Intelligence Support to Situational Understanding
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Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence publishes the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) quarterly under the provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB presents information designed to keep intelligence professionals informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; problems and solutions, etc., can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of professional development.

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From The Editor
As a reminder, MIPB is now online at IKN on the open front page at https://www.ikn.army.mil/apps/IKNWMS/Default.aspx?webId=2248. You will find several of the most recent issues there as well. Please note, the MIPB site, located on IKN, is under revision. You may not be able to access the issue archives at this time.

The following themes and suspenses are established for:

April-June 2016, Separate Intelligence Teams, deadline for submissions is 6 May 2016.

July-September 2016, Dense Urban Terrain, deadline for submissions is 16 June 2016.

Articles from the field will always be very important to the success of MIPB as a professional bulletin. Please continue to submit them. Even though the topic of your article may not coincide with an issue’s theme, do not hesitate to send it to me. Most issues will contain theme articles as well as articles on other topics. Your thoughts and lessons learned (from the field) are invaluable.

Please call or email me with any questions regarding your article or upcoming issues.

Sterilla Smith
Editor
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Inside Back Cover: Contact and Article Submission Information
As articulated in the Army Operating Concept (AOC), the future is unknown, unknowable, and extremely complex. In order for our Army to win in a complex world, we must be able to dominate at the tactical and operational levels while functioning in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. Success requires continuous situational understanding. In order to facilitate situational understanding, we as Military Intelligence (MI) professionals must clearly provide our analysis so commanders and leaders can better understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess operations.

The Army defines situational understanding as, “the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT)) and the mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC)) to facilitate decisionmaking.”

Situational understanding is critical to executing mission command during unified land operations to achieve sustainable political outcomes and winning in a complex world. The 2014 AOC introduced Force 2025 and Beyond (F2025B) as the modernization framework for evaluating and recommending landpower capabilities for the joint force in the 2020 to 2040 time frame. Through the Army’s F2025B Campaign of Learning—which incorporates lessons learned, experiments, wargames, and technology demonstrations—the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) is now in the process of developing key concepts, ideas, and solutions to meet the challenges posed by the future operating environment. The AOC asks a tough question: “How will the Army develop and sustain a high degree of situational understanding while operating in complex environments against determined and adaptive enemy organizations?”

As many of you have witnessed firsthand, the critical first step in achieving situational understanding is gaining access to timely and relevant information from across the intelligence enterprise. To better enable access to information in support of the ground force commander, USAICoE is providing enhanced Army expeditionary intelligence capabilities; extending our processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities into a global enterprise; and modifying the Distributed Common Ground System-Army to be effective in denied, degraded, or low-bandwidth environments. Additionally, USAICoE has:

- Launched creative and critical thinking pilot programs at the schoolhouse to develop students’ cognitive abilities.
- Revamped the Army Pre-Command Course in order to prepare our commanders to better leverage and enable the intelligence enterprise.
- Worked across the Army to better organize our forces by establishing the Expeditionary MI Brigades in support of the deployed corps, divisions, and brigades.
- Refined the MI Brigade (Theater) concept of operations to better orchestrate support to regionally aligned forces.

The MI Corps is actively addressing emerging and evolving mission sets. After strengthening the current and long-term strategy for aerial collection, we are focusing attention on intelligence operations in the terrestrial layer. We are committed to equipping our multifunctional teams to meet the pace of future operations, thus enabling land force commanders to operate from a position of relative advantage, and to exploit the emergence of new signatures and phenomenologies. To this end, USAICoE is developing a multidiscipline, multimodal, and multifunction capability—that is expeditionary and survivable and has access to the intelligence enterprise—to support the development of situational understanding across the range of military operations. In response to the enemy’s extensive use of open sources and social media, we are pursuing an Open Source Intelligence strategy that professionalizes the discipline, is enabled by clear and reasonable policies, and leverages tools to facilitate rapid exploitation of “Big Data.” Likewise, we are working closely with the U.S. Army Cyber CoE, Army Cyber Command, and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command across the force development domains (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)) to (Continued on page 3)
Army Warfighting Challenge #1 is “Develop Situational Understanding,” and the Intelligence Center of Excellence has the lead.

Your job as intelligence professionals is to provide your commanders, regardless of what echelon you support, with situational understanding so they can make the best decisions possible. Situational Understanding is to Situational Awareness what intelligence is to information. It is not enough for you to keep your commander informed, you need to visualize and describe the environment so your commander knows the intent of the adversaries, not just the actions they have taken. Knowing why an adversary has taken a specific action, and what the end goals are, provides your commander the insights necessary to make strategically critical decisions and remain ahead of the enemy, instead of simply tactically reacting to the adversary’s latest move.

Developing situational understanding of an adversary is a perishable skill that is developed not only from your own skills within your military occupational specialty or current role in an intelligence organization, but from continued development of your expertise; understanding of the other intelligence disciplines; cultural awareness of your target; maintaining relevance with current event developments (not just in your own area of responsibility, but globally), and the ability to convey your analytical efforts into a product commanders can use to impact future operations.

As an Intelligence Professional you should be championing the concept of regionally aligned forces. Keeping intelligence professionals focused on the same regional target set will help increase situational understanding on a regional level. As you gain more experience and seniority within your career you will be able to provide better support to commanders in making decisions that have not only tactical implications, but strategic ones as well for diplomatic, economic, and political outcomes.

If you are not sure how the environment influences military operations and impacts larger strategic goals I recommend you read (reread) Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War” or Clausewitz’ “On War,” or a myriad other materials both current and past that show the interdependency between nations and non-nation states. Look back at history and review case studies from previous conflicts in the 20th century. History has a tendency to repeat itself and provide valuable insights to the future. Stay current on the business and economic developments within your region. Keep abreast of world politics and current events.

Every single time I see the Army Operating Concept statement that “the future is unknown, unknowable, and extremely complex,” I take it as a personal challenge as an intelligence professional that it is our job to make the unknown known and simplify the complex to a degree that our commanders have situational understanding when making the decisions that affect the future of our Army and our Nation. As the Army gets leaner on resources in the future, providing accurate situational understanding to our leaders becomes even more important. Be accurate, be timely, be concise, and be relevant.

“Always Out Front and Army Strong!”

(Continued from page 2)

ensure intelligence support to cyberspace operations meets the commander’s need for timely, accurate situational understanding of the cyberspace domain.

The future poses many challenges to our Army and intelligence professionals. The best way to meet the future challenges is to build competent, agile, and critically thinking MI Soldiers and civilians enabled by excellent training tools. Whether it is in 2016 or 2030, commanders will require a clear understanding of the complex environment they are facing. It is critical we all understand how the intelligence enterprise facilitates the development of situational understanding. The intelligence enterprise starts, and ends with you.

Endnote
1. ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, 7 December 2015.

“Always Out Front and Army Strong!”
Chief Warrant Officer Five Matthew R. Martin
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

"We have the most skilled, ethical, and combat hardened Army in our Nation's history. No matter where we are around the world, America's Soldiers are displaying courage, commitment and character. We are demonstrating unparalleled competence and agility. And no matter the challenge, no matter how complex the environment, or how dangerous the situation, our Soldiers fight and win. I am honored to lead this remarkable team."

—Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark A. Milley

The Army Operating Concept (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1) “Win in a Complex World” introduced the Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFCs) which represent first-order questions that facilitate integration and analysis across our warfighting functions to address learning activities, modernization, and future force design. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) has been charged with AWFC #1 “How to develop and sustain a high degree of situational understanding while operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations.” To develop situational understanding in today’s complex world, we must prepare to operate against an evolving adversary that will challenge our ability to prevent conflict, shape the security environment, and win wars.

To foster the development and sustainment of situational understanding, USAICoE made a significant investment towards Warrant Officer Education with the development and execution of Warrant Officer Intermediate and Senior Service Education Phase III Follow-on Courses. The intent is to provide field grade warrant officers with graduate level education to assume roles of greater responsibility as adaptive and agile technical leaders.

The MI WOILE Follow-on provides CW3s with critical leadership skills that are necessary to integrate Warrant Officer technical expertise in support of leaders as staff officers, trainers, managers, systems integrators, and leaders at the tactical and operational levels of Army, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) organizations executing Unified Land Operations through Decisive Action. The MI WOILE Follow-on Course emphasizes rigorous academics within a Professional Military Education environment.

**MI WOILE Follow-on Critical Task List:**
- Advise commander on Intelligence Architecture.
- Professionally develop MI Warrant Officers.
- Fuse Intelligence.
- Intelligence support to Cyber.
- Concept of operations plans.

The MI WOSSE Follow-on provides senior CW4s with the knowledge, and influential leader competencies necessary for success in the contemporary operational environment. The MI WOSSE Follow-on Course will provide a high level of Warrant Officer Professional Military Education, enabling knowledge and communication skills geared toward technical solutions to complex problems at the tactical and operational levels of Army and JIIM organizations executing Unified Land Operations through Decisive Action.

**MI WOSSE Follow-on Critical Task List:**
- Educate the commander on the Intelligence Enterprise.
- Identify key considerations for an intelligence collection mission.
- Draft Intelligence Architecture recommendations.
- Advise the commander on funding and acquisition processes.
- Professional development.
- Warrant Officer Mentor Program.
- Prepare information paper worthy of professional publication.

The recent advances in MI Warrant Officer training have been significant. Through today’s training, education, and practical application opportunities our MI Warrant Officers are better prepared to leverage technology, seamlessly integrate with JIIM partners from tactical to strategic levels, and provide situational understanding within a constantly changing and complex world.

Please contact course managers for MI WOILE and MI WOSSE for more information at (520) 538-4070 or (520) 454-2088.

Thank you for your selfless service and tireless commitment to our Army and Nation. Please take the time and thank your family and loved ones for their enduring support and contribution to our Nation.

Always Out Front!
Army Strong!
The way USAREUR is going to win in our complex world is through the successful, deliberate integration of the RAF and nothing speaks louder to our Allies than integrated, shared intelligence.

—Lieutenant General Ben Hodges
Commanding General,
USAREUR

Introduction

A paradigm shift has occurred in the strategic employment of ground forces within the Army with the advent of regionally aligned forces (RAF). At the strategic level, the Global Force Management process dedicates forces and outlines their employment by Combatant Commands (COCOM). Operational doctrine is adjusting to the new, more agile environment required for the effective employment of these RAF units. Taking a historical review at the Army Force Generation model for Iraq and Afghanistan deployments to the Global Force Management processes at Forces Command (FORSCOM), the implementation of the RAF concept can be studied from first discussions to fully realized doctrine and manning requirements of the supported COCOMs. Through a case study of the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Intelligence Warfighting Function (IWff), integration strategies and utilization difficulties of the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) managing the aligned division and brigade forces will be highlighted and discussed.

RAF–The Origins

The Army is ever adapting to face the future fight. After the first Iraq War, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Peter Schoomaker led a transformation to modular brigade combat teams to create more independent brigades, less reliant on a specific higher headquarters. In the latter years of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, senior leaders within the Department of Defense (DOD) began to discuss the need to redesign the general employment of ground combat forces in future engagements and began to introduce it into the Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR).

When the 2010 QDR was published, it emphasized the requirement to build regional partners’ and allies’ capacity in order to reduce reliance on large deployments of U.S. forces; thus leading to the requirement for assistance with Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) by the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC). To address this DOD requirement, CSA, at the time, General George Casey approved the concept and implementation of the regionally aligned brigades (RAB). The initial Department of the Army (DA) order to implement a regionally aligned concept came to fruition on February 12, 2011, in the Execute Order (EXORD) 039-12: Regionally Aligned Brigades signed by then CSA, General Raymond Odierno. This EXORD outlined the planning considerations for the implementation timeline for one combat brigade to perform the duties as a RAB for Africa Command (AFRICOM) in Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, expanding to three brigades in FY 2014, and finally to six brigades in FY 2015.

As the Dust Settles

Building upon the RAB concept as tested in AFRICOM, Army leaders continued to plan for its incorporation in other GCCs. Within the European Command (EUCOM), one Brigade—1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division (1-1 CAV)—was assigned as a troop provider for FY 2014 as the NATO Response Force (NRF) and European Rotational Force (ERF). While 1-1 CAV was not described or addressed as a RAF, RAB, or Service Retained Combatant Command Aligned (SRCA) unit, USAREUR began to view them as such, because they were deploying into theater for two 60-day training events and participating in a variety of exercises. Essentially, 1-1 CAV was to function in a similar manner as the RAB for AFRICOM. DA further refined the RAF concept, by designating 1-1 CAV as “allocated” to EUCOM for the NRF and TSC missions and “aligned” 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions (ID) as the next two SRCA division headquarters (see Figure 1). Thus, EUCOM and derivatively USAREUR, now had a RAF Brigade and a RAF Division Headquarters allocated or aligned to their area of responsibility (AOR).
Early Integration

As the RAF concept was developing at the Army Staff level, the USAREUR G2 directed the USAREUR G2 Training and Exercise Branch (TREX) Chief to visit 1-1 CAV for preliminary integration briefings in May 2013. In January 2014, the TREX Chief also led a briefing team to Fort Stewart to provide initial integration with the 3ID Intelligence Staff which included contingency plan (CONPLAN) overviews; intelligence training available at the European Foundry Platform (EFP); prepositioned equipment sets; exercise schedules and overviews, and essential points of contact within the IWfF in Germany. Following this initial visit, the TREX Chief engaged the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) liaison officer to FORSCOM, regarding the progress and the integration process which led to the development of a phased approach to RAF integration (see Figure 2).  

“NATO Ready”

By early 2014, USAREUR G2 TREX formalized the three phase approach (Orientation–Mission Preparation–Deployment), thus ensuring the RAF units were “Globally Responsive, Regionally Engaged.” To support the three phases, the designers relied on tenets such as “No MI Soldier at Rest,” “the Military Intelligence Brigade (Theater) (MIB(T)) is the Anchor Point,” “No Cold Starts,” and TSC plans from the DA G2, Commanding General, INSCOM, and EUCOM respectively. USAREUR identified additional requirements to support the GCC intent for RAF integration to include regional understanding, integration into the intelligence architecture, exercise in a coalition environment, and agile and responsive tasking.

Many of the requirements were designed to make regionally aligned units ‘NATO Ready.’ NATO Ready is a USAREUR concept whereby a unit is capable of integrating, operating, and cooperating within NATO. NATO Ready requires coalition architectures; foreign disclosure training; familiarity with NATO doctrine and terminology; participation in coalition exercises; ability to write in a NATO report syntax, and involvement in exchange programs. With the plan developed, communication and synchronization became the next consideration.

Engage Early and Often

The communication plan between USAREUR and RAF units needed to be robust and multifaceted. USAREUR emphasized face-to-face meetings, which although expensive, played a vital role and laid the framework for all other communication mediums. Secure video teleconferencing (SVTC) was critical to maintain synchronization of efforts. Beginning on March 13, 2014, USAREUR G2 hosted the first SVTC with 4ID, because they were the first SRCA aligned to EUCOM, and continued to conduct it monthly with the attendees (4ID, INSCOM G3, FORSCOM, 66th MIB(T), and the EFP). During that initial SVTC, it was agreed that USAREUR G2 would go to Fort Carson to provide the initial orientation briefings similar to what had been done for 1-1 CAV earlier that year. For the RAF Integration visit to 4ID, the USAREUR G2 sent a team to discuss intelligence training, CONPLANs, and DCGS-A architecture.

Most critical to the plan was the architecture, the foundation for 4ID to connect, understand, and collaborate in the EUCOM AOR. The first connection in this architecture was their DCGS-A Brain to the USAREUR MIB(T) DCGS-A Brain for synchronized common operating pictures and facilitating collaboration on fused intelligence. The connection was delayed until the second RAF integration visit in late September 2014 due to the discovery of firewalls and security issues that impacted integration across multiple networks. This remains an area of concern for future RAF integrations, as network security protocols vary between military installations and national networks.

The second part of the architecture was the U.S. Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems (BICES) network. U.S. BICES is the collaborative space and national interface with the NATO intelligence architecture for U.S. forces. BICES overall enables the sharing and exchange of intelligence through interoperable national, NATO, and coalition systems while following the principles of open standards.
commercial-off-the-shelf solutions, and common training standards in a non-competitive environment. With this open environment and self-funding by each country, BICES allows nations to incorporate additional analytical tools for their own network but maintain a common standard across the greater network. Thus, BICES is the window through which the RAF interacts and is truly interoperable with the allies within the EUCOM AOR.

The final portion of the communication plan was telephonic. Every person involved in the coordination during both orientation and mission preparation phases knew they could pick up a phone and conduct direct liaison with their counterpart.

Several observations can be made from the aforementioned communications strategy. First is the critical role face-to-face meetings play. These meetings are by definition direct in the communication style and allow for a clear understanding of commander’s intent. They allow for agreement on major objectives, articulation of challenges, establishment of project management systems, and goal setting. The use of SVTC, email, and telephones is most useful in between face-to-face meetings to maintain momentum on the project and work through details of particular challenges. Although meetings in person are expensive and time consuming, they are vital at the initial, middle, and final checkpoints to ensure understanding, commander’s intent, and timeline adherence.

Meanwhile, as USAREUR G2 began the integration of the RAF, the USAREUR staff simultaneously conducted integration for the NRF/ERF, 1-1 CAV (see Figure 3). It was readily apparent that the same three-phase process should be used for its integration. Fortunately, the process had already begun with the RAF integration visit in May 2013 enabling USAREUR G2 TREX to move to the next level of communication, exchanging emails and ensuring that subject matter experts were connected and actively communicating on issues (e.g., FDO training, Foundry training, logistic support, administrative and travel requirements, current intelligence production, intelligence architecture and connectivity).

The first USAREUR G2 SVTC with 1-1 CAV S2 was conducted on April 1, 2014, and was also scheduled to occur monthly with many of the same participants as the SRCA SVTC. After just a few months of multiple SVTCs, USAREUR G2 TREX determined that the SRCA and the NRF/ERF units would benefit from hearing the problems and planning considerations of the others; therefore, the two were combined into one monthly SVTC. With active communication occurring and the Orientation Phase well underway, the next phase, Mission Preparation took center stage.

“Deepen Regional Understanding in line with Regionally Aligned Forces”

Figure 3.

Training Equals Readiness–Foundry 2.0

The RAF integration visits to the brigades and divisions included an orientation to the AOR, CONPLAN briefings, architecture requirements, and intelligence requirements for the theater. This prompted the development of a recommended IWfF training plan by USAREUR G2 TREX for RAF units consisting of lists by intelligence discipline with recommended capabilities for the unit to be able to accomplish while deployed in support of EUCOM. Each unit then conducted a self-assessment of its ability and developed a plan to conduct or attend Foundry training at home station or within CONUS or live environment training (LET) to reach those goals. Any gaps or area-specific training would then be identified for training once the unit deployed to theater, as was the practice during the earlier decade’s deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Unique features of the new Foundry 2.0 Program and theater specific training events provide significant improvements over the old IWfF Force Generation model utilized for OEF and OIF. Within Foundry 2.0, there are LETs, the Intelligence Readiness Operations Capability (IROC), home station 100-200 level skills development, and advanced 300-400 level courses as both resident and mobile training team opportunities. For the RAF integration into USAREUR CONPLANS, the USAREUR G2 relied on the Foundry 2.0 Program to ensure the units were fully engaged prior to deployment, building regional competency, honing cognitive analysis, developing cultural awareness and savvy, and inculcating a “NATO Ready” mentality. The more these skills are practiced, the better prepared the RAF was to accomplish their mission in theater.

A prime example of the training model execution would be 4ID receiving the USAREUR integration briefings and conducting self-assessments to determine its training plan prior to deployment. 4ID knew that their all-source ana-
lysts needed to be able to use their assigned systems (e.g., DCGS-A, ACE Block II, CPOF, TROJAN), so that training was already programmed and available at the 100-200 level at the Foundry Platform at Fort Carson.22 Step two included USAREUR recommended skills and courses (e.g., write for release, NATO Collection Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management Courses, NATO Plans Course).23 The third step involved LET and IROC, which takes the analyst to the graduate level for Foundry 2.0.24 For the LET, small teams of analysts were sent TDY to the MIB(T) in Darmstadt, Germany where they could sit side-by-side with regional analysts to learn USAREUR methodology, targets, and analytical rigor.25

Upon completion of the LET, the analysts were then ready to establish an IROC function at Fort Carson feeding into and collaborating with the MIB(T) in order to maintain currency on the intelligence situations monitored by USAREUR, and sustain their regional familiarity and awareness.26 In this manner, the 4ID analyst goes from a general analyst to a regionally attuned analyst who is contributing to the overall mission of the USAREUR IWfF, while the MIB(T) acts as the synchronizer, the anchor point, for all intelligence feeding into the USAREUR headquarters. Finally to enhance NATO interoperability, 4ID sent analysts to assist with an all-source workshop for NATO allies with USAREUR G2 instructors in Lithuanian for Latvian and Lithuanian Soldiers.27

For 3ID, this model was expanded to include LET opportunities at the Multinational Corps–North East (MNC-NE) located in Szczecin, Poland, thus allowing a greater understanding of NATO language, culture, and interoperability.28 During the MNC-NE LET, a U.S. Army staff sergeant worked directly for an Estonian major and produced relevant and timely intelligence products for the MNC-NE commander while demonstrating the commitment of the U.S. to the Alliance and willingness to work together. Therefore, when Soldiers get to the point of working in either an IROC or a multinational headquarters, they are putting their training into operational work with strategic impact.

Developing Regional Expertise and Building Partner Capacity

4ID participated in a LET, instructing NATO allies on the fundamentals of intelligence analysis. This is just one example of USAREUR G2’s effort to support LTG Legere’s vision that an ASCC should “view your LET(s) as part of the collaborative regional effort.”29 To expand upon this “collaborative regional effort,” USAREUR regularly tasks the aligned and allocated units to participate in TSC activities and considers this a necessary part of integrating the RAF into the theater.30 Participants may attend a class being taught at a NATO facility or serve as an observer controller or participant in a multinational exercise.31 The RAF Soldiers may find themselves teaching skills to other countries in military-to-military engagements, or working inside a NATO Corps headquarters, or serving in the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre.32 Through all of these engagements, U.S. Soldiers are exposed to NATO standards, doctrine, and terminology; cultural diversity and awareness; and the need to understand how and what we share with our allies (see Figure 4).

It’s not all Roses

While this discussion has highlighted the successful integration of the IWfF portion of the RAF into USAREUR, it is not without its difficulties and challenges. Early in the planning process for the integration, the lack of current intelligence hardware sets in the European Activity Set became a considerable planning constraint.33 Deploying units would have to bring any MI specific equipment with them which increases deployment costs and slows the movement to the theater. While USAREUR is able to bring small groups of Soldiers TDY under Foundry, ASCCs have had to be patient for the administrative processes to be defined with FORSCOM for the movement and request for forces.34 For the SRCA and RAF to be effective as a ready force for employment within a theater of operations, the force flow from request to arrival must be agile and dynamic and cannot be the same process used over the past several decades without inhibiting the ASCCs’ and COCOMs’ ability to win in a complex world and execute the core competency of “set the theater.”35

The Foundry program is undergoing restructuring due to the shift from Overseas Contingency Operations funding to base funding at the same time the U.S. Army is defining the concepts of SRCA and RAF units. ASCCs will have to continue to refine the training under the Foundry umbrella to accommodate regional competency and cultural awareness opportunities in a synchronous and collaborative regional effort.36 The coalition network of choice for the U.S. forces
in Europe is U.S. BICES, which is available in CONUS; however, units must have an active NATO Registry account and be a certified NATO Control Point to maintain access to this network.\textsuperscript{37}\ Unfortunately, over the years of OIF and OEF, many installations failed to maintain NATO certification and must reestablish them to secure access to NATO systems and information.\textsuperscript{38}\ Due to USAREUR's vital role of enabling the Alliance, USAREUR will have to interpret and incorporate NATO language, architecture, interoperability, and culture into every aspect of training, operations, and employment of Theater Army forces with an emphasis on sharing information, data, and techniques among the Alliance.

**Conclusion**

So, as we face the challenge put forth in the *U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World*, we assume a smaller force largely based within CONUS with fiscal constraints. To meet this challenge, USAREUR G2 has articulated a plan for the IWfF of regionally aligned and globally responsive forces to be integrated into GCC AORs from the initial planning through the deployment of forces. This case study of the integration of RAF highlights methodologies for success and areas of concern for both the operational and strategic levels of the U.S. Army. The future is dynamic and the IWfF is prepared to win in a complex world.

**Endnotes**

4. Marks, 11.
6. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
17. RAF Orientation Brief to DA G2.
18. 4ID G2 Training Meeting, November 20, 2014, 6-7.
21. 4ID G2 Training Meeting.
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Introduction

The Army Total Force Policy (ATFP) echoes “DoD policies [that] require the military departments to organize, man, train and equip their Active and Reserve Components (AC/RC) as an integrated operations force to provide predictable, recurring and sustainable capabilities.”1 While the policy is simple on the surface, implementation at the operational and tactical (division and below) levels requires mature leadership, a deliberate approach, and command emphasis in both the AC and RC. This article examines the first year of an ATFP implementation within I Corps’, 25th Infantry Division’s (25ID), and 34th Infantry Division’s (34ID) Intelligence Warfighting Functions (IWfF).

In June 2014, 34ID completed a highly successful Division Full Scale Exercise (DFSX) 14.5 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, setting the stage for the Division’s ARFORGEN cycle ready-year. Prior to this exercise, 34ID had a long-standing informal relationship with I Corps as both had participated in multiple exercises together, including Yama Sakura 61 and Talisman Saber 13. 34ID will also support I Corps in Yama Sakura 69 and 71, Army Warfighting Assessment/Network Integration Evaluation (AWA/NIE) 17, and Talisman Saber 17.

Based on these experiences, and with a vision for implementing ATFP, the I Corps Commander challenged his staff to go beyond simply coordinating 34ID’s participation in Talisman Saber 15 and to fully integrate 34ID into the I Corps staff. The I Corps G2 section rose to this challenge and took steps to integrate the 34ID G2. Simultaneously, the 34ID Commander challenged his staff to define their value proposition and communicate it to their I Corps counterparts. For every exchange, 34ID staff officers were prepared to describe their integrated role and offer suggestions for future improvements. The 34ID Commander emphasized that the ATFP provides an additional, often enhanced opportunity for leader development. AC/RC integration in building and sustaining the readiness cycle can provide an early glimpse into a leader’s ability to integrate for combat.

Both Commanders were keenly aware that the ATFP process provides critical insight into a leader’s ability to integrate components for combat.

This strong command emphasis is critical to successful cross-component integration at the tactical and operational levels. Both sides must own the relationship, and be willing to dedicate the additional time and resources to make it successful—especially in the long term. Many obstacles can derail ATFP, such as funding or a change in OPTEMPO. One result of this guidance is the excellent and still evolving relationship between both units’ IWfFs.

The MI Community is uniquely suited to embrace the type of integration envisioned in the ATFP. The nature of collection and analysis requires sharing and using multiple non-organic resources to help commanders visualize the battlefield. Units at the division and Corps levels routinely coordinate, negotiate, and compromise to develop a shared understanding. During Talisman Saber 15, the 34ID’s Intelligence section successfully integrated into the Corps G2, proving that ATFP can be successful. Key components of this model are open dialogue regarding limitations and goals, flexible requirements that acknowledge the differences between the AC/RC planning horizons and human capital constraints, and the willingness to share resources including funding and support.

Starting the Collaboration

In August 2014, the Corps G2 conducted a staff visit to 34ID Headquarters to learn about its capabilities and begin collaboration on a plan for future exercises, training,
and support. This visit resulted in a common understanding of both units’ capabilities, challenges, and organizational goals, and set a foundation for expectation management. This early coordination was perhaps the most important to the long-term viability of the partnership, because shared understanding facilitates dialogue rather than disconnect when challenges arise.

Shared understanding and open dialogue are critical to avoiding the inevitable challenges that arise due to the differences between the two components. For example, I Corps’ Collection Manager was very proactive in gathering information on the specifics of the Division’s collection plan. This avoided potential issues associated with the Division Collection Manager’s limited access to SIPR outside of weekend drills. It also made up for shortfalls that resulted from limited training time and funding constraints that often prohibit RC Soldiers from attending additional training such as the Collection Manager’s Course.

Finally, I Corps’ early coordination and consideration of the RC execution requirements helped ease 34ID’s challenge to pack six months of AC planning and execution into 12 working days. While there is occasionally funding available to support this type of effort outside of drill weekend, RC Soldiers complete much of this work without compensation. Most RC leaders and Soldiers do this work to ensure mission success, but the monetary and time costs are borne by their families.

I Corps’ staff visit also created a shared understanding of the support requirements for Talisman Saber 15. This shared understanding allowed I Corps and 34ID to address two key limitations: MI personnel shortfalls in key areas and limited funding for MI personnel. 34ID has only one full time NCO responsible for updating and maintaining its MI systems, and its MI Systems Warrant Officer position (353T) is vacant. The second limitation was that 34ID had 24 personnel to replicate the entire Division G2 for the exercise (2 personnel to support set up and operations of the MI systems infrastructure). I Corps’ shared understanding also ensured that the plan allowed the Division to achieve its training objectives, including employment of the Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A) and Intelligence Fusion Server (IFS) stacks, and exercising the intelligence enterprise within the context of the Corps’ battle rhythm.

Together I Corps and 34ID developed and implemented a solution for the exercise, based upon 34ID capabilities, limitations, and objectives. The I Corps recommendation was to co-locate the 34ID ACE with the I Corps reach-back cell in the Intelligence Operations Facility (IOF) at Joint Base Lewis McChord (JBLM), and link that production capability to the 34ID TAC at the JBLM Maneuver Training Center (MTC). This allowed close synchronization of the Division and Corps’ common operating picture (COP), providing more effective targeting and collection efforts. I Corps also created space in their server room to allow the Division to link its IFS stack through the I Corps stack. This configuration facilitated the Division’s use of its 35T Soldiers and Field Service Representatives (FSRs) to provide additional MI systems support. This allowed 34ID to update and exercise the limited equipment that it could bring, while leveraging I Corps’ equipment for the systems that the Division could not bring to the exercise (e.g., ACE Block II, Geospatial Intelligence Workstation, and Cross Domain Solution Suite).

Each one of these challenges represents a significant training opportunity, and each solution was foundational to achieving full ATFP implementation.

Refining the Relationship

The next step towards realizing the ATFP vision came in the spring of 2015. The I Corps G2 proposed an analyst exchange. The intent was to exchange four MOS 35F10 Intelligence Analysts for the duration of the exercise to enhance intelligence integration. Although originally limited to Soldiers working in the IOF, the plan ultimately evolved to include sending an MI NCO from Division to I Corps Forward to work as the COIC night shift NCOIC, and an I Corps NCO to serve as the 34ID MI NCOIC working in the JBLM MTC. The remaining two exchange Soldiers worked in the IOF. The exchange provided much closer intelligence coordination between the organizations. The analysts involved in the exchange each brought institutional knowledge and skills from their parent organization. This made both organizations immediately more effective because it eliminated most of the trial and error required to learn the same information. The I Corps NCO’s institutional knowledge helped clarify I Corps requests, and facilitated the Division’s inter-
action with JBLM. Similarly, the 34ID NCO was able to contact Division personnel to facilitate information flow to I Corps forward.

The analyst exchange was successful because both units fully integrated the Soldiers into operations. I Corps tasked the 34ID NCO with maintaining the blue COP, including gathering information from the U.S. and Australian land forces and providing it to the I Corps G2 ACE so it could create a combined COP. This NCO stated that he learned more at this training than at any previous training because I Corps took him out of his usual area (ISR OPS) and gave him additional responsibilities.

The 34ID ACE had a similar experience operating adjacent to the I Corps reach-back cell in the IOF. The I Corps G2 fully embraced 34ID Soldiers during the exercise. This created an I Corps/34ID team that quickly resolved challenges. This cooperation paid big dividends when it came to the DCGS-A. Due to limited training time, RC Soldiers have difficulty staying proficient on the perishable skills required for system operation and upkeep. I Corps assigned a technically skilled junior analyst to the 34ID ACE, and 34ID assigned an analyst to the I Corps reach-back cell. The I Corps Soldier became an integral part of the 34ID ACE operations because he had day-to-day experience working with DCGS-A. He was able to support production and gain valuable experience training 34ID analysts on best practices and short cuts. He also increased 34ID Soldier productivity and grew individually as a trainer. Similarly, the 34ID Soldier was able to gain valuable ACE Block II skills that will be useful as the Division upgrades that system.

One of the primary drivers behind co-locating the 34ID ACE with the I Corps reach-back cell was to facilitate direct access to I Corps’s 353T, 35T, and FSRs. There are less than eight qualified MI Systems Warrant Officers in the entire National Guard. The Division had one full time MI systems Soldier and one traditional National Guard Soldier participating in the exercise, both of whom were 35Fs with substantial technical expertise. I Corps leveraged its FSR and 35T capability to support both the 34ID G2 and the I Corps reach-back cell by co-locating in the IOF. This technical exchange will always be critical to any AC/RC integration. AC Soldiers have an intimate working knowledge of MI systems based on their day-to-day work; whereas, RC Soldiers can bring a higher level of civilian corporate IT experience to bear. This combination of different skills and experience creates a knowledge base that is more than the sum of its parts, and is one of the strengths of the ATFP.

Although it was necessary and beneficial to leverage I Corps systems personnel, 34ID had a training goal of using as much organic equipment as possible. One option to support 34ID’s operations was to fall in on I Corps or another tenant unit’s equipment. But operating the Intel enterprise with borrowed equipment would provide a false sense of readiness and negative training (i.e., develops habits that are contrary to mission readiness). Updating and employing as much of the MI systems architecture as possible provides a critical training opportunity for an Intel section. One of the most difficult responsibilities for any network owner is to ensure the integrity of the equipment allowed on the domain. 34ID worked closely with the DOD Intelligence Information Systems Information Assurance Manager to enable the Division to access the exercise network using organic equipment.

**Future Opportunities**

The dialogue between 34ID and I Corps continues to increase through participation in events such as the I Corps G3 Sync, G2 CG Brief, and Joint Event Life Cycle events for large exercises including Yama Sakura 69, Talisman Saber 17, and AWA/NIE 17. I Corps is gaining experience working within the RC timeline (6 calendar months equals less than 12 training days), and the 34ID G2 is using a modified training approach by bringing selected production staff in for additional man-days to allow additional time to perform MDMP leading up to the exercises. The preparation for Yama Sakura 69 included increased VTC coordination with I Corps, hosting a Collection Management sync meeting with 25ID and 34ID. I Corps also hosted a full Intelligence sync VTC that set the stage for that exercise.

The Commanders’ challenge for Training Year 2016 and beyond is for the organizations to achieve a level of staff integration such that distinctions between components are
virtually invisible when building and sustaining readiness. We must ensure that the ATFP is the backbone of the sustaining readiness model, and not simply an afterthought. The next level of maturation will result in more creativity in the home-station training program.

Even though the I Corps/34ID G2 collaboration was successful, and I Corps is fully engaged with the 34ID and other RC partners, all parties understand there is still a great deal of work to solidify it into a Total Army culture where this level of cooperation is the standard. There have been many leadership transitions at I Corps following Talisman Saber 15, but the hand-off has been smooth so far. Preparation, open dialogue, and resource sharing continues to improve with every exercise. If this continues, the MI Corps will continue to lead the way toward making the ATFP concept a reality, living up to the motto, “Always Out Front.”

Endnotes
2. The new Division MTOE adds 6 35Ts (2 NCOs and 4 Soldiers) to the G2 section, which will help correct this shortfall.
3. This is a recommended TTP the Division will emulate for future exercises including Yama Sakura 69. The only difference will be that I Corps will operate its G2 forward, rather than utilize a reach-back capability, so coordination and networking will be more difficult. However, the relationships and experience gained during Talisman Saber 15 should provide a foundation to resolve any challenges.
4. National Guard units do not have organic FSR support.
5. The 34ID G2 made the decision to staff Talisman Saber 15 with All Source elements and ISR OPS and Targeting rather than single source to limit system requirements to DCGS-A and IFS stacks in order to make use of the limited personnel slots available.
6. They planned and executed the full 34ID MI systems architecture for DFSX 14.5 including the ACE Block II Interim Authority to Operate and at Fort Leavenworth the previous training year.

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(U) ATP 2-22.2-1, Volume I is the Army’s doctrinal publication for counterintelligence (CI) investigations, analysis and production, and technical services and support activities. It provides techniques for, and examples of, using Army CI assets at all echelons and in all operational environments.

(U) ATP 2-22.2-1 outlines the following areas:

✦ The CI mission areas and CI specific functions.
✦ The roles and responsibilities of Army, joint, and national CI elements and the U.S. intelligence community.
✦ Specific techniques and procedures for conducting CI investigations, analysis, technical services, and support activities in support of Army operations and programs.
✦ The considerations for CI support in specific operations, missions, and environments.

(U) The principal audience for this publication includes Army CI special agents, commanders, and staffs of those military intelligence organizations responsible for conducting (planning, preparing, executing, and assessing) CI missions. It also serves as a reference for military personnel developing doctrine, institutional and unit training, materiel and force structure, and standard operating procedures for CI activities at all echelons.

Distribution is authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors, only to protect controlled unclassified information and operational data.

Soldiers may access this document at https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_c/pdf/atp2_22x2_1.pdf

Introduction

The requirements of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept within the movement and maneuver warfighting function’s expanded role is best captured by the phrase “prevent, shape, and win,” a phrase that was uttered many times by General Raymond T. Odierno, and is the core of the Army’s strategic vision and Army’s Operating Concept 2020-2040. An emphasis on building partner capacity to enhance security shifts importance to shaping and deterring, so operation planning phases involving seizing the initiative, dominating, and stabilizing may not become necessary. The objective of steady-state activities and shaping operations is to dissuade and deter potential adversaries while strengthening relationships with partners and allies. As recent conflicts that span the globe have dictated, partner capacity building requires a multi-faceted and versatile approach to understanding, connecting, and deterring threats throughout the full spectrum of conflict to include “gray zone strategies” and evolution of 21st century conflict (see Figure 1).

Current and emerging threats include the potential for more successful hybrid conflict in all domains through escalation dominance (local and/or regional) and calculated direct and indirect effects (military and non-military) based combinations to reach political objectives. A critical facilitator of understanding involves intelligence and a variety of estimates and assessments which contribute to a holistic understanding of the operational environment (OE), and support joint operation planning processes and multi-echelon decision making to meet political end states.

This article outlines how an intelligence model specifically tailored for the contemporary OE better supports unified action involving the U.S. Army’s RAF, and associated joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) partners during all joint and multinational operation plan phases (see Figure 2) through collective human network identification and engagement (NIE) methods.
These methods and processes are employed in the human and physical domains and also exhibit effects in the information and electromagnetic environments and cyberspace during Army-centric Unified Land Operations (ULO).

**ULO and RAF**

The model was modified from the existing ULO model contained in ADRP 3-0 and foundational elements of brigade combat team (BCT) Intelligence techniques. ULO is the Army’s contribution to Unified Action and refers to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations, in order to create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. ULO has four foundations: initiative, decisive action, army core competencies, and mission command. ULO is summarized as being executed through decisive actions involving offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities during domestic situations. The Army core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security constitute mission command guidance and mission command system execution. The Army defines RAF as:

- Those units assigned or allocated to combatant commands (CCMDs).
- Those service-retained, CCMDs-aligned forces prepared by the Army for regional missions.

They are drawn from the total force, including the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. Regional alignment consists of assigned forces, allocated forces, and service retained CCMD-aligned.

RAFs consist of capabilities that are forward stationed in a CCMD area of responsibility supporting CCMDs through reach-back capabilities. Some of their key tasks include: operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises (Operation Combined Resolve at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany), and theater security cooperation activities (USAREUR’s Operation Atlantic Resolve). The intent of the RAF is to provide a tailorable capability to meet steady-state and phase zero shaping requirements through culturally and regionally aware forces.

The RAF concept provides a foundation for examining and adapting the role of land forces in support of combatant commanders (CCDR) across the spectrum of conflict. RAFs were designed to provide CCDRs with up-to-joint task force capable headquarters with scalable capabilities to cope with the anticipated OE. The BCT is the Army’s primary ground maneuver force with the combat aviation brigade as the parallel air movement and maneuver force. BCTs are flexible and adaptable combined arms elements and are capable of fulfilling core competencies associated with ULO, and therefore have the capacity to meet the RAF mission requirements among others.

**Describing Collective Network Identification and Engagement**

The proposed model is collective NIE and is rooted in an emerging NATO concept of a similar name which broadens joint countering threat networks (CTN) efforts. This model accelerates intelligence in ULO to better fit the 21st century strategic environment and proliferation of urban operations in dense population centers and the multidimensional battlefield. This particular model is also all-inclusive and supports a holistic understanding of the OE, sustained presence, partner capacity building, intelligence organization, parallel planning, and execution of regional missions at all echelons through nested engagement methods. Those nested methods are: NATO Human Network Analysis and Support to Targeting (HNAT), Attack the Network (AtN) which has been expanded and re-named Network Engagement (NE), and Company Intelligence Support.
Military Intelligence

Team (COIST) processes (see Figure 3). All of the these understanding and engagement methods are applicable to traditional and irregular warfare operations and include academic assessments and doctrine as a common language.

Next, collective NIE includes single and all-source intelligence, which enables target development and engagement during ULO at all levels. This model was designed to address 21st century irregular warfare (also called New Generation War, Nonlinear War, or Hybrid Warfare), evolution of conventional forces and special operations forces interdependence, U.S. Army’s regional mission requirements, and NATO’s international obligations involving proportionality and collective defense. The above warfare terms highlight threat applications of non-military and military means, executed through evolved traditional and coercive activities, state sponsored unconventional warfare, espionage, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism. The model also accounts for western definitions of traditional warfare and characteristics involving peer-to-peer or near-peer actors, high-precision weaponry, full range of technology, and dense population centers in interactively complex OEs.

Furthermore, the model inherently integrates tailored targeting methods into the existing processes which inform the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP), Military Decision Making Process, and Troop Leading Procedures institutionalized within allied militaries at all levels. The envisioned end state for this concept is for commanders and staff sections to develop appropriate courses of action that facilitate simultaneous supporting, influencing, disrupting, and neutralizing activities in their concept of the operation and scheme of maneuver during operations planning, mission execution and assessments in ULO. The course of action development is the result of effective bottom-up intelligence from subordinate units, which is fused with higher echelon capabilities and the commander’s intent.

The model begins with the Intelligence Warfighting Function (IWfF) described in ADRP 2-0 Intelligence, then progresses to the Anticipated Holistic OE, and culminates with more precise intelligence and analytic support to offensive, defensive, and stability operations executed through the below methods. This statement summarizes the definition of the stated model:

**Unified Action involves all unified action partners conducting collective NIE informed by HNAT, NE, and COIST operations by means of intelligence core competencies and capabilities, which are guided by the Commander, the intelligence process and staff, specialized cells (COISTS/RAF cells) and the greater intelligence enterprise.**

Figure 4 illustrates the components which extend intelligence and analytic support to operations through more collective network engagement practices and joint targeting processes. It also acts as a guide for the remainder of the article.

All components of the model correlate to specific parts of the RAF’s mission involving comprehensive approaches to understanding areas of responsibility, interoperability training, collaborative planning, and execution of regional partnered missions during the initial planning phases of the operation.
First, ADRP 2-0 states that the IWfF is larger than military intelligence, and therefore provides a more comprehensive view of the active situation by drawing from diverse sources. Due to the current nature of collective defense planning and interoperability, training a concise understanding of the entire range of threat and friendly force capabilities requires a mechanism like the IWfF which includes military intelligence and the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. For example, intelligence and analytical tasks within the article’s model include all operational variables and sub-variables, friendly, neutral, unknown, and threat human networks, where additional focus is placed on the network formation conditions, center(s) of gravity, and critical factors that influence movement, maneuver, and wide area security operations.

Critical factors analysis can be broken down further into critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities which drive intelligence analysis, assessments, and operations. NE includes CTN methods as a pillar and supports the aforementioned processes through meta-network analysis which applies social network analysis to identify potential nodes for lethal and/or non-lethal action or further analysis.

Secondly, the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) process contained in Joint Publication 2-01.3, involves four major and continuous steps:

- Defining the total OE.
- Describing the impact of the OE.
- Evaluating the adversary.
- Determining and describing adversary potential courses of action.

The JIPOE process includes the physical areas and factors and information environment, both of which are overlapped by cyberspace and political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time (PMESII-PT) systems. Additionally, the above operational and mission variables (METT-TC) are not only contained in the holistic view of the OE, but also drive mission analysis inputs and outputs. Finally, JIPOE facilitates an integrating and overlapping understanding of the anticipated OE involving the physical, human, and cyber domains as well as the socio-cultural factors, information, and electromagnetic environments (information and electronic warfare implications) and tightly coupled systems in the OE. The holistic approach to understanding is crucial to a RAF’s training requirements, threat analysis, and mission.

The approach also frames the OE for planning processes, commander’s intent, interagency assessment, language proficiency, and regional expertise and cultural knowledge. Lastly, mission planners and multinational forces must synchronize intelligence efforts with all staff sections and unified action partners to achieve a unity of effort, or what NATO calls a comprehensive approach. This involves international governments working together to meet the commander’s intent and mission objectives in all domains. At the joint and multinational task force level, the interagency coordination can be exercised by liaison officers operating under an optimized JIIM environment which reconciles various partners’ differing goals, objectives, and methods. This is crucial to enduring capabilities and capacity of all parties involved.

In order to perform collective NIE during offensive, defensive, and stability operations, units must have a circumspect understanding of joint dynamic targeting, integrating methods to engage targets, and the indicators which occur continuously and simultaneously in complicated, non-linear, and densely populated urban operational environments worldwide.

![Figure 4. Collective NIE Model.](image-url)
Threats and associated weapons involve conventional, improvised, and mass destruction means delivered by nation state and irregular and/or rogue state actors. A hybrid threat continuously evolves, adapts, and transitions which necessitates the need for accurate and continuous threat course of action evaluation and mutually beneficial effects analysis. Contributors to these evaluations and mission enabling activities involve private industry, academia, civilian law enforcement, national, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and local national authorities in addition to multinational military task forces.

Additionally, HNAT, AtN/NE, and COIST are all methods to, on one hand, conduct supporting activities, and on the other, to both influence and neutralize relevant human actors across a large spectrum of irregular warfare operations and activities outlined in Joint Publication 3-26 Counterterrorism. These activities or major operations must be aggregated to meet the campaign objectives, and include, but are not limited to: foreign internal defense, security force assistance, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, stability operations, strategic communication, psychological operations, information operations, civil-military operations, intelligence and counterintelligence, law enforcement, and peacekeeping. These methods once institutionalized, not only change and develop capabilities, but also influence critical thinking capabilities required to cope with the strategic security environment. Additional efforts borrowed from the NATO NIE concept include: improving intelligence support to operations visibility in day-to-day tasks, improving JIIM organizations’ ability to coordinate military capabilities dealing with threat networks, increasing understanding regarding threat networks and countering them, and ensuring engagement processes are adequately represented within multinational exercises.

Moreover, Intelligence Core Competencies must be applied effectively during operations at all levels as the basic tasks and activities driving the IWfF and support mission command. All core competencies involving synchronization, intelligence operations, analysis and associated analytical techniques, tools, and products are contained in all of the above methods. Intelligence operations shape decisive action and involve information collection by means of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and security operations. Reconnaissance is a critical competency and one of many information sources providing the information that enables a commander to understand where he or she can gain a decisive advantage while limiting the enemy’s ability to disrupt maneuver.

COISTs provide support to reconnaissance and security operations and operate at the lowest tactical levels employing sensors and assets to develop information to enhance higher echelon commanders’ understanding of the ground situation. Additionally, single-source intelligence integration is one of the basic requirements within these engagement methods and occur in all arms formations, at all levels. Finally, due to the nature of 21st century technologies and information systems, single-source data can be processed, exploited, and disseminated more rapidly and accurately to all unified action partners, enhancing a shared understanding and consciousness. Information and intelligence sharing involving all military and civilian organizations is critical for development of a common intelligence and operational picture.

Next, the IWfF executes the intelligence process by employing intelligence capabilities involving single and all-source approaches to developing intelligence. An important aspect of the intelligence effort involves the intelligence disciplines, capabilities, and complementary capabilities. The 21st century security environment and hybrid threat(s) call for more precise applications of specific capabilities. RAFs must become proficient at synthesizing those capabilities which contribute valuable information for all-source intelligence fusion in order to facilitate decision making and delivery of decisive action to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver. Critical complementary intelligence capabilities include: biometrics-enabled intelligence, forensic-enabled intelligence, cyber-enabled intelligence, and document and media exploitation. Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI), a component of Technical Intelligence, can also be applied to the contemporary OE and all-source intelligence fusion.

Complementary intelligence capabilities provide assessments on conventional and asymmetric threat capabilities involving improvised, emerging, or high-precision weapons systems, and varying courses of action. An example of irregular capabilities involves attacks where individuals are radicalized, recruited, trained, and launched on social media platforms. This phenomenon deserves deliberate attention, resources, and application of forensic, biometric, cyber and human enabled intelligence. Additionally, when fused with identity intelligence, WTI is crucial to significant activities, events and improvised explosive weapons or device attribution to a network or individual. The pre-emptive identification of individual cells, members, and targeting may demonstrate non-linear change involving local, connected, and associated cells and materiel inside and outside of the joint operational area or assigned region. This deals with
the disproportional inputs of capturing or interdicting a cell member(s) which results in exponential (non-linear) outputs involving the exploitation of associated personnel and materiel for intelligence value and operational gain. Non-linear change and predictive intelligence also occurs during decisive action when site exploitation operations occur. It is imperative that intelligence efforts are synchronized with controlled identity and technological dominance initiatives which provide preventive and deterrence measures.

Finally, all of the aforementioned components are guided by the final model component involving the commander, intelligence process, and staff. Guided by mission command fundamentals and systems, the commander, staff, and relevant civilian counterparts conduct intelligence operations, analysis, working groups, targeting meetings, and decision briefings which follow the unit’s battle rhythm and inform assessment, decision making, and continuous operations.

Conclusion

Collective NIE supports RAF adaptability objectives involving upgrading intelligence processing, reach, and sharing among multinational units. Maneuver and supporting elements have already institutionalized planning and engagement methods from previous joint training and real-world missions which facilitate interoperability. The collective engagement model combines and enhances an organization’s ability to assess ambiguous and hybrid threats and share information involving collective violent extremist organizations, state and non-state sponsors, transnational organized crime, and revanchist states through a more comprehensive and combined method. Conversely, this model includes engagement methods and assessment tools which can be directed inwardly and toward host nation forces in order to facilitate both friendly and neutral capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities assessments.

Conflict is rapidly evolving, and multinational forces must adapt and evolve through effective collective NIE practices in operational and strategic environments involving displaced populations, hybrid and deceptive threats, high precision weapons systems, and transnational irregular forces. A Regionally Aligned Force, associated sustainment readiness model, Decisive Action (DATE 2.2), and RAF training environment (RAFTE) assist in shaping the global security environment by setting conditions and relationships prior to any potential crisis. An additional requirement is to develop leaders who are capable of teaching and learning skills from partner nations in support of security cooperation activities and NATO readiness action plans to prevent, shape, and win.

Endnotes


2. Regionally Aligned Forces: Concept Viability and Implementation, March 2015, Carlisle Compendia of Collaborative Research, USAWC Student Publications. At http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/carlislecompendia/issues/mar2015/full.pdf. The study group examined the RAF concept, explored capability and capacity shortages, and considered the compounded effect of related implications from the different WFs. Organized across the Army WFs, and through the lenses of Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities, this compendium reports the results of that effort.

3. NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center Attack the Networks, May 2015. The NIE concept is intended to cover the full spectrum of counter threat network activities conducted by NATO. The project team believes that the development and institutionalization of such a concept would allow NATO to better coordinate all counter threat activities, resulting in more efficiency and effectiveness in operational planning and execution.

4. NATO Human Network Analysis and Support to Targeting (HNAT) is a newly approved doctrine which is fundamental to AtN and NIE. Working Draft 1 AItP-13 NATO (Unclassified) defines HNAT as an intelligence process that provides understanding of the organizational dynamics of human networks and recommends individuals or nodes within those networks for interdiction, action, or pressure. HNAT consists of Human Network Analysis (HNA), and HNA support to operations, targeting, and effects that influence attack, neutralize, and influence networks.

5. USAREUR COIST Framework, Raptor 14 Multinational C-IED Training Team 2014.

Other References

ADRP 2-0 Intelligence, August 2012.
ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations, May 2011.
Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence, October 2013.
Joint Publication 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, May 2014.
Joint Publication 3-26 Counterterrorism, October 2014.

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Introduction

In the complex operating environment that defines every theater, developing a flexible force is a critical element to achieving operational intelligence success. This flexibility requires access to a broad array of capacities, the full scope of the intelligence community (IC), and an engaged, relevant relationship between the Active Component (AC) Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade (Theater) (MIB(T)) and the regionally and operationally aligned Army Reserve MI Theater Support Battalions (TSB). This fundamental relationship must be founded on a collaborative team building model, collective planning, and an interconnected fabric of leaders and experts down to the subordinate teams that collect, produce, and exploit intelligence within both the MIB(T) and TSB. This article dives into this collaborative relationship, examines the key foundations of current and future success, and previews this path through the lens of the current engagement between the 66th MIB(T) and the 323rd MI Battalion (USAR) TSB. To be sure, the way ahead will require a fully aligned Total Army MI Corps: Active, Reserve, National Guard, and DA Civilian MI Professionals.

The Value of Operational Alignment

The anachronistic model of employing reserve intelligence personnel and units as a ready pool to fill individual and randomized mobilization needs in a “plug and play” manner ignores the inherent value of the skilled teams offered by the Army Reserve through the TSB. While there will always be a need for individual augmentation to larger missions, a paradigm shift toward operational alignment and employment of intelligence units promises to deliver increased capability to all. This new paradigm requires the TSB to be seen as a holistic unit capable of delivering products, as well as tailored teams and select individuals, to increase MIB(T) capacity to meet theater requirements through integrated operations. MI Reserve forces should be strategically managed for application to the right mission at the lowest level possible: the MIB(T)/TSB relationship and their subordinate units. This alignment and strategic commitment promises an opportunity to deliver assured capacity to the intelligence enterprise well into our dynamic future.

A Collaborative and Integrated Team

The single most critical element to the development of the MIB(T)/TSB relationship is a collaborative leadership mindset anchored by a commitment to developing sustainable, predictable, and scalable plans for current and future intelligence operations. This new paradigm focuses on developing flexibly adaptive and collaborative leaders and teams across the total force. No longer is the purpose of the Reserve Component (RC) to only fill gaps in emergency scenarios. Now the intelligence capacity of the Army Reserve, nested within the TSBs of the MI Readiness Command (MIRC) must be leveraged and integrated as part of current operations. Each of these Battalions, operationally aligned to a MIB(T) within a geographic command can, and should, provide ongoing and surge support for real world missions across the intelligence spectrum while remaining in their Reserve status. In accordance with this vision, the TSB should be able to provide the following capabilities to the MIB(T):

Analysis. Each TSB has an internal Analysis and Control Element (ACE) located near a SCIF with capacity for research, analysis, and production. Currently in support of the 66th MIB(T) and U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), the 323rd MI BN provides intelligence support for key European regional intelligence topics while also simultaneously providing intelligence for the Sub-Saharan African Region and U.S. Army Africa (USARAF). The ability of the TSB to provide this enables the MIB(T) increased intelligence coverage of their area of responsibility (AOR) as well as the opportunity to expand production at minimal monetary cost to the MIB(T) (Battle Assembly weekends are funded by the USAR).

Collection. Each TSB within the MIRC has the broad capacity to offer collections across the intelligence spectrum: Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Counterintelligence (CI), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), etc. These capacities are developed at the team level, making them capable of supporting the MIB(T) as a team, in small sections, or as individuals that are deployed on orders or working in Battle Assembly windows on uniquely designed products. While missions and mission timelines must be intentionally crafted in such a way as to
interconnect with the Reservist Battle Assembly weekend, creative project management can net outstanding results and increased productivity.

As part of the collaborative team approach, the 66th MIB(T) and the 323rd MI BN recently executed an annual training event at Fort Meade, Maryland, that incorporated a Leadership Conference involving the MIB(T) Commander, his staff, a team of observer/trainers, and key leadership of the 323rd MI BN. Planning identified an assigned AOR in support of USAREUR, coordinated potential future lines of funding, and began the process of matching requirements to personnel within the 323rd MI BN, while also developing a list of needs and opportunities for future growth of the relationship and interaction with the broader IC. Additionally, the 66th MIB(T) observer/trainers were able to interact with, train, and observe the 323rd MI BN ACE, CI/HUMINT, and GEOINT sections in a collective training event that brought in trainers from across the IC. At the conclusion of the event, quality feedback and an understanding of unit capacities, allowed the 66th MIB(T) and 323rd MI BN to develop a way ahead for further integration.

Developing an Enduring Mission

A critical requirement to successful integration of the TSB into the MIB(T) mission set is the development of an enduring mission that the TSB can completely own and develop over the long term (ideally five + years). Currently the 323rd MI BN, as the TSB, owns the ACE mission for several Sub-Saharan African nations for USARAF and is shifting to take analytic responsibility for a key region of USAREUR. These enduring missions involve a small core of USAR Soldiers on orders who manage intelligence and briefing requirements for those regions on a daily basis from their home-station mission facility. They also provide an enormous return on investment by enabling the troop program unit (TPU) mission set to be more fully developed and managed with well planned, connected requirements that support the MIB(T). The MIB(T) is provided a valuable reach-back capacity that allows for expanded mission sets and planned surge moments from home station in Maryland. This process effectively increases the TSB’s total value to the MIB(T) and allows for a greatly increased return on investment for mobilization/deployment dollars.

Collaborative Planning

The enduring mission must be sustainable, predictable, and scalable in order to become the envisioned ideal. This requires planning and interconnectedness as the leadership of the MIB(T) and TSB collaborate to recommend requirements to the G2 for funding and filling intelligence gaps. Using the core group of USAR Soldiers (on orders) conducting reach-back support keeps the total number of mobilized/deployed Soldiers limited, while expanding capability and reach of the MIB(T) into not only the USAR, but the diverse civilian capacities of the TSB force, and even the broader IC for an expanded network of experts, solutions, and ideas. The ultimate benefit of this planning is that the enduring mission can be sustained for years at a time, providing a strong understanding of mission, threats, and context.

While the operational world is very complex and unpredictable in many ways, allowing a habitual integration of the TSB into the MIB(T) planning cycle allows understanding of the many reoccurring exercises, training events, and habitual practices that are part of the culture of every organization. Examples of this type of culture include intelligence architecture, communications, computer programs, battle rhythm of required meetings, etc.

Finally, the last concept, scalability, allows the model of reserve involvement to be expanded, or contracted over time based on demand. By working habitually within the same TSB, the MIB(T) reaps the benefits of a group of Soldiers and teams that can be employed effectively with a higher degree of confidence into mission requirements because the MIB(T)/TSB relationship allows the Soldiers to be more known, understood, and selected for best mission fit to the Soldier.

The Total Army Benefit

Operational alignment and incorporation of the Army Reserve TSB with the AC MIB(T) is a strategy that benefits the entire force. The TSB brings personnel and teams with highly diverse skills from many facets of civilian life, levels of maturity, and experiences that rival or even surpass many AC units. Additionally, many Reserve Intelligence TSB’s units are geographically aligned with critical intelligence nodes across the country, allowing these units to house, train, and inject personnel with deep connections and experiences within the IC. This connectivity offers a unique opportunity for the MIB(T) to deepen and expand its network across the broader IC, increasing operational reach and mission success. As an example of this application, consider some of the effects of the recent two week collaborative annual training event between the 66th MIB(T) and the 323rd MI BN:

ACE Mission Shift: The 323rd MI BN ACE began the process of transitioning the current mission set from USARAF to USAREUR, connecting directly with experts in Germany to assume new mission over a major theater mission area while simultaneously beginning to transition USARAF mission to the 207th MIB(T) and 337th MI BN (TSB). The ACE
began developing the current operating picture for the 323rd’s USAREUR Area of Operations (AO) through creation of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment product for the 66th MI BDE’s USAREUR ACE team, with a final brief of all projected production requirements to the ACE and 323rd leadership during the second week of annual training.

**Connectivity:** DCGS-A connectivity was historically developed and resourced by the MIRC. With the additional support and expertise of 66th MIB(T) Soldiers, the 323rd ACE was able to take DCGS-A connectivity to the next level by synching with the 66th network. Using this capability, the 323rd USARAF team dynamically expanded their product quality and volume into the Theater Entity Database for their USARAF AO, finalized the 90-day update to AO, completed one Intelligence Summary, and gave a situational update brief on their AO to the 66th MI BDE’s USARAF G2 and ACE leadership using the established reach-back capability in the first week of annual training alone.

**GEOINT Capacity Enhancement:** GEOINT personnel, partnered with 66th trainers and began the process of answering USAREUR, Special Operations Command Europe, USARAF, and Special Operations Command Africa requests for information (RFIs) for the first time, following full system connectivity with the 66th ACE. Over the course of the first week of annual training, active RFIs were answered, and significantly more All-Source and Single Source products were completed in support of the 66th MI BDE mission than ever previously achieved.

**CI/HUMINT:** In addition to valuable cross-training with the 902nd MI Group and the Army Operations Group, the 323rd CI/HUMINT teams, working with 66th MI BDE Operations and Training Soldiers and NCOs, completed the CI and HUMINT Analysis portion of their Foreign Intelligence Services/Counterterrorism (FISS/CT) Country Focused Threat Brief and further refined the analytical portion of a FISS product collaboratively produced with the 66th MI BDE.

While the benefit to both the TSB personnel and the MIB(T) is quite obvious in this relationship, there are other stakeholders enjoying deeper benefits of our approach. The first of these is U.S. Forces Command, which is required to maintain a pool of ready forces. Implementing this model of TSB integration with the MIB(T) improves readiness by delivering a higher level of training and development opportunity to the RC force.

A second beneficiary of this relationship is the broader MI community in the Army Reserve, which falls under the MIRC. With the availability of missions through these operationally aligned TSBs, the MIRC is able to effectively tap into more events that can be employed to train the broader MI force through Foundry funding. Additionally, no TSB will ever be able to service the entire requirements list of the MIB(T). This opens numerous possibilities for live environment training and other unique opportunities to the broader MI force across the USAR and National Guard.

**The Road Ahead for the MIB(T)/TSB Relationship**

The future of Total Army Intelligence Integration is now, and one of the most critical pieces of that future is the MIB(T)/TSB relationship. MIB(T)s continue to face increasing requirements in a complex and uncertain operating environment. Leaving the Army Reserve TSB assets underutilized or viewing them as available solely to provide individualized mobilization decreases their net value to the broader IC and the MIB(T)s. Regionally aligned TSBs, such as the 323rd MI Battalion, must assume mission and effectively provide intelligence support through a layered program of highly predictable rotating tours/mobilization orders, annual training, and TPU unit training on a routine and surge capacity. This will benefit ongoing mission fulfillment, enhance training and readiness, and provide a higher caliber of ready individuals, teams, and units to the entire force in the years to come.

*COL Pendall is the Commander, 66th MIB(T).*

*LTC Allen is the Commander, 323rd MI Battalion (USAR).*

ATP 2-22.82 Biometrics-Enabled Intelligence, dated 2 November 2015, has been published. ATP 2-22.82 provides guidance concerning the use of biometric information by intelligence professionals, protection operations personnel, personnel involved in detainee screening or operations, and personnel involved in targeting operations. It addresses biometrics-enabled intelligence, the fundamentals of biometrics, and biometric systems, as well as biometric tools used in current operations. The manual discusses the biometric processes in support of the intelligence process, roles and responsibilities of intelligence units and individuals using biometrics, and intelligence considerations for the use of biometrically enabled watch lists. ATP 2-22.82 contains information protected as For Official Use Only. It supersedes TC 2-22.82, dated 21 March 2011.

This document is available at [https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_b/pdf/12dpi2_22x82.pdf](https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_b/pdf/12dpi2_22x82.pdf)
INTRODUCTION

Integrating U.S. Army Reserve Military Intelligence (MI) forces is essential for mission accomplishment as the U.S. Army responds to evolving global threats in a resource-constrained environment. Commanders and staff must develop an Army Reserve integration strategy to fully maximize the capability and capacity of their operationally aligned MI units from the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Every MI brigade (Theater) (MIB(T)) is assigned an operationally-aligned Army Reserve battalion that is organic to its formation. The 323rd MI Battalion (USAR) is operationally aligned to the 66th MIB(T). The 323rd MI BN provides trained, equipped, and ready Soldiers, teams, and units to conduct all-source and single source intelligence operations, and theater-level human intelligence (HUMINT), counterintelligence (CI), and target exploitation operations in support of 66th MIB(T).

The integration of proven, knowledgeable, and talented Army Reserve Soldiers of the 323rd MI BN increases the operational capacity and enables 66th MIB(T) to meet its requirements. The Battalion will increase Army Reserve support to augment intelligence production, Title 10 Force Protection, training support to multinational intelligence operations and security cooperation, and exercise and mission support in theater and in CONUS. The 66th and 323rd will resource this support through active duty orders, Overseas Deployment Training (ODT), Foundry Live Environment Training (LET), Inactive Duty Training (IDT), and Annual Training (AT).

GETTING THE RESOURCES RIGHT

To best utilize Army Reserve MI Soldiers, teams, and unit support, Active Component (AC) commanders must understand how to use and access Army Reserve resources, and the limitations placed on these resources. They must identify what capability gaps they seek to mitigate, and then determine the specific timeframe needed for Army Reserve support. To do this, the 66th will synchronize Army Reserve support through ODT, Foundry, IDT, AT, and a reduced number of active duty orders. Planning and coordination is essential to forecasting Army Reserve support in the right space and time. This coordinated effort includes staff from the 66th MIB(T), 323rd MI BN, 24th MI BN, 2nd MI BN, the MI Readiness Command (MIRC), and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Reserve Programs Office. An Army Reserve Engagement Cell/Team in U.S. Army Europe will assist and coordinate additional Army Reserve resources to support theater requirements.

INTEGRATING THE FORCE

As part of the Army Reserve integration strategy, the 323rd MI BN supports the 66th MIB(T) with resources that enable the Brigade to respond to emerging operational requirements. To enable mission command, the operationally-aligned Army Reserve MI BN must integrate its systems with MIB(T)’s intelligence enterprise and anchor into the theater architecture. The MIRC has geographically located the operationally aligned MI battalions with their Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISC) and ARISC detachments. These facilities provide an established fixed site platform for operationally aligned MI battalions to access the theater architecture. This includes the Distributed Common Ground System-Army, and SIPR and SCI communications networks. The 323rd MI BN utilizes the MIRC’s Dekalb facility in Fort Meade, Maryland to conduct reach-back analytical support. The facility also provides the primary training platform for the Battalion to conduct sustainment and readiness training.

TRAINING TOGETHER FOR READINESS

To facilitate Army Reserve support, the MIB(T) and its operationally-aligned Army Reserve battalion must synchronize its training and readiness. To support the brigade, the battalion participates in key synchronization events and adheres to guidance set forth by U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), MIRC, and the brigade’s training guidance and its aligned Army Service Component Command’s operational policies. Therefore, an operationally-aligned Army Reserve battalion must communicate its training gaps in order to
develop a training strategy and plan nested in the MIB(T)'s operational requirements. These operational requirements are coordinated and synchronized with the operationally-aligned MI battalion and the MIRC in order to facilitate and resource Reserve intelligence sustainment training.

Currently, the 323rd MI BN's major training objectives include assessing team level tasks for HUMINT Collection, CI Teams, Document Exploitation, Geospatial Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, and the Analysis and Control Element. To meet these training objectives, the Battalion uses the MIRC's MI Sustainment Training Program and Foundry. Training is executed as part of the Battalion's mission essential training conducted during Battle Assembly (IDT) and AT. In addition, Foundry, LET, and ODT provide additional resources to assess and validate individual and team training in support of MIB(T) requirements. Training assessment will culminate at the 323rd MI BN's Collective Training Event (CTE). CTE coordination includes 323rd Soldiers supporting the Regional Operations Company in Wiesbaden, Germany and the 66th's observers/controllers/trainers at the Dekalb Detachment.

**Mission First**

The 66th MIB(T) relationship with 323rd MI BN and the use of Army Reserve MI Soldiers on IDT, AT, LET or Active Duty Operational Support status at home station are essential and cost-effective ways to meet mission requirements at the individual, team, and unit levels. MIB(T)-defined training, based in requirements, enhances the Battalion's intelligence capacity to execute assigned mission sets in support of U.S. Army Europe. The MIB(T) and operationally-aligned Army Reserve MI Battalion relationship requires full integration into operations, training readiness, systems architecture, exercise and mission requirements.

The 66th MIB(T) and the 323rd MI Battalion will continue to further develop lines of communication, planning, and resourcing to meet theater requirements in a dynamic and evolving environment. The depth of knowledge and experience of our Army Reserve MI Soldiers and units has proven invaluable in meeting mission requirements. A focused Army Reserve integration strategy is a force multiplier in meeting tactical, operational, and strategic requirements in a resource-constrained environment.

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**Speaking With Intelligence**

Speaking With Intelligence (SWI) is a monthly, informal online talkshow presented by the Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center enterprise. We bring exciting speakers from around the Intelligence Community to the warmth and comfort of your living room. We broadcast live on the last Thursday of each month at 2000 central time.

We've had a lot of exciting topics:
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Authors note: I have served as an All Source Intelligence Officer throughout my career and held the same positions and made the same mistakes as those highlighted throughout this article. The scenarios/recommendations provided are my observations and are meant to provide options for unit tailored solutions.

A U.S. Combined Arms Battalion is seventy-two hours away from their first offensive action to defeat Arianan aggression and restore the territorial sovereignty of the country of Atropia.

Step 1: Receipt of Mission—Conduct a movement to contact to fix the enemy to allow an adjacent unit to destroy them. The receipt of the order immediately starts the battalion staff’s Military Decision Making Process.

Step 2: Mission Analysis—Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) has started. Each individual officer/analyst in the section is hunched in front of a computer or over a map working feverishly to satisfy product requirements. Fast forward twelve hours. The Battalion Executive Officer (XO) makes the final corrections to the Mission Analysis (MA) Brief just as the Battalion Commander enters the Tactical Operations Center (TOC).

The MA Brief begins and rapidly covers the mission, commander’s intent, and forces available before transitioning to the S2. The S2 defines the operational environment and describes its effects through elaborate slides that include ground reference guides, line of sight analysis, terrain mensuration, population center overviews, and a myriad of other products. Forty five minutes later the S2 is finished describing the terrain in which the battalion will operate.

The enemy is now the focal point.

When evaluating the threat, the S2 covers the enemy order of battle and transitions the floor to a junior intelligence analyst. The analyst nervously positions himself in front of the senior leaders and reads verbatim data pertaining to enemy weapon systems. The S2’s portion of the brief has now reached the one hour mark.

Enemy Courses of Action (COA)—the S2 again takes the floor and describes enemy COAs using a PowerPoint slide for each. The slides are comprehensive and include many red diamonds and multiple tactical mission task graphics. However, to the audience the intent of the slides is lost in a sea of red shapes and lines.

After describing each COA, the S2 introduces the Assistant Intelligence Officer (AS2) who is designated as the Battalion Collection Manager. The AS2 recommends priority intelligence requirements and identifies named areas of interest that comprise the majority of the battalion’s area of operation. After an hour and a half and more than one hundred slides, the S2 turns the brief back over to the staff.

At the onset of the S2’s brief, the audience was attentive and engaged the section in dialogue. But as time passed and slides portraying data were flipped, leaders throughout the organization started to drift. At the brief’s conclusion all attendees appeared relieved that they could move forward. Put bluntly— the intelligence section missed the “so what.”
This story provides a synopsis of common Decisive Action Threat Environment (DATE) MA Briefs delivered by U.S. Intelligence Sections at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center. It is meant to demonstrate a common trend observed amongst most intelligence sections that is not just restricted to mission analysis. We (S2s, Intelligence Analysts) are trained and are proficient at developing data to understand enemy doctrinal roles/requirements. However, we fail to apply the proper analysis required to turn that data into intelligence, thus coming up short in extracting the “so what” for our consumers, the maneuver commanders.

What is preventing us from developing understanding through analysis? Through personal experience and observations as an Observer–Coach–Trainer there are three major trends that limit the ability of the Intelligence Warfighting Function to provide the “so what.”

1. Data development over analysis.
2. Failure to leverage organizational knowledge to compensate for lack of maneuver experience.
3. Struggle to employ the Intelligence Section in its entirety.

**Data development over analysis.** A British Battle Group (BG) receives an order. The Question 1 Brief, the equivalent of U.S. MA, is in twelve hours. The intelligence section composed of seven personnel prepares to answer the question: “What is the current situation, and how does it affect me?” Unlike most U.S. units they have done no intelligence preparation at home station for the DATE scenario. The section congregates around a single table. Each member of the section references a variant of our Battle Staff Smart Book, their organization’s TOC Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and higher headquarters Annex B to guide them through their process. Absent from the table are computers. The next morning the section delivers a comprehensive and effective brief—the commander walks away understanding how the current situation affects him in under an hour.

As an observer to the process I asked myself how they made such a complex process seem so easy. Their manning was no larger than our own. They were working under the same time constraints as most organizations. They had the same requirements/outputs as U.S. MA briefs. How did it happen? The section kept their processes simple. They read, processed, and discussed the information available to create shared understanding. Thus when they presented their findings to the commander it was in the form of analysis and recommendations—they extracted and delivered the “so what.”

Most U.S. Intelligence Sections struggle to find simplicity. Sections are largely driven to satisfy product requirements in the form of PowerPoint slides or acetate overlays. Consequently, the section spends more time creating a tool to present information than analyzing it.

I am not trying to debate the relevance and/or effectiveness of PowerPoint or any other presentation method. But, when product development limits our ability to extract relevant analysis and make recommendations to our commanders, we are missing the point.

Let’s use the British BG Intelligence Section as an example for improvement:

- They had defined roles and responsibilities for each analyst. In addition, they understood what was expected of them.
- They leveraged SOPs that helped them pull relevant data for analysis.
- They understood how their commander(s) receive and process information and tailored their presentation in that manner.
- They focused on creating understanding through analysis that drove product development.
Failure to leverage organizational knowledge to compensate for lack of maneuver experience. Early in my tenure at JMRC, my team senior trainer, a past Combined Arms Battalion Commander, looked in my direction and posed the following question: “How does a mechanized enemy break down his offensive movement? (i.e., What does his lead element in the attack want to achieve, followed by task and purpose of subsequent echelons?) After that talk to me about how he builds his defense.”

After an extended period of silence followed by an awkward and incoherent response it was evident that I had no idea. However, prior to asking the question my boss already knew the answer. He did his homework and understood my background—MI pure, predominantly light infantry organizations, multiple counterinsurgency based deployments, and no previous DATE Combined Arms Training Center experience. The intent was not to exert superiority or make me feel dumb. He simply understood a shortcoming in my professional development.

Though the narrative above is based on a personal experience, it demonstrates a larger trend—Intelligence Officers/Sections often do not understand maneuver. Do our commanders expect S2s to be the subject matter experts on maneuver? Probably not. I don’t recall any commander or operations officer I have worked with asking for my thoughts on the ground maneuver plan. So if we are not expected to be maneuver experts, why is it a problem?

As the S2, our commanders do expect us to think and plan operations from the enemy perspective. Our enemy analysis throughout IPB—strength, capabilities, and limitations—shapes our assessment on how they will fight. Ultimately, we need to paint a picture that will enable the commander to visualize the enemy in time and space, highlighting unique capabilities. Therein lies the friction point. If we do not have baseline knowledge of the doctrinal tenets involved in a movement to contact, attack, defense, breach, etc., will our COAs be detailed enough for the commander to visualize the fight?

Additionally, it is important to understand how unique enemy capabilities are employed, specifically those that can inflict significant effects to our formation. It is not enough to say that an enemy battalion has been tasked organized with a battery of 2S9s (120mm Self Propelled Mortar System) with a range of 10 kilometers. We should be able to say that the battery will be broken down into two sections of three tubes and will establish mortar firing points in support of the battalion’s main effort with task and purpose.

Trying to wrap your head around all of this in a time constrained environment can be overwhelming, but we, as S2s, have a pool of subject matter experts that we rarely utilize—our own staff. The Fire Support Officer can shape your understanding of how indirect fires will be task organized and employed at multiple echelons. The AS3 can talk employment of maneuver elements for offensive or defensive operations. The S6 can provide line of sight analysis and assess where the enemy will most likely employ retrans. Each staff element can offer significant insight to supplement your understanding of the enemy maneuver plan. The most effective manner I have seen this employed is through a formalized Reverse IPB process during MA chaired by the XO. However, a proactive S2 can pull the information in lieu of a formal setting. The S2 Section is the busiest section during MA. Never accept “I am too busy” from another section, and leverage the Battalion XO to make it clear to the staff that IPB is a battalion effort.

Listed below are some additional options to increase our individual understanding of Combined Arms Maneuver:

- Reference doctrine (Red–TRISA/TC Series Manuals and Blue) to learn the fundamentals of each type of major operation. This could be tasked to an individual analyst to research and then present his or her findings.
- Incorporate intelligence personnel into maneuver training events at the organizational level. For example, have them observe and/or participate in company level engagement area development. Seeing this first hand will speak volumes on how an enemy company would array its platoons and countermobility obstacles in the defense.
Observe your S3 plan and brief an operation. Emulate the same level of detail when developing enemy COAs. Some examples usually included in the friendly scheme of maneuver, but overlooked from the red perspective, are the execution sync matrix (time phase lines), phases of an operation, and decision points with criteria/conditions.

Struggle to employ the Intelligence Section in its entirety.

It’s the early morning hours and a U.S. battalion is minutes away from crossing the line of departure to begin an attack with breach. The S2 is in the TOC preparing his part of the Operations & Intelligence Brief. He has organized a leader’s book that includes enemy COAs, a kill chart, and Brigade and Battalion IC overlays and synchronization matrices. He is ready to go. However, a quick glance in the back of the S2’s M1068 tells a different story. There are no graphics or battle tracking products posted anywhere. The section’s Blue Force Tracker is inoperable. No analysts can be found in the tactical command post or in front of any digital mission command system. Initial reports of enemy contact begin to flood the Battalion Command Net.

The Brigade S2 calls the Battalion S2 on the phone while his analysts are asking for updates through digital chat rooms. At the same time, the Battalion Commander comes up on the net asking for the S2’s assessment. During the transmission between the S2 and the Battalion Commander the Battle Captain calls the TOC to attention: “The Brigade Shadow has identified an armored column moving east on Route New York.” Over the next two hours reporting does not slow down and the desire for situational reports from higher and the battalion commander grow. The requirement to provide updates and assessments has limited the S2’s ability maintain situational awareness of the fight. His shop cannot fill the void. The intelligence section has just become ineffective.

The vignette above highlights a common reality for most intelligence sections during DATE rotations. S2s struggle to leverage their complete section in planning and execution, leaving themselves overwhelmed while analysts merely observe the exercise. Why?

U.S. Intelligence Sections conduct minimal individual or collective training. Instead, they consume themselves with administrative requirements such as physical or personal security, clearance processing, or scenario development to support maneuver training. Consequently, analyst proficiency does not progress past entry level. In addition, analysts do not understand individual roles and responsibilities or required outputs to facilitate IPB or current operations. So when an S2 gives an analyst a specified task of performing Step 3 of IPB—Evaluate the Threat, that individual does not understand the implied tasks associated with it, or the required output of their analysis. Hence the S2 finds himself redoing work tasked to an analyst. But is it really the analyst’s fault when there was never an established standard?

Collectively, sections lack SOPs and fail to validate a task organization that can handle competing requirements. Thus most intelligence sections spend the majority of a DATE rotation struggling through a trial and error experiment attempting to establish systems and processes rather than refining them.

How can we get better? The solution starts at home station. S2s working with their senior analyst need to ensure they allocate time for internal training. Just like maneuver elements the section must create and execute a training plan that progresses from individual through collective Mission Essential Tasks. During the training evolution, the S2 can establish standards and expectations for analysis and product development, thus creating the foundation for SOP development (or refining it if a product already exists). Additionally, this will enable leadership to hold individuals accountable when a standard is not met. Be creative when developing training scenarios and attempt to mirror the DATE scenario as much as possible. Train as you would fight—leverage tactical mission command systems, work communicating via FM radios, pull training scenarios from previous experience or centers of excellence, and get analysts accustomed to briefing senior leaders.
“So What?”

There are high expectations placed on the Intelligence Section in DATE scenarios, and rightfully so. Our assessments can and should significantly impact operational decisions in both planning and execution (i.e., What we say to the boss matters.) This responsibility is well understood and drives countless hours of staff work in spite of significant sleep deprivation. Our emphasis on product development over analysis, lack of maneuver experience/knowledge, and insufficient training proficiency are major contributory factors in our struggle to extract the “so what.” The acknowledgement of these common shortcomings in addition to mitigating their effects through training and preparation will get us closer to our goal—enabling maneuver commanders to visualize the enemy in time and space driving informed operational decisions.

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Introduction
In November 2011, President Barack Obama outlined America’s rebalance to Asia while addressing the Australian Parliament. Given sequestration and the reduction-in-force, the Army has operationalized the rebalance by optimizing limited resources and personnel. It has experimented with new training approaches; integrated General Purpose and Special Operations Forces; repurposed and restructured units, especially on the Korean Peninsula; and, exercised deft defense diplomacy to build new partnerships and modernize alliances. The 2014 U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World also presents core competencies that are instrumental in facilitating the Army’s regional engagement.

Unfortunately, it is not clear how such competencies combine to better enable Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). This represents the Army’s organizational policy to facilitate the rebalance. Most puzzling, RAF insufficiently capitalizes on the Army’s Total Force Policy and joint force interdependence. These factors undergird the Army’s ability to demonstrate at least two competences. According to General Vincent Brooks, commander of U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), setting the theater results from “having the necessary forces, footprints and agreements in place to support regional operations and missions.” Shaping the security environment results from the deployment of “unique capabilities that...reassure partners and deter aggression while establishing conditions that support the potential employment of joint forces.”

Authorized by Secretary of the Army John McHugh in 2012, Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy) instructs leaders to “organize, man, train and equip their active and reserve components as an integrated operational force.” Some recent training exercises have forged relationships between components. During Operation Gryphon Longsword conducted in November 2014 at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), Washington, the 201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BfSB) integrated reserve elements. Organic to the brigade, the 502d MI Battalion partnered with the 373rd MI Battalion, a reserve unit also located in the state, to execute tactical site exploitation and Signals Intelligence operations. Such examples are uncommon and inherently ad hoc, however. Components generally operate absent of one another given diverse battle rhythms, budgetary imbalances, and distinct organizational cultures. So desynchronized are the service components that Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster contends “more work needs to be done with integrating the reserve component into RAF.”

Similarly, RAF has enabled minimal inter-service partnerships beyond the movement of materiel and personnel, as well as trials of sea basing Army helicopters, on U.S. Navy vessels. Notwithstanding the myriad exercises annually conducted across the region, these are also largely designed to enhance the interoperability of one service of America’s armed forces and its allied or partnered nation counterpart. Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the former Chief
of Naval Operations, further cautions that fiscal uncertainty threatens to alienate the services from each other. Even defense experts who lobby for an adaptation of the Infantry battalion to better “integrate enablers, work with regional partners, and train with interagency partners and special operations forces” fail to realize how regionally aligned forces can operate interdependently with adjacent services to provide officials options. I argue that senior leaders can refine RAF by adopting an operating paradigm referred to in this paper as capabilities sets. These formations “package individuals and teams with associated equipment against identified mission requirements that span the spectrum of conflict and enable a multi-echelon, joint, and/or multi-national response.” As interdependent, distributable, and tailor able solutions, capabilities sets will “ensure that the Total Force is organized, trained, sustained, equipped and employed to support combatant commander requirements as force packages tailored to anticipated objectives.” They will also enable commanders to better synchronize, sequence, and apply Army elements across the joint force. Based on this argument, this article unfolds in three parts. First, I review the Army’s staying power. To assuage concerns, USARPAC has initiated four broad changes to achieve the Army’s security goals in Asia. First, USARPAC has implemented a new strategy to generate trained and ready forces, pursue cooperative and persistent engagement, exercise agile mission command, and maximize the efficiency of deployed forces. This strategy is executed along four lines of effort—Shape, Posture, Ready, and Communicate—that frame a Theater Campaign Support Plan and enable USARPAC to set the theater. Second, USARPAC has been elevated to a four-star command. This accords the Commander greater access to influential defense leaders to build relationships that precede policy decisions. Based on its heightened stature, USARPAC is now the Theater Joint Forces Land Component Command expanding the scope of its responsibilities. Given the conversion of the Eighth Army in Korea to strictly a warfighting role, USARPAC also serves as the Army Service Component Command. Planners have also restructured USARPAC aligned forces. By integrating a South Korean brigade, for instance, the 2nd Infantry Division (ID) has transformed into a combined division whereby “U.S. and Korean Soldiers will literally operate as one unit and one unified effort.” Meanwhile, USARPAC has worked with U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Army Forces Command to deactivate and replace the 2nd ID’s 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) with the 2nd ABCT assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. This demonstrates the flexibility of rotational forces. Trained and ready forces have augmented USARPAC enhancing its “ability to sustain a diverse mix of rapidly deployable capabilities, adapt to meet a broadening range of requirements and provide scalable options in defense of South Korea.”

Third, USARPAC is investigating how to achieve readiness with limited resources, at lower cost, and with shortened training cycles. Major David Hammerschmidt contends that planners have experimented with three training models consisting of regionally-aligned training, live environment training, and “CTC-like” training exemplified by Operation Gryphon Longsword. Regionally-aligned training garners significant attention given the Army’s identity as a globally responsive yet regionally engaged force. This approach is reflected through Pacific Pathways. The program positions smaller-scaled forces closer to threats and vulnerabilities for upwards of six months, allowing for realistic training, heightened responsiveness, and expanded interoperability with allies and partners. The 2nd Stryker BCT assigned to the 7th ID at JBLM completed the inaugural Pathways in 2014, participating in several exercises including Garuda Shield in Indonesia, Keris Strike in Malaysia, and Orient Shield in Japan. The 2nd Stryker BCT, assigned to the 25th ID in Hawaii, recently completed the second iteration.

Although less explored, it is difficult to overstate the significance of USARPAC’s defense diplomacy to manage relations with allies, partners, and adversaries. The assurance of allies is compulsory for any viable military strategy within Asia, considering the expansion of intra-regional trade and opportunity costs associated with escalation. For example, a September 2010 collision between a Chinese fishing trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessel near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea prompted China to suspend export of rare earth metals vital to Japan’s economy. Reassurance is also important based on criticism of America’s response to security challenges, including competing irredentist claims in the South China Sea. Washington’s perceived lack of leadership to resolve these challenges begs questions for allies regarding America’s regional staying power. To assuage concerns, USARPAC has set the conditions for an unprecedented delegation of command and control to allies. An Australian officer serves as the deputy commanding general for USARPAC.
Korean officer will serve as the deputy commander of the combined 2nd ID.

A Balancing Act?

While USARPAC has demonstrated institutional agility, critics reprove RAF is nothing more than a balancing act. Perhaps most troubling for defense analysts is RAF’s intent. Has RAF emanated from a sensitive reading of complex challenges that beset regional states including unresolved war memories, competing irredentist claims, and human security vulnerabilities epitomized by Japan’s triple disaster in 2011? Or, does RAF represent a convenient way to solidify the U.S.-centered “hubs and spokes” alliance system that some argue China threatens? The evidence indicates that China interprets RAF as containment. Given this litmus, USARPAC’s initiatives risk stoking tensions between the region’s two dominant powers causing Brigadier General Paul Bontrager to caution that the rebalance as a whole could be liable for “pressing China into behavior that exacerbates the issue.”

Gainsayers also question RAF’s scope. Planners are confronted with a cacophony of threats and vulnerabilities and assume USARPAC will be able to set the theater to meet every contingency. Such reasoning derives from at least two factors. First, America’s rebalance to Asia is surprisingly devoid of a military strategy according to some analysts. T.X. Hammes, a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University, laments that the Department of Defense (DOD) has merely published the Air-Sea Battle concept and nor yet fostered the “joint mindset” required to synchronize USARPAC’s action “with Marine Corps Forces, Pacific; Special Operations Command, Pacific; and other USPACOM functional components, including the theater joint air and maritime component commands.” Capabilities sets could help reconcile these challenges.

Rebalancing the Rebalance

The capabilities sets concept is not new. Its implementation as a framework to train, equip, and deploy forces is an adaption of USARPAC’s arguably incongruous practices. The 201st BfSB has developed a mechanism to package capability based on personnel transitions and Asia’s landscape of challenges. “Acquisition, Protection, and Exploitation” provides a model to extrapolate principles to facilitate an integration of capabilities sets across USARPAC.

During Operation Gryphon Longsword, the BfSB tested a “WMD Defeat” capabilities set to detect, exploit, and manage the consequences of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While Soldiers from the 110th Chemical Battalion assigned to the 555th Engineer Brigade established a decontamination point to screen detainees, Charlie Company, 4-23 Infantry Battalion secured a chemical weapons laboratory replicated by vacant cooling towers at the Satsop Business Park. These actions enabled multi-functional teams (MFTs) assigned to the 502nd and 373rd MI Battalions “to collect intelligence on enemy activity, and exploit or eliminate a weapons of mass destruction threat.” During a similar exercise called Operation Gryphon Tomahawk in February 2014, the BfSB tested the feasibility of attaching MFTs to a Long Range Surveillance Company assigned to the 3-38th Cavalry Squadron. “Task Force Omega” streamlined “collection assets to provide situational awareness, collect against intelligence requirements, and provide support to targeting.” Based on these experiences, capabilities sets afford three advantages.

**Interdependence:** Capabilities sets enable a multi-echelon, multi-component, joint, interagency, and/or multi-na-
tional response to meet the region’s “new security agenda” consisting of terrorism, disease-based threats, climate change, and weapons of mass destruction. Innovations including Pathways are still clearly designed to “assure, deter, compel, and support” the sovereign borders and territories of America and its allies and partners. As such, and notwithstanding the Army Operating Concept’s advancement of joint combined arms operations, Pathways is predicated on integration defined as a consolidation of resources for combined action. Capabilities sets advance beyond integration to achieve interdependence. Considering “Army forces will be essential for projecting national power through support for diplomatic, political, law enforcement, development, and other efforts,” this solution better connects personnel with resources from across the joint force and Army components.

Interdependence “implies a stronger network of organizational ties, better pairing of capabilities at the system level, willingness to draw upon shared capabilities, and continuous information-sharing and coordination.” The BfSB’s “WMD Defeat” capabilities set has fostered organizational ties between MFTs assigned to the AC 502d and the RC 373d MI Battalions. The BfSB’s “Task Force Omega” capabilities set has better paired intelligence enablers—MFTs—with reconnaissance assets—Long Range Surveillance Company—to provide commanders at multiple echelons situational awareness. Based on their distributable and tailored nature, the number of possible configurations of capabilities sets is simply limited by how a commander conceives of setting the theater and shaping the security environment. Preliminary analysis indicates that capabilities sets “could range from remote joint intelligence collection and cyber exploit/attack systems, SOF, modularized Army field medial units, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief supplies and service teams, to Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) detachments, either airborne, surface, or subsurface.”

Distributable: Capabilities sets maximize mission command by decentralizing personnel and resources. Their modularity arrests the centralization of resources cautioned against by LTG McMaster. This advantage is best conceptualized in horizontal and vertical terms. The latter relates to task organization concerns resident to the operational Army. The former considers interactions between USARPAC and regional defense forces.

Vertically, capabilities sets capitalize on the “archetypical application of mission command so effective in Iraq and Afghanistan” whereby smaller-scaled forces, drawn from all components, operated disassociated from headquarters for extended periods. The DOD’s investment in ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) demonstrates how capabilities sets similar to “Task Force Omega” can better synchronize elements across the joint force and total army. While “SOF and the Air Force are heavily invested in ISR infrastructure, the Army is building more reach-back, and the Navy is examining its distribution of PED assets between large deck ships, maritime operations centers, and the Office of Naval Intelligence.” Unfortunately, these advances lack inter-service coordination. Given the BfSB’s transition to an Expeditionary MI Brigade designed to conduct multidiscipline intelligence operations globally, it stands to reason that “Task Force Omega” can “tighten our partnerships between ISR nodes, share resources, maximize DOD investments in people, training, software, information system, links/circuits, communications pipes, and processes.”

Horizontally, capabilities sets can refine USARPAC’s region-wide “battle-rhythm” that synchronizes training, exchanges, and rotational forces across allies and partners. Capabilities sets provide USARPAC force packages tailored to set the theater, shape the security environment, and respond to human security challenges such as the massive earthquakes that recently struck Nepal. Consistent with the 44 additional Army Support to Other Services tasks, for instance, the “WMD Defeat” capabilities set is underpinned by Army personnel and resources that provides the joint force, allies, and partners the ability to respond to contingencies.

Tailorable: Although USARPAC officials endeavor to provide “tailorable and scalable forces” for rapid deployment, initiatives including Pathways are still structured around Infantry battalions. Even practitioners like MAJ David Rowland, who recognize the future operating environment will be characterized by expanded burden-sharing among America and its allies and partners, still contend that “the Infantry battalion must maintain mastery of its core competency: combined-arms maneuver.” Such a doctrinal perspective is at odds with the region’s unique security challenges. Capabilities sets better enable USARPAC to right-size forces for non-traditional security operations like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief that may not always require a combined-arms maneuver pedigree. The inordinate number of natural disasters across the Asia-Pacific explains why the 25th ID recently established a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team to provide USARPAC officials enhanced situational awareness within 24 hours of a disaster. The advantage of capabilities sets is that they provide for an echelonment of capability, based on shifting conditions that span the spectrum of conflict.
bat power, based on mission, intelligence requirements, or a contingency.

Conclusion

It is clear USARPAC leads America’s continued commitment to the Asia-Pacific.60 How USARPAC best enables the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons remains an outstanding question, however. This concept replaces the Air-Sea Battle framework in the interest of better articulating the Army’s role in countering anti-access and area denial threats epitomized by China.61 Unless or until, the Army adopts an operating paradigm that more concertedly harnesses the total force, as well as thoroughly emeshes with the joint force, even this name change may not enable the service to provide the country’s political leaders options to prevent conflict, shape the security environment, and win wars. This force design gap, when coupled with advocates who favor an expansion of combined-arms maneuver proficiency at the expense of expeditionary competencies, risks centralizing resources although RAF presupposes the opposite trend.

An opportunity exists to consolidate RAF’s promising gains and cement the Army’s role in facilitating the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons. Although routinely derided, this concept represents a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, component of any regional military strategy.62 As reflected by the 2014 BfSB’s experiences, the interdependent, distributable, and tailorable advantages of capabilities sets reconfirm that “diplomacy and military strength are not competing approaches.”63 The adoption of capabilities sets by USARPAC would further balance total Army and joint force capabilities to project power and maintain freedom of action across an expansive, non-contiguous, and strategically important Asia-Pacific region.

Endnotes


8. TR Pamphlet 525-3-1, 22.


10. The 2014 BfSB is assigned to I Corps and attached to USARPAC. Operation Gryphon Longsword represented the largest intelligence-focused exercise ever conducted on JBLM. Designed to replicate a CTC rotation, it also represented a brigade-level exercise that certified the BfSB as an Army Contingency Force capable of providing enablers in support of missions across primarily the Pacific Theater of Operations. For more information, see SSG Bryan Dominique, “JBLM Units Prepare for ‘WMD Component’ Missions,” 18 November 2014. At www.us.army.mil.


22. GEN Curtis M. Scaparrotti, The U.S. Army in Korea: Strategic Landpower at the Forward Edge of Freedom (Torchbearer, Association of the United States Army Institute of Land Warfare, 2014), 3. At www.ausa.org. As COL Robert Dixon notes, USARPAC doesn’t actually have operational control of either the 2nd ID or 1st Cavalry Division, meaning USARPAC worked closely with USFK and
23. Brooks, “Perspectives on East Asia.”


33. BG Paul Bontrager, email to the author, 19 February 2015. Bontrager served as the 7th ID’s deputy commanding general for support. See also Robert Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy is Unnecessary and Counterproductive,” Foreign Affairs 91(6)(November-December, 2012), 70-82.

34. Brooks and Kim, 36.


36. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 20.

37. Comments made by LTG H.R. McMaster at the Solarium Symposium, 24 February 2015. According to GEN Odierno, this could create “a situation of ‘have and have nots’ in the force.” Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh and GEN Odierno, 15.


41. Conversation with a 2nd Battalion, 2nd Stryker BCT junior officer participating in Pacific Pathways, 18 October 2014. See also Brooks, “Rebalanced and Beyond,” 112.


43. For more information, see David Rowland, “Relevant, Cost-Effective, Home-Station Training,” Army 64(6)(June 2014), 68.

44. Lushenko, “Intellectualizing the U.S. Army’s Rebalance within Asia,” 56.


46. Brooks, “Rebalanced and Beyond,” 112.

47. Greenert, 11. See also TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 47.

48. LTG McMaster, email to the author, 12 March 2015.

49. Greenert, 11.

50. Ibid., 12.

51. ADP 6-0 Mission Command, May 2012, 1.

52. Lushenko and Hammerschmidt, 58.


54. Ibid.


56. Westen, 2.

57. Odierno, 28.

58. Rowland, 41.


60. Brooks and Kim, 30.


63. GEN Creighton Abrams quoted in “Why Do We Need an Army?” (Association of the United States Army, 14 September 1973), 4.

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Learning to Use a Spoon Again: Lessons Learned for Intelligence in the Decisive Action Fight

by Captain Joshua J. Campbell

Introduction

In 2005, retired LTC John A. Nagl recommended that military professionals engaging in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan must adapt their training and techniques to a new way of war. He used the analogy of “learning to eat soup with a knife” to describe the difficult process of combating a non-conventional foe. Now, with decisive action as the predominant threat training environment for the U.S. Army, Soldiers and leaders must return to the doctrine and techniques designed to counter a conventional threat and learn how to use a spoon again.

After over a decade of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, the U.S. Army finds itself again at a crossroads between training for the last war and preparing for the next. Many effective tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) forged in streets of Baghdad or in the grape rows of Kandahar are now part of the standard “tool kit” of most analysts who have served overseas. However, many of the methods that worked so well in COIN are ill-suited to the current Army training model, the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). This article identifies the requirements of intelligence in a DATE, examines lessons learned from recent rotations at the National Training Center (NTC), and suggests new TTPs for analysts to employ during future operations.

Understanding the Decisive Action Training Environment

The DATE problem set, also called the “hybrid threat,” is defined as “the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects.” It is a complex environment that employs a near-peer conventional threat with a robust unconventional threat in the form of an insurgency or guerilla-like combatants. In practice, it creates a “worst-case scenario” for our forces, mixing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) with artillery-delivered chemical munitions or suicide bombers employed in conjunction with T-72 main battle tanks. It requires intelligence analysts with mental agility, able to rapidly transition between determining the capabilities of an IED cell through pattern analysis to calculating the length and depth of enemy obstacle belts emplaced by their engineer assets. It is by no means an easy task.

The conventional threat in DATE is based on the brigade tactical group (BTG) concept, similar to that of the brigade combat team (BCT), where an existing organization can be augmented by additional forces and enablers from higher headquarters or affiliated units. The flexible task organization inherent in the BCT is a critical concept in the BTG as well, challenging analysts to understand, not only the order of battle of their assigned enemy unit, but also the higher enemy unit as well. Force multipliers such as artillery, electronic warfare assets, and aviation units can be assigned to a battalion or lower formation in order to increase the capabilities of these tactical units.

Despite the advantages provided by the organizational flexibility of the BTG system, the enemy in DATE cannot match our primary armored and mechanized systems with their own main battle tanks or infantry fighting vehicles. In a real world scenario, these systems are expensive to commission, time-consuming to train on, and difficult to maintain. Instead, the conventional forces in DATE leverage niche capabilities that are low-cost, easy to operate, and exploit weaknesses in U.S. armor formations. Anti-tank systems, both dismounted and mounted, become the primary weapon against massed U.S. tanks, bucking the trend of conventional warfare followers who attest, “Tanks kill tanks.” Even internationally banned weapons such as chemical munitions can be employed as a part of the enemy’s fires plan in DATE.
As these niche capabilities blur the line between conventional and unconventional weaponry, so too does the DATE enemy seek to blur the line between conventional warfare and insurgency. In DATE, operations against an unconventional threat are labeled Wide Area Security (WAS) missions in order to emphasize the different goals behind stability operations in COIN versus an operation against insurgent-like elements during decisive action. COIN is a long-term mission that requires a thorough understanding of the operational environment, especially the human terrain. Intelligence disciplines such as Human and Open Source Intelligence were of critical importance in understanding the dynamics of COIN. It is population-focused and designed to enable local security forces to establish security and return normalcy to daily life. In contrast, ADP 3-0 defines WAS as “the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces and infrastructure and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative.” It is not stability operations, and it is not COIN. Though interactions with community leaders can be a portion of a WAS mission, lethal targeting and security operations are critical to success.

The tactics of the enemy within a WAS environment are extremely similar to those in an insurgency, including IEDs, ambushes, and indirect fire from man-portable mortar systems. These attacks are low-cost, easily executed, and when done consistently can grant a high payoff to enemy forces. However, the most insidious facet of WAS is that it capitalizes on the U.S. proclivity to engage in COIN. A decade of combating insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, focused on winning the “hearts and minds” has created a habit to conduct presence patrols, key leader engagements, and integrate into the local population. While these operations are critical in COIN missions, in a DATE environment, a COIN response to a WAS mission can quickly drain combat power and leave a friendly force vulnerable to enemy conventional forces.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace in DATE

As in COIN, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) in decisive action remains the bedrock upon which the Military Decision Making Process is conducted. WAS operations will bear many similarities to COIN analysis, focusing on the human terrain and encompassing a very small area of the battlefield. Conversely, operations against a conventional force will require extensive enemy and physical terrain analysis to understand potential enemy courses of action (COAs). The challenge to intelligence analysts is that they must be able to conduct both kinds of analysis to succeed in a DATE. Below is a graphic from a 2006 issue of Military Review illustrating the differences between IPB conducted against a conventional threat versus an insurgency. This breakdown may again be useful as intelligence analysts adapt their COIN analytical techniques to the DATE.
such as “The Whale” and “The Washboard.” We should expect future adversaries to have a similar “home team” advantage against us.

To effectively describe the effects of the operational environment, analysts must display the same appreciation of micro-terrain that the combat arms Soldier has. Small rivulets may not satisfy the doctrinal definition of a mobility corridor, but after an especially dry winter, this hard-packed, covered and concealed route could allow a column of wheeled vehicles to bypass friendly defensive lines and penetrate into the friendly support zone. Small mountain passes on imagery may appear to be too small to fit a BMP through, but if that image was taken six months ago, the reality on the ground may have drastically changed. Torrential downpours in an especially rainy season could have opened up that pass to a company-sized mobility corridor.

Weather conditions and climatology can also severely affect both friendly and enemy systems, and unlike in COIN, we cannot always assume a friendly technological advantage in weapons and combat enablers. The DATE threat employs many near-peer systems, but their niche capabilities such as man-portable anti-tank rockets, surface-to-air missile systems, and electronic warfare capabilities specifically mitigate traditional U.S. advantages in armor, airpower, and mission command. The enemy can further close this technology gap by exploiting weather conditions in which our systems perform sub-optimally, choosing to attack in hurricane force winds to limit our ability to employ aerial fires or utilizing camouflage to distort aerial intelligence collection (IC) imagery. Further, the DATE threat has trained and employed their systems in the climate in which the combat occurs, garnering them a similar “home team” advantage when it comes to weather conditions and effects. It is up to the intelligence section to understand these conditions and effects in order to mitigate the enemy’s ability to exploit friendly unfamiliarity with the operational environment. To do this, an analyst must not only know the enemy’s equipment and capabilities, but friendly assets as well.

In a DATE, this doctrinal knowledge of enemy systems, organizations, and tactics replaces the pattern analysis of COIN. Mundane factors such as doctrinal frontages, standard movement rates, and the capabilities of enemy and friendly weapon systems becomes the data that feeds into analysis during the development of threat templates. Concurrently, analysts cannot lose sight of the WAS threat and its ability to affect operations. These lightly-armed forces are usually assumed to target friendly logistics capabilities and affect lines of communication, but analysts should also consider the impact they can have against friendly lethal operations. Even in decisive action, conventional forces can receive up-to-date intelligence from a reconnaissance asset disguised as a civilian who “accidentally” stumbles into friendly defensive lines.

When attempting to evaluate the decisive action threat and determine enemy COAs, staff assistance to the IPB process is essential. An intelligence section in Iraq and Afghanistan could become the experts on past significant activities due to a collection of robust databases and a SIPR connection. In decisive action, there is no historical data. Instead, the staff sections must assist the intelligence section by weighing in on enemy capabilities within their warfighting function. ATP 2-01.3 gives the following examples:

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| The intelligence staff can provide the personnel staff with information on how the threat/adversary may affect personnel replacement or casualty evacuation. The intelligence staff can provide the sustainment staff with threat/adversary information that may have an impact on friendly logistic efforts. Conversely, the intelligence staff needs to utilize the expertise of the other staff sections. Collaborating with the staff engineers can provide valuable information on terrain mobility, where the threat/adversary is likely to employ obstacles, and where the threat/adversary could employ engineer assets. Coordinating with the surgeon concerning the health status of threat/adversary forces can indicate the willingness of threat/adversary forces to engage in long-term operations.

Based on time available, this collaboration between the intelligence section and the rest of the staff can be as formal as a Reverse IPB Working Group, or as informal as distribution of hard copy worksheets that staff primaries use to analyze enemy capabilities and then return to the intelligence section. A simple staff estimate quad chart completed from the threat perspective may be enough for some intelligence sections to gain an appreciation of the threat’s capabilities in that warfighting function. Regardless of the method, the endstate is the staff experts in each warfighting function communicate with intelligence analysts to ensure all aspects of the threat picture are considered.

When analysis of the operational environmental effects is combined with a staff-assisted evaluation of the threat, enemy COAs are readily apparent. Terrain and systems limit the enemy operations just as they do friendly, forcing attackers into just a few avenues of approach which allow them to maximize the employment of their systems. ATP 2-01.3 explains the importance behind identifying and prioritizing as many enemy COAs as possible, but in practice, any avenue of approach identified during terrain analysis could be a likely enemy axis of advance in the attack.

Similarly, the enemy in the defense could assess the friendly decisive operation to be moving against any avenue of approach and prepare accordingly. Rather than wasting valuable analyst time and effort in fully fleshing out each and every avenue of approach, intelligence sections
should devote their attention to determining enemy decision points using an Event Matrix and graphically displaying these decisions in time and space on an Event Template.

The Event Template is developed through “an analytical process that involves comparing the multiple enemy COAs developed earlier in Step 4 of the IPB process to determine the time or event and the place or condition in which the enemy commander must make a decision on a particular COA.” These decisions do not need to be active decisions made by the enemy commander during execution. If the enemy force has an option between an avenue of approach that branches to the northeast and the southeast, it is likely that a decision to go one direction rather than the other was made during the planning process.

Rather than attempt to determine precisely what decision the enemy commander will make, friendly intelligence sections able to develop a good Event Template can give their commander the points in the enemy’s operation where he can be influenced by fires, obstacles, and lethal effects. By attacking the enemy commander’s “decision chain,” friendly forces can disrupt his decision making cycle, limit his tactical options, and dictate the tempo of the operation.

**Intelligence Collection in DATE**

IC in decisive action requires a significant cognitive shift in the way staff and commanders are used to planning for and employing IC assets. Even the way we speak about collection has to change as phrases like “patterns of life” and “ISR soak” become irrelevant in a DATE. Commanders at every echelon have to adjust to a new reality where many assets are held at brigade or higher level to answer priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) rather than providing “unblinking eye” capabilities for operational oversight as was the standard in Iraq and Afghanistan. Intelligence analysts must learn to develop doctrinally correct PIR and intelligence collection plans that maximize the use of organic IC assets and are synchronized with higher headquarters in order to successfully conduct collection operations during decisive action.

Key to employing IC in a DATE is understanding that unlike in COIN, decisive action is a brigade and above fight, and as such, many brigade-level assets will not be allocated to support battalion-level missions. Battalions have to “do less with more,” utilizing organic assets such as scouts, TUAS such as the Raven, and even maneuver companies to answer PIR and IRs. While battalion collection managers should still request as many capabilities as possible to answer collection requirements, it is incumbent on them and their operations counterparts to plan and execute collection missions within their commander’s area of influence. PIRs that reference enemy decision points or high value targets outside of their commander’s area of influence are the purview of the higher headquarters. All levels of the staff must synchronize their IC effort to ensure that the battalion and brigade collection responsibilities are clearly delineated.

Intelligence officers at all levels must manage the expectations of commanders who are most familiar with collection in COIN environments and endeavor to prevent the misuse of valuable IC assets. The best way to do this is to concentrate analytical effort during IPB on the creation of a true Intelligence Collection Plan. More than just an Event Template and an IC Synchronization Matrix, an IC Plan identifies enemy locations and the locations of high value targets, labels those locations as named areas of interest (NAI), and assigns a collection asset with a clear task and purpose to each NAI. ATP 2-01.3 states NAIs “should be based upon the enemy locations or suspected locations,” and in a decisive action fight with limited collection assets, those suspected locations that will have the most impact on friendly operations are the locations of enemy decision points. By giving the commander the location of a critical enemy event and allocating an IC asset to determine the time, the enemy will be forced to make a decision. The friendly intelligence section has turned analytical “guess work” into an operational trigger for the commander to affect the enemy force.

After the creation of the IC Plan, the final planning effort for the intelligence section is support to the creation of the commander’s Decision Support Matrix (DSM). ADRP 5-0 states the DSM “lists decision points, locations of decision points, criteria to be evaluated at decision points, actions that occur at decision points and the units respon-sible to act on the decision points.” The production of the DSM, like that of IPB, is a collaborative effort among all the staff. Intelligence feeds into the DSM by determining the conditions that would require a friendly commander to make an operational decision. These conditions are codified into PIR and are identified through IC assets allocated to NAIs in the IC Plan. Once conditions are met, the commander can choose to affect enemy forces through fires or maneuver depending on the situation. Not only is this tool a useful matrix for the commander, it is an excellent check on staff synchronization to ensure that all staff planning efforts are aligned.

**Conclusion**

Conducting intelligence operations in a DATE is a challenging, fast-paced experience that truly tests the abilities of even the most seasoned analyst. In some cases, intelligence Soldiers fresh from the schoolhouse are quicker to adapt to this new training environment than their NCOs who learned
analytical techniques that applied primarily to COIN. It is always worth remembering that the true strength of the DATE threat group lies with its ability to rapidly adapt. Conditions-based “decision chains” and the ability to leverage unconventional forces ultimately create an enemy that is resilient, capable, and flexible. To defeat them, our force requires equally resilient, capable, and flexible analysts who can internalize the best practices of the COIN fight and adapt to the doctrine-heavy techniques of decisive action.

Endnotes
2. TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat, 2010, 1-1.
8. For more information and additional techniques for staff-assisted IPB, see Andrew G. Attar, Jr. and Rob Rouleau, “Reverse IPB: A Whole-of-Staff Approach to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,” *Small Wars Journal* (12 March 2013).
9. ATP 2-01.3, 6-6.
10. Ibid., 6-53.
11. Ibid., 1-36.
12. ADRP 5-0 The Operations Process, 4-20.

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Language Capability in the Military: The Army and MOS 09L

by Captain Nigina A. Cruz

Author’s Note: Language capability is a paramount coefficient for success in any operation of regionally aligned forces (RAF) worldwide. This became even more apparent to me during the Saber Guardian/Rapid Trident Mission, as an S2 of the 4th Multinational Battalion created for the regional command post and field training exercise held at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in Yavoriv, Ukraine. The summer 2015 exercise focused on peacekeeping and stability operations while promoting interoperability among 1,800 attendees from 18 nations, including Ukraine, the U.S., NATO and Partnership for Peace member nations.

The S2 section consisted of several international officers. Being a Russian and Ukrainian linguist becomes advantageous in this situation as it allowed for successful integration of the international officers into the Intelligence section, and it made an immediate and significant contribution to the training and effectiveness of the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces.

This article highlights the need to redesign the Army’s language program and the Linguist MOS in the Army. It focuses on regionally realigning and pairing linguists with the appropriate RAF to become its force multiplier by expanding its cultural and linguistic capability.

Introduction

In the era of RAF engagement, individuals with expertise in languages other than English are value added for the U.S. Army. It would be wise for the Army to invest in its own current language support and structure. For example, Special Operations Command contracted with World Wide Language Resources to provide language support for five years, last year alone.1 Hiring interpreters outside of the military, who typically do not understand the U.S. Army culture, operations process, and values, is expensive. The current program is inadequate, and the Army must reorganize and evolve its current Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 09L Interpreter/Translator, by facilitating continuous interpretation and translation training, as well as providing comprehensive English language training, and restructuring current linguist career progression and placement. With these mechanisms in place the Army’s own “regional expert,” who is a heritage speaker, becomes equipped to provide a comprehensive military-focused foreign language and cultural support package to regionally aligned forces and the Special Operations community.

In past conflicts, Army leaders found that success in sustained land operations often required extremely sophisticated linguistic skills. In many cases, such abilities are unique to narrow sections of the nation’s civilian populace. Where intelligence gathering, coalition building, and military government are concerned, the ability to understand the languages of the nation’s allies and opponents can spell the difference between victory and defeat.2

Background

Institutional utilization of native-speaker interpreters in the U.S. Army began during World War II, when second generation Japanese, known as Nisei, trained as our first Cryptologic Linguists. The project eventually lead to the establishment of a language school now known as the Defense Language Institute (DLI), Foreign Language Center (FLC) at Presidio of Monterey, California. Today DLI teaches over 20 languages to 3,500 graduating students each year.3 Historically, the Army’s regional focus determined the languages taught. During the Korean War, there was an emphasis on Korean; during the Vietnam War, Vietnamese was the focus, and during the height of the Cold War, Russian language took priority.

In today’s regionally aligned Army, the focus will continue to shift, but the need for language capabilities will remain.
There will not only be a demand for foreign languages, but a demand for a refined English translation and interpretation skill. The DLI umbrella that focuses on English training is DLIELC (Defense Language Institute English Language Center) at Lackland AFB, Texas. DLIELC’s mission is to acculturate and train international personnel to communicate in English, and train U.S. military personnel in English as a second language.

There are two types of linguists in the Army: 09L Interpreter/Translator and 35P Cryptologic Linguist. Their missions and training differ significantly. MOS 09L, a heritage speaker, provides cultural expertise and physical interpretation (oral) and translation (written). MOS 35P, a DLI trained linguist, identifies foreign communication using signals equipment and provides analyses of the communication. Our focus here lies with the 09L because stability and civil support operations are impossible without direct communication and understanding of the host society.

The 09L Interpreter/Translator program began in 2003 when the Office of the Secretary of Defense tasked the Army to establish a pilot program focused on recruiting heritage speakers of Arabic, Dari, and Pashtu to meet critical foreign language requirements. A vast majority of the 09L recruits are born overseas and possess a bachelor degree from the country of origin. While the pilot program was an excellent step to meet the ever-growing need for language, it must convert into a permanent solution. Going forward, it must address what it failed to account for in the pilot program: Soldiering skills, English ability, career progression, and integration into Army units.

Improving Soldier Skills

With a modest ASVAB score requirement of forty, joining the U.S. Armed Forces allows the 09L recruit to enlist in the Army as a Specialist, E-4, and provides the 09L recruit an opportunity to become a U.S. citizen. Historically, someone recruited as an E-4 without prior military experience, will simply not perform at an above E-2 level. It takes years of experience, which the linguists do not possess, and an extreme amount of effort on Soldier’s behalf to earn the rank. Hence, this poses a serious self-worth and entitlement issues for Soldiers in this MOS. The rapid enlistment of the 09Ls during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom overlooked these important aspects: lack of American culture knowledge, military history, and soldiering skills as well as linguist performance in both English and native languages. This leads to our first recommendation: 09L recruitment should start with a cultural and an initial military history orientation. The Army must assess, and then orient the recruits to the American culture and its military history prior to basic training. This additional time allows Soldiers to develop basic Soldiering skills, learn how to lead others, and live by military values.

Improving English ability

The Army leader’s mission is not only to effectively understand, but to also influence communication with the nation’s allies. For the commander, the concept of effectively understanding lies with linguists who have developed:

- The required degree of foreign language and cultural comprehension.
- The ability to effectively transform foreign language into English.
- A high degree of competence in the English language and American culture comprehension.
- The aptitude to translate a commander’s communication into a foreign language while considering cultural nuances.

Surprisingly, 09L linguists do not officially test English language ability. The requirement is only an annual oral proficiency interview/certification (OPI) in the target language with a required minimum score of Level 2 (limited working proficiency). A person at this level satisfies routine social demands and limited work requirements, and handles most basic social situations without technical requirements, such as current events, work, family, and autobiography.

Utilizing such a linguist, a commander engages foreign nation representatives on very basic terms and cannot expect the linguist to translate technical jargon.

It is important to keep in mind that English speaking, writing, and reading skills are at various levels throughout the 09L population. For example, English skills of foreign-born linguists who went to college and lived in the U.S. most of their lives, as opposed to English skills of a foreign-born linguist who came to the U.S. two months ago will always have a significant gap between the levels of expression and comprehension. During any mission, this simple fact can lead to misunderstanding between nations and may have major consequences for the commander.

A second recommendation: The Army should mandate an annual English testing for 09Ls with a requirement to maintain a score of 2 for speaking and 2 for listening. The DLIELC has the capacity to test linguists prior to entering basic training and provide extensive English training to those who are accessed below the minimum requirement.
Modern Career Progression

Lastly, the 09L MOS does not have a solid, predictable career progression and lacks an official mentorship program. 09Ls must request this of their leadership. Currently, the 09L training path includes nine weeks of basic combat training, followed by eight weeks of advanced individual training (AIT) at Fort Huachuca. Some of the recruits arrive to this training and the U.S. for the first time in their lives. The 09L training path does not address a formal immersion into the American culture. Without understanding the culture, linguists will not be able to fully implement the commander’s intent. The Army must assess, and then orient the recruits to the American culture prior to basic training.

A well-defined career track ensures MOS stability and fluidity. A third recommendation: Establish specific career progression guidelines and training designed for the senior 09Ls in a mentor capacity to expand their professional development. To enable this, mentors remain current in their MOS, attend language conferences, certify in foreign language and English teaching, and officially extend their accumulated knowledge and expertise to junior linguists. The mentorship program necessitates a well-defined proposal and execution at Fort Huachuca, where senior 09Ls come to train the AIT linguists.

According to the AIT team at Fort Huachuca, the Interpreter/Translator Course trains entry-level personnel in the skills they will need in order to function as military translators and interpreters. The critical task-based training consists of five blocks: Foundation, Translation and Interpretation, Field Exercise and Warrior Tasks, and Battle Drills.

During the Foundation block of the training, the module encapsulates the roles and duties of an interpreter and identification of the essential elements of interpretation. It provides tools for interpretation and allows Soldiers to conduct cultural briefings. A Translation and Interpretation block of training consists of document translation and interpretation from low to high levels of complexity, such as interpreting convoy operations to interpreting bi-lateral negotiations and legal affairs.

Organic integration into Army units

Upon graduation, 09Ls move to one of the two Interpreter/Translator units, either the 51st Translator/Interpreter Company (TICO), in the “austere” training environment at Fort Irwin, California (the National Training Center), or the 52nd TICO at Fort Polk, Louisiana (the Joint Reserve Training Center). The 09L mission in both companies is to prepare and deploy as individuals or small groups to provide “native heritage” translation, interpretation, and cultural advice to Army, Joint, special operations forces, and select inter-agencies.

From my experience as one of the former platoon leaders at 51st TICO, placing 09Ls in one location creates underutilization and segregation of linguists and their families from the Army. As a Command Language Program Manager, I implemented Linguist of the Quarter and Year competitions. This provided the TICO linguists an opportunity to share their unusual MOS skills with those senior NCOs on the assessment board panel, who had not heard of interpreter/translators before. With the Army-wide lack of knowledge about the 09L linguists’ existence, the dollars are shifting to contracting civilian linguists, and the 09L MOS will downsize from two company size elements to a one company size element by Fiscal Year 2017.

With this reduction on its way, keeping linguists concentrated in one location will not be beneficial to the Army. The final recommendation: 09L linguists would be more rounded and better serve in small teams within Military Intelligence (MI) companies and the Special Operations branch. The linguists already proved to be effective in working for brigade commanders, MI professionals, Civil Affairs, and SOF teams. Placing linguists in a RAF MTOE allows linguists to be an essential part of a unit and builds rapport and trust with their commander and among their colleagues. The more the 09L linguists work with their commanders, the more they learn their body language, tone, and etiquette for a successful language mission. The 09L linguist trains all year with the assigned unit and becomes a part of a team, while focusing specifically on the unit’s mission; as opposed to deploying on a tasker, attached to an unfamiliar unit, and focusing on being accepted by their peers rather than focusing on the mission at hand.

Conclusion

As long as there is a need for those who can interact with governments and possess critical language skills, the need for linguists will remain. The recent regional alignment of forces did not address the need for a well-established language program. Without a comprehensive language program the Army may settle with the opportunity cost of becoming more culturally and linguistically astute, potentially impeding the way forward within the regionally aligned units in relation to stability and civil support operations.

Without a comprehensive language program addressing the difficulties in the 09L MOS, the quality of the 09L output will not change as it directly tied to their lowest proficiency languages influencing mission of that commander. Professional development must continue. Re-organizing
current linguist units, pairing linguists with regionally aligned forces, advancement in both English and foreign language skills, addressing professional development measures during annual critical task/site selection boards, and implementation of a linguist mentorship program are all essential for the existence of the Army’s language capability. The Army must redirect its contract dollars from the civilian sector and re-invest them in its own language program and existing regional experts, recruit new linguists, and expeditiously market its linguists to newly regionally aligned units and the Special Operations Community for utilization and successful mission execution.

Endnotes


4. LTC Jeffrey D. Steffen, DLIELC Deputy Commandant, Telephone Interview, 9 September 2014.


7. Mr. Kevin Moses, MOS 09L Course Manager; MSG Sudan Baker, MOS 35M and MOS 09L Instructor; Mr. Rami Elsouhag, MOS 09L Instructor. Personal Interview, 17 October 2014.

8. SGT Hami Yazdanpanah, 09L, Written Interview, 5 October, 2014.

This article was originally written by CPT Cruz for the MICCC Advanced Seminar, 304th MI Battalion, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

CPT Cruz attended the Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Georgia and was commissioned in 2010. She was assigned as a Platoon Leader, 51st TICO, Fort Irwin, California after completing MIBOLC at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. She was then assigned as the S2 of the Regimental Support Squadron at Fort Irwin in 2012. Thereafter, she was assigned as the Armored Cavalry Regiment Assistant S2 until she departed for the MICCC in 2014. Currently, CPT Cruz serves as the S2, 15th Engineer Battalion, the only engineer unit forward deployed within USAREUR, responsible for supporting missions throughout EUCOM and AFRICOM. CPT Cruz holds a Masters of Global Studies from the University of Denver, Colorado and a BA in International Trade and Relations from University of Northern Colorado.
With the outbreak of the first Gulf War, the U.S. Army realized it had a shortage of Soldiers proficient in Arabic. The Army's 267 Arabic linguists, trained in Syrian, Egyptian, and other Persian Gulf dialects, had already deployed to Saudi Arabia in late 1990 to serve with the XVIII Airborne Corps. When the Army committed a second Corps to the conflict, it faced an additional requirement for more than 900 linguists. The 142nd MI Battalion (Utah National Guard) deployed its Arabic speakers as reinforcements, but the need for more linguists could not be satisfied, even partially, until the middle of the following year.

To help mitigate the shortage, Colonel William Lipke, from the Office of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, dealt directly with the government of Kuwait to establish Operation DESERT OWL. The Kuwaiti Embassy in Washington, D.C., recruited volunteers from Kuwaiti college students already in the U.S. to provide language support for the military efforts in the Persian Gulf. The 300 students chosen spoke fluent English, as well as the Iraqi dialect of Arabic. Their understanding of American customs and traditions eased their adjustment to serving side-by-side with American Soldiers.

The DESERT OWL volunteers enlisted as sergeants in the Kuwaiti Army and then reported to Fort Dix, New Jersey, for training and equipping on January 6, 1991. The span of time between identification of the requirement and the arrival of the students at Fort Dix was approximately six weeks.

The U.S. Army Intelligence School at Fort Devens, Massachusetts (USAISD), served as executive agent for DESERT OWL. The Electronic Warfare Department quickly developed a training package to ensure these native speakers could provide language support to tactical intelligence and electronic warfare ground system teams in Saudi Arabia. On January 4, USAISD’s 40-person Training Task Force (TTF), directed by Lieutenant Colonel Donald Manchester, traveled to Fort Dix to prepare to provide the accelerated intelligence training. The Combat Intelligence Training Course (CITC) began on January 7.

The CITC focused foremost on teaching the Kuwaitis to recognize enemy communications and to extract essential information for intelligence purposes. The students learned military terminology, the structure of military communications, U.S. and Iraqi order of battle, and the recognition of Iraqi military communications. Students also learned the basics of the Army’s Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) equipment in use at that time.

The CITC also incorporated combat skills, such as basic rifle marksmanship, M-16 familiarization, nuclear/biological/chemical training, and gas mask confidence. These skills were taught by drill instructors from Fort Dix’s 3/26th Infantry Battalion as well as drill sergeants and noncommissioned officers from Fort Devens’s 306th MI Battalion and NCO Academy.

Although all the students were expected to arrive at once, they actually arrived in four groups over the course of the week. Because they had a fixed deployment date, the training for the later arrivals had to be curtailed to fit the time available. On January 14, just eight days after their arrival at Fort Dix, 287 graduates of the CITC to Saudi Arabia.

(Continued on page 59)
Information Collection Management in the BCT

by First Lieutenant Anthony J. Sterioti

Introduction

Information collection is a task that can be the focus of the entire brigade. The brigade Collection Manager (CM) must include the commander’s input into the collection plan as well as coordinate with the battalions to ensure that all assets are effectively employed. The CM must synchronize all available assets that are organic and request non-organic assets; communicate the collection plan down to the battalions; continue to assess and refine the collection plan, and continue to refine the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) in order to answer the commander’s questions.

Considerations for how these tasks are implemented in order to develop a successful collection plan that uses all assets available to the brigade are discussed below. Emphasis is placed on how the brigade coordinates and communicates with the battalions, and how the collection plan remains a fluid process that needs to be constantly assessed and refined.

Information Collection Process

Information collection is a process that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets, as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) systems in direct support of current and future operations.\(^1\) The brigade CM must understand all the assets and sensors available to the brigade (organic and non-organic), how best to utilize those assets to maximize results and eliminate intelligence gaps, and which units to coordinate with to provide detailed timely and accurate information to the commander. The brigade S3 Operations staff must review all available collection assets and create an inventory of capabilities to apply against collection requirements.\(^2\) Information collection includes all activities and operations that gather data and information used to create knowledge and support the commander’s requirements, situational understanding, and visualization.\(^3\) Information collection is an ongoing process that needs to be assessed and refined after determining how effective the initial collection plan is performing. Changes to the collection plan may be driven by external events, internal forces, or by feedback from higher about the information the unit is collecting.

The commander must provide adequate guidance to the collection working group regarding timelines, information requirements (IRs), and information collection focus, and directs the development of information collection requirements or requests for information from higher, subordinate, or adjacent units. In the absence of the commander, the brigade S3 provides the guidance for the collection working groups which allows timelines to be adhered to and a clear focus to be communicated to the brigade and battalions. The CM and staff identify collection assets that could collect information, and ensures that requests and coordination for them to support each of the commander’s IRs are addressed. As the military decision making process continues, the collection plan will evolve and the commander’s IRs will become PIRs. The commander’s guidance should provide proper focus and detail.\(^4\) PIRs can be recommended by the brigade CM, with input from the entire staff, to the commander after a collection working group meeting.

Guidance from the commander, the S3, and input from S2, will determine the tasks for the collection assets. Collection asset tasks are based on the commander’s PIRs, the capabilities and limitations of the collection assets, and the latest enemy situation (known or templated.) Once the collection plan is issued, the S3 is in charge of the collection working group and will provide the critical guidance in determining what information is needed to best support the maneuver plan. The S3 will also determine the command and control relationship of each collection asset that is tasked within the collection plan. The biggest deviation from the command and control relationship is the control of the
assets within the brigade tactical operations center (TOC). As the fight unfolds, there is a tendency to maneuver the collection assets all over the area of operations (AO). The S3 needs to adhere to the collection plan because moving collection assets from the established collection plan will introduce new intelligence gaps with no planned coverage. The goal of the collection working group and the collection plan is to have “an enabling operation that integrates and synchronizes all warfighting functions to collect and produce relevant information to facilitate the commander’s decision making.” The collection plan has been researched, planned, and communicated. Now it is time to execute the collection plan, while not drastically changing the approach and the focus that was agreed upon during the collection working group.

**Executing the Collection Plan**

CMs must understand their brigade’s position with respect to the division’s priorities of asset allocation. A brigade that is not the main effort, or a high priority, will most likely not be allocated many of the requested assets for collection. A CM should not rely on an asset from higher echelons; those requests should merely enhance the effectiveness of the CM’s plan. The CM also needs to communicate the priority of collection assets to the commander in order to manage expectations of how many, and what assets will be available to the brigade at a given time. Commanders have a tendency to view assets currently within their AO or theater as being available to their brigade. But this is not the case, as the division and theater level assets have a priority list to follow based on the mission. That is why it is so important for the CM and the staff to understand all the organic assets available to the brigade, and how best to utilize those assets for maximum coverage, addressing the commander’s requirements and intelligence gaps. Coordination and synchronization with the battalions will allow for maximum collection asset utilization. Synchronization meetings should be conducted on a daily basis in order to ensure that PIRs are being answered, updated, crossed off, and new ones created.

The brigade CM should develop an initial information collection plan prior to the issuance of any order. Even prior to creating the initial plan, the brigade CM should conduct an information collection rehearsal with all the battalion CMs (utilizing the checklist above for attendees, products to assess/refine, movements to understand, and topics to cover). This is a great opportunity to identify all organic assets, their capabilities, and the commander’s initial guidance for the collection plan, and allows battalions to understand the overall concept of the collection plan prior to implementing their own collection plan. This will provide subordinate units with clear guidance and allow all units to synchronize information collection based on all available assets.

Collection meetings should continue to be held daily, if possible, as the collection plan is assessed and adjusted based on the effectiveness of the original collection plan. If the collection plans are not nested, this could lead to duplicate reporting, priorities not being set for collection assets, non-coordinated targeting, independent planning, and intelligence reports not being properly disseminated. The focus of collection plans should be to answer the commander’s PIRs, task collection assets against PIRs and named areas of interest (NAIs), and minimize intelligence gaps.

The information collection plan can be issued to the units in the form of a warning order, a fragmentary order, or published as an operations order. The plan will allow the units receiving the order to understand what to collect, where to collect, when and for how long to collect, and why they will be collecting. Clear, precise guidance will allow for the intent of the collection plan to be met, which will eliminate most intelligence gaps and maximize use of the assets available to the brigade. This is the most effective means of tasking the assets and allows units to understand how and why to best utilize the collection asset in order to meet the commander’s intent. Once the collection assets are tasked to specific units, it is the obligation of the staff to provide feedback to the controlling unit. This will allow the unit to know if it is utilizing the asset properly, if reports are being received, and provide feedback on the effectiveness of the mission that was tasked in the order.

The brigade CM needs to be in synch with the battalion CMs in order to utilize all assets available, but also to en-
able the battalions to understand the brigade CM’s plan. Brigades and battalions should have their NAIs and collection plans nested together. This will allow for a coordinated plan that answers the commander’s questions and eliminates intelligence gaps. Coordination in planning and communication during the fight will enable a flow of information top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top, which will answer most questions about the enemy. This will clarify the enemy situation for the commander allowing for the most informed decision based on the intelligence reports and reports from the maneuver units engaged with the enemy.

The information collection plan should answer the PIRs which were provided by the commander during their initial guidance. The PIRs should be linked to enemy events which will lead to answering what course of action (COA) the enemy will adopt. The event template will assist with the decision making process when it comes to determining the enemy COA. The expected enemy locations and times of action will lead to the development of NAI and event templates. This provides the CM and staff with indications of when the enemy will start/stop activity and where to expect enemy activity. The CM, the staff, and subordinate units will then coordinate available assets to be committed to the NAIs at a specific time for collection. High value and high payoff targets should be considered in the development of NAIs as well. The link between PIRs, NAIs, and the event template will lead to establishing a clear focus for collection assets. The synchronization between the brigade and battalions at this stage is crucial for a complete collection plan. The brigade CM will then review the collection plan in order to identify any intelligence gaps in overall coverage, and synchronize all available assets across the brigade.

The CM builds the collection plan based on historical analysis and activities which can provide indicators of the where, when, and how the enemy will attack, maneuver, or respond to friendly forces. Historical analysis can assist in identifying times and locations of future attacks which will lead to the creation of NAIs. This will allow for a focused area or target for a collection asset to be tasked with collecting information. A PIR should be attached to the NAI which will answer the commander’s intelligence gaps and provide clarity of the current enemy situation. CMs and the staff need to realize that NAIs and PIRs need to be continuously assessed and refined based on whether the collection asset is answering the intelligence gaps and accomplishing the mission. This process of refining NAIs can assist the targeting working group to make them target areas of interest. Fires assets and close air support can be tasked to action on the target at a specific time in that location. Effective staff members know their respective responsibilities and duties. An officer or a noncommissioned officer must be appointed and properly trained as the CM prior to a National Training Center rotation or a deployment. There must be a CM counterpart in the brigade TOC operating within the CUOPS cell who understands the collection plan, the assets available, and can communicate to the brigade CM the refinements that are necessary to the collection plan for the next 48 to 72 hours. The counterpart needs to act in the absence of the CM as he continues to focus efforts on planning assets for the upcoming fight. Not properly training the CM in garrison will make it difficult to properly synchronize all available collection assets. A lack of understanding about how to request and task assets, capabilities and limitations of the collection assets, and how to effectively employ collection assets will lead to a lack of a collection plan or an ineffective collection plan. This will impact answering any of the commander’s IRs and many intelligence gaps will continue to remain.

**Conclusion**

The information collection plan created by the brigade CM will always be assessed and refined. Assets will need to be requested in order to identify the intelligence gaps that the commander needs to know in order to answer his PIRs. The brigade CM needs to communicate and coordinate with the battalions to nest their collection plans within the brigade collection plan in order to maximize available assets and to create a synchronized collection plan that can be easily understood and executed. The brigade CM is the central figure in the collection plan that brings it all together to create a plan that allows the most intelligence gaps to be answered. The commander will then be able to make informed decisions based on the intelligence.

**Endnotes**

1. FM 3-55 Information Collection, May 2013, 1-1.
2. Ibid., 3-4.
3. Ibid., 1-5.
4. FM 3-90.6 The Brigade Combat Team, 6-40.
5. FM 3-90.6 The Brigade Combat Team, 3-29.
6. FM 3-55, 4-1 to 4-3.
7. FM 3-55, 2-3.

1LT Steriotti is currently attending law school as part of the Funded Legal Education Program. His most recent assignment was the Information Collection Platoon Leader and BCT Collection Manager for 2ABCT, 1ID at FT Riley, Kansas. 1LT Steriotti deployed the Platoon to NTC 15-06 for a Decisive Action rotation. Previously, he served as the Assistant S2 for 1-63AR where he deployed to Djibouti, Africa in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Introduction

The pervasiveness of the cyberspace domain differs from the traditional warfighting domains. 24/7 accessibility, anonymity, and input from both Soldiers and civilians—all make cyberspace a growing threat to national security. This article seeks to demystify intelligence support to cyber operations by dispelling common misperceptions and providing recent examples of adversary use of the cyber domain relevant to the Intelligence Warfighting Function. This article is a primer, with subsequent submissions focused on processes, methodologies, inputs and outputs to each step of the Military Decision Making Process.

The layperson regards cyberspace operations as simple attack and defense of networks. The media popularizes this limited view because it makes the intangible cyber domain more accessible to the average person. For example, a quick Google search of “China cyber threat” returns hundreds of news articles about Chinese attacks on military and commercial networks but few, if any, are from general media sources on the multiple layers, both within cyberspace and across domains that identify threatening Chinese actions in the cyberspace realm. To be clear, network vulnerabilities are an important component in understanding threats in cyberspace, but they are not the full picture.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) in cyberspace is not just binary code mixed in with routers and switches, it is a domain that spans across three layers (logical, physical, virtual) and should be incorporated into every intelligence professional’s IPB. Cyberspace is a domain in its own right. The concept of cyberspace is somewhat esoteric to those who do not operate within this domain on a regular basis. Traditional IPB (examining land, air, sea, and space) is insufficient given the intangible nature of cyberspace. The cyberspace domain has the potential to impact activities and operations within the other four domains.

Adversarial Use of Cyberspace

Integrating cyberspace into the IPB process is essential for intelligence professionals to fully capitalize on the advantages afforded by this domain. Cyberspace can act as an offensive projection of force, a defensive operation to preserve networks and systems, or provide specific actions to protect, detect, characterize, counter, or mitigate threats to networks. In particular, the cyber domain can provide intelligence that informs unified land operations and confers a strategic advantage. The use of cyberspace is critical to adversary attempts to gather intelligence, recruit, or prepare the battlefield, and minimize the impact of U.S. superiority in the other warfighting domains. There are multiple examples where the adversary has demonstrated the capacity within cyberspace to manipulate the battlespace to gain the operational advantage. The three examples that follow highlight the offensive and defensive advantages to leveraging the cyber domain at all three operational levels of war.

Operational security is paramount at the tactical level. The use of social media can negatively influence or impact operations. The very nature of social media creates exposure and risks too great to ignore. With the amount of information posted on social media, whether well meaning, benign, or nefarious in nature, it is almost impossible for U.S. troop movements to remain undetected for an extended period. In 2008, the terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), made use of social media to gain and maintain situational awareness of Indian counterterrorism (CT) forces, and to gain intelligence on hostages during the Mumbai Hotel Attacks. Monitoring social media sites (e.g., Twitter) from a command post in Pakistan, LeT members used social media posts from unwitting bystanders on the streets of Mumbai, to ascertain locations of Indian CT forces. The remote LeT command post then relayed this intelligence to terrorists in the hotel, who executed a series of ambushes based on
this information. LeT forces also used Internet searches to identify high profile and western targets residing within the hotel, aiding the operatives in their ability to target specific individuals of interest. 1

In 2008, numerous cyber attacks targeted Georgian government networks, severely impairing their strategic-to-tactical level communications, highlighting the strategic implications of the cyber domain. Amidst the confusion and the lack of communications within the Georgian government, Russian troops moved into South Ossetia. 2 Similar cyberspace operations could have severe impacts on Department of Defense (DoD) operations.

The beliefs that our classified networks are immune to intrusions is a fallacy. In 2008, a worm named agent.btz compromised DoD classified and unclassified networks. Most security experts believe that a foreign government designed the malware, with the purpose of establishing an avenue for an adversary to transfer files from DoD networks to those under adversarial control. It took the DoD over a year and millions of dollars to remediate this compromise. 3 While the agent.btz, the LeT, and the Georgian instances are dated, the cyber prowess used in those cases demonstrates a threat that is still relevant within our interconnectedness and dependence on cyberspace.

The Cyber Domain Layers

The inherently intangible nature of the cyber domain sets it apart from the other warfighting domains. But despite being defined as a warfighting domain by the DoD in 2009, cyber is not given the same considerations as the other domains. Land, sea, air, and space domains have a concrete physical presence and actions in these domains are observable and quantifiable. Cyberspace has a physical layer as well, but there are additional components to cyberspace that one must understand in order to fully observe and quantify threats in this domain. These include a logical layer and a persona layer.

Cyberspace, at its base, is rooted in a physical structure. Interconnected computing devices (e.g., computers, servers, grids, and sensors) facilitate data transmission, whether hardwired or through wireless network connections. This physical layer is the medium in which data travels; it consists of the geographic and the physical network components. Building upon the physical layer is the logical layer, defined as those elements of the network that are related to one another in a way that is abstracted from the physical network. In other words, the form or relationships within the logical layer are not tied to an individual, specific path, or node. The logical layer is key in differentiating cyberspace from a closed, fixed-function system. It is the logical capacities that give cyberspace a plasticity not afforded the other warfighting domains. For example, the vast capabilities of the logical layer form the foundation of the cloud-computing model–multiple redundancies and remotely accessible; built upon, but not tied to, a physical foundation of networks and infrastructure.

The last layer of the cyber domain is the persona layer, which is perhaps the most complex part of cyberspace. The persona layer consists of an individual's presence on the network, but does not represent a simple one-to-one relationship. 4 For example, one individual may have numerous online personas, or numerous individuals may use a single online persona. This makes tracking “who is doing what” complicated. The persona layer is critical to both understanding the threats within the cyber domain and leveraging intelligence therein, because it is here that those interacting in the domain are not simply passive users. How individuals use the tools of cyberspace, and how they interact with each other and with information is an active process, and one influenced by individual characteristics or priorities and regional idiosyncrasies. When conducting IPB it is important that intelligence professionals incorporate cyber considerations throughout the process.

Considerations for IPB in Cyberspace

During IPB, Steps One and Two (understanding the operational environment) are the most critical when evaluating cyberspace. While this may seem difficult for those not use to cyber, the same principles that apply in the land domain exist in the cyber domain. Within the cyber domain, in Step One, geography, terrain, population demographics, and political/socioeconomic factors all influence our evaluation of the cyber environment. For example, a nation state’s gross domestic product and infrastructure capacity significantly impact Internet penetration within the population. By understanding who built the network infrastructure within a country, analysts can develop topography, and identify both risks and opportunities to support cyberspace operations.

Within Step Two of IPB, intelligence professionals describe the battlefield effects primarily through the OAKOC (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment) aspects of terrain analysis. Within the cyber domain, areas of the network that are visible to an on-net operator (individuals traversing through cyberspace) are observation and fields of fire. For example, if an attacker needs access to a particular network in order to reach a target, how can the network, in turn, be accessed? Fields of fire might be obstructed by obstacles in
the cyber domain such as firewalls or passwords. Avenues of approach in cyberspace are composed of various paths operators traverse to reach a target. Just as an armor battalion may travel down a hardball road to reach its objective, an adversary could send a spear phishing email to penetrate a network.

All three cyber layers can be characterized as key terrain. An administrator account is key terrain in the persona layer because of the amount of data it can access. Operating systems are examples of key terrain in the logical layer. If an entire network is running on a version of an operating system with a vulnerability, an adversary could exploit any system on that network. Within the physical layer a switch, router, or poorly configured wireless device can all become key terrain. Just as concealment in the physical domain is the protection from observation, concealment in the cyber domain is the same. Tools like The Onion Router or Virtual Private Networks allow cyber actors to conceal themselves from observation. Obstacles such as passwords, firewalls, and encryption software provide cyber actors protection from cyber operations within the cyber domain.

Intelligence professionals must understand and effectively communicate these three layers in order to demonstrate the valuable contribution cyber intelligence can bring to warfighting domains. The intelligence section within a unit is responsible for evaluating the adversary, so it is dependent on us, as intelligence professionals, to work with the Signal representation (G6 or Signal Officer) to evaluate the cyber threat and defend the network. The Signal Section cannot track the adversary’s use of the Internet to influence operations; it focuses on preventing an intrusion into our networks and then providing first response when an incident occurs.

Summary

Whether functioning at the strategic, operational, or tactical environment the cyber domain demands our attention, we have become too trusting of it. As I illustrated by our adversary’s use of cyberspace to dominate the operational environment and by breaches to our own network security posture, cyberspace impacts all echelons and warfighting domains. Every unit within the Army has a tie into cyberspace. An armor battalion does not own, operate, or control air assets; however, it still incorporates the air domain into IPB. We must do the same for cyberspace. In future articles, representatives from U.S. Army Cyber Command and Second Army G2 will explore in detail the parallels between warfighting domains.

Endnotes


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In a number of areas the author uses terminology and concepts that do not completely comply with current Joint and Army doctrine. We included this as a “think article” so personnel can use the ideas to grapple with the challenges of cyber-electromagnetic activities.
The Relationship Between the UAS Platoon and the BCT

Introduction
This article discusses the critical importance of the relationships among the Brigade Aviation Element (BAE), brigade S2, Military Intelligence (MI) Company, and the Tactical Unmanned Aerial System (TUAS)-Shadow Platoon. The Shadow system is a brigade support asset which should be used to enhance surveillance and intelligence collection and enable commanders to make decisions. The use of intelligence is ongoing, before and throughout the entire mission. Learning how the UAS platoon plays a role in intelligence collection, and understanding the process for each Shadow launch and recovery is essential to mission success. Without going into each detail of every sections’ job, there are a few things to remember when considering their roles in UAS integration.

Airspace
The BAE is critical in preparing for UAS operations. Its function is to assist the brigade combat team (BCT) in aviation planning and provides mission information to the unit. During this process commanders and S3 officers must participate and lead aviation mission planning. The mission of the BAE is to provide integration and synchronization of aviation assets into the BCT’s scheme of maneuver, employment advice and planning for attack reconnaissance elements (such as Shadow), and Army airspace command and control planning, coordination, and airspace deconfliction.1 Airspace deconfliction includes assigning a restricted operating zone, which is developed for a specific operational mission or requirement. During launch and recovery of Shadow, there is a required zone minimum to get the bird in the air to the coordinated altitude. This altitude is assigned by BAE prior to the mission according to Shadow minimum and maximum flying capabilities.

Another consideration is the altitude at which Shadow can produce the best quality of video feed and maintain the necessary amount of stealth for the mission. All of these elements will be based on the commanders intent and recommendations given by the UAS Standardization Operators.

Some operations may require the BAE to use “key pads” to coordinate between the UAS Platoon and Air Traffic Control (ATC). The key pads break the area of operations (AO) into numbered grids that allow ATC to easily identify where Shadow will be located and observing. In these cases where key pads are required, the BAE should coordinate with the Brigade S2 to ensure the key pads correlate with the Information Collection (IC) Matrix. Although some may argue it isn’t completely necessary, communication between BAE and the Brigade S2 (particularly the IC Manager) is preferred and helpful when planning airspace and flight times.

In addition, the BAE typically provides the Squadron Weather Officer (SWO). The SWO should be updating the Shadow Mission Coordinator (MC) every thirty minutes leading up to launch, or as specified. The SWO should also communicate with the IC Manager to ensure the IC plan can be updated accordingly. The weather brief will be within the parameters of DD Form 175-1, Flight Weather Briefing, as directed in the Shadow operation regulation. If the weather is forecasted to keep the aircraft grounded until a specified
time of day, the SWO should continue to monitor weather and update the MC and BAE cell often, according to unit standard operating procedures (SOP). If weather conditions start to become more favorable, the SWO should inform the MC/Aircraft Operator to allow sufficient time for pre-flight operations to restart.

Personnel

The Brigade IC Manager is coordinating the eyes and ears of the BCT commander’s assets. The Manager should be given a Shadow capabilities brief prior to the start of operations. Based on the capabilities and limitations of Shadow, the manager should have a good idea of how to employ the asset within the brigade’s reconnaissance plan. Depending on the number of personnel within the Platoon and Shadows available within the BCT, the Platoon could ideally maintain 24/7 flight operations. The IC Manager should show the IC Matrix to the BAE prior to distributing to the battalion’s to ensure the section is tracking flight times and airspace needed for the upcoming missions.

The IC manager has a very important and demanding job that requires continual planning and changes as the mission changes. The more direction and surveillance guidance the Manager includes in the products, the stronger the asset will be to the brigade. This direction should include, but is not limited to, unit movement times and phases, named areas of interest, priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), enemy composition and weapons, and situation templates. If these types of products are included with the IC plan, the UAS Platoon will be better able to answer the brigade’s intelligence requirements.

During flight operations, the Shadow feed will generally be broadcasted in the brigade tactical operations center (TOC). The feed should be observed by the analysts within the S2 shop. The same applies for the feed in the battalion S2 shops. It is the job of the analyst to positively identify any possible enemy targets. Although a UAS operator knows the enemy’s composition and equipment, it is the job of the S2 to confirm or deny the reporting, based on the imagery provided.

If at any point during the mission, the relationship between the UAS Platoon and brigade changes, the Platoon should be notified immediately. This means, the Platoon needs to know for which battalion they are flying support. The brigade needs to make it clear, whether through the IC plan, or notifying prior to the mission or during the mission, who the Shadow will be in direct communication with to facilitate dynamic retasking. If the mission is to support the Scouts during Phase One of the operation, and the Shadow is their reconnaissance asset during that time, the brigade S2 needs to specify if they, or the Cavalry, will be directing surveillance.

Because the Shadow is a BCT asset, sometimes there can be miscommunication between the battalions and Platoon during support operations, (i.e., who is in control of the aircraft). To prevent this issue, the battalions should feed their Shadow requests to the Brigade S2, via the S3. At this time, the brigade S2 can make an informed decision to place Shadow where the asset is needed at each phase in the fight. The S3 will task according the brigade commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). If the brigade is to remain the sole controller of the aircraft, the S2 needs to ensure that any information gathered is disseminated quickly to the battalions. Operating with a “real time” video feed is one of the many advantages to Shadow, and all new intelligence should be reported down as quickly as possible.

The MI company commander, although mostly supporting UAS Platoon logistics, is an important piece to the communication puzzle. How often should the company commander be notified throughout flight operations? This may be the commander’s preference, but should be specified in the company and Platoon SOP. The company commander needs to be able to report the status of his assets not only to the brigade commander, but the battalion commanders as well. This may include, but is not limited to: estimated and actual Shadow launch and recovery times, any lost communication between brigade and the Platoon, and weather delays. In addition, the MI commander should establish CCIR for the Platoon prior to the mission. This should include loss of a Shadow, or any down mission essential equipment.

The company commander is responsible for making recommendations to the brigade as to when the Platoon should jump sites at a time which will minimize loss of coverage during the mission. The commander will also make the recommendation of placement for launch and recovery site, based on TOC location and whether or not to provide a forward site to the brigade.

Shadow missions include actual and simulated tactical and/or combat operations, crewmember training, intelligence, maintenance flights, and support to search and rescue.² During any mission, it is the operator’s job to ensure they are following the correct operating procedures required by BAE and ATC, while complying with all Shadow and aviation requirements. During flight operations, it is the Platoon’s responsibility to report regularly to higher headquarters. Operators will give grids and an assessment of what they see on the feed: number and types of vehicles, weapons, and personnel.

(Continued on page 65)
What is DSCA?

Army forces support civil authorities in the U.S. Homeland by performing defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) tasks. Army DSCA operations encompass all support provided by the components of the Army to civil authorities within the Homeland—the physical region that includes the continental U.S., Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. possessions and territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace. DSCA operations are performed by the Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard, and by Army civilians and contractors. Army forces conduct DSCA operations in response to requests from Federal, state, territorial, local, and tribal authorities.

DSCA operations are similar to stability operations and foreign humanitarian assistance, both of which are conducted outside the U.S. But DSCA operations are conducted within the U.S. and its territories and possessions in support of the U.S. population. For Army forces, four core tasks are associated with DSCA operations (see Figure 1):

- Provide support for domestic disasters.
- Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies.
- Provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incidents.
- Provide other designated support.

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and its subordinate U.S. Army North (USARNORTH), and the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and its subordinate U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), perform DSCA operations within their areas of responsibility.

When an event takes place in the Homeland, whether a natural disaster or terrorist attack, the local first responders (police, firefighters, and other emergency workers) are first on the scene. A local first responder is designated Incident Commander. For example, the Fire Chief of Arlington County, Virginia was the Incident Commander for the response to the terrorist attack on the Pentagon on 9/11. If the local authorities at the city or county level do not have sufficient assets to properly respond, or are affected by the event and cannot respond, local officials request support from the state. The state then uses its assets, such as the highway department or state police, to assist the local authorities. The Governor can use his National Guard forces in a state active duty or Title 32 status. If the state’s assets can handle the incident, no further involvement beyond National Guard activation is needed. An Emergency Management Assistance Compact may be invoked to permit neighboring states to send their assets to assist the affected state.

If an incident is so serious that state resources cannot respond effectively or support the large number of affected citizens, the Governor then asks for Federal assistance. The President may respond with a Presidential emergency declaration, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) then initiates a response. A Federal Joint Field Office (JFO) will be created, and the JFO and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will bring Federal assets to the incident scene to support the incident command structure already established. If required, DHS requests support from the Department of Defense (DOD), which in turn tasks
USNORTHCOM, which may task USARNORTH; or USPACOM, which may task USARPAC. USARNORTH and USARPAC work through the defense coordinating officer (DCO) and the JFO to identify and deploy Army units to support the affected population.

The DCO is typically an active duty Army Colonel (O-6) who is assigned by USNORTHCOM or USPACOM to serve as DOD’s single point of contact, coordinating with Federal and state authorities on the use of military resources. Currently, ten DCOs are permanently assigned and aligned with the ten FEMA regions in the U.S. In addition, one or two reserve DCOs are available in the Continental U.S., and one in Hawaii, to be activated to support the Federal response during an incident. Each DCO works closely day to day with Federal and state emergency agencies in his FEMA region, and develops personal ties with key personnel.

The DCO serves as a vital link between the FEMA region headquarters, the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC), state National Guard Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ), responding Federal agencies, and Federal military forces. The DCO coordinates requests for Federal assistance, forwards mission assignments to the appropriate military organizations through DOD channels, and assigns military liaison officers, as appropriate. A DCO may serve as the JTF commander if one is created for a DSCA operation. Each DCO is supported by a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE), a group of administrative and special staff personnel that coordinates DOD efforts with the primary agency and with other Federal and state authorities during DSCA operations. There is usually no intelligence staff officer or intelligence expertise within the DCE.

**The Intelligence Process in DSCA**

Commanders use the operations process to drive the planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their unique operational environment, make articulate decisions, and direct, lead, and assess military operations. Commanders cannot successfully accomplish activities involved in the operations process without information and intelligence. That information and intelligence is provided by the intelligence process for DSCA operations, just as it is for all other military operations. There are four steps in the process that recur continuously throughout the operations process—plan, collect, produce, disseminate—and two continuing activities that occur across all four steps: analysis and assessment (see Figure 2).

**Plan.** Planning begins with analysis and assessment of the conditions in the operational environment. The intelligence staff should complete much of this analysis well in advance of any operational planning, particularly in the case of recurring natural disasters such as wildfires, floods, and hurricanes; or in the case of support to events identified well in advance, such as a political convention or major sporting event.

**Collect.** The collect step consists of collection, processing, and reporting of information in response to information collection tasks. Collection assets collect information about the terrain, weather, and civil considerations (area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events), plus force protection information (although an enemy is rarely if ever encountered during DSCA operations, there may be threats to the safety of Army forces). Much of the information required for intelligence support to DSCA operations may be available from other Federal, state, local, tribal, or private sector organizations and will not require additional Army collection operations.

**Produce.** Production involves using the results of intelligence analysis to develop information and intelligence and create products, conclusions, or projections regarding the operational environment. These products answer known or anticipated requirements in a format that provides situational awareness to the force and enables the commander to achieve situational understanding. Intelligence products for DSCA operations will most often be at the unclassified level, since supported civil agencies seldom have cleared personnel or systems capable of handling classified information.

**Disseminate.** The disseminate step ensures that users receive the products and assessments that they require to support DSCA operations. Particularly in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment that accompanies most DSCA operations, a variety of dissemination methods and techniques may be required, including web posting, instant messaging, and printed reports or information downloaded onto CDs delivered by couriers or liaison officers.

The two continuing activities occur throughout the intelligence process and can affect any of the four steps in the intelligence process at any time.

**Analysis.** In addition to analyzing the information collected, intelligence personnel conduct analysis to assist in making many types of decisions concerning information collection and intelligence operations. Particularly in requirements management, analysis is critical to ensuring information/intelligence requirements receive the appropriate priority for collection.

**Assessment.** Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of a DSCA operation. The continual assessment of operations, infor-
Intelligence collection assets, available information and intelligence, and the various aspects of the area of operations, are critical to:

- Ensure the CCIRs are answered.
- Ensure intelligence requirements are met and collection assets are redirected to meet changing requirements.
- Ensure operations run effectively and efficiently.
- Ensure information collected and intelligence produced are properly and effectively used.

Intelligence Planning for DSCA Operations

Army units conducting DSCA operations may contend with complex considerations requiring a concerted effort among all intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, from coordinated exploitation of national and joint capabilities down to Soldier reconnaissance at the company or platoon level. During DSCA operations, Military Intelligence efforts may be directed and coordinated at levels well above the brigade or battalion S2. In the case of a major hurricane, for example, DHS leads the effort to assess damage after the storm passes. This better integrates the capabilities of national assets that do not belong to DOD, such as those available from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the Civil Air Patrol. The state National Guard controls its own assets, which are often employed early in a natural disaster. The Interagency Remote Sensing Coordination Cell in-
If a USARNORTH JTF is activated, the JTF J2 is the intelligence planner for DOD Title 10 forces in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The S2s of brigades and battalions under JTF operational control coordinate with the JTF J2 to receive taskings. The JTF coordinates intelligence support through USARNORTH to USNORTHCOM. If National Guard forces in Title 32 status are also operating, detailed coordination between the state JFHQ, NGB, USARNORTH, and USNORTHCOM is required to consolidate the intelligence plan. USPACOM has tasked USARPAC G2 as its executive agent for land domain Homeland intelligence and information awareness support within the JOA.

Commanders and intelligence planners must still integrate all resources into a single intelligence plan to capitalize on different capabilities. The brigade or battalion responding to a disaster is only a small part of the overall effort. During the response to the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, the Mississippi JFHQ (JFHQ-MS) J2, using Microsoft Excel, developed an easily adjustable collection plan addressing the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and subordinate SIR of the JFHQ-MS Commander. By identifying areas where the projected effects of the oil spill were expected, graphically depicting those areas, and assigning available National Guard assets while maintaining visibility of known interagency activities in the JOA, the J2 was able to provide situational awareness to leadership and maximize PIR satisfaction through organic and external agency capabilities.

For certain DSCA operations, the most useful product for developing the intelligence plan may be an event template. When supporting national special security events, such as political conventions or large sporting events, an event template that shows when and where important events will take place, routes into and out of venues, and support areas may help develop named areas of interest on which information collection assets should focus their collection efforts. The time schedules for such events will also help schedule collection by particular assets in particular areas, as shown in the timeline developed by USARNORTH for the 2013 Presidential inauguration (see Figure 3).

**Collecting Information through Liaison with Civil Authorities and Other Sources**

Upon being alerted to conduct a DSCA operation, units normally send liaison officers (LNOs) to various unified action partners. The state National Guard may be assisted by the state militia or a state organized defense force (if one exists). Nearly all of these militia members are volunteers,
but often they are well trained in emergency management issues and LNO responsibilities.

Army LNOs are often sent to state, county, and city EOCs in affected areas. The LNO must quickly grasp the situation in the area and explain the capabilities, limitations, and associated costs of available Army units. The LNO should provide information on the local situation to the mobilizing or deploying Army unit, either directly or through a higher headquarters. Since police and fire departments, public utilities, and other government services have a presence in most EOCs, the LNO may be able to answer questions for the intelligence Soldier to assist in situation development. Some EOCs include representatives from the American Red Cross and other non-governmental organizations that can provide information concerning shelters and population in an affected area. This information provides a good indication of how widespread the disaster is, and whether people are staying in place or evacuating the area because of the event.

During large-scale events, the DCO located in the affected FEMA region sends LNOs from the DCE to supporting organizations in the JOA. This provides another source of data for the S/G/J2 concerning the area impacted by the event. Before an ARNORTH JTF deploys to respond to a DSCA event, the ARNORTH G2X establishes contact with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in the JOA to ensure the JTF has counterintelligence support for threat awareness and reporting. The JTF has a counterintelligence officer on the staff, and the J2X may be augmented, if necessary, with counterintelligence agents to serve as liaisons with the State Fusion Center, FBI JTTF, and other law enforcement agencies in the JOA. The liaison mission is coordinated with the JTF Provost Marshal. Together these two sections provide timely and accurate reporting on foreign and domestic threats to Army assets.

Within USPACOM’s Homeland JOA, USARPAC maintains relationships with multiple Federal, state/territory, and local agencies which feed the USPACOM intelligence community enterprise. During operations this information is assessed by the USPACOM Joint Intelligence Operations Center in conjunction with DOD threat reporting to periodically produce tailored threat updates.

Often during natural disasters or developing terrorist events, simply monitoring local or national news media can provide relevant information on the developing situation. News helicopters and on-scene reporters provide general information about the event, whether a natural disaster or the chaos resulting from a terrorist attack. The most rapid reporting concerning the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was broadcast to the entire nation by network TV news. The Washington, D.C. National Guard even used national television stations to broadcast its call for mobilization of the force. However, the information on TV may not be accurate or up-to-date. A wide variety of rumors, half-truths, and just plain wrong information was broadcast on 11 September 2001. Intelligence Soldiers must still verify with a local authority or state EOC whether the information reported in the news media is accurate. The S/G/J2 who uses local news reporting in updates to the commander and staff should qualify this information as “according to local news reports...”.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather radio and internet pages provide detailed information concerning weather-related emergencies. Weather forecasts and advisories from NOAA are usually sufficiently detailed to provide the initial deployment information required by the unit commander. Supporting weather specialty teams from the U.S. Air Force can provide weather data in enough detail for flight operations of fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft. Aviation units have the ability to obtain detailed weather information suitable for flight operations through aviation channels.

Intelligence Oversight during DSCA Operations

An understanding of intelligence oversight regulations is particularly important for intelligence Soldiers during DSCA operations. Intelligence oversight is an enabling tool; it protects the civil rights of U.S. persons while ensuring that intelligence organizations can effectively perform their mission.

It is particularly important to understand the concept of “U.S. person.” U.S. persons are protected by intelligence oversight rules. A U.S. person is defined in AR 381-10 U.S. Army Intelligence Activities, as:

- A U.S. citizen.
- A lawful permanent resident alien.
- An unincorporated association substantially composed of U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens.
- A corporation incorporated in the U.S., except for those directed and controlled by a foreign government.

Chapter 2 of AR 381-10 specifies that MI Soldiers may collect U.S. person information only when it is necessary to fulfill an assigned function (for example, support to civil authorities) and when it is:

- Consensual–the U.S. person consents to MI collecting information about him or her.
- Publicly available.
- Foreign intelligence. Of particular interest for DSCA operations, information may be collected on individuals
or organizations reasonably believed to be engaged, or about to engage, in international terrorist or international narcotics activities.

- Counterintelligence. In particular, information on individuals reasonably believed to be engaged in, or about to engage in, international terrorist activities.
- Physical security information. In particular, information concerning a U.S. person reasonably believed to threaten the physical security of DOD employees, installations, operations, or official visitors.
- Narcotics information. In particular, information concerning a U.S. person reasonably believed to be engaged in international narcotics activity.
- Threats to safety. Information required to protect the safety of any person or organization.
- Overhead reconnaissance. When not directed at a specific U.S. person.
- Necessary for administrative purposes.

While conducting intelligence activities in support of DSCA missions, U.S. person information may be retained in accordance with Procedure 3 of AR 381-10. Information may be retained up to 90 days for the purpose of determining if it is retainable under the regulation. This 90-day period begins upon receipt of the information. Intelligence elements should review all printed and electronically stored information to ensure that it meets the requirements for retention, and if not, properly remove the information from working files and electronic storage.

**Conclusion**

An MI Soldier from any Army component may be called upon to support a DSCA operation, possibly in his hometown or home state. Soldiers must understand that DSCA operations require the same timely, thorough information and intelligence support as offense, defense and stability operations, and that the support they provide will ultimately benefit U.S. persons. Knowledge of the intelligence oversight rules is vital to ensuring that information and intelligence support during DSCA operations protects the rights of those U.S. persons, but the intelligence oversight rules do not prevent MI Soldiers from providing the support the commander requires.

Brigadier General John Stewart, the ARCENT G2, stated the Kuwaitis, “served mainly as SIGINT intercept operators but also helped with document exploitation and did some interpretive work.” In the 24th Infantry Division, they were placed with each MI company, each Interrogation of Prisoners of War team, and with the Civil Affairs teams. The Division G2, Colonel Richard Quirk, recalled that they played “a disproportionately important role as leavening agents throughout the organization. They helped improve the language skills of our intelligence collectors, and they collected valuable information themselves.” Within the 82nd Airborne Division, the Kuwaitis performed duties as interrogators and interpreters, assisting in the screening of more than 2,700 prisoners of war and innumerable captured documents. Stewart summed up the DESERT OWL Soldiers’ performance and contribution as “magnificent and immeasurable” and concluded, “We couldn’t have done it without ‘em.”

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On January 15, the TTF returned to Fort Devens. Less than a week later, it received a new task to train an additional 40 Kuwaiti soldiers. By the time this class started on January 27, an additional 20 trainees had been identified, specifically for the interrogation mission. While the SIGINT students worked with Devens instructors, the interrogators trained with a two-person mobile training team (MTT) sent from the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The 59 graduates of the late January course deployed on February 6. A final class of 63 Kuwaitis trained in interrogation skills from February 20-26 at Fort Dix. The Fort Huachuca MTT also conducted this accelerated course, artfully condensing a 9-week program of instruction into just 28 hours.

Once overseas, the Army Central Command (ARCENT) distributed the Kuwaiti soldiers where they were needed most.
The Uses of History

History has many uses for the present. It can show us how and why our societies have become what they are today; and in the process, it shows us that what we accept today as the status quo was not preordained and, under the right conditions, is subject to change. History, however, does not provide us with lessons on how act in the present, much to the disappointment of generations of policymakers and military officers who have looked to history to figure out how to confront the problems of the present using solutions from the past. Every place, time, and individual in history reflects unique social, political, cultural, and geographic contexts. The historical record is also incomplete and colored by a variety of factors.

For much of history, the majority of humanity was illiterate and unable to produce documents; thus, only the cultural and political elite had the ability to produce and store records for future generations. What these elites wrote, moreover, only recorded their perceptions of reality, not the full truth. Other important factors, such as the thoughts and psychological state of individuals shaping the events of history are largely unknowable, forcing historians to rely upon informed speculation. But how historians speculate about the past reflects their conscious and unconscious biases, adding yet another layer of uncertainty regarding the completeness of a particular historical account. Therefore, it is nearly impossible to generate usable lessons from the past to guide the present. In other words, history is not a science; it can produce no laws.

Although history cannot provide reliable lessons to guide our actions, there are ways it can help improve our ability to make sound judgments regarding unstructured problems—the types of problems that military intelligence (MI) professional face daily. Drawing on the writings of Professor Jon Sumida, I illustrate how two nineteenth century military theorists—Carl von Clausewitz and Alfred Thayer Mahan—combined history and general theories about warfare to produce a unique educational method to improve the judgment of military officers. These methods, the rationale behind them, and the potential uses for MI professionals today are discussed.

Critical Analysis

In 1832, Carl von Clausewitz’ On War was published, forever reshaping the field of military theory and practice through his linkage of the dynamics of war to political and social contexts. But as Sumida notes, most readers have overlooked important aspects of the book, due primarily because many have read only the first few chapters, assuming that they serve as a summary of the book. Sumida argues, however, that when one reads the entire book it reveals a groundbreaking argument for how one can use military history to improve the capacity of military officers to make sound judgments by improving their awareness of themselves and of the general dynamics of warfare. Improving the ability of officers to make sound judgments was important for Clausewitz, who wrote at a time in which he and other Prussian officers feared a new war would erupt between the battle-hardened French military of the 1820s and the relatively inexperienced Prussian military.

To improve the readiness of the Prussian officer corps to counter a French invasion, Clausewitz developed an educational method he called “critical analysis.” This method aimed to instill within the corps the characteristics of the military genius. This was someone who possessed the skills, knowledge, and abilities to make and enforce rapid, sound military judgments during the chaos of battle. It is important to note that Clausewitz considered the realm of the genius to be the execution, rather than the planning, phase of war. The execution phase was much more difficult because it was not organized according to scientific plan-
ning techniques and it generally took place away from the dangers of the battlefield. During the execution phase, moreover, commanders encountered greater friction that created a gap between what they intended to accomplish in their plans and what actually occurred.

Friction includes the enemy’s actions, the fog of war, decisions of superiors and subordinates, and the fear and stress that typifies the fighting experience. Only the select few commanders—those who demonstrated the characteristics of the genius—would excel in this environment. (Clausewitz likely had Napoleon in mind when he came up with this theory.) To become a military genius, however, officers typically need to have significant amounts of battlefield experiences—experiences that would have taught them how battles generally unfold and how the variables that shape battles interacted and shaped its outcomes. But what if a commander lived in a period in which he had few to no opportunities to gain experience in battlefield command? Or what if commanders only had the opportunities to gain command experience in a narrow range of battle types? To overcome this challenge, Clausewitz turned to critical analysis.

Critical analysis contains several ingredients—all of which contribute to the ultimate goal of improving an officer’s capacity for sound judgment. The first step is to find a battle with a detailed historical record that would enable a historian to paint a relatively accurate picture of the battle’s dynamics, from the planning phases to its conclusions. But, as Clausewitz knew, the historical record would be silent on certain areas, such as the psychological state of soldiers and officers within each army.

Theory based speculation, therefore, was necessary to fill the gaps in the record. We can, for instance, expect that a commander entered the battle without a fully accurate picture of what the enemy looked like, how he would behave, and how his own soldiers would react once the battle commenced. We can also imagine that an army that marched for days to reach the battlefield would have been physically and psychologically drained, reducing its combat effectiveness. Until John Keegan’s *The Face of Battle*, historians typically overlooked these physical and psychological stresses when describing battles. This is due in part to the fact that the historical records from which historians draw upon rarely include those details. Instead, official accounts typically focus on describing how each side structured their forces, their plans and tactics, and the outcome.

Once Clausewitz accounted for the unknowable aspects of battle through theory, he combined his theory based speculations with the historical record to create a complete account of the battle. Students would then read through the account paying attention to how the battle unfolded and how the commander responded to battlefield dynamics, in light of the tactical, psychological, and physical challenges he faced. It is important to note that the purpose of this exercise, which was supposed to act as a kind of historical simulation, was not to judge whether the past commander was right or wrong; rather, it was to understand why that commander’s decisions were so difficult and why the characteristics of the genius are necessary to survive and to excel. In other words, the student gained a full appreciation of what it is like to go to war and to be responsible as a commander. The point, therefore, is not to arm a student with principles to guide their actions—an approach to military history employed by Clausewitz’s intellectual rival, Antoine-Henri Jomini.

Having completed the historical simulation, the reader would then reflect on that experience in order to further understanding. This entire process ultimately aims to improve the reader’s capacity for sound judgments during the stresses of combat. Ideally, the reader repeats the exercise with other battles to solidify their appreciation of the general dynamics of war. The graphic below illustrates this concept.

**Mahan’s Contributions**

The problem with critical analysis is that Clausewitz provides little practical advice for how to implement it in the classroom. In the late nineteenth century, however, Alfred Thayer Mahan, the famed American theorist of naval warfare, introduced two ways one could combine theory and history to improve officer judgment: an introduction to principles of war and a demonstration of military genius.

The first method, introducing students to the principles of war through historical case studies was—and still is—a popular teaching method in professional military educational institutes around the globe. These principles, however, are not guides for action during the execution phase of a plan, but they can guide planning, as both Mahan and Clausewitz conceded. Basil Liddell Hart’s famous “indirect approach” is an example of a popular military principle.
this principle, one can generally achieve favorable results on the battlefield by concentrating superior forces at unexpected places and at unexpected times, which can lead to a certain psychological shock that may paralyze an enemy.

Commanders should account for this principle in their planning. But the indirect approach does not guarantee success on the battlefield because the enemy behaves in unpredictable ways. At the same time, commanders are working with imperfect intelligence, with subordinates who may misinterpret orders or behave irrationally under stress, and with superiors who have political considerations to take into mind that may restrict certain military actions. Nevertheless, exposing students to the principles of war can familiarize them with the general dynamics of warfare both in its planning and execution phases. One could use this method in the classroom by breaking down the planning process during a particular battle or campaign to show how those principles shaped the plans and their impact on the events in question.

Preparing students for the stresses of battlefield command, however, requires a more advanced technique. Mahan’s technique drew inspiration from art.21 To become a great artist, an aspiring painter must master the mechanics of art. He must know how to manipulate paint, brushes, and canvases to produce certain representations—something that is achievable with practice, study, and maybe some instruction. But to turn the painting into a work of art requires experience gained through constant practice. The painter may also look to advanced painters for inspiration by watching them create a work, observing how they manipulate their brushes and colors to create art. Over time, the aspiring painter gains an appreciation of the genius of great artists.

Mahan believed that military history provided aspiring military geniuses with a deep well of case studies that demonstrated military genius in action. Thus, the job of the historian was to bring these case studies to the attention of students and to guide them through their readings of military genius in action. From these readings, a student can see how a military genius applied the science of war from his time to achieve desired goals, despite the friction that frequently renders plans obsolete as soon as the fighting commences. Through constant repetition of this exercise a student would, in theory, start to develop the characteristics of the military genius. A military that developed these characteristics within its officer corps, moreover, could gain a major advantage over its adversaries. As Mahan famously said, “first-rate men in second-rate ships are better than second-rate men in first-rate ships.”22

**Uses for MI Professionals Today**

Clausewitz and Mahan devised their teaching techniques with combat arms officers in mind. Nevertheless, these techniques have value for MI professionals today. MI analysts at either the tactical or strategic level share much in common with the battlefield commanders who Clausewitz and Mahan focused on, even though analysts generally do not face the same physical and psychological challenges that confront leaders in the combat arms.

There is a science and an art to intelligence analysis. Analysts, depending on their specialty, have a wide array of tools at their disposal—collection platforms, databases, mapping programs, computers, and much more. They also have tactics that guide their actions. At the tactical level, for instance, intelligence analysts have the intelligence preparation of the battlefield method that is part of the overall military decisionmaking process. These tactics provide structure and direct analysts’ research and analysis. But familiarity with these tools and tactics—which can collectively be seen as the science of intelligence analysis—does not guarantee that these analysts will produce high quality analytical products. This is because they also face friction, just like individuals working in the combat arms.

Friction confronts analysts in many ways. In war and peace, adversaries are actively attempting to deny analysts access to critical information regarding their disposition, composition, and likely courses of action. At the same time, analysts must confront the real possibility that the information they receive from collectors has been colored by denial or deception efforts by adversaries. Analysts also must confront their own conscious and unconscious biases that undermine their ability to conduct objective research and analysis. In short, knowledge of the science of intelligence analysis is not enough. Analysts must become artists in their field. They must be able to apply the science of their profession in uncertain stressful environments, and they must understand that they have to pay close attention to how they perceive and process the information they receive in order to mitigate bias.

The MI community can use “critical analysis” to improve the decisionmaking ability of its analysts. Working with historians and social scientists, the MI community can develop in-depth case studies that show how past analysts confronted difficult analytical problems. How, for instance, did a group of analysts leverage the tools and tactics at their disposal to make accurate predictions regarding an adversary’s most likely course of action? To reiterate, the point would be for current analysts to read through these studies to gain a sense of the difficulty of producing high-quality in-
telligence products and how the various tactics, techniques, and procedures that go into producing those products may vary depending upon the circumstances.

Conversely, analysts should also look at case studies in which past analysts failed to make accurate assessments. Again, the point is not to judge these past analysts. Rather, it is to understand what conditions limited their ability to make accurate assessments. It is important, moreover, that these case studies cover multiple types of conflict environments to ensure analysts develop a deep understanding of how the dynamics of the armed conflicts that they study change considerably depending on the type of conflict and the location of that conflict within time and space.

Adapting critical analysis to the skillset of the MI community faces several obstacles. The community, for instance, lacks a clear set of military principles to shape its planning and to help guide it through historical case studies. The community also lacks the deep well of case studies that the combat arms personnel can draw upon using military history. Although intelligence history does exist, much of it focuses on the experience of the human collectors or the counterintelligence agents, the analysts’ stories often go untold. Overcoming this challenge will require extensive and intensive research by historians and MI professionals. Nevertheless, by working together to sift through the archival records of the intelligence community, researchers and MI professionals can start to build case studies from which to draw planning principles and to demonstrate the genius of past analysts in action.

Endnotes


2. The recent fascination that military officers have had with counterinsurgency theories and practices of French and British colonial armies is an example of this.

3. Only in the last century have historians started to find ways to read official documents to account for the ideas and actions of non-elites. For more on this topic, see Arlette Farge, *The Allure of the Archives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013).

4. Their words also have meanings that we may not grasp fully due to cultural and/or historical divides. For more on this issue, see the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

5. This is a central argument of Michael Howard’s collection of lectures in *The Lessons of History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).

6. The works that this paper references are: Jon Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to on War* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2008) and Jon Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). Note: Jon Sumida is my academic advisor at the University of Maryland, College Park.


10. Specific skills that he mentions include appreciation of terrain, deep knowledge of the science of war for that time period, ambitious and energetic leadership, awareness of own strengths and weaknesses, knowledge of others and how to motivate them, understanding the “nature of things” (his general theory of war), maintaining composure in combat, and the ability to inspire faith and trust. See Chapter Three of Book I in Clausewitz, *On War*.


13. He pays particular attention to the decision making abilities of the officers, the influence of politics on the direction and dynamics of the battle, and how social factors altered the will and/or ability of a combatant to fight. Soldiers motivated by nationalism will be more likely to stand and fight than ones fighting only for a paycheck.


16. Paraphrased from page 189 of Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*.


18. This graphic is a variation of one used in the first appendix in Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 195-96.

19. Mahan did not use the term military genius. In fact, it is unclear whether Mahan was aware of Clausewitz’s “critical analysis.” Nevertheless, he developed an approach to teaching high command that was very similar to “critical analysis.” For more on the relationship between Clausewitz and Mahan, see Jon Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered*, 113.


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The bottom-line up front of this column: What we learn from you today will help build the force of tomorrow.

A basic tenet of the Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE) Lessons Learned (LL) Team’s philosophy is that our success is determined by how successful we make others. Our most successful endeavors begin with your endorsement and approval to share the lessons we learn from you with others. We build upon this success by sharing—and encouraging others to share—the lessons and best practices (L&BP) in turn. Often, we link those seeking lessons with those possessing the most recent or superior experience in specific areas. Your operations and training experiences provide the most realistic and authoritative perspective of the condition of today’s force. Transferring knowledge and experiences with the current force is a good technique in preparing and completing a combat training center (CTC) rotation or designing a pre-deployment training plan for a named operation. You may wonder if the Army considers your lessons in planning for the long-term. The short answer is yes.

The TRADOC Commanding General introduced the Force 2025 and Beyond (F2025B) plan as a “living document that will guide growth” and that (the Army) will “not get everything right” at the start. The two quoted passages reveal three implied tasks for the Intelligence Warfighting Function (IWff) LL collection effort: identify those activities we (MI) did get right, identify current challenge areas, and seize the opportunity to present the L&BP observed to those charged with designing the MI force’s future capabilities captured in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF).

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The aforementioned implied tasks complement the specified LL collection task to report observations pertinent to Army Warfighting Challenge #1 (AWFC #1)—Develop Situational Understanding. At the time this column was written AWFC#1 contained nine subordinate Learning Demands (LDs). Each separate observation in every ICoE LL Collection Report is linked to the appropriate AWFC#1 LDs. Linking observations to the LDs helps the MI Capabilities Developers readily identify which of your experiences is most applicable to designing the future force.

It is not only the future MI force that benefits from the learning derived from your experiences. The Army’s overall LL enterprise is encouraged by the recognition that the F2025B plan is a living document which can be positively affected by the L&BP we learn from you. The future threats presented in the F2025B plan are those that originate from operations, training, or study activities in which you or your units are already engaged. All of the AWFCs (a total of 20 at the time of writing) are addressed in the Army Lessons Learned Forum and supporting activities. The AWFCs are available online at a public site (not requiring a CAC or password) at http://www.arcic.army.mil/Initiatives/army-warfighting-challenges.aspx.

As the MI proponent and lead for AWFC#1, ICoE reviews the IWff-related L&BP each quarter in a Lessons Learned Integration Update (LLIU) presented to the ICoE Commanding General. The LLIU provides the leaders of each of the DOTMLPF capability areas a venue to describe pertinent L&BP reported, received, or discovered that have been integrated into their respective areas. The ICoE LL Team’s reports are only one source of L&BP. The LLIU also provides an opportunity for the DOTMLPF leaders to highlight L&BP they have discovered or received from other sources.

The LLIU is a one-stop shop which reveals how the multiple MI proponent processes of the U.S. Army ICoE are using your L&BP. If you ever question whether the L&BP you share with us results in any positive change, the answer is provided during the LLIU. Changes are announced, and sometimes directed, by ICoE leaders at the LLIU. Additional LL collection requirements are sometimes identified at the
LLIU which often results in an ICoE LL Team request to visit your unit.

**Expeditionary MI Operations**

The most lucrative sources of L&BP supporting F2025B are MI elements involved in operations and exercises involving processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) activities. The F2025B plan identifies the Army’s transition to a smaller, continental U.S. (CONUS) based force that is more expeditionary. It is clear that lessons from MI forces supporting current outside CONUS (OCONUS) operations are inherently applicable. What some may not know is that the lessons from CTC rotations and exercises involving PED are just as valuable in identifying trends, issues, or challenges unforeseen and not captured in the documents or concepts specifying the MI force of the future. Several CONUS-based exercises we’ve observed over the past 18 months have involved an OCONUS aspect particularly useful in informing Reach, PED, or anchor point support for future requirements.

We’ve also traveled to gain perspectives only available OCONUS. These trips also involved observing training and current operations. While L&BP gleaned have been put to immediate use by forces engaged in named operations, we also have been able to apply what we’ve learned to future MI force development. The results of immediately applying L&BP are more quickly observed. The results of lessons applied to the future force may not be seen for years. I offer these aforementioned comparisons to dissuade you from the misperception that no one ever does anything with the lessons you provide. The hardest part of integrating lessons is the work (mission) you’ve done which formed the lesson. The easy part for us is listening to you. The complex, and longest process, is collaborating with our DOTMLPF partners at the U.S. Army ICoE or throughout the Army’s LL enterprise to convert your lesson or best practice into an enduring positive change. Remember, our success is determined by how successful we make others. We look forward to learning from you.

Join us to hear the latest MI LL developments at our monthly MI LL Forum sessions held the third Thursday of each month at 1700Z using Defense Collaboration Services at https://conference.apps.mil/webconf/millforum. All you need to participate is a CAC-enabled computer equipped with speakers and a microphone.

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**The Relationship Between the UAS Platoon and the BCT**

(Continued from page 53)

The UAS operations technician plays an important role as liaison between the Platoon and brigade. His responsibility is developing UAS requirements and identifying appropriate configuration to satisfy mission requirements. The technician will work closely with the BAE to coordinate airspace and Shadow/radio frequency requirements. Overall, the technician will work to integrate Shadow into the collection plan and assist the all-source and imagery analysts with analysis of data to satisfy PIRs. He/she will be the advisor and subject matter expert for all UAS related issues.

**Conclusion**

There are several people who contribute to the planning of UAS collection operations. Communication at all levels is essential to the execution of Shadow missions. The synchronization of all the aforementioned entities may seem simple, or even obvious, but if not performed adequately can prevent effective IC. All personnel understanding how they affect the mission, and knowing how to contribute, will make the mission flow smoothly and eliminate unnecessary rifts. Learning to work together with Soldiers, NCOs, and officers at different levels that you don’t normally work with can be challenging. It is important to take advantage of field training and garrison exercises that practice communication skills that will improve your unit’s readiness.

**Endnotes**


See also FM 3-55 Information Collection, May 2013.

1LT Kari LaRubio is currently the UAS Platoon Leader for 2ABCT, 1ID at Fort Riley, Kansas. She has deployed the platoon twice, once in support of a National Training Center rotation and an Exportable Combat Training Center rotation. Her platoon has supported countless maneuver battalion and brigade level exercises. Her previous duty positions include S2, DHHB, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, where she was forward deployed. She is a 2012 graduate of the MI Officer Basic Course.
Proponent Notes

Officer Notes

Army Directive 2016-01. Changing the Army Policy for Female Assignments. As of 29 January 2016, all Infantry (11 series), Armor (19 series), and Special Forces (18 series) specialties are open to both enlisted and officer females. All Ranger-coded positions are included in that list. In addition multiple skill identifiers are subsequently open to women, ranging from B4 (Sniper) to Q5 (Special Forces Combat Diving, Medical). This momentous event opens over 125,000 additional positions to women joining the Army today.

This will affect the MI officer population in a significant way. Many officers come to MI through the branch detail program, with the majority of the detail slots going to Infantry and Armor. With the change we will see an increased number of women receiving the branch detail program with either Infantry or Armor as their detail. With more officers to utilize in the program we may see an increase in branch detailed officer numbers coming to MI with combat arms leadership experience.

This change is effective as of 29 January 2016, along with a list of regulation changes Army-wide in order to mirror this change. The OCMI POC for this article may be contacted at (520) 533-3785, DSN 821-3785.

Warrant Officer Initiatives

MI Warrant Officer career opportunities abound for MI professionals in all seven Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), and in all three Compos. Despite, and because of, the force reduction in the Active Army, the need for technical expertise in all MI MOS is growing. A smaller force must be a smarter, more capable and ready force, and warrant officers are the strategic planners who make success happen. With the creation of new MI Brigades and Joint Interrogation and Detention Centers in the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard, there are more opportunities than ever to serve in a more technical capacity within Compos 2 and 3. MI continues to seek the best qualified NCOs who are ready for the next challenge in their careers.

Also in Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, MI branch introduced technical follow-on courses to the Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education (WOILE) and Warrant Officer Senior Service Education (WOSSE) for CW3/4s and CW4/5s respectively. These follow-on courses are taught in residence at Fort Huachuca, and build upon education provided at the Warrant Officer Career College courses. The MI WOILE follow-on course provides intermediate level education and leadership skills critical and necessary to integrate warrant officer technical expertise as staff officers, trainers, managers, systems integrators, and leaders at the tactical and operational levels of Army, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational organizations. The MI WOSSE follow-on course provides senior level education, knowledge, and influential leader competencies necessary for success in the contemporary operating environment, enabling knowledge and communications skills to clearly articulate technical solutions to complex problems.

The curriculum for both courses is rigorous, engaging, and addresses the current need for senior Intelligence professionals by empowering Senior Warrant Officer Leader Development in the Profession of Arms. IAW AR 350-1, officers who attend WOILE and WOSSE at Fort Rucker in FY 2016 and beyond, must also attend the corresponding MI WOILE follow on or MI WOSSE follow on courses for PME completion. The OCMI POC for this article may be contacted at (520) 533-1181, DSN 821-1181.

Enlisted Notes

JCAC. As of 1 October 2012, the Joint Cyber Analyst Course (JCAC) became the MOS 35Q (Cryptologic Network Warfare Specialist) producing course for the U.S. Army. JCAC is instructed solely by NSA contractors with military liaison requirements to assist in the administrative duties associated with conduct of the course. Although there is not yet an Inter-service Training and Review Organization Agreement between the Army and Navy to provide Soldiers to instruct or administratively support the course, Delta Company, 344th MI Battalion does provide one Chief Instructor and one administrative advisor to provide oversight of the course, assist with administrative responsibilities, and help in the academic review board process. D Company has no 35Q qualified personnel in the company.

JCAC is currently 25 weeks and 1 day long and 1,008 classroom hours. The course is divided into 16 modules, with 18 knowledge and 10 performance tests. A service member must finish the course with a grade of above 75 percent. A score of a 90 percent is considered exceptional. Other than one module, JCAC is unclassified. Beginning FY 2016,
6 days were added to the course for the Mobile OS material, but not added as a stand alone module. The Capstone Exercise will be 3 days but does not increase the course length because material from Modules 14, 15, and 16 are being used for the Capstone.

Since May of 2013, the following attrition mitigation strategies have been instituted:

- **Head Start.** This is a one-week course taken upon arrival at Corry Station, Florida that focuses on the transition from a Basic Training mindset to an academic mentality. The course provides the Soldier an orientation to the classroom environment they will experience, and allows the Soldier a week to adapt mentally, socially, and physically to their new surroundings. The course includes instruction on research methodology, MI basics, critical thinking, an introduction to Cyber, and culminates with a country brief delivered to the Commander, Executive Officer, or Army Liaison Officer.

- **Warrior Sustainment.** A one-week course conducted following the Soldier’s graduation from JCAC. The course focuses on Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills (WTBD), Army Values, and instilling the warrior mentality following 6 months in a multi-service classroom. The course was created in order to remove WTBD during JCAC to allow the Soldier to focus solely on JCAC academics.

- **JCAC Prep Course:** A course designed to familiarize new JCAC students with problems they will encounter in the first 6 modules of the course with a focus on successfully navigating the first 30 days. The intent is for the students to learn the basics in a controlled, low pressure environment with Army instructors, rather than seeing the information for the first time in the formal classroom. The lessons taught in the prep course are derived from feedback from the students and an identified lack of understanding of basic math and computer concepts. We get positive feedback from all students (graduates and drops, new accessions, and MOS-T) that this course helped prepare them for JCAC. This strategy is currently not utilized as the company does not have a 35Q to instruct the course.

- **Learning Supplements:** D Company has identified approximately 75 hours of online training using YouTube, Khan Academy, and Skillport classes. The online training directly corresponds to specific JCAC modules. This information is provided to students in an extended hold under status and also MOS-T prior to their arrival at Corry Station.

- **Increase in ST Score.** The increase to 112 ST score was implemented at the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) in October 2014. The historical average ST for a drop is 110 while the average ST for a graduate is above 118. There is a direct correlation in ST Score to final GPA.

- **Information Computer Technology Literacy Test (ICTL):** This is an aptitude test administered at MEPS, designed to identify Soldiers who have the aptitude to be successful in JCAC. A minimum score of 60 is required. The ICTL became a requirement in October 2014. The first full class of IET students to have taken the ICTL started 5 January 2015. There is no ICTL requirement for MOS-T at this time, however, D Company is assisting the Army Research Institute (ARI) in the development of an in-service assessment test.

FY 2016 attrition thus far seems to show a downward trend. OCMI, the 344th MI Battalion, and Intelligence Center of Excellence continue to identify measures for reducing attrition rates for IET students and MOS-T students. ARI is currently validating an in-service ICTL version to screen all future reclassification Soldiers into MOS 35Q. OCMI is working to raise the ST score for in-service Soldiers with older ASVAB test dates. Future actions also being looked into, is utilizing the Tailored Adaptive Personality Assessment System (TAPAS) to identify recruits and Soldiers who are best suited for MOS 35Q.

The Office of the Chief, MI (OCMI) is the MI Corps’ Personnel Proponent office and executes the personnel life cycle management functions relative to DOTMLPF for MI and Functional Area 34, Strategic Intelligence. The USAICoE and Fort Huachuca Commanding General, as the MI Proponent, enlists the help of OCMI, to ensure that the Army has the sufficient number of MI officers, WOs, NCOs, and Enlisted Soldiers, with the correct occupational specialty, and correct training available for assignment at the right time.

Contact Information:

OCMI Director at (Comm) (520) 533-1728/1173
OCMI Career Management Page on IKN
The MG Oliver W. Dillard Award honors the most outstanding company-size military intelligence (MI) unit assigned to a BCT, each fiscal year. Although MG Dillard was an infantry officer during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, he was a decorated Battalion S2 in Korea and became FORSCOM’s first Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2) in 1973. Continuing his service as an infantry officer within an MI functional area, he promoted the use of intelligence Soldiers and units at the tactical level as the senior intelligence officer in U.S. Army Europe from 1975-1978. MG Dillard is a Thomas W. Knowlton Award for Intelligence Excellence recipient, a member of the Army’s Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame (2012), and Alabama Military Hall of Honor (2013), and symbolizes the promotion of esprit de corps and professionalism in military intelligence units throughout FORSCOM.

Colonel Anthony R. Hale, U.S. Army Forces Command Deputy Chief of Staff, G2, officially designated Delta Company, 307th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 3/82 Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Fort Bragg, North Carolina as the MG Oliver W. Dillard Award recipient for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015. Under the leadership of Captain Joseph Feifer and First Sergeant Adalberto Colon, the Soldiers of the MI Company demonstrated an exceptional commitment while maintaining the highest state of readiness, awareness, and a thorough understanding of potential environments around the world. “Darkhorse” Paratroopers also continually provided reachback support to forward deployed elements.

Delta Company, 307th BEB, 3/82IBCT fundamentally contributed to, and enabled the Panther BCT’s successful deployment to the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) area of responsibility in support of Operation Inherent Resolve from January to September 2015. “Darkhorse” Paratroopers integrated into every echelon and operated at every outstation within the Brigade’s footprint.

The unrelenting efforts of “Darkhorse” Paratroopers facilitated the production of over 200 daily intelligence updates, which were consumed by leaders from the Pentagon to U.S. Central Command to CJTF to the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Iraq. These updates were essential to maintaining nested, congruent intelligence estimates encompassing the efforts of six subordinate Security Force Advise and Assist Teams, thereby reducing the often inevitable fog of war associated with battlespace seams and improving interoperability across teams and Coalition partners.

Delta Company, 307th BEB, 3/82IBCT “Darkhorse” Intelligence team has proven through numerous training events and the pinnacle test of deploying in support of a real world operation that it can, and will, succeed in its current mission. “Darkhorse” retains the best analysts, SIGINT Soldiers, HUMINT Soldiers and technicians in the U.S. Army. Additionally, the “Darkhorse” team serves as a role model for other U.S. Army Forces Command and U.S. Army intelligence professionals. The company epitomizes esprit de corps and professionalism in Military Intelligence and is the most outstanding company-size MI unit assigned to a BCT for FY 2015.
This is your professional bulletin. We need your support by writing and submitting articles for publication.

When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the Military Intelligence and Intelligence Communities.

Articles about current operations; TTPs; and equipment and training are always welcome as are lessons learned; historical perspectives; problems and solutions; and short “quick tips” on better employment or equipment and personnel. Our goals are to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps and the IC at large. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how new technology will change the way we operate.

When submitting articles to MIPB, please take the following into consideration:

✦ Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3,000 words, double-spaced with normal margins without embedded graphics.

✦ We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles and it may take up to a year to publish some articles.

✦ Although MIPB targets themes, you do not need to “write” to a theme.

✦ Please note that submissions become property of MIPB and may be released to other government agencies or nonprofit organizations for republication upon request.

What we need from you:

✦ A release signed by your unit or organization’s information and operations security officer/SSO stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain (IAW AR 380-5 DA Information Security Program). A sample security release format can be accessed at our website at https://ikn.army.mil.

✦ A cover letter (either hard copy or electronic) with your work or home email addresses, telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published.

✦ Your article in Word. Do not use special document templates.

✦ Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic. We need complete captions (the Who, What, Where, When), photographer credits, and the author’s name on photos. Do not embed graphics or photos within the article. Send them as separate files such as .tif or .jpg and note where they should appear in the article. PowerPoint (not in .tif or .jpg format) is acceptable for graphs, etc. Photos should be at 300 dpi.

✦ The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author’s current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications.

We will edit the articles and put them in a style and format appropriate for MIPB. From time to time, we will contact you during the editing process to help us ensure a quality product. Please inform us of any changes in contact information.

Submit articles, graphics, or questions to the Editor at usarmy.huachuca.ioe.mbx.doctrine@mail.mil.

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