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Disclaimer: Views expressed are those of the authors and not those of the Department of Defense or its elements. The contents do not necessarily reflect official U.S. Army positions and do not change or supersede information in any other U.S. Army publications.

From The Editor
As a reminder, MIPB is now online at IKN on the open front page at https://www.ikn.army.mil/apps/IKNWMS/Default.aspx?webId=2248. You will find several of the most recent issues there as well. Please note, the MIPB site located on IKN is under revision. You may not be able to access the issue archive at this time.

The following themes and suspenses are established for:

July-September 2016, Intelligence Support in Dense Urban Areas, deadline for submissions is 16 June.

October-December 2016, DCGS-A: Our Primary Weapons System, deadline for submissions is 11 July.

Articles from the field will always be very important to the success of MIPB as a professional bulletin. Please continue to submit them. Even though the topic of your article may not coincide with an issue’s theme, do not hesitate to send it to me. Most issues will contain theme articles as well as articles on other topics. Your thoughts and lessons learned (from the field) are invaluable.

Please call or email me with any questions regarding your article or upcoming issues.

Sterilla Smith
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Always Out Front

by Major General Scott D. Berrier
Commanding General
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

Today, our Army is engaged in a more complex environment than ever before. There are more than 190,000 of our Soldiers operating in over 140 countries around the world combating irregular and hybrid threats, deterring aggression, and reassuring our allies and partners. As we adapt to fiscal constraints and reduced manning, the Army must be ready to conduct the full range of military operations—prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win our Nation’s wars. Readiness is our challenge and our priority. As stated by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Milley, “Readiness is number one....And there is no other number one.”

The foundation of Army readiness is trained Army formations equipped to accomplish our Nation’s military objectives. The U.S. Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) has a vital role in training our future intelligence professionals in accomplishing those objectives. That training starts here at Fort Huachuca; Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas; Corry Station, in Pensacola, Florida; and at National Guard and Army Reserve training sites in Georgia, Utah, and here in Arizona. USAICoE trains and develops Soldiers and leaders, as well as supporting the operating force, ensuring our intelligence enterprise is well prepared and ready to support commanders.

A cohesive team of training developers, instructors, and support personnel are closing identified knowledge gaps by implementing battle-focused institutional training that builds trust and confidence in Army intelligence warfighters. Our instructors continually strive to improve course curriculum for relevancy, every day. Our day-to-day dialogue and partnerships with the combat training centers (CTC) and operational units ensure USAICoE training and education remains on target. This interaction contributes to building agile Soldiers and leaders who think critically and are ready to provide intelligence support to commanders.

The Army’s training focus has recently transitioned from supporting a decade-long set of stability and counterinsurgency missions to the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). DATE scenarios are used as a tool to standardize training from schoolhouse to home-station and culminating at CTC rotations. The DATE scenarios require units to conduct a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks against a hybrid threat in a complex operational environment. By efficiently using existing resources, USAICoE has incorporated DATE scenarios into almost all of its training to match the CSA’s readiness focus.

Our institution is also developing leaders and Soldiers charged with ensuring our intelligence force is well prepared and ready to support commanders. USAICoE is implementing ways to develop adaptive Soldiers and leaders who have the cognitive, interpersonal, and cultural skills necessary to excel in a complex environment. Programs are specifically geared to provide additional learning opportunities and challenges for students in ways not offered before. Initiatives such as the USAICoE Writing Program and the Cognitive Enhancement Program are building more competent, agile, and adaptive leaders ready to support the operating force.

USAICoE’s information technology architecture is constantly improving to meet the dynamic training and operational requirements of the intelligence community. The MI Corps’ primary weapon system, the Distributed Common Ground System-Army, is Army MI’s automated tool set of choice and is integrated in USAICoE courses taught with many other systems used across the intelligence community. All courses taught at USAICoE are absolutely dependent on state-of-the-art information systems and high-speed access to worldwide networks and databases at multiple classification levels. This architecture is expertly maintained by the CIO/G6 team who ensure these systems operate 24/7/365. USAICoE’s classrooms and training facilities rely on a complex infrastructure, taking advantage of leading-edge technologies to deliver the necessary capabilities to all training facilities. This infrastructure creates a flexible, efficient and cost-effective, yet capable environment. Additionally, a robust Battle Simulations capability provides a virtual battlefield environment Soldiers require to prepare them for the operating force.

Training is continuous throughout the career of intelligence professionals. USAICoE is heavily invested in delivering and supporting excellent intelligence training and life-long learning. Every Soldier, Army Civilian, and contractor at USAICoE is committed to preparing our MI forces through institutional training and education. This commitment to excellence makes us the best in the world at what we do. USAICoE units and organizations are continually working to enhance the skills, capabilities, and knowledge of intelligence professionals of all ranks. High-quality, demanding, and realistic training leads to operational success and saves lives on the battlefield. Army readiness starts with intelligence readiness, and intelligence readiness starts at Fort Huachuca. 🌟

“Always Out Front and Army Strong!”
CSM FORUM

by Command Sergeant Major Thomas J. Latter
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

“Readiness for ground combat is—and will remain—the U.S. Army’s #1 priority.”
—General Mark A. Milley
Chief of Staff of the Army
27 August 2015

The officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers of the 111th Military Intelligence Brigade (111th MI BDE) and Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) are responsible for the institutional training and education of all the MI professionals in the Army, and creating a baseline of intelligence readiness for our force.

This 111th MI BDE’s cadre of experts provide the introduction to Army Intelligence required for all 10-level accessions into our MI Corps’ eight entry military occupational specialties (MOSs) 35F/G/M/N/P/Q/S/T, seven MOS-producing Warrant Officer Basic Courses, and the MI Basic Officer Leadership Course for lieutenants. They also train the 35L Counterintelligence MOS-producing course and 13 additional skill identifiers to include all of the Special Electronic Mission Aircraft related courses flown out of Libby Army Air Field. The Brigade provides the basic skills needed for our Soldiers to provide situational understanding to commanders and ensure mission success on and off the battlefield to win the Nation’s wars.

The 111th MI BDE and NCOA are the hub for professionalization of the MI Corps. Whether it is the captain coming back to attend the MI Captain’s Career Course; the chief warrant officer coming back to attend the Warrant Officer Advanced Course, or the promotable sergeant coming to attend the Advanced Leader Course; the cadre at Fort Huachuca strive to level the knowledge base for MI mid-career professionals. The goal is to not only to increase their individual technical subject matter expertise, but also share learned experiences and prepare for future assignments. It is this leveling of skills, guided by the professional cadre that ensures intelligence readiness across the force.

Institutional learning also plays an important role in the development and education of senior leaders as well. The MI Pre-Command Course, for command selected battalion and brigade commanders, senior intelligence officers, and sergeants major; and the Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education Course (inaugural class graduated 9 February 2016) are designed to educate those career intelligence professionals and prepare them for future assignments. Institutional training remains a pillar in the life long professionalization of Soldiers, and the 111th MI BDE is the keystone for MI leaders.

The 111th MI BDE and NCOA are more than just their instructors. Their course developers are incorporating the feedback from the field via Critical Task and Site Selection Boards, guidance from the Army Staff, and the U.S. Army Doctrine and Training Command (TRADOC) such as inclusion of the Decisive Action Training Environment Scenario to retain relevancy and currency in the training. These organizations are spearheading Army efforts to increase the quality of Soldiers the institutional Army produces, not just at USAICoE, but throughout all of TRADOC with their experimentation with Cognitive Enhancement to facilitate quicker learning processes with greater retention. USAICoE also sponsors a Writing Program which is evolving into a communication program beyond the written word.

As Major General Berrier, USAICoE Commander, states “Army readiness starts with intelligence readiness, and intelligence readiness starts at Fort Huachuca.” We need the best and brightest to teach the next generation of intelligence professionals. So when you feel you have enough experience in Forces Command, the Intelligence and Security Command, and the Special Operations Command, you need to come back to the Intelligence Center of Excellence to share your hard earned knowledge and make the next generation even better.

“Always Out Front and Army Strong!”
Long before receiving orders to Fort Huachuca, I realized the importance of shaping and developing the future of our warrant officer cohort, a desire to “give back” to our institutional education and training center at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE). This desire to share experiences and pass on knowledge was acquired through years of experiential learning. Assignment to USAICoE provided a monumental platform to broaden a career, and gain knowledge and experience within multiple realms including doctrine, capabilities development, force design, requirements determination, training development and design.

It remains clear to our senior leaders at USAICoE that MI warrant officers embrace the philosophy of “giving back” with the intent of building the next generation. This is achieved because USAICoE seeks MI warrant officers that are among today’s most proven leaders and highly competent intelligence practitioners. There is no greater honor or privilege than to be selected as a member of the USAICoE training and education team. It’s a privilege to cultivate the next generation, a privilege to shape the future, and a privilege to advance the MI Corps and the Army. In pursuit of that goal, members of our warrant officer cadre are:

- **Technical Leaders** who are critical in shaping and molding the next generation. They are leaders who instill the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities towards optimal individual and collective performance. They instill technical expertise through practical application and proven performance in today’s complex environment.

- **Innovative Explorers** in pursuit of endless possibilities and progress. They challenge students to think more critically and pursue advancement through a lens of continuous improvement.

To be a successful educator and trainer you must approach every day with an enthusiasm and commitment to excellence in both word and deed. Each student has to be viewed as an Intelligence Professional with the potential to become one of our future great leaders. Warrant officer instructors spend years gaining the knowledge and experience that will be invaluable to the professional development of the entire MI Warrant Officer Cohort. The example they set while assigned to USAICoE will pay dividends for many years in shaping our future senior warrant officers.

The MI Warrant Officer Education System has made significant strides since its humble beginnings spanning back to the mid-1980s. Regardless of force drawdowns or budgetary constraints, MI warrant officer education continues to evolve to meet the demands of the operational force. This is directly attributed to the quality and adaptability of the cadre who have masterfully transitioned lessons learned from experiential to formalized training and education. If the past history of warrant officer education and training is an indication of the future, our MI warrant officer professionals at USAICoE will continue to uphold the high standards of those who came before them.

I encourage all MI warrant officers to seize the opportunity to serve at USAICoE or a Foundry site because it will signify that you are among the very best within the MI Corps. Through successful service you will have shaped the MI Corps on a pinnacle platform while influencing the careers of thousands of MI professionals. 

*Always Out Front! Army Strong!*
Regionally Aligned Forces Concept Maximizes Opportunities for Training and Professional Development of MI Soldiers

by Lieutenant Colonel James W. Welch

Introduction
With the dawn of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept, Army brigades now have the opportunity to support missions in a specific area of the world and focus training efforts around potential missions in that particular area of responsibility (AOR). While the duties and responsibilities of Military Intelligence (MI) Soldiers may vary depending of the RAF mission undertaken, this tremendous opportunity allows leaders to maximize training of MI Soldiers while supporting real world missions. Rather than focusing on a wide range of possible contingencies throughout the world, Brigade S2 Soldiers can now zero in on specific regions of the world and develop expertise akin to what they might gain during deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan.

For any contingency or military situation, it is imperative that MI Soldiers thoroughly understand the AOR well before the commencement of operations. This is one of the great strengths of the RAF concept. Not only does it allow commanders to train for a specific mission, but it allows those in support roles to focus with laser-like precision on a particular problem set. As the Army’s RAF for NORAD-Northern Command (N-NC), 3rd ABCT, 3 ID (3/3 ID) had a unique opportunity to not only support a Combatant Command (CCMD) but to also learn about the Army’s role in Homeland Defense (HD), Defense Support of Civilian Authorities (DSCA) operations, and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) missions. 3/3 ID served as the N-NC RAF from February 2014 through January 2015 and continued to support N-NC TSC missions through July 2015.

Throughout this time period, 3/3 MI Soldiers were able to directly support many N-NC missions, while maximizing training opportunities and honing individual skills. As the 3/3 NORTHCOM mission proved, units undertaking a RAF mission have a tremendous opportunity at their disposal. However, in order to maximize the opportunity, everyone on the team must treat the RAF mission just as they would a deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Unless the units’ leaders embrace the mission and reach out to other entities that have similar interests in that particular portion of the world, the RAF mission will seem more like a tasking and Soldiers’ interest and opportunities may very well diminish.

NORAD-NORTHCOM RAF
Since terms like DSCA and HD are relatively foreign concepts to most active duty Soldiers, our unit established coordination with ARNORTH several months before we assumed the RAF mission. Because our Division headquarters gave us Direct Liaison Authority (DIRLAUTH), we were encouraged to communicate directly with our ARNORTH counterparts in order to plan for the RAF mission. It was not only important that we understood our roles and responsibilities, but that our Brigade’s MI Soldiers fully understood all of the potential threats (kinetic or non-kinetic) that may be associated with our RAF duties. With DIRLAUTH, our MI leaders began coordinating with ARNORTH via a series of VTCs and teleconferences. The series of VTCs allowed us to begin putting faces with names and understand whom we might need to call upon in the ARNORTH G2 section. We were also able to better understand ARNORTH expectations, have a sense of the training required to support ARNORTH, and recognize the numerous opportunities that our Soldiers would have during the course of our RAF mission. A substantial portion of those opportunities would fall under the scope of live environment training (LET).

Live Environment Training
Throughout the duration of the 3/3 RAF mission, the MI Soldiers within our Brigade benefited tremendously from the use of Foundry training funds. With this funding, our unit was able to send over 30 Soldiers to LET opportunities at ARNORTH headquarters and various other locations. While the bases for these LET opportunities were often pre-existing, we were able to work directly with the ARNORTH staff to enhance and expand LET opportunities. This allowed our Soldiers to better understand the mission and provide real world support to ARNORTH. It also heightened our Brigade’s overall understanding of the NORTHCOM AOR, as analysts were able to use their LET experiences to
provide more in-depth analysis for leaders throughout the Brigade.

The majority of these LET opportunities allowed our unit to send all-source analysts to ARNORTH headquarters to support every day operations. In order to ensure they fully grasped the NORTHCOM threats, we sent analysts from each subordinate battalion to ARNORTH headquarters prior to actually assuming the RAF mission in February 2014. With this experience, our analysts came back to the unit with a much better understanding of the threat environment and were able to keep their respective battalion commanders better informed as a result. Once our Brigade undertook the RAF mission, we began to rotate all-source analysts from across the Brigade to ARNORTH on a monthly basis. Their utility to ARNORTH became apparent as 3/3 analysts began taking part in intelligence updates to the ARNORTH Commanding General. In addition, we coordinated with ARNORTH to have our analysts at its headquarters during NORTHCOM exercises. This allowed our Brigade to increase our contribution to ARNORTH during these exercises, and also increased our Brigade’s situational awareness as our Soldiers were able to provide information back to our headquarters on a routine basis.

As we began to see the return on investment we gained from the all-source LETs, we worked with ARNORTH to expand opportunities into other MI fields. For example, our Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Soldiers began to provide assistance to a U.S. Embassy, in accordance with a pre-existing HUMINT LET. In addition, ARNORTH sought ways for us to include Signals Intelligence and MI systems maintainers (MOS 35T/353T) on LETs to ARNORTH, as well as in support of NORTHCOM exercises. These LET opportunities not only allowed us to better understand our RAF mission, but they allowed our Soldiers to directly contribute to the RAF mission. By doing so, the morale of MI Soldiers throughout the Brigade remained extremely high, as they saw the RAF mission just as they would any other deployment or mission. This gave them a purpose and direction that is not always available in a garrison environment.

**Theater Security Cooperation**

A central part of the NORTHCOM RAF mission is working with Canada and Mexico as part of TSC missions. TSC missions may include specific training missions with partnered countries or even participation in a partnered country’s military exercises. While the great majority of our Brigade TSC missions did not originally entail specific MI training, we were able to eventually include 3/3 MI Soldiers in at least some aspect of every TSC mission to both Canada and Mexico.

Throughout the first several months of our RAF mission, there were no specific requirements for MI Soldiers to participate in TSC missions. For example, 3/3 support to Canadian military exercises was limited to small numbers of combat arms Soldiers. Likewise, TSC training missions to Mexico were often comprised of 3/3 Soldiers who could provide instruction in areas such as smalls arms marksmanship or combat medic training. However, all of these missions still required an in-depth analysis of potential threats and necessitated that all-source analysts from across the Brigade conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) for these particular missions.

To enhance our analytical efforts across the Brigade and capitalize on a potential training opportunity, our senior all-source intelligence technician began rotating junior all-source analysts from across the Brigade into the Brigade S2 section on a weekly basis. These Soldiers from the MI Company and the battalion S2 sections were then able to focus all of their attention on providing analytical support to ongoing TSC missions or preparing for future requirements. Each week, this effort culminated in a formal briefing to the Brigade Commander and Brigade staff. These briefings were also disseminated throughout the Brigade for maximum effect. Coupled with the all-source LET opportunities, this weekly rotation ensured that every all-source analyst in the Brigade had a thorough understanding of the NORTHCOM AOR.

Several months into the 3/3 RAF mission, ARNORTH began to utilize our Brigade’s MI Soldiers to augment MI-specific TSC missions. The ARNORTH G2 Intelligence Security Cooperation Section worked hand-in-hand with our Brigade to ensure the right 3/3 Soldiers would be selected to support these technical missions. While ARNORTH had previously used Army MI units and/or contractors to fulfill these requirements, they began to request our Soldiers to fill personnel gaps. This opportunity blossomed into full-on TSC missions for our Brigade, allowing our Soldiers to serve as mission leads and primary instructors on a variety of TSC missions. The range of these missions varied, and included subjects such as Open Source Intelligence, Small Unmanned Aerial Systems courses, as well as Document and Media Exploitation and Cell Phone Exploitation.

**Relationships Critical to Success**

Overall, our Brigade’s support to the N-NC RAF mission was successful due to personal relationships between our Brigade and ARNORTH. By having DIRLAUTH with ARNORTH, our MI leaders were able to build relationships and integrate ourselves into the ARNORTH team. Credit must also
be given to the ARNORTH G2 section which ensured we fully understood the RAF role and continuously sought out ways 3/3 Soldiers could contribute to the ARNORTH mission.

This support was evident early on, as ARNORTH G2 representatives took part in a 3/3 simulation exercise to prepare our Brigade’s MI Soldiers for the RAF mission. Due to the idiosyncrasies of the ARNORTH mission, this was particularly important to our Brigade’s success. For example, if our unit were to support a DSCA operation, our MI Soldiers must be fully attuned to Intelligence Oversight protocols and how they can support the commander without violating those regulations. In addition, the ARNORTH G2 allowed 3/3 MI leaders to take part in weekly intelligence updates to the ARNORTH Commanding General. This inclusion not only made our Soldiers feel like part of the team, it allowed us to have a comprehensive understanding of the threats facing ARNORTH. When requested, it also allowed us to provide feedback and assistance to the ARNORTH G2 section.

Another great asset for our team was the ARNORTH Human Terrain Team. The Team went out of its way to assist and inform our Brigade, ensuring that we were on an equal footing with the organic ARNORTH team. In addition to providing us with information on a frequent basis, the team provided 3/3 analysts with briefings via VTC. An in-depth briefing was provided to all company and battalion commanders within our Brigade. Coupled with the information we received from the ARNORTH G2 section, the Team’s data ensured our Brigade had all of the material we needed to be positive contributors to the RAF mission.

In addition to building relationships with the ARNORTH G2 team, we were able to build connections with other entities who had similar equities with our RAF mission. Part of this exposure came about due to a pre-existing working group directed by the ARNORTH G2 section. This Joint Interagency Working Group brought together various entities who had responsibilities or interests within the NORTHCOM AOR. By taking part in these working groups, we began to develop other relationships and build a vast list of resources for our Brigade’s intelligence analysts. One example is our Brigade’s relationship with the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). After establishing a relationship, we were able to utilize a pre-existing LET opportunity to get analysts to NGIC to broaden our understanding of the NORTHCOM AOR. As with the LETs with ARNORTH, the NGIC LET allowed our analysts to contribute to the overall mission of the host organization, while also greatly expanding our Soldiers’ analytical resources and understanding.

**Future Recommendations**

Without a doubt, the RAF concept offers Soldiers incredible training opportunities that might not otherwise be available in a traditional garrison setting. In addition, MI Soldiers are able to support their higher echelon CCMD with real world analysis on a recurring basis. Short of a conventional deployment, these Soldiers would not be able to focus on a specific AOR unless it directly correlated with an assigned mission. For this reason, MI Soldiers within RAF brigades have the opportunity to conduct a very thorough IPB and develop an in-depth understanding of threats within the CCMD’s AOR. While it may not be practical for a Brigade to continue as a RAF for an indefinite period of time, it does make sense to rotate a RAF mission between two brigades. Ideally, this rotation should exist between brigades within the same division, but a rotation system of any kind would still allow MI personnel in those units to maintain a high level of expertise in that particular CCMD. This would include institutional knowledge and relationships that would endure as individual Soldiers departed the RAF unit.

When fully embraced, the RAF concept affords MI personnel tremendous opportunities for training, professional development, and personal growth. Furthermore, it gives Soldiers the opportunity to support real world operations that are not usually available while in a garrison environment. The RAF mission is a win-win for tactical units and CCMDs, and should remain the modus operandi of the U.S. Army. Short of a combat deployment, no other experience will allow MI Soldiers to contribute to real world missions in such a meaningful way.

LTC Welch served as the Brigade Intelligence Officer for 3/3 ID from September 2013 through May 2015. He is currently the Senior Military Intelligence instructor at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Georgia.
The uncertainty and complexity of the future operational environment will require Army units to respond to a broad range of threats and challenges to effectively achieve our Ends. Reduced Means and changing social demographics—which can affect local political conditions and questions of economic resources and scarcity—will impact the Way that conflict is conducted and will continue to produce an increasing degree of uncertainty and complexity. In addition to demographic trends, climate change, natural disasters, pandemics, food and water shortages, globalization, conventional and unconventional state-on-state conflict will impact the use and role of Army intelligence forces...Army Intelligence will continue to be critical in achieving decisive action against a hybrid threat.”

—Army Intelligence Training Strategy

Understanding the USAREUR Operating Environment

Western Europe is experiencing an ever-increasing number of threats in both terrorism, as well as aggression from Russia today. Countering these threats requires the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Army Service Component Command (ASCC) to stand with and support our European allies. The doctrinal axiom “intelligence drives operations” mandates a heavy reliance on the Military Intelligence Brigade (Theater) (MIB(T)) to provide accurate and timely intelligence, while also enduring a significant force draw-down. The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command’s (INSCOM) 66th MIB(T) is the Intelligence Anchor Point for Regionally Aligned Forces, or “RAF units” rotating into the European theater. The MIB(T) is responsible for providing these units with the timely and accurate intelligence they require to be successful. Providing this intelligence charges the Brigade with the responsibility to properly train intelligence personnel, while also providing timely and accurate intelligence analysis at the operational level.

This article outlines a training strategy that the 24th MI Battalion, 66th MI Brigade has developed to improve and sustain our intelligence readiness. We hope this article will spark the discussion of long-term training sustainment while properly assessing MI Soldier development over time.

The 66th MIB(T) Mission

As a theater-committed and operationally engaged force with operational control provided by the USAREUR ASCC in support of assigned theater missions, the 66th MIB(T) conducts theater-level single-source (Signals Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Human Intelligence, Geospatial Intelligence, Measurement and Signature Intelligence) and all-source intelligence operations to include collection, analysis, production, and dissemination. The 66th MIB(T) sets the theater architecture and core enterprise services as the gateway for the RAF units and major subordinate commands operating within the USAREUR area of responsibility (AOR).

24th MI BN Support to the 66th MIB(T) Mission

The 24th MI BN (OPS) is a critical component in providing the core capabilities necessary for the 66th MIB(T) to set the theater. The Battalion conducts all-source and multi-disciplined intelligence analysis, production, and dissemination in support of Unified Land Operations across the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Theater to support USAREUR, RAF units, NATO, and Allied and Partner Nations. The 24th MI BN is responsible for the Analysis & Control Element (ACE) operations, Intelligence Enterprise management, and operational-level intelligence training supporting USAREUR. The 24th MI BN is also tasked to deploy a tailored MI package to augment other units during various named operations and international crises.

Special Training Considerations

The intelligence requirements for an ASCC require different capabilities and expertise than most analysts possess when they arrive at the battalion. Therefore, the 24th developed the Intelligence Readiness Training Plan (IRTP) to address these shortcomings in a deliberate way without detracting from the battalion’s daily requirements. Furthermore, with a rapid turnover of intelligence personnel, it becomes problematic to train newly assigned personnel to understand the operational environment (OE) immediately upon assignment. The ever-growing complexity of the OE leads to increasing requirements, while not affording our NCOs and senior analysts the necessary time to develop Soldiers prior to placement within the ACE mission.

A Collective and Deliberate Approach to Intelligence Training at the MIB(T)

The Battalion must train new analysts while simultaneously fulfilling daily theater and ASCC intelligence require-
ments. The IRTP consolidates several training opportunities into a coherent plan that maximizes Soldier development without detracting from the Battalion’s mission. The Battalion leverages unit training initiatives such as the ACE Academy, Foundry training, on-the-job training, exercises, and military-to-military engagements in the IRTP. This provides Soldiers with continuous opportunities to improve their skills as theater analysts. As the Army Intelligence Training Strategy explains, “Military Intelligence requires creative, aggressive, and unorthodox training approaches to maintaining the agility and adaptability necessary to support the Army in an uncertain strategic environment.”

The Overall Approach to the Intelligence Readiness Training Plan

Our approach to intelligence readiness is to break up the Soldier training cycle into four parts: training, assessment, validation, and sustainment.

1. **Training.** Training will incorporate our ACE Academy, Foundry Training, mobile training teams, and live environment training (LET), in order to facilitate Soldiers’ development in the analytical skills necessary to support theater level intelligence production. This will be accomplished through common core courses that will be trained prior to Soldier’s placement into a mission set within the ACE.

2. **Assessment.** Monthly counseling statements will be used as the assessment tool for the IRTP. Assessments will require first-line supervisor, instructor, and First Sergeant input to evaluate Soldier progression. These counselings will have an assessment rubric to allow Soldiers to understand the metrics behind their evaluation.

3. **Validation.** Based on the Soldier’s analytical capabilities, measured through the Soldier’s ability to formulate accurate assessments and meet all necessary intelligence requirements, the Soldier will either be assigned to a team within the ACE or retrained in another area.

4. **Sustainment.** The sustainment of our Soldiers will be through a deliberate process of placement and continuous training objectives that are tied to mission skill sets. Soldiers will be afforded the opportunity to go on LETs, exercises support, and higher level Foundry courses in order to grow both their experience and skill sets.

Intelligence Readiness Training Tables

The MI Ops “Tables” enable the Battalion Commander to determine the readiness of the unit by providing metrics. The training and assessment processes of the IRTP will aid the Commander and ACE Chief in determining the Battalion’s strengths and weaknesses. It will also measure the level of progress a Soldier makes over time. The MI Gunnery Tables (for the MI Ops Battalion) are modeled after Tank Gunnery Tables as a “crawl, walk, run” methodology of training, using outside sources (INSCOM, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) as certifying officials. These training tables are used to support our progressive approach to improving the Battalion’s collective proficiency in the three Army Intelligence core competencies of intelligence synchronization, intelligence operations, and intelligence analysis. (See Figure 1.)
Table I (Familiarization). Provides an introduction to the mission sets of both the ASCC and Brigade missions as it’s tied to the OE.

Table II (MOS Skills). Provides Soldiers a refresher in their MOS skills through tailored training support packages from the Foundry Platform and by specific training objectives identified by the team leadership. This table will focus training on advanced technical skills and system certification skills.

Table III (Mission Skills). Provides Soldiers the foundation for specific mission sets conducted by the ACE. These mission skills range from lessons learned, toolset availability, intelligence architecture use, production responsibilities, and on-the-job training in multiple regional problem sets.

Table IV (Operational Exposure). Soldiers are given greater roles within the ACE, including support to training exercises, DISE deployments, RAF LETs, and other events (foreign military engagements, unit partnership engagements, etc.). This exposure to operations outside the Brigade will help develop analytical skills, while still operating in a closely monitored and evaluated training environment.

Table V (Sustainment). Provides Soldiers with opportunities to become ACE Academy Cadre, LET trainers, acquire leadership roles within the ACE, and to sponsor newly assigned Soldiers within the unit. This table will also allow a Soldier the time and resources necessary to enhance skills in areas where they require improvement. They will leverage self-development tools created by instructors and continue to use the Foundry platform.

Understanding the Soldier Readiness Glide Path

The Soldier Readiness Glide Path (SRGP) will be used by leadership as a tool to lay out a standardized timeline for the training and assessment of the Soldier. It provides guidance to effectively manage the organization and the Soldiers’ time with the unit. The SRGP will be a phased approach, consisting of four complete phases:

Phase I SGRP (Days 0-90). Encompasses two critical components: Soldier in-processing and orientation to the MIB(T) mission. Phase I comprises the first three months upon arrival to the unit.

Phase 1a: Soldier In Processing. Soldier sponsorship will last approximately 30 days. The critical component to this stage is the Battalion's sponsorship program.

Phase 1b: Table I (Familiarization). Encompasses familiarization of the IRTP as well as the ACE Academy. Phase 1b lasts around 60 days. Soldiers are provided the fundamental basics to accomplish their mission within the Battalion, while revisiting intelligence concepts and doctrine.

Phase II SGRP (Days 91-180). Begins once the Soldier enters Table II (MOS Skills), and is anticipated to be completed in approximately 90 days. The Soldier is provided a more comprehensive understanding of the automated processing systems and how they are integrated into the daily intelligence production cycle for the ACE.

Phase III SGRP (Days 180-365). Following the operational familiarization phase, the Soldier will enter Tables III (Mission Skills) and IV (Operational Exposure). This phase will end at the completion of the Soldier’s first year with the unit. The critical component to this stage is the Soldier’s exposure to other operational requirements outside of ACE operations. These opportunities provide the Soldier with additional experience valuable in developing a well-rounded MI professional.

Phase IV (Year One through PCS). The final and most critical stage is Table V (Sustainment) period, which lasts from the Soldier’s first year with the unit to their time of PCS. This is an assessment and sustainment of the Soldier’s individual and collective competencies and skills developed while working in this complex OE.

Home Station Training with an ACE Academy

The ACE Academy provides Home Station training, assessment, and validation as an essential component of the Soldier Readiness Glide Path. This approach ensures that Soldiers are prepared for their roles within the ACE and are equipped with the skills necessary to support their units effectively.

**Figure 2: The Soldier Readiness Glide Path.**
essential component to the 24th MI BN’s IRTP. The training will develop the essential skills an analyst requires to be successful in the 24th MI BN’s ACE—proper report writing, briefing, and familiarization with intelligence disciplines.

ACE Academy training will exist in two forms: a two-week training event that occurs quarterly for newly assigned 24th MI BN Soldiers and weekly Sergeants’ Time Training (STT) that will happen every Thursday. Scheduling for the ACE Academy will be done by the companies in coordination with the Battalion S3. Records on course attendance will be maintained by the company orderly room and submitted to the BN S3 at the beginning of each quarter. The ACE Academy’s two-week quarterly training event will include familiarization in the different intelligence principles and disciplines, the mission of the MIB(T), systems familiarization, AO/AOR familiarization, briefing, and writing reports.

Deep Dive training that is specific to a problem set or intelligence discipline will occur in the form of STTs and taught by Section NCOICs. Foundry resources are available to the leaders and Soldiers in the form of training support packages. These packages will be made available by the BN S3 at the request of Team Leaders or OICs and are designed to teach certain Collective and Individual Tasks. The Battalion will maximize the use of Foundry to train our teams.

This program leverages resources and trainers that help build upon our intelligence core competencies as outlined in ADRP 2-0.

The 24th MI BN will use its assigned DCGS-A instructor to train all-source analysts. This training will allow analysts to exploit all DCGS-A program capabilities and the Theater Intelligence Enterprise. There will be one iteration of training every other month. One-on-one training will also be executed when deemed necessary by the mentor and leaders.

Assessments will take place in the form of monthly counseling sessions. It will include a thorough evaluation of the Soldier’s performance, including strengths and weaknesses, along with future goal setting. These monthly counseling sessions will include suggested training and progress reports on the Soldier’s “Intelligence Readiness.” The company
commander and First Sergeant will use these counseling statements as a way to evaluate their company’s readiness and the Soldiers’ development.

**Sustainment and the Way Forward**

Executing, assessing, and validating the training will render no true results unless the training is sustained. A committed way ahead requires a consistent and predictable cycle that will not only train new Soldiers, but also retrain Soldiers to develop operationally capable analysts. This requires not only continued command emphasis from company to Brigade levels, but also support from the USAREUR G2 staff and all teams on the ACE floor. Without their continued support in rotating Soldiers out of the production cycle to execute training, Soldier development and the progression of the ACE Academy will undoubtedly stagnate. Furthermore, each individual team will be faced with the burden of integrating untrained Soldiers into their team’s Production Cycle, while still being forced to maintain production requirements necessary to support the 66th MIB(T)’s mission and USAREUR.

**Endnotes**

1. Army Intelligence Training Strategy, January 2014, Chapter 1-3, Para a 1.

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Introduction

It’s possibly an Army heresy, but I wasn’t sure I wanted to be a company commander. I didn’t know if I had the right skills or if I would enjoy it. I had been in the Arrowhead Brigade for four years and already served in two key developmental positions. When command interviews were announced in late 2013, my instinct was to not compete.

Had it been any other company, I may have made a different choice. But it was 209th MICO, the organic Military Intelligence Company (MICO) of the Arrowhead Brigade, 3-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). I had observed this Company in action for years: the brilliant, innovative Soldiers, and the awesome capabilities the company could bring to the fight. I had also witnessed the company’s struggles in training. It was a tough nut to crack. It seemed like the company answered to no less than three bosses between battalion and Brigade levels, and the requirements leveraged on the Company often competed with one another. The Company’s Soldiers, training, and effectiveness suffered for it.

In early 2013, I’d found an MI Gunnery concept developed by 10th Mountain Division on Army Knowledge Online. I immediately believed that something like it could reduce the company’s historical friction by bringing all stakeholders on line and standardizing the company’s training. I modified the concept to fit the MICO and brought it to my command in interview to discuss how I would approach command. The maneuver commander who conducted the interviews dryly told me I was a good staff officer, but he had reservations about whether I’d be a good commander. Well, we agreed on that! It turned out we both also thought the training concept had true potential, and I was ultimately given the immense privilege of commanding the 209th MICO in June 2014.

Over the next year, every member of the company worked to create, plan, and execute our MI Gunnery. That year was the best and most challenging experience of my career to date.

A BCT MICO presents unique employment capabilities and training challenges. In 2014, 209th MICO was home to more than ten of the Brigade’s lowest-density military occupational specialties (MOS) which were predominantly responsible for the Brigade’s collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information and products.

The company’s task organization and command structure were complex. In garrison, 1-14 Cavalry Squadron was responsible for the company’s training. Operationally, the Brigade (BDE) Headquarters controlled the company, the BDE S3 managed collection assets, and the Company largely became an extension of the BDE S2 section. This transition highlighted a break in the continuous relationship that traditionally exists between companies and their higher headquarters.

As 3-2 SBCT transitioned to training in the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE), the Company’s need for a coherent, MICO-specific training progression became critical. Unable to locate a training resource that addressed this problem set in full scope, 209th MICO developed and executed its ‘MI Gunnery.’ The Tables simplified the extensive training requirements of a multi-discipline intelligence unit into a logical training progression that translated well to maneuver terms.

![209th MICO Gunnery Tables Concept](image-url)
Though it was an imperfect process built through trial and error, 209th MICO’s Gunnery became the Company’s common operating picture (COP), driving training requirements and communicating achievements from the squad to BDE level. The purpose of this article is to address how 209th MICO developed and executed its MI Gunnery and to identify lessons learned.

**MI Gunnery Development**

The 209th MICO Gunnery template consisted of eight tables, accounting for training and certification at each level from individual to Company collective:

- **Table I:** Individual Requirements, MOS-specific.
- **Tables II/III:** Individual MOS-specific Training and Certification.
- **Tables IV/V:** Platoon Collective Training and Certification via External Evaluation (EXEVAL).
- **Tables VI/VII:** Company Collective Training (Brigade Integration) and Company Validation (EXEVAL).
- **Table VIII:** Company Certification via Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE).

Due to time constraints, team, and section training tables were consolidated into platoon training and certification. Future MI Gunnery iterations should expand to include these tables.

Table design began with the Company’s approved Mission Essential Task List (METL), four tasks nested with the Brigade METL that enabled the Company to perform its wartime mission. Using the Army Universal Task List and Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS), the Company developed its METL crosswalk to define key collective tasks and training requirements. The crosswalk was then developed into quarterly training projections, which identified the company’s progressive training focus, goals and areas of assumed risk (See below.)

With the backbone of the crosswalk and eight-table framework, each platoon constructed MOS and platoon-specific tables modeled from the 10th Mountain Division format. Tables V through VII were principally designed at the company level. The resulting gunnery provided a clear road map, complete with certification tollgates that would enable the Company to train to METL proficiency.

**Implementing the MICO Gunnery Strategy**

A structured training progression for the BCT MICO is invaluable if brigade leadership understands and supports it. While imperfect, MI Gunnery is a concept maneuver commanders readily understand. Talking from tables, MICO leadership can clearly and succinctly communicate the company’s complex training requirements, creating greater shared understanding that may ultimately determine whether the MICO completes its own training progression or serves as a training aid in the brigade’s training progression.
Beyond communicating company training, the MI Gunnery narrative also identifies when the company is best prepared to integrate with brigade operations. This ability to forecast and execute a logical integration timeline strengthens the likelihood that when integration must occur downrange, it is routine and the brigade is successful.

Accordingly, MI Gunnery timeline cannot be developed or executed in a vacuum. Prior to execution, 209th MICO overlaid its gunnery template onto the Brigade’s Long Range Training Calendar. By equal parts design and coincidence, the gunnery nested with 7th Infantry Division’s Integrated Training Strategy, which 3-2 SBCT executed between August 2014 and July 2015. The Company learned quickly that MI Gunnery iterations must be executed approximately one quarter ahead of the Brigade’s training progression. Without this lead time, the Company lacks the proficiency to effectively integrate into brigade collective training.

209th MICO Gunnery Execution and Lessons Learned

Table I: Individual Requirements, MOS Specific.

Table I: Training Execution. Table I ensures all MICO Soldiers establish and maintain the accounts and certifications required to do their jobs by discipline. Execution is ongoing and must be frequently reevaluated to ensure it reflects requirements unique to the discipline, unit and installation. Platoon leadership owns Table I.

Table I: Lessons Learned.

✦ **Standardize the process.** Ensure each platoon’s standard operating procedures (SOP) contains a checklist of MOS- and grade-specific requirements, including a timeline and steps for completion. Disseminate these tools to in-processing personnel, and track individual Soldier readiness as a component of the company’s readiness program.

✦ **Reevaluate early and often.** Prior to major training events like MREs, establish training accounts and permissions whose neglect would adversely impact training, and be sure to account for training ‘scenario-isms’ unique to an installation or training environment. Failure to submit timely TSCIF or imagery account requests, for example, can disproportionately degrade the company’s ability to execute its mission.

Table II/III: Individual MOS-specific Training and Certification.

Table II: Training Execution. DATE presents a significant challenge to the MICO, whose members’ service has been predominantly defined by fiber-enabled, bandwidth-intensive counterinsurgency operations. Performing intelligence operations in DATE requires a ‘back to the basics’ approach. Tables II and III build individual Soldiers’ tactical and technical competencies on their MOS-specific skillsets.

Every discipline’s training must be grounded in friendly and enemy doctrine, systems and capabilities. This enables All-Source Analysts to generate feasible enemy courses of action, and communicate them in doctrinal terms and graphics. It enables collectors like 35Ms and 35Ps to identify and make correct inferences about information collected. Table II instills the fundamental tactical and technical knowledge each MI Soldier requires to support a maneuver commander.

This foundation is then complemented with discipline-specific skills training. Derived from the METL crosswalk and bounded by the total time allotted to Table II, the company prioritizes a defined number of core tasks by skill level and discipline, and platoons plan and execute training.

Table III: Certification Execution. Soldiers’ ability to perform these core tasks is tested and recorded in Table III. Certification occurs in a tactical environment over a 48 to 72 hour period and concurrently trains basic fieldcraft and Warrior Tasks. Certified evaluators assess Soldiers individually at a series of stations using clear Go/No-Go criteria retrieved from CATS. Each Soldier receives clear feedback on their performance. If deficient at any task, the Soldier is retrained and reevaluated during Table IV.

Table II/III: Lessons Learned

✦ **Table II is the crux of a successful gunnery.** Table II trains each intelligence Soldier to perform discipline-specific tactical intelligence tasks and communicate outputs using organic systems in DATE. Gunnery is a linear progression, and Table II is the foundation on which it stands. The company must therefore dedicate maximum time affordable to this table, prioritize the core tasks selected, and ensure they are trained to standard.
Have a plan to retrain and execute. Conduct multiple iterations of Tables II and III to integrate new unit members, systematically refresh core skills, and retest Soldiers who previously failed certification. Table III is ideally executed twice a year and can include other BCT intelligence Soldiers.

Table II develops junior leadership. In 209th MICO, the Company’s junior leaders were the principal Table II executors. From team to platoon level, leaders gained experience with the training management process, and their development and resourcing of training nested firmly within our squadron, brigade, and division leader development programs.

Table II also underscored a systemic weakness in the tactical and technical proficiency required for Combined Arms Maneuver-focused training. This internal shortfall led us to seek out external support as a mechanism to cross-level knowledge from pre-9/11 intelligence professionals to a new generation of Soldiers and leaders. For in-depth training on doctrine, tactics, and scenario development, 209th MICO relied heavily on:

- Brigade subject matter experts (e.g., maneuver commanders and staff).
- JBLM Foundry Platform.
- Intelligence Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer (IEWTPT).
- Mission Command Training Center (MCTC).

Low-density MOS training requires external support. The company struggled to train and certify its lowest density MOSs due to a lack of organic NCOs and officers experienced in those disciplines. Brigade-external support is necessary to train these critical MOSs to standard.

Tables IV/V: Platoon Collective Training and Certification.

Table IV: Training Execution. ADRP 2-0 defines intelligence core competencies as “the basic activities and tasks the Army uses to describe and drive the Intelligence Warfighting Function (IWff).” The three intelligence core competencies are: intelligence operations, intelligence analysis, and intelligence synchronization.

By composition, the MICO is a sum of two components that mirror the two core competencies of intelligence operations and intelligence analysis. The operational or collection component conducts intelligence operations. It is generally comprised of the Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and unmanned aerial systems platoons, which provide the brigade’s HUMINT Collection Teams, Prophet Teams, and Shadow-platform collection.

The analytical component conducts intelligence analysis. It is comprised of the Analysis and Integration Platoon (now Information Collection Platoon), which operationally become the Brigade Intelligence Support Element (BISE). It also includes the company’s organic SIGINT and HUMINT analytical components.

In the company’s transition to collective training, platoons train and certify against their corresponding core competency. They build on the foundational skills certified in Table III to accomplish three objectives:

1. **Develop proficiency in platoon key collective tasks (KCT).** Based on the METL crosswalk, platoons train the tasks which enable each to execute its core competency on organic systems.

2. **Develop and test communications (Primary/Alternate/Contingency/Emergency (PACE)) plans.** If the company cannot communicate in its operating environment, its ability to produce intelligence is useless. The company must clearly define its PACE plan and develop operator proficiency to leverage organic system capabilities across all classification enclaves. Platoons must practice the plan, conducting communication exercises in field conditions using organic equipment frequently.

3. **Write, refine, and validate TACSOPs.** The end product of Table IV is each platoon’s draft TACSOP that will be initially validated in Table V.

Table V: Certification Execution.

The platoon certification via EXEVAL is a 10-12 day field training exercise conducted in three iterations of execution and retraining that uses the crawl-walk-run methodology:

- **Iteration 1** (48 hours) consists of a 24-hour exercise and internal evaluation. It is followed by a platoon-internal after action review (AAR) and a 24-hour platoon-internal retraining period. This iteration provides platoons time to ‘see themselves’ and fix internally identified issues.
Iteration 2 (96 hours) consists of a 48-hour exercise that is externally evaluated by like-MOS evaluators, preferably BDE and division-level leadership. Each KCT is evaluated according to CATS-derived Go/No Go criteria. The AAR includes evaluator participation and is followed by 48 hours for platoons to retrain on the most critical issues identified. Iteration 2 also allows evaluators to resolve any identified issues with grading criteria.

Iteration 3 (96-144 hours) consists of a certification exercise with external evaluation. It is followed by an AAR, evaluator submission of EXEVAL grade sheets, and company recovery operations.

Upon completion of Table V, each platoon’s proficiency on KCTs is validated, and platoons are certified against their core competency. SOPs are internally validated for refinement and validation during brigade integration.

Table V requires separate exercises for the BISE and each of the three collection disciplines. The scenarios may be closely related, but one platoon’s performance does not impact another’s. Exercises employ live, virtual, and constructive resources to drive realistic operations on organic systems. Intelligence training enablers like IEWTPT, MCTC, and Foundry are critical to developing training events with the fluidity and depth required for evaluation. For the company’s collection component, maneuver unit integration is also imperative. As ADP 7-0 states, “A unit must train like it fights.” In Table V, maneuver units should be integrated as a training enabler.

Tables IV/V: Lessons Learned

Field time is critical. Classroom or motor pool training cannot replicate the stress and realism needed for a platoon to define how it will operate with organic equipment in field conditions. Conduct field training often.

Table V is the company’s most valuable training opportunity. It allows the company to see itself and fairly evaluate its training progress. If resources support, complete the EXEVAL twice, once in Table IV to establish SOPs and again in Table V for certification.

Begin brigade integration early. Without brigade integration, TACSOPs are developed in a vacuum and need significant future refinement. Delineate platoons by their respective core competency:

The collection component, often task-organized to maneuver units to execute operations, must begin interacting with companies, troops, and batteries (C/T/B) and battalion staffs in Table IV. Interactions include capabilities brief execution and should identify future integration opportunities.

The analytical component will more accurately delineate roles and produce sounder SOPs the more heavily the BCT S2 is involved in and shapes Tables IV and V.

The less the MICO plans its training events, the more it trains. The Company was the primary planner and executor of its Table V exercise, which employed 5 separate scenarios and 10 external organizations’ support for exercise design and execution, technical support, evaluations and role-playing. While a tremendous learning experience, these efforts detracted from the Company’s ability to focus wholly on achieving training objectives. Starting at the platoon level, a MICO’s collective training and evaluations should have significant support from higher intelligence echelons, mirroring its maneuver counterparts.

Be creative in training. With doctrine at its core, the company develops unique best practices in Tables IV and V, particularly if it is operating with any constraints. Some of 209th MICO’s best practices included:

Brigade-external partnerships. To replicate an MOS-rich environment equivalent to what 35Fs have available in a BCT, the HUMINT platoon routinely partnered with HUMINT elements of the former 201st Battlefield Concept of Execution.
Surveillance Battalion. The SIGINT platoon likewise partnered with 2-2 SBCT’s SIGINT platoon and conducted multi-component training with 81st Brigade Special Troops Battalion, Washington Army National Guard. These discipline-driven partnerships enriched training and mitigated resource and personnel shortfalls.

- **The Intelligence Process Rehearsal of Concept (IPROC) drill.** Early on, we identified that individual MICO Soldiers often didn’t understand their respective roles within the context of company operations. To overcome this deficit, 209th MICO developed the IPROC as a company-internal, intelligence-centric Combined Arms Rehearsal (CAR) or ROC drill. During the IPROC, we physically walked through the company’s Intelligence process cycle from information collection to processing and dissemination, demonstrating how the company collectively fights. This practice increased MICO Soldiers’ ability to adapt usefully in new conditions, and likewise the company’s comprehensive ability to operate effectively.

- **Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) Evaluations.** 209th MICO’s Table V evaluated 45 collective tasks using MOE evaluations, a concept adopted from 1-14 Cavalry. The MOE evaluations rated overall task performance on a scale from failure to superior performance. Beginning with CATS Go/No Go criteria, the evaluations’ performance metrics broadened their scope to incorporate Brigade standards. This shift from a Go/No-Go approach better allowed the company to track qualitative improvements.

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**Tables VI/VII: Company Collective Training and External Evaluation.**

**Table VI: Training Execution.** Returning to ADRP 2-0, the third core competency, intelligence synchronization, is “the ‘art’ of integrating information collection and intelligence analysis with operations to effectively and efficiently support decision making.” In Table VI, the company applies its platoons’ proficiency in intelligence operations and analysis to achieve intelligence synchronization. This requires the MICO to simultaneously integrate internally within the company, and externally with brigade staff and maneuver elements.
This simultaneous integration is best characterized as occurring across three zones:

A. Company Internal Integration. Focusing on weaknesses identified in platoon validation, training integrates organic collection and analysis components to perform company-internal intelligence synchronization. The end state is the company is METL-proficient and platoons interoperate with ease. Because the MICO will be heavily involved in brigade operations during Table VI, company leadership should fully leverage brigade training events to conduct multi-echelon training and achieve company training objectives.

B. External: Separate Brigade-Level Integration of Intelligence Analysis (B1) and Intelligence Operations (B2).

Core Competency Integration. Table VI’s linchpin is external integration, the company must integrate into brigade operations. Integration, though, is an immense task and must be broken into logical segments. Beginning with core competencies, the company’s analysis component integrates with staff, and the collection component integrates with maneuver units.

B1 Intelligence Analysis Integration. The company’s analytical component integrates with the brigade IWfF at brigade and battalion levels. This focused staff integration promotes brigade IWfF SOP development, allowing the IWfF to establish and refine its PACE plan, report formats, battle rhythm and process for COP management in DATE.

If resources support, conduct an IWfF staff exercise with the BISE, BDE S2 and BN S2s to define roles and responsibilities prior to major brigade training exercises. Execution can alternately be nested within a brigade exercise.

B2 Intelligence Operations Integration. The company’s collectors, often referred to as intelligence enablers, integrate into maneuver training, building on relationships established in earlier tables. Effective integration occurs in field training environments at the platoon and C/T/B levels. In a best-case scenario, intelligence enabler integration is an evaluated component of maneuver platoon and company training events. Evaluated or not though, effective integration requires strong battalion support and staff coordination, particularly with the S2 and S3 for scripting intelligence collector participation.

This integration is critical, because it allows the collectors, battalion staffs and C/T/B leadership to develop relationships. As a result, maneuver formations understand collectors’ capabilities and requirements, and intelligence collectors provide better collection against both brigade and battalion-level requirements. These developments are then codified in an intelligence enabler integration battle drill.

C. External: Comprehensive Brigade-Level Intelligence Synchronization. The culmination of all efforts is full-scale integration, wherein the company performs its METL as part of comprehensive brigade intelligence synchronization operations. Ideally, this collective integration first occurs during a home-station Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) prior to an MRE. If time and resources do not support an MRX, this may only occur during the brigade’s MRE.

Table VII: Validation Execution. Table VII validates the company’s METL proficiency in the most realistic training environment available in preparation for MRE certification. In execution, Table VII is essentially Table V with all platoons operating interdependently to conduct intelligence collection, analysis and synchronization. Company collectors in the field feed the BISE, HOC, and CST with information, and the analytical component processes it into timely, relevant analysis to answer the brigade commander’s priority intelligence requirements and enable decision making. The BDE S2 section’s full participation is vital for realism and facilitates SOP validation.

Tables VI/VII: Lessons Learned:

✧ To integrate into brigade operations effectively, the MICO must be credible. Effective MICO integration into brigade training requires significant time and resources; if brigade leadership are the investors, they must believe the juice will be worth the squeeze. Because the company derives its credibility from its proficiency, platoons must be proficient in their core competencies prior to conducting brigade-level integration. The more proficient the platoons, the more likely they will be viewed by brigade leadership as training enablers and effectively integrated into maneuver training. To achieve this, MI Gunnery...
iterations must be executed at least one table ahead of the brigade’s training progression. Ideally, the company will complete its company collective exercise immediately before the brigade begins platoon-level training.

- **Plan and execute Table VII as early as logical.** Table VII is the company’s Catch 22. If the company executes Table VII prior to brigade integration, its METL validation is relatively hollow. If Table VII is planned for execution too late, it competes for time on the brigade training calendar and may not be executed. Ultimately, it is better to execute early rather than not at all, but company leadership must be diligent in timing Table VII’s execution.

- **The brigade’s collection plan is its barometer of MICO Gunnery’s success.** MI Gunnery’s ultimate objective is intelligence synchronization in brigade operations, allowing intelligence to drive operations. Tables I through V prepare the MICO to integrate with brigade staff and maneuver elements. In Table VI, intelligence synchronization is directly reflected in the level of brigade, battalion and MICO involvement in the development and execution of the brigade collection plan. The hallmark of a successful gunnery is a collection plan developed by the brigade’s leadership at all echelons because it:
  - More accurately reflects the brigade commander’s requirements, satisfies his intent and reduces extraneous collection and analysis.
  - Drives operations and intelligence synchronization through rehearsal at the brigade CAR.
  - Enables advanced, insightful and complete employment of organic Information Collection assets.
  - Alleviates overreliance on the BDE collection manager, a non-MTOE position often filled by a junior officer lacking collection management experience.

This ultimately makes the brigade IWfF more capable, more relevant and better able to support the brigade commander’s requirements.

### Conclusion

Operating today under the Brigade Engineer Battalion, the BCT MICO’s task organization has changed, but the breadth of its capabilities, resources, and training requirements remains the same. Training the MICO is one of the BCT’s most complex and challenging problem sets.

The solution lies in the MICO’s training progression, the more comprehensively a progression is developed and executed, the more successful the company will be. MI Gunnery is a tool that enables the company to nest its efforts with the brigade, train effectively and ultimately provide more valuable intelligence support to brigade operations. In the near future, the MI Gunnery manual (MI Gunnery 34-120-30), currently in production, will provide an invaluable planning tool for MICOs to maximize training efforts and subsequent effectiveness in performing their wartime missions.

Because effective gunnery execution is resource intensive, there must be a mechanism for higher echelons to track and support the company’s gunnery progression. This most immediately pertains to home-station certification tables and low-density MOS training, though higher echelon support could enable MI Gunnery expansion to train the BCT IWfF in its entirety.

Ultimately, 209th MICO’s experience yielded a number of successes and failures. The enduring message is that MI Gunnery provides the BCT’s company, battalion, and brigade leadership a framework to effectively train the MICO. Regardless of how a brigade chooses to execute its MI Gunnery, the simpler, more thorough and well-resourced the progression is, the better equipped the brigade will be to leverage the MICO’s unique tactical intelligence capabilities to support brigade operations.

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Let’s start with one of the Top 10 Army Intelligence Urban Myth: “The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) is an unwieldy, bureaucracy bloated, process driven, TRADOC-constrained institution incapable of responding quickly with relevance and rigor in updating institutional training and education changes in response to the rapidly changing operational environment. In simple “urban myth” language: USAICoE courses are stagnant and outdated. This myth is no closer to the truth than the fable that Mr. Rogers was a Navy Seal.

In truth USAICoE’s military and civilian leaders, training developers, instructors, and education experts are constantly improving the relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness of the institutional training and education we provide. Yes, just as there are processes in the Operational Force that must be followed, there are U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) processes involved in what we do and how we do all of which are governed by TRADOC and available resources (training time, people, equipment, etc.). This article will outline how we manage those challenges, what we are doing to ensure the Soldiers arriving to your formations are ready to support your mission, and most importantly how you can engage with us as we train future intelligence professionals.

Think about the last training you attended whether at USAICoE, Intermediate Level Education, or even at your unit. There were probably some things you liked about it and some you did not; information you learned and things you wished you had learned; learning events that worked for you and those that did not. Military Intelligence (MI) Soldiers being trained, regardless of the location and staff, will experience learning differently. Effective instruction creates a wide variety of learning experiences to reach a wide variety of students. Now imagine leading USAICoE in which you are training over 4,000 Soldiers and civilians a day in scores of different courses at different locations, while attempting to ensure each course is relevant, rigorous, and meets each individual learner’s needs. Not an easy task, but a task that Major General Berrier, Commander, USAICoE, and “Team Berrier” take on each and every day! Here is some insight as to how we train and educate you and your MI Soldiers at USAICoE.

USAICoE Regulation 350-70 USAICoE Training Development System, 1 July 2015, is our equivalent of a technical manual. It describes the processes, checks, and repairs all curriculum goes through on a regular basis to ensure it continues to function at peak performance. There are multiple battle rhythms established in USAICoE Reg 350-70 to guide the “weekly PMCS” as well as the “annual service” of courses and their training materials. Managing these battle rhythms is a shared effort between the course manager and the Discipline Technical Advisor (DTA). The DTA is a senior warrant officer, officer, or NCO who serves as the USAICoE CG’s primary staff officer for the content and development process of individual resident training in their assigned discipline(s). This collaboration between the USAICoE training units (111th MI Brigade and the Noncommissioned Officers Academy) and the Training Development Support (TDS) Directorate is essential to making the small fixes needed to keep courses on the road and relevant.

Each discipline meets monthly to discuss changes within the discipline that are, or might, influence the content/outcomes of the course. These monthly Integrated Development Teams (IDT) include course personnel on Fort Huachuca and their Reserve Component (RC) and National Guard (NG) counterparts, as well as representatives from Doctrine, Lessons Learned, Quality Assurance, and a variety of other organizations. The IDT is the forum for discussing training gaps, content gaps, or directed changes and planning course changes to close identified gaps. USAICoE bins course changes into three tiers which represent increasing levels of change to standards, resources, or assessments. Additionally, the IDT reviews course changes for impact on the corresponding RC/NG courses. During the lifecycle of a single course, it will undergo multiple changes as indicated across the bottom of Figure 1.
Every two to three years, USAICOE holds a Critical Task and Site Selection Board (CTSSB) for MI MOS. TDS coordinates the CTSSB, invites representatives from all the major commands, and facilitates the discussion of, and ultimately the voting on, the most important (critical) tasks for the MOS. Additionally, this board determines where the task is best trained (institutional, operational, or self-development). The results of the CTSSB often drive a more in-depth review and revision of course materials (think annual service on a vehicle). Currently USAICOE is working major course revisions to:

- MOS 35T10
- MOS 35F10
- MOS 35G10
- MOS 35M10

TRADOC uses the ADDIE model for creating and delivering course materials. ADDIE stands for Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation, and Evaluation and shares some characteristics with the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) as shown in Figure 2. USAICOE uses an ADDIE Development Team (ADT) to conduct the most involved course changes. The team includes instructional designers who help the content subject matter experts figure out the most educationally sound way to teach students to give them the best opportunity to learn the content. The ADT starts with the tasks from the CTSSB, writes specific learning objectives/outcomes, creates assessments to measure those outcomes, then devises learning events that will prepare students for the assessments. The green arrow in the middle of Figure 1 represents this cycle. It is important to note, that even in the midst of an in-depth course change project, smaller incremental changes often continue to occur.

This “annual service” is where USAICOE is able to integrate the two initiatives MG Berrier mentioned in his column, the USAICOE Writing Program (see article on page 27) and the Cognitive Enhancement Program (CEP). The CEP focuses on those specific mental skills needed to increase performance and learning efficiency based on the military content. CEP instructors are sports psychologists with educational backgrounds who teach lessons on topics such as attention control, stress management, energy management, and fixed/growth mindset (See Figure 3). The CEP instructors currently deliver targeted blocks of instruction in the:

- MI Basic Officer Leader’s Course
- MI Captains Career Course
- Warrant Officer Basic Course
- MOS 35M10 Course
- MOS 35P Course

In addition to teaching in the classroom, CEP instructors run Cognitive PT events where students experience specific cognitive skills under physical stress (think doing 300 yard sprints, then immediately solving a mental math problem). The CEP instructors lead students through a discussion of their performance, as well as the significance to the skill they are learning in the classroom. By utilizing the CEP instructor’s expertise during the ADT process, USAICOE will be able to integrate these skills into all courses when they come in for “annual service.”

USAICOE courses are truly never at rest. By aggressively using processes and initiatives discussed in this article, USAICOE training developers, instructors, and support personnel continue to ensure Soldiers receive the best training and education in the Army. From the “PMCS” nature of the IDTs through the in-depth annual service provided by
the ADT, we are working to keep courses relevant, rigorous, and educationally sound. However, we cannot do it alone. We need your input when the job survey comes out prior to the CTSSB. We need your attendance at the CTSSB when we determine what it means to hold your MOS. We need your participation in lessons learned collections, doctrine reviews, and training material validation. USAICoE personnel remain committed to building adaptive and agile intelligence leaders and Soldiers who excel at enabling mission command to win in a complex environment.¹ Your partnership with USAICoE is critical in defeating this Army Intelligence urban myth.

Endnote


Ms. Leeder joined federal service as a Department of the Army Civilian in May 2006 after more than 13 years as a high school math and science teacher. She has studied and/or worked in the field of education for over 30 years. She holds a Master’s Degree in Educational Technology from the University of Arizona and currently serves as the Chief of the Teaching, Learning and Technology Division, Training Development and Support Directorate, USAICoE.
In 2009, General Dempsey, then Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), visited various Centers of Excellence (CoEs) to observe Soldiers training during exercises. He determined there was little commonality among the scenarios being used at the various CoEs (those used in leader development and education (LDE) courses and those used for Capability Development (CD)). Dissimilarities existed with the operational environment (OE), the opposing forces (OPFOR), both regular and irregular forces, and with the threat tactics employed. Some scenarios were still using the Fulda Gap OE, other scenarios were using the ‘Krasnovians’ as the adversary, while some used real-world friendly coalition partners as the adversary in an unclassified scenario.

GEN Dempsey determined that policies and procedures needed to be established to govern all TRADOC scenarios, and he also wanted to establish a linkage between LDE, training, and the CD scenario process. In February 2010, TRADOC FRAGORD 19 was issued which established the Common Framework of Scenarios. The combination of the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) Task Order, FRAGORD 19 to OPORD 09-008 TRADOC Campaign Plan 10-11, and TRADOC Regulation 350-70 Army Learning Policy and Systems, directs entities with the leader development, training, and education (LDTE) mission to use approved scenarios, and preferably the DATE from which to design scenarios. Army Directive 2016-05 (released February 2016) announced that the focus of the Secretary of the Army, and General Milley, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, is ‘Building Training Readiness,’ which places even more emphasis on DATE.

The TRADOC G2 ACE Threats Integration (TI), formerly called the Threat Intelligence Support Agency (TRISA), was chartered to produce the DATE OE (the ‘conditions’ of the training environment). TRADOC G2 ACE TI published the DATE complex OE document and updates of the past several years. We are currently using DATE Version 2.2, April 2015; DATE Version 3.0 should be published in September 2016. The DATE encompasses the detailed conditions (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time (PMESII-PT) variables) for the five countries of Ariana, Atropia, Donovia, Gorgas, and Limaria, located in the Caspian Sea region. TRADOC G2 ACE TI also produces the OPFOR Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series. As well, they conduct a five-day Threat Tactics course to train the force and proliferate the new OPFOR doctrine across the Army training environment.

The TC 7-100 series is available from the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) website. The DATE document is available from the Army Training Network (not on APD), located at https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=311.

Army Regulation (AR) 350-1 Army Training and Leader Development, dated August 2014, standardizes DATE across the Army, Army National Guard, and the Army Reserves for LDTE. AR 350-2 Operational Environment and the Opposing
Forces Program, dated May 2015, prescribes responsibilities, concepts, and policies for the OE and OPFOR, applicable to both the Army operational and institutional domains. Both ARs are available at the APD website at http://www.apd.army.mil.

The Army cannot predict who it will fight, where it will fight, and with what coalition it will fight. Anticipating future threats and planning to win in an increasingly complex world is extremely challenging. TRADOC’s role in developing doctrine, and the 111th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade’s role in training our intelligence Soldiers, sets the education foundation that will enable our MI Corps to meet future challenges of an uncertain world. The new hybrid threat doctrine and DATE OE document provide trainers with the tools to develop exercise scenarios across the Army training community. The DATE applies to all U.S. Army units (Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve) that participate in an Army or joint training exercise.

Within the last five years all combat training centers (CTCs), including the National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Joint Military Readiness Center (JMRC) integrated the DATE OE into their exercise scenarios. Decisive Action operations are simultaneously offensive, defensive, and stability operations, against a hybrid threat in a DATE complex OE. The hybrid threat consists of any mix of regular forces and irregular forces. Irregular forces consist of any mix of insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals. Their equipment and tactics may or may not correlate with U.S. tactics (a reason we no longer use ‘onion skin’ doctrinal templates to template out the threat). The Commander and staff must be able to depend upon the intelligence staff to plan and conduct intelligence operations, in support of the scheme of maneuver, for successful combined arms maneuver and wide area security, and decisive action operations.

For the past decade and a half, U.S. Army counterinsurgency operations required that many units deploy and establish their S2 within the tactical operations center (TOC) on an existing forward operating base, where the intelligence architecture (including DCGS-A and communications) was already established by the previous unit. At the CTCs, this does not happen. MI leaders face a number of challenges in this training environment such as:

- Jump the TOC in order to maintain momentum with, and provide intelligence to, support maneuver forces offensive operations.
- Re-establish the intelligence architecture, (including DCGS-A and communications) and power.
- Conduct split-based operations with multiple command posts established.
- Employ the communications plan (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency) and synchronize with higher/adjacent/lower (and attached/non-organic) units in a high OPTEMPO environment.

The USAICoE Lessons Learned Branch regularly sends a team to observe MI units training at the CTCs, and compiles reports on units’ successes and challenges which are available on the Lessons Learned website: https://army.deps.mil/Army/CMDS/USAICoE_Other/CDID/Lessons%20Learned/SitePages/Home.aspx.

The 111th MI Brigade Commander identified gaps among knowledge, training, and experience levels of potential instructors, due to the focus on counterinsurgency the last fifteen years of war. He directed the Brigade S3 PLEX to develop and execute a Cadre Immersion Course to train the brigade’s cadre (instructors and training developers) to gain a foundational understanding of the new doctrine on hybrid threat, DATE, Decisive Action, and tactics. Cadre learn to integrate DATE in their committees, and prepare Soldiers for known and unforeseen contingency operations around the world.

The BDE S3 PLEX conducted an abridged Analyze, Design, Develop, Implement, and Evaluate (ADDIE) instructional design process from November 2014 to May 2015, and held a series of USAICoE-wide work groups to gain input and feedback. They conducted extensive external coordination with TRADOC G2 ACE TI, National Ground Intelligence Center, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, NTC, JRTC, JMRC, and the Maneuver CoE to ensure the course was synchronized and based on current doctrine. In June 2015, PLEX conducted three pilot classes, finalized courseware, and began training in August 2015. The course employs a blended learning. Phase 1 is web-based distance learning (DL) using Blackboard, with 11 critical tasks, and takes approximately 25 hours to complete. Phase 1 covers hybrid threat, DATE, Decisive Action, and tactics. Students are assessed at the ‘Comprehension’ level. Nine tasks have a pre-test and allows students to test out. Two tasks are writing assignments developed in accordance with the 111th MI Brigade Writing Program.

Phase 2 is the 3-day resident class, covering threat systems, threat organization, threat functions and threat tactics. Instruction uses Adult Learning Model techniques and includes lecture, small group vignettes, and in-class practical exercises. Students develop threat offensive and defensive courses of action, and present them to the class for analy-
sis and discussion. Students must demonstrate learned understanding of DATE, hybrid threat, OPFOR doctrine, threat weapons, and tactics and are assessed at the ‘Application’ level. The course critical tasks are shown below.

**Phase One (DL)**
- **301-DATE-001**: Explain the purpose of the DATE 2.1 document.
- **301-DATE-002**: Identify OEs in DATE 2.1 document.
- **301-DATE-003**: Identify threats and other actors.
- **301-DATE-004**: Explain the hybrid threat concept.
- **301-DATE-005**: Identify the foundations of unified land operations.
- **301-DATE-006**: Identify U.S. Army unit types.
- **301-DATE-007**: Identify U.S. Army offensive tasks.
- **301-DATE-008**: Identify U.S. Army defensive tasks.
- **301-DATE-009**: Identify U.S. Army stability tasks.
- **301-DATE-010**: Identify U.S. weapon systems and vehicles.
- **301-DATE-011**: Identify capabilities of threat weapon systems and vehicles.

**Phase Two (Resident Training)**
- **301-DATE-012**: Implement threat offensive actions.
- **301-DATE-013**: Implement threat defensive actions.

The Brigade S3 PLEX has now transitioned the training to the 304th MI Battalion, 305th MI Battalion, 309th MI Battalion, and 344th MI Battalion. In 3rd Quarter 2016, the battalions will integrate the training into their respective Instructor Certification Program and Sponsorship Program. This will maintain continuity for incoming instructors to the brigade. To date, the PLEX has trained 225 cadre (including military, DAC, and contractor instructors) at Fort Huachuca and Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. The USAICoE Staff and Faculty approved the completion of the course that will count as a unit training event for Instructor Badge progression. To request a copy of the training material, please contact the 111th MI Brigade S3 PLEX at (520) 533-1600.

Mrs. Manigault is the Project Manager for the 111th MI Bde S3 PLEX, and led the development and execution of the Cadre Immersion Course. She served on Active Duty from 1983 through 2003, retiring as a Master Sergeant. She began her military career as an MOS 31E Field Radio Repairer, assigned to the 197th INF BDE (Mech) (Sep), Fort Benning, Georgia. She reclassified as an Intelligence Analyst. Mrs. Manigault is currently a Department of the Army Civilian with the 111th MI Brigade, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
Current Challenges in Communications for MI Professionals

Due to rapidly changing technologies and the increasingly complex operational environment, the modern intelligence professional has never had to learn or adapt more quickly. However, the additional burden of assimilating vast amounts of data, intelligence, and instruction placed on top of the daily rigors of being a Soldier, puts a strain on the Soldier’s foundational skill set, namely communication. Because language is the primary method of acquiring, processing, and rehearsing new information, such skills as critical thinking, reading, writing, listening, and briefing ability are integral to the MI Soldiers’ success. By extension, with the Soldier’s cognitive abilities running at capacity, even routine communications can become arduous tasks, much less the more complicated duties, such as producing intelligence analyses or briefings.

As such, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) Writing Program is an effort designed to shore up exposed cracks in our Soldiers’ communication foundation, and reinforce the basic skills necessary for success in the Military Intelligence (MI) field. By focusing on the foundations of Army writing, Soldiers can internalize the critical skills, making them automatic; thereby freeing up cognitive space for the more important analytical tasks.

The USAICoE Writing Program

In order to reinforce the foundational communication skill of writing, Major General Robert P. Ashley, former Commanding General of USAICoE, initiated the Writing Program to address concerns about the status of writing skills among MI professionals. This included, but was not limited to, assessing the current ability levels of MI professionals within USAICoE, the available resources for supporting writing instruction, and the ability to make recommendations to ensure the future success of MI Soldiers. Where this program differs from other initiatives is its systematic approach to define the craft of writing and establish a 360-degree support system for Soldiers and instructors within USAICoE.

Its main goal is to integrate a common writing standard into all coursework involving written assessments and measure the amount of improvement that Soldiers have achieved upon completion of their coursework. Additionally, this effort is highly collaborative in nature, as integrating new material into any course requires a strong leadership directive and cooperation among the instructors, course managers, and training development specialists.

The secondary goal of the Writing Program is perhaps the most important—namely providing targeted feedback about written communication skills while at USAICoE, coupled with a reach-back capability to continuously professionalize in those areas. The entirety of the implementation and support resources further this goal and remain the center of gravity for the Writing Program.

Beginning the implementation required a summary of priorities for Army writing. After reviewing the Federal Plain Language Guidelines, and best practices in professional writing, the Writing Program distilled the most frequently required skills for modern intelligence Soldiers:

🔹 **Analysis.** The ability to break down a situation, idea, or concept into its constituent parts to see how they relate to the whole.
Purpose. Prioritizing and maintaining the “bottom-line-up-front” throughout the document, paragraphs, bullet points, and sentences.

Voice [Syntax]. Crafting sentences that use and maintain the active voice to emphasize the agent of action.5

Concision. The ability to condense the greatest amount of information into the fewest amount of words.

Accuracy. Technical mastery of grammar, mechanics, punctuation, spelling, and usage, as well as being factually correct.

We then developed a six-point rubric with behavioral anchors to measure each Soldier’s ability to capture a baseline along these five skills. (The use of “behavioral anchors” is a technique borrowed from best practices in performance management.) While a holistic measure in writing assessment is more common, we integrated a behavioral technique for each to simplify the grading process and reduce subjectivity in grading requirements.6 By scaling back all the expectations of “good writing” to just five skills paired with a single technique each, we reduced the cognitive burden for teaching and learning. Creating “good writing” then became an outcome evidenced by a more analytical, organized, concise, and accurate document, with the assessor taking the role of a facilitator using targeted feedback.7

Developing a Systematic Approach to Implementation

During the early planning stages, we determined that the best chance of success for implementing and sustaining MG Ashley’s initiative rested on deeply embedding the skills into all aspects of USAICoE’s training culture.8 To begin, we created stakeholder and needs analyses to determine the breadth of all invested parties, their level of initial projected buy-in, and the specific challenges faced by each group.9 Further, this needs analysis studied best practices in similar initiatives to anticipate the kinds of training, academic resources, and civilian expertise required to smoothly integrate and track the standards across the courses. Finally, we conducted surveys and focus groups to determine if there were any existing trends/anxieties precluding the change. While the results of the needs analysis are beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to say that the study revealed three general trends for the Writing Program to address:

- Instructors spent too much time grading papers compared to industry averages.10
- Students would need support outside of the classroom in addition to time during coursework.
- The perceived weakest areas of student writing were in fundamentals (grammar, syntax, spelling) and in the adoption of Army writing style.11

This analysis provided the fledgling Writing Program with our three strategic outcomes:

- Improve the Soldiers’ ability to write clearly in Army style.
- Facilitate success with learner-centric support materials aimed at students and cadre alike.
- Implement the program using the lowest-impact for highest return on investment possible.

As such, any initiative would need to incorporate resources for both instructors and students, be easy for instructors to apply, and focus targeted areas for student improvement based on their demands as members of a large professional organization. A further implication of this is that any approach to address writing skills within USAICoE would need to adopt a systems-based strategy that recognized each factor for improving student writing in the context of all other success factors.

Below is the basic framework for the implementation strategy previously discussed. As a goal, the Writing Program attempted to simultaneously introduce the initiative as a complete package covering all stakeholder concerns. The initial approach involved:

- Creating a rubric for the five standards as a base for courses to apply, with a template flexible enough that it could be tailored to suit more complicated assignments.
- Establishing the roles and responsibilities of all the stakeholders in the process, and creating job aids and spreadsheets to track metrics.
- Developing a scoring sheets to capture student grades more quickly, while making instructor comments more efficient.
- Delivering instructor training to each course, going over the skills, assessment materials, and possible applications within the course.
- Holding “norming” sessions to acclimate the instructors to using the new materials, anchor papers, and creating a course record for what “right” looks like on each assignment.12
- Hosting an open website in partnership with the CW2 Christopher G. Nason MI Library, to mount all the electronic resources, including free videos for self-paced tutoring.
Drafting and publishing the USAICoE Writer’s Handbook to define the USAICoE Writing Standard and explaining how to apply it to assignments, as well as demonstrating the skills and their use in the rubrics.  

Establishing a comprehensive metrics analysis package, including job aids for education specialists, battalion leaders, and course instructors processing student results.  

Adding instruction to the Army Basic Instruction Course (ABIC) and the 111th MI Brigade PLEX Cadre Immersion Course (See Beverly Manigault’s article “The 111th MI Brigade Cadre Immersion Course” in this issue for more information.)

This last portion, in particular, aimed at creating longevity through repetition. Instructors would receive initial exposure to the Writing Program in ABIC through innocuous, low-stakes assignments where they could familiarize themselves with the principles of assessment, instruction on Army-style writing, and practice using the new materials for assessments. After graduation from ABIC, the instructors could then join their peers on platform, participating in the norming sessions for their course where they could refine the skills in the context of the specific, tailored assignments developed for the course.

Concurrently, the long term strategy to ingrain the Writing Program into the coursework involved participation and collaboration with the course redesign process and attached academic support units. Because the redesign process involves serious, in-depth analyses of the course content, timing, instructor needs, and addition of value-added technologies, this formed an ideal situation to address gaps in writing instruction. This includes consultation and rework of existing assignments, creation of new assignments and writing instruction within the lesson plans, and targeted training for the cadre regarding execution of new material. The benefits of this approach include:

- Additional efficiencies in course instruction time.
- Reduced overall assessment time grading writing assignments.
- Shorter, more effective writing assignments clearly linked to critical tasks.
- The inclusion of progressively more difficult and complex writing tasks throughout the course.

Because of the intensity involved in course redesigns, this long term strategy will take years to complete; however, this process is already underway in several courses.

As mentioned previously, creating and maintaining a reach-back capability for the Soldier is a main goal for the Writing Program. As such, the sustainment of the initiative required consideration into methods and materials necessary to continuously professionalize. Currently, this means frequent updates and expansion of the support materials, such as the USAICoE Writer’s Handbook and LIBGuide website. The Writing Program is also developing additional job aids for use in areas outside of the training environment. These job aids will cover basic editing, proofreading, and professional writing, while also incorporating strategies for coaching and goal-setting when approaching routine and complex writing tasks.

Change Management Strategy

The difficulty in executing an initiative with a systematic implementation strategy is that it requires a proactive and assertive change management approach. Developing a change management strategy started with understanding the three main cultural influences within USAICoE. It is a military environment, a large professional organization, and a training institution. Addressing the mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel involved required adopting a hybrid-style change management methodology to communicate the change, encourage adoption, and sustain the initiative. Toward this end, the USAICoE Writing Program cascaded and reinforced the organizational vision that steered from the top-down while relaying and applying the best practices, planning, and training that flowed from the bottom up and across peer networks horizontally.

In terms of communicating the strategic vision, leadership at all levels of USAICoE provided guidance and expectations for all subordinate units to follow. Specifically, that every Soldier who leaves Fort Huachuca must be capable of communicating effectively and always have the ability to reach back for additional support. Further guidance identified that Soldiers should receive this training at least twice during their career. This means that each Soldier will receive training on military style writing during basic or initial entry training, then again during advanced education a few years later. By spreading out the education, the Soldier is able to learn skills and apply them to the Force, then return years later to apply his experience to refine communication skills.

In order to adopt the initiative and ensure integration into each of the 32 identified courses, the cadre teaching at each course became the center of gravity. The Commander of the 111th MI Brigade set a priority for each course to receive the Writing Program training and materials. From there, the Writing Program staff would meet with all the course leadership to identify how best to integrate the new materials into the courseware. The Writing Program staff held focus groups, issued surveys, and led town hall meetings to
gather feedback directly from stakeholders. Senior instructors within courses would provide feedback and refinement to the implementation plan on how best to integrate into the course, creating a higher level of organizational buy-in. During instructor training and norming, the staff tailored the materials to the needs of the course while still maintaining the core USAICoE writing standard. The Writing Program adopted a strategy of training all current instructors using specific materials designed for their course.

Using tailored course materials allowed the instructors to see how the changes to their courseware enhanced their course while providing qualitative feedback and speeding up the grading process. Meanwhile, the Writing Program also integrated into the ABIC at Fort Huachuca to introduce all new instructors to the basic material before they moved on to their permanent courses. As new instructors arrived to their courses, they would have the basic skills to guide Soldiers to better writing craft and would only require training on the course specific materials.

The continued growth and sustainment of the Writing Program is achieved by integrating into course redesigns to identify where writing assignments are best served in each course, and how each assignment can enhance learning and retention by the Soldiers. The Writing Program subject matter expert (SME) works closely with instructional designers and SMEs within each military occupational specialty to ensure that writing assignments are relevant and tailored to the course, as well as seamlessly integrated throughout the course redesign process.

One of the most powerful tools the Writing Program has to offer is the USAICoE Writing Program page on the MI Library Website. The Writing Program page provides the most up-to-date materials for Soldiers and instructors to reference no matter where they are in the Force. In fact, over the last year, the Writing Program page has been the most visited page on the website and also represents the most frequently downloaded items from the Library.

To keep the instructors well-practiced and trained on the most up-to-date materials the Brigade has adopted a schedule requiring all instructors to receive refresher training on writing skills and resources annually. In addition to the refresher training, the Writing Program will soon begin conducting a professional development series to enhance the communication skills of students and cadre alike.

Building Stronger Partnerships

While not called out specifically in the previous section about change management, the strengthened partnership between the civilian and military personnel during the outset of the Writing Program has proven to be a major asset to the implementation as a whole. From the outset, the Brigade appointed a series of post-instructor/post-command captains to work directly with the civilian SMEs attached to the effort through Teaching Learning and Technology Division. The USAICoE Writing Program is, at its core, a collaboration between experienced instructors working toward common goals. Because of this unique balance and blend of expertise, the USAICoE Writing Program has found unique success in both implementation and change management. Leadership buy-in from the CG translates immediately through his representative in the Writing Program, while new information, technologies, and instructional innovations find root level access through the civilian SME attached to the Writing Program.

Results and Future State

The initial results from the Writing Program show positive, if cautious, results. The most recent metrics showed that 75 percent of students assessed (273/365) showed an average improvement of 20 percent once introduced to the standard over the course of two assignments. Note that the measurements only took into account improvement (i.e., change in scores over two assessments). There was a small number of students who showed no improvement because their scores were consistently high-performing. Previously polled courses reported a drastic drop in grading times for cadre who participated in instructor training and norming sessions, including one instructor who reduced grading time from 90 minutes per paper down to 10 after applying the best practices introduced during the instruction.

In the future, the USAICoE Writing Program will continue to work with courses and instructional designers driving toward completion of all redesigns. If current trends continue, we expect that Soldiers will have ingrained good writing behaviors through academic exposure, setting the conditions for lifelong learning. To reinforce these foundational skills, USAICoE will host a professional development series available to cadre and students and will export a digital toolkit to assist in maintaining these skills while in the Force. Ultimately, while the impetus for adapting to a rapidly changing environment rests on the Soldier, the USAICoE Writing Program’s approach and resources remain flexible and robust enough to adjust accordingly. With access and reach-back to the foundational skills, the Soldier can focus on the new challenges at hand without worrying about the fundamentals cracking under the pressure.
Endnotes


3. Here, “professional writing” refers to best practices in business and technical writing, as well as organizational communications.

4. This type of analysis supports problem deconstruction as a precursor to writing, briefing, and presentation skills; however, there is still a need for Soldiers to develop problem reconstruction to enhance adaptable thinking as well.

5. Normally, skills in syntax cover all areas of sentence construction, but due to the focus on the importance of using the active voice identified within AR 25-50 and our own analysis of USAICoE students, this category narrows the skill set down to recognizing and crafting active voice constructions. Even so, passive voice is sometimes acceptable based on situation and genre of writing. We noted frequent exceptions to this AR 25-50 requirement in the USAICoE Writer’s Handbook.


7. This approach focuses more on the outcomes for a well-written paper or document rather than the exact steps required to build one. Using an outcome, rather than step-based, approach is a proven technique for increasing individual engagement. See John H. Fleming and Jim Asplund, Human Sigma: Managing the Employee-Customer Encounter (New York: Gallup, 2012) 176-177.

8. Since the change in command, MG Scott D. Berrier has reinforced this effort as a command priority, thereby embedding it in USAICoE’s leadership culture as well.

9. A “needs analysis” is literally a study of the “needs” for all stakeholders to ensure success of an initiative.

10. Survey and focus group respondents reported as little as seven minutes to as much as 90 minutes grading short assignments (i.e., less than two pages, double-spaced). The Writing Program polled civilians with experience in assessing high school and early college-level essays to determine the industry average of approximately 13 minutes for double-spaced, five-page essays graded on a rubric.

11. According to instructor feedback during focus groups, instructors spent most of their grading time in proofreading and editing their students’ work. Written feedback focused on how to apply Army principles, for example “bottom-line-up-front,” to multiple writing situations in order to create priority, coherence, or enhance analysis.


13. The Writing Program is currently developing the second edition of the USAICoE Writer’s Handbook. The next edition will include chapters on new writing skills, such as Coherence and Description, while adding resources on analytical reasoning, research, integrating sources and avoiding plagiarism, CMS/Turabian style, and a demonstration of each skill in a student paper.

14. In addition to collecting student improvement scores, the Writing Program also uses the metrics to track cadre trends in support of sustainment and to initiate continued professional development and training.

15. This approach endorses using and reinforcing the skills throughout the course, rather than isolating writing skills to a single, high-stakes assignment with little integration into the rest of the material.

16. Located on an open website to promote easy access, the LIBguide’s permanent hyperlink is http://intelllibrary.libguides.com/writing.

17. Clarifying expectations is a key part of both assessing the quality of a written document and performance management. For writing tasks, improvement often occurs when coupled with discussions about priorities and expectations.

18. For comparison, 20 percent is approximately two letter grades. Because this number is an average, it is important to remember that some students showed much more improvement than others, while high performing students may show little or no change at all.

Dr. Winslow currently chairs the civilian side of the USAICoE Writing Program, reporting to the Teaching Learning and Technology Division at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. An experienced instructor, he started teaching undergraduate courses at the University of Arizona in 2003 where he specialized in first and second-year composition, technical and professional writing, and advanced composition. Graduating in 2009, Dr. Winslow completed his dissertation on persuasive writing using cultural and narrative arguments. Starting in 2011, he joined the faculty of Pima Community College, teaching courses in composition, literature, and the humanities. He joined Raytheon Missile Systems in 2012 as part of its performance development team, specializing in performance metrics analysis and communications for senior leaders and employee initiatives. He began his current position in 2014 working for Raytheon Intelligence Information and Services to create and implement the academic portion of the USAICoE Writing Program. He holds a BA in Psychology, and both an MA and PhD in Rhetoric, Composition, and the Teaching of English.

CPT Johnson is currently the Program Manager for the USAICoE Writing Program. Prior to this assignment, he taught Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and Leadership at the MI Captains Career Course. Commissioned in 2007, he was selected as a platoon leader in 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division immediately following completion of the MI Officer’s Basic Course. After graduating the MI Captains Career Course, he was selected to serve as a BDE S2 for 4th BCT (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division while deployed in RC-East, Afghanistan. Upon redeployment, CPT Johnson took command of the MICO in 4th BCT (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division. He has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in support Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
Army Intelligence continues to benefit from the strong contributions of our Reserve and National Guard professionals, particularly in the training arena. In fact, at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence’s (USAICoE) Warrant Officer Training Branch we find that the Reserve and National Guard warrant officers excel among their active component (AC) peers. Many of these warrant officers serve as civilian and DOD analysts, often performing similar requirements at Regional Fusion Centers or as part of law enforcement intelligence cells.

Army Intelligence training supports a regionally responsive, globally engaged Army, developing an agile multidiscipline MI force that is expeditionary, operationally adaptable, and capable of supporting decisive action in all current and emerging contingencies. Army Intelligence training harmonizes all learning domains to ensure the critical depth and versatility needed to support our Army’s three strategic roles of Prevent–Shape–Win.¹

As part of the Army’s strategic training plan, The One Army School System (OASS) continues to foster professional growth opportunities across the country. Resulting from a 2007 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) feasibility study, OASS is comprised of Active and Reserve Component (RC) schools, designed to provide relevant and realistic institutional training to an AFORGEN-based Army in an era of persistent conflict.² It provides Soldiers the ability to attend the right class at the right time regardless of component. OASS has markedly increased the effectiveness and efficiency of noncommissioned officer academies (NCOAs) across the Army.

Since 2012, AC Soldiers have filled seats in RC courses throughout the country. This approach to integrating AC and RC has reinforced the expectations of quality training across the force and provides the reservist with proof positive that their training is the same as those of their AC counterparts. To guarantee excellence of training, TRADOC initiated a quality assurance program. TRADOC Regulation 11-21 outlines this evaluation process, defining responsibility for accrediting all Army training and education institutions (Active and Reserve) with the exception of the U.S. Army Military Academy. The Quality Assurance Office assists all active CoEs and learning institutions (TRADOC and non-TRADOC); NCOAs; the Army National Guard (ARNG) regional training institutes; RC multifunctional training brigades, and multi-functional training units, from the preparation phase through accreditation.³

While OASS presents all the indicators of a TRADOC success story, USAICoE Pamphlet 350-18-1 has identified several challenges. Resourcing models are different for the components and funding between Title 10 and Title 32 or organizations also results in barriers, such as pay and allowances, including per diem for any Soldier participating as an instructor or student in the training. These costs can strain RC resource budgets depending on the class size and duration.⁴ Additionally, the RC and National Guard are limited in the amount of training time (such as unit Battle Assemblies (weekend drills)) that Soldiers can participate in when not mobilized. Geographic locations also present a certain degree of challenge in training, limiting guest speakers and resources. This problem is often magnified due to the variety of specialized intelligence disciplines. However, now that the USAR MI School at Fort Devens, Massachusetts has completed its relocation to Fort Huachuca, a more centralized training campus may be the best answer to unique problems faced by intelligence trainers and professionals.

Despite the move to a One Army School System approach, there are still instances where it is more feasible for states to run separate ARNG training. One such instance is the ARNG Warrant Officer Candidate Schools (WOCS). Initially approved in 2006, thirteen states were authorized to establish state WOCS programs. Today, many more states now run their own WOCS programs. Students attend the school on their drill weekends two days per month for a period of six months, then attend full-time for their two week annual training period. This accounts for the same number of hours as the AC WOCS program at Fort Rucker, and allows the Soldier to maintain his civilian job.

While it makes sense for states to run their own WOCS programs, it is beneficial to incorporate AC, RC, and ARNG
MI warrant officers into combined technical training. The
Warrant Officer training at USAICoE incorporates the prin-
ciples of the Army Learning Concept 2015, which “seeks to
transform the learner from a passive receptor of informa-
tion to a collaborator in the educational process.” Among
the key tenets outlined in ALC 2015 is tailoring learning to
individual learners’ experiences and capitalizing on collabor-
ative problem solving. Integrating ARNG and RC MI war-
rant officers with their AC peers for their technical training
is critical to achieve these educational objectives, particu-
larly given the relevant civilian experience that many war-
rant officers bring with them.

In addition to working in closely related civilian jobs, our
Reserve and ARNG MI warrant officers often possess a sig-
nificant amount of real-world deployment experience or
detailed knowledge about a particular country, theater, or
region. Many spend their drill weekends conducting de-
tailed analysis or over watch of an area or theater at Army
Reserve Intelligence Support Centers. By working at these
centers, they are able to access the latest classified report-
ing on areas tasked for study, which fosters considerable
subject matter expertise. Additionally, many Reserve and
ARNG units are now regionally aligned, directly supporting
AC Forces and Theater Intelligence Brigades for the Unified
Combatant Commands.

The Army Reserve Military Intelligence Readiness
Command’s (MIRC) vision, as outlined in the MIRC 2025
strategy, requires more support to meet theater re-
quirements by providing more MI support to Combatant
Commanders. As AC force reductions continue in our fis-
cally strained environment, reliance on our Reserve and
ARNG forces will continue to expand. MI Soldiers, regard-
less of component, will increasingly be called upon to work
together to provide real-world intelligence and it is critical
the integration process begins with their initial training.

Integrated training continues as MI warrant officers pro-
gress in their careers. The MI Warrant Officer Advanced
Course at USAICoE also integrates warrant officers from all
three components into the same class. There is a distance
learning phase in which students complete some of their
core training, (which limits how long they will be in a tem-
porary duty status and saves money.) However, all students,
regardless of component, attend Fort Huachuca’s five week
resident phase, during which students participate in group
exercises designed to capitalize on experiential learning.

In an effort to secure the success of Intelligence profes-
sionals in the RC and ARNG, Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence (USDI), Mr. Michael Vickers issued DoD
Instruction #3300.05. The July 2013 Memorandum of
Instruction “Reserve Component Intelligence Enterprise
(RCIE) Management” directed that:

Reserve Military Intelligence (RMI) will be integrated as part of the
Total Force across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to maximize
the contribution to national security and the intelligence missions
of DoD, and to meet intelligence force requirements for homeland
defense, homeland security, crisis, conflict, contingency, and war.

Mr. Vickers’s intent was to ensure RMI received access to
Intelligence Community networks for training and opera-
tional support and that RMI utilized such training to provide
operational support to DOD missions. Additionally, this re-
quirement was extended to other federal and DOD partner
facilities.

Mr. Vicker’s memorandum supports and reaffirms a 2007
directive by Acting USDI, Mr. Robert Andrews. USDI Andrews
addressed requirements for the Joint Reserve Intelligence
Program (JRIP), defining its intent to support readiness and
requirements for a variety of intelligence functions through
the Reserve Component Intelligence Elements (RCIEs). Mr.
Andrews sought to integrate RCIEs with real world missions
and advocated the need to provide regular access and train-
ing on operational systems and intelligence networks.

USDI Andrews’ directive further defined oversight require-
ments for the JRIP initiative of establishing a Flag/General
Officer Steering Committee comprised of active and re-
serve intelligence officers from the Military Departments
and RCs, to routinely assess the JRIP, provide recommenda-
tions on its continued implementation, and advise on issues
involving Defense Intelligence as it relates to the Military
Departments, the Joint Staff, and the Combat Support
Agencies.

In conclusion, the civilian and military experiences which
our Reserve and National Guard members contribute, con-
tinues to pay dividends for USAICoE and the Army as
a whole. Experiential learning, through combined train-
ing opportunities for Active, Reserve, and National Guard
presents an environment which promotes the Army as a
learning institution and capitalizes on the best our service
member have to offer.

Endnotes
standto/archive/2011/02/28/.
3. TRADOC Regulation 11-21 TRADOC Implementation of the Army Quality
Assurance Program, March 2014.
6. Ibid., 10.

CW3 Davis and CW3 Zilliox are the Course Managers for the MI Warrant Officer All Source Intelligence Technician Basic Course at USAICoE, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. CW3 Davis holds a BA from Appalachian State University in Marketing and Advertising and a Master’s Degree from the American Military University in Intelligence Studies. CW3 Zilliox holds a BA from Troy University in Criminal Justice and a Master’s Degree from the University of Louisville in Criminal Justice.

The 2014-2015 issues of MIPB can now be accessed on the outside of IKN (no CAC login required) at http://ikn.army.mil. Both regular and e-reader versions are available.

To access archived back issues, logon with your CAC and click on the MIPB icon under IKN Community Sites. Go to past issues to select the issue.
Introduction
As Doctrine 2015 winds down, the Intelligence Center of Excellence’s Doctrine Directorate is embarking on its next round of updates. The update process will begin with the staffing and publication of Change 1 to ADP 2-0 Intelligence and ADRP 2-0 Intelligence. From Change 1 to our capstone Intelligence publications we will update the rest of the doctrinal inventory. Change 1 for both publications will have four major content changes that are important for readers to understand. The current draft changes are provided below.

Intelligence and the Human Dimension
Current trends in operations in a complex operational environment (OE) require agile, adaptive, and ethical leaders trained and educated to improve and thrive in uncertainty. Success requires the Army to empower Soldiers not only with advanced technology, but also with broad cultural understanding, professional judgment, critical thinking, and technical skills. These characteristics prepare Soldiers to adapt to unforeseen and unpredictable conditions as they emerge. The Army is addressing four emerging trends that illustrate the cognitive, physical, and social demands the OE places upon Soldiers of the future:

✦ **Large and densely populated urban areas.** Many urban populations inhabit vast, densely packed areas with populations in excess of ten million people. Their countries already struggle to provide governance and essential services. Vast urban slums outside the control of a legitimate government will lead to increases in violence and lawlessness. These slums will become sanctuaries for adversaries trying to remain indistinguishable from the population and seeking to negate the technological overmatch of even the most sophisticated precision weapons.

✦ **Near-to-real time media coverage.** The private use of drones, closed circuit television, and satellites will allow social media users, bloggers, and traditional media outlets to secure live feeds of any event anywhere within minutes and disseminate them worldwide immediately. The social impact of live broadcasting of tactical battle-field actions is likely to place extraordinary pressures on small-unit leaders. In the future, leaders will frequently need to make highly stressful tactical decisions before a live global audience.

✦ **Rapid technological innovation.** Advances in technology, such as additive manufacturing (also called industrial three-dimensional printing), will allow technologically proficient adversaries to rapidly acquire inexpensive, high-end weapons systems. Future non-state adversaries, unfettered by bureaucracy, will be able to exploit private sector innovation to adapt more quickly than more established bureaucratic institutions. They will rapidly translate commercial innovations into military capabilities and seek to gain asymmetric advantages in niche areas, increasing their potential threat to U.S. security interests.

✦ **Conflict short of warfare.** Adaptive adversaries will seek to avoid direct, unambiguous action that will provoke a violent U.S. response. Instead, they will seek to avoid U.S. strengths, and attack U.S. weaknesses in subtle ways hard to tie directly to an established government. Subtle nuances of both international and U.S. law will affect leaders’ decision making processes, as the traditional definition of an enemy combatant becomes increasingly harder to apply.

Specifically, the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps must produce personnel, at every level, who think broadly about the relationship between the OE and operations, are prepared to meet the many and varied requirements associated with operations in a dense urban area, and can develop effective intelligence on asymmetric threats possessing sophisticated capabilities. Analysts will need to identify when those sophisticated capabilities provide the threat periods of situational overmatch or information superiority. All of these conditions may exist in an environment characterized by immediate worldwide media coverage over multiple means resulting in a hyper-sensitivity to all friendly force activities.

Joint Phases of Operations
Army forces engage regionally to prevent conflict, shape security environments, and create multiple options for re-
sponding to and resolving crises. Across the globe, mission-tailored Army units build partners, deter adversaries, and overcome challenges to defeat enemies using simultaneous actions integrated in time, space, and purpose. Joint force commanders and component commanders arrange operations and activities through the joint phasing model (joint phases of operations). There are six phases:

- **Shape (Phase 0).** Joint, intergovernmental, and multinational operations, and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies.

- **Deter (Phase 1).** The joint force seeks to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating its capabilities and resolve. This phase includes activities to prepare forces and set conditions for deployment and employment of forces in the event deterrence is not successful.

- **Seize the Initiative (Phase 2).** Joint force commanders seek to seize the initiative through the application of appropriate capabilities.

- **Dominate (Phase 3).** Joint force commanders focus on breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance, or in noncombat situations, control of the OE.

- **Stabilize (Phase 4).** The stabilize phase is required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority present. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance until legitimate local entities are functioning. The force may have to integrate the efforts of other supporting or contributing multinational, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and U.S. Government department and agency participants.

- **Enable Civil Authority (Phase 5).** Joint force support to legitimate civil governance in theater characterizes this phase. The joint force works to enable the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of people in the region.

There are requirements for intelligence during each phase. Some intelligence activities are specific to certain phases, while others span multiple phases. Commanders and leaders address the collection, storage, processing, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence and associated contextual data in each phase. This allows units to maintain, populate, and continually update the database during subsequent phases. However, units are not always able to establish the database during phase 0. Commands prepare to establish localized intelligence databases during any phase of an operation. It is critical for commands to update the intelligence database continuously with actual and potential adversaries to maximize the value of intelligence products and reports.

### Setting the Theater

For the Intelligence Warfighting Function, setting the theater refers to executing the tasks needed to prepare for intelligence support to all echelons of a deployed force within a theater of operations. There are three core tasks. First, the G2/S2 staff establishes and builds an intelligence architecture. Second, the G2/S2 staff builds the knowledge needed to understand the OE through coordination and collaboration with regionally aligned forces, using the MI Brigade–Theater (MIB(T)) as the anchor point. This task includes connecting the intelligence architecture to, and feeding the mission command information systems. Last, the G2/S2 staff supports the engagement that develops context and builds relationships through the successful conduct of intelligence operations, intelligence analysis, and intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED).

- **Establishing the Intelligence Architecture:** Planning the intelligence architecture is inseparable from long-range planning for future intelligence operations. It is roughly equivalent to developing a blueprint for a house and gathering the materials to build the house. It connects the sensors, PED activities, and analysts whose products and assessments inform decision makers. When developing the intelligence architecture, the G2/S2 staff considers all personnel, organizations, systems, and procedures necessary for developing intelligence, including those needed for intelligence operations. The architecture must address preparing for operations, collecting the required information, analyzing it, producing the required products, disseminating the resulting intelligence, and assessing both the intelligence produced and the process that produced it. The G2/S2 staff portrays the intelligence architecture in a series of planning products that map the operational and technical aspects of the interrelationship of the many components of the architecture. The products capture not only networks and their technical specifications, but also how the elements of the architecture relate to each other. These products should address mission tasks, technical control, tipping and cueing, maintenance, security measures, medical evacuation, and force protection, among other considerations.

- **Regionally Aligned Forces:** The Army is transitioning from the Army force generation (also called ARFORGEN) model and processes to regionally aligned forces. Regionally aligned forces are those forces that provide...
a combatant commander with up-to-joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable the combatant commander to shape the environment. Regional alignment also provides a more effective approach for facing nontraditional threats. Forces organized under this concept provide a persistent presence for combatant commanders and an immediate force capability to assure partners and deter potential adversaries. Regionally aligned forces follow combatant command requirements to understand the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed. They also develop expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others. Additionally, these forces help meet other requirements to include operational missions in response to crisis or contingency, operations support, theater security cooperation activities, and bilateral or multilateral military exercises.

♦ MIB(T) as the Anchor Point: A U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) MIB(T) is an echelons-above-corps brigade assigned to a geographic combatant command and typically under operational control of the Army service component command (ASCC). MIB(T)s are the Army’s access points into the intelligence architecture and training platforms in each combatant command’s area of responsibility. The MIB(T) serves as the ASCC G2’s operational intelligence force provider, repository of intelligence on Army systems, and resident collection and analytical capability. The MIB(T) is also the ASCC G2’s primary connector to INSCOM assets, the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence enterprises, and the intelligence community. The MIB(T) coordinates with the ASCC G2 to ensure effective intelligence force and resource management as it assists in shaping future intelligence requirements. The MIB(T) facilitates readiness throughout all layers of the intelligence community, tactical to national. It reinforces the “No MI Soldier at Rest” principle and provides combatant and ASCC commanders with intelligence capabilities fully prepared to support their mission.

Intelligence PED as the 4th Intelligence Core Competency

ADP/ADRP 2-0 introduces a fourth Intelligence Core Competency—Intelligence Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED). Army doctrine has long recognized the functions of processing, initial analysis, and reporting, and the requirement for providing combat information. However today, joint and Army doctrine recognizes these functions under the concept of PED and the core capability of intelligence PED. In joint doctrine, PED is a general concept that facilitates the allocation of assets to support intelligence operations. Under the joint PED concept, planners examine all collection assets and determine if allocation of additional personnel and systems is required to exploit the collected information. Beyond doctrine, PED plays an important role within DOD intelligence capabilities development. PED began as processing and intelligence exploitation support for unique systems and capabilities, (e.g., full-motion video from unmanned aircraft systems.)

Since 2006, PED requirements have grown significantly, and DOD has created many different PED capabilities across the intelligence enterprise. Therefore, a separate PED capability was required. Processing, exploitation, and dissemination is the execution of the related functions that convert and refine collected data into useable information, distribute the information for further analysis, and provide combat information to commanders and staffs. PED is not exclusive to MI organizations; other branches employ sensor collection capabilities. PED is inextricably linked to planning, collection, analysis, control via technical channels, and the intelligence architecture. Therefore, PED conducted by intelligence personnel or units is called intelligence PED. Intelligence PED facilitates efficient use and distribution of information following collection.

In essence, intelligence PED is the way the Intelligence Warfighting Function processes collected data and information, performs initial analysis (exploitation), and provides information in a useable form for further analysis. During initial analysis, some information will be identified as combat information. In those cases, the combat information is disseminated to commanders and staffs. Intelligence PED ensures information is distributed with adequate context and formatted to facilitate understanding or make subsequent analysis easier.

It also provides feedback on the effectiveness of collection relative to taskings and expected results. Receiving feedback gives leaders and staffs information they need to maintain synchronization of intelligence operations with the overall operation. This synchronization may include re-tasking MI collection assets or cueing other MI collection assets. This approach to intelligence PED is part of meeting the enduring challenge to get the right information to the right place at the right time. In response, the Army is placing a major emphasis on resourcing, planning, executing, and maintaining a continuous assessment of PED. This approach is resourced with and executed by a broad variety of intelligence PED capabilities.

(Continued on page 40)
Introduction
The Intelligence Low-Overhead Driver (ILOD), a training capability resident within the Intelligence Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Training (IEWTPT) training system baseline, was recognized by the Army Modeling and Simulation Office with the “2015 Team Award for Intelligence.” This simulation, unique among all M&S entries for 2015, is one of a few Army intelligence training simulations. It is the only capability nested within the Army intelligence community’s Program of Record (POR) training device: the IEWTPT.

The ILOD was developed as a response to the Army intelligence community’s challenge to train Soldiers on operational system software (especially the Distributed Common Ground System–Army (DCGS-A)), while reinforcing training for complex military occupational specialty (MOS) critical tasks. This award and recognition demonstrates the value of military and industry partnerships, and it showcases the significance of Soldier subject matter experts in the training development and simulation validation process.

Background
Facing emerging threats from current and future Decisive Action scenarios, Army All Source Analysts must be well trained and experienced in a variety of tasks and skills associated with analytical processes and complex intelligence systems. Critical thinking, technical expertise, practical experience, and familiarity with the Intelligence Process and Mission Command processes are perishable commodities. Outside of an operational environment, there are few opportunities for analysts to exercise these skills, especially in concert with their primary weapon system, the DCGS-A.

In the past, it has been difficult to train critical analytical tasks to the appropriate level of fidelity without using real-world data. Although this approach has its place, real data cannot be easily shaped to focus on specific training objectives, such as those associated with current Decisive Action scenarios. When discussing these training challenges, one all source analyst stated, “Show me one place in the world [at this time] which has a brigade on brigade fight” (that can be used as a training example). That brigade “fight” is precisely the scenario for which Army intelligence analysts must train to prepare for the realities faced in combat, albeit in a control “do no harm” exercise environment.

Other simulations, especially constructive, train combat warfighting functions, but these most often support only staff level exercises, providing little value to the intelligence process. They use pre-processed data focused mainly on higher level Mission Command task requirements, not on the detailed analytical information, signatures, and granularity required to train intelligence fusion, development of intelligence summaries, and to answer the commander’s information requirements.

ILOD, as sub-component of IEWTPT, was purpose built as a brigade level force-on-force simulation driver with a Military Intelligence (MI) focus to address the unique and
complex requirements of the MI training audience. Using ILOD, trainers can develop a data rich training exercise quickly, which challenges MI Soldiers with realistic and layered scenarios that include high intensity conflicts as well as asymmetric and hybrid threats. Each scenario can be tailored to a unit’s needs. They can range from team/section training to large scale exercises at the brigade level.

Enabling intelligence analysts to concentrate on refining their MOS skills while using their operational weapon system, DCGS-A, allows unit commanders the ability to assess their analysts based on known outcomes to support a true “MI Gunnery” progressive training model. ILOD-produced training events contain detailed exercise data that challenge analysts with realistic, yet virtual, information to collectively develop products and target packages that can be quantifiably assessed and evaluated. Leaders can use this assessment to ensure analysts have the requisite skills for effective intelligence roles across the range of military operations. In many respects, using ILOD in a well-structured and dynamic exercise is the first instance where leaders have the ability to ensure Soldiers learn and develop in a true training model, as opposed to trial and error in the operational environment.

In support of the intelligence training requirements described above, ILOD features a web-based collaborative environment for developing and conducting exercises. ILOD enables the creation of scenarios using an intuitive map display to place units, routes, and activities in regional locations, in support of training objectives. Using ILOD, a trainer defines the scenario using a unit’s master scenario event list and generates the correlated data that results from the activities. Prior to the start of the exercise, ILOD enables road-to-war historical intelligence reports and data to populate the DCGS-A systems via the Mission Command network. Analysts can conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield and data mine the simulated environment in which they will be training.

During the exercise, ILOD sends out timely, relevant data to the DCGS-A via the Data Distribution Service (DDS) as if the data were being provided by collection assets and adjacent units. Data can then be sent back to the DDS to reach the other Mission Command Systems such as the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System or the Command Post of the Future to drive staff functions. ILOD enables leaders to increase or decrease the flow of generated reports to their analysts throughout the exercise to test analysts’ ability to sift through data and discern relevant reporting from “white noise.” The exercise can also be stopped, reviewed, and restarted during any portion of the scenario if a leader wants to focus the analysts on a particular task. Since IEWTPT/ILOD is the POR for home station intelligence training, there is no cost to the unit to utilize the system.

**Key ILOD Features**

- **Web Based, Multi-user Environment**: Multiple user access over the web to collaborate while developing one or more training scenarios. Multiple training events can be conducted simultaneously.
- **Map Server**: The Tactical Ground Reporting System Atom Web Map Server provides high resolution imagery for the scenario area of operations.
- **Automated Route Finding/Generation**: Uses Open StreetMap for users to automatically generate routes for movement. Routes are easily edited if special routes are required.
- **Major Combat Operations**: Users define enemy and friendly forces structures and activities for maneuver elements using Mil-Standard graphics.
- **Counterinsurgency Operations**: Scenario can contain insurgent activities for Pattern of Life analysis. Users can create patrol debriefs, SIGACTS, BIO reports, CIIR and CELLEX data for analysis using DCGS-A.
- **Reports/Protocols/Interfaces**: Automatically or manually generate reports to create large, correlated data for training intelligence analysts. Uses templates from libraries of real world text to enhance realism. To populate the databases with the Road-To-War, IEWTPT can send data over the DDS, use the DCGS-A pipeline service, or send messages over email.

ILOD has been used in section/team exercises at several locations across the Army and is available at all current IEWTPT fielded locations. For several events, it has been used to drive exercises as large as brigade-level situational training exercises. The “way ahead” for the IEWTPT ILOD capability is continued toolset development to better simulate all of the various current and emerging applications of DCGS-A, and to expand the baseline to create data for all Army intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.

**Summary**

The IEWTPT ILOD provides intelligence analysts with the capability to train in a customizable, realistic environment to more effectively support a commander’s training objectives. Using simulations, it presents operationally relevant data to intelligence Soldiers for training and sustainment of critical tasks and perishable skills. This simulation data is virtually indistinguishable from real data; it creates a computer-generated operational environment for analysts to
employ their “weapon system,” DCGS-A, for training. During the exercise, the unit uses its own systems as it would when deployed, except the data presented is shaped, managed, and dynamically manipulated to sharpen analytical skills and achieve unit training objectives. Before this capability, leaders had considerable difficulty in developing appropriate training scenarios to effectively challenge analysts in support of combat operations. With the development of ILOD, Army trainers and Soldiers can accommodate training at many more locations, on a much more refined level, and tailor training to unit commanders’ requirements.

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence is the proponent for IEWTPT and ILOD. The Program Executive Office–Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation is the Material Developer.

Some members of the IEWTPT/ILOD team with MG Berrier, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence Commanding General. Left to Right: Mr. Johnny Jackson, CW3 Richard Frizzell, SSG (P) Jarrett Warmack, Mr. Donald Stewart.

Doctrine Corner

(Continued from page 37)

Conclusion

Besides the changes outlined above there are also other less significant changes within both ADP and ADRP 2-0. Change 1 of these publications is currently in the USAICoE Command Group approval process. The Intelligence Center Doctrine Directorate anticipates a mid-to-late May staffing of both publications. When you see the publications during staffing, the blue text is for new text. The red strike-through represents material that is being eliminated from both publications. The black text is unchanged material. When staffed the only material open for comment is the material in blue and red strike through. The publication of the Change 1 will start our efforts to maintain the currency of publications through the same quick-change process. This effort reflects a philosophical change to use quick changes vice more lengthy and complicated full revisions. This philosophical change will facilitate our ability to keep the Intelligence library of doctrine up to date. We look forward to the feedback from the field.
HUMINT Training: A Three-Step Model

by Chief Warrant Officer Three David Clark

Introduction
With the drawdown of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collectors have had to face a difficult problem; namely, building and maintaining sensitive skills in the absence of active collection operations. HUMINT Collectors assigned to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) are expected to spend most of their time at home station in training, but practicing clandestine methodology has historically been difficult, if not impossible, to conduct at home station. The common perception that HUMINT tradecraft cannot be trained locally is mistaken, but must be handled with care when setting the conditions and conducting the training.

Part I: Breaking the Mold
Training HUMINT methodology has traditionally had three significant misperceptions set against it, which has reduced the willingness of commanders to assume risk and conduct training. The first misperception is that training tradecraft is illegal or requires such elevated levels of permission that it is not feasible to incorporate into a standard quarterly training schedule. This perception is only partially correct. While there are necessary limitations on collection operations that need to be observed, a collection exercise that uses an established scenario, scripted information, and cleared personnel is entirely legal. Coordination with higher echelons is critical for situational awareness, but there is no significant authority issue related to HUMINT training. A company commander, if they can resource the training and assume the risk, can authorize such training.

The second misperception that afflicts HUMINT training is that it must be conducted in a special location, such as within a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility or at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. While there are handling caveats for HUMINT methodology, no element of basic tradecraft rises above the SECRET level, so that training can be held at any location that is cleared for that level of classification.

In addition to the problem of location, HUMINT training suffers from the misperception that certifying courses have adequate training incorporated into them to prepare Soldiers for success. This problem is the antithesis of the Army training model but remains a significant obstacle to HUMINT training. Units should be conducting training at home station to prepare HUMINT Collectors for certification, the same as any other military course. This confusion certainly feeds into the legendary attrition rates of the Source Operations Course and the Defense Advanced Tradecraft Course, as units are not enforcing training time prior to the TDY to prepare Soldiers to certify. No unit would send a Soldier to Airborne or Ranger school without preparation. There is no reason that HUMINT training should be any different, but somehow the combination of secrecy and difficulty has led to the reality that Soldiers are sent to Fort Huachuca with only the benefit of their experience rather than being adequately trained.

Part II: Setting the Conditions
Units have a responsibility to prepare Soldiers to conduct their wartime mission, and HUMINT collection is no different, despite common misperceptions. The Eight-Step Training Model applies to the clandestine methodology in the same fashion as it would to marksmanship or Combat Lifesaver training. However, since this type of skill is less common in the Army; it can prove to be difficult to resource for a Military Intelligence company in a brigade combat team. Finding and certifying trainers and establishing a training venue are both critical parts of successfully conducting the training.

Subject matter expertise is crucial to successfully training tradecraft. While the Source Operations Course has certified thousands of HUMINT Collectors since its inception, the attrition of thirteen years of war has degraded the Army’s capacity significantly. Most units in FORSCOM struggle to maintain 25 percent of their HUMINT Collectors certified to conduct clandestine techniques. For units at most major Army installations, this means securing training from the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Foundry Platform. However, the reduction in funding available for Foundry programs is limiting the ability of platforms to provide large-scale unit training. For the duration of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Foundry was the go-to resource for training, but INSCOM’s Foundry 2.0 program transitions a great deal of the responsibility back to units and focuses on training specialized tasks or non-organic equipment. However, Foundry can provide training support packages to units, provided the requesting units have capable instructors within their formations.

The lack of certified trainers is difficult, but not impossible to answer. Establishing a requirement that all Soldiers as-
sessing to become HUMINT Collection Technicians (351M Warrant Officers) be certified in clandestine methodology will help to increase the percentage of available subject matter experts, provided these officers can oversee the training around other duties (platoon leadership, etc.). **Doctrine Note: The Source Operations Course is required for 351M MOSQ. While not the Defense Advanced Tracecraft Course, it does teach Tracecraft.** Another viable option is to reach across unit boundaries and conduct methodology training collectively. At Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), the 201ST Expeditionary MI Brigade has very well-established relationships with 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) as well as 2-2 and 3-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. While a single unit may not be able to provide enough certified trainers, four brigade-sized elements certainly can.

That being said, there is a danger in trying to train too many HUMINT Collectors at once. Limiting the size of the training is necessary due to several factors. Large numbers of Soldiers raise the operational profile of the exercise, and risk drawing undesired attention from local communities or compromising methodology. Keeping the training audience to twenty Soldiers and under in a typical urban area is sufficient to keep the profile low, and likewise reduces the number of certified instructors needed to successfully conduct the training.

Clandestine tradecraft must be practiced in venues similar to where it will be performed—out in public. However, this is the greatest risk involved in the operation. Civilians accusing military personnel of collecting on them, or a Soldier being arrested for suspicious activities are disastrous with relations with the community. Incorporating the Provost Marshal’s Office, the Public Affairs Office, and local law enforcement agencies into the planning process before conducting training ensures that if a misfortune occurs, it can be handled appropriately.

Mitigating operational risk associated with HUMINT training in realistic, urban environments is absolutely critical to the success of the training event, and should be incorporated into the preparation for the event. Commanders must consider factors that could impact the training audience which include traditional hazards to personnel and equipment, but also evaluate and address risks to the mission and organization. Risks to the mission include those elements that detract from training objectives. Closely adhering to the fundamentals of unit training management is the best way to ensure that resources are coordinated, instructors are certified, and external distractors are minimized. Risks to the organization are those factors that could preclude approval of the training event, and affect the reputation of the unit or Army to an external audience.

Clearly articulating commander’s intent to higher headquarters and close coordination with external agencies are critical to ensuring the training event’s success at JBLM. Coordination with the 7th ID Public Affairs cell before conducting training allowed for the Division to proactively respond to any media inquiries in the event an off-post incident occurred during training. Effectively communicating the size and scope of the HUMINT training event with each local law enforcement agency built confidence in the community and allowed for multiple iterations of training.

**Part III: Conducting the Operation**

Clandestine tradecraft is challenging and intensive to train, so units must be prepared to commit their instructors and students for the duration of the event. Operations start before and continue after the end of the standard duty day because of the involved nature of the operations being trained. Charge of Quarters or Staff Duty significantly impact tradecraft training, because they remove a trainer or trainee for 48 hours (the duration of both duty and recovery). Soldiers involved in the exercise must be exempted from as many extraneous duties as possible to reduce the impact on the event.

Likewise, resiliency training must be incorporated into the exercise. Tradecraft is stressful, demanding, and must be performed to an exacting standard. The lack of resiliency training disproportionately impacts junior Soldiers who may not have developed the resiliency skills to address the stresses during their brief careers. Bringing a Master Resilience Trainer with the appropriate clearance into the training provides Soldiers the support they need to adapt to the pace and intensity of the training, and practice the necessary resiliency skills while they are being evaluated by instructors.

Luckily, there is no shortage of doctrinal guidance to use for evaluation criteria. The Defense Intelligence Agency has several manuals on the SIPRnet that provide guidance for HUMINT Collection Operations, and both Foundry and the HUMINT Training Joint Center of Excellence offer a wide variety of materials that can be used as part of the evaluation standards. However, units should not base their training programs on specific courses, but should try to provide a holistic and thorough understanding of the theory and practice of tradecraft. Training to attend a specific course means that collectors are only trained for that course, while a basic understanding can be more readily adapted to a variety of applications.

Documenting the skills trained in memorandum format and providing this to unit leadership allows supervi-
sors to update training records in the Defense Training Management System. This paperwork also provides specific data for commanders, officers and senior NCOs to evaluate Soldiers’ candidacy quantitatively for advanced training or special assignments. This gives unit leaders an incentive to support these training events and provides a return on their investment.

Conclusion

Home station training is the only way forward for HUMINT Collectors in the absence of major combat operations and associated training events. Units are no longer able to rely on “on the job” training in Iraq or Afghanistan, and funding for TDY and Foundry training is becoming harder to secure as budgets shrink. However, units can conduct intense, demanding training with a minimal expenditure of resources with the proper outlook and preparation. By overcoming the misperceptions about HUMINT tradecraft training and committing the personnel and time to its success, units can reap significant benefits and better posture themselves as the Army transitions to new formations.

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Sustainable readiness is not about being ready at one specific time. It is about building and sustaining readiness over long periods of time.

~GEN Robert “Abe” Abrams, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command*

Introduction

In the 2014 Army Intelligence Training Strategy, the Army Intelligence “Big Three”: U.S. Army G2, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Commanding General (CG) and U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) CG emphasize “No Cold Starts, and No MI Soldier at Rest.” As we transition out of Iraq and Afghanistan, we must continue to train and maintain a ready Intelligence force, prepared for the next contingency. Given our fiscal constraints, Intelligence Soldiers must be able to train effectively and efficiently. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Soldiers are no different and rely on unique training platforms that encourage the abilities to think, speak, and write clearly. To make this a reality, Commanders must be willing to support a program that results in trained and ready Soldiers, while fulfilling their operational requirements.

The U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) is responsible for preparing approximately 3,000 Soldiers (MOS 35M/351M) in various HUMINT tasks including HUMINT Collection, HUMINT Analysis, and HUMINT Management. HUMINT tasks are unusually subjective, and difficult to train or measure. For example, HUMINT Collectors must be trained to build rapport with cooperative and uncooperative sources; write accurate and coherent intelligence reports; and respond to the Commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR). Considering the relatively small numbers of HUMINT Soldiers in FORSCOM units, it is generally cost-prohibitive for units to hire role players and devise the elaborate scenarios necessary to train effectively. HUMINT Soldiers also are frequently on the short list for duty rosters unrelated to their MOS because of fiscal constraints and lack of realistic training opportunities. Reports of low morale and low retention in the HUMINT force cause concern for their future readiness.2

This article explains how FORSCOM HUMINT Soldiers are provided unique real-world opportunities to achieve sustained readiness now and for the next contingency, and the necessity for commanders to support these opportunities.

HUMINT Operations Support Concept

FORSCOM G2X, in coordination with INSCOM, developed the HUMINT Operations Support Concept (HOSC) approximately one year ago. Through the HOSC, FORSCOM HUMINT Soldiers are able to train and operate under the Defense HUMINT Executor (DHE) mission and authorities of the Army service component commands (ASCC), as delegated from the Secretary of the Army, through the Combatant Commands, to the ASCCs.

Between March and June 2015, FORSCOM and the six ASCCs signed Memorandums of Agreement (MoA) outlining mutual support for the conduct of HUMINT operations. These agreements allow qualified FORSCOM Soldiers to conduct HUMINT operations under the mission command relationship (Tactical Control–TACON)/Operational Control of the ASCC. Using the ASCC DHE authorities, FORSCOM Soldiers can perform HUMINT activities to include: Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activities (FORMICA), tactical interrogation/questioning, Military Source Operations (MSO), collection management, and targeting and analysis.4 Through the MoA, FORSCOM Soldiers can be deployed forward to the ASCC area of operational responsibility (AOR) or conduct operational support from home station using FOUNDRY platforms and/or the Intelligence Readiness and Operations Capability.

In this era of uncertainty, the likelihood that our Nation will again find itself in an armed conflict remains high. Since we cannot predict the future, the Army has regionally aligned its Corps and Divisions to provide tailored forces to respond to combatant commanders’ requirements for operational missions, exercises, and security cooperation activities around the globe.5 With the reduction of overseas contingency operations and the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF), FORSCOM HUMINT Soldiers are in a unique position to continue to support contingency operations both at home station and forward deployed. As the Army becomes smaller, we remain regionally aligned, with 40 percent of FORSCOM formations fully committed to combatant commander missions.6 Ultimately, the HOSC allows FORSCOM HUMINT Soldiers to stay engaged and develop their perishable skill sets on a continuous basis, while responding to the mission and addressing the ASCC Commanders’ PIRs.
Identifying the need to maintain a ready HUMINT force and providing support to the combatant commands, FORSCOM and INSCOM developed the HOSC to support the RAF model. Regionally aligned forces are the Army’s vision for providing combatant commanders with tailored, responsive, and consistently available Army forces. They meet the combatant commanders’ requirements, develop Army Total Force Soldiers and units, engage with partner nation security forces, and connect the Army globally.

Once trained and certified, HUMINT Soldiers are identified to participate in the HOSC. FORSCOM G2X then coordinates with ASCC G2X personnel to ensure an approved Operational Proposal is in place. FORSCOM then publishes an Operations Order (OPORD), specifying the duration of the operational support—typically, no more than 179 days—and the appropriate mission command relationship for the conduct of HUMINT operations. The ASCCs are responsible for:

✦ Assuming mission command of the assigned Soldiers.
✦ Providing technical control and oversight of FORSCOM HUMINT elements conducting HUMINT operations and intelligence production.
✦ Providing FORSCOM-specific HUMINT training requirements for HUMINT Soldiers to support ASCC operations.
✦ Reviewing and validating Operational Management Team training of FORSCOM’s HUMINT leaders, prior to participating in HUMINT operations through FOUNDARY.
✦ Assuming responsibility for Intelligence Oversight reporting.

In addition to the Army Intelligence Community’s “Big Three” initiative of “No MI Soldier at Rest,” the HOSC also supports FORSCOM CG’s number one priority: Readiness.

FORMICA Platform

The FORMICA platform, one of the more successful missions for HUMINT Soldiers, was established through a previous agreement between FORSCOM and INSCOM. FORMICA is an effective opportunity that sharpens debriefing and writing techniques of FORSCOM Soldiers, while addressing the Commander’s PIR. While FORMICA operations are conducted mostly at home station, in some cases, FORSCOM Soldiers may be forward deployed to assist combatant commands with their intelligence requirements.

Under the original FORMICA Live Environment Training (LET) agreement signed between FORSCOM and INSCOM, FORSCOM HUMINT Soldiers executed FORMICA under TACON of INSCOM, pursuant to their DHE authorities as delegated from DA G2. Support from INSCOM’s U.S. Army Operations Group (USAOG) greatly enhanced the success of the FORMICA program. Each platform submits a Weekly Activity Report (WAR) summarizing significant events, number of IIRs produced, number of evaluations received and total number of HUMINT Soldiers trained and participating. The WARS are provided to the FORSCOM G2 and briefed quarterly to the FORSCOM Chief of Staff.

While similar to the preceding FORMICA platforms, Soldiers participating in the Fort Bragg program fall under TACON of USAOG. Using office space co-located with the FOUNDARY Program, designated Soldiers set up the FORMICA program in a crawl-walk-run method, under USAOG’s oversight. To track their progress and eventual successes, the FORMICA team began publishing their WAR on 7 November 2014 covering five combatant command AORs. “The cooperation between FORSCOM and INSCOM in the HUMINT discipline has been superb, and will echo throughout the HUMINT community for the coming years. While honing the collection skills of our young Soldiers and preparing them for war, excellent intelligence is being produced.”

HOSC Program Successes

As demonstrated by these HUMINT Soldiers, they are taking advantage of real world training opportunities and continue to thrive. The HOSC allows FORSCOM HUMINT Soldiers to expand their opportunities from the original FORSCOM/INSCOM FORMICA LET Program to real world missions supporting combatant commands. Since June, FORSCOM G2X published six OPORDs providing HUMINT support to three ASCCs. The 4th Infantry Division is on the verge of conducting FORMICA at Fort Carson and, as previously mentioned, III Corps HUMINT Soldiers are participating in a train-up for their FORMICA platform at Fort Hood.

Over the past two years, USAOG played an integral role in training, mentoring, and guiding FORSCOM HUMINT Soldiers throughout the command. Per the FORSCOM/ASCC MoA, the HOSC is transitioning to ensure HUMINT personnel continue to support RAF operations. FORSCOM HUMINT Soldiers are presently supporting U.S. Army Africa, U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Army Central. On 1 October 2015, U.S. Army North (ARNORTH) assumed responsibility for all CONUS-based FORMICA platforms. This means ARNORTH assumes TACON of FORSCOM HUMINT Soldiers, provides DHE oversight and, when necessary, works with the respective ASCC to address their intelligence requirements.

Command Support

The Army’s training challenge is to optimize, synchronize, and support training in schools, training in units, and self-development to produce forces and leaders capable of responding across the range of military operations.
ployments decrease, and the focus shifts to garrison training, real world opportunities play a major role in supporting the training needs of HUMINT Soldiers to meet the wide array of potential missions. It is imperative commanders support the training requirements of their HUMINT Soldiers to prepare them for the next unforeseen contingency. The HOSC can be a training venue, but more importantly, a real world opportunity to polish HUMINT Soldiers’ skill sets, while responding to and answering the commander’s PIRs.

The HOSC relies heavily on the commander’s support to achieve success. Realizing the importance of maintaining a trained and ready HUMINT force, FORSCOM and the six ASCCs agreed on this concept to ensure Soldiers continue to perform at an operational level. FORSCOM G2 promotes this plan by issuing OPORDs to the supporting units, detailing the mission, duration of the mission, and command relationship between the supporting unit and ASCC.

Although HUMINT Soldiers are categorized as overstrength, the actual retention rate for first term HUMINT Soldiers is below the Army average. Anecdotal evidence reveals many 35Ms depart the Army or change their MOS for two primary reasons: low promotion rates and not being able to perform their job. The HOSC has quickly become a useful tool for FORSCOM commanders to train their HUMINT Soldiers and prepare them for the next operational uncertainty. We are convinced that command support for the HOSC will encourage HUMINT Soldiers to maintain and build on their proficiencies, eventually reversing the trend of leaving the Army prematurely.

Conclusion

Looking at the way ahead, opportunities for HUMINT Soldiers will continue at home station and in support of combatant commands abroad. The HOSC provides a venue for HUMINT Soldiers to apply their skills, gain valuable experience, and grow into professional HUMINT leaders, prepared, trained, and ready for the next conflict.

The HOSC has been a huge success, promoting the readiness of FORSCOM HUMINT Soldiers. FORSCOM sees the HOSC as a “win-win-win” situation. The concept is a win for FORSCOM’s training readiness, ensuring HUMINT Soldiers master hard-to-train “soft skills,” under the mentorship of seasoned HUMINT Soldiers, making them much better prepared for their combat missions. The ASCCs and USAOG also win by training HUMINT Soldiers to identify potential operations and groom a future pool of talent. Finally, the Army wins by gaining HUMINT teams capable of producing valuable intelligence and promoting a program that potentially increases morale and improves the retention rate among HUMINT Soldiers.

The HOSC is a force multiplier designed to meet the Commander’s mission while ensuring HUMINT Soldiers are ready to fight today and always prepared to fight tomorrow. Commanders ensure “No MI Soldier at Rest” when at home station by maximizing institutional and operational training opportunities. Readiness remains at the heart of bringing trained and ready HUMINT Soldiers to the fight, essential to “ensuring” the Army remains ready as the World’s premiere combat force.

Endnotes


3. Based on personal discussions with several HUMINT Warrant Officers (351M) and HUMINT collectors (35M) between December 2013 and October 2015.

4. MSO refer to the collection of foreign military and military-related intelligence by humans for humans. MSO are conducted under SECDEF authorities, to satisfy DOD needs in compliance with DOD policy. Within the Army, MSO are conducted by trained personnel under the direction of military commanders. FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations, September 2006. 5-1.

5. LTG Mary A. Legere, U.S. Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army Intelligence Training Strategy, January 2014. Foreword.


8. GEN Robert B. “Abe” Abrams, CG, FORSCOM, Initial Address, 10 August 2015.


11. COL Anthony Hale, FORSCOM, Email message to MG Franz, CG, INSCOM, “XVIII ABC FORMICA Team is Army’s Nominee for DoD HUMINT Award,” 4 August 2015.


14. GEN Mark Milley, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Initial Message to the Army, 28 August 2015.

15. Army Intelligence Training Strategy, 2.

16. GEN Milley, 28 August 2015.

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Introduction

Regardless of the position they occupy, or the unit to which they are assigned, intelligence analysts require a series of core competencies and attributes. Among the many attributes of successful analysts, critical thinking is often considered to be among the most crucial. Previous research has noted that supervisors of intelligence analysts rate deductive reasoning, flexibility of closure, inductive reasoning, information ordering, oral and written comprehension, and written expression as the most important cognitive attributes in the junior intelligence analyst job. Unfortunately, American students, across all education levels, tend to be deficient in their ability to think creatively and critically. Fortunately, critical thinking skills can, and should, be enhanced through deliberate training programs. Although a stand-alone program of instruction in critical thinking might be ideal, it may not be necessary. It is possible to foster critical thinking through modifications to an existing curriculum, rather than adding an additional course. If critical thinking is a core competency for intelligence analysts, the Intelligence Community (IC) has a vested interest in determining the efficacy of its training programs in enhancing this particular skill.

What Works?

A review of the existing research in the development of critical thinking skills suggests that targeting instruction at the higher cognitive levels and engaging the students in active learning can both be effective tools in fostering the development of critical thinking. More than half a century ago, Benjamin Bloom and his colleagues proposed a hierarchical taxonomy of “cognitive domains” which could be used to develop academic courses and assessments. In ascending order of cognitive complexity, these domains include knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. The level of Bloom’s taxonomy at which a lesson is presented impacts the level of cognitive response by the students. Lecture as a means of instruction tends to focus on the lowest levels of Bloom’s taxonomy. Not surprisingly, schools that rely on lecture-based instruction do not produce substantial gains in critical thinking skills among their students. Unlike lecture-based learning, instruction that emphasizes classroom discussion and debate is more likely to promote critical thinking.

In addition to classroom discussion, the instructor’s questioning technique is another teaching tool that can impact the development of critical thinking. The initial words used in an instructor’s question influence the levels of cognition required by the student in order to answer the question. For example, questions that begin with words such as “explain,” “why,” or “relate” are likely to require more cognitively complex responses than questions beginning with “what,” “who,” “how many,” or “describe.” These findings highlight the impact of pedagogical techniques and the level of instruction within Bloom’s taxonomy on the development of critical thinking skills among students.

What Are We Doing?

On-site research conducted for this study assessed the curricula and instructional methods used at a U.S. military school providing initial intelligence training. The curriculum was assessed by determining the relative proportion of learning objectives that require greater or lesser cognitive effort, based on Bloom’s taxonomy. This examination revealed a program appropriately structured to provide a strong knowledge base in the earliest phases of the course before requiring the students to build up to more cognitively complex tasks. Unfortunately, the focus remained primarily on knowledge-level learning objectives across the duration of the course. Of 307 learning objectives, 81.1 percent required the student to perform at the lowest level of Bloom’s Taxonomy (i.e., “describe,” “list,” or “state” various items of fact).

Conversely, only 1.3 percent of the objectives (4 of 307) require the student to perform skills in the top half of the taxonomy (e.g., “evaluate the reliability of intelligence information” [emphasis added]). Evaluation of the initial intelligence course from another branch of service revealed a similar structure with 74.3 percent of the objectives at the knowledge level and only 2.8 percent of the objectives (5 of 175) in the top half of Bloom’s Taxonomy.
To assess the classroom questioning techniques employed, a frequency count of the interrogatives used by the instructors during the presentation of a lesson was compiled. Three classroom sessions were sampled. The lessons observed were drawn from points across the course, sampling classes presented early in the course, in the middle of the course, and near the end of the course. Content analysis revealed a predominance of questions asking “what” or “where” and a relative scarcity of questions asking the students to explain “why” or “how.” Indeed, of the three classes visited, only one instructor ever required the students to explain the “why” or “how” of the subject matter. Although the curriculum did have the necessary progression from lower level skills to more complex skills during the span of the course, the overwhelming majority of learning objectives remain at the knowledge level—even in the terminal phases of instruction.

This focus on knowledge-level objectives is likely a primary force in driving the instructors at both schools to present their instruction at the knowledge-level. It is important to note that the pedagogical analyses in this study relate only to classroom instruction by the faculty. The curriculum did employ a substantial amount of student briefings and presentations, which require the students themselves to produce and present an intelligence product. This pedagogical technique requires the students to function at the third level of Bloom’s taxonomy: “Application.” Similarly, the curriculum also includes a capstone exercise requiring the students to integrate and apply their accumulated knowledge.

How Are We Doing?

To assess the impact of intelligence instruction upon critical thinking skills, the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (WGCTA) was used to quantify the critical thinking skills of service members attending a military intelligence school. Students were tested at the beginning of their initial intelligence training, and at graduation from the school. A time-sequential design was used. This method sampled a beginning and a graduating cohort at the first time of measurement (T1), completing a single cross-sectional study. This is then followed by another cross-sectional measurement at the second time of measurement (T2). The second cross-sectional data collection re-samples the cohort that was assessed at the start of their training, now at the time of their graduation, and also samples a second beginning cohort. This research design provides longitudinal data on one cohort but also provides the researcher with two cross-sectional studies that can be contrasted to reveal and control for any historical effects during the study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time1</th>
<th>Time2</th>
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<tr>
<td>Group1Post (Post-Training)</td>
<td>Group2Post (Post-Training)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group2Pre (Pre-Training)</td>
<td>Group3Pre (Pre-Training)</td>
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To determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the levels of critical thinking skills between the cohorts, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to compare the mean scores of each cohort. This analysis revealed no significant difference in the level of critical thinking skills among the three groups. For the cohort tested at both the beginning and the end of their training, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. This analysis revealed no significant difference in scores on the WGCTA taken at the start of training and scores from the same cohort when re-assessed at the completion of the course. Excluding the attrited participants from the sample, the cohort mean at the first time of measurement (29.63) was essentially identical to their mean score of at the end of training (29.38). These data suggest that the curricula and pedagogy used for the training of intelligence analysts are not contributing to the development of critical thinking skills among their graduates.

What Should We Do?

If the U.S. military, and the IC at large intend to develop the most capable analysts, a deliberate effort to enhance critical thinking skills is required. The curricula of two intelligence schools were evaluated and found to have an appropriate approach to the sequencing of the course objectives. Although both curricula include a progression in the cognitive complexity of their objectives, they were both dominated by objectives at the lowest level of cognitive complexity across the entire span of the course. Critical thinking will be more effectively developed by expanding the use of curricular objectives requiring students to perform in the upper levels of Bloom’s taxonomy.

Students in initial entry training programs arrive with little or no base of knowledge in the art of intelligence analysis. This necessitates a curriculum weighted heavily with knowledge-level objectives. However, subtle changes to the curricula could be made that would shift from an almost exclusive focus on knowledge-level objectives to the inclusion of a greater percentage of objectives requiring students to operate at higher levels of Bloom’s taxonomy.

A study of U.S. university students found a significant difference (almost 5 points on the WGCTA) between students completing a course with learning objectives based on higher levels of Bloom’s taxonomy versus those enrolled.
in a similar course with a lower level focus—even though the WGCTA scores of the two groups were almost identical at the start of the courses.12 Our institutional training programs can also make a meaningful contribution to the development of critical thinking abilities, but this will require thoughtful changes to those programs. Perhaps the most easily applicable changes to the curricula would involve revising many of the application level objectives (Bloom’s third level) to the analysis or synthesis (fourth and fifth) levels of the taxonomy.

The focus on knowledge-level learning in our initial intelligence training programs fosters the pedagogical practices seen at the school. The questioning techniques employed by the faculty typically require only low-level cognitive effort of the students. Coaching the instructors to ask “why,” rather than “what” questions will encourage more cognitively complex responses from the students. By implementing a revised questioning technique, we can equip our faculty with a no-cost pedagogical tool to nurture their students’ critical thinking abilities.

Additionally, instruction is most often presented by lecture session—again requiring the students to perform only at the knowledge level. We can better nurture nascent critical thinking skills by incorporating discussion-based lessons. Unlike teaching based on the lecture format, instruction centered on classroom discussion and debate is known to foster critical thinking skills. Classroom discussion provides a forum for students to think for themselves and also exposes them to the views of others, which may be very different from their own. Even group discussions conducted via electronic media have been found to encourage critical thinking.13 Additionally, the incorporation of writing into the curriculum has also been shown to have a positive impact on critical thinking skills.14

By making a small number of modest and inexpensive changes to our institutional training programs we can immediately begin to have an impact on what may be the most important skill for the graduates of these institutions. We don’t necessarily need to change much with regard to what we teach, but we do need to change how we teach it.

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**Endnotes**


2. Ibid.


11. Craig Morrow, “The Development of Critical Thinking Skills in the Training of Enlisted Intelligence Analysts,” MSSI Thesis (Washington, D.C.: Joint Military Intelligence College, June 2004). (F2,37 = .5013, p=.603). Analysis revealed no relationship of age, sex, ethnicity, racial background, and socioeconomic status with scores on the WGCTA. One difference was found. Unsurprisingly, greater levels of civilian education correlated with higher scores on the WGCTA (r = .242, p = .04).


14. Tsui, 740-763; Yuretich, 44.

**Note from the Director, Teaching Learning and Technology Division:** The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) agrees with the importance of critical thinking and the effective instructional techniques that lead to learning transfer. Learning transfer refers to the ability of the student to take what was learned in the classroom and apply it to diverse and novel situations on the job.1 Within the teaching of critical thinking, this is a very important concept because The Army Operating Concept describes a need for Soldiers to think critically and be comfortable with ambiguity.2 Creating a learning environment that supports critical thinking transfer requires a two fold approach: ensure the
learning events students participate in are maximized to develop critical thinking skills and ensure the instructors are able to use those learning materials. USAICoE is focused on both.

Bloom’s taxonomy alone is not the best way to judge the critical thinking required by a student. It is important when considering the Bloom’s taxonomy level of a learning objective, to look at the assessments and training materials that support the objective because many objective verbs are found across multiple levels of the taxonomy. Regardless of Bloom’s level, critical thinking is enhanced when learning events (and the assessments that grade them) are designed to provide students an opportunity to learn, practice, and demonstrate their knowledge, skills, and attributes within the context of the job they will perform. USAICoE uses a collaborative process to design and develop curriculum materials (lesson plans, training aids, student tests). The team includes military content subject matter experts and an instructional designer who brings an educational perspective to the process. The team is able to create critical thinking instruction within the context of the job the Soldier will perform, a technique which has been shown to enhance transfer of learning.3

A second area of focus is the instructor who delivers the training. USAICoE’s Staff and Faculty Development Branch develops workshops and courses specifically designed to help the novice instructor engage students in a more meaningful way. The one day Socratic Questioning Workshop focuses on framing questions to elicit critical thought and uses the Paul and Elder elements and standards of critical thinking as a starting point. The Advanced Instructional Methods course specifically introduces instructors to the case study method of instruction and designing learning activities that require students to write, say or do something – the only way to provide feedback on their thinking. We are happy to discuss the many ways institutional training has improved and continues to improve here at Fort Huachuca.

Endnotes
2. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 The U.S. Army Operating Concept, 31 October 2014.
3. Wlodkowski, 359
Introduction

In July of 2015, we had the opportunity to attend the Strategic Studies Fellows Program hosted by the Institute for Defense and Business, a defense sector non-profit research and education organization, in partnership with the University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill. This flagship program is one of the seminar-style programs available under the banner of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Strategic Broadening Seminars. Other programs are hosted at the University of Louisville, Institute for World Politics, and by the British and Israeli militaries.

The goal of all these programs is simply to lend strategic perspective to leaders earlier in their careers. We asked ourselves: What’s the catch? An Active Duty Service Obligation? A utilization tour? No catch, we were assured by representatives from both the Combined Arms Center and HQDA G3/5/7, just go back to your unit and be a better informed and more effective leader. Initially, the skeptics among us remained incredulous.

Now in reflection, however, we have reached the conclusion that the Army, at an institutional level, has made a substantial investment in our development. Not underplaying the important role that personal mentors have played, but in an organization where we are all, by design, replaceable, we felt refreshed by this program’s approach. Without describing each moment of the program, some major elements do warrant discussion.

Program Overview

The program was conducted in a seminar format for six days a week over four weeks. A major topic of the curriculum was national security policy, which constituted about 40 hours of instruction. Professors from both Duke and UNC provided lectures on national security topics from the constitutional foundations of the national security apparatus to the modern challenges of the post-9/11 intelligence reforms. As a result, we are now well equipped to have an informed discussion on questions such as, Why are cabinet appointees confirmed by the Congress? Who must be notified in Congress in the event of a presidential covert action? What about an intelligence operation? What is the responsibility of the military officer to the Commander-in-Chief? Under what legal authorities are we operating in Iraq? How are they different from those in Afghanistan or Yemen?

The highlight of this portion of the curriculum came in the form of a moderated debate. On one side, was Dr. Bruce Jentleson, former national security staffer and contributor to the Clinton National Security Strategy and on the other, Dr. Peter Feaver, former advisor to President Bush’s administration and co-author of his National Security Strategy. At the heart of the debate was the fundamental question, What is America’s role in the world? It was truly awesome to see these two academic heavyweights exchange ideas on American primacy versus multilateralism as a grand strategy to secure our national security interests. This experience was about far more than national security policy alone.

We spent a substantial amount of time learning executive skills. These seminars were taught largely by faculty from the UNC Kenan-Flagler Business School on topics surprisingly relevant to day-to-day officer training. Topics included leadership communications, strategic innovation, critical decision making, and negotiations. Buzzwords, right? Wrong. Each session was illuminating in its own way. What can the paper airplane teach us about innovation through iterative improvement? It turns out to a lot. One of the most
exciting, and harrowing experiences was the period of instruction on media relations and crisis communications. Ahead of time, we were given a detailed scenario about a number of crises and scandals (some notional, some real) transpiring at UNC. On the day of the training we were taken to the campus television news studio, and told to play the character of the university chancellor for a television interview. In the studio, under the lights, we were grilled by a professor of journalism role playing a news anchor. CPT Oliver’s interview began, “Chancellor, given your failure to manage the numerous scandals rocking UNC, isn’t it time for you to resign?” It didn’t get any easier from there. In the green room our classmates assessed us on our performance. Did we stumble? Were we argumentative? Did we stay on message? Later, we all had the opportunity to review our performance, and clench our teeth.

The third element of the program was the frequent special events. These ranged in length and scope from a lunch time roundtable with the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Daniel B. Allyn, to a daylong off-site at a non-governmental organization devoted to ending hunger in our lifetime. These were each fulfilling but the day we spent visiting SAS, the world’s largest privately owned data analytics software company, was a group favorite. At the luxurious conference center on their expansive Cary, North Carolina campus, we heard from the director of Human Resources about how SAS recruits, trains, and retains the best programmers and sales force in the industry.

We also heard about how other military customers are coming to realize what we in MI have known for some time—that analytics can tease out a signal hidden in the noise. In the example case, “What attributes and accomplishments predict success at Special Forces Assessment and Selection?”

The other incredible opportunity these special events presented was to interact with our senior leaders and learn from them first hand. A quick tally reveals that we met eight current and former flag officers, SESs, and ambassadors, including two of only twelve Army four-star generals.

The final element of the program, and the one in which we invested much of our time, was our group projects. Upon arrival we were assigned a region, a research question, and a team. CPT Oliver’s team included a public affairs officer, a logistician, an MI officer, and two infantrymen (one officer, one NCO). The team’s assigned mentor was a former U.S. Navy admiral and former fleet commander, with whom we met several times. Over the four weeks, he helped us describe the current environment, identify critical uncertainties, forecast potential future scenarios and then develop a strategy to address those challenges. CPT Fields’s team included a garrison command sergeant major, an Army diver, an ordinance officer, and a logistician. Their mentor was a retired Air Force general who helped their team tremendously to explore techniques and methods the U.S. Army and U.S. Government might employ to ease tensions between Russia and the Baltic States. Ultimately, we presented our research to a distinguished panel, including several flag officers. The group project yielded a paper and presentation but, as cliché as it sounds, the relationships we built with our teammates were the real reward.

Implications

At this point, it may be evident why attending this program is important. It’s a discriminator. It says to your boss, and to your team, that you are curious enough as a leader to seek a better understanding of the world around you. To win in an environment characterized by complexity, curiosity is a requirement. From a practical standpoint, this program is a Human Resources Command board-selected.
Introduction
Current trends in global security indicate an increasingly capable and prolific air and missile threat to U.S. forces, Allies and partnered forces. The result is a growing demand for air and missile defense (AMD) capability. In an effort to meet this demand, the U.S. and its partners have begun transition to the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) platform of operations. IAMD employs unified action with a full range of capabilities to deter adversarial attack. Accordingly, integrated Air Defense is heavily dependent on intelligence synchronization to precede a situational understanding that enables mission command. The operational environment is extremely complex and requires a developed understanding to better determine, analyze, and interpret information of intelligence value. Consideration for the counterair threat is given very little coverage at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. Without institutional training, the AMD intelligence Soldier requires additional specialized training to establish a baseline skill set. The AMD community offers various opportunities for training; however, without proper research and planning, training can become redundant or ineffective. There is no “one-step” agency that provides a training curriculum for the AMD intelligence Soldier. In order to maximize the effectiveness of AMD training, the organization must develop a strategy that includes training plans and identification of roles and responsibilities to build required knowledge and skills. The purpose of this article is to assist AMD organizations in defining the training requirements necessary for intelligence professionals working in an AMD environment.

The AMD mission requires the intelligence professional to assume a working level aptitude, also known as a knowledge baseline. The baseline comprises three core competencies associated with the AMD fight: the strategic environment, science and technology, and the tactical threat. Strategic level training provides the scope and direction necessary to analyze the broad aspects of the operational environment. This type of training must include an overview of the history and evolution of ballistic missile weapons systems and ballistic missile defense (BMD), as well as the geopolitical, legal, and other international considerations associated with our own national defense and the defense of our allies. Strategic level training provides the scope and direction necessary to analyze the broad aspects of the operational environment. This type of training must include an overview of the history and evolution of ballistic missile weapons systems and ballistic missile defense (BMD), as well as the geopolitical, legal, and other international considerations associated with our own national defense and the defense of our allies.
important for the intelligence professional to understand BMD architecture in order to discern the enemy threat. Learning weapon system capabilities will convey to the intelligence professional the extent of this threat. This type of training should include the basics of infrared and radar theories and their respective applications to sensors, the different type of orbits and ballistic trajectories, the categories of ballistic missile ranges, the components of a ballistic missile and the three phases of flight, and the difference between theater and homeland BMD system engagement scenarios.

Threat environment training focuses specifically on the theater of operations the intelligence professional is expected to support. This type of training includes the disposition of enemy forces and their lines of communication, individual weapon systems and associated support equipment, weapon system capabilities during all phases of flight, and the fire doctrine and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures.

**AMD Training Roadmap for Intelligence Professionals**

The AMD Training Roadmap for Intelligence Professionals (Table 1) illustrates a useful method to streamline the planning process with a composite of coursework based on two levels of curriculum. The Roadmap identifies key roles within the organization, matching those roles with corresponding courses best suited to fulfill the curriculum requirement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Curriculum</th>
<th>Advanced Curriculum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Course Title</strong></td>
<td><strong>Course Title</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I2C3-Ballistic Missile Intelligence Analysis Course</td>
<td>Information Collection Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC14-2014 Ballistic Missile Defense Chief Staff Basic Course</td>
<td>Targeting Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATCOM-MD-200 Ballistic Missile Defense Staff Basic Course</td>
<td>All Source Intelligence Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFCC-IMD-210 Ballistic Missile Defense Command of Targeting</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Intelligence Analyst</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Training Roadmap.

Based on this information and taking into account the unique environment of the combatant command, the training planner/organizer may determine which courses should be allocated to different groups or individuals. The Core Curriculum prepares the intelligence professional with a knowledge baseline, to include subject matter in the strategic environment, science and technology, and the tactical threat. Table 2 provides course descriptions of the Core Curriculum.

The Advanced Curriculum is designed to support intelligence synchronization, with subject matter in missile defense planning, information collection, and joint targeting operations. Table 3 provides course descriptions of the Advanced Curriculum.

**Current Training Opportunities**

The AMD community offers plenty of training opportunities; however, the access to training is not equivalent throughout every combatant command, so it is important to conduct extensive research. The U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) conducts Joint BMD training through a variety of venues, including online. The registration for courses is available via the Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) website at [https://jkodirect.jten.mil/](https://jkodirect.jten.mil/). The JKO catalog, November 2014, offers several web-based courses in air and missile defense operations and ballistic missile defense planning. The Foundry training program offers two courses specifically designed for intelligence professionals in AMD, including the Ballistic Missile Threat Immersion Course and the Ballistic Missile Intelligence Analysis Course. The Ballistic Missile Threat Immersion Course is provided by the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) and the Ballistic Missile Intelligence Analysis Course is provided by the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USAMDC).
Final Thoughts

In December 2014, the G2, 32d AAMDC hosted the first annual G2 AAMDC Intelligence Summit attended by various elements of the AMD intelligence community, to include the 263rd AAMDC, the 94th AAMDC, and the 10th AAMDC. On the topic of training, participants concluded that the high-demand for “operationalized” intelligence requires a structured strategy for implementation. Air defense units remain in high states of readiness for rapid deployment and rely heavily on their intelligence teams to prepare them for combat. However, well over 95 percent of intelligence personnel arriving to an AAMDC Headquarters or ADA BDE or BN S2 Sections are serving with Air Defense units for the first time. The AMD community offers multiple courses but without proper research and planning, training can become redundant or ineffective. Therefore, the intelligence community is encouraged to utilize the AMD Training Roadmap to assist in building their skills.

Endnotes

2. 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMD), AAMDC G2 Intelligence Summit 2014, (Fort Bliss: 32d AAMDC 2014).
4. JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats, 23 March 2012.
6. JP 3-01.
9. Ibid.
10. ADRP 2-0 Intelligence, 31 August 2012.

13. AAMDC G2 Intelligence Summit 2014.

Other References


ADRP 3-09 Fires, Ch1, 8 February 2013.

Foundry 2.0, July 2014 Catalog.

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Raymond T. Odierno, CSA Strategic Priorities, 2013.


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Strategic Broadening Seminars: What They Taught Us, Why They’re Important

(Continued from page 53)

program. It was selective, with over 2,000 applicants and fewer than 200 selectees. With the removal of the GO/FO letter of recommendation, the applicant pool is sure to increase, and that is a good thing! This program was a challenge and requires our best officers and NCOs to apply to keep improving it.

Conclusion

Some who read this will decide that they are too busy for a four week TDY with uncertain immediate applications. Some senior leaders will recite the common rejoinder, “She/He is mission essential. I can’t let them go.” To the first point, the majority of the captains in the class were in company command, including the authors. Even if you are fully investing in the self-development domain (which most of us are not), this opportunity is not a substitute; it’s a complement. Additionally, you earn the 6Z Additional Skill Identifier (Strategic Studies Education) for completing the program, though we would question your motives if this is what convinces you to apply. To the second point, senior leaders must know that they will receive back a better Soldier and officer, one that is refreshed and refocused, someone who can better understand strategic problems.

Make no mistake, we don’t believe this program is for everyone. Some people are high performers but simply do not demonstrate the aptitude for strategic thinking, those folks will not benefit from this program. We recommend this program for people who ask a lot of questions, and are driven to understand “the why.”

CPT Oliver is a Company Commander at the National Ground Intelligence Center in Charlottesville, Virginia.

CPT Fields is a Company Commander in the 706th MI Group at Fort Gordon, Georgia.
Following the closure of the Black Chamber, the secret American unit responsible for foreign code-breaking in the 1920s, the Army established the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS). William Friedman, the civilian chosen to lead the new organization, along with one enlisted man and a secretary, was struggling to conduct all the Army's communications intelligence and communications security. He desperately needed a staff. He turned to the Civil Service Register and personally selected three individuals who not only possessed acute mathematics skills but also foreign language competency. In April 1930, those three men—Frank Rowlett, Soloman Kullback, and Abraham Sinkov—joined the SIS at an annual salary of $2,000 each. As Sinkov later stated, “Our coming increased the size of the establishment to the grand number of six.” Small in number but not in ambition or ability, by the mid-1930s, Friedman’s team made important headway in breaking the Japanese diplomatic codes.

Abraham Sinkov was born in August 1907 to Russian immigrants living in Philadelphia, but he grew up in Brooklyn. After receiving a degree in Mathematics from City College of New York, he taught in the public school system. Unsatisfied and desiring a more practical application of his skills, Sinkov looked to civil service for an alternative. He was not disappointed in his career change.

In the ensuing years, Sinkov proved to be a talented codebreaker and also an able leader and administrator in the field. In July 1936, Sinkov traveled to Panama to establish the Army’s first permanent intercept site outside the continental United States. Initially, Sinkov’s collection team gathered Japanese diplomatic traffic to and from Central America. To support the local Army commanders, however, Sinkov switched to collecting traffic from the Latin American countries, achieving success against several Mexican and Colombian ciphers and making progress against Brazilian codes. With valuable field experience under his belt, Sinkov returned to Washington and began attacking Italian diplomatic codes.

Having earned a commission in the Army reserves, Sinkov was called to active duty as a Captain in the Signal Corps in January 1941. The following month, Sinkov led a four-man delegation to England, helping to lay the groundwork for the successful Anglo-American cryptologic cooperation of World War II.

In April 1942, five months after the U.S. entered World War II, now Major Sinkov took command of the 837th Signal Intelligence Service in Melbourne, Australia. The 837th was the American component of the Central Bureau, the code-breaking organization for General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Theater. Officially, the Central Bureau’s director was MG Spencer Akin, MacArthur’s Chief Signal Officer, but confident in Sinkov’s abilities, Akin stayed out of the day-to-day operations. Sinkov’s leadership, organizational abilities, and practical experience helped forge a cohesive Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) organization from a divergent assortment of American and Australian intercept, analytical and support units, and personnel.

During its first year, the Central Bureau struggled to unravel Japanese military codes and ciphers. Yet, Sinkov and his analysts gained valuable experience and expertise and eventually became a first-rate cryptologic organization. In March 1943, one of Sinkov’s analysts, Sergeant Joseph Richard, discovered some patterns and changes in the Water Transport Code the Japanese used to encrypt traffic on their troop movements throughout the Pacific. While Richard scrutinized the code, Sinkov coordinated with the SIS at Arlington Hall. The dramatic result was that, by mid-1943, the Central Bureau was easily reading traffic about Japanese troops and reinforcement shipments, an invaluable tool for MacArthur’s operations through the end of the war.
In early 1944, Sinkov and his team received a huge windfall when an Australian patrol discovered a Japanese division’s entire set of codebooks and immediately forwarded them to the Central Bureau. Able to exploit the main Japanese Army codes, the bureau passed information to MacArthur’s G2 that provided enormous advantages for American operations in New Guinea and the Philippines. After the war, MacArthur praised the organization’s “effective efforts in the war against Japan” and called it “outstanding in its achievements.”

Colonel Sinkov ended the war as the Chief Cryptanalytic Officer for U.S. Army Forces in the Far East. In 1946, he returned to civilian service with the SIS successor organizations—the Army Security Agency and later the Armed Forces Security Agency—ending finally with the National Security Agency (NSA). At NSA, he served as deputy director of production before retiring in 1962.

COL Sinkov was inducted into the Hall of Fame in 1987 as one of the original eleven Distinguished Members of the MI Corps. His three SIS counterparts—Friedman, Rowlett, and Kullback—joined him in 1988 and Richard followed in 1993. Abe Sinkov passed away on 19 January 1998.
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Articles about current operations; TTPs; and equipment and training are always welcome as are lessons learned; historical perspectives; problems and solutions; and short “quick tips” on better employment or equipment and personnel. Our goals are to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps and the IC at large. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how new technology will change the way we operate.

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- We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles and it may take up to a year to publish some articles.
- Although MIPB targets themes, you do not need to “write” to a theme.
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- A release signed by your unit or organization’s information security officer/operations security officer/SSO stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain (IAW AR 380-5 DA Information Security Program). A sample security release format can be accessed at our website at https://ikn.army.mil.
- A cover letter (either hard copy or electronic) with your work or home email addresses, telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published.
- Your article in Word. Do not use special document templates.
- Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic. We need complete captions (the Who, What, Where, When), photographer credits, and the author’s name on photos. Do not embed graphics or photos within the article. Send them as separate files such as .tif or .jpg and note where they should appear in the article. PowerPoint (not in .tif or .jpg format) is acceptable for graphs, etc. Photos should be at 300 dpi.
- The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author’s current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications.

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MI Institutional Training

**Strategic Environment.** The DoD FY16 budget request is an attempt to strike a balance between the nation’s defense capacity, capabilities, and current/future readiness. The DoD as a whole has accepted increased levels of risk for some missions; included in this risk is expected gaps in near term training and maintenance requirements. Along with these risks, the specter of sequestration continues to linger. TRADOC, as the proponent for Army training, will be impacted by risks accepted at the national level. USAICoE must prepare for and safeguard against these risks. It remains our mission to supply the intelligence capability the operational force will use to win wars in a complex world. We will secure ourselves against these risks to ensure we accomplish our mission.

**ICoE Training Mission.** USAICoE supports Army Readiness by delivering intelligence training and education, and by developing and integrating intelligence concepts, doctrine, and capabilities.

**ICoE CG Vision.** Build an adaptive and agile intelligence force of leaders and Soldiers who excel at enabling mission command to win in a complex environment.

**ICoE CG End State.** USAICoE is a world-class learning institution that provides cutting edge training through a blended learning environment to produce leaders who are adaptive, agile, and trusted military professionals.

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**National Guard/Regional Training Institute 4/640th RTI**
- Camp Williams (Salt Lake City, UT)
- 35F10 (Analyst)
- 35M10 (HUMINT)
- 35L20 (CI)
- ALC: 35F30, 35M30, 35P30
- SLC

**National Guard/Regional Training Institute 1/122nd RTI**
- Dobbins Air Res Base (Camp Clay, GA)
- 35F10 (Analyst)
- 35M10 (HUMINT)
- ALC: 35F30, 35M30

**National Guard/Regional Training Institute 344th MI BN, 111th MI BDE**
- GAFB (San Angelo, TX)
- 35N (SIGINT Analyst)
- 35P (Cryptologic Linguist)

**National Guard/Regional Training Institute 111th MI BDE**
- Corry Station (Pensacola, FL)
- 35S10 (Signals Collection Analyst)
- 35Q10 Network Warfare Analyst
- Intermediate & Advanced Signals

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**IMT (Initial Military Training)**
- 35F10 (Analyst)
- 35G10 (MIINT)
- 35M10 (HUMINT)
- 35T10 (MI Systems Maintainer)
- 09L10 (Translator/Interpreter)
- 35L20 CISAC

**Professional Military Education (PME)**
- SLC 35
- SLC 09L
- ALC
- 35F30, 35G30, 35L30, 35M30, 35N30, 35P30, 35S30, 35T30, 35Q30
- 09L30 (Translator/Interpreter)
- MICCC (MI Pre-CMD/22 Course)
- RO-OICCC (RO CPT Career Course)
- IOICCC (Intelligence Officer Career Course)
- MIPOCC (MI Pre-CMD Course)
- FA 34 Strategic Intelligence Officer Transition
- SI 1D Imagery Intelligence Officer

**PME (cont’d)**
- 35G SIGINT Officer
- 35E CI Officer
- MIWOAC (MI WO Advance Course)
- SEMA Course (EMARSS and MC-12)

**Functional Courses**
- Battlefield Weather
- Trojan Spirit Operator
- ISR Synchronization Manager
- Culture Center MTT
- CREW Master Gunner

**Total Army System School (TASS) Training Center (TTC)**
- 1/100th TASS
- 35F10 (Analyst)
- 35G10 (MIINT)
- 35M10 (HUMINT)
- 35L20 (CI)
- ALC: 35F30, 35M30, 35L30
- SLC