefs for activated LOGCAP personnel, directly impacting the level of personal protective equipment their mission will require. The intelligence support element additionally supports LOGCAP noncombatant evacuation operations by monitoring indicators for events of unrest or national disasters, thereby providing LOGCAP personnel with indications and warnings to support their preparation, planning, and risk mitigation efforts, ensuring successful operations. Simply put, the intelligence support element provides detailed intelligence support from the strategic to the tactical level, enabling LOGCAP operations to have the greatest impact.




Figure 3. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Capabilities




Figure 4. Army Prepositioned Stocks

Army Pre-Positioned Stocks Intelligence Support

APS is an Army program that stores and maintains equipment sets around the globe for use when a CCMD commander requires additional capabilities. These stocks—identified as APS-1 (United States), APS-2 (Europe), APS-3 (Afloat), APS-4 (Northeast Asia), and APS-5 (Southwest Asia)—are available to support all CCMD commanders’ missions, not only in contingencies but also for major exercises and humanitarian missions. The sustainment enterprise utilizes exercises such as Operation Pathways (formerly Pacific Pathways) in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to test operational and tactical employment of logistics and the use of APS in a large-scale combat operation. This exercise program requires sustainment headquarters, such as the 8th Theater Sustainment Command, to coordinate with multiple AFSBs and the ASC for APS requests and dynamic employment.

The intelligence support element enhances APS operations by delivering tailored intelligence products for each existing and projected APS location and its corresponding AFSB. This ensures that the AFSB, APS, and ASC leadership receive up-to-date threat reports, enabling them to make informed decisions on safeguarding the APS assets. The intelligence support element also provides the ASC leadership with predictive analysis within the individual areas of responsibility, allowing them to anticipate and address emerging APS requirements effectively and efficiently.

Support During a Crisis

With a global response mission, the ASC G-2 maintains situational awareness to provide the most up-to-date information and predictive analysis on global crises. Since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United

States has issued presidential directives aimed at providing military assistance to Ukraine. The 405th AFSB is critical to this mission because it provides materiel enterprise support to U.S. forces in Europe and Africa.

In support of the 405th AFSB, the ASC G-2 intelligence support element communicated with other intelligence units in the theater, including the U.S. European Command J-2 Joint Analysis Center, the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade (Theater), and the XVIII Airborne Corps G-2, to ensure that commanders at all levels were aware of threats to shipments from the point of embarkation, to the myriad points of debarkation, to the final point of need. Additionally, the dynamic threat environment, coupled with automation and the inception of real-time troubleshooting telemaintenance, required an emphasis on the cyberspace threat to all ASC assets in the theater to identify any potential delay to the requested military assistance. As the conflict in Ukraine continues, the ASC G-2 intelligence support element and the 405th AFSB continue to monitor threats to military aid, ensuring the uninterrupted flow of materiel support to Ukraine.

Conclusion

Through this article, we have offered broad examples of how intelligence professionals support logistics in no small part due to the unique nature of the logistical challenges. Because sustainers must meet the warfighter’s needs worldwide, there cannot be a “one size fits all” approach to how the Military Intelligence Corps supports the sustainers. Looking toward tomorrow’s fight, the information that logisticians require will undoubtedly become more diverse. As the U.S. military continues its focus on large-scale combat operations, intelligence support to sustainment must meet the increased demand for

relevant and timely intelligence. The emerging requirements may take the form of analyzing sea states for their shipping capacity and capability to load and unload goods, analyzing secondary and tertiary effects of modernized militaries on the battlefield, or monitoring environmental and social threats that could lead to a noncombatant evacuation operation.

The intelligence support provided to the logistics field can take the form of intelligence support for APS, LOGCAP, and interactions with partner nations; however, it is not limited to these topics. We can expect the demand from the sustainment enterprise to increase as warfare continues to evolve. Therefore, in order to enable the sustainment community to guarantee the continuation of force projection and the capacity to “fix forward,” the scope and scale of intelligence support to sustainment must expand to provide intelligence from the tactical to the strategic level. 🌟

Endnote

1. Department of the Army, Field Manual 4-0, *Sustainment Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 14 August 2024), 30.

LTC Alexander Corbin is the Deputy G-2 for the U.S. Army Sustainment Command, Rock Island Arsenal, IL. He previously served as the Director of the Joint Intelligence Support Element, NATO Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan/Special Operations Joint Task Force–Afghanistan, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. He holds a master of science in strategic intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College and a master of arts in military history (intelligence) from the American Military University.

CPT Ariel Ayala is an intelligence production manager for the U.S. Army Sustainment Command, Rock Island Arsenal, IL. He previously served as an intelligence officer for the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade (Theater), Fort Eisenhower, GA. His deployments include Afghanistan and the U.S. Central Command areas of responsibility, serving as an operational management team officer in charge and horizontal engineer. CPT Ayala holds a master of arts in intelligence and security studies from the Citadel and the open-source intelligence and theater sustainment planner skill identifiers.

CPT Tyler Eagan is an intelligence production manager for the U.S. Army Sustainment Command in Rock Island Arsenal, IL. He previously served as the S-2 for the 401st Army Field Support Brigade at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. He deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, where he supported Operations Inherent Resolve and Spartan Shield.

CPT John Seman serves as the G-2 operations officer for the U.S. Army Sustainment Command, Rock Island Arsenal, IL. He previously served as an assistant professor of military science in the Golden Lions Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps Battalion at California State University, San Bernardino, CA. He deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel.



Aerial view of Rock Island Arsenal, IL.