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
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Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence publishes the **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)** quarterly under the provisions of **AR 25-30**. MIPB presents information designed to keep intelligence professionals informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; problems and solutions, etc., can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of professional development.

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From The Editor

Important Notice: As directed by the CG, ICoE MIPB is undergoing some changes that will improve this professional bulletin over the course of the upcoming year. We identified some aspects of this bulletin that will be improved to ensure we discuss the topics most important to our Army MI force, broadcast the most important intelligence strategic messages, and use MIPB as a driver for training and force modernization developments.

Some of the changes are: reintroducing MIPB themes, soliciting specific articles from senior leadership and across the MI Corps, changing some of our recurring departments and adding new ones. You will also see a change in the current MIPB format for easier reading and added visual appeal.

Articles from the field will always be very important to the success of MIPB as a professional bulletin. Please continue to submit them. Even though the topic of your article may not coincide with an issue's theme do not hesitate to send it to me. Most issues will contain theme articles as well as articles on other topics. Your thoughts and lessons learned (from the field) are invaluable.

The following themes and suspenses are established for:

October-December 2014, *INSCOM*, deadline for article submissions is 21 August 2014.

January-March 2015, Self-Development and Unit Training, deadline for article submissions is 1 December 2014.

April-June 2015, Intelligence Challenges, deadline for article submissions is 27 February 2015.

Please call or email me with any questions regarding your article or upcoming issues. We appreciate your cooperation as we undertake this exciting new effort to upgrade MIPB and serve you better.

Sterilla Smith
Editor



FEATURES

- 6 Culture, Regional Expertise, and Language (CREL) Competency: Ramping-Up for Global Response and Regional Engagement**
by Mr. John Bird
- 12 Army Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture Program**
by Colonel Monty L. Willoughby and Mahir Ibrahimov, PhD
- 22 A Decade of Agility and Adaptability**
by Marilyn Willis-Grider, EdD
- 24 The Culture Puzzle: Piecing Together More Relevant Learning**
by Eric Lepisto
- 26 The Army Learning Model: Mentoring at its Best**
by Clint L. Cooper
- 28 TRADOC Culture Center's Train-the-Trainer Program**
by Mr. Christopher Clark
- 31 The UFMCS and Regionally Aligned Forces, Strategic Landpower, and LREC**
by William McGovern and Virginia Kammer
- 36 Strategic Landpower and RAF: Preparing Front-Line Leaders for Phase 0 Engagements**
by Windle Causey
- 40 DOD Partnerships Advance Web-based Culture and Language Training Products**
by Mrs. Cathleen Moran
- 45 The TRADOC Culture Center and the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps**
by Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Ret.) Michael M. Maleski
- 47 Ready, Set, Go Anywhere: A Culture-General Competency Model for the DoD**
by Louise J. Rasmussen and Winston R. Sieck
- 53 Intellectualizing the U.S. Army's Rebalance within Asia**
by Captain (P) Paul Lushenko
- 58 The Allied Land Command: NATO's New Headquarters Focused on Land Forces**
by Colonel Eric T. Heist
- 62 Human Ecology and the Need for a Systems-Based Theory to Understand the Human Domain in the Operations Process**
by Marcus B. Griffin, PhD
- 66 An Open Source Look at Russian Strategic Land Power**
by Charles K. Bartles
- 71 Understanding and Navigating Social Relations in the Operational Environment**
by Allison Abbe

DEPARTMENTS

- 2 Always Out Front
- 4 CSM Forum
- 4 Technical Perspective
- 76 The Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame 2013 and 2014 Inductees

- 84 Moments in MI History
- 86 ICoE Lessons Learned Branch
- 90 Proponent Notes
- 91 Professional Reader
- 92 Contact and Article Submission Information

Always Out Front

by Major General Robert P. Ashley
Commanding General
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence



“While people in general are enabled by technology, the last ten years has highlighted the limits of technical means at providing reliable, predictive intelligence.”

—Strategic Landpower White Paper, May 2013

I am pleased to present this Culture, Regional Expertise and Language (CREL) focused issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. This edition contains contributions from CREL stakeholders who are engaged in today’s “heavy-lifting” and setting the conditions for a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army. CREL proficiencies are key enabling competencies for the successful delivery of landpower and vitally important to fielding an effective 21st century Army. CREL competencies are clearly enduring imperatives for our Army as evidenced by the ongoing work of the Strategic Land Power Task Force, adding *Engagement* as the Army’s 7th Warfighting Function, and the continuing exchange of ideas regarding the human dimension.

Conflict is an inherently human problem—a contest of wills—best approached by those with the requisite CREL competencies to understand the human dimension. The last 13 years have certainly taught us that while technology enables Soldiers, technology also has some very real limitations, especially in terms of explaining and predicting human behavior in the operational environment. CREL competencies and capabilities enable our Soldiers to gain a deep understanding of the operational environment and its people, connect with host nation security forces, and engage the population. It also provides a basis to develop insights into how civilian and military leaders make decisions. For these reasons CREL is an important enabler for a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army that must prevent, shape, and, when necessary, win decisively.

Today’s Army is “battle hardened” and more experienced in the elements of CREL—but we have only begun to scratch the surface, there is much to do. We must consolidate these gains, expand on the momentum, and set the conditions for our Army to effectively operate and seize upon the opportunities presented within the human domain during current and future operations. We must build a new expeditionary mindset supported by unit level training that focuses on

these unique aspects of the human dimension. This change requires us to build Soldiers, leaders, and units that can respond to a broad spectrum of global threats and opportunities with flexibility and agility. Our Army culture must embrace the value of CREL training as a critical enabler to unified land operations. This effort will require command emphasis, prioritization of CREL in our formations, innovations in training, and may even necessitate a reporting requirement for unit commanders.

I suspect our readers are familiar with the construct known as LREC (Language, Regional Expertise and Culture) and may know there is some debate within the larger DoD community of practice regarding the use of “LREC” vice “CREL” (Culture, Regional Expertise and Language). While I agree with the elements of LREC as we unpack them, and, know this has been a useful framework throughout the Department of Defense, this acronym does not accurately reflect the priorities of a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army. Mindful that our Army will invest in culture as the main effort and language as a supporting effort, I submit that CREL is a far more useful aggregation of these elements, all critical to building adaptive, agile and innovative leaders in our conventional forces. To be sure, our Army will attain its greatest return on investment through culture and regional expertise and there is a significant body of empirical evidence pointing to the fact that these competencies are far greater predictors of success in the operational environment than language - within the Army, leaders have always used the phrase “big-C and little-l” to make these priorities clear. In an effort to contribute toward this ongoing debate, I submit that CREL is a much clearer articulation of our Army’s priorities, simultaneously managing expectations about language acquisition investments for our conventional forces.


CREL competencies are an investment we cannot afford to overlook and are most effectively addressed when nested within leader development. Our Army builds its own leaders, and leader development is the most important investment we make as a profession of arms. We value leaders who understand their operational environment, think critically and creatively, visualize solutions, communicate effectively, and work as a team. CREL competencies are an integral part of growing leaders with those abilities. Leaders are forged over the course of a career through a combination of education, training, and experience. CREL must be rooted in each leg of the Army’s leader development triad as life-long learning opportunities.

In general, I expect our Army will focus on broad foundational cultural competency first and regional expertise second because they have proven to have a significant return on investment. However, language training is a significant challenge. The costs required to generate enduring language capabilities within the Army are very high. While our Army will continue to strive to produce as many CREL “experts” as we can, the reality is that most will never achieve this level of competency. Ideally, Soldiers would be immersed in a target language and culture that they desire to thoroughly study. However, it takes a considerable investment to grow each CREL “expert” and we cannot grow them quickly or “just in time” for a crisis. This truth reinforces the need to ensure our Army is grounded in the broad foundational aspects of CREL.

Teaching a Soldier the broad foundational aspects of CREL is analogous to training map reading. To train a Soldier on map reading, we train him how to read a map but we don’t have to train him how to read every map in the world. This same approach applies to CREL. If we teach a Soldier about a given culture, region, or language, they can apply the foundational cultural frameworks, concepts, and theories to other cultures, regions, and languages. Then the Soldier can couple this foundation with their inherent cultural sensitivity, curiosity, and interpersonal skills. Therefore, there

really is no such thing as learning about the “wrong” culture or language. All CREL experiences contribute toward our experience base and provide useful footholds as we progress along the learning curve toward a better understanding of the human dimension.

As I reflect on my career, I am amazed at the progress we have made. I grew up as a Military Intelligence officer focused on finding large enemy formations and predicting broad courses of action. Now we are charged with being able to analyze multiple complex threats and describe, explain, and predict human behavior at the individual level. CREL competencies are certainly one key to ensuring our continued success as leaders and Soldiers aggressively seek mentorship, self-directed study, and experiential learning opportunities.

We are proud and excited to be among the leaders within the growing CREL community of practice. This year marks the tenth anniversary of the TRADOC Culture Center, which is an Intelligence Center of Excellence initiative that has had a broad positive impact across our Army. I would like to thank all of the CREL stakeholders who have contributed to this issue of MIPB. You continue to make critical improvements within the Army as we learn to value the power of the handshake as much as direct fire. 

Two important definitions germane to this discussion are:

Human Domain: The totality of the physical, cultural and social environments that influence human behavior in a population-centric conflict. (ARSOF 2022, 7)

Human Dimension: The cognitive, physical, and social components of Soldier, Army Civilian, leader, and organizational development and performance essential to raise, prepare, and employ the Army in unified land operations. (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7, The U.S. Army Human Dimension Concept, 33)

Always Out Front!

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The GSP identifies, selects, trains, assigns, and retains personnel conducting sensitive and complex classified operations in one of five distinct disciplines for the Army, DOD, and National Agencies.

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CSM FORUM

by Command Sergeant Major Jeffery L. Fairley
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence




Team,

I want each of you to take a hard look at how you are helping your Soldiers progress in their career and how you are helping yourself in your own career. Here are a few questions you can ask:

1. What have you done in the past month to encourage and build your Soldiers professionally?
2. What are you doing to mentor your Soldiers both professionally and personally?
3. What demanding jobs are you taking to stand out amongst your peers? What do you do to encourage your Soldiers to do the same?
4. What is the relationship between the career map for your MOS and your long-term goals?

Please take time to think about these questions.

Thank you for what you do every day for this great country and for the MI Corps.

Please visit my website on IKN for the latest updates concerning the Force and our Corps. 

***Always Out Front,
CSM Fairley***

MI Corps CSM Website

<https://ikn.army.mil/apps/IKNWMS>

<https://ikn.army.mil/apps/IKNWMS/Default.aspx?webId=2360>

Technical Perspective

Chief Warrant Officer Five Joe D. Okabayashi
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence



Greetings to all!

Many have asked questions about broadening assignments for Army Warrant Officers. What is broadening for a Warrant Officer? What broadening opportunities are available to MI Warrant Officers? When in their career should an Army Warrant Officer strive to serve in a broadening assignment?


DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, defines broadening positions as those "...that provide exposure to experiences outside the Officer's core branch or functional area competencies..." The pamphlet states that "broadening assignments develop a wider range of knowledge and skills, augment understanding of the full spectrum of Army missions, promote practical application of language training or increase cross cultural exposure, and expand Officer awareness of other governmental agencies, units or environments." This definition means that positions outside of a Warrant Officer's MOS are considered broadening. This definition also includes positions inside the Warrant Officer's MOS that are found in diverse organizations in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational environment.

There are many broadening opportunities for MI Warrant Officers. Positions outside of one's MOS, to list a few, include TAC Officer or instructor at any institutional training center, Observer/Trainer at a combat training center, doctrine writer at any Center of Excellence, or Assignments Officer at HRC. Some examples of broadening positions within an MI Warrant

Officer's MOS include assignments to Division Headquarters, Corps Headquarters, Special Forces Units, Joint Task Forces, Combatant Commands, or National Agencies.

Broadening can begin early in a Warrant Officer's career through diverse assignments in one's MOS. Developing MOS expertise is the developmental goal of a Warrant Officer from the rank of WO1 through CW2. It is at the rank of CW3 and higher that our Army expects a Warrant Officer to seek broadening outside of their MOS. Broadening outside of a Warrant Officer's MOS depends on life cycle factors, authorizations, and individual performance levels. Successful broadening for a Warrant Officer depends on the individual knowing and understanding the developmental model for MI Warrant Officers described in DA Pamphlet 600-3. Successful broadening for a Warrant Officer also requires effective communication with the Warrant Officer's assignments manager.

I encourage MI Warrant Officers, in regards to broadening, to ask questions in the MI Branch Rally Point, Warrant Officer Net, Military Professional Forums at: [https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/apf/warrant_officer_network_\(wo_net\)/branch_rally_point/military_intelligence](https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/apf/warrant_officer_network_(wo_net)/branch_rally_point/military_intelligence).

I wish to make special note that 9 July 2014 marked the 96th anniversary of the U.S. Army Warrant Officer Corps. As always, I thank all of you who are reading this column for your continued selfless service to our Army and to our Nation. I also thank your Family members for the sacrifices they make to support you! 

Always out Front!
Army Strong!
CW5 Okabayashi

TRADOC CULTURE CENTER

Mission Statement: Established in 2004, TCC provides relevant and accredited cultural competency training and education to Soldiers and DA Civilians in order to build and sustain an Army with the right blend of cultural competency capabilities to facilitate a wide range of operations, now and in the future.

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Course Number:
9E-F36/920-F30 (CT-MTT)

TRAINING AND EDUCATION



Available Training: The TCC provides training and education in cross-cultural competence skills, regional expertise, and functional topics in support of the CJCSI 3126.01A Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) competency factors at the basic or fully proficient levels. The course is tailored to meet the requesting unit's cultural competence requirements in these areas.

Cross-Cultural Competence Skills Topics:


- What is Culture?
- Cross-Cultural Communication
- Cross-Cultural Negotiation
- Cross-Cultural Rapport Building
- Self-awareness and Perspective-taking

Regional Expertise:

- AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, NORTHCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM
- Smart Cards and Smart Books are also available

Functional Topics:

- Key Leader Engagement
- Culture and Female Engagement Teams



Primary Training Focus:

- OEF Pre-Deployment Training
- Regionally Aligned Forces
- Train-the-Trainer Events
- Advanced Specialty Training



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Culture, Regional Expertise and Language (CREL) Competency: Ramping-Up for Global Response and Regional Engagement

by Mr. John Bird

“The ability of the U.S. to shape a peaceful and prosperous global environment will rest more and more on our ability to understand, influence, or exercise control within the human domain.”

—Strategic Landpower White Paper, May 2013

CREL Competencies: Enduring Imperatives for our Army

The work of the Strategic Land Power Task Force, coupled with the Army’s creation of a 7th War Fighting Function—Engagement, demonstrates the importance of the human dimension and signals the Army’s continued commitment to its investment in culture and language programs.¹ Informed by 12 years of sustained combat operations, the U.S. Army clearly understands that CREL competencies and capabilities enable our Soldiers to gain a deep understanding of the operational environment (OE), connect with host nation (HN) security forces and engage the population—key to success in the prevent, shape, and win construct of a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army. Today’s Army is battle hardened and well seasoned in the elements of CREL.


Key to success is consolidating these hard fought CREL gains, continuing to capitalize on the momentum achieved to date, and setting the conditions for our Army to effectively confront the challenges of 21st century unified land operations. With history as our guide, we must remain mindful that we will never predict the next conflict with accuracy and we have never entered a conflict, or conducted an operation, where the current CREL capability supply met the demand signal.

Our Army must create a flexible management system to meet the unknown when contingencies occur, and we must acquire CREL capabilities in sufficient numbers, types, and

levels to meet known and expected needs as well as design a system that facilitates rapid surge capability—a tall order, indeed. Finally, key to success in the future, a North Star of sorts, will be an Army organizational culture that accepts the value of CREL competencies and capabilities. This will require command emphasis and prioritization of CREL in our formations and may even necessitate a reporting requirement for unit commanders. The purpose of this article is to meaningfully contribute to the ongoing CREL debate by positing solutions and framing the Army’s approach to CREL as we ramp up for the challenges and opportunities associated with 21st century unified land operations.

Unpacking CREL

CREL consists of three inter-related components that reinforce and build upon each other: cross cultural competence (3C), regional competence, and language.² 3C consists of foundational knowledge, skills, and abilities with a global application. The key broad emphasis areas include open-mindedness and emotional intelligence, and training centered on concepts such as culture learning, self awareness, sense-making, perspective-taking, and rapport building. Regional competence builds upon the foundation of 3C with a geographic overlay. Training outcomes include a deeper understanding of a specific point on the ground (the OE), the ability to influence HN security forces, connect with the local population, and accomplish a given mission. Language, the final CREL component, consists of basic communications skills, such as several hundred mission tailored words and phrases, and the skills necessary to effectively employ interpreters—a tremendous rapport enabler and window into culture.



The primary components of CREL are Cross Cultural Competence, Regional Competence and Language. These building blocks are inter-related and feed off each other.

Our Army will likely weight CREL investments toward culture and regional awareness because they have proven to be high payoff and the costs required to generate enduring language capabilities in our Army are simply too great and unsustainable. This is commonly referred to as the big “C” and little “L” approach. In general, expect our Army to focus on 3C first and regional expertise second, with language a distant third (and at a very basic level) based on regional alignment or operational deployment. Of particular note, the Army will likely continue to rely on Foreign Area Officers and other specialists—such as the Military Intelligence Corps, Special Operations Forces, and other low density specialists as the Army’s true regional experts, a pragmatic and cost effective approach.

CREL Outcomes: Goalposts and Organizing Principles

Mindful of continued fiscal austerity, coupled with uncertain OEs, it’s important for our Army to focus on CREL “ends” as we set both the generating force and the operational force for the demands of the 21st century unified land operations. Guided by over a decade of lessons learned and best practices, as well as a few missteps along the way, the following are suggested CREL goalposts which may be constructive as organizing framework principles, potentially driving which CREL programs will endure and others to divest from:

Support to Deployed Forces. CREL capabilities which can be attached to deployed forces, from the platoon


level through a brigade combat team and joint task force, as critical non-lethal enablers providing socio-cultural support to operational decision making within a modest footprint.

Socio-Cultural Analysis. CREL capabilities, primarily positioned at Army Service Combatant Commands, which can describe, explain, and predict behavior drivers, grievances, societal structure, patronage networks and other prominent features of the OE’s human terrain which often confound traditional analysts.

Knowledge Management. Effective and efficient ways to store, access, share, and visualize socio-cultural information across a robust knowledge management (KM) enterprise, free of stovepipes and silos, and resident on all networks—especially unclassified—with universal access across our Army.

Training and Education. A system of sequential and progressive CREL learning outcomes layered across the institutional, operational, and self-development learning domains, nested in the Army’s Leader Development Program and continuously informed by lessons learned and real world socio-cultural analysis.


Active Enterprise Management. A mission command structure actively committed to improved prioritization, synchronization and integration of these high demand/low density capabilities and dedicated to building a more muscular, adaptive, and enduring CREL enterprise.



Suggested CREL outcomes which may provide a useful CREL framework as the Army becomes more globally responsive and regionally engaged.

The Nexus of CREL and Leader Development

The Chief of Staff of the Army has made it clear that leader development is the Army's number one priority and there is a clear nexus between CREL competencies and leader development.³ Leader development is the most important investment we make as a profession of arms. We place a premium on leader attributes such as character, presence, and intellect and learned CREL competencies play a key role in achieving these attributes.⁴ We additionally value leaders who understand their OE, think creatively and critically, visualize solutions, communicate effectively, collaborate and work as a team. CREL competencies are an integral part of these outcomes as well. Leaders are forged over the course of a career through a combination of education, training, and experience and CREL is rooted in each leg of the Army's leader development stool—training, education, and experience.



Our Army builds its own leaders and there is a clear intersection between CREL and leader development.

In the CREL training environment, we train for certainty and teach leaders “what to think,” as in employing an interpreter using the FEPS model.⁵ CREL education centers on preparation for uncertain environments, demanding strong emphasis on “how to think,” such as using cultural frameworks and models which can be applied globally to describe, explain, and predict, human behavior in the OE. It is through CREL experience—immersive experiential learning and self-directed study that we bring the totality of a leader's training and education to bear, this is where he/she truly sharpens the sword. Examples include Cadet Overseas Training Missions as well as scholarships and fellowships, some of which are abroad, within the Army's Broadening Opportunity Program.

Forged through the crucible of combat, today's young leaders “get it” and our Army must continue to embrace the strong linkage between CREL and leader development as we build the next generation of officers and noncommissioned officers capable of leading in volatile and ambiguous OEs. Our Chief of Staff of the Army put it best when describing leader development. He said that we have to develop officers faster than the way he was developed as a young officer, going on to state that we must develop them in much more diverse ways, providing them with a deeper understanding of the socioeconomic, cultural and religious aspects of the environments they will operate in.⁶ Leader development, our Army's true competitive advantage, clearly intersects with CREL and these competencies are an investment we cannot afford to overlook.

A Practical and Pragmatic Approach Across the Three Learning Domains

As our Army draws down force structure in Afghanistan and becomes more regionally engaged in all of the geographic combatant commands, the demand signal for CREL, on a global scale, will no doubt increase markedly. Mindful of confusing CREL enthusiasm with capacity, it will be imperative for our Army to pursue CREL “ways” which are both practical and pragmatic—resource informed, outcomes oriented, and centered on proven best practices. These “ways” should be layered across the institutional, operational, and individual self-development learning domains; progressive and sequential in terms of scaffolded learning objectives, and blended to maximize efficiencies between distributed learning and traditional face-to-face instruction.

CREL education and training in the institution should begin with a focus from pre-commissioning and extend through the senior service college and the Sergeants Major Academy. This education and training should be broad, foundational, and centered on general learning outcomes which are empirically driven and enduring knowledge, skills and abilities at the individual level.⁷ The instruction should be learner-centric, and to the extent possible, leverage methodologies such as practical exercises, facilitated discussion, Socratic questioning, and other time-tested discovery learning methodologies. The old fashioned “sage on the stage” instructor-centric, PowerPoint driven lecture is dead, making way for the Army Learning Model. It's also important to note that these CREL learning outcomes should be progressive and sequential, logically arrayed from the pre-commissioning and initial military training level through senior service college and Sergeants Major Academy.

Learning areas such as self-awareness, open-mindedness, emotional intelligence, and culture learning are bedrock components—see yourself and learn to read the “rules” or

“operational code” associated with culture in a given OE. It’s also in the institutional environment where we introduce Soldiers and leaders to culture models and frameworks with relevant practical application, such as the Values, Beliefs, Behaviors and Norms (VBBN) model.⁸ This foundational learning, beginning with incentivized language and culture education at the U.S. Military Academy and the Reserve Officers Training Corps, then sets the conditions for regional focus and a more collective approach once Soldiers and leaders are assigned to units.

The self-development learning domain should expand on the institutional layer by efficiently and effectively transferring knowledge through distributed learning programs and self-directed study, to include borrowing best practices from academia such as massive online open courses. These initiatives should begin to focus Soldiers and leaders on a regional overlay through educational methodologies aimed at enhancing baseline knowledge, but are insufficient in terms of changing a Soldier’s behavior. Nonetheless, it’s through leveraging these platforms that precious time is not wasted in the traditional face-to-face learning environment. It’s through self-development that Soldiers and leaders begin to exercise their curiosity about language and cultures and begin to gain deeper understanding of a given operational environment. It’s also through self-development that Soldiers and leaders start to internalize the value of CREL as a life-long learning pursuit.

CREL training in units, the operational learning domain, should continue to build on the institutional and self-development layers with deeper regional focus, and, perhaps most importantly, practical CREL application. This training is designed to change a Soldier’s behavior in the OE through collective level practical exercises and situational training exercises. Ideal outcomes include detailed understanding of the OE; the ability to shape, influence, and connect with the HN security forces and the population, and more effectively accomplish assigned missions. It’s important to note that in units, CREL should not be simply trained as a discreet set of tasks, but permeates the conditions associated with every form of Live-Virtual-Collective-Game collective training. In fact, sometimes CREL is more effectively learned by Soldiers when it is a condition, it essentially represents the complexity manifest in the OE and demands adequate representation in the complex conditions associated with the integrated training environment.

Regionally Aligned Forces: CREL is Crucial to Success

Central to the Army’s drive to become more globally responsive and regionally engaged is the regionally aligned

forces (RAF) concept. It’s important to note that regionally aligned forces are Army units that not only have their world class warfighting skills, but are also trained for the global regions to which they are oriented. Whether situated in the U.S. or abroad, a regionally aligned unit will train in the culture, geography, and language of its global area of focus. This training enables the aligned unit’s Soldiers, sent in teams of various sizes as needed, to be well prepared for a full range of missions in that region.

When culture and language become second nature to aligned units, it improves operations and planning, and becomes a significant force multiplier. Iraq and Afghanistan taught that to achieve long-term success we must understand the culture and values of the countries and populations within which we operate. It is no longer sufficient that culture and language capabilities be limited to Soldiers with specialized skill sets or contractors. Because of their cultural and language training, regionally aligned Soldiers will more readily work with the people on the ground, which helps shape the OE for the Combatant Commander.

Regional alignment also complements the Army’s core mission to fight and win the Nation’s wars. We always will be ready to win decisively on land against any foe. Regionally aligned Soldiers add to their combined arms operations and security capabilities by developing situational awareness and context for an area they may have to fight in by getting region-focused culture, language, and geography training, by deploying in elements of varying sizes, and by conducting missions in undeveloped, austere areas.

Finally, regional alignment contributes to Soldiers’ morale and career satisfaction. Going forward, most Soldiers will be based in the U.S, so being focused on another part of the world and conducting missions in small teams abroad will enrich their skills and encourage them to develop an expeditionary mindset.⁹ A higher payoff will be Soldiers conditioned to think more broadly and more empathetically and to be more globally self-aware, truly embracing and internalizing the value of CREL.

The Case for a Blended Approach to CREL for RAF

Preparing our total Army for RAF will call for ways and means which are both effective and efficient. Key to success will be operationalizing a network of existing CREL enablers that can be brought to bear against a given unit commander’s CREL training objectives. This blended approach to CREL learning should combine distributed learning programs of record, web-based access to training support packages, face-to-face mobile training team instruction in units, functional courses, and access to lessons learned reporting, as well as socio-cultural KM repositories containing real-world

data. This blended approach to CREL learning will yield effective outcomes and resource efficiencies for our Army.

It should be informed by pre-deployment training best practices from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, representing 12 years of hard work by highly experienced CREL specialists. This approach will deliver foundational knowledge transfer through distributed learning platforms and sets the conditions for hands-on, practical and performance oriented unit training designed to change a Soldier's behavior. This approach will additionally enable units to enjoy research access to a global network of CREL specialists and current lessons learned reporting from the operational area.

The benefits of this approach are not risk free though. Unit commanders and staffs will have to be better sensitized to the multitude of existing CREL programs and seize the initiative to leverage these CREL enablers.¹⁰ Realistically speaking, unit participation will likely be uneven across formations and planning/scheduling may be problematic for unit staffs. Much of this risk can be mitigated through an active CREL enterprise management structure, such as the one suggested earlier in this article.

Risk and Expectations Management—An Uncertain OE Coupled with Fiscal Austerity

The risk is clear and simple—the Army will be ineffective as a globally responsive and regionally engaged force without CREL competencies. Fiscal austerity, uncertain future OEs and the intellectual capacity of Soldiers, leaders and units combine to create some very real CREL challenges. Further contributing to this complex mix is our personnel assignment system and rotational assignment realities. Leaders, Soldiers, and units will rotate among geographic combatant commands and their depth of knowledge and experience will always be somewhat limited. While we will consistently set the bar high as the most seasoned Army in the world, we must remain realistic when pondering the art of the possible and manage expectations accordingly.

Our Army requires Soldiers, leaders, and units that can get on the ground in a wide variety of foreign environments, quickly gain situational awareness and a deeper understanding of the problem they have to solve, then come up with adaptive and culturally appropriate solutions to shape their environment — effectively working by, with and through HN security forces, allies and interagency partners. While our Army will strive to produce as many CREL “experts” as we can, the reality is that most will never achieve this level of competency.¹¹ What's more, those that do become CREL “experts” will achieve that level of proficiency upon considerable investment of resources. Furthermore,

we won't grow them quickly, or “just in time” for a crisis. All the more reason to ensure our Army is grounded in the broad and foundational concepts of CREL.

Some say that CREL training is like map reading. To teach a Soldier map reading, we teach him how to read a map, we don't have to teach him how to read every map in the world, the same approach applies to CREL. If we teach a Soldier about a given culture, region, or language, they apply frameworks, concepts and theories, coupled with their inherent cultural sensitivity, curiosity, and interpersonal skills to other cultures, regions and languages—a very useful metaphor to consider as we move forward. In fact, there really is no such thing as learning about the “wrong” culture, it all contributes toward our experience base and provides useful footholds as we climb the learning curve toward better understanding the human dimension.

Finally, we must acknowledge that as superb as our professional military education and training systems may be, CREL must be embraced as a life-long learning pursuit—a shift in our own Army culture. As such, Soldiers and leaders must aggressively seek self-directed study and experiential learning opportunities, ideally immersed in the target language and culture they desire to passionately pursue.


“After a dozen years of war, we don't want to go back to our corners.”
-GEN Odierno, 29 May 2013

Conclusion: There Will Never Be a Shiny Box Solution

People live on the land and it is on the land where conflict is ultimately decided. CREL proficiencies are key enabling competencies to the successful delivery of landpower and vitally important to fielding an effective 21st century Army. Informed by over a decade of sustained combat, the wars taught us that while technology will always be a great enabler for Soldiers, it has very real limitations when it comes down to explaining and predicting human behavior in the OE. We all know that conflict is an inherently human problem—a contest of wills—best approached by those with the requisite CREL competencies to understand the human dimension.¹² The U.S. Army has truly gone to school on the importance of CREL—we must now apply those hard earned lessons to future OEs.

CREL competency and capability, and its emphasis on the human dimension, will be a critical non-lethal enabler to 21st century unified land operations. CREL enabled Soldiers will contribute significantly to missions from joint exercises and partnership training to quick-reaction forces and humanitarian assistance, much of which will be expeditionary in nature and in small units. As we complete the transition

from an Army at war to an Army of preparation, the bulk of our Army's unit training will be at home station and focus on the human dimension of conflict will be a key component of any training program.

In the end, our Army must be operationally adaptable, scalable and tailorable on a global scale. We must build Soldiers, leaders, and units that can respond to a broad spectrum of global threats and opportunities with flexibility and agility. As global access for, and acceptance of, larger U.S. Army unit formations decreases, the ability to shape and prevent requires frequent, smaller scale engagements by Soldiers with higher CREL capabilities. Indeed, "expeditionary" must become the new mindset as training and support focuses on the human dimension at the small unit level, and our Army culture embraces the value of CREL as a critical enabler to 21st century unified land operations. 

Endnotes

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3. David Vergun, *Odierno: Leader Development No. 1 Priority*, Army Homepage, 12 February 2014 at http://www.army.mil/article/120024/Odierno__Leader_development_No__1_priority/.
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9. DA Staff. *Talking Points Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF)*, 20 December 2013.
10. TCC has been an active participant in the DA led RAF Training/Education/Doctrine Working Group. This description of an approach to RAF training, developed jointly by the TCC and the LREC Management Office (LRECMO), is efficient, effective, and informed by nearly two years of RAF training in units.
11. Department of the Army, *Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS)*, 1 December 2009 at <http://www.benning.army.mil/mcoe/maneuverconference/content/pdf/Army%20Culture%20%20Foreign%20Language%20Strategy%20Final.pdf>. The ACFLS defines three levels of proficiency—awareness, understanding, and expertise. The ACFLS will soon be replaced by the Army Language, Regional Expertise and Culture Strategy (ALRECS), in draft as of article submission for this publication.
12. Robert W. Cone, "Building Strategic Landpower," *Army Magazine*, October 2013, pp. 75-79 at http://www.ousa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2013/10/Documents/Cone_GreenBook2013.pdf.

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- John Bird serves as the Director of the TRADOC Culture Center. A retired colonel, now a supervisory education specialist, he has a wide array of global LREC experiences, to include multiple combat tours and building partner capacity experiences.*



"We have learned many lessons over the last 10 years, but one of the most compelling is that—whether you are working among the citizens of a country, or working with their government or Armed Forces—nothing is as important to your long term success as understanding the prevailing culture and values."

*—GEN Raymond Odierno,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
22 March 2012*

"Developing and maintaining a Force that has an understanding of other Cultures and their Languages is Regionally astute and critical to our strategic security requirements when employing Globally Responsive and Regionally Aligned Army Forces. Now more than ever we must be able to understand, communicate, and conduct operations with a variety of partners including host nation militaries and populations to execute our Prevent, Shape, and Win strategic role. The LREC concept creates a sustainable advantage for Regionally Aligned Forces in any combination of indigenous cultures by providing training and educational tools to enhance Professional Military Education, Pre-Deployment, and Functional Training. To do anything less would be to disregard the single most important lesson we have garnered in the last 13 years of war! "

*—BG Christopher P. Hughes,
Deputy Commanding General,
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center*

by Colonel Monty L. Willoughby and Mahir Ibrahimov, PhD

Introduction

In the near term and in future operational environments (OEs) the U.S. Army must have technically and tactically proficient and expeditionary minded leaders who will be able to operate in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment across unified land operations and with a level of competence to perform assigned tasks in a specific geographic area. To that end, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) are working together to provide a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army with the language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC) competencies and capabilities that will enhance the operational adaptability of Soldiers, leaders, and units.

The concept is to build LREC competencies and improve how units leverage LREC capabilities to effectively operate in the 21st century OE resulting in:

1. Soldiers, leaders, and units with LREC competencies to prevail in unified land operations with any combination of partners and allies.
2. An Army culture that embraces the value of LREC and requires career long development and sustainment of LREC competencies and capabilities as essential components of individual and unit readiness.

Foundational Concepts

The Strategic Landpower White Paper was published by a combined Army, Marine Corps, SOCOM Strategic Landpower Task Force (SLTF) that stood up in late 2012. The SLTF's objective was to integrate the psychological or "human domain" aspects of conflict into military thinking and planning. The White Paper states that to accomplish all of the 10 primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces as articulated in the 2012 Defense Planning Guidance, leaders must influence people, "be they government and military leaders or groups within a population, as their core strategic focus." Operations in the human domain provide a unique capability to preclude and deter conflict through shaping operations that leverage partners and populations to enhance local and regional stability."¹

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3126.01A, *Language and Regional Expertise Capability Identification and Planning*, provides the latest guidance for the identification and evaluation of proficiency for foreign language, regional expertise and cultural competencies.² The instruction identifies 12 regional expertise and cultural competencies and

		Language	Regional Expertise	Culture
Conventional Forces		Basic <i>select personnel</i>	Basic to Fully Proficient <i>over the course of a career</i>	
ARSOF		Basic	--- Fully Proficient ---	
Linguists		Master	Basic	Full
FAO		--- Master ---		
Outcomes	Basic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic awareness & can apply in simplest situations. • Individuals still require close & extensive guidance. • ILR Standard: 0+/0+ ILR Goal: 1/1 (Select individuals who enter the Army with a background in foreign language, such as Native and Heritage speakers). 		
	Full	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thorough understanding & can apply in routine & non-routine situations. • Can work independently with minimal guidance & direction. • ILR Standard: 1+/1+ ILR Goal: 2/2. 		
	Master	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extensive level of expertise & can apply in highly complex & ambiguous situations across range of disciplines. • Acknowledged authority, advisor, and key resource in the organization. • ILR Standard: 2/2/1+ ILR Goal 3/3/3. 		

Figure 1. LREC Standards across the Total Army.

will leverage the capabilities at their disposal to establish the initial foundational training and education for leaders to be able to competently and confidently lead Soldiers. This includes the introduction and development of a basic awareness in languages, regional expertise, and cross-cultural competence.

Training and Education Approach

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 affirms the “requirement for Soldiers to possess a broad foundation of learning to better prepare them to meet future challenges across the spectrum of conflict.”⁴ Two of these challenges are culture and language. In order to build and sustain an Army with the right blend of culture and foreign language capabilities to facilitate unified land operations, we must leverage existing professional military education (PME) programs, organizational and functional training, and continuous life-long learning capabilities through a combination of education, training and experiential opportunities to attain a level of understanding and expertise, at Full Proficiency Level and Master’s Proficiency Level expertise.

As the Army determines how to best continue implementing the Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS) and future ALREC Strategy, we can continue leveraging the current Leader Development Strategy that serves as a base for our existing instruction within our CoEs and in the growth of our leaders.⁵ Cross-cultural training and education should build on the foundation of an individual’s existing leader attributes which in turn reinforces the core leader competencies of leading others, developing oneself, and achieving results.

For the CoEs and CAC LD&E, the development of cultural and regional awareness and/or understanding at the Basic to Full Proficiency level will be the principal objective. Introduction to a foreign language (basic phrases and elemental proficiency) is a supporting effort. In order to achieve a higher level of cultural understanding, expertise, or language proficiency, individuals will need to leverage other PME, civilian education, and self-development programs.

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
clusters them into three proficiency levels: core, leader/influence, and regional/ technical. The guidance outlines the proficiency standards for four elements within the Army as shown in Figure 1.³

The December 2013 Army LREC draft Strategy depicts the means to assess LREC competencies in individuals and capabilities in units to justify resourcing and guide requirements for training, education, and experience in the graphic below.

Soldiers and leaders must possess a sufficient level of cross-cultural and regional competence to effectively accomplish duties at their assigned level, and to have the cognitive, interpersonal, and cultural skills necessary to make sound judgments in these complex environments.

The Centers of Excellence (CoEs)/Schools

Training Source (Means) Linkage Across the Army		
Basic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prescriptive Common Core Curriculum. • DLI online Programs (Headstart2 & Rapport). • Leader Development. 	Army Career Tracker, Evaluations, Experience & Self Development DLIFLC, LTDs, CTCs TRADOC Leader Development & Education for Sustained Peace (LDESP) Regional Cultural Education
Full	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sequential and Progressive PME (Emphasis - Reinforce). • Selection and Advance Civil Schooling. • DLI Functional Training. • SFQC & related courses. 	
Master	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DLI Functional Training w/ continued sustainment. • Selection for Advanced Civil schooling and utilization tours. 	



Taking a descriptive path for implementation, TRADOC and CAC LD&E Schools and Centers will incorporate the following learning outcomes in their education and training programs with terminal and enabling objectives and assessments that can clearly be tracked back to these outcomes:

Outcome 1 (Character). Demonstrate interaction and cross-cultural communication skills in order to effectively engage and understand people within their environments. Demonstrate a level of cultural awareness that includes a positive openness to other people, an understanding of prevailing values, beliefs, behaviors and customs, and a desire to learn more about cultures and language. This includes an introduction to a language that supports current military operations with the intent to promote additional study through self-development at the institution, at home-station or at an academic university.

Outcome 2 (Presence). Demonstrate communication, influence and negotiation skills essential for leaders to effectively operate in a JIIM environment. Leverage the knowledge gained by challenging students to employ skills to deal with ambiguous and complex situations, to regulate one’s own behavior, and to use interpersonal abilities to deal with people from one’s own or other cultures. This includes an understanding and ability to engage other joint and allied military personnel, and host country indigenous leaders with a moderate level of confidence.

Outcome 3 (Intellect). Demonstrate a familiarization in a geographic region of current operational significance. Leverage critical thinking and cognitive skills through organizing information that supports cultural self-awareness. Depending on level of leader development PME, expand cross-cultural competence skills by gaining an awareness or understanding of a geographic area that highlights the implications of a region’s economic, religious, legal, governmental, political and infra-structural features, and of sensitivities regarding gender, race, ethnicity, local observances and local perception of the U.S. and its allies. Apply relevant planning considerations, terms, factors, concepts and geographic information to mission planning and in the conduct of operations. This includes leveraging other TRADOC and DOD schools, partnerships with universities and academia, gaming technology, and opportunities that stress students’ ability to concisely and persuasively speak and write, engage in discussions, and employ cognitive reasoning and thinking skills.

CoEs/Schools CFL Strategy Implementation

CAC was assigned the lead in implementing the ACFLS in 2011 within all TRADOC organizations. As part of this implementation, CAC is working to integrate ACFLS/ALRECS learning objectives into existing programs of instruction (POIs) using internal resources/assets at the CoEs and other Army educational institutions using the basic collaborative schema as depicted in Figure 2.





Figure 2. Cross-Cultural Competencies.



General Learning Outcomes across Cohorts.

Core lesson plans based on Army Learning Coordination Council approved General Learning Outcomes (GLOs) are provided to Initial Military Training (IMT) Command, Cadet Command, CoEs, Command and General Staff College, Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace Program, and the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy for integration into applicable POIs by cohort or other appropriate applications.

Training developers at CoEs and schools further refine resource and curriculum requirements based on specific branch/military occupational specialty. The CAC LD&E LREC Enterprise Management Office (LRECEMO) along with TRADOC/CAC QA offices provides quality assurance/quality control for integrated plans to ensure standardization and synchronization.

The Army Research Institute (ARI) assists in the implementation with research and as a resource for materials and analytic tools as well as access to and collaboration with others of similar interests. CoE instructors will use a variety of learning-enabled training, education and self-development techniques to teach students attending IMT and PME courses at station. Cultural instruction may be prescriptive, integrated into other training objectives, or as reinforcement through the use of self-paced learning tools or as research for presentations and writing requirements.

Instructional Methodology

Facilitated instruction. Classroom instruction will include instructor-led discussions and facilitated problem-centered exercises to assist students in understanding basic cultural awareness as well as relevant and challenging scenarios that they may encounter in their unit and/or during a deployment. Facilitated learning will focus on initiative, critical thinking and accountability for their actions. Small group instructors will receive cultural training assistance to enable them to better present information, lead discussions, and facilitate problem-centered exercises. The instruction will leverage blending learning resources, augmented by professional reading requirements, self-paced technology-delivered instruction, and research outside the classroom.

Web-enabled instruction, simulations and gaming. The TRADOC Culture Center (TCC), Intelligence CoE, the Marine Corps University, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), and Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and others all have a variety of on-line instructional material that is available for instructor use. As other culture and foreign language AVATAR and interactive simulation programs become available, they will be evaluated and leveraged as educational tools to augment classroom, independent study instruction and self-development opportunities.

Role-playing and key leader engagement (KLE) scenarios. Instructors will leverage the knowledge gained by challenging students to employ their interpersonal skills as part of in-class role-playing practical exercises and formal key leader engagement opportunities. The KLE scenarios will require an individual(s) to use an interpreter to engage other coalition military/police members and host country indigenous leaders in order to address a particular problem. Ideally, this engagement should use mock-up facilities and capstone field exercises to reinforce the learning objectives and provide each student with feedback through an after-action review. Both role-playing exercises and the KLEs will result in constructive feedback to the individual.

Academic lectures and seminar panels. Outside speakers and panels offer broader regional perspectives and expertise into the institution. They are crucial to a balanced education and training approach to expand on concepts and provide an alternative to institutional instruction and facilitation.

Leveraging International Student Populations. Where appropriate, U.S. students will receive country and cultural briefs from their fellow international students and assigned liaison officers during the resident courses. Programs such as “*Know Your World*” assist students in better understanding the culture and geo-political significance of the countries from which their classmates come and further expand the student’s awareness of other cultures.

Analytical writing. To address the need to develop critical thinking and improve written communication capabilities in our leaders, analytical papers should be a required assessment of students. Papers should address a cultural or geo-political topic of military operational significance to the U.S.

Professional reading program. A critical component of our leadership development and cultural awareness efforts includes a professional reading program (professional reading list will be located on the LRECEMO web-site).

Culture and Foreign Language Resource Centers are established in some CoE Libraries and need to be established in others. Students need to be provided access to computers, cultural resources, and professional reading material to facilitate research, learning, and language proficiency.

The Army CFLP/LRECEMO website (currently in development) will contain cultural awareness and foreign language resources, DLIFLC resources, information on past lectures, foreign language guides, and other significant links.

The Army Culture and Foreign Language Resource Center will be established as part of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth.

Course Implementation

Schools and CoEs are expected to implement programs as outlined here.

Branch Captain’s Career Course (CCC) (24 weeks). The CAC desired outcome is for branch captains to demonstrate an understanding of culture and the ability to leverage that knowledge in a JIIM environment with a level of competence necessary to serve as staff officers and leaders within a complex environment. An example of the approach for CCC is below:

Learning Objectives 1 (Character)	Learning Objectives 2 (Presence)	Learning Objective 3 (Intellect)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assess cultural perspectives and values different from one’s own; compare differences and sensitivities in order to modify one’s behavior, practices and language, and operate in a multi-cultural environment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Cross-cultural skills building ○ Cultural influence and military operations ○ ISD briefs “Know Your World” • Apply cross-cultural communication skills <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Army 360 Cultural Trainer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop communication skills that enable effective cross-cultural persuasion, negotiation, conflict resolution or influence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Local University media training ○ Cross-cultural negotiations • Apply communications skills during cross-cultural negotiations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Role-play exercises ○ Key Leader Engagement exercise • Develop confidence in learning and applying language skills <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Introduction to a language through Rapport/Headstart 2 software ○ Additional language training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Apply culturally relevant terms, factors, concepts and regional information in the development of mission plans and orders <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Insurgency overview and theory ○ Pattern and social network analysis and PE ○ COIN IPB and planning • Assess and describe the effect that culture has on military operations specific to countries or regions of operational significance to the US <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ SWOT analysis country brief ○ Writing requirement: Analytical paper ○ Analytical paper presentation / discussion ○ CoE CFLP Lecture Series ○ Professional reading program
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prescriptive [P] • Reinforced / Integrated [R/I] • Professional Development [PD] – optional 		

In support of current and future operational requirements (Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept) captains will be assigned one of the operationally important regions and languages. Captains will learn to apply operational culture to a tactical scenario in that region.

Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC-B) (18 weeks, 4 days). The desired outcome is for lieutenants to demonstrate a basic awareness of culture,

along with the ability to leverage that knowledge in a JIIM environment, with a level of competence necessary to serve within a complex environment. The instructional material for second/first lieutenants will be available on the ALREC website. Officers should access *Headstart2* and begin their language training as early as possible. The language instruction will continue progressively as a blend of platform instruction, *Headstart2* and other on line resources, as well as web-enabled instruction, simulations and gaming.

Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) (10 weeks). The desired outcome for junior warrant officers is to demonstrate a basic awareness of culture, and the ability to leverage that knowledge as a BCT/division officer.

Warrant Officer Advance Course (WOAC) (33 weeks). The desired outcome for senior warrant officers is to demonstrate a basic understanding of foreign culture, along with the ability to leverage that knowledge as a Corps/Theater officer.

Noncommissioned Officer Academy (4-8 weeks based on MOS). The desired outcome for senior NCOs attending the Senior Leader Course (SLC) is to demonstrate a basic understanding of foreign culture along with the ability to leverage that knowledge as a platoon sergeant and/or first sergeant. The desired outcome for mid-grade NCOs attending the Advanced Leader Course (ALC) is to demonstrate a basic understanding of culture and how to leverage that knowledge as a senior section sergeant and/or platoon sergeant. The instruction is offered through a blended learning approach (programmed instruction, seminars, educational tools and independent study).

Advanced Individual Training (AIT). The desired outcome is for Soldiers to internalize the Army Values and Warrior Ethos, live by our Professional Military Ethic and display empathy towards others.

Intermediate Level Education and LREC

Command General Staff Officer College: CGSOC JPME 1 Common Core contains 40 hours of education supporting and expanding concepts related to cultural considerations for military plans and operations.

GSOC Advanced Operations Course applies cultural analysis in 108 hours of practical exercise in the planning and execution of military operations (JOPP and MDMP).

4 regional studies programs contain 24 hour core courses combined with focused interdepartmental LREC electives.

Foreign language. The goal is to introduce culture and foreign language to students attending PME instruction and provide the opportunity to achieve an elemental language proficiency (Level 0+, memorized proficiency) in a language of military operational significance. All PME students are issued and/or provided basic instruction on the use of *Headstart2* or multi-platform tactical language software programs.

DLIFLC also provides a website to facilitate the language training and sustainment proficiency at www.dliflc.edu/index.html. DLIFLC will continue to support the CGSS with both pre- deployment language familiarization training and professional development language education.

Operational language training. Beginning in 2006 all U.S. Army officers whose assignments following graduation resulted in deployment in support of OIF/OND/OEF were required to take language electives in either Iraqi Dialect, Dari, or Pashto as appropriate. The Iraqi program has ended, while Dari/Pashto continues with reduced enrollment. These are 48 hour courses, taught by DLIFLC instructors during the normal CGSS elective terms.

Strategic language training: In support of the ACFLS and future ALRECS, U.S. officers interested in building a foundation for lifelong learning of selected languages may take 48 or 72 hours of beginning instruction in Chinese, French, Modern Standard Arabic, Spanish, Farsi and Korean. These courses are taught by DLIFLC instructors; they begin during AOC and continue through the elective terms. Additionally, students who already possess proficiency in one of these languages may take directed study electives, earning up to three elective credits. Students with existing proficiency in a language not taught in CGSS may be able to earn elective credit for directed study via distance learning, using DLIFLC instructors located in Monterey, California, or elsewhere. The percentage of ILE students taking language classes during CGSS has increased with every class. More than 30 percent of the students take some form of DLI language instruction during ILE.

Self-Study: Officers desiring to pursue self-study of a foreign language may receive one elective credit by utilizing DLI's *Headstart2* online language programs, currently available in 27 languages, with more added annually. DLIFLC continues to develop options for CGSS students (as well as faculty) to maintain and improve their existing capabilities, whether through advanced level resident instruction in the above-mentioned languages or through web-based and distance learning means such as the Global Language Online Support System (GLOSS) learning objects and the Broadband Language Training System (BLTS) for other languages which are not offered in residence.

Incorporation of language into ILE curriculum: As the CGSC develops options for broadening officer development in ILE, there are many ways in which language and culture can be integrated into various programs of study. For example, students who focus on a particular COCOM, region, or country might be required to learn a relevant language as a part of the program. Students who arrive at CGSS with extensive operational and/or language experience in a given theater could be given the chance to deepen and broaden their knowledge base, with language and culture being a significant portion of the curriculum. Certain Masters of Military Art and Science (MMAS) programs could include language courses as a portion of the requirement. DLIFLC will continue to work with CGSC staff and faculty to explore ways to provide language and culture within the framework of PME.

ILE courseware for all venues will ensure that they contain, at minimum, learning objectives that support the following proficiency matrix. See Table 1.

Senior Level Education and Culture

Stage IV PME & JPME II Implementation: Senior Level Education is also governed by the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). GLOs for Senior Officers were developed by Soldier Competency Panel 3 (Culture and JIIM Competence) working under the Army Learning Coordination Council (ALCC) co-chaired by DCG TRADOC and CG CAC. After review and minor editing during the 1-3 May 2012 Army Learning Summit 2012, they were approved for release for final staffing.

GLOs are associated with the competencies and attributes found in TR Pam 525-8-2 under six Army Learning Areas. *Among the GLOs for LTCs and COLs are:*

Table 1

	MAJ	LTC
Training	*Competent coordinator and collaborator across JIIM organizations *Elementary language proficiency; can initiate and maintain conversation	*Competent in coordinating across JIIM entities at the national strategic level *Elementary language proficiency; can initiate and maintain conversation
Education	*Displays judgment and agility in planning tactical operations in JIIM context	*Judgment and innovation in application of design principles to operational art in JIIM context *Develops and maintains insight regarding geo-political environment
Experience	*Demonstrates mastery of FSO and ability to leverage JIIM capabilities to achieve operational objectives	*Confident operating in a JIIM environment
Desired End-state	*Confident of cultural, language and information skills *Competent coordinator and collaborator across JIIM organizations *Elementary language proficiency; can initiate and maintain conversation	*Expert at applying culture, language and information *Capable to serve in a JIIM capacity on a TT, S-TT, IA, Joint or Multi-National Staff *Competent in coordinating across JIIM entities at the national strategic level *Elementary language proficiency; can initiate and maintain conversation

- ◆ Perform strategic leadership in a multi-cultural, JIIM environment.
- ◆ Evaluate cross-cultural competency in synthesizing theater strategies, estimates, and campaign plans employing military power in a unified, joint, multinational and interagency environment.
- ◆ Integrate critical culture elements into all levels of military operations across the conflict continuum.
- ◆ Assess the implications of a unit's actions and initiate cultural change within a unit to operate effectively within a specific operational environment.

Pre-deployment Training

CFL standards for pre-deployment training (PDT) have been delineated for both Iraq and Afghanistan. CFL PDT resourcing has been provided to DLIFLC and executed through its MTTs, LTDs, and via online CFL training programs (*Rapport, Headstart2*).

Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF)

In the face of Army wide resourcing challenges, PDT efforts will be focused on providing the most efficient and cost effective means to meet DA directed PDT standards and to assist FORSCOM in the identification and resourcing of PDT for RAF.⁶ These are U.S. Army units tasked to train and mentor partner nation security forces in support of U.S. National Security Strategy. RAF is the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army's vision for providing combatant commanders with versatile, responsive, and consistently available Army forces. RAF will meet combatant commanders' requirements for units and capabilities to support operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities.

Beginning in March 2013, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division (2/1ID), stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas, began supporting the U.S. Africa Command's security cooperation and partnering requirements. 2/1ID was undergoing training at the Combat Training Center before embarking on specialized Language, Regional Expertise and Cultural training. Once training is complete, over the course of this year, teams of Soldiers from the brigade will deploy to multiple African countries to engage in partnering and training events, and to support bilateral and multinational military exercises.

RAF Implementation Concept

The process of implementation of the full RAF concept will take several years. The initial priority was to begin alignment of Corps and Divisions in FY 2013. The Army plans to formally establish the alignment of I Corps to U.S. Pacific Command, III Corps to U.S. Central Command, and XVIII Corps to the Global Response Force. In addition, in fiscal year 2013, Army started to align divisions to U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Africa Command. For FY 2014, the Army will align brigades to support theater requirements. Planning is currently underway to align brigades to PACOM, EUCOM and AFRICOM.

The CAC LRECEMO

The CAC LRECEMO is assisting FORSCOM and HQDA in determining the required language, regional expertise and culture proficiency requirements for the RAF Soldiers/leaders to function within their cultural operational environment and for the RAF to attain unified land operations competency. The required resources are coordinated with DLIFLC, TCC, UFMCS, HTS, and other LREC stakeholders.



Pre-deployment Training Country and Mission Specific Knowledge

PDT requirements clearly delineated by DA/COCOM through DA EXORD and ALARACT

- Requirements all Soldiers must complete “Rapport” program (online).
- 1 leader per platoon 0+/0+ in appropriate language.
- Language options: DLI, LTD, Headstart2 (online).
- Currently implemented through DLI LTDs.
- Facilitate/conduct cultural and language lesson plans at distributed locations.

TCC



Cultural
MTT/TTT

DLIFLC



Language
0+/0+
and
Cultural
Awareness
(MTT/LTD)

DLIFLC LTD Locations

DLIFLC - Monterey, CA	SOUTHCOM	JBER
DLI - Washington DC	Ft. Carson - CO	JBMDL
Offutt AFB - NE	Ft. Gordon - GA	Hawaii
Maxwell AFB - AL	Ft. Meade - MD	Italy
Hurlburt Field AFB - FL	Ft. Huachuca - AZ	Tampa - FL
Goodfellow AFB - TX	Ft. Leavenworth - KS	Washington DC
Camp Pendleton - CA	Schofield	Norfolk - VA
Camp Lejeune - NC	WHINSEC	Osan - Korea
San Antonio - TX	JBLM	Vilseck - Germany

CFL Integrated Home Station Training

Provides CFL
Relevant and
Ready Force
Pool



Coordination of the ACFLS/ALRECS implementation is being accomplished through the Army Learning Coordination Council's (ALCC) three-tier process, specifically through the ALCC Soldier *Competency Panel 3: Cultural and JIIM Competence*. This panel is made up of ACFL and JIIM subject matter experts from TRADOC schools, centers, and colleges. Panel objectives include:


- ◆ Ensuring that ACFL learning outcomes are progressive and sequential along each continuum.
- ◆ Monitoring alignment of PME courses' terminal learning objectives with the ACFL learning outcomes endorsed by the ALCC.
- ◆ Identifying and resolving gaps or redundancies in ACFL training along the career continuums as well as within the operating force.
- ◆ Ensuring that learning outcomes are assessed and reported through the ALCC Working Group to commandants and commanders sitting on the ALCC.⁷

The LRECEMO briefed the Prepare Army Forum on 2 November 2011. The TRADOC Commander approved the “*Expand the Culture and Foreign language Training*” initiative as the way ahead for the ACFLP.⁸ The brief was based on the implementation concept approved by CAC CG in the CFL Operations Order and Implementation Guidance.⁹

LREC Enterprise Management Governance and Integration

CAC's LRECEMO will manage the CFL/LREC Enterprise by leveraging, synchronizing, and coordinating with the leads of relevant stakeholders in support of the training, Leadership and Education, and Doctrine support requirements. Our intent is to replicate the ALCC educational governance model for the LREC Management Governance. The LRECEMO LREC Working Group will be created based on ALCC Soldier Competency Panel 3 (Culture and JIIM). One of the major tasks will be to connect the Ends, Means, and Ways to be able to effectively manage and implement the ACFLS/ALRECS. Existing Army governance forums such as Training General Officer Steering Committee (TGOSC), Army Language and Culture Enterprise (ALCE), the Army Learning Coordination Council (ALCC), and Army Leader development Forum (ALDF) need to be fully leveraged to achieve the ACFLS/future ALRECS and National Security Strategy (NSS) objectives for an Army with culturally competent leaders and culturally aware soldiers to prevent, shape, and win within an increasingly complex operational environment.

The Army Training and Leader Development Forum (ATLDF) addresses overarching issues in support of Army requirements/initiatives. The ALCE specifically addresses the holistic assessment of implementation and LREC requirements across the DOTMLPF domain. ALCE derived requirements are subsequently worked through the ALDF or TGOSC as appropriate to address training, leadership and education and materiel issues. The ATLDF also specifically addresses policy issues required to implement the strategy. The ALCC addresses the integration of learning outcomes across all cohorts to ensure sequential and progressive learning in support of Army requirements.

The CAC LD&E LRECEMO and LREC WG can play at least an initial role in support of TRADOC to a fully integrated approach to connect the enterprise in order to span the boundaries between generating and operating capabilities. This is a necessary step until the Army identifies an overarching proponent, which would integrate those capabilities to insure their most effective support of military operations. 

“What is culture? Soviet culture, Western culture, Iraqi culture, Afghan culture, military culture, corporate culture, generational culture. Becoming aware of cultural dynamics is a difficult task because culture is based on experiences, values, behaviors, beliefs and norms, as well as collective memories and history.”

***–Mahir Ibrahimov,
MIPB (January March 2011)***

Endnotes

1. Strategic Landpower White Paper, 6 May 2013, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Amos and Adm. William McRaven, head of U.S. Special Operations forces. This paper outlines their plans to ensure the nation’s investment in its land warfare forces doesn’t waver in the face of budget cuts and a national defense strategy that emphasizes the Pacific.
2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3126.01A), 31 January 2013. Provides policy and procedural guidance for the identification, planning and sourcing of language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC) capabilities in support of the Department of Defense Strategic Plan for language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities, national decisionmaking, and global military operations.
3. While CJCSI 3126.01A standards actually apply just to regional expertise and cultural understanding, this Army Strategy extends the use of those categories to language proficiency. Further language proficiency details by interagency language roundtable levels are found in Annexes A, B, C, and D. (*March 2014, Draft LREC Strategy*)
4. TR Pam 525-8-2, The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015, 20 January 2011. Describes the framework for a new Army Learning Model (ALM). The ALM is the operational term for the Continuous Adaptive Learning Model.
5. The Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy, 1 December 2009. The ACFLS provides a holistic strategy for present and future culture and foreign language education and training programs needed to close the gap in capabilities. This strategy links individual leader and Soldier knowledge, skills, and attributes to unit capability to directly enable the execution of assigned missions or tasks.
6. Regionally Aligned Forces, STAND-TO, 20 December 2012. Accessed at <http://www.army.mil/standto/archive/issue.php?issue=2012-12-20>.
7. FY 2012 Guidance for ALCC Soldier Competency Panels, 22 January 2012.
8. Army Development Program (ALDP), *Prepare the Army Forum*, 12-1, 2 Nov 2011, signed by Gen Cone, 3 January 2012.
9. CAC Culture and Foreign Language Strategy Implementation Guidance, 27 October 2011 and OPORD 11305-003 (CAC Implementation of the Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy), 2 November 2011.

Colonel Willoughby is currently serving as the Chief of Staff, USACAC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He previously served as the Assistant Deputy Commandant for CGSC and the Commander of Task Force Sinai and Chief of Staff for Multi National Force and Observers, Sinai, Egypt.”

Dr. Ibrahimov is the LRECEMO Program Manager. He served previously as the Army’s Senior Culture and Foreign Language Advisor and is the author of “Invitation to Rain: a Story of the Road Taken toward Freedom,” and “Life Looking Death in The Eye,” among numerous other publications.

A Decade of Agility and Adaptability

by Marilyn Willis-Grider, EdD



Introduction

Army leaders must be agile and adaptable.¹ This is a well-established and accepted mantra for today's Army. Circumstances and situations change so rapidly that Soldiers and leaders must be equipped to act promptly. At the same time as the kaleidoscope of events revolves at dizzying speed, stability is grounded in enduring values, traditions, and doctrine. This is a dichotomy of life—one that the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center (TCC) endeavors to balance.

We were not long or deep into Afghanistan or Iraq before the Army recognized a gap in operational skills. The human dimensions of war complicated all kinds of things. Part of the Army's strategy to fill this gap was the establishment of the TCC at Fort Huachuca in 2004. The Intelligence School was one of few players directly addressing the effects of culture on operations, so the choice was a natural. This natural connection, though, has caused a lot of confusion. TCC is located at the Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE) and culture is an important competency for Intelligence Soldiers, but TCC is not an Intel-only asset. Since 2004, TCC has focused on providing culture training for the General Purpose Force and increasing the cross-cultural competence (3C) of our troops.

The Army expends a great deal of effort to develop culture and language experts and specialists. These elite professional linguists, foreign area officers and special operators are vital assets for success in the Army's mission of Prevent, Shape, and Win. However, it is unnecessary and unrealistic to expect all Soldiers to attain that level of expertise.

Building 3C Competencies

The average Soldier does not need high level 3C skills, just enough to keep from thoughtlessly committing cultural errors that are likely to have significant fallout. One Regionally Aligned Forces leader stated that the goal for training was to "avert catastrophe." This is a fairly low bar of expectation, but a critical line. A basic level of cultural awareness and 3C skills can support this goal. TCC's unique staff base of one-third prior military, one-third prior foreign national,

and one-third academic with feet on the ground experience equips the organization to provide a basic level of region specific culture and basic survival language training that builds on the foundation of 3C. This also allows us the agility and adaptability to prepare training on a wide range of countries and cultures in response to the training requirements we receive.

The great culture question is "Why?" Why is this important to these people, why do they think or react this way, why do they do things this way? The answer always starts with "It depends..." The Soldier needs to know when to ask why and figure out the factors upon which the answer depends. That is, recognizing when culture is having an effect on a mission or interaction and using good questions to filter influential factors and determine effective courses of action to mitigate the results.

TCC is dedicated to building a strong 3C foundation in our conventional force so that it will be more flexible (agile) and adaptive when interacting with host nation forces and populations. We work across all three learning domains (operational, institutional, and self-development) to achieve this goal.

Operational. TCC started out providing pre-deployment training on Iraq and Afghanistan through mobile training teams. Horn of Africa was added two years later to support the Combined Joint Task Force based in Djibouti. Since 2004, we have provided pre-deployment training for over 140,000 troops. In the first 18 months of the program, we provided RAF training for over 1,200 Soldiers supporting Building Partner Capacity or Security Force Assistance missions across Africa Command, European Command and Western Hemisphere.

Institutional. TCC develops foundational 3C training for Professional Military Education that can be modified for application by all TRADOC schools and CoEs from initial entry through Captains Career Courses. In addition, several course proponents have requested TCC's assistance in developing 3C materials for their common core training blocks—IMT-BCT, BOLC-A, BOLC-B, and Captains Career Course. TCC

works with course proponents and CoEs to tailor culture training to their specific requirements.

TCC also conducts train-the-trainer (T3) missions on request by the CoEs, modeling the Army Learning Model (ALM) practices. It also works with training developers to incorporate culture training into existing training without adding to programs of instruction time, particularly by using culture as the condition for other skills training. (See the article by Chris Clark on T3 in this issue for more information.)

TCC cadres are very committed to the ALM strategy. Culture is a subject area particularly geared towards experiential learning since every military member has already achieved some level of cultural adaptation by making the transition from civilian to Soldier. We facilitate Soldiers' discovery of the transferable 3C skills and practice adapting to multinational environments.

TCC plays an important supporting role for numerous specialty missions, such as the Behavioral Science Consultation Training Course; the First Year Graduate Veterinary Education program, and Cadet Command's Warrior Forge and Cadet Overseas Training Missions (formerly Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency missions). TCC instructors provide sixteen hours of core culture and country-specific training and then travel with the cadets for a two to three week immersion in the target culture. This year alone, ten TCC instructors are supporting Cadet training for nine different countries.

Self-Development. TCC has worked with a variety of Government entities and contract partners to build distributed learning solutions to allow Soldiers to increase their 3C knowledge base on their own. We recognize that one cannot "train" 3C expertise, though interactive training and situational training exercises are effective tools in practicing application of the 3C skills and building good cross-cultural habits that will be more instinctual when faced with critical interactions. "Train as you fight" also applies to other interactions—train to interact competently in culturally complex scenarios.

TCC has provided subject matter expertise in support of DOD/JKO in the production of Virtual Cultural Awareness Trainers modules on Horn of Africa; North Africa; West Africa; Southeast Asia; Central America, and other Western Hemisphere countries. These modules are focused on cul-


tural awareness with simulation exercises to practice application of cultural knowledge and skills.

One can only achieve expertise with experience but simulations can provide a very helpful platform to develop good cross-cultural habits so that 3C becomes a more natural instinct. Soldiers need to train as they fight so situational and field training exercises are essential for instilling the habit of recognizing when culture is having an effect and asking the right questions to determine appropriate response or counter activity.

Conclusion

"Stop-Drop-Roll," we practiced this drill regularly when I was in school. I don't recall anyone ever catching on fire, but we were ready should the unthinkable happen. We had done the drill so often that the response was instinctual.

3C is not as straight forward as the fire drill. There are many variables to consider and they change every time, but making a habit of the skills of questioning, listening, communicating, building rapport, and negotiating will increase the likelihood of understanding a situation quickly, choosing an appropriate response, and acting accordingly to bring about the desired results.

TCC is a proud member of the Army Culture and Foreign Language Enterprise, flexibly adapting to mission training requirements. We work together with other partners and Services to increase efficiencies and reduce duplication in training and development activities to achieve the TCC mission of building and sustaining an Army with the right blend of cultural competency capabilities to facilitate a wide range of operations, now and in the future, supporting the Army priority of agile and adaptive leaders. 

Endnote

1. Army Leader Development Strategy, 2013, 4.

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by Eric Lepisto

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Recognition of the value of culture for military planning and operations has made significant gains over the last decade. However, converting these gains into relevant training remains a challenge. While cultural training teaches students how to break culture down, putting these pieces back together so that culture is operationally relevant remains a task under development. At the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center (TCC), recent advances in cultural analysis training promises to show students ways to complete the culture puzzle.

Toward this objective, the U.S. Army, as well as other services, has developed a variety of tools for understanding culture. Analytic tools, such as PMESII-PT or ASCOPE, allow soldiers to identify significant components of an operational environment (OE). More advanced analysis depends on exploring the (sometimes competing) stories or narratives arising from the subject of culture. To promote cultural understanding, the TCC promotes breaking culture down into the components of values, beliefs, behaviors, and norms (VBBN), following a definition provided by the Army's Culture and Foreign Language Strategy.

The obstacle is that none of these approaches is a stand-alone solution for generating operationally relevant data that forms a comprehensive picture. As a result, use of these methods can be more problematic than promising for soldiers looking to recognize, explain, or anticipate cultural phenomena. Instructors are also challenged to make sense of the culture puzzle, especially those who are not subject matter experts or experienced practitioners.

For example, most students are able to complete simplified PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, infor-

mation, infrastructure, physical environment, and time) worksheets. Rather than produce a data set readily transformed into actionable information, they are more likely to list a bunch of disconnected factoids that lead to more confusion. This confusion in part occurs because people unfamiliar with an OE have a tendency to focus on broad, generic issues at the strategic level, rather than work to develop a tactical level of understanding.

A simple, yet elegant fix to this problem is to combine these tools in a way suitable to student level and responsive to mission requirements. The goal should be to let students examine culture in a form that best reflects how they will encounter it during deployment. For the novice or beginner level, two simple and complementary approaches are possible that will increase the operational relevance of this information.

The best way to describe the goal of these approaches is to create a snapshot image of the culture (or group) that is being studied, one that will address the mission at a basic level, possess some personal relevance for the soldier, and form a foundation from which to understand the views of the local population. Signifying the difference between how the requisite elements take form at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels provides a mission relevant way to put this knowledge to use.

The first variation of this approach resulted from a discussion amongst TCC cadre members while developing regional knowledge products to support culture training for Regionally Aligned Forces training missions. TCC developers realized that it wasn't sufficient to simply present PMESII-PT elements (or results from similar analytic tools). Instead, they decided that presenting regional knowledge through strategic, operational, and then tactical levels of information was a more constructive and accessible way to organize their material. One way to accomplish this goal was to use

the information to answer a short series of soldier relevant questions as noted. A similar approach in cultural awareness training allows students to not only use critical thinking skills, but to also create a useable product, such as a mission relevant culture brief.

Strategic Questions (Orientation)	<i>How does this country/culture fit into the larger world? How does the population describe itself? Why is the U.S. here/interested/involved?</i>
Operational Questions (Situational Awareness)	<i>Why am I (my unit) here/deploying? What's going on here? What do I need to know about the OE? Where can things go bad?</i>
Tactical Questions (Mission Essential)	<i>How do I get my job/mission accomplished well? How does culture (VBBN) affect the mission? How might the culture/OE be difficult for my soldiers? What opportunities/challenges exist to control for or use? What don't we know? What are variables that affect my mission?</i>
Integration Questions (Application)	<i>"So what?" What is the best way to accomplish my mission? What do I need to know to navigate through the OE?</i>

Another awareness level analysis approach asks the students to explore each PMESII-PT element in terms of VBBN. The novice culture analyst is tasked with indicating how the local population (or its subgroups) might respond to each PMESII-PT element. In other words, they are asked to answer the question, "What are people doing at the local (tactical) level?" Facilitators again play the role of devil's advocate to encourage critical discussion of the results. To conclude, the students as a group are requested to summarize lessons learned to bring forward into the field.


What is useful for culture training is that neither approach requires strong familiarity with the OE by students or the facilitator. Instead these tasks push students to envision what might be going on at the local level. Facilitators then challenge their responses by considering whether their statements are true for all members of that population. These awareness approaches also allow students to answer "I don't know," which is a significant lesson that can allow them to identify what they do or do not know. It also provides an opportunity to help them learn how to phrase a better question when requesting further information from a subject matter expert.

Higher levels of cultural analysis take a more nuanced and dynamic look at an OE, but build on the methods described above. For the Captains Career Course, an integrated ap-

proach is being developed for the "Across Cultures" block by the TCC training cadre where students are taught to perform Seminal Event Analysis as an approach for analyzing culture. Since soldiers are more likely to deploy to places experiencing instability, this approach addresses the lack of good information about the OE as it experiences extreme transformation. This approach also recognizes the symbolic narrative of the seminal event that caused the change, and this event is used as a point of comparison that allows students to analyze, anticipate and even adjust planning and operations under changing circumstances.

The Seminal Event Analysis first asks students to identify what the OE was like prior to the seminal (change) event using PMESII-PT as a guide. They then are asked to hypothesize how this event changed the OE at the strategic-operational level. The students are then asked to describe what these changes mean for the general population at the tactical level in terms of VBBN. By identifying patterns of change, this approach creates the opportunity to isolate stabilizing and de-stabilizing cultural factors that have potential mission impact.

Like the basic level analysis, this approach also identifies what is known or not known as well as what needs to be verified. It also allows students to grapple with another important answer for cultural fluency—"It depends." Getting across to military students that the answers "I don't know." and "It depends." are important steps in improving critical thinking, especially for students more accustomed to lessons that result in clear answers.

Each analytic approach completes a culture puzzle by combining existing pieces at different levels. Introductory level cultural analysis provides students with a cultural snapshot, one that allows them to gain awareness of a culture. The intermediate level produces a story of the population, one that explores consistency and change and results in fuller cultural understanding. Expert levels of analysis, which deserve additional discussion, should address the cultural implications of military operations on an operational environment. 

Eric Lepisto is a Desert Storm era Marine who holds a PhD in Applied Anthropology from Columbia University with a focus on Eurasia. For nearly twenty years, Dr. Lepisto worked abroad as a social scientist, international development practitioner, project consultant and intercultural trainer. In 2010, he became the Strategic Studies Analyst for the South Caucasus for the 4th Military Information Support Group, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. He joined the TCC in 2012 as a contract instructor-developer under the Warrior Training Alliance (WTA), for which he is now the Raytheon task lead. In addition to preparing regional knowledge curriculum on Eurasia for TCC, Dr. Lepisto also assists with the strengthening of institutional courses, such as the MICCC, and is responsible for the creation of the Seminal Event Analysis and the integration of the Decisive Action Training Environment into culture training.



The Army Learning Model: Mentoring at its Best

by **Clint L. Cooper**

I was a newly minted Army E-2 and had just been assigned to my first unit. My very first assignment was to conduct Claymore mine lane for the unit's round robin Common Tasks Training course. I *knew* all about claymore mines since I'd just finished basic training and had recently deployed several of the blue training versions quite successfully. I'd even seen a real one detonated as I was sitting in the grandstands a safe distance away.

The first few soldiers navigated my lane without any issues and I was even confident enough to point out a few minor corrections. Then came MSG Sanchez, and he did something that didn't even remotely resemble the pictures in the CTT manual opened in front of me. Very courageously, I stepped up and corrected him. In a matter of fact way he stated, "Private, if I'd done it that way in Vietnam the static electricity in the air would have set it off and we'd both be dead." Not having the slightest idea about how to respond, I simply replied, "Sergeant, you are a GO at this station."

When I grew up in the Army it was a rare thing to spot a soldier wearing a patch on his right sleeve. Now, after 12 long years of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan the opposite is true. But, for how long? All that well planned and well intentioned Army training can't possibly compete with that first hand, boots on the ground knowledge and experience.

Between my own military deployments I've always been involved in one way or another in training and mentoring soldiers. Initially I would share a PowerPoint presentation and augment it with a few of my own down range lessons learned. The individual soldier was left up to his own research, study, and imagination about what things might actually look like when he arrived in country.

Lately, I've been able to simply play the role of traffic cop as I guide conversation in a classroom full of soldiers who've already been there and done that. More often than not I end up being the one who can take home some new piece of lessons learned.

As the financial chopping block looms, units are looking for cheaper, yet still effective ways to conduct meaningful training. Gone are the days when we were simply told where and when to be and a well trained contractor would step in and conduct the training for us. Suddenly training is becoming more and more the responsibility of the unit—again.

I've been there as a training NCO looking at piles and piles of FMs and training manuals and not having the slightest clue about how to transfer the knowledge from a stack of dusty old boring books into the minds of young soldiers. Surprisingly, that ability to tap into the existing knowledge base, that knowledge base being your more experienced soldiers, is not readily apparent. What is most often missing is just a simple framework or strategy.

Anybody recently involved in training has heard about the new Army Learning Model, or simply ALM. DA Pamphlet 525-8-2, The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015, describes ALM which is being spearheaded by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The pamphlet emphasizes "the need for a new learning model . . . to develop adaptive, thinking Soldiers and leaders capable of meeting the challenges of operational adaptability in an era of persistent conflict" and who can "operate under conditions of uncertainty and complexity."¹

It's a new concept that outlines the Army's shift away from platform centric training and Death by PowerPoint, to a new more interactive and participatory way of learning. ALM

emphasizes that instructors should facilitate engaging discussion by interacting with the students.


Rick Swain, Dean of Academics for U.S. Army Cadet Command said, "It's about taking the curriculum and making it interesting to the students so that it will resonate." For me the ALM model has always been about mentoring, interaction, discussion, and participation. It's moving the instruction from a well trained and well intentioned contractor and into the hands of MSG Sanchez. I still think he might have been pulling one over on me, but he had my respect and definitely the experience, none the less.

ALM can be difficult to wrap your head around if you haven't seen it in action. For example, if you were to teach Key Leader Engagement (KLE), the old method would be via PowerPoint presentation outlining the 7 steps of the KLE process. 50 minutes later and a 10 minute break and we're done.

An ALM method might simply be a short two minute YouTube video clip showing Civil Affairs soldiers in Somalia helping villagers digging a well. You then give your soldiers a KLE card and say, "Okay, I want you to use the 7 steps of the KLE process to plan your next meeting with those same villagers." Under the supervision and direction of the instructor they are off and teaching themselves. You can augment this training strategy with the personal experience and cultural observations of your soldiers who have already been down range interacting with the locals.

This is old fashioned mentoring. No need for PowerPoint Rangers here. This type of training greatly improves peer-

to-peer interaction as well as team development and eventually unit cohesion. Learning can be inspirational and there is a pride in ownership as the students start to visualize how this very training might be valuable to them in the near future.

There are many, many ways of integrating ALM into training that become more readily apparent as the unit strives to follow its simple strategy. ALM will not only affect soldiers in an institutional environment as it is implemented, but as it is learned and applied throughout the Army, it becomes the way that soldiers continue to train in operational units. Soldiers are skilled in their crafts, are resilient and ready to adapt to an ever-changing environment. The new Army Learning Model offers an opportunity to develop mentors and retain that valuable experience and knowledge already found in the ranks of our modern Army today. 

Endnote

1. TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015, 2.

Mr. Cooper served in the U.S. Army as a Counterintelligence Agent and linguist. He deployed to Bosnia as a HUMINT Collection Team Leader. In Afghanistan, he served as the Senior Interrogator at the Kandahar Interrogation Facility and as a senior human terrain team analyst, Afghan subject matter expert, and Pashto linguist, working with the 101st Airborne Division in Kandahar Province. At the TCC, he is currently developing and conducting pre-deployment training covering current Afghan, KLE, Female Engagement Team, and Green on Blue "Insider Threat" issues. He holds a BIS from Weber State University.

The Army Publishing Directorate has authenticated ATP 2-22.8, "Measurement and Signature Intelligence," dated 30 May 2014. ATP 2-22.8 establishes doctrine for measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). It discusses the six MASINT technical data sources, what each provides, and how data is collected from them. The manual discusses the conduct of MASINT operations and the processes for developing collected technical data into intelligence. ATP 2-22.8 also provides an overview of unattended ground sensors and describes the capabilities of MASINT collection systems. This manual is classified Secret. For access to this publication, send a request to usarmy.huachuca.icoe.mbx.doctrine@mail.mil

The Army Publishing Directorate has authenticated ATP 2-22.33, "2X and Staff Procedures and Techniques," dated 6 June 2014. This publication supersedes TC 2-22.303, The 2X Handbook, dated 31 July 2006. ATP 2-22.33 provides detailed doctrine to military intelligence Soldiers serving in G-2X or S-2X staff elements. The 2X staff element manages counterintelligence and human intelligence operations at all Army echelons above brigade combat team. However, this manual focuses on 2X staff elements at brigade combat team and division. This manual is classified Secret. For access to this publication, send a request to usarmy.huachuca.icoe.mbx.doctrine@mail.mil

TRADOC Culture Center's Train-the-Trainer Program



by Mr. Christopher Clark

*"Tell me and I forget. Teach me and I remember. Involve me and I learn."
—Benjamin Franklin*

Introduction

This over 200 years old quote highlights the fact that learning by doing is a timeless concept. Learning by doing or as it is called in education and training programs within the Army, student-centric training, is the driving force behind the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center's (TCC) Train-the-Trainer (TTT) program. The TCC's TTT program is a 40-hour certificate producing course that is designed to demonstrate how culture can be trained using the Army Learning Model (ALM) strategies. The target audiences for this course are TRADOC certified instructors and training developers at each of the 15 Centers of Excellence.

TCC TTT Program Revamped

The objective of this training is to model ALM strategies within the context of conducting culture training within their respective courses. This course focuses more on the application of concepts within a training environment. This represents a significant move forward with our TTT program. Our initial TTT program focused solely on the training of culture. There was not a substantial application piece built throughout the training. This course is designed to add more tools in an already extensive toolkit that many of these instructors and training developers can adapt to their current courses of instruction.

On Day 1, the students are informed that they will be required to conduct a group facilitation at the end of the course. The students are separated into organizational groupings for the purpose of developing and facilitating a discussion of activity that could be used in their course. This provides purpose and relevancy to the development and facilitation of their material. Each group is assigned a TCC cadre member who serves as an advisor/mentor to the group. The groups can use their advisor to bounce ideas off of, aid in shaping their training strategy, and provide assistance if the group is getting off track in their preparation for the facilitation.

These student-led facilitations are constructed to be executed within a full TRADOC hour (50 minutes). Structurally, this works well within the development process of these facilitations. Instructors are generally comfortable executing training strategies that cover a TRADOC hour and training developers are generally comfortable constructing training strategies with the same time frame. The end results of the majority of these student-led facilitations have been extraordinary. Some groups planned to integrate what they developed within their courses. Students are allowed to display creativity, showcase their abilities as instructors, and they generally walk away from the training feeling more comfortable in their ability to conduct culture training using ALM strategies.

Course Structure

The intent in this section of the article is not to go into too much detail about each day, but to provide a sufficient overview of each day to communicate both structure and intent. Day 1 is what we like to refer to as the "buy-in" day. In any training you have only a short amount of time to build a connection with your audience to convince them that what they experience this week will be interesting and relevant to their current mission. If you do not build the connection, you will most likely have lost your audience for the rest of the week. This "buy-in" generally comes from quickly convincing the students that this is not going to be a "Death-by-PowerPoint" method of training. The students find out that they will be continually involved in the training throughout the week and this will grab their attention which allows the "buy-in" to happen.

The day begins with an interactive style of introductions and a few warm up exercises to start the process of thinking about culture. One of these warm-up exercises involves the use of sticky notes. The students are each given two sticky notes. On one, they are asked to jot down a benefit of incorporating culture training into their course. On the other, they are asked to provide a negative regarding incorporating culture training into their course. The students are provided

an area to post their sticky notes so that other students and cadre can look at them. These sticky notes are discussed during the rest of the week which results in an open and honest conversation about the benefits and pitfalls of incorporating culture training. These discussions provide some insight on the “how-to” aspect of incorporating culture training and can influence some students to reshape their thinking on how culture training should be incorporated.

The rest of Day 1 includes the block “Culture Information into Experience,” which provides insight on how to move from the informational aspect of culture to the application of this information. Products such as “Culture Matters” are discussed briefly to introduce students to the product and to demonstrate how to use it. “Culture and the Experiential Learning Model” closes out the day. This block includes exercises and discussions to demonstrate that training culture through experiential learning is an optimal method to use. At the end of the day, the students are provided with information about the expectations, intent, and additional supporting information that will be useful to them in shaping the classes they will facilitate during the final two days of training. Students will also meet with their advisor to discuss questions and concerns they may have about the assignment.

Day 2 covers the topics of “Culture and Its Impact on Military Operations and Cross-Cultural Skill Building.” How these topics are covered can vary since the material is tailored to meet the unique needs of each audience. Combined Arms Center approved lessons are used as the foundation for the training. The focus of this day is to reinforce material discussed on Day 1 as well as to prepare the students for their negotiation training on Day 3. The topics that are discussed on this day include cross-cultural communications, use of interpreters, rapport building, and cultural aspects of key leader engagements.

Day 3 is “Cross-Cultural Negotiations.” This is a pivotal day for the students since they take ownership of the instruction on the afternoon of Day 3. In the afternoon, the students are tasked to prepare for and execute a negotiation scenario that they have been provided. In the past, The TCC cadre member would process and discuss the negotiation after the negotiation was completed. A change was made to allow one of the primary observers to facilitate the processing of the negotiation. TCC cadre monitors the negotiation and is prepared to intercede only if the negotiation stalls or gets far off-track. To date, cadre have not been needed to intercede. The students have been more than capable of facilitating a discussion that covers the key events that happened during the planning and conduct of the negotiations,

and bring out relevant lessons learned and highlights items to consider in future negotiations.

The focus for Days 4 and 5 is on student-led facilitations. They are given time to put the finishing touches on their lessons during the morning of Day 4. During the afternoon of Day 4 and the morning of Day 5 these facilitations are conducted. Each group is provided peer feedback when they are done with their class. This works very well since they will receive feedback from a variety of perspectives. A group after action review (AAR) facilitated by TCC cadre is the closing event for the TTT. A significant amount of useful feedback has been received through this process and has influenced some of the changes that have been made.

Senior Leader Training

A companion event to the TTT is a Senior Leader’s Seminar conducted by our Director, Mr. John Bird. The purpose of this seminar is to baseline leaders on the Army’s view of culture; share best practices from throughout the Army, and sensitize them to the fact that the TCC can be used as a reach-back center. Culture is also specifically discussed from a leadership perspective to include how to advise/mentor others on relevant aspects of culture. The seminar’s objective is achieved via facilitated discussion (experiential learning), practical exercises, and short video clips.



A sampling of some of the student comments taken from TTT AARs:

- ◆ All the training was delivered in short bites, like 10 or so minutes in each bite, and that made it stay interesting.
- ◆ I walked into work and they said “Hey, you’re going to this class,” and I thought it was going to be another mindless week of culture. Nope, I liked it, it ended well.
- ◆ This was all peer-to-peer learning and collaboration. I learned more from the people in this class than I thought I would.


- ◆ You didn't just tell us about culture, you showed us techniques to teach culture.
- ◆ This wasn't just cultural awareness for me, it was better understanding for me and it helps me be a better instructor.
- ◆ 95 percent of the training I'm told I have to go to is a waste of my time, but this training wasn't a waste of my time and it was good. You also used multiple instructors with different backgrounds and that was good too.

Conclusion

As the Army transitions from Iraq and Afghanistan to future initiatives such as the Regionally Aligned Forces concept, culture training will need to become a permanent part of both the institutional and operational sides of the Army. For this to occur, officers and NCOs need to understand how and what to discuss on issues relating to culture

as they train and mentor our future fighting force. These TTTs will benefit many instructors/trainers on the institutional side which will in turn benefit the operational side once the Soldiers they train and mentor transition back into the operational force. ✨

Mr. Clark is a TCC Training Specialist. He retired from the U.S. Army with 20 years of service as an Intelligence Analyst. He served in numerous locations during this time to include Iraq, Germany, England, Japan, and South Korea. Assignments of note include member of a Military Transition Team for the 1st Mechanized Brigade, 9th Iraqi Army Division; instructor for the MOS 35F10, Intelligence Analyst Course, and Chief Instructor for the MI Senior Leaders Course. He earned a BA in Business Administration from Franklin University and a Masters of Business Administration with a minor in Technology Management from University of Phoenix. As part of the TCC Professional Military Education team, he develops culture education and training products for use in professional development courses for the enlisted and officer cohorts. Mr. Clark also develops products and training for Soldiers deploying to the PACOM area of responsibility.



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The UFMCS and Regionally Aligned Forces, Strategic Landpower, and LREC

by William McGovern and Virginia Kammer

Introduction

The Army recognizes the need to provide regionally trained and culturally aware soldiers and leaders to its combatant commanders. As the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Odierno has stated,

"We have learned many lessons over the last 10 years, but one of the most compelling is that—whether you are working among citizens of a country, or working with their government or Armed Forces—nothing is as important to your long term success as understanding the prevailing culture and values."¹

To accomplish better cultural understanding, the Army will use a multifaceted approach including Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) and Strategic Landpower (SLP) concepts, as well as the policy and procedural guidance found in *"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction: Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability Identifications, Planning and Sourcing (CJCSI 3126.01A)."* The LREC Instruction identifies language, regional expertise, and culture as enduring warfighter competencies critical to global mission readiness. It also identifies that lessons learned from recent operations "prove these capabilities save lives and facilitate mission effectiveness."

The challenge for the Army is to merge the RAF and SLP concepts with the LREC capabilities and requirements in a resource-constrained environment. Fortunately, the Army has the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. UFMCS, also known as Red Team University, was created in 2006 by the Chief of Staff of the Army to help students escape the gravitational pull of Western military thought. UFMCS programs are designed to help graduates ask better questions of subject matter experts (SMEs) and to foster cultural empathy in support of planning.

UFMCS and Cultural Understanding

First, it is important to understand what is meant by the term "cultural understanding" in order to see the value UFMCS brings to the force. In his cold war classic, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, Ken Booth makes the following observations:

"The inability to recreate the world through another's eyes, to walk in his footsteps and to feel his hopes or his pain has been the cause of a plethora of strategic problems and failures. It is difficult to appreciate another's problems. It is difficult to feel another's pain. It is difficult to understand another's ambitions. It is difficult to internalize another's experience. It is difficult to understand how our own actions appear to others. It is difficult to feel how threatened another may feel."

The resultant lack of empathy causes an absence of intimate understanding of the feelings, thoughts, and motives of others; this prevents an accurate forecasting of likely responses which can be the genesis of tactical, operational, and strategic mistakes. At the basis of this process is the ability to identify with others, to see the world as they see it. In order to master this skill, one must really know and understand oneself before one can begin to understand others. UFMCS courses emphasize self-awareness and the critical-thought process—the experience is, in essence, a "boot camp for thinking," but the classes are nothing like typically military training and educational experiences which emphasize facts and process over concepts.²

The UFMCS Approach

UFMCS education combines tools, SMEs, and a world class faculty, using case and country studies to provide students facilitated, problem-centered instruction with the intent of cultivating cultural empathy in support of military and interagency planning and operations. The curriculum emphasizes competencies that lead an individual to ask better questions and to grow intellectually. Instructors rely heavily on the Socratic Method, facilitated problem solving, terrain walks, and case study discussion. UFMCS uses guest professors from universities in a wide range of disciplines including anthropology, economics, and geography to facilitate discussion. All courses contain the following key components: self-reflection, critical thinking, culture, "group-think" mitigation, and Red Team tools.

◆ **Self-Reflection.** UFMCS advocates that before one can know and understand another culture one must first know and understand one's own. Self-awareness is a "meta-competency" that supports all leadership competencies. A self-aware leader will learn from each de-

cision and action; therefore, students are provided an opportunity for development of self-awareness through introspection, reflection, and storytelling.

One of the first assignments is the “Who Am I” exercise which is designed to provide a single reference point about one’s system of beliefs and values. Knowing one’s own culture, beliefs, and values provides an avenue for students to acknowledge and accept alternative perspectives. This reference point then makes it easier to examine another’s frame of reference by taking another’s perspective long enough to begin to understand them. Students also conduct a self-assessment of their individual temperament patterns.

- ◆ **Critical Thinking.** The curriculum proceeds from a premise that most people are disinclined to challenge their prevailing thoughts even once they know what they are. It exposes them to the ethnocentrism of their own thinking, their tendency to default to Western/Aristotelian logic, their lack of appreciation for the frames that subconsciously capture their thinking and their failure to avoid common cognitive biases. UFMCS teaches students to identify and examine the metaphors and analogies they use and how to test them for appropriateness. While learning about theory, inductive and deductive thinking, and mental models, students are asked to reflect on the quality of their own “ways of thinking.”
- ◆ **Culture.** Students are provided with tools and skills that help them view problems from alternative perspectives and through different cultural lenses, especially non-Western cultures. This leads students to realize and challenge their own biases. It introduces replicable methods of understanding cultural artifacts that can support decision making in the multi-cultural environment of military activity and provides frameworks to examine and make sense of the distinctions between cultures without being a regional expert.
- ◆ **Groupthink Mitigation.** Groupthink is often referred to without fully realizing what it is, why it occurs, and how to mitigate it. Whether because of habit, fear, or working on preconceived opinions, groupthink impedes the discovery of alternatives and understanding of complex operational environments (OEs). Group norms—and the social pressures to conform to them coupled with suspenses and group cohesion—are in tension with a staff’s need to rigorously consider alternatives during decision making. UFMCS introduces Liberating Structures which are frameworks and methods that make it possible for people and organiza-

tions to foster creative ideas and innovation. Liberating Structures focus engagement on the fringe of the “people network,” integrate and improve peer-to-peer relationships, and create an environment of cooperation. Instructors model and students learn and practice these methods during the course.

- ◆ **Red Team Tools.** Students are taught a series of analytic techniques designed to generate and provide alternative perspectives to the commander such as “pre-mortem analysis,” “four ways of seeing,” and the “nine-step cultural methodology.” These tools, as well as others in the UFMCS curriculum identify gaps, seams and vulnerabilities in plans and operations and lead to better decision making.

The UFMCS approach to educating the force is not only “distinct” because of its unique curriculum and methods, but it is also directly relevant to the Army’s RAF and SLP concepts and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) LREC capabilities directive. These concepts and initiatives are relatively new, so the “terms” are sometimes used interchangeably. They are related but not the same. All three address, from a different perspective or force requirement, the importance of culture in meeting strategic and operational objectives.

UFMCS and RAF

Before the most recent set of conflicts, it was generally believed that cultural awareness was only required in select Army units, such as Special Forces or Civil Affairs. Recent history has made clear that the Army needs expanded levels of cultural and regional awareness in *all* Army units. So, in the simplest terms, regionally aligned forces are Army units and leaders—brigades, divisions, Corps, and support forces—who focus on a specific region within their normal training program by receiving cultural training and language familiarization.

RAF is an Army concept that addresses the need to educate, assign, and maintain forces with knowledge of a specific area. Forces are educated on the regional cultures within a combatant commander’s geographic area and then assigned to facilitate accomplishment of Theater Security Cooperation Plan initiatives and to support operational missions. Soldiers maintain core combat skills and capabilities while furthering the important business of training and mentoring partner nation security forces.³

UFMCS currently provides cultural education to soldiers at brigade, division, and Corps levels. These soldiers provide the critical thinking skills and cultural empathy needed to provide decision support in a complex multi-cultural environment.

UFMCS and SLP

SLP is a concept that emphasizes importance of engaging the land and human domains to achieve national strategic objectives. SLP's focus is engagement and the prevention of war.

During operations three organizations intersect in the land domain among people. They are the U.S. Army, U.S. Marines, and Special Operations Forces. These three organizations have chartered the SLP Task Force to study the application of landpower to achieve national objectives in the future. Landpower can be described as the joint application of military power at the convergence of the land, cyber, and human domains to achieve national objectives.

In past conflicts we have engaged without fully considering the "human domain." Two factors may contribute to this oversight:

1. Because of our insularity and our egalitarian ethic we think other people are like us or want to be like us.
2. Because of our focus on technology we see conflict as a technical problem to be resolved by technical means. Competition and conflict is about people.

- ◆ What we know and project about the future operating environment tells us that the significance of the "human domain" in future conflict is growing, not diminishing.
- ◆ The Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces significantly contribute to the activities central to influencing the "human domain" short of war, such as peacekeeping, comprehensive military engagement, security force assistance, building partner capacity, and stability operations
- ◆ Operations in the "human domain" provide a unique capability to preclude and deter conflict through shaping operations that leverage partners and populations to enhance local and regional stability.⁴

In an article in *Small Wars Journal*, Steve Rotkoff, Director of the University, describes the role UFMCS can play in educating the force for SLP.⁵ Regardless of the service, nation or agency, UFMCS inculcates the following ideas in its graduates. These ideas are congruent with the central theme of SLP, complex OEs, appreciation of other ways of viewing problems, and the pre-eminence of the human dimension. All of the following observations in italics reflect goals the Army has established as part of SLP.

1. All culture is local. People from Brooklyn and Binghamton, New York have differing values and do not think the same way. Why should people from two different regions in another country be represented

by a single 'cultural advisor?' *Immersion in the 'human domain' requires a nuanced understanding of how that domain varies.*

2. While orders come from the top-down, cultural understanding flows from the bottom up (see 1 above). Leaders must create context between those on the ground with the best local view, and those controlling resources and setting priorities from above (with a synoptic view). *Understanding the SLP environment requires global scouts who understand both the local OE and the strategic goals and objectives.*

3. Groupthink is a certain function of human behavior. While good leadership can mitigate groupthink, it cannot preclude it. Organizations need specific techniques (which include anonymous solicitation of best ideas) to really get to the truth of a wicked problem—UFMCS teaches these techniques. *Inculcating lessons, maintaining relevant and adaptable doctrine regarding SLP requires an open internal conversation.*

4. How you think is a function of geography, history, economics, social structure, religion, beliefs, and culture. We think differently among ourselves—certainly our allies think differently, as do adversaries and neutral parties. Tools designed to force one to contend with other frames of reference, and to better understand others' perspectives, are always a good place to start planning. *SLP reflects the 'clash of wills' that is warfare. Cultural 'will' is a function of worldview.*

5. It is crucial to ask good questions about values, beliefs and culture.

- ◆ Concepts that don't translate well MUST be explored, rather than ignored. (For example, the Chinese pictogram for "individualism," when translated, equates to 'selfishness'.)
- ◆ Narratives learned at a young age matter. Think of our own Thanksgiving story of the Pilgrims and Native Americans. People who are very different can sit down together, break bread, and find common ground. The narrative reinforces the diversity of American culture—but it is not a narrative common to most other cultures. Graduates are encouraged to seek out those local narratives.
- ◆ What is in the "informal economy" matters. Economic life is a basic function of all societies. Understanding the role of the informal economy is a critical component of the OE.

- ◆ Understanding the roles that tradition, ritual, and ceremony play in society are vital to recognizing the underlying beliefs and values of a society. Contrast the change in ritual and ceremony between George Washington’s simple first inauguration and today’s inaugural week. Our current presidential inauguration ceremonies demonstrate our place in the world order and that the U.S. transitions power democratically. *Successful strategies have a human objective, the influence of people based on better understanding them.*

6. Problems are on a scale between the simple and complex and it is important to identify which you are dealing with and understand the characteristics of various problems. Copying a car key is *simple*, building the car the key will start is *complicated*, driving that same car everyday commuting to and from work is *complex*. While mechanics and physics dominate the simple and complicated task they only play a role in the complex task. The driver must constantly assess the local OE, and practice creative and agile thinking throughout the drive, while in the first two tasks following directions and knowing how to operate required equipment is sufficient. *In the SLP OE we cannot predict actor adaptation thus we must be open to adapting ourselves in response to unforeseen events that result from complexity.*

7. The more complex the problem, the less willing we are to let go of our frames. When struggling with truly complex problems, we search for a clean analogy or frame that will allow us to approach the problem with a semblance of understanding and without the cognitive pain of coping with complexity. It is vitally important when operating in complexity that we are always prepared to challenge what we think we know, especially in an environment where the truth changes rapidly. Understanding the role of bias and framing in our thinking and decision making is a key component in addressing this human predisposition. *We need to be better able to identify emerging threats, strategies, tactics and weapons—accept new developments and not hold on to preconceived notions of the OE.*

8. We all sit somewhere on a spectrum of “culturally relative” to “ethnocentric.” Many of us think of ourselves as truly culturally aware, and would challenge those who say we are prejudiced towards others’ beliefs or cultures. In practice, we all tend to believe the values and mores with which we were raised are correct and that other practices are either unenlight-

ened or completely wrong. *SLP requires we expose leaders to a broad array of perspectives based on real world scenarios.*

9. Self-awareness, introspection, and empathy change your worldview. In *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, Ken Booth explains that it is difficult to appreciate an adversary’s problems, feel their pain, understand their ambitions, internalize their experience, understand how one’s actions appear to them, or know how threatened they may feel or what threatens them. *These questions are founded in developing empathy and are critical when conducting Strategic (or Operational) land power planning.*

10. Developing alternative perspectives in the planning process is an unnatural act and requires tools beyond MDMP to generate options. Tools like Pre-Mortem analysis (imagining the plan has failed, imagining why it failed, then examining the plan for the mitigation of that potential failure); the 4 Ways of Seeing (how X sees X, how X sees Y, how Y sees Y, and how Y sees X); Stakeholder Analysis (formalized method of identifying key parties and their perspectives and goals); the 9-Step Cultural Analysis methodology, and others all help generate additional perspectives on the problem. *Education that is redesigned and tailored to the learner, providing a wide variety of tools for understanding the human domain, is a critical need for SLP.*

UFMCS and LREC

LREC describes the specific knowledge, skills, and attributes required of U.S. military personnel and leaders to be successful in achieving national security strategy objectives. In describing requirements the CJCSI 3126.01A identifies three regional expertise and culture competency dimensions and within these three dimensions, twelve capabilities referred to as competencies. They are:

Cross Culture Competency	Regional Competencies	Leader/Influence Function
Understanding Culture	Applying Regional Information	Building Strategic Networks
Applying Organizational Awareness	Operating in a Regional Environment	Strategic Agility
Cultural Perspective-Taking	Regional Competencies	Systems Thinking
Cultural Adaptability		Cross-Cultural Influence
Core Culture Competencies		Organizational Cultural Competence
		Utilizing Interpreters

UFMCS lessons address all competencies identified, directly or indirectly. To date, the Capabilities-Based Requirements Identification Process has shown it is possible to need regional expertise and/or cultural knowledge without needing language proficiency, but that it is highly unlikely to need language proficiency without also needing regional and/or cultural competence. As Major General Saud S. Abid, Saudi Arabian Armed Forces Command and Staff College, insisted to the Commander of Air University's Air War College, "It does not matter if you know my language." To work together effectively, he said, "You need to understand my culture."⁷


A One-week Program

UFMCS has developed a one-week program to address requirements outlined in the LREC strategy in support of RAF and SLP. This program will provide the graduates with the following:

- ◆ Better understanding of our own cultural biases (American and military) and how they influence our planning and actions.
- ◆ Better understanding of the spectrum from ethnocentrism to cultural relativism and how it informs how we think and act.
- ◆ Tools for developing better cultural understanding of foreign cultures and how to consider them when planning operations.
- ◆ The constraints cultural differences impose on operations.
- ◆ The opportunities cultural differences provide and how to leverage them.
- ◆ How people from other cultures think differently and ascribe to different values, and the impact on operations.
- ◆ Experience integrating cultural considerations in planning in an area of the requesting units choosing (a culturally centric planning exercise and rehearsal).
- ◆ Learning tools for becoming operationally adaptive leaders through improved self-awareness and critical thinking.

There is a well developed library of courses that can be tailored to meet the needs of users regardless of the area to which they may deploy, along with general education that helps prepare leaders across a wide variety of areas for operations that center on the human domain in other cultures. Ultimately the program helps staffs and commanders escape the gravitational pull of western military thought and achieve cultural apperception.

Way Ahead—UFMCS, RAF, LREC and SLP

This DOD program designed specifically to address many of the issues identified above already exists. It includes faculty representatives from each of the three components that participated in the SLP study. On a daily basis, Marines, Special Operators, and Army leaders wrestle with the role of culture, critical thinking, and planning strategic and operational land power problems within the context of the current OE. As the Army faces a future dominated by the need for rapid adaptation and a resource constrained, CONUS based force, in support of expeditionary operations, the type of education UFMCS provides is a critical component in the preparation of our soldiers and leaders. As UFMCS continues to evolve its curriculum with the input from Soldiers, Marines, and Special Operators it will serve as a thought leader and key trainer in support of Strategic Landpower and Regionally Aligned Forces. 

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Strategic Landpower and RAF: Preparing Front-Line Leaders for Phase 0 Engagements

by Windle Causey

"The Army's doctrine will change dramatically in the near future as joint leaders develop the operational concept of Strategic Landpower. One change will be a seventh warfighting function called "engagement."

*—General Robert W. Cone
January 2014*


Introduction

This statement provides context and conditions within which the Army can better focus scarce training resources. Strategic Landpower relies mainly on Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) for execution. The Army Campaign Support Plan FY2014-2019 states, "Through RAF implementation, the Army will provide the means to achieve GEF-directed end-states through the provision of versatile, agile, globally responsive, and regionally engaged forces in support of CCDR objectives."² RAF events within CCDR regions will ultimately see execution at the tactical level. Mobile training teams or other small footprint teams will forward deploy to train partner nation soldiers or participate in multinational exercises. These teams will operate in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment.

LREC Training to Meet the RAF Challenge

Preparation of teams to execute these Security Cooperation (SC) events requires a new way of thinking about training. Now, it is the new lieutenant on her first overseas deployment who must be prepared to demonstrate strong leader skills, regional and cultural knowledge and an appreciation for the "jointness" of the task in this foreign environment. RAF soldiers and especially their leaders work to build personal relationships with and engage our partner nation military members in building their own capacity to secure a stable home environment and help other nations within their region. As such, Army RAF generates substantial demand for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) trained and certified leaders.

Company grade officers and Soldiers who form the "tip of spear" in the execution of strategic landpower during operations require a high level of LREC competence in the execution of RAF Engagement events. LREC leader development competencies are outlined in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3126.01A (CJCSI 3126.01A).³ Much work



is on-going within the institutional Army to develop and implement LREC training programs aimed at providing LREC training and certification. A majority of current LREC effort is focused on pre-deployment training. This is partly due to limited instructional time within the institutional Army, from Initial Entry Training (IET) to War College. Generally speaking, any increase in instructional hours in one area of study requires a comparable decrease in some other area. Conversely, each element of LREC training can require lengthy in-depth studies. Since even basic LREC proficiency requires "survival" level foreign language capability as well as fundamental knowledge of regions and cultures, ways and means must be found to deliver this training.

Moreover, a functional grasp of the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) of a specific military region is also essential. Small unit leaders who possess even novice LREC competencies will contribute much to the success of SC events. Consequently, innovative training models must to be developed and quickly fielded to adjust to unfolding RAF requirements.

Cadet Overseas Training Missions

One innovative and successful LREC annual summer training event is the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) Cadet Overseas Training Missions (COTM). This program falls into the category of experiential learning, also commonly called on-the-job training. COTM links experiential learning in the training domain to SC lines of effort (LOEs) in the operational domain to form a symbiotic relationship with substantial return on investment and expectations for both domains.

In the operational domain, the National Military Strategy outlines two top SC LOEs, “We will strengthen and expand our network of partnerships to enable partner capacity to enhance security. Military to military relationships must be reliable to be effective, and persevere through political upheavals or even disruption.”⁴ The Army conducted more than 4,300 SC events around the world in 2012 and about 4,500 in 2013.⁵ A majority of these were small footprint events, conducted mostly by Army teams led by company grade NCOs and officers fully immersed with the partner nation’s military. From a training perspective, each SC event presents opportunity for development of future leaders concurrently addressing regional SC LOEs. In many cases these teams provide the only U.S. military interaction in a particular partner nation.

These events marry LREC training with regional SC activities requested by U.S. Embassy Country Teams, Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), and regional Combatant Commands (CCDR). President Obama in his 2012 Strategic Guidance directed the services to, “...maintain partnerships in and around the Middle East, and develop innovative, low cost and low footprint engagements to assure our allies, build partner capacity, and increase overseas presence.”⁶ These engagements provide opportunities for soldiers to execute tasks associated with CJCSI 3126.01A LREC competencies under “real-world” conditions. During annual summer LREC training events overseas, Cadet Command certifies ROTC Cadets based on these LREC Competencies. See Figure 1.

LREC Training for Future Officers

In the training domain there are two broad categories: academic and experiential. Civilian education combines with professional military education (PME) to provide academic learning to include independent studies. A second important category of learning is experiential and consists of all “learn by doing” activities whether part of a structured learning program or on-the-job training. Army officer academic LREC training begins during pre-commissioning at the U.S. Military Academy and at more than 1,000 colleges and universities where ROTC Cadets learn and train.

LREC training during Basic Officer Leader Course-A, (BOLC-A), is now an *undeniable priority* and has become fully integrated into the BOLC-A curriculum. New lieutenants must be substantially competent at LREC basics by the time they arrive at their first duty assignment. LREC training programs providing experiential learning to reinforce and validate academic preparation can provide an initial point of certification of LREC competence for participants.

Attempts to simulate real-world LREC experiences abound. An abundance of on-line simulations exists, all of which provide varying degrees of useful academic knowledge. ROTC Cadets experience a half day of Cultural Awareness as part of the Leadership Development and Assessment Course (also known as Advanced Camp), where, in a simulated village environment with actors portraying host nationals, Cadets gain a glimpse of foreign culture. This brief performance, “teaches cadets a basic understanding

“The importance of cross cultural competence and the ability to build trust with various indigenous populations may be as effective in protecting future Soldiers as body armor.”
 –TRADOC PAM 525-8-3

of cultural matters and how cultural awareness will facilitate mission success. Cadets learn how to conduct bi-lateral discussions with local officials, how to conduct a knock and search mission and how to defuse volatile situations using an interpreter.”⁷

However, no matter how elaborate these simulations are, they can never capture the reality experienced when soldiers are on the ground, in the marketplace or village interacting with real host nation people. It is with this in mind that Cadet Command began asking the ASCCs, “How can we develop partnerships utilizing ROTC Cadet teams

Cadet Competency Worksheets			
<p>INSTRUCTIONS. It is the responsibility of each deploying Cadet to seek opportunities to experience as many tasks for each competency as possible. These learning experiences must then be documented in the following worksheets. Cadets must provide evidence that verifies/validates knowledge or experience gained for each task. Evidence may be saved in any media, (written, visual, or other) and identified by Competency and Task.</p>			
<p>USACC LREC Competency: Understanding Culture</p>			
NAME:		RANK/GRADE: CADET/MSL-II	
UIC:		DATE COMPLETED:	
<p>COMPETENCY-1: Understands the different dimensions of culture; how cultures vary according to key elements such as interpersonal relations, concept of time, attitude towards interpersonal space, thinking style, tolerance and authority as well as values, beliefs, behaviors and norms; uses this information to help understand similarities and differences across cultures.</p>			
	TASK DESCRIPTION	TASK EXPERIENCED, EXPLAINED OR DEMONSTRATED	
TASK #		GO	NO GO
	Explain the core properties of culture, e.g. It is a facet of society, it is acquired through socialization or socialization, it		

Figure 1. USACC LREC Competency Certification Worksheet.

to address your SC efforts?" In 2010, U.S. Africa Command hosted an SC planning conference in Vicenza, Italy. Country teams from all over Africa as well as various Army training and support agencies worked to plan events aimed at addressing each partner nations' individual SC needs. It was during this conference that a Navy lieutenant from the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda asked the Cadet Command LREC planner, "Can you send a team of Cadets to Rwanda to teach English to participants from the Rwandan military?" It was from this request that Cadet English Language Training (CELT) teams were developed.

LREC Training Opportunities

Specially developed LREC training programs can, and do, merge the operational and training domains providing substantial return on investment and expectations for each. COTM is a time tested and proven means for successfully merging the two domains. U.S. Army Cadet Command deploys up to 1,400 ROTC Cadets overseas annually to execute SC events requested by or through the ASCCs. These LREC/SC events offer Cadets an opportunity to gain certification of basic LREC competencies under real world tactical level conditions. Each summer more than 130 Cadet teams, each led by a senior NCO or Officer Cadre deploy to remote venues where they execute important SC events. The administrative and logistical processes involved in these team deployments become an integral part of Cadet leader development and training.

Cadets who apply for COTMs are recommended by their Professors of Military Science for the month long summer training program. (ROTC contracted Cadets are enlisted in the Army Reserves in the rank and grade of Cadet.) Those selected for COTMs receive Active Duty for Training orders during the Fall semester and begin the process of mobilization for their mission. They must complete all requirements for their overseas travel and mission engagement to include immunizations, required pre-deployment training, obtaining passport/visas, as well as completing a country study and additional specific LREC preparation. Cadet teams report to Fort Knox, Kentucky for Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration (RSOI). Cadets in-process and receive their Common Access Cards, then complete more training and Soldier Readiness Processing. After this week long RSOI process Cadet teams on group orders deploy to their host nations to execute their assigned mission.

COTMs range from providing conversational English to foreign military personnel to participation in medical exercises, acting as interpreters, embedding with partner nation military units for training, or participating in major joint multi-nation exercises. Building partner nation capacity for English

communication is by far the most requested COTM worldwide, with more than 70 of the 130+ teams thus engaged. CELT Teams work in cooperation with Defense Language Institute's English Language Center, (DLIELC), at Lackland AFB, Texas. DLIELC developed the CELT training manual and annually provides a number of instructors who accompany CELT teams during their English training events.

The TRADOC Culture Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona also contributes instructors to accompany CELT Teams and has assisted Cadet Command in the development and implementation of a Cadet LREC Competency Certification Program and process based on CJCSI 3126.01A. This certification process provides a means to certify each Cadet at basic level competency for each of the 12 LREC and Leader Development competencies listed in CJCSI 3126.01a, ENCLOSURES F, G, & H. Tasks were developed for each competency and Cadets are required to provide their Cadre Leader and Mission Commander evidence of having experienced each task in order to gain certification.

These Cadets, who spend nearly a month of total immersion into these foreign cultures, commission with an increased appreciation for and understanding of these regions and cultures. Return on investment: the Army gains new lieutenants who, on their initial overseas deployment, lead with confidence and competence in a JIIM environment. Additionally, and just as important, CCDR SC objectives are addressed. Some key words in the above assertions are "appreciation and understanding" as well as "confidence and competence."

Allegations have been made that cultural understanding cannot be gained in three weeks. This claim may be valid but should not be construed to mean that COTM Cadets can't come to understand "culture" and cultural differences or come to appreciate the other culture in that short time. Those of us who have been plunged into the uncomfortable situation of having to perform, (communicate, make decisions, navigate, etc.) in another culture have experienced cultural shock, that "sense of confusion and uncertainty sometimes with feelings of anxiety that may affect people exposed to an alien culture or environment without adequate preparation." Most Cadets returning from COTMs declare their overseas experience to have been life-changing.

Their culture shock, framed within a rewarding but unfamiliar cultural setting, leaves a positive and enduring imprint. Probably the most important objective of Cadet overseas training, therefore, is to bring the Cadet to a new and expanded frame of reference; to gain an adjustment in their perceptions and analysis of who exactly they are in the "grand scheme of things." Through the study and observa-

tion of other regions, languages, and cultures, ROTC Cadets can gain a sense of Universality, a realization that we, as human beings, are in many ways “all in the same boat.” Leader development opportunities, cultural acuity and appreciation of other peoples and cultures gained during COTM events will result in future leaders better prepared to make right decisions as future Officers.⁸

LREC Competence in Leader Development

Leader Development is an integral component of career development and is generally considered to occur in a relatively linear and chronologically progressive manner. Spikes in leader development occur as a result of opportune experiences. Basic skills and competencies are required of all Soldiers (rifle marksmanship, drill, military decision making process, small unit tactics, Mission Command, and a host of other competencies). For Soldiers, these competencies are front-loaded during IET, while most Army officers acquire these competencies during BOLC–A, their pre-commissioning phase of PME.

LREC competence has moved into the forefront of required PME for junior officers with implementation of RAF. However, addressing the leader development needs of the Army Officer Corps for Phase 0 Engagement at basic levels of LREC competency lags behind development of basic combat skills taught during BOLC-A. Junior officers assigned to RAF units are expected to execute SC events with confidence and competence during those Phase 0 operations. LREC competencies, therefore, must also be “front-loaded” as part of future Leader Development models. ROTC Cadets have that training opportunity–COTM.

great complexity...*Waypoint #2* provides a tool to discuss and implement my priorities across all formations and at every echelon.” Outlined in *Waypoint #2* he reinforces the need to evolve our Leader Development. He tasks our leaders and institutions to “educate and develop all Soldiers and Civilians to grow the intellectual capacity to understand the complex contemporary security environment to better lead Army, Joint, Interagency, and Multinational task forces and teams.”⁹

Conclusion

Army leaders today are keenly aware that Leader Development cannot continue as it has in the past. New policies and new operational requirements are driving major changes in Army training philosophy. Training is no longer linear and progressive in nature. LREC knowledge and experience can’t wait for field grade. The ranks of our lieutenants are in continuous turnover. Each spring a new cohort joins the force. Enhanced preparation of these new lieutenants to lead regionally engaged teams in the JIIM environment has come to the training forefront. Shrinking budgets, combined with expanded requirements to develop LREC capable leaders, demand innovative cost effective training with substantial return on both investment and expectations. The U.S. Army Cadet Command’s Cadet Overseas Training Mission model meets that test. 🌟

Endnotes

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


Figure 2. Phase 0 Operations, JP 3-0, August 2011.

In February 2014, General Raymond T. Odierno presented his *CSA Sends-Waypoint #2*. In that email he stated, “Today’s global security environment is characterized by

9. *Waypoint #2*, GEN Ray Odierno, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 2014 at http://www.army.mil/article/118873/Waypoint__2__Follow_up_to_CSAs_Marching_Orders/.



DOD Partnerships Advance Web-based Culture and Language Training Products

by Mrs. Cathleen Moran

“Hands down, this is the best CBT I’ve seen so far as I’ve been doing my pre-deployment training. This should be mandatory. I especially like the use of real people telling their stories and sharing experiences. The scenarios are also very good to get a feel for what to expect.”

—U.S. Air Force LtCol-VCAT Survey Response

Introduction

Virtual Cultural Awareness Trainer (VCAT) courses are multimedia rich, self-paced online courses available on Joint Knowledge Online (JKO). VCATs teach essential culture awareness and language familiarity, tailored to particular areas of operation and mission scenarios. These particular web-based courses use a variety of learning technologies including game-based technology, storytelling, and intelligent tutoring to immerse the learner in interactive scenarios specific to missions and fundamental language to impart culture and language competence for area and mission specific duties.

VCAT Background

The Joint Knowledge Development and Delivery Capability (JKDDC), an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-sponsored training transformation initiative, introduced the first VCAT in 2009, hosting it on the JKO distributed learning system. With the JKDDC charter to provide relevant, timely, and globally accessible joint training to prepare individuals for joint exercises and operations, JKO operationalizes the charter by sustaining global access to its training portals, and developing, delivering, tracking, and reporting web-based training for DOD, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Service and other organizational individual and staff training requirements. JKO develops and delivers web-based training products to meet Combatant Commanders Exercise

Engagement and Training Transformation goals and objectives, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Training Guidance and High Interest Training Items, Joint Staff J-7 Annual Training Guidance, and stakeholder-identified requirements.

With successful early adoption of JKO for global access to distributed self-paced training, interest grew in the use of simulation technology to enhance individual online training experience and effectiveness. JKO sponsors sought development of an advanced technology-based, web-based gaming simulation capability for immersive training in particular areas of operations, mission sets and scenarios. The design objective was to achieve a first person “game” incorporating storytelling scenario introductions, real-time remediation, intelligent tutoring, advanced sequencing, learning content navigation, and use of avatars to stimulate critical thinking and learning. Concurrently, language and culture training was emerging as a high interest training topic for General Purpose Forces.

“Language, regional and cultural skills are enduring warfighting competencies that are critical to mission readiness in today’s dynamic global environment. Our forces must have the ability to effectively communicate with and understand the cultures of coalition forces, international partners, and local populations. DoD has made progress in establishing a foundation for these capabilities, but we need to do more to meet the current and future demands.”

—Secretary of Defense, 10 August 2011¹

Out of this combined interest in leveraging technology to enhance training and readiness, and high interest in advancing language and cultural awareness training, VCAT evolved as an immersive, interactive game-based train-

"Taught me a lot about the details of the specific region I am going to. It gives you an appreciation for the culture and customs."

—SFC, U.S. Army
VCAT Horn of Africa Survey Response

ing tool on JKO—persistently available to a global training audience. The first VCAT—*Horn of Africa*, introduced immersive mission-specific cultural training with basic language phrases common to the countries of the Horn of Africa.

The following year a new VCAT standard was introduced with the integration of Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) language modules with the development of a VCAT for the Northern Africa region. Significant advancements in web-based mission-specific operational language and culture training soon followed with the partnering and sponsorship by the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO) and others.

"I enjoyed everything about the training. Excellent language options available, very informative culture processes also."

—A1C, U.S. Air Force
VCAT Northern Africa Survey Response

DOD Partnerships Advance Language and Culture Training Products

Today, the OSD—DLNSEO partners with the Joint Staff J-7 JKO Division, the Navy Center for Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (CLREC), the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center (TCC), and the Air Force Negotiation Center of Excellence (NCE) to develop and deliver a variety of highly immersive, web-based culture and language training products. These products, all made available to a global training audience of military and civilian personnel on JKO, include VCAT courses, Cross-Cultural Competence Trainer (3CT) courses, Cross-Cultural Negotiation (CCN) courses, and Operational Swahili.

Using these self-paced, online training products learners quickly and efficiently develop culture knowledge, language, and interpersonal skills. The advancement in access to instructionally rich training products is a credit to leveraging capabilities and cooperation across the DOD to better prepare military and civilian personnel with general culture knowledge, cross-cultural competence, and region/mission specific language and culture training. DLNSEO and JKO partner with Service Culture Centers and Combatant Commands for language, culture, and area subject matter experts to participate in the design, development, and evaluation of the various language and culture products.

This partnership yields a variety of operationally relevant and accessible culture and language training products responsive to national security emphasis on the need for lan-

"I liked the interactive games and scenarios. Great way to maintain interest."

—MSGT, U.S. Air Force
VCAT Horn of Africa Survey Response

guage and culture skills as enduring warfighting competencies. DLNSEO products on JKO provide self-paced training specific to regions and missions, imparting cultural knowledge and skills needed to help prepare military and civilians for operations in their country of deployment. Simulations of mission-relevant scenarios model face-to-face human interactions that enable trainees to practice cultural knowledge skills in an immersive training environment. Mission areas are tailored for each region and include Civil Affairs, Countering Transnational Organized Crime, Theater Security Cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, Meetings and Engagements, and others. Country and region lessons provide a foundation and context for operational culture and language and use a variety of interactive learning activities.

"I like how it allowed you to interact and that it allowed you to hear different ways and languages."

—PV2, U.S. Army
VCAT Horn of Africa Survey Response

"I thought the videos were the best tools. It always helps to actually hear from people that have been there and even from the locals."

—GYSGT, U.S. Marine Corps
VCAT Horn of Africa Survey Response

Real-time remediation helps trainees to quickly learn from mistakes prior to testing and enables them to review the relevant material before retesting. On-camera interviews with host country nationals and language experts provide a native perspective to help trainees understand the operational environment. Interviewees provide personal insights about their in-country experiences. Many VCATs include language instruction and provide trainees with the opportunity to practice key phrases using record and playback technology. Basic Language Survival Guides for the target languages are provided by the DLIFLC.

To date, JKO has delivered 13 products, with 6 in development, covering 49 regions in Africa, the Middle East,

"I thought the scenarios gave life to the topic. I also like that I can go back and work on my language skills later."

—LCDR, U.S. Navy
VCAT Northern Africa Survey Response

South and Central America, and portions of the Caribbean and Asia. Eight VCAT courses: *Horn of Africa*, *Northern Africa*, *Afghanistan*, *South America*, *Taiwan*, *Southeast Asia*, *Central America and Hispaniola*, two 3CT products, CCN courses, and *Operational Swahili* are currently available on JKO. VCAT Caribbean is in the final stages of acceptance testing. VCAT products in development include West Africa, Horn of Africa, Northern Africa, and 3CT course upgrades, and a variety of mobile versions using existing VCAT

course content. Most recently, U.S. Army Central requested development of VCAT for the U.S. Central Command areas of responsibility; the first in development is VCAT Arabian Peninsula.

"I use VCAT to get my mind focused for a teaching assignment or to stimulate thought when I'm writing lesson material on a particular region, place, or people. I use it to gain breadth of knowledge, to stimulate my own curiosity and to generate questions I can use to gain depth of knowledge."


—TCC Training Specialist

The CCN course in response to a U.S. Air Force NCE requirement is the first JKO online training product developed for the Air Force NCE. The CCN course provides training to help U.S. personnel determine and employ essential negotiation strategies across cultures, and guides trainees in applying that knowledge to specific mission sets such as Humanitarian Assistance, Civil Affairs, and Force Protection Planning. The interactive course includes guidance and advice from experts in the field of negotiation and warfighters who have successfully employed these strategies. During mission modules, CCN mentors provide expert guidance on applying foundational negotiation concepts in the context of each specific mission. Finally, trainees are challenged to apply what they have learned by interacting in 3D mission scenarios where their decisions determine what happens next.

"We have been charged with bringing the skillset of adaptive negotiations to the Air Force. On top of that, the joint community is now using our product in pre-deployment training and other areas where it can assist, which is a great step for our team."

—Dr. Stefan Eisen, Director, AF NCE²

Operational Swahili was developed with the U.S. Navy's CLREC. This course, available both as desktop and mobile versions, directly addresses the mission-critical need for basic Swahili language familiarization and cultural awareness for individuals deploying to the U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility (AOR). Operational Swahili teaches operational cultural and language skills needed to successfully complete a typical Civil Affairs mission while operating in the East African countries of Kenya and Tanzania. The immersive training course introduces learners to the language and culture of East Africa using interactive mission scenarios where trainees are placed contextually in simulated situations to perform or practice particular missions.



The scenarios covered include "Building Rapport," "Meeting Local Leaders," and "Talking to Villagers" as part of a Civil Affairs Village Assessment mission. Operational Swahili features video of military members in East Africa performing a Civil Affairs mission, providing first-person accounts of in-country experiences relevant to the learner and includes a reference section that features a searchable dictionary of Swahili words and phrases taught in the lessons. Each lesson features a list of the words and phrases used that can be printed out for future study or reference in the field. Language familiarization occurs throughout the course with operationally specific words and phrases taught through the use of dialogs with virtual Swahili speakers, matching exercises, and a voice recording system where the learner can hear a native speaker alongside their own voice to work on pronunciation.

U.S. Combatant Commands Embrace VCATs



DLNSEO and the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), in partnership with JKO have introduced a series of VCATs for the USSOUTHCOM AOR. The USSOUTHCOM VCAT series allow trainees to practice culture and language skills for mission areas including Senior Leader Engagements, Countering Transnational Organized Crime, and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. Trainees select a country and mission to create a customized course of instruction that includes the relevant language content. A virtual coach guides the trainee through the VCAT, providing feedback and remediation. On-camera interviews with service members and civilians provide personal insights about in-country experiences, providing an informed perspective to help understand the operational environment. USSOUTHCOM VCATs provide the opportunity to practice key

"In preparation for my 6-month assignment in Brazil military, this course has proved to be extremely valuable. Thank you so much!"

—GS13, U.S. Army
VCAT South America Survey Response

words in the target languages using record and playback technology.

VCAT Central America focuses on the countries of Costa Rica, Panama, Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, containing operational language instruction for Latin American Spanish focused on the missions of Humanitarian Disaster Relief, Countering Transnational Organized Crime-Interdiction, Countering Transnational Organized Crime-Subject Matter Expert Exchange/Senior Leader Engagement, and the topic of Building Partner Nation Capacity.

"I really enjoyed this training and learned quite a bit. Impressed with the quality and clarity!"
 –SSG, U.S. Army
 VCAT South America Survey Response

VCAT Hispaniola focuses on the countries of Haiti and the Dominican Republic and contains operational language instruction for Haitian Creole and Latin American Spanish focused on the missions of Countering Transnational Organized Crime and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief.

VCAT South America focuses on the countries and languages within the Andean Ridge and Southern Cone regions and was recently updated and re-released on JKO. The newest USSOUTHCOM VCAT–VCAT Caribbean–will be available on JKO by early summer.

The Task Force Commander for *Beyond the Horizon Dominican Republic Exercise* used VCAT Hispaniola in an auditorium setting for reservists without access to computers during drill weekend. Approximately 1,400 Reservists participated with additional drilling units scheduled to take VCAT Hispaniola. The Commander praised the VCAT, its utility, and in particular the value of video interviews, noting that as a professor teaching online courses, he found this particular VCAT to be one of the best DOD courses he has seen. Most recently, USSOUTHCOM J-7 announced that VCAT courses are formally published in the USSOUTHCOM AOR Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG), section 3, paragraph A (2) for countries in South America, Central America, and Hispaniola as a “strongly recommended” theater entry requirement and

that they are coordinating with U.S. Northern Command for potential inclusion in FCGs for Mexico and the Bahamas.

DLNSEO also partnered with CLREC and JKO to develop



and deliver two products, VCATs *Southeast Asia* and *Taiwan*, for the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) in


"Great activities during the course in which they made the person feel involved with the material that was being taught."
 –SPC, U.S. Army
 VCAT Southeast Asia Survey Response

response to the combined USPACOM and U.S. Navy N13 requirement. These VCATs provide operationally relevant customized courses of instruction based on the student’s specific area of deployment. VCAT Southeast Asia covers key mission areas: Theater Security cooperation, Civil Affairs, and Humanitarian Assistance-Disaster Relief over Mainland (Vietnam and Thailand) and Maritime (Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippine Islands) Southeast Asia. Additionally, the DLIFLC Survival Guides are included as a reference tool for the languages spoken in the region.

"I liked the scenarios and that you got to pick which country you were most interested in. I liked the basic language instruction."
 –SPC, U.S. Army
 VCAT Southeast Asia Survey Response

VCAT *Taiwan* countries covered are Taiwan and China with the mission of Key Leader Engagement focusing on a scenario for an office call

and a scenario for an official dinner. VCAT Taiwan contains language instruction for operationally focused Mandarin Chinese by providing a record and play back feature. Additionally, the DLIFLC Language Survival Guides are included as a reference tool for the languages spoken in the region.



There are currently two VCATs, *Horn of Africa*, and *Northern Africa*, covering the U.S. Africa Command areas of operation

and one in development. VCAT West Africa is in development and will be available on JKO late summer 2014. VCATs Horn of Africa and Northern

Africa are also in the process of updates. VCAT Horn of Africa 2.0 covers the countries and regions of Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Primary language supported is Swahili with record and playback activities in the “Operationally Relevant Culture” and “Language Lessons” modules, and DLIFLC Language Survival Guides for Amharic, Swahili, French, and Arabic.

"Provides a general and specific POV about the country and surrounding countries. Also, provided me a cheat sheet so I will not embarrass myself, or even worse the Marine Corps."
 –CAPT, U.S. Marine Corps
 VCAT Horn of Africa

Mission scenarios covered are Humanitarian Assistance and Senior Leader Engagements. VCAT Northern Africa covers the countries/regions of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania. Primary languages supported are French, Modern Standard Arabic and Moroccan Arabic with DLIFLC Language Survival Guides provided for these same languages. Mission scenarios include Senior Leader Engagements and Humanitarian Assistance. VCAT West Africa covers the countries/regions of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Languages include West African French, Portuguese Creole, English, English Akan, English Hausa and Wolof. Mission scenarios include Subject Matter Expert Exchange and Humanitarian Assistance.

"The interactive modules are just awesome and it is a great deal of learning with a high proficiency."
 –CPL, U.S. Army
 VCAT Northern Africa Survey Response

Mobile Access to Language and Culture Courses and Apps



JKO offers a mobile app for iPhone, iPad, and Android mobile phone and tablet users. The JKO Mobile App is available in Apple and Android app stores as a free download. Mobile courses are available for use on mobile devices—iOS and Android phones and tablets using the free JKO Mobile app.

3CT for Civilians, 3CT for Military, VCAT Afghanistan Dari, VCAT Afghanistan Pashto, VCAT Southeast Asia, and Operational Swahili are currently available as mobile courses with a number of new culture and language mobile products in development. Mobile versions of VCATs Central America, Hispaniola, and South America are currently in development and will be available to mobile users this summer.

Additionally, JKO mobile hosts the NCE Applied Negotiations Scenario. The Afghan Negotiation application

is an interactive negotiations exercise that gives users a better appreciation of the importance of rapport-building in many cultures. The app was produced by the NCE staff for an Air Force audience and modified to a JKO-hosted mobile application providing a negotiation learning tool to a wider audience of service members by capitalizing on the NCE's groundwork. Mobile culture and language courses are particularly useful because of the opportunity to download to a mobile device and keep conveniently available to update or refresh knowledge, or check on specifics as you are coming into a country or once there.

"I would like to be able to download the language portion to an IPOD. This would be extremely useful."
 –2LT, U.S. Army
 VCAT Afghanistan Survey

To Learn More

The advancement in global, distributed access to critical competence training is a great example of leveraging capabilities through partnerships to achieve efficiencies across the DOD, particularly in this time of austere budgets. To learn more about language and culture products available on JKO go to <https://jkodirect.jten.mil> and login with CAC. **Non-CAC users** can follow the instructions provided under the **"Login Options"** on the login page to submit an account request to the JKO Help Desk. Find language and culture products by clicking on the **"Course Catalog"** tab at the top of the page and typing the course title or any key word such as **"VCAT"** or **"cultural"** in the search title block then click on **"Search."** ✨

Endnotes

1. Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities in the DOD, 10 August 2011.
2. Sr Airman William Blankenship, 42nd Air Base Wing Public Affairs, AETC, "AF Negotiation Center of Excellence Wins Prestigious Award." Accessed at <http://www.aetc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123409157>.

Mrs. Moran holds the position as the Chief, Advanced Content Development for the Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director Joint Training, JKO Division. In this role, she identifies promising technologies available for distributed learning to complement the joint training mission. The development of the Virtual Cultural Awareness, Cross Cultural Competence, Cross Cultural Negotiations, and Mobile courses are among the many projects managed by Mrs. Moran.



The TRADOC Culture Center and the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps

by Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Ret.) Michael M. Maleski

Over the last 13 years the U.S. Army has been engaged in numerous deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. During this time the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps has been involved in numerous interactions with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) Culture Center (TCC). The TCC has been able to provide cultural assistance for Religious Leader Engagements (RLE) and religious assessments on how to advise commanders on religion and religious groups in a particular geographical location.

The TCC has been actively involved with all levels of the Chaplain Corps from the Chief of Chaplains down to the Battalion Chaplain. In addition, the TCC has been involved with the Center for World Religions and Chaplain School at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. I would like to share the comments from three different Chaplains regarding the relationship between the TCC and the Chaplain Corps.

Without a doubt, the TCC is one of the best kept secrets in the U.S. Army. TCC provides multiple venues and geographic "specific" areas for training. The staff is comprised of subject matter experts (SMEs) with an impressive wealth and depth of personal, professional, and academic experience on 'areas of interest' for our military community today. While serving as the Division Chaplain for the 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas, the Division Commander, MG Dana J. H. Pittard conducted a Team Bliss (Installation wide) professional development training session for all of the tenant unit commanders and command sergeants major utilizing TCC SMEs for various geographic areas of interest.

The TCC also works cooperatively with the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps to conduct multiple blocks of training in preparation for and prior to deployments in emerging situations across the globe. On a personal note, the TCC hit it 'out of the ballpark' for every training event or special education session they conducted during my two year stint at Fort Bliss. To put it in the vernacular that every trigger puller can understand—TCC is 'on time, on target, with incredible pinpoint accuracy!'

—Michael T. Klein
Deputy Command Chaplain
U.S. European Command

The TCC has demonstrated professionalism through collaborative efforts with the Center for World Religions with relevant and reliable expertise on the religions of a region. The TCC provides the Center with practical cultural-religious resource books to assist with operational planning and engaged with the U.S. Army Chaplain School through the Center for World Religions to promote curriculum development of how religion and culture impact the operational environment. TCC provided a thorough assessment of how the Chaplain Captain Career Course could best achieve the Cultural Learning Objectives as outlined in the Army's Cultural Awareness program of instruction. They are a great resource and one that the Chaplain Corps has a great working relationship with.

—Chaplain (LTC) Ira Houck
165th INF BDE, BDE UMT


The mission of First Army, in accordance with Title XI and Army Total Force Policy, is to partner with USAR and ARNG leadership to advise, assist, and train Reserve Component (RC) formations to achieve ARFORGEN directed readiness requirements. This training support enables FORSCOM to provide Combatant Commanders trained and ready RC forces in support of worldwide requirements and includes requirements for training Religious Support Operations. Religious Support Operations includes the key task of advising the command on external religious factors shaping the military mission including the cultural and religious background to areas of operations. The TRADOC Cultural Center (TCC) has provided critical cultural understanding through quality regional packages made available to RC Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants, improving their ability to advise their command and staff on religious factors shaping the mission. These packages, combined with the access to online course on cultural understanding and cultural awareness, greatly improve the Unit Ministry Teams (UMT) ability to prepare for our nation's critical religious missions during contingency operations.

As First Army shifts to training focused on Rotational Force Pool-Non-deploying forces and our Army shifts to Regionally Aligned Forces, our Observer-Coach/Trainers UMTs will incorporate more cultural support to train future UMTs. This will be done in an era of reduced resources using more Live, Virtual, Constructive, Gaming resourced training. The packages produced by the TCC offer exportable support to training Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants concerning the religious and cultural factors shaping future missions of the Army. First Army Chaplains have provided feedback to the TCC to help refine their religious understanding and training products.

The TCC has assisted the Center for World Religions by promoting the advisory capabilities of the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps with niche capabilities and nuanced analysis. TCC expertise enhanced the function of the World Religions to advise and assist the commander with relevant religious impact analysis; to provide the commander with professional military religious leadership's understanding of cultural impact; to assess the influences of cultural and religious networks for current and future operations; to contribute unique advising capabilities to tactical, operational, and strategic level planning by assisting with nuanced religious impact analysis for situational awareness; contributing assessments of religious-cultural influences that shape the informational and operational environment.

—CH (LTC) Timothy K. Bedsole, Sr.
Deputy Command Chaplain
First Army Chaplain Directorate

Conclusion

The relationship between the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps and the TCC has been fruitful over the years as Chaplains seek to have the most relevant information and the TCC has the ability to provide that information through mobile training teams or printed materials. The TCC looks forward to continuing its relationship with the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps. 

Michael Maleski is a certified Army military trainer with the TCC at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He spent over twenty-eight years as a chaplain in the U.S. Air Force and Army National Guard. He graduated from Washington Bible College, Lanham, Maryland, with a BA in Education. He also earned a Master of Divinity Degree from Eastern Baptist Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He is currently enrolled in the Doctor of Ministry program at Atlantic Theological Seminary in Daytona Beach, Florida. Mr. Maleski has been very involved in supporting the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps and the Army National Guard State Partnership programs in areas of cultural awareness and understanding.



Check out the Fort Huachuca Museum website at <http://huachucamuseum.com>

Ready, Set, Go Anywhere: A Culture-General Competency Model for the DoD

by Louise J. Rasmussen and Winston R. Sieck

Two click clicks. The other Marine was standing behind me. I felt his back up against mine and I felt the safeties click off our weapons. We talked about it later. We both thought, this is it; our bodies are going to get drug through the streets on the five o'clock news. That was the first day we went to the rebel compound. We were the first Marines out there since the Liberian Civil War had started. There was a huge gap in Intel. Nobody had any idea what the leadership of this group was like, what they were influenced by, what they wanted, what were their strengths. And there was really no other way to fill it than to go out there.

Someone had gone upstairs to get the "General" when we arrived. We stood back to back and we were literally surrounded in this compound. There must have been 300 of them. And this kid, he was probably 13 or 14 with an AK47 bayonet strapped to his bandoleers. He walked up to me and looked me right in the face. His eyes were glazed over and yellow. He looked at me and looked at all my gear and said "superpower." He said it twice. Then he pulled out his bayonet and said, "I am going to cut out your heart and eat it, so I can absorb all of your abilities."

Introduction

This U.S. Marine's narrative is dramatic. But it illustrates the universal conditions under which DoD personnel use cultural skills and knowledge. They have to think quickly, make decisions (with serious outcomes), take action, and accomplish a mission. When applied in a military context, cultural skills and knowledge supports those core functions.

Significantly complicating the task of preparing DoD personnel to handle such challenging situations in other cultures is the additional circumstance that they operate in multiple regions in the world across their careers. The Marine who had the experience described above had pulled into port in Liberia a week after leaving Iraq. In addition to working in the Middle East and Africa, his past and subsequent assignments had taken him to Eastern and Western Europe, South and East Asia, and South America. Even when organizations do their best, it will always be difficult to predict where an individual's next assignment will be. With this state of affairs arises the requirement that DoD personnel possess a special set of cultural skills. Skills that can help them learn, reason, solve problems, and make decisions in any new culture. In essence, these special cultural skills are advanced cognitive skills applied to cultural issues.

The Need for a Culture-General Competency Model

To foster the development of cultural skills that are widely applicable across regions, the DoD needs to know precisely what they are. In other words, a competency model

is needed that prescribes the essential cultural knowledge and skills that enable personnel to successfully accomplish the tasks they are sent overseas to do; no matter what region in the world they are operating in. By *essential*, we mean those skill sets that are important regardless of organizational affiliation or occupational specialty. Because the focus is competencies that support operations in any region and culture, we refer to the model as *culture-general*. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the broad population for whom the model is relevant as *DoD personnel*.

This model of culture-general competence must be actionable from an operational perspective by recommending knowledge and skills that DoD personnel can realistically acquire and use—that is, they fit within the constraints of their preparation cycles, operating environments, and missions. It must also be actionable from an organizational point of view by supporting the development of learning objectives that can be met through instruction.

The best way to build an actionable competency model for a job is to develop it based on an investigation of individuals who do the job well. In this case that means studying DoD personnel who have worked in many cultures and who are regarded by their peers and supervisors as effective. In the following we will provide an overview of an empirical study aimed at doing exactly that. We will refer to the carefully selected group of DoD personnel who participated in the study as culture-general subject matter experts (SMEs). We will then describe the model that was developed based on the findings, and discuss approaches for cultivating culture-general competence.

The Cognitive Skills of Culture-General SMEs

We conducted a cognitive field research study to uncover the key skills and knowledge that cultural-general SMEs use to overcome challenges in foreign environments.

Twenty-six military professionals, primarily officers from the Army and Marine Corps, with recent and varied overseas assignments participated in semi-structured, incident-based interviews. All had worked overseas at least twice in their careers (75 percent of them three or more times), completing an average of 3.7 overseas assignments.¹ None of the participants had specialized language or culture training, but all had been assigned to jobs overseas that required

daily interactions either with members of the local populations, foreign coalition partners, or both. Their overseas responsibilities included, among others: mentoring, advising, planning for and managing provincial reconstruction, providing embedded training, collecting intelligence, and facilitating interactions with local government officials or civilian partners. All had been recommended to us by other professionals because they were effective in these culturally intensive missions.

In the two-hour interviews, participants were asked to describe personally experienced challenging intercultural interactions during their most recent overseas assignment. The participants' experiences were then used as a point of departure for asking more focused questions designed to elicit information about ways specific skills and knowledge allowed them to cope with intercultural challenges. These questions and the competencies they focused on were informed by a review of past literature.²

The Marine's narrative at the opening of this paper is an example of such an experience. To continue the example, the Marine responded to the young African rebel by clicking his safety off, bringing the muzzle up a little bit so it was pointed at the other's midsection, and saying "that wouldn't be a good idea." His assessment of the situation was the following:

"I think this kid was trying to project amongst his peers that he was tough. Here is the baddest guy in the room, here is an American, I am going to go cut this guy's heart out and then everyone will respect me."

The Marine had learned about the concept of face saving from a past experience with a Turkish officer while on assignment in Bosnia. He used his understanding of face saving in this situation in Liberia. Raising his weapon only slightly demonstrated to the rebel in front of him that he had power. But the motion was subtle, decreasing the likelihood that it was visible to the surrounding rebels. This gave the antagonizing rebel the opportunity to back off, while still projecting that he was in control.³

From transcripts of the interviews, we extracted all statements that revealed skills used to understand, decide, and take action during intercultural encounters. This means that we did not rely on the participants' reflections on what *they thought was important to do*; instead we analyzed the data to figure out which skills and knowledge they *applied*. Results of the analysis were synthesized into a set of themes and categories that were used for developing the model. Using this approach we identified twelve culture-general competencies.

12 Actionable Culture-General Competencies

The twelve competencies we identified speak to four broad challenges DoD personnel encounter each time they enter a new culture. These challenges relate to adopting a constructive mindset for working in a new culture, learning about the new culture, making sense of people and events in the new culture, and interacting with members of the culture. In the following we describe each competency in terms of the activities that personnel engage in when they enact the competency.

Diplomatic Stance

1. Maintain a mission orientation. When DoD personnel work overseas, building intercultural relationships serves a purpose. Having the general understanding that building intercultural relationships can be a direct means to achieve work objectives and understanding some of the specific ways building relationships can support the mission will motivate personnel to engage and learn more about a new culture.

2. Understand self in a cultural context. Thinking about themselves and the U.S. as having a culture keeps personnel aware that they see the world in a particular way and that people from other parts of the world may see things differently. DoD personnel should continuously seek information about how others view them and the U.S. This will help them decide how to act and what to say when they interact interculturally.

3. Manage attitudes towards culture. DoD personnel see and experience things in new cultures that challenge their values. They do not have to condone the decisions people in other cultures make. But personnel should be able to keep check on their reactions to values and customs that are different from their own. The first two competencies can help them manage their attitudes.

Cultural Learning

4. Self-direct learning about the new culture. No book or training course can give personnel the answers to all the challenges and dilemmas they will face in new cultures. Personnel should understand that cultural learning takes place while they are working overseas and should actively seek opportunities to increase their cultural skills and knowledge during overseas assignments.

5. Develop reliable information sources. Cultural learning is greatly enhanced if personnel identify and use a variety of sources such as web sites, books (even fiction), local informants, and colleagues for obtaining information about a new culture. Personnel should be aware that general information about a culture will not necessarily be true in all

contexts and circumstances. This means they should assess the credibility and bias in cultural information and sources by checking more than one source and comparing their answers.

6. Reflect and seek feedback. Personnel should continue to reflect on their experiences and interactions in new cultures after they occur. After an interaction personnel can personally reflect on whether actions or messages worked as intended, or they can seek feedback from a reliable information source.

Cultural Reasoning

7. Cope with cultural surprises. Personnel will always encounter people and situations in new cultures that are unexpected. When they do, they should try to find out why. Trying to make sense of the culture for themselves will often lead to new insights.

8. Develop cultural explanations of behavior. Personnel should try to explain to themselves why people act as they do in the new culture, differently from their own. Using things they know about the new culture to explain their behavior will help them build a deeper understanding of the culture overall.

9. Take a cultural perspective. Personnel should try to see things from the point of view of the people from the other culture. This can mean considering how their beliefs, desires, motivations, their immediate situation, or history influence their behavior.

Intercultural Interaction

10. Plan cross-cultural communication. In intercultural interactions, personnel should think ahead of time about what they want to say and how they want others to perceive them. They should use what they know about the culture to figure out the best way to get their messages across.

11. Control self-presentation. Personnel should be deliberate about how they present and express themselves, be it verbally, nonverbally, through their dress, actions, or mere presence. This can sometimes mean being themselves. Other times they have to adapt how they present themselves to the culture in order to make the intended impression.

12. Act with incomplete knowledge. Fear of saying or doing the wrong thing or general discomfort from having what feels like 'not enough' information can lead to paralysis. Personnel should focus on learning a few things about a new culture that fit their interests, and use those as a starting point for interacting and making connections with people and thereby learn more while abroad.

These 12 competencies were derived from studying activities experienced DoD personnel engage in, prior to and while they are operating in new cultures.⁴ The activities are straightforward and they are powerful. Novice personnel could benefit from learning and practicing these strategies early in their careers.

The strategies are simple because they fit within the constraints DoD personnel have to contend with, such as time, resources, objectives, and uncertainty. They are efficient because by providing the tools to self-regulate their learning, they enable narrowing the learning focus to the skills and knowledge that are relevant for their typical overseas assignments. The strategies are powerful because they provide immediate and long-term benefits. They directly aid intercultural interactions anywhere, while at the same time fostering deeper acquisition of knowledge about a specific culture during an overseas assignment. They are also powerful because these strategies often provide more than one kind of benefit. For example, seeking information by asking members of a culture questions about themselves provides information, naturally. However, it also generates goodwill because it demonstrates interest in people and their culture.

Culture-general competence is fundamentally about cognitive adaptation. If a person is adaptable it means that he has the potential, and is ready, so to speak, to adjust to new or changing situations.⁵ The 12 culture-general competencies provide personnel with thinking skills that will help them make sense of and make decisions in new intercultural situations. When applied over time these thinking skills will increase a person's repertoire of interpretations and responses they are able to bring to bear on new situations. In this way the 12 competencies provide a foundation for cultural adaptation.

Cultivating Culture-General Competence in the DoD

When culture-general competence develops naturally, it does so through socialization and experience. It is unclear whether in fact it could be developed without those ingredients. Given that, a useful role for programs aimed at promoting culture-general competence is an augmentative one. This means that the objective of such programs would be to prepare personnel to take advantage of learning opportunities when they arise. This will both accelerate their acquisition of culture-specific knowledge and the longer term development of culture-general competence. We will discuss two ways organizations can accelerate the development of culture-general competence—through formal

instruction and through leadership that creates productive social learning environments.

Instruction Culture-General Competence. There are two broad strategies for realizing culture-general learning objectives through formal instruction. The first is by creating courses or programs that focus specifically on the knowledge and skills that make up culture-general competence. The second is by embedding culture-general learning objectives within existing curricula that have a culture, language, or international relations focus. This could be as part of a pre-deployment package, course, or exercise that has a strong primary emphasis on a specific area of operation. Or, it could be as part of instruction aimed at building specialized competencies for jobs that entail developing and sustaining international relationships, such as a cross-cultural communication course or a security cooperation training program.

A number of things have to happen before either of the above strategies can be implemented. Those in a position to develop or deliver instruction need to:

- ◆ Understand what culture-general competence is.
- ◆ Know what specific culture-general skills and knowledge are important for students to learn.
- ◆ Have examples of how they can foster culture-general competence using their instructional medium of choice, be it classroom instruction, web-delivered courses, or field exercises.
- ◆ Understand how to merge primary course learning objectives with objectives relevant to culture-general competence (in cases where instruction has a regional or job-specific focus).

From an administrative point of view, leadership plays a critical role in ensuring that the lesson design that occurs within an organization includes culture-general learning objectives. This, at the minimum requires that the organization circulates information to instructors that helps them develop a common understanding of what culture-general competence is. A second step could include providing professional development for instructors on how to incorporate culture-general competence in course design.

The topmost requirement for formal instruction of culture-general competence is clarification of job- and mission-relevance. Instructors as well as learners must be able to see how culture-general competence not only relates to, but enhances the primary job or task they are accomplishing overseas. One Marine Corps major we interviewed described this requirement in particularly persuasive terms.

He said “Marines will shut down faster than anything if they don’t think it’s going to be applicable to their mission. They won’t know why they’re learning it.” He went on to provide an illustration of how even a simple piece of cultural information can become significantly more useful if placed in the context of ‘this is what it will help you do.’

“You’re telling me that Karzai is Popalzai, who cares? Well, it matters if you meet someone from the Popalzai tribe and you can bring it up as an ice breaker. You’re going to be able to open a conversation with him in a way that will gain you credibility. Now it makes sense.”⁶

There have been a couple of major obstacles to making the relevance of culture-general skills clear to the broad population of DoD personnel who can benefit from them. A great deal of research over the last 50 years has uncovered many important ingredients to making expatriates successful.⁷ However, one obstacle towards translating these findings into prescriptive recipes for success in specific applied work domains is that a number of the identified elements simply have not been defined with an eye towards instruction. Culture-general competencies have been suggested previously that relate to somewhat vague affective or even spiritual orientations that are difficult to connect to actual human activity. For example, one researcher describes “...transcending boundaries in regard to one’s identity” as an important component of developing intercultural competence.⁸

Another obstacle has been that proposed conceptions of culture-general competence in some cases borrow specialized terminology from other work domains. For example, the field of anthropology has converged on a set of methods and associated skills that are required to be a good anthropologist. Some have suggested that these same skills can be used to define guidance for how DoD personnel should approach new cultures.⁹ It may be useful for certain segments of DoD personnel who have achieved a high level of cultural proficiency to think through the similarities and differences between social science practices and the work they themselves engage in overseas. However, in an effort to make both instructional possibilities and job-relevance broadly apparent, we made it a priority to couch the elements of the culture-general competency model in terms and examples that make a clear connection to DoD missions and activities.

Socializing Culture-General Competence. The development of culture-general competence can also be accelerated by increasing the likelihood that social learning opportunities occur on the job. Social learning happens when a person is a part of a community of individuals who practice a set of

skills or a trade.¹⁰ Several lines of research point toward the idea that “people develop habits and skills of interpretation through a process more usefully conceived of as socialization than instruction.”¹¹ In other words, the capabilities that allow a person to adapt to new situations and challenges likely develop or are at least greatly enhanced through socialization.

Many communities of practice already exist within the DoD. Their primary function can center on any field of specialization, such as reconnaissance, intelligence analysis, or security cooperation. Members of these communities naturally support each other in becoming better at their requisite jobs. These communities also have the potential to support each other in increasing their culture-general competence. The key to creating the conditions under which this will happen is leadership.

Leaders at all levels are influencers. A leader’s ideas, beliefs, and values directly and indirectly set standards for subordinates. This means that leaders have a platform for significantly accelerating the development of culture-general competence. They can do so by creating a day-to-day work environment that encourages its development and practice.

Interweaving cultural elements into daily activities does not have to be time consuming or expensive. There are a number of tactics leaders can employ fairly straightforwardly to create a community of practice related to culture that supports learning both during and between overseas assignments.¹² For example, leaders can enable ongoing dialogue within a unit about intercultural experiences, possibly in the context of debriefs or after action reviews or by encouraging informal discussions with interpreters. By listening for and responding to elements of subordinates’ experiences that relate to culture, leaders can demonstrate that they value consideration of cultural factors, and learning about same.

Next Steps

The culture-general competence model presented here was developed based on analysis of the strategies culturally-experienced DoD personnel use to handle challenging situations in new cultures. We are currently taking steps to validate the model using a broader cross-section of DoD personnel. In addition to including both officer and enlisted personnel from all the services, the validation study also includes DoD civilians, and personnel with formal language and culture backgrounds, such as Foreign Area Officers, Special Operations, and Intelligence professionals. We expect that the model will accurately characterize this variety of specialties.

The twelve competencies in the current model have been identified as critical to military tasks that require face-to-face intercultural interaction. Because the new sample will also exclusively focus on such tasks there is reason to expect that the new data will provide support for the essential nature of these competencies. The validated model will demonstrate the relevance of culture-general competence to a broader set of DoD tasks and missions, and it can provide the foundation for clarifying the relationship between culture-general competencies and training and education standards.



We greatly appreciate the program management and support for the studies provided by Mr. Marc R. Hill, Associate Director for Culture for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Defense Language and National Security Education Office (OUSD/DLNSEO).

Endnotes

1. Individual assignments ranged in duration from 6 months to 7 years. Overall, participants had spent an average of 5.1 years overseas. All had worked overseas in at least two different regions in the world. Most had worked in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both, but the final sample represented intercultural experiences all over the world including Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America.
2. See Rasmussen, L. J., & Sieck, W. R., “A Cognitive Field Study of Professionals who Work in Many Cultures to Develop a Domain Focused Culture-General Competence Model.” Invited paper for special Intercultural Communication Competence issue of the Journal of International Journal of Intercultural Relations.
3. This example illustrates at least 6 of the 12 competencies: *Understanding self in a cultural context*: The Marine understood that he represented the U.S. and the rebel saw him as powerful for that reason. *Coping with cultural surprises*: The Marine did not have time to think deeply about the reasons for the young rebel’s behavior during the encounter. He did think about why the rebel may have acted the way he did afterwards. *Develop cultural explanations*: The Marine used information from a previous experience in Bosnia to come up with a possible explanation for the young rebel’s behavior, mainly that he was trying to project power among his peers. *Reflecting and seeking feedback*: The Marine reflected on the experience afterwards, both personally and in discussion with the other Marine who was present. *Controlling self-presentation*: The Marine controlled the image he projected to the rebel, repressing the urge to make an overt display of strength. *Taking a cultural perspective*: The Marine thought about what he himself represented to the young rebel, and thought about what the rebel’s motivations and goals in the situation could have been. Mainly, that the rebel wanted to project power and that he would be keen to save face in front of the other rebels.
4. Rasmussen, L. J., Sieck, W. R., Crandall, B., Simpkins, B., and Smith, J. (2011). “Data collection and analysis for a cross-cultural competence model.” Applied Research Associates Inc, Fairborn, OH. Retrieve from: www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a588188.pdf
5. See Morrison, R. F., & Hall, D. T. (2002), Career Adaptability. In D. T. Hall (Ed.), *Careers in and out of Organizations* (205-234). Thousand Oaks, C. A.: Sage
6. This is a good example of how Competency 12, *Acting with Incomplete Knowledge*, can be connected to activities anyone working overseas can engage in.

7. See Dearnorff, D. K. (Ed.). (2009). *The SAGE handbook of intercultural competence*.
8. *Ibid.*, vii, 267. Transcending boundaries entails “moving beyond the traditional dichotomous in-group/ out-group mentality to one that embraces and respects other’s differences as well as commonalities and, in so doing, keeps the focus on the relational goals of engagement.”
9. R. Greene Sands, “An Essay on Cultural Relativism and the Convergence of Ethnography and Cross-cultural Competence,” *Military Intelligence Review Bulletin* (January/March), 2012: 13-18.
10. See Lave, J. (1993). Situating Learning in Communities of Practice. In L. B. Resnick, J. M. Levine, & S. D. Teasley (Eds.) *Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition* (17-36). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
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- Past Issues
- Title/Author Index
- Article Submission Information
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
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Intellectualizing the U.S. Army's Rebalance within Asia



by Captain (P) Paul Lushenko

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or Government.

Introduction

Practitioners and scholars continue to discuss how the U.S. Army can best balance reforms with an expanding array of security commitments especially across the Indo-Pacific. The Army Chief of Staff—General Raymond Odierno—has assured domestic and international audiences that the force will become “globally responsive” yet “regionally engaged.” The Army’s ability to “rapidly deploy, fight, and win whenever and wherever” America’s interests are threatened, Odierno contends, derives from regional alignment.¹ The regional alignment concept portends deployments of less than even company or platoon strength. Underpinned by an evolving preference for decisive action, or combined arms operations and security operations, the concept provides for the pre-staging and deployment of a blending of forces. Lauded as tailored and culturally-attuned, these elements are arguably more capable of conducting a range of operations spanning from security cooperation to consequence management to high intensity combat.² Based on a number of threats and vulnerabilities that beset Indo-Pacific states, movement towards regional realignment is often celebrated as somewhat of a panacea.

This article assesses the realignment of the Army’s Indo-Pacific footprint, particularly as it relates to the Intelligence Warfighting Function, an important but hitherto under-analyzed topic. As reflected through the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), the Army has made significant progress in rebalancing or “setting the theater” since President Obama issued his strategic defense guidance in 2012.³ This article argues USARPAC can do more to incorporate intelligence enablers consisting of *individuals*, *teams*, and *capabili-*

ties. While *individuals* consist of trained and capable analysts and collectors, *teams* task organize these enablers for a given task and purpose. Meanwhile, *capabilities* package individuals and teams with associated equipment against identified mission requirements that both span the spectrum of conflict and enable a multi-echelon, joint, and/or multi-national response.

Within a regional context, unique requirements may consist of leveraging Human and Signals Intelligence to foster situational awareness of so-called “HADR” (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) incidents, epitomized by Japan’s Triple Disaster on March 11, 2011. Similarly, as one of the region’s most intractable challenges, North Korea imposes unique requirements to manage the consequences of a spontaneous collapse, a distinct possibility given the regime’s autarky. Here, a reconnaissance and surveillance capability is necessary to quarantine the inevitable proliferation of nuclear weapons materiel, technology, and expertise. Whatever the case, by shepherding the heightened involvement of intelligence enablers at especially the tactical level, USARPAC can better benchmark the role of Army Intelligence across the region—providing support to force generation, providing support to situational understanding, collecting against information requirements, and providing intelligence support to targeting. This, in turn, better facilitates USARPAC’s emerging strategy outlined here.

Investing in analysts, teams, and capabilities creates enduring relationships that better position the operations of maneuver forces throughout the region.

The remainder of this article briefly reviews the literature regarding the U.S. Army’s “pivot” to the Indo-Pacific. Set against this context, it then answers the question of how USARPAC can better incorporate intelligence enablers

whether in a training, live-environment training, or operational capacity. It concludes by identifying dividends of such integration with respect to USARPAC's evolving strategy.

Rebalance and its Critics

With respect to forces currently positioned within the Indo-Pacific, realignment is tantamount to rebalance. Some planners admit it is not exactly clear how to operationalize such an approach or establish a set theater "having the proper force structure and also having assets—people, equipment, infrastructure and the right agreements—in the right places at the right time."⁴ Often, gainsayers lambaste the approach given that it is predicated on an increasingly meager active component of perhaps no more than 420,000 Soldiers when defense cuts and sequestration are complete no later than Fiscal Year 2021. Other defense intellectuals charge that the approach is too optimistic. Planners are confronted with myriad threats and vulnerabilities epitomized by North Korea's nuclearization and natural disasters, respectively. The result is that they have yet to position USARPAC's shift within a framework that prioritizes training, capabilities, and task organization against threats, vulnerabilities, or some compromise between the two challenges.

Practitioners routinely contend USARPAC must prepare to respond to every contingency, and potentially all at once. In a fiscally constrained environment, such reasoning is troublesome.⁵ Still others contend the approach ignores questions of sufficiency or what the Pentagon dubs "reversibility." At what point, pundits ask, does rebalance reduce forces to such a degree that commanders can no longer reconstitute them quick enough, or at all, in response to unforeseen provocations?⁶

Less studied, however, is the concern that the approach as currently conceptualized focuses myopically on articulating the task and purpose of maneuver forces divested from a deeper appreciation of the intelligence enablers that should situate their deployment and operations. For instance, USARPAC has defined a "Pacific Pathways" paradigm through which positioning land-based forces closer to regional threats and vulnerabilities allows for more realistic training and enhanced responsiveness.

Some critics insist the concept is more germane to a *realpolitik* reading of regional relations, what with the current administration's intent to shore up the U.S.-centered "hubs and spokes" alliance system that has provided security throughout Asia since WWII, rather than sensitivity to the complex challenges that beleaguer regional states including unresolved war memories, competing irredentist claims, brinkmanship, and human security vulnerabilities that often result in the cross-border movement of refugees. This is a disturbing perception considering doctrine and practice

prescribe that intelligence drives operations, not the other way around. It also begs an important question regarding how USARPAC can more attentively incorporate intelligence enablers for the purpose of facilitating its regional mission.

Balancing USARPAC's Rebalance

Since the onset of America's rebalance in 2012, USARPAC has transformed in several fundamental ways. Beyond its preferment to a four-star command, USARPAC is now a Theater Joint Land Component Command broadening the sphere of its regional responsibilities. It is also the only Army service component command responsible for training, organizing, and equipping ground forces following the conversion of the Eighth Army in Korea to a strictly warfighting footing. At the same time, USARPAC has attempted to communicate the status of its rebalance in terms of capabilities, initiatives, opportunities, and challenges. These factors are reportedly key to USARPAC's emerging strategy of:

1. Generating trained and ready forces.
2. Pursuing cooperative and persistent engagement with partners, allies, and potential adversaries.
3. Exercising agile mission command.
4. Maximizing the efficiency of forward deployed, maneuver forces.⁷

Unfortunately, USARPAC planners have not clearly defined how intelligence enablers can generate the context by which to execute this strategy. Writing recently for *Army Magazine*, planners did address functions unique to the Pacific Army including "chemical decontamination, psychological operations, security of communications lines and defense of forward operating bases."⁸ Absent from this defining article, however, was any discussion of intelligence enablers. This gap likely derives from shifts in regional security order—namely, China's "rise"—that assume America's need to swagger through the deployment of maneuver forces.

The dispatch of land-based forces is designed to placate allies and partners as well as deter challengers. All of these actors increasingly question America's staying power. Such uncertainty is based not only on sequestration and its attendant spending caps, but the recent denigration of U.S. soft power given the country's failures in Iraq and Afghanistan and its frustrated management of global security challenges including Syria's implacable civil war and Russia's annexation of the Crimea Peninsula.⁹ To more effectively implement its strategy, USARPAC can better employ intelligence enablers consisting of *individuals, teams, and capabilities*.

Analysts and collectors represent perhaps the most significant instruments to facilitate USARPAC's shifting footprint and strategy. An expanded investment in reachback analysis,

for example, would necessarily enhance USARPAC's situational awareness and generate forces more tailored to meet the region's litany of traditional and non-traditional security challenges. Positioned within Washington State, Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) maintains a deft but arguably underutilized community of analysts and collectors. The former are organized against sub-regions; such alignment affords priority-of-effort in studying, and comparative advantage in addressing, the region's landscape of challenges. The latter, consisting of Human and Signals Intelligence Collectors as well as Counterintelligence Agents, possess technical skill-sets that are transferrable to the full range of military operations.

The sheer number of tactical analysts and collectors positioned on JBLM surpasses that of all other installations throughout the Indo-Pacific combined. Ironically, these experts are assigned to I Corps, one of the Army's three active Corps headquarters attached to USARPAC. The augmented deployment, detail, or temporary duty of these enablers would encourage assessments that move beyond merely an understanding of the material capabilities of regional states to include a nuanced appreciation of their intent. This is a salient conclusion for a region where the intentions of allies, partners, and potential adversaries alike turn on social considerations such as status or legitimacy.¹⁰



As reflected through Operation RISING THUNDER recently at Fort Lewis, WA, the use of analysts, teams, and capabilities within a multinational training environment sets the conditions for greater intelligence sharing at the operational and tactical levels.

Meanwhile, analysts and collectors facilitate intelligence sharing. Currently, intelligence sharing between the U.S. and its allies and partners occurs mostly at the Corps-level. By way of rebalance, USARPAC has attempted to engender collaboration at subordinate levels of command. The employment of analysts and collectors within a training or live-environment training scenario such as the National Training Center (NTC) or Korean Peninsula, respectively, would facilitate cooperation, engagement, and interoperability. During its first-ever rotation to the NTC from January to February of this year, for instance, a senior representative of the

Japanese Ground Defense Force stated, “[t]he objective is to improve our unit maneuverability and capability, and to enhance interoperability between the U.S. and Japanese.”¹¹ Although Japan represents the “cornerstone” of America's regional hierarchy, intelligence sharing can foster a certain degree of interoperability between the U.S. and its increasing number of partners in Southeast Asia as well, especially Cambodia and Indonesia on the basis of their democratization efforts.¹²

Similarly, USARPAC planners can harness teams of tactically and technically proficient analysts and collectors to impart a common operating picture and fuel the planning, operations, and targeting cycles consisting of primarily “D3A” (Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess) and “F3EAD” (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate).¹³ Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that enablers including “Multi-Functional Teams” (MFTs)—multi-discipline collectors that gather, exploit, and disseminate combat information to tactical commanders—provide expertise to focus combat power as well as sequence and synchronize lethal and non-lethal operations. To maximize their potential, MFTs must integrate with land-based forces early, often, and at multiple echelons of command. While receipt of so-called “capabilities briefs” from intelligence enablers is important for a maneuver commander,

multi-echelon, joint, and multi-national training identifies comparative advantages to devise the right mix of forces for future operations.

Admittedly, USARPAC has attempted to incorporate intelligence teams into maneuver planning and operations. During a recent training exercise, Gryphon Tomahawk, on JBLM designed to incul-

cate an expeditionary capability across I Corps, MFTs operated in concert with ground forces. Unfortunately, the MFTs did not integrate as early, often, and at all necessary echelons of command. This exercise reflects that USARPAC planners must continue to emphasize adjacent unit coordination, especially considering the region is characterized by the “tyranny of distance” that frustrates communication, undermines rapid response, and burdens logistical support.

Of course, planners must also transition the tactics, techniques, and procedures of intelligence teams from COIN to expeditionary, decisive action operations. It is not clear



As opposed to the “digital” mission command that characterized combat operations throughout Iraq and Afghanistan, the 201st BfSB has emphasized the importance of “analog” measures within an expeditionary environment.

how an MFT conducts battle damage assessment, for example, as opposed to the exploitation of high value targets following direct action raids indicative of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Appreciating that the Indo-Pacific region is framed by innumerable threats and vulnerabilities, practitioners have initiated study of how to overhaul the training and task organization of MFTs and other cross-functional variants. In point of fact, the U.S. Army Japan—which serves as the Army’s component command in support of the defense of Japan and a forward deployed command post in support of contingency operations—has developed an exercise in conjunction with the Japanese Ground Staff to not only strengthen allied interoperability, but maintain and refine the skills of intelligence teams in an expeditionary environment. Meanwhile, the 201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BfSB) assigned to I Corps is testing the feasibility of attaching MFTs to reconnaissance and surveillance units, namely its Long-Range Surveillance Company. Referred to as “Task Force Omega,” this concept attempts to streamline a set of complementary collection assets to provide situational awareness, collect against intelligence requirements, and provide support to targeting.

Planners can capitalize on other emerging and unique intelligence capabilities to facilitate USARPAC’s strategy, especially enabling the agile mission command pillar. Capabilities, of course, are part and parcel to ready and able analysts and teams. They represent the enduring and systemic means by which to package niche functionality based on consistent personnel turn-over and the region’s diverse set of threats and vulnerabilities. An appreciation of capability becomes important when assessing performance, effectiveness, and efficiency across units. While an infantry company may ultimately be effective in defining and describing an operating environment, for instance, it may not conduct this task as efficiently, or with as little organizational energy and heightened rigor, as intelligence enables. Regionally, perhaps the

most under-appreciated and utilized capability is “APEX”—Acquisition, Protection, Exploitation—championed by the 201st BfSB.

This model serves as the BfSB’s preferred mechanism to operationalize an “Intelligence Readiness and Operations Capability.” As explained by the recently published Army Intelligence Training Strategy, this capability represents an “approach to formally employing and directing Army Soldiers to provide support from overwatch or reachback locations against National, Theater, or Army Specified missions.” By generating analysts, collectors, and teams designed to provide full spectrum collec-



During the recent GRYPHON TOMAHAWK exercise at Fort Lewis, WA, the use of a TA-312 “Field Phone” enabled units assigned to the 201st BfSB to better exercise expeditionary operations indicative of the Asia-Pacific region.

tion, protection, and exploitation operations, APEX achieves this mandate by training units on systems and analytical processes; enhancing an organization’s analytical power; familiarizing Soldiers with an area of operations; and providing intelligence reach to contingency operations.¹⁴ Because APEX is tailorable and scalable, it nests well with other initiatives and is ideally suited to facilitate the mission command and operations of smaller-scaled Indo-Pacific forces.

Conclusion

The expanded involvement of intelligence enablers would empower USARPAC’s strategy in several ways. First, it would enable planners and commanders to meet the Army’s intent of “no MI Soldier at rest” when at home station by maximizing institutional and operational training opportunities. Given the region’s many and varied threats and vulnerabilities, training is fundamental to protecting against so-called “cold starts” or a loss of tactical and technical proficiency importuned by sequestration.¹⁵ By employing intelligence enablers within a live-environment training scenario, for instance, planners and commanders can generate trained and ready forces, or forces prepared to ask the right questions and integrate information and intelligence into the planning, operations, and targeting cycles.

Secondly, a broader integration of intelligence enablers, especially capabilities similar to Task Force Omega and APEX, would enable USARPAC to “right-size” forces for re-

lated missions. This is particularly true of HADR operations that presuppose similar individual and collective tasks including observation and security. Task Force Omega and APEX-like capabilities would not only allow for agile mission command, they would also maximize the efficiency of forward deployed forces by redressing redundancies that often result from a lack of previous familiarization, coordination, and training. At the operational-level, such capabilities would also facilitate USARPAC's institution of a region-wide "battle-rhythm." The alignment of training, exchanges, exercises, and rotational forces across the region is designed to not only streamline command relationships within USARPAC, but foster linkages with regional armies as well.¹⁶

Concomitantly, a greater investment in intelligence enablers would facilitate USARPAC's regional engagement pursuant to peace and stability. This is an important consideration regarding those allies and partners who increasingly question the viability of America's pivot. It is a concern of equal, if not greater, import with respect to potential adversaries. As a case in point, China fears "encirclement" on account of America's strengthened and expanding partnerships with particularly Australia and Japan. The employment of intelligence enablers across the region, especially for the purpose of facilitating multi-national training through forums such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations and East Asia Summit, would allow for Sino-U.S. cooperation in addressing mutually-shared challenges. It would also illustrate a profound awareness that the security and prosperity of both states are entwined.

Such awareness, although dubious to realist observers within and without the armies of both countries, does exist. Given that the evolving Sino-U.S. relationship is part and parcel to solidifying stability, avoiding major armed conflict, and guaranteeing long-term prosperity across the region as well, General Vincent Brooks—USARPAC's Commander—recently explained that "steadily developing in the past few years is USARPAC's disaster management exchanges with the People's Liberation Army."¹⁷ Where key "Phase 0" tasks such as communication and dialogue are supplanted by misunderstanding and enmity, however, intelligence enablers would facilitate USARPAC's Contingency Reaction Force. Whether deployed reactively to manage the consequences of Pyongyang's machinations, or dispatched proactively to attenuate China's escalating disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines over the South China Sea, intelligence enablers would provide the situational awareness and targeting support to better align the force's size and capabilities to the type of threat or vulnerability. ❄️

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The Allied Land Command: NATO's New Headquarters Focused on Land Forces



by Colonel Eric T. Heist

◆ A German lieutenant trains, advises, and assists Afghan security forces, growing their capability to conduct security operations.

◆ A Portuguese sergeant exchanges a high five with young boy while on patrol in Kosovo.

◆ A Dutch Patriot missile unit deployed to Adana in southern Turkey defends against possible missile attack from Syria.

◆ A logistics exercise in Slovakia involving over 1,750 troops and 600 pieces of equipment from 35 countries in cooperation with 14 international organizations, develops collective logistics solutions and assesses the interoperability of their equipment, systems and procedures.

◆ Thousands of ground troops from over 30 countries participate in a joint force command and control and live fire exercise in Poland and the Baltic states.

These are all examples of operations and training conducted by the land forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the past year.

Engaged in operations around the world, there are significant changes ongoing within NATO concerning land forces. While many U.S. service members are generally familiar with NATO, recent reorganization and restructuring have occurred, significantly changing its command and control organization and missions. This article provides an overview of recent changes and details about the Allied Land Command—NATO's new command, focused on land forces.

Established in the spring of 1949, NATO was created to ensure the collective security and territorial integrity of the Alliance members in the face of potential threats from the Soviet Union that emerged after World War II, prevent the resumption of nationalist militarism in Europe, and support European political cooperation. Growing from 12 original member nations, the Alliance now has 28 member na-

tions. In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO evolved to adapt to the new conditions as relations across Europe changed. After years of Alliance military operations in Afghanistan, Allied Heads of State and Government agreed to a new Strategic Concept at the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010 to prepare for the future security environment.^{1,2}

"Following the Lisbon and Chicago Summits, we are embarking on NATO 3.0—an Alliance with stronger capabilities and stronger partnerships across the globe to meet the range of the 21st century challenges."

*—NATO Deputy Secretary-General,
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow*

The NATO 2010 Strategic Concept, "Active Engagement, Modern Defence," included a framework for a new NATO Command Structure (NCS), which included a new Allied Command Operations (ACO) structure. ACO is one of NATO's two strategic military commands, the other being Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Directed from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), near Mons, Belgium, ACO is responsible for all Alliance operations. The 28 nations of NATO agreed to a momentous change to ACO by consolidating eleven major headquarters to six as part of a larger effort to increase NATO's efficiency and effectiveness. Leveraging the experience and history of this 60+ year old alliance, NATO enacted historic change to prepare for the complex security challenges that the Alliance will face in the future. The new structure was designed to support the transition from deployed operations to readiness operations as the mission in Afghanistan evolves and decreases.³

This new structure includes two standing Joint Force Commands (JFCs) and three service component commands.

The JFCs are located in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and in Naples, Italy. Both have the mission to conduct comprehensive operational-level campaign planning and deploy into a theater as a Deployed Joint Headquarters (DJHQ) in addition to engaging with key partners and regional organizations, reinforcing cooperation with operational partners, and preparing partner countries for NATO membership.

The three service component command headquarters include Air Command (AIRCOM) in Ramstein, Germany, Maritime Command (MARCOM) in Northwood, United Kingdom, and Land Command (LANDCOM) in Izmir, Turkey. AIRCOM is the central command of all NATO air and air defense forces and MARCOM is the central command of all NATO maritime forces. LANDCOM, however, has a unique mission and purpose.⁴

LANDCOM was established in Izmir, Turkey, December 1, 2012, consolidating the two previous land force headquarters—Forces Command Heidelberg (Germany) and Forces Command Madrid (Spain)—into one, and reducing personnel from over 800 to 350. Reaching Initial Operating Capability in November 2013, it continues to progress steadily towards Full Operating Capability (FOC) by December 2014. LANDCOM serves as the recognized authority of the Alliance’s Land community, ensuring land forces’ interoperability, capability, synchronization, and effectiveness in support of full spectrum Allied operations. LANDCOM is the ACO’s primary interface with the NATO Force Structure (NFS) and national armies. The NFS is comprised of nine multi-national Corps stationed throughout the Alliance, made up of Graduated Response Forces-Land (GRF-L) or the NATO Corps.⁵


“...we, right now in Afghanistan, enjoy probably the highest level of cooperation, capability, cohesiveness of our forces. Our ability, our tactics, techniques, procedures, to work together is probably at the pinnacle of NATO’s history, and what we don’t want to do, is lose those capabilities as the force structure, and the mission in Afghanistan, not only draws down, but changes, and LANDCOM is going to be at the center [of maintaining NATO capabilities]...”

*—Supreme Allied Commander Europe,
U.S. Air Force General Philip Breedlove*

In peacetime, LANDCOM is responsible for facilitating land and joint interoperability; promoting land doctrine development; synchronizing NATO land forces’ training and integrating training events; maintaining the oversight of evaluation and certification of the NFS; maintaining robust land and NATO-area wide environmental land expertise, and contributing to ACO’s comprehensive situational awareness. It also supports NCS and NFS in contingency, crisis, and exercise planning as well as maintaining relationships with NATO partners (including Ireland, Sweden, Ukraine, Georgia, etc.), international organizations, and non-governmental organizations in coordination with SHAPE, ACT, and the JFCs. Additionally, as part of the 2010 Strategic Concept, LANDCOM was given a new role in times of crisis. HQ, LANDCOM will be ready to deploy a core command and control (C2) capability for a Land Component Command (LCC) supporting a JFC or acting as a standalone headquarters across a range of major to small joint operations, with the ability to provide C2 over assigned Forces up to three Corps.

“Land Command will be the leading advocate for Soldiers and Land Forces in NATO, responsible for ensuring their effectiveness and interoperability.”

*—Commanding General of LANDCOM,
U.S. Army LTG Frederick “Ben” Hodges*



LANDCOM has three primary lines of operations to support its numerous responsibilities as it leads NATO’s efforts to maintain the effectiveness and new levels of interoperability achieved by ground forces operating within joint forces during recent combat and contingency operations. LANDCOM’s main effort is Land Forces Operational Capability. LANDCOM enables land forces interoperability, capability, and synchronization in support of the full spectrum of Allied operations through the authority given it by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe for oversight of evaluation and certification of the GRF-L, new NATO members, and partners.

The first supporting effort is Land Advocacy. LANDCOM promotes land expertise, doctrine, conceptual development and utilization of lessons learned while facilitating mutual training and operations within a joint context. Finally, LANDCOM is focused on its Headquarters Operational Readiness. It is ready to provide immediate, interoperable, responsive planning capability supporting the NCS and NFS or deploy a core C2 capability for an LCC or standalone headquarters in support of a range of joint, full spectrum Alliance operations

pose Soldiers to the numerous opportunities and challenges that have and will continue to characterize coalition operations. In everyday interaction, there is much to be learned from the experience, expertise, and multiple operational approaches that the various nations bring to intelligence operations and training.

Working through the intelligence cycle and intelligence sharing across NATO and national caveats provides excellent experience and skills to adapt to future operations with Allies and Partners. By traveling to oversee exercises, par-



A representation of the wide range of organizations and events with which the NATO Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) interacts to accomplish its task to promote land forces expertise, doctrine, conceptual development and utilization of lessons learned.

Within LANDCOM, enthusiastic and talented military and civilian professionals from 23 of the 28 NATO nations are working together to achieve FOC and exceed the high expectations and requirements placed on the HQs. The U.S. is leading contributor to the LANDCOM headquarters, providing 48 of the 350 total personnel including a lieutenant general who is the Commanding General (COM), three colonels serving as Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G2 and G6, and the Executive Officer to the COM, as well as numerous other field grade officer and senior NCO positions across the staff. Within the G2, there are several major and lieutenant colonel positions and staff sergeant to master sergeant opportunities. Working in the LANDCOM G2 provides an exceptional opportunity for professional and personal development.

Professionally, an assignment with NATO directly supports two of the Chief of Staff of the Army's strategic priorities:

- ◆ Adaptive Army leaders for a complex world.
- ◆ A globally responsive and regionally engaged Army.

With fifteen different NATO countries represented within the G2 Division, a duty assignment with LANDCOM will ex-




Soldiers from the LANDCOM G2 Division during Battle Staff Training at the Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland in November 2013.

icipating in various NATO working groups or conferences, and participating in headquarters staff training events, U.S. Soldiers assigned to LANDCOM are exposed to tremendous broadening experiences, gaining knowledge and familiarity with numerous countries, militaries and cultures. Particularly as the Army faces significant end strength reductions in the future, understanding the capabilities and strengths of our Allies and Partners will be essential to planning and preparing for future contingencies.

Photos Credit: NATO photo/LANDCOM PAO

Outside of official duties, LANDCOM enjoys tremendous support from the host nation, Turkey, in the city of Izmir. A sunny, seaside city and popular cruise ship destination located on the western coast of Turkey on the Aegean Sea, Izmir is the third largest city in Turkey. With a friendly population and more European feel than one might expect, Izmir offers a variety of great housing, public transportation, dining, and shopping in a welcoming environment. The 425th Airbase Squadron and a U.S. NATO Brigade National Support Element provide exceptional administrative, logistical, recreational, and other support to the military community. There are numerous sight-seeing destinations in the region as well as recreational opportunities including SCUBA diving, sailing, golf, etc. While currently a one year unaccompanied tour, efforts are on-going to seek approval for accompanied tours to LANDCOM. Izmir is a great city in which to learn and experience living abroad.

“For the Soldier!” is the motto of LANDCOM and it highlights the Command’s commitment that all plans, initiatives, key decisions, and actions developed by LANDCOM are ultimately to support the mission accomplishment by the most basic element of any Army unit: the Soldier. It serves as a reminder to the countries that enjoy the protection of the Alliance’s collective defense and collaboration that it is essential to train, equip, and prepare Soldiers to conduct the missions they are called upon to do. As NATO’s new Command focused on land forces, the Allied Land Command is well on its way to full operating capability and is committed to accomplishing all of the diverse missions assigned to it.⁶ 

“Our motto is ‘For the Soldier.’ This headquarters is going to work every single day to ensure that the young soldiers, men and women, who fill our ranks have the best possible chance to accomplish their mission and to be protected while doing it. All that we will do is ‘For the Soldier.’”

*—Commanding General of LANDCOM,
U.S. Army LTG Frederick “Ben” Hodges*

For more information, please visit the NATO and LANDCOM websites at <http://www.nato.int/> and <http://www.lc.nato.int/>.

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Did You Know!

One of the new key terms introduced in JP 2-0 is sociocultural analysis. Sociocultural analysis is the analysis of adversaries and other relevant actors that integrates concepts, knowledge, and understanding of societies, populations, and other groups of people, including their activities, relationships, and perspectives across time and space at varying scales.



Human Ecology and the Need for a Systems-Based Theory to Understand the Human Domain in the Operations Process

by Marcus B. Griffin, PhD

Although the war for the U.S. in Iraq is over and the war in Afghanistan is nearly at an end, the need remains for a systematic approach to social and cultural considerations—the human domain—that iteratively aggregates and effectively contributes to integrated planning processes. This is true not only for new security force assistance missions conducted by regionally aligned forces but by Soldiers performing the Army competencies of combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and special operations. Descriptions and explanations of culture and society based on a mixed bag of approaches created by one unit to another prevent cumulative insight. Instead of creating a Mona Lisa portrait over time, stick figure drawings are reinvented at each Relief-in-Place and Transfer-of-Authority. Existing doctrine in the form of PMESII-PT and ASCOPE is inadequate and insufficient to the task.

To remedy the problem, current doctrine needs to clearly define and emphasize a systems-based approach to human domain aspects of the operational environment (OE). The approach needs to be deliberate, relevant, systematic, flexible and readily transferable—not an approach that eclectically addresses sociocultural concerns as and when needed which only serves to achieve short term partial success rather than long term sustainable and transferable success. Understanding how the human domain affects the OE as a complex system is best achieved using a systems-based theory such as human ecology. Results will facilitate greater understanding for commanders and staff to better lead operations as well as successfully impart and transfer cumulative knowledge in Joint Operations and with Unified Action Partners.

Existing Doctrine and the Operations Process

Attention to sociocultural concerns does not have the lengthy and intense doctrinal history that attention to war fighting has. Therefore, doctrine and use of theory to deal with what is now being called the human domain is not at the level of sophistication as can be found when examining war fighting competencies and functions. In order to bring sociocultural concerns and the human domain closer to the level of sophistication the Army must incorporate theory and transcend static, normative understandings of culture.

The operations process involves mission variables and operational variables. Commanders prioritize what to analyze

during the planning phase of any operation according to the variables of mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time, and civil considerations (METT-TC). The human domain is captured in the last variable—civil considerations, and broken out via ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events. Unfortunately, the vast majority of issues and factors addressing people and culture is left to a single element of ASCOPE—people. For the human domain to largely fall in one single sub-bullet of METT-TC is problematic. Insufficient significance for such an important variable in mission success is given to the subject. The relative obscurity of a sub-bullet of the last mission variable priority invites problems.

The operational variables of PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, time) are slightly better equipped at assigning value to the human domain. In PMESII-PT only time does not directly involve sociocultural concerns (regardless of the fact that different cultures have different views of time; the T in this case represents a culturally loaded U.S. military understanding, application, and expectation of “time” concepts—often a point of significant cross-cultural problems in and of itself).

Although doctrine includes the human domain to a greater or lesser degree through METT-TC and PMESII-PT, a further barrier to effective understanding is that these acronyms are simply lists and their results no more than descriptive content. Information can be placed in each category but there is no framework to create significance to information or data in each category or relationships between them.

Culture and society are integrated. Significance is determined by analyzing how data placed in different categories are interrelated. Therefore, to analyze correlations of data found in ASCOPE or PMESII-PT categories needs to be clarified in order to generate sociocultural understanding. Soldiers and their enablers are often left to their own devices to develop meaningful analysis. What has often resulted is a well-intended patchwork quilt of disparate information sewn together that increases ambiguity and confusion with each consecutive deployment, rather than a clear common operating picture designed to increase resolution with each rotation. Anthropologists have spent decades building theories and methods to understand what Soldiers are called upon to do overnight.

This is not a trivial matter. With lists, one is limited to basic information: the “what” with no consideration for context or dynamic processes that characterize the validity of that information. When a model of explanation (theory) is brought to bear on any sociocultural category set (such as an ASCOPE list), a commander not only knows what is going on among people in a given area, but why because causal variables are understood. This subsequently allows the effects of variable alteration to be better predicted/inferred. The model of explanation provides a systematic means of pointing out significance: the “so what.” When significance is determined and driven by a theoretical framework, then what can be done about the sociocultural concern is more easily revealed: the “now what” of course of action (COA) development.

Ultimately, “the what” of information needs a theory or model of explanation that enables the “so what” of that information and systematically highlights the “now what” for getting closer to a desired end-state. The current categories of METT-TC and PMESII-PT simply provide bins to hold information. They say nothing about how that information is operationally significant or actionable by the commander. This can be overcome by adopting human ecology theories and models as the base framework to generating shared understanding in the operations process. Human ecology approaches are not exclusive. They can accommodate or complement other theories, models, or approaches. However, a human ecology is currently the best fit paradigm for military application to the human domain.

Supporting the Operations Process

Commanders and the Soldiers they lead often face unfamiliar OEs and complex problems to resolve. To ensure that Soldiers not only successfully solve the complex operational problems, but also solve the appropriate and most important problems, Army Design Methodology (ADM) was introduced into planning doctrine. ADM is based on a complex systems approach to problem-solving and therefore requires a complex systems approach to the human domain. Such an approach is not only possible but more effective when culture and society is conceived and treated as a dynamic “process” rather than a static “thing.” A description and explanation is never finished, fixed, or standing still. Like the running estimate in Mission Analysis, an approach to culture and society which is process and systems-based and accounts for change over time can be continuously updated. A Civil Considerations Common Picture used to generate staff estimates is constantly closer to accuracy and relevance (if done properly) rather than a static narrative. A static narrative of description—depending on the purpose,

context and age of that original narrative—may be misleading in the current context. A running estimate can incorporate various and consecutive narratives to understand trajectories of cultural dynamism.

Because very little detail is provided to Soldiers about what goes into understanding culture and society (P in ASCOPE, for example), Soldiers seemingly include anything and everything to do with people and culture. The degree of generality and abstraction gets in the way of operationalizing what is actually meant by the terms. This lack of specificity hinders incorporating human domain considerations coherently and systematically into the integrated planning process. Lack of a coherent approach to human domain considerations results in a patchwork quilt view of the populations in which Soldiers operate. Furthermore, few of the human domain analyses aggregate from tactical to the operational to the strategic level. Telescoping from tactical to operational to strategic does not result in a clear picture when the lenses used to understand human domain considerations keep changing from one echelon to another, one unit to another, and one area of operations (AO) to another.

Approaching human domain considerations haphazardly from lack of insight on how societies operate as a complex system decreases operational coherence. Subsequently, this hinders unity of effort with host nation (HN) security forces as well as allows enemy forces the opportunity to exploit the disconnect between the local population and U.S. forces.

Adopting an approach to human domain analysis that is theoretically and compatible with the planning and decision-making processes ensures the greatest contribution and integration. A modest degree of standardization with emphasis of how human domain considerations are conceived, similar to reasonable standardization efforts found in integrated planning, is necessary to ensure operational coherence. When not taken to an extreme, this standardization to human domain considerations allows understanding and insight to build from the tactical through operational and eventually to strategic. This approach also allows deductive refinement from strategic to operational to tactical resolution. Information shared about the population between echelons, units, and AOs are open to aggregation and comparative analysis as well as trending over time. The problem of creating a patchwork quilt view of society is solved as a result of modest standardization.

A Systems-Theory Based Solution: Human Ecology

Human ecology provides the missing explanatory framework for making sense out of information placed in the

PMESII-PT, METT-TC, and ASCOPE categories. It best addresses the human domain to effectively inform the operations process. Essentially, human ecology is the study of how people, through their culture, survive and successfully adapt (or fail to adapt) in any particular environment. It accommodates both physical and social variables.

One way to explore and discover significant interconnections between people, culture, and environment is to focus on how the variables are connected through the way people make a living—or their cultural core—as each variable undergoes constant change. This kind of study produces an understanding of social change. It is significant to the operations process because a commander can visualize with clarity how things work and where important dependencies have been broken by, for example, conflict, war, and various actions taken to alleviate or exacerbate the problems. Knowing how things work and how things are broken allows a commander to lead his staff in appropriately doing something to solve the problem with greater fidelity of estimating primary, second and third order effects. The following example will illustrate the kind of understanding that emerges when seeing how people, culture, and their environment are collectively examined.

Educating Girls in Afghanistan

Human ecology is a framework that informs a diverse range of operational concerns familiar to Soldiers. For example, the systems approach sheds light on the issue of spending money on building schools for girls in Afghanistan and why men in a community may resist such a stability task. Human ecology helps Soldiers understand why building schools for girls and promoting their education is often met with conflict and controversy in Afghanistan. Understanding requires knowing how people make a living, organize themselves to manage resources and the physical environment in which they try to exist.

Small-scale agriculture and animal husbandry in Afghanistan is driven by significant environmental constraints. Converting rocky terrain into arable land using irrigation canals requires significant labor and investment. As a result, land and animal herds are managed by patrilineal descent groups (tribes and clans) to ensure grazing rights are kept clear and agricultural land remains productive. This is ensured, in part, by a social system whereby sons inherit and daughters marry out of the descent group. Their children belong to the tribe or clan of the husband. This system enables brothers to keep land and herds together and more productive as a whole while married off daughters form bonds of alliance and obligation with other descent groups needed when threatened by outsiders or by ill-fortune.

Resources are scarce in a typical Afghan family; the World Bank claims that more than a third of Afghans live at or below absolute poverty. There is little to no discretionary income when people are barely getting by and every expense must make a difference. Money spent and labor lost by sending a boy to school will benefit in time the parents and family group through a better marriage, potential access to wage income, and the myriad benefits that follow from literacy. They have public status rewards that follow from education and potential “labor abroad” opportunities for work in Iran or Pakistan or in a near-by city. This income will go directly back to the household.

On the other hand, scarce resources expended on a girl’s education will only benefit her husband’s family. One might reasonably argue that spending money on a daughter’s education and losing her labor outputs while she is in school imperils the financial stability of a family. There are very few job opportunities for females in the public, wage-earning realm. The real question becomes not why are they against it, but why would any family in a patrilineal, patrilocal agrarian society (like Afghanistan), put any effort into any female education other than basics? Women, whether marrying out or marrying in are temporary to the economic household unit. An educated daughter may bring more bridewealth, but not enough to offset expenses incurred educating her. If she were highly educated, it would probably make finding a husband locally more difficult rather than create substantial upward mobility; and if the latter, very little would come back to her temporary household of birth.


Trying to compel local families to educate their daughters without understanding the system of relationships in which girls are embedded invites destabilizing families at or near the poverty line. Once understood in this ecology-based systems context, what actually requires understanding is why we find such families actually sending daughters to school. A systems approach to understanding helps Soldiers to include during Mission Analysis possible interventions that mitigate family instability when planning to build schools for girls and supporting their education.

Design Planning for Contingency Response in Africa

Students in the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) applied the human ecology frame during a Design and Joint Operations Planning exercise. The Design planning team was tasked to come up with indicators to track that will help a commander prevent or respond quickly to a mass atrocity in a distressed African country and otherwise suggest the need for a problem-reframe. The team developed a systems based set of indicators to monitor and analyze con-

currently. The result would help the commander to know where the likelihood for a mass atrocity will be highest such that increased attention and readiness would result for that specific location. The following graphic captures the whiteboarding that the Design planning team produced. It shows how they came to understand the three principles of people, place, and culture and the ways in which making a living and getting things done relates to each principle.

achieve actionable insight in the human domain, we need to seek analysis beyond that of perceptions and opinions of the local population or that of HN Security Forces with whom we partner. Army personnel need to increase relevant understanding of the culturally-based frameworks that our partners around the world use to guide their behavior and interpret the behaviors of others, such as U.S. personnel or the enemy.



I have argued here that understanding sociocultural concerns in order to conduct operations in complex, changing, and uncertain OEs requires movement away from a normative approach to culture that emphasizes description and the adoption of a systems approach such as human ecology, an approach that can also accommodate normative approaches. Current Army doctrine provides a framework where sociocultural concerns are captured: METT-TC, PMESII-PT, and ASCOPE. Although useful for some purposes, they remain inadequate. This is not surprising because the Army has struggled with the issue of culture and society—the human domain—for years in Iraq and Afghanistan despite these frameworks existing. Regardless of being encoded in doctrine, the stumbling

block to achieving human domain understanding is that military OE variables are inadequate to the task because they lack a framework for how data are correlated, how the society self-organizes, and how culture is changing.

By taking a systems approach, the SAMS students were able to describe and explain why people in a particular place are more vulnerable to a mass atrocity event happening than other places. In addition, COAs to mitigate the likelihood were clearly revealed by the same analysis and supported by clear logic and open to evidence-based discussion. The human ecology approach used here moves away from unchanging normative views of culture commonly used in the Army. This approach facilitates understanding human domain variables and their correlations. Commanders and staff can use this for more refined and accurate planning to achieve mission goals and make more effective and efficient decisions on resource allocation and COAs. Primary, secondary, and other tertiary effects may also be better predicted.

Human ecology satisfies the base need for a systems-based theory that frames a description and enables an explanation of how the variables of people, culture, and the environment are interrelated. Knowing how people in a community predominantly go about making a living as the method for exploring interconnections between people, culture, and environment helps Soldiers to better understand what occurs in his AO, the dynamics, the human domain, and why people think and act as they do. This kind of systems-based understanding will lead to greater mission success. ✨

Conclusion

Culture has proven itself an important concern in military operations over the past decade. Through the course of Iraq and Afghanistan operations, failing to fully define and appreciate the impact of human domain variables in the tactical and operational levels frustrated mission success. To

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An Open Source look at Russian Strategic Land Power

by Charles K. Bartles

The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Introduction

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian military has struggled to match its forces against likely threats. It has been slow in transitioning from a large conscript army focused on large-scale, high intensity warfare with NATO to one focused more on immediate threats, namely small-scale regional conflicts, terrorism, proliferation, and insurgency. These types of threats are often handled by units called rapid reaction forces (RRF), such as the usual first responders, (i.e., the Russian Airborne forces (VDV)), but the term has been used in an ad-hoc manner. In order to combat these challenges and perform peacekeeping duties, the Russian Armed Forces are currently experimenting with the establishment of an RRF Command. This is not a new concept in the Russian Armed Forces; the idea has been discussed several times since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and a previous iteration of the idea was tabled during the tenure of the previous Defense Minister, Anatolii Serdyukov.¹

In the last year the issue has again gained momentum, culminating in a November 2013 announcement that the RRF Command would be activated in 2014. Although the details are still being worked out, the Russian RRF will be approximately 70,000-80,000 members strong, primarily built around the VDV. These forces are apparently intended to have an air-land-sea capability, and would be well suited to handle current threats, as well as to perform peacekeeping duties.²

Air

In order to quickly deploy forces, proponents of the Russian RRF suggest that an organic lift capability is required for the organization. In the current scheme of organization the VDV are required to request aircraft for long-distance transport and jump operations through the Transport Aviation Command (VTA), which is part of the Russian Air Force. By the same token, VDV and Ground Force




Figure 1. Russian Rapid Reaction Forces.

commanders must request Army aviation (helicopter, light reconnaissance, and tactical strike) support through the Air Force.³ In the new scheme, select elements of Army aviation and VTA that are in support of the RRF would be placed under operational control of the RRF commander.⁴ Even under the most optimistic proposals of RRF proponents, it is almost a certainty that any major movement (air, land, or sea) would require some level of support from the Russian Transportation Directorate (VOCO), which is very roughly the U.S. TRANSCOM equivalent.⁵

Land

The land component of the RRF is based upon three motorized rifle brigades (MRB) and select SPETSNAZ units. Relative to their strategic purpose, these units are located in or near internal hot spots, such as the volatile North Caucasus region, and external hotspots, such as Georgia and Armenia,



where direct action or peacekeeping assets could be required on short order. The 34th MRB (Mountain) in Zelenchukskaya,

Karachay-Cherkessia, and the 33rd Reconnaissance Brigade (Mountain) in the city of Botlikh in the Republic of Dagestan are the primary force projection components of the proposed RRF land assets.⁶ (The 33rd Reconnaissance Brigade would probably be better termed as a reduced strength MRB.)⁷

Traditionally in the Soviet/Russian model of armed forces, peacekeeping activities have typically been delegated to select VDV units. The VDV still have the majority of peacekeeping assets in the Russian Armed Forces, with one brigade (31st Air Assault Brigade, Ulyanovsk) dedicated to general peacekeeping and several other battalions trained for operations in a United Nations “blue helmet” capacity.⁸ The Russian Ground Forces’ 15th Separate MRB (Peacekeeping) in Samara is Russia’s first attempt to design a unit from the “ground up” as a peacekeeping unit, instead of simply designating existing units with the task.⁹

There has been reporting that select SPETSNAZ brigades would be included in the RRF. It is unlikely that all SPETSNAZ brigades will be placed in the RRF, as the former are the “eyes and ears” of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff and are also used for direct action in the enemy rear to support conventional Ground Forces movement. SPETSNAZ brigades usually consist of three detachments (*otriads*), which are roughly battalion-sized elements commanded by a colonel. These brigades are deemed “elite,” but they are often manned with conscripts, as opposed to contract soldiers (*kontraktniki*). As a whole, SPETSNAZ brigades have a higher percentage of *kontraktniki* than the average Ground Forces unit, but a lower percentage of *kontraktniki* than the average VDV unit.

Sea

The RRF will include all Naval Infantry assets. The Naval Infantry is currently part of the Coastal Defense Troops, along with the Coastal Defense Artillery. Naval Infantry units

are co-located with each of the four fleets and one flotilla, totaling approximately 9000 troops. It is already in the process of a major overhaul to improve equipment and training, and has recently announced plans to expand by turning the 3rd Naval Infantry Regiment of the Pacific Fleet and the 61st Naval Infantry Regiment of the Northern Fleet into full fledged brigades.¹⁰

The Naval Infantry enjoys close ties with the VDV, dating at least back to the Great Patriotic War, when certain Naval Infantry units were



commanded by VDV officers.¹¹ The close ties have continued to today, as Naval Infantry units have select units on jump status and naval infantrymen routinely train at the VDV training center in Ryazan. The current commander of the Coastal Defense Troops, Major General Alexander Kolpachenko, is a career VDV officer.¹² As for other naval assets, there has been some mention of including large amphibious landing craft in the RRF. Although not specifically mentioned, several companies of Naval SPETSNAZ could also be included.

Special Operations Forces

As with the SPETSNAZ brigades, Russian special operations forces are currently under direct control of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff. There has been little reporting on the size or units in these forces, but in the Russian system all special operations forces are SPETSNAZ units, but not all SPETSNAZ units are special operations forces, so it is likely that the latter are collocated with SPETSNAZ brigades.¹³ Presumably, Russian special operations forces conduct similar activities as their U.S. counterparts. However, in contrast to U.S. special operations forces, the premier Russian special operations forces that handle counter terrorism related missions are under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federal Security Service. Although current plans call for the inclusion of special operations forces in the RRF, it seems difficult to believe the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff would surrender such an asset.

Airborne (VDV)

The core of the Russian RRF is built around the VDV, with approximately 35,000 paratroopers. The Russian VDV is significantly different than its Western counterparts, structurally the VDV is a mechanized force and is divided between parachute and air assault units. In terms of function, the Russian VDV fulfills many of the same roles as those in the West, but also fills another niche not filled by Western air-

borne forces, that of a reliable enforcer for politically sensitive operations. This role began with the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 to quell the uprising. VDV units began quietly occupying Hungary weeks before overt Soviet action began, and after the commencement of hostilities they gained a reputation for quickly and efficiently seizing objectives in an urban battle space in which conventional Soviet commanders were not accustomed. In all, 1,710 paratroopers were decorated in the Hungarian campaign, including four recipients of the Soviet Union's highest award, the Hero of the Soviet Union. In total, the VDV garnered 18 percent of the total medals awarded for the campaign, despite only having 6 percent of the troops.

The VDV actions in Hungary set a precedent in the Soviet Armed Forces of using the VDV as special operation forces are used in the West, namely to enter an area of operations discretely and then begin conducting operations. This pattern played out again in the 1968 Czech uprising, when the VDV flew into the Prague Airport in commercial aircraft and then began fanning out through the city with commandeered vehicles in order to quickly secure Czech command and control (C2) and communications infrastructure. This role of the VDV in Soviet times has undoubtedly been inherited by today's Russian VDV.¹⁴ Although exact details have yet to emerge, there has been reporting that VDV units are involved in current operations in Crimea, and if previous behaviors are indicators of current activities, it will likely be discovered that the VDV elements began arriving there well before masked gunmen started showing up on the streets of Crimea.¹⁵

The VDV are commanded by career airborne trooper Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, a popular, but somewhat controversial general who gained a reputation for aggressive action while commanding various units in the Russian North Caucasus. The battlefield is not the only place Shamanov has gained a reputation for aggressive strategy and tactics. He has been equally adept in his deal-

ings with the Ministry of Defense and General Staff to promote his beloved VDV. He has been the primary proponent of the RRF, and if it comes into being he will almost certainly be the first commander of these forces.¹⁶

Command and Control

The VDV headquarters will be expanded to provide C2 of the RRF, and there has been reporting that the 38th Signal Regiment at Medvesh Ozera will be elevated to a C2 brigade.¹⁷ What is less certain is where the RRF will fall as an organization in the Ministry of Defense hierarchy. Colonel General Shamanov has promoted the idea of placing them at the four-star level, putting the organization on par with the four operational strategic commands, among which the country is divided.¹⁸ Another possibility is that a newly formed RRF would simply attain the same position in the Russian Ministry of Defense hierarchy that the VDV currently occupy, that of an independent branch of the Armed Forces, commanded by a three-star level officer.




Figure 2. Proposed Elements of the Russian Rapid Reaction Forces.

Strategic Land Power

From a Russian perspective, if the RRF are put at the same level as the four regional operational strategic commands, by definition they will be considered as a functional strategic asset. Even if the RRF are placed in some other command, however, these forces will likely still be regarded as a strategic asset by Russia, because the Russians view the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare differently than the West. In the West these levels are typically defined by echelon size (battalion, corps, army, front, theater, task force, etc.), but in the Russian system these levels are more

nuanced. The Russian system defines them not by the echelon of the unit, but rather by the unit's scope of mission. For instance, a division operating under an army group would be considered to be acting at a tactical level, but if the same division was detached and began operating under a front-level command, it would be considered to be acting at the operational level. By the same token, a brigade is usually considered to act at the tactical level, but in a conflict with a much smaller opponent like in the Russo-Georgian War, a brigade could be a "war winner," and therefore be a strategic asset.¹⁹ Given that at least some components of the RRF will likely engage in most, if not all high profile missions, they will most likely be considered a strategic asset, and a true strategic land power.


CSTO Obligations

In Russia's capacity as the unofficial leader of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russian Federation established a Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) of CSTO member states, with a focus on Central Asia. "The agreement on the CRRF was signed on June 14, 2009 which aimed at repelling aggression, carrying out special operation[s] and fighting terrorism. The CRRF is also responsible for responding to emergency situations and providing emergency humanitarian assistance, reinforcing armed forces covering national borders and guarding member-states' public and military facilities, and resolving challenges identified by the CSTO's Collective Security Council."²⁰ The Russian Federation satisfies its CSTO obligations with two VDV units (98th Airborne Division and the 31st Air Assault Brigade) that are dual-hatted as being both in the Russian and CSTO RRF.

The 2010 riots in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, caused something of a crisis when Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva requested CSTO assistance to quell the violence. The request was officially denied because it was solely an "internal matter," but there was later some back pedaling that the situation could have been handled differently.²¹ The lesson for Russia in this instance may well have been that although multilateral security organizations appeal to a sense of international cooperation, they are often not expedient, and consensus does not always reach the right (Russian-desired) outcome. In short, multilateral cooperation is good, but not always reliable, requiring the Russian Federation to keep its own assets to handle such situations, if required.

Outlook

Despite a November announcement from Colonel General Shamanov that the RRF would be operational this year, there has been no reporting as of yet on the establishment of the RRF.²² The official rollout of the RRF may have been put on hold due to the crisis in Ukraine or other unrelated

matters. As some reporting explains, the core components the proposed RRF (VDV, Naval Infantry, SPETSNAZ) are already operating in Crimea, raising the possibility that the RRF have already been activated and Crimea may be their first campaign.²³ 

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
Doctrine Update 3-14

**Mission Command Center of Excellence
US Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
24 JULY 2014**

This edition of FM 2-0, Intelligence Operations, distinctly differs from that of previous editions. Previous editions (titled Intelligence) established the fundamentals of military intelligence. This version focuses on the tactics used in the intelligence warfighting function. FM 2-0 also contains the descriptions of the Army tactical tasks included in the intelligence warfighting function, doctrine on language support, and doctrine on employing remote sensors.

FM 2-0 describes how military intelligence units and collection assets conduct intelligence operations to accomplish the tasks developed during information collection. Intelligence operations are the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements (ADRP 2-0). At the tactical level, intelligence operations, reconnaissance, security operations, and surveillance are the four primary tasks conducted as part of information collection. Intelligence operations collect information about the activities and resources of the threat or information concerning the characteristics of an operational environment.

This publication is located at the following link: https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_c/pdf/fm2_0.pdf




FM 3-07, Stability, contributes to the Army and joint community by addressing employment of forces in the conduct of operations focused on stability. FM 3-07 expounds on the doctrinal fundamentals and concepts established in ADRP 3-0 and ADRP 3-07. Readers must be familiar with ADRP 3-07, which establishes the doctrinal fundamentals for the conduct of operations focused on stability.

This publication is located at the following link: http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_07.pdf



FM 3-16, The Army in Multinational Operations, blends key points of JP 3-16 into its approach to ensure consideration by Army elements of a joint force and addresses the Army's roles and functions in a multinational operation. While North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies' Program have achieved some levels of standardization in certain areas, no comprehensive common doctrine exists among the armies. This publication does not fill this gap. However, it will help the multinational commander understand and develop solutions to create an effective fighting force.

This publication is located at the following link: http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_16.pdf



Understanding and Navigating Social Relations in the Operational Environment

by Allison Abbe

Introduction

As key support to command decision making, intelligence professionals need to make sense of the human element in regions of U.S. interest. As Major General Flynn noted about Afghanistan, intelligence professionals not only have to make sense of enemy actions, but also extend their focus to include the broader political and socio-cultural environment, including civilians.¹ Whether conducting analysis for intelligence preparation of the battlefield or building relationships with counterparts in security assistance, social structures and relationships are an essential component of that broader environment.

Unfortunately, using one's own perspective as a lens or relying on the Golden Rule can result in mirror imaging, misleading intelligence personnel into an illusion of understanding. When this mirror imaging is projected into analysis or into decision making with partners, costly errors can result, with effort and resources directed into courses of action that are ineffective at best, and counter-productive at worst. As General Cone noted, "What may be the standard for us is not necessarily useful or welcomed with our host nation partners. So, shaping also entails tailoring our delivery of security assistance to our counterparts in ways appropriate for their culture and military capabilities."²

For that reason, intelligence professionals would benefit from sharpening their cultural acuity to better understand the human terrain. *Cultural acuity* refers to the ability to form accurate assessments about social and situational dynamics in an unfamiliar cultural environment.³ Having a foundational set of culture-general concepts can help guide those assessments as new information is encountered. Foundational concepts can also suggest questions to guide further observation by providing insight into the values, thoughts, beliefs, and behaviors of culturally-diverse populations. This article introduces one set of concepts for making sense of social relationships across cultures.

Relational Models Theory

Drawing from both psychology and anthropology, Alan Fiske identified four relational principles that people use across cultures to organize social relationships.⁴ Although

cultures differ in how they apply them, these four principles or models can be found in virtually all cultures: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing.

Within a specific culture, people often use a common principle for organizing certain types of relationships. This shared application of principles helps coordinate social interactions, guide moral judgments, and make sense of the social environment and one's place in it. Below are descriptions of each relational model and examples of how each may be applied in U.S. culture. Further comparison of the four models appears in Table 1.

- 1. Communal sharing (CS).** Communal sharing emphasizes commonalities among members of a group. Members of the group see themselves as sharing as essential characteristic, such as blood ties. Membership is celebrated through ritual, and tradition is valued. Resources are shared among members of the group with little concern for who contributed what or how much each person is using. In the U.S., communal sharing is often limited to kinship relationships with one's immediate family or children, and sometimes extended to romantic relationships.
- 2. Authority ranking (AR).** In authority ranking, social relationships are organized according to one's position in a hierarchy. Although there can be multiple hierarchies, position within a hierarchy is strictly linear in order. Higher rank is of greater value. The basis for hierarchy may be culture specific, but age- and gender-based hierarchies are common across cultures.⁵ Many institutions in the U.S. are organized according to authority ranking, including the military, with tenure or expertise dictating where individuals are placed in the hierarchy.
- 3. Equality matching (EM).** Relationships structured by equality matching are characterized by balance. Turn-taking and reciprocity are common. Distributing resources evenly or by coin flip and principles like one person/one vote are examples

of applying equality matching to guide relations. Friendships and many co-worker relationships are structured according to equality matching—for example, friends often reciprocate invitations to each other’s homes or take turns driving in a carpool.

4. Market pricing (MP). Market pricing refers to relations governed by proportionality, rates, and ratios. Utility, efficiency, and cost-benefit ratios are common considerations in these relationships. Economic exchange is the most common basis for market pricing, but it may include other forms of exchange. Compensation for work in the private sector is governed by market pricing.

contributing whatever cash they have handy, and drinking whatever amount they choose (CS). Alternatively, the most senior (or most junior) member of the group could treat the group (AR), either buying everyone a drink of their choice or making the choice for them. As another option, each person could take a turn buying a round of drinks for everyone (EM), or could contribute equal amounts to a communal pitcher (EM+CS). In still another alternative, each person could order and pay for their own individual drinks (MP). In such situations, the choice of relational principle can indicate group member’s orientations to each other, as well as what kind of relationship they expect to maintain in the future.

Model Mismatch across Cultures

Table 1 Comparison of Relational Models

	Communal Sharing	Authority Ranking	Equality Matching	Market Pricing
Distribution of Resources.	Resources are pooled without tracking individual use or contribution.	Those of higher rank have more control over distribution.	Resources are divided evenly; everyone gets an equal share.	Resources are divided according to a ratio or rule.
Groups and social identity.	Identity is based on common bonds, such as shared ancestry or shared fate.	Identity is determined by status in a hierarchy.	Group identity is based on equal status with peers.	Identity is based on economic roles or interests, such as one’s profession.
Conflict motivated by:	Group honor.	Dominance or subordination.	Retribution.	Economic interests.
Morality. ⁶		Respect and obedience.	Equality and fairness	Proportionality and utility.

In intercultural settings, mismatches in relational principles are common and are often a source of confusion and conflict. Inadvertent mirror imaging can cause intelligence professionals to misunderstand the goals and motivations of actors in other cultures. For example, giving contracts to family members may appear to be corruption or nepotism from a U.S. perspective, because market pricing is the dominant principle in U.S. contracting. But in some cultures,

Each relational model is oriented in opposition to another model, such that the theory includes two pairs of models.⁷ Whereas authority ranking is vertical, equality matching is horizontal. Whereas market pricing involves relationships that are “cool,” often governed by economic or other interests, communal sharing relations are “warm,” and the relationship is an end in itself.

In a complex relationship that continues over time, multiple relational models may be used at the same time. For example, a team or unit may apply different models depending on the issue. Whereas tasks and orders may be structured hierarchically (AR), everyone in the office may be expected to contribute to a coffee fund at their discretion with no limits on or tracking of consumption (CS). While on deployment, the members of a unit may evenly distribute responsibility for certain duties, with everyone contributing an equal amount of time on shift (EM). In maintaining equipment, market pricing (MP) may be applied, with Soldiers required to pay for equipment that they lose or damage.

In addition, a single activity can be carried out according to any of these four principles. For example, consider going out for drinks with a group. You could opt to buy pitchers of beer, with everyone sharing the same beverage,

the same behavior may be governed by other relational principles.

Distribution of resources may be governed by a system like neopatrimonialism, whereby powerful individuals use state resources to bolster non-state systems of patronage.⁸ Such systems may involve elements of both market pricing and authority ranking to a degree that seems unfamiliar or unacceptable to Americans. Furthermore, in some regions, communal sharing may be more broadly applied than in the U.S. Where communal bonds are shared with a broader group and communal sharing extends into contracting practices, individuals may carry an obligation to assist their family members or ethnic group in matters of economic interest. In such a case, awarding contracts to family members may not only be considered ethically acceptable (unlike in the U.S.), it may be considered unethical for individuals in power not to show family preference.

Mismatches can be particularly troublesome in domains where the U.S. military and the other region or nation apply opposing relational models. For example, in the example above, the U.S. applies market pricing and the partner culture applies communal sharing—a cool-warm discrepancy. Similar mismatches can occur when the U.S. applies equal-

ity matching and the other culture applies authority ranking or vice versa – a horizontal-vertical discrepancy. These mismatches can be very frustrating on both sides, producing perceptions of unethical or immoral behavior. Other examples of such mismatches are described below.

Communal Sharing vs. Market Pricing: Cool-Warm Discrepancies

In some countries, the threshold for a friendship based on communal sharing may be lower. As a result, befriending a counterpart may carry more obligation than an American service member is accustomed to with his or her friendships with other Americans, who may apply more equality matching. In the workplace, American personnel may be more accepting of cool relationships based on shared professional interests (MP), whereas counterparts may expect greater warmth (CS). This mismatch sometimes occurs when a Soldier rotates out and is replaced by another Soldier of similar rank and specialization (EM and MP). To the U.S., these Soldiers are equal and interchangeable, but to a counterpart applying communal sharing, the prior relationship may not readily transfer to the newcomer and may have to be built anew.

In another example, in some Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, work relationships often incorporate more communal sharing and authority ranking than in the U.S., with work supervisors playing a familial role with subordinates. When supervisors provide advice on personal matters, subordinates are expected to follow that advice. In contrast, in the U.S., a supervisor's advice on personal matters may be perceived as optional. Thus, if an American in advisory role makes casual remarks about preferences and opinions, these comments could be perceived as directive, potentially causing confusion or distress for an advisee on the receiving end.

Authority Ranking vs. Equality Matching: Horizontal-Vertical Discrepancies

U.S. personnel encountered many examples of horizontal-vertical differences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where age- and gender-based hierarchies are more pronounced than in the U.S. Engagement with leaders in those communities sometimes required adapting to a more vertical orientation for the purposes of the mission. In some anecdotes, advisors sometimes reported to pretend holding a higher rank than they actually held in order to be more influential.

In other countries, U.S. personnel may encounter cultural practices that are less vertical (AR) and more horizontal (EM) than U.S. practices, or practices that use a different basis for authority than is common in the West. For example,

Rwanda's post-genocide *gacaca* courts have been criticized by Western observers for allowing too much community participation and relying too little on formal legal authorities.⁹ These courts were based on a traditional, communal form of justice, allowing broad participation from anyone within the community affected by the alleged crimes. Judges were elders drawn from the community rather than legal experts or representatives of a more centralized authority. An observer focusing on the cool justice of formal law may overlook the function of the *gacaca* courts from a Rwandan perspective, which prioritized reconciliation within the community.

Applying Relational Models

When you recognize that members of a community or group are using a different relational model to guide interactions, then you can more readily adjust your own thinking to match theirs, making more accurate situational assessments and forecasts about future actions. In interacting with members of a foreign military, considering what relational model your counterpart may be using to structure your relationship can help you determine how best to adapt your behavior to be effective. It may be more helpful to adopt their relational frame than to assert your own. For example, if your status as an American or your religious affiliation makes you an 'outsider' to someone applying a communal sharing orientation, it may help to identify a basis for claiming 'insider' status in another way, such as some shared values or shared interests.

In addition to offering a conceptual framework for general cultural understanding, the relational models can also be used to better understand a specific country or region. As noted in the examples above drawn from U.S. practices, different relational models appear within a country and may reflect diversity among social structures within a country. Training alone cannot cover all the relevant social, political, and other structures in a specific operational environment. Relational models can encourage further information seeking to build on and refine one's regional knowledge and expertise through first-hand observations and experience.

In observing the human terrain in another country, it can sometimes be tempting, but misleading or ineffective, to assert a more familiar relational frame. For example, the rational actor model is a common application of market pricing to understanding political decision making.¹⁰ Cost-benefit analysis and value maximization are common instantiations of this model applied in defense analyses, as well as in other sectors. Assumptions of rational choice are so pervasive in Western thinking that they can mislead U.S. observers into a false sense of understanding, when they assume that de-

cision makers in other countries follow similar principles. Though useful, this model can blind intelligence professionals to other, less instrumental motives (such as identities) that may be equally or more important.


The four relational models provide a useful lens for making sense of an unfamiliar cultural environment, but as with any social lens, caution is needed to prevent overgeneralizing. Even within a particular culture, there are differences in how relational principles are applied across different groups and organizations. Thus, one cannot infer from observing one model in action that all similar relationships in a country will operate according to the same model. Just as in the U.S., some settings and subcultures may be more hierarchical or more communal than others. For example, military cultures across countries share some similarities to each other and show critical differences from their corresponding civilian cultures.¹¹

Furthermore, some countries may have tighter norms around relational structures than others.¹² In 'tight' countries, such as Pakistan, social norms are strongly enforced. In contrast, in 'looser' countries, such as Brazil, deviance is tolerated and a broader range of behavior is considered acceptable. In tight cultures, one could expect to find more consistency in social relations, with stronger rules and expectations about how one should behave in certain relationships. In loose cultures, relationships may be less predictable and vary depending on the individuals involved.

The relational models are a useful set of tools for understanding relationships and social structures in many cultures. This simple framework can be readily included in training and education, and a training product incorporating these principles is currently under development.¹³ *CultureGear* is computer-based training that aims to enhance company-grade and noncommissioned officers' ability to assess and shape the socio-cultural environment in support of the mission. *CultureGear* combines principles of Naturalistic Decision Making with a well-established cultural training method to improve cultural acuity, regardless of the region or country.

The field of Naturalistic Decision Making examines expertise development, emphasizing on real-world learning in high-stakes, dynamic, and uncertain contexts.¹⁴ *CultureGear* combines Naturalistic Decision Making with a training method called the culture assimilator, which uses cultural scenario-based learning activities. Developed with defense funding in the 1960s and 70s, the culture assimilator has accumulated extensive evidence of its effectiveness in cultural training.¹⁵ Trainees practice making cultural assess-

ments in realistic scenarios and receive feedback. Culture assimilators have been developed and successfully used for culture-general and country-specific training purposes.

This training approach contributes to the development of multiple, inter-related aspects of cross-cultural competence. Though *CultureGear* targets cultural acuity specifically, the conceptual frameworks also support the overlapping skills of perspective taking, cultural sense making, and cultural relativism. A combination of cultural and regional training with immersive, inter-cultural experiences is likely the best approach to developing these skills and abilities. They provide the cognitive tools that intelligence professionals need to navigate the diverse range of social structures they will encounter in the operational environment. 

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
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What is the UMI? Where is it? How do I use it?



The **University of Military Intelligence (UMI)** is a training portal of MI courses maintained by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona for use by authorized military (Active, Reserve, National Guard) and non-military (e.g., DOD civilian, Department of Homeland Security, other U.S. Government agencies) personnel. UMI provides many self-paced training courses, MOS training, and career development courses. In addition, the UMI contains a Virtual Campus that is available to users with an abundance of Army-wide resources and links related to MI: language training, cultural awareness, resident courses, MI Library, functional training, publications, and more.

UMI is undergoing improvement and expansion to become available for any approved MI courses (from any U.S. Army MI source) that are designed to be offered as Distributed Learning (dL) via the UMI technologically advanced online delivery platform(s).

UMI online registration is easy and approval of use normally takes only a day or two after a user request is submitted. Go to <http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.army.mil>, read and accept the standard U.S. Government Authorized Use/Security statement, and then follow the instructions to register or sign in. The UMI Web pages also provide feedback and question forms that can be submitted to obtain more information.

Use of the UMI requires:

- User registration (it's free!).
- An active government email address (such as .mil or .gov).
- A sponsor (if user has no .mil or .gov email address) who can approve user's access to training material.
- Verification by UMI of user's government email address.
- Internet access. UMI courses require Internet Explorer 7 or previous browser and Adobe Reader, Adobe Flash Player, Adobe Shockwave Player, Windows Media Player, and/or a recent version of MS Office.



The Military Intelligence Corps 2013 Hall of Fame Inductees



The Hall of Fame Class of 2013 was chosen in the fall of 2012 and would normally have been inducted during a ceremony in June 2013. However, due to sequestration and other budget concerns, the 2013 induction ceremony had to be postponed. In 2014, MG Ashley was honored, therefore, to induct both the 2013 and 2014 classes into the Hall of Fame.



Command Sergeant Major Franklin A. Saunders, U.S. Army, (Retired)

Command Sergeant Major Franklin A. Saunders entered the U.S. Army on 14 November 1983 and spent the first ten years of his Army career in Field Artillery and Special Forces. In 1993, he reclassified as an MOS 96U, Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Operator. His first intelligence assignments were as an Intelligence Analyst with the 7th Special Forces Group, Platoon Sergeant for Company D, 304th MI Battalion, and then First Sergeant of the Army's first tactical UAV Company at Fort Hood, Texas. During his 27-year career, CSM Saunders served in a variety of leadership and staff positions to include: Squad Leader, Platoon Sergeant, Battalion Operations Sergeant, First Sergeant, Brigade Operations Sergeant Major, Battalion Command Sergeant Major, Brigade Command Sergeant Major, The Army War College and Carlisle Barracks Command Sergeant Major, and U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca and MI Corps Command Sergeant Major. He retired in 2010 from the position of U.S. Army G2 Command Sergeant Major.

As both a trainer and a leader, CSM Saunders had significant impacts on the MI Corps. He turned tired programs of instruction into relevant hands-on training that prepared MI Soldiers to enter a unit ready to work. He was instrumental in developing Signals Intelligence training that employed modern signals and in merging traditional imagery training with full motion video. He was one of the first leaders to get the Army's UAV program out of the starting block, developing operators; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and the operational concepts for their employment. He advocated for increased Human Intelligence training, the Distributed Common Ground System-Army across our formations, persistent surveillance platforms, and the Every Soldier is a Sensor program, all of which were later validated by deployed commanders. His constant focus on deployed Warfighters enabled the MI Corps to provide trained and ready Soldiers along with the best Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities.

CSM Saunders repeatedly demonstrated steadfast leadership, selfless devotion to duty, and focus on the Soldier. As the Command Sergeant Major for the Army Intelligence Center,



he updated organizational and Military Occupation Specialty structures to include the initiation of Company Intelligence Support Teams and Multifunctional Teams. When he became the Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G2, he championed every aspect of the Army G2's mission and vision to transform MI and to rebalance the Army MI force.

CSM Saunders bettered the Profession of Arms. In the words of CSM Todd Holiday, U.S. Army, Retired, who nominated CSM Saunders to the Hall of Fame, "He is a mentor against which all other mentors should be measured. His success as a leader shaped each organization to which he was assigned, as well as Military Intelligence Soldiers for generations to come."

CSM Saunders' awards include the Distinguished Service Medal; Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters; Meritorious

Service Medal with four Oak Leaf Clusters, and the Army Commendation Medal with four Oak Leaf Clusters. Badges awarded include the Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, Kuwaiti Parachute Badge, and the German Marksmanship

Badge. He is a member of both the Sergeant Audie Murphy and Sergeant Morales clubs and recipient of the Field Artillery Order of Saint Barbara Medal and the MI Corps' Knowlton Award. ✨

Brevet Brigadier General George H. Sharpe

George Sharpe was born in Kingston, New York. He graduated from Rutgers in 1847 and then studied law at Yale University. When the Civil War began in 1861, Sharpe raised a company of volunteers for the 20th New York Infantry and fought in the first Battle of Bull Run. Sixteen months later, he raised the 120th New York Infantry and was appointed its Colonel.

In February 1863, Major General Joseph Hooker, Commander of the Union's Army of the Potomac, established the Bureau of Military Information (BMI) under the direction of Colonel Sharpe. Sharpe, who would become a Brevet Brigadier General by the end of the war, was conceivably the most effective intelligence officer of the American Civil War.

Upon assuming leadership of the BMI, Sharpe built an all-source intelligence service that collected information from a wide array of sources and then provided timely analysis of it to the commander. Unlike other ad hoc information-gathering groups of the era, Sharpe's organization was a permanent part of the Army of the Potomac commander's staff. Sharpe's bureau consisted of seventy to eighty men, mostly scouts, who provided the basis of Sharpe's knowledge of the location and movements of the enemy. Sharpe also knew the importance of specialization in an intelligence agency. He hired Mr. John Babcock, a civilian, as his chief interrogator. Babcock kept the BMI records, sketched maps, and compiled the Order of Battle charts. Captain John McEntee organized scouting operations, assisted with interrogations, and established, when necessary, "branch offices" for the BMI.

Sharpe obtained valuable information from a number of methods and sources, including systematic interrogations of enemy prisoners and deserters; reports from cavalry reconnaissance; Signal Corps observation posts; captured correspondence; communication intercepts, and newspapers. In short, Sharpe developed an all-source collection effort, one of the first in American military intelligence. When Sharpe reported to his army commander, he did not present raw data, but a careful and thoughtful analysis of the enemy and terrain situation. The mass of information was collated, analyzed, and presented in daily written reports to the commanders of the Army of the Potomac, and later, General U.S. Grant, Commander-in-Chief of all Union forces. One historian noted, the commanders received "not an assemblage of undigested bits of news seemingly of equal weight but true intelligence, the finished product of systematic information analysis."

Sharpe's BMI had several notable intelligence successes, although they did not all translate into battlefield successes. In



the Chancellorsville campaign, his section provided an extraordinarily accurate estimate of the location and strength of the Confederate army, an advantage that was lost when Union tactical reconnaissance failed to detect the Confederate flanking movement. Sharpe's intelligence proved to be a major factor in the Union Army's timely pursuit of the enemy during the Gettysburg campaign and its remaining on the battlefield until victory was won. Finally, in 1864 and 1865, Sharpe supplied critical intelligence to Union leadership on the enemy's movements, strengths, and intentions culminating in the Union victory at Petersburg, Virginia.

From his appointment as the BMI chief to the end of the war, Brevet Brigadier General Sharpe demonstrated effective leadership of an intelligence service that provided the Army's senior commanders with accurate and timely information about the enemy. Through his efforts, Sharpe can be credited for establishing and directing the first modern intelligence service in the history of Army Intelligence. ✨

Colonel William “Jerry” Tait, U.S. Army, Retired (Deceased)

Colonel Tait was a 1980 Distinguished Military Graduate of the University of Alabama, where he received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Communication and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in Military Intelligence through the Reserve Officer Training Corps.

Colonel Tait’s 30-year career was filled with challenging assignments during which he made a significant mark on the MI Corps. In one of his earliest assignments with the 7th MI Company, 7th Infantry Division, Fort Ord, California, he was instrumental in creating the 107th MI Battalion, one of the Army’s first Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) battalions. In 1987, then Captain Tait served as Action Officer for the activation of the Military Intelligence Corps. Besides planning, coordinating and synchronizing all events associated with the MI Corps’ activation worldwide, he was responsible for developing the MI Corps’ entry into the Army regimental system.

Captain Tait was next assigned to the 66th MI Brigade in Munich, Germany, where he spent four years as a Battalion S3, Brigade Executive Officer, and then Commander of the 5th MI Company, leading the overt intelligence operations that predicted and then exploited the fall of the Berlin Wall. Following graduation from Command and General Staff College in 1993, Major Tait was assigned to Fort Hood, beginning a close association with III Corps that lasted his remaining 17 years in uniform. He served in various positions in III Corps, including, as a Colonel, the Corps G2 for five years from 2003-2008.

During this time, he deployed to Iraq with III Corps Headquarters twice, both times serving as the Director of Intelligence (CJ2) of Multi-National Corps-Iraq. He led the Intelligence Battlefield Functional Area at the operational level in Iraq during the 2007-2008 surge in forces, which he had helped plan the previous year. The Surge included an unprecedented infusion of intelligence capabilities and systems. Many of these had been developed or conceived during the FORCE XXI digitization and modernization initiatives led by Lieutenant Colonel Tait when he was assigned to the 4th Infantry Division, then the Army’s “Experimental Force,” from 1997 to 2001. Colonel Tait also played a key role in developing and advocating for the Counter-IED Operations/Intelligence Integration Center concept; the Joint Intelligence Operations Capability-Iraq that is now part of the Distributed Common Ground Station-Army, Company Intelligence Support Teams; Weapons Intelligence Teams; Cryptologic Support Teams, and Task Force



Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize (ODIN), among other innovative capabilities, all of which have forever changed intelligence operations.

After 30 years as a Military Intelligence officer, Colonel Tait retired as Executive Officer of III Corps in 2010. After retirement, Jerry Tait continued to serve as a member of the Army Science Board which advises and makes recommendations to the Army leadership on scientific and technological matters.

Colonel Jerry Tait passed away on 14 September 2013. Colonel Richard Allenbaugh, US Army, Retired, who nominated Colonel Tait to the Hall of Fame, stated, “His achievements as an MI officer distinguished him as being among the very best intelligence professionals to ever serve in uniform.”

Colonel Tait’s awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal; Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster; Bronze Star Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster; Meritorious Service Medal with six Oak Leaf Clusters; Army Commendation Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster; Army Achievement Medal with four Oak Leaf Clusters, and the Parachutist Badge. 🌟

Mr. Robert J. Winchester, Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service-5

After graduating from the University of Paris, La Sorbonne, and Kings College, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, Robert Winchester was drafted into the U.S. Army in 1968 and served as an Intelligence Analyst with the 199th Light Infantry Brigade and the 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) in Vietnam. His intelligence skills and leadership earned him rapid promotion to staff sergeant before his honorable discharge in 1971. Returning to his educational pursuits, Mr. Winchester earned Master's Degrees in European Studies from Illinois State University and the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium, as well as a Law Degree from Temple University.

In 1977, Mr. Winchester began a seven-year tenure with the Central Intelligence Agency where he served in positions of increasing responsibility culminating as the Assistant General Counsel to the Operations Law Division and Chief of Liaison to the US House of Representatives. His accomplishments with the CIA were numerous. Of particular interest to Army MI, he played a pivotal role in the enactment of public law prohibiting exposure of covert agents wherever they are stationed.

Beginning in 1984 until his retirement in 2010, Mr. Winchester was the appointed Special Assistant for Legislative Affairs to the Secretary of the Army, providing support to sensitive investigations and Special Access Programs. He served as the Legislative Counsel to the Army Leadership, the Army G2, and the commanding generals of both the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.

For 26 years, Mr. Winchester served as the personal liaison between the Department of the Army and the U.S. Congress, resulting in successful and long-lasting support for MI Soldiers around the world. As the voice of Army MI in Congress, Mr. Winchester avidly supported Congressional oversight of the U.S. Intelligence Community and promoted proactive interaction to keep oversight committees fully and currently informed of Army MI capabilities and requirements. He often took members of Congress to view first-hand the value of intelligence missions to national security and the stellar quality of MI Soldiers and officers in the field. Mr. Winchester's avid advocacy of Army Human Intelligence led directly to the establishment of a strong base of vital intelligence capabilities, for which he was honored with the Intelligence Community's National Intelligence Medal of Achievement in 1993.

In summarizing Mr. Winchester's contributions to the MI Corps, nominator Lieutenant General Richard Zahner, U.S.



Army (Retired), stated, "Mr. Winchester's unique combination of intellect, experience, and leadership produced results and impact equaled by very few members of our Army MI community. His fingerprints are found on virtually every system, project, program, and innovation within Army MI over the period from 1984-2010. More importantly, he was the foundation of Army MI's outreach to the Congress and caused pure magic to happen time after time in terms of gaining Congressional support, addressing possible contention quickly, and telling the Army MI story with clarity, context, energy, and humor."

Mr. Winchester's awards include the Senior Executive Service Special Achievement Award; Presidential Rank Award-Meritorious Executive; National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal; Army Exceptional Civilian Service Medal; National Intelligence Medal of Achievement; the Secretary of the Army Decoration for Exceptional Service; Bronze Star Medal; Army Commendation Medal, and the Knowlton Award. 🌟

The Military Intelligence Corps

2014

Hall of Fame Inductees




Colonel Kurush F. Bharucha-Reid, U.S. Army (Deceased)

Colonel Kurush Bharucha-Reid, fondly known as “KB,” enlisted in the Army under the Special Forces enlistment option in 1973. His skill at leading Soldiers and training foreign armies in small-unit weapons and special operations tactics resulted in rapid promotion to Sergeant First Class. In 1983, KB was selected to attend Officer Candidate School and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in Military Intelligence (MI).

In 1984, KB returned to the Republic of Korea (ROK) to serve as Chief of the Combined Liaison Team, 501st MI Brigade, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. KB expertly led this one-of-kind special operations organization which provided total immersion training to a small team of ROK assets capable of performing sensitive and high-risk intelligence collection missions in the event of major military hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.

In 1987 then Captain Bharucha-Reid was selected for membership into the MI Excepted Career Program (GREAT SKILL) and, for the next 23 years, pursued the most challenging and sensitive Army MI assignments. He served as Regional Desk Officer and Special Assistant for Military Affairs for a national-level intelligence agency with focus on East Asian and Near East operations, commander of a Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service base in Bosnia, and Director of Current Operations of a Tier 1 Special Mission Unit. During this latter assignment he deployed to Bosnia again as CJ2 for Combined Joint Task Force Fervent Archer. In 2002, KB returned to the U.S. to stand up and command a sensitive HUMINT collection detachment under the Defense HUMINT Service and deployed to Afghanistan as the first HUMINT case officer assigned to provide direct support to the U.S. Special Operations Command. KB deployed again to Afghanistan in 2004 as the Commander of a Defense HUMINT base that conducted critical HUMINT activities during surge operations to support Afghanistan’s first democratic elections.

Beginning in 2005, KB deployed to Iraq as a Senior HUMINT Advisor in a sensitive inter-agency coordination cell. He re-




turned to the U.S. later that year to serve as Chief of the Military Group and Senior Department of Defense Instructor at a prestigious inter-agency strategic intelligence training institution. In May 2009, KB assumed command of the US Army Field Support Center (AFSC). It was during this assignment that KB lost his brave fight against pancreatic cancer. He was laid to rest at Arlington National Cemetery on 9 September 2010.

In summing up the extraordinary impact Colonel Bharucha-Reid had on the MI Corps, Colonel Don Fox, U.S. Army, Retired, stated, “KB’s entire Army career was spent in the shadows where he never sought the recognition that he deserved.... His numerous deployments and command assignments are indicative of the confidence that U.S. Army leadership had in his exceptional abilities to succeed in the most demanding opera-

tional environments. ...[KB's] legacy will endure as an extraordinary Army MI officer who was Always Out Front."

In October 2011, the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) Field Operating Base in Kabul, Afghanistan, was renamed Camp K.B. Reid in honor of Colonel Reid's memory; and in 2012, the newly established DIA training facility in Norfolk, Virginia, was dedicated as the Reid Center. Although both are now closed, they illustrate the impact KB had on the Intelligence Community. In February 2014, the HUMINT Training Joint Center of Excellence established an Honor Graduate Program to recognize outstanding student performance in both the Source Operations Course and the Defense Advanced Tradecraft Course. Army Soldiers

and civilians are now awarded the Colonel Kurush Bharucha-Reid Award for Excellence in HUMINT Tradecraft.

Colonel Bharucha-Reid's awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal; Bronze Star Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster; Defense Meritorious Service Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters; Meritorious Service Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters; Joint Service Commendation Medal; Army Commendation Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster; Army Achievement Medal, and the Ranger, Special Forces, Pathfinder, Master Parachutist, and Military Free Fall Jump Master badges. 

Colonel Thomas G. Fergusson, U.S. Army, (Retired)

Colonel Thomas G. Fergusson, who was born at Fort Huachuca and raised in an Army family, was commissioned in Military Intelligence (MI) after graduation from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1965. Following completion of the MI Basic and Tactical Surveillance Officer Courses in 1966, Lieutenant Fergusson was assigned to the 131st Aviation Company (Aerial Surveillance) near Hue, Vietnam where he led the imagery analysis platoon and participated in more than 100 combat reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam and Laos aboard the OV-1 Mohawk.

Returning from Vietnam in 1968, Captain Fergusson attended the MI Officers Advanced Course, then served at MI Branch, Officer Personnel Directorate as an assignments officer. He was the first captain selected for a Permanent Change of Station assignment at MI Branch. In 1971, Captain Fergusson was assigned to Laos as Executive Officer of a unique MI unit providing all-source analysis and targeting support to the U.S. Ambassador and the Country Team. Afterwards, he attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and Duke University, where he earned both a Master's and Doctorate degree in military history, before joining the Department of History at West Point.

From 1978 to 1984, he served back-to-back tours as S2, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Bliss, Texas, and G2, 3rd Infantry Division at Wurzburg, Germany. As Senior Intelligence Officer of these two major combat units, he played a vital role in implementing and evaluating the Army's new Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) doctrine and fielding new tactical CEWI systems. While a Division G2, Lieutenant Colonel Fergusson developed an operations & organizational concept for a long range reconnaissance unit. In 1983, the 3rd Reconnaissance Company (Provisional) was activated as the U.S. Army, Europe test-bed for divisional long range reconnaissance units, a groundbreaking effort that led to the fielding of long range surveillance (LRS) units in all active Army divisions.

In 1984, Lieutenant Colonel Fergusson was the first MI officer to join the faculty of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. As a SAMS seminar leader, he served as teacher, mentor, and evaluator for 12



of the Army's most promising young majors each year. He was the first commander of the 532nd MI Battalion (Operations), 501st MI Brigade, activated in Korea in 1986. In 1990, after a year as Army Senior Fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, Colonel Fergusson took command of the 500th MI Brigade, the Army's Pacific theater MI brigade, at Camp Zama, Japan. While accomplishing its challenging intelligence and counterintelligence missions under Fergusson's command at the strategic and operational levels, the 500th played a leading role in developing the new Army Intelligence and Security Command force structure in the Pacific theater.

Colonel Fergusson retired in 1995 after 30 years of Army service and has continued to contribute to the Intelligence Community as a defense consultant. Since 2009, he has taught courses on critical thinking and intelligence analysis to thousands of young men and women from all 16 agencies of the Intelligence Community.

Colonel John G. Lackey III, U.S. Army, Retired, nominated Colonel Fergusson for induction in the MI Corps Hall of Fame. He called Colonel Fergusson “a visionary of intelligence architecture...and a mentor of the intelligence community.” He stated, [Colonel Fergusson’s] contribution to the Military Intelligence service is immeasurable.”

Colonel Fergusson’s awards include the Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster; Bronze Star Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters; Meritorious Service Medal with five Oak Leaf Clusters; Air Medal with four Oak Leaf Clusters; Joint Service Commendation Medal; two National Defense Service Medals, and the Vietnam Service Medal with seven campaign stars. ✨

Colonel Maxie L. McFarland, U.S. Army, Retired (Deceased)

Colonel McFarland’s career spanned 40 years of service as both a commissioned officer and a member of the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DISES). Commissioned through ROTC in 1972 from the University of Tennessee, Maxie McFarland first served as a Signal Officer and Infantry Officer before being re-branched as a Major into Military Intelligence in 1984. His first intelligence assignment was as Brigade S2, Field Station Berlin, followed by two battalion commands—one as Commander of the Operations Battalion at Field Station Berlin in 1987 and the second as Commander of the 312th Military Intelligence Battalion at Fort Hood, Texas, in 1991. During Operation DESERT STORM, Major McFarland deployed to the war zone as Special Assistant to the Army Central Command G2 to solve intelligence architecture issues and improve analytic acumen. Beginning in 1993, Colonel McFarland undertook a series of G2 and Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSINT) positions from Division to Army Command, including the Assistant Chief of Staff (ACoS), G2 for 2^d Armored Division; the ACoS, G2 of V Corps, and the DCSINT of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). While the V Corps G2, he spent a year directing the intelligence efforts of deployed forces in Bosnia implementing the Dayton Accords and then served as Executive Officer to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe/Commander Stabilization Forces who led the Bosnia effort in 1998.

After he retired from the Army in 2002, Colonel McFarland became the first ever DISES-coded G2 for TRADOC. During his nearly ten years at TRADOC, he established the Operational Environment Enterprise and the Training Brain Operations Center to replicate real-world complexity in training scenarios and to refine operational environment threat assessment products and analysis to ensure Soldiers were rapidly cognizant of emerging threats. His development of the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, Devil’s Advocate Red Team, the Human Terrain System, and the Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy made it possible to fill socio-cultural and language gaps identified by deployed commanders.

In 2006, the Chief of Staff of the Army asked Colonel McFarland to set up the intelligence architecture to support the newly formed Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization to assist in countering the critical threat against U.S. Soldiers. He established that organization’s highly regarded Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) to provide near-real time counter-IED support to deployed forces.



The result was a dramatic reduction in combat losses from IEDs. After setting up the COIC, Colonel McFarland returned to TRADOC until his retirement from government service in June of 2011. Colonel McFarland passed away on 8 November 2013.

In summing up the impact Colonel McFarland had on the MI Corps, Mr. Thomas Greco (DISES), the Deputy Chief of Staff G2 at TRADOC and nominator of Colonel McFarland, stated, “He has no equal in his ability to support commanders and provides a shining example for Intelligence professionals everywhere.... His vision and leadership on tough intelligence issues along with his willingness to see beyond the present into what should be make him one of the best intelligence officers the Corps has ever produced.”

Colonel McFarland’s awards and decorations include the Presidential Rank Award for Meritorious Executive; Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster; Meritorious Service Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters; Army Commendation Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters; Army Achievement Medal, and the Parachutist Badge.

Command Sergeant Major Michael W. Roberts, U.S. Army, Retired

Command Sergeant Major Michael Roberts enlisted in 1981 and, after training as a MI Systems Maintainer, he was assigned to the Counterintelligence/Signal Security Support Battalion of the 902^d MI Group at Fort Sam Houston. Thus began a 30-year Army career of an MI professional dedicated to the highest principles of leadership.

CSM Roberts spent many of his early years in Germany, first attached to the Division Automation Management Office of the 3rd Infantry Division, with sole responsibility for maintaining the Division Tactical Operations Center and associated intelligence and automation equipment modernization efforts. He also served as Platoon Sergeant at Field Station Berlin where he provided excellent leadership and training support of the maintenance mission. Roberts then spent several years at Fort Huachuca serving as the First Sergeant of the 306th MI Battalion; Battalion Sergeant Major for the 304th MI Battalion; Sergeant Major of the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Test Directorate, and Command Sergeant Major of the 309th MI Battalion. These assignments were broken up by a one-year tour as First Sergeant for Company A, 3rd MI Battalion, Camp Humphreys, Korea.

Beginning in 2005, he served two and one-half years as Command Sergeant Major for the 504th MI Brigade at Fort Hood, just after the unit returned from its deployment to Iraq. CSM Roberts was the driving force in reevaluating the brigade's mission and Mission Essential Task List, incorporating lessons learned from the brigade's Iraq service into its deployment preparation plans, and deploying the 504th again to Iraq. CSM Roberts' actions were instrumental in the brigade's ability to provide timely and actionable intelligence to the Battalion, Brigade, Division, and Multi-National Corps—Iraq commanders using human, signals, and imagery intelligence collection assets across the entire Iraqi theater. This included the integration of Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize (ODIN) into the organization in support of the counter-improvised explosive device (IED) effort.

CSM Roberts began his final assignment as the Command Sergeant Major for the 111th MI Brigade at Fort Huachuca in January 2008. In addition to transitioning the Brigade's Drill Sergeants to Platoon Sergeants, he oversaw the complete revision of the brigade's initial entry training and professional military education in light of an unprecedented increase in student load. Key to this revision was the integration of en-



listed, noncommissioned officer, and officer students into realistic training exercises to replicate the working environment in Afghanistan. He was a critical force in the development of MI's newest generation of military technicians and leaders.

Lieutenant Colonel James Chambers, U.S. Army, Retired, nominated CSM Roberts to the MI Corps Hall of Fame citing his "stellar military career over three decades." Chambers went on to state, "[Roberts], more than any other Soldier I have known, has been the model of the 'Always Out Front' ethic of the Military Intelligence Corps. His dedication, loyalty, and pride in our Corps are exemplary. His legacy lives on in the thousands of Soldiers he shaped, molded, and mentored during his career."

Command Sergeant Major Roberts' awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster; Bronze Star Medal; Defense Meritorious Service Medal; Meritorious Service Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters; Joint Service Commendation Medal; Army Commendation Medal with five Oak Leaf Clusters; Army Achievement Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters, and the Parachutist Badge. ✨

Moments In MI History

The Fourth Army Language School, 1941-1942

by Ruth Quinn, Staff Historian, USAICoE Command History Office

On November 1, 1941, the U.S. Fourth Army began a secret program to teach the Japanese language to military students. The first class met in an abandoned hangar on Crissy Field, at the Presidio of San Francisco. But before the students could move into the haphazard building that would become their home and classroom, they had to chase away the rats.

Who were these students and where did they come from? It was no secret that tensions between Japan and the U.S. were escalating. The rest of the world had been at war since 1939, and Japan was in direct conflict with the Soviet Union, China, and Europe. Alarmed, the U.S. Congress approved the first-ever peace-time draft in September 1940, with the first induction notices being issued that December. Draftees came from every ethnic and economic corner of America—including Japanese immigrants and their families. The “*Issei*,” first-generation Japanese, who had immigrated before 1924, and their American-born children, or “*Nisei*,” responded with pride. These Japanese-Americans hoped that military service would dispel once and for all any doubts about their loyalty to America, while at the same time they fervently hoped that war with their homeland would not be necessary.

Meanwhile, the Army was well aware of its need for linguists. According to historian James McNaughton, the Army “would need not just a few dozen officers, but hundreds and possibly thousands of interrogators and translators.” A former language attaché officer suggested using Nisei Soldiers as linguists, thinking that these men would already be fluent in Japanese and only need training in the military aspects of the language. At bases in Hawaii and the West Coast, about 3,000 Nisei were proudly wearing a U.S. Army uniform by the summer of 1941. It was from these ranks that the first class of students would come.

The Army tasked three officers: Captain Kai E. Rasmussen, a Danish immigrant who had spent four years in Japan learning the language and studying the Japanese Army; Captain

Joseph K. Dickey, who had served in the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo; and Lieutenant Colonel John Weckerling, a veteran of eight years in Japan. These three worked together from July to October 1941, interviewing 1,300 Nisei Soldiers from the West Coast to find “Nisei of unquestioned loyalty reasonably qualified in the Japanese language.” In four months of searching, they found 58. Two Caucasian students rounded out the first class to 60.

If finding Nisei students who were proficient in both English and Japanese and could pass a rigorous security check was difficult, finding instructors proved more so. Eventually, a cadre of four was located and selected. Only one had any experience teaching at a Japanese language school. For a library they had Rasmussen’s personal collection of textbooks from Tokyo: eight volumes of readers, one Japanese-English military dictionary, various Japanese and American training manuals, a compilation of Chinese characters, and a handful of other books. Their school was a shabby warehouse with no desks or chairs, only two old Army cots. They had two weeks to pull together a program of instruction and curriculum for the first class of 60 students, and convert the building into classroom and barracks. Weckerling managed to obtain \$2,000 from the Fourth Army Quartermaster and hired carpenters to build partitions to make three classrooms, offices, and barracks space inside the hangar.

When classes began, the instructors quickly realized that this was not going to be a refresher course for the majority of their students. Only 20 or so were fluent in Japanese. The rest had to start from scratch learning a language that is notoriously difficult for English speakers to learn. They studied day and night, having only Sundays off. They were looking forward to a much-needed break from their books on Sunday, December 7, 1941, when the terrible news came that Japan had bombed Pearl Harbor. The country reeled from the attack, often taking out their anger and suspicion on these students who were studying hard to defend their nation and were caught between the heritage of their homeland and loyalty to their country.

When President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 authorizing the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast, the Nisei at Crissy Field threw themselves into their studies, tormented, heartbroken, and energized all at once. But they could not stay in San Francisco. In April, the language school moved to Camp Savage, Minnesota. It was big enough to handle the recruitment of 150 new Nisei students to meet the new demands, and far enough from the bitter politics of the West Coast to welcome the Japanese-Americans into their community.

On May 1, 1942, the Fourth Army Language School held a small graduation ceremony for about 40 Nisei and two Caucasian reserve officers. Ten students were held back to serve as instructors. The rest were on their way within days to serve in overseas assignments. Before the end of the war, the school, which was renamed the Military Intelligence Service Language School, would train over 4,800 Japanese linguists.

The humble beginnings of the Fourth Army Language School would change in size, scope, name, and location, eventually becoming the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center, the premier language learning institution in the world. Today the school has 3,500 students at any given time, from all four branches of service, who are learning 23 basic course languages ranging in duration from 26 to 64 weeks. Through its language training detachments in 26 locations worldwide, the school trains another 35,000 students across the globe. What hasn't changed over the past 70-plus years is the school's vision to deliver the world's best culturally based foreign language education and training at the point of need. 🌸



This image shows the original classroom of the Fourth Army Intelligence School at the Presidio of San Francisco and is the only known image of the first class of students in class, which at the time was a military secret. The improvised nature of the school's first classroom is demonstrated by the rows of surplus theater seats seen in the foreground.



Camp Savage, MN students at the Japanese Language School.



ICoE Lessons Learned Branch

The Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE) Commanding General asked to see what the ICoE LL Team considers its Top Ten observations from the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). We share these ten categories of observations compiled from LL collection missions between Oct 2012 and July 2014 at the CONUS-based CTCs (National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP)) with you in this issue of MIPB.

Our findings may not reflect the same categories as those reported by Combat Training Center (CTC) personnel. This does not mean that we reject or seek to contradict their findings; it simply reflects limiting the categories in this column to those culled from our own direct observations or collection. All of the categories were compiled from raw observations of the ICoE LL Team that are specific to the mission/situation-specific context in which they were collected. These categories do not necessarily represent a statistically significant sample of all MI personnel or U.S. Army units and the categories are numbered for convenience and not prioritization of importance or observed frequency.

1. Unit Training Management.

(Note: The Unit Training Management aspect of the CTC rotations stems from interviewing personnel during CTC rotations who (often unsolicited) described the pre-deployment training or conditions which led to these observations.)

Training for CTC proficiency is a unit task. BCT S2s must be prepared to compete against other priorities to include the entire Intelligence Warfighting Function (IWfF) in intelligence enterprise training. Some BCT S2 training programs successfully included the battalion S2 sections, Company Intelligence Support Teams (CoISTs), MI Company (in the Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB)), and often the Scout Platoons. MI Leaders must be engaged in training the IWfF in their formations. A best-practice supporting superior CTC rotation performance is unit pre-deployment collective training which is comprehensive (incorporating all IWfF components), synchronized (integrating IWfF with other warfighting function training), and realistic (exercises the IWfF as it will be employed). BCTs which support the S2's role in ensuring the IWfF is sufficiently trained are routinely more successful than others at CTCs. BCT S2s are most effective in training if they are supported by the BCT Commander and subordinate battalion commanders in "wrapping their arms" around all of the IWfF elements to ensure MI training is adequately planned, resourced, conducted and assessed.

The BCT S2 is the senior intelligence officer in the BCT; but, does not control (own) all of the MI assets the BCT will employ in operations or training events. The MI Company is subordinated to the BEB. The CoISTs are organized (some-

times differently) in the subordinate battalions. Other MI assets which may be received as part of an impending CTC rotation (or deployment) should be incorporated into the unit's training. Unit leaders are best served by ensuring the fundamentals of training are implemented (as presented in ADP 7-0 and ADRP 7-0 Training Units and Developing Leaders.) The Army Training Network website has a host of useful products and links for reference. The Foundry Program (Foundry 2.0) is experiencing deep cuts and will not be able to provide the type and scope of training many MI leaders have experienced during the last ten years. Units which performed at higher levels during CTC rotations often performed pre-deployment training which was well planned, adequately resourced, well attended, conducted to standard, and involved leaders at all levels.

2. Intelligence Architecture and Connectivity. The Intelligence Architecture is the mechanism by which the unit commander, staff and subordinate elements receive information on what the enemy is doing and estimated to do in the future. Units which do not routinely use, rehearse, or integrate the entire intelligence architecture into training events are not able to provide effective intelligence support to commander. Units which establish an intelligence architecture which clearly depicts how intelligence will be received, processed, and disseminated across the lower and upper Tactical Internet are generally successful. Understanding the separate elements, components, and steps involved in establishing effective PED (processing, exploitation, and dissemination) is integral in establishing an effective intelligence architecture. An important component of intelligence reporting is the unit's PACE (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency) plan. Due to the mobile nature of Decisive Action operations, units must outline intelligence architecture, reporting requirements and formats (including the PACE plan) into a Tactical Standard Operating Procedure (TACSOP) and adjust them according to lessons learned in training and rehearsals.

3. MI Leader Development. MI officers and NCOs must be as proficient in using operational terms and military symbols (ADRP 1-02) as their maneuver colleagues. MI leaders who struggle with communicating in the common language of

operations (Method, Task, Purpose) in describing enemy or friendly conditions, situations and courses of action (COAs) are often dismissed or irrelevant. MI Majors are often the senior intelligence officer within a BCT; they serve as mentors and require mentorship. Lessons indicate that the best performing S2s are members of cohesive staffs with effective leaders. Common leader development areas of understanding and applying doctrine, assigning troops to tasks, the value of pre-combat checks/inspections, performing troop leading procedures, and leading by being present (versus email) serve MI leaders as well as other warfighting function leaders. In order to develop junior leaders, senior leaders must be able to demonstrate “what right looks like.”

4. Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) Training. Commander oversight and insistence on integrating DCGS-A into training and operations are the most critical factors in units which have demonstrated proficiency in using DCGS-A. Soldiers only do well with those things that the commander emphasizes. DCGS-A is an oft-cited example of that axiom reflected in CTC observations. The DCGS-A training LL trend is also related to the three categories described above: Unit Training Management, Intelligence Architecture and Connectivity, and MI Leader Development. DCGS-A operators and MI leaders must learn to use the system, its processes and its products during home-station training prior to CTC rotations to demonstrate the value of DCGS-A to informing unit operations and Commander decisionmaking. The system’s value to the unit overall is only realized when integrated into collective training events, staff exercises, and communications (intelligence architecture) rehearsals. DCGS-A proficiency is a “use-it or lose-it” skill. Some units falter in employing DCGS-A at the CTC by failing to conduct pre-combat checks and inspections relevant to DCGS-A operations. Some units failed to ensure: appropriate maps were loaded on the system; operators possessed the required passwords to operate the system; common data loads; common software images; common PACE plan and procedures for displacement operations (“jumping the TOC”). With DCGS-A the axiom “Train as you (intend to) fight” is appropriate.

5. Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) in a Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). Units are not completing IPB products in sufficient detail or using the products to support MDMP. This issue is linked to the issues listed in items 1 through 4 above. ICoE LL observations and CTC observer trainer mentor reporting identifies challenges in performing effective IPB in support of MDMP as stemming from unfamiliarity with the potential benefit of IPB products

and the degree of detail required in IPB products and not a reflection of the time-compressed MDMP process often encountered at the CTCs. Products such as the Weather Effects Matrix, Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay, and Event Template were routinely not completed or not done correctly. Weather effects were not used to describe how the weather affected friendly or enemy capabilities (weapon systems, collection assets, personnel) or the terrain. Event Template deficiencies often led to difficulties in representing the enemy in time and space; in turn preventing the creation of a synchronized Information Collection plan to help confirm or deny enemy COAs. Some MI leaders did not know the capabilities and limitations of all organic, (and often less about all available), information collections assets hindering the construction of an effective Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Plan and Annexes B and L of Operations Orders. The overwhelming effect of the lack of knowledge was a failure to integrate R&S assets into the scheme of maneuver leading to (simulated) fratricide, poor asset placement, and gaps in situation awareness. Gaps in planning were mirrored in critical R&S tasks and elements in the R&S, Fires, and Combined Arms Rehearsal. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) were often not linked to decisions or failed to delineate between estimated enemy courses of action. During rotations some units which had successfully answered a PIR failed to activate or draft new ones.

6. Lack of SOPs. SOPs, often referred to as TACSOPs, are effective references for those who may be unsure what is required of them during operations/training. The most effective units at CTC rotations are those whose SOPs reflect a grounding in the unit’s Mission Essential Task List and revised through experiences in training, rehearsals or operations. SOPs establish a common expectation of who should be completing which task, to an established standard (quality and time), and in support of an identified element or step in a process. S2 sections without SOPs (or had SOPs which were never exercised) often did not understand what products needed to be built for each mission (Offense, Defense, Movement to Contact, and Wide Area Security (WAS)) or who was responsible for building the products. Not knowing who was responsible for completing, or failing to delegate responsibility for, specific tasks led to the S2 or assistant S2 completing tasks their subordinates could have accomplished. This issue led to missed opportunities or involvement in which the S2/AS2 could have been more useful to the unit or IWfF. SOPs also identify the tasks and responsibilities of the various Command Posts (CP) and establishes an expectation of IWfF support available from each (Assault CP, Tactical CP, Main CP, Rear CP, etc.) during specific mission

types. This lack of clarity often leads to duplication of effort, gaps in production, confusion and an incoherent intelligence picture of the current or estimated situation.

7. Information Collection Management. Collection management success at the CTCs is directly correlated with understanding information collection doctrine and employing a comprehensive or efficient collection operation. Units struggle with building a comprehensive Information Collection Plan and integrating R&S assets into operations. The S2 builds the Information Collection Plan but, the plan belongs to the unit—it is not intended to be used only by the S2. Building the collection plan divorced from the MDMP or operations involvement leads to a lack of synchronization and detail needed to identify the enemy situation or support PIR satisfaction for the commander. To ensure sufficiency in detail and synchronization the unit must rehearse the collection plan. Some units opt to conduct a separate R&S rehearsal; others use the combined arms or fires rehearsals to assess the collection plan's intended effectiveness. Rehearsals also help overcome many units' failures to recognize all potential sources of information which could be tasked to address information collection requirements. Some staffs limit the collection plan to tasking 'traditional' R&S assets. A best practice is to include all assets in the collection plan that have the capability, availability, and survivability of identifying and reporting information answering requirements. A superior practice is to have integrated these elements into pre-CTC rotation information collection training.

8. SIGINT in Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM). Some units struggled with understanding SIGINT principles or how SIGINT collection assets could be used to support CAM. Experience and familiarity with SIGINT systems used in a counterinsurgency role sometimes results in focusing SIGINT collection during WAS and not capitalizing on SIGINT capabilities during the CAM phase of DATE CTC rotations. One unit was observed not using its Prophet systems during CAM for fear of them being destroyed and not being available for WAS operations. Critical enemy activity and locations indicating an estimated COA were missed due to the unit's failure to use its Prophet. Additional SIGINT limitations are caused by some MI leaders' ignorance of basic radio-wave propagation theory or SIGINT employment considerations such as: radio line-of-sight, lob/cut/fix, SIGINT base-line, sources of electromagnetic interference, target location error (ellipse), terrain and cross-country movement limitations, etc. One unit placed their Low-Level Voice Intercept (LLVI) Team with Fire Support Forward Observers with the intent to collect SIGINT as far forward as possible; however, the team's placement was unable to collect on the

designated target due to terrain masking. Current MTO&E limits most units' ability to conduct LLVI and Prophet operations simultaneously.

9. HUMINT in CAM. Some unit leaders were very familiar and practiced in using HUMINT assets during the WAS phase of a CTC DATE rotation but struggled with employing HUMINT during CAM. Units struggled with identifying enemy Order of Battle collection requirements for HUMINT assets. Many units failed to plan how to conduct and integrate screenings, tactical questioning, and interrogations into CAM scheme of maneuver. Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Collection Points were rarely established in locations where EPWs would most likely be captured. The logistical requirements of safeguarding prisoners, evacuating to appropriate locations for HUMINT collection, and reporting of information which may indicate enemy CAM courses of action or answering the PIR was rarely considered in planning. Integrating HUMINT soldiers into the unit's pre-CTC deployment training results in positive performance. One observed best practice is ensuring that the S2 and HUMINT professionals are involved in the unit's training and documented procedures of EPW handling.

10. Intelligence Synchronization. Intelligence synchronization, one of MI's three core competencies, integrates information collection and our other two competencies of intelligence analysis and intelligence operations to support decisionmaking. Challenges units face at the CTCs with performing intelligence synchronization routinely surface as observations during the unit's Mission Command operations and performance. The BCT S2 cannot alone address deficiencies in the unit's ability to synchronize the IWfF; the Commander and staff must set the conditions to enable IWfF synchronization. Some of the challenges in intelligence synchronization appearing in the preceding categories underscore the criticality of integrating the full range of IWfF methods, tasks, and purposes into the unit's training and operations. Some units struggle with building and sharing a Common Operating Picture. This issue reflects challenges in establishing and operating an intelligence architecture which supports the unit's information and dissemination demands. Building an enemy situation picture on DCGS-A without having a plan or efficient means to transmit the picture to the leaders who need the information is an intelligence synchronization failure. MI leaders, and the leaders they support, who understand the role of DGCS-A and the full range of its products are more successful than those who do not.

Effective intelligence synchronization at CTC rotations enabled by pre-CTC training which effectively integrated the IWfF. One unit BCT S2 identified he was unable to integrate

the MI Co into a BCT collective training events because the MI Co's higher headquarters needed MI personnel to perform other tasks. Intelligence synchronization is also impacted by not understanding, or failing to ensure during planning, the appropriate command and support relationships established for various IWfF elements. This leads to confusion regarding task assignment, priorities, sources of support, time lines, etc. A lack of clear understanding of the effects of command and support relationships has led to IWfF elements operating according to what they 'felt' was important and not according to what was actually important to the commander. Failing to understand the roles and responsibilities of IWfF elements at each of the unit's various CPs is an obstacle to intelligence synchronization. A best practice is to list in the SOP expectations of what type of IWfF support is available, or performed to support, the unit's multiple CPs in accordance with the operations

type or tempo. Anticipating where and when the priority of effort will be for the IWfF also allows staffing of the units CPs with the requisite quantity and type of MI personnel. CP staffing is most affected as the unit displaces CPs as part of the operation. Having a PACE plan for the unit's IWfF PED is just as important as a PACE plan for communications.

These categories were compiled from observations in ICoE LL Team contractor collection reports. The LL Team is only able to collect and report its observations through the cooperation and support of unit leaders and CTC cadre. It speaks volumes to the professionalism and courage of those Army and MI professionals who grant access to the LL Team to collect and report observations during unit CTC rotations. These leaders understand that in order to effect positive change we first must identify our profession's successes and challenges. You can contact the LL Team and access its products at <https://iknsp.army.mil/CDID/dcell/II/SitePages/Home.aspx> or by phone at (520) 533-7516. The Team also hosts an MI LL Forum on the third Thursday of each month at 1700Z on Defense Connect On-Line at <https://connectcol.dco.dod.mil/millforum/>.



Doctrine Update 3-14


Mission Command Center of Excellence
US Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
24 JULY 2014

FM 3-24/ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, builds on the 2006 version. Much of the doctrine covered in the 2006 version is now in other doctrine publications. For example, FM 3-22, Security Cooperation, covers security force assistance. The new FM 3-24 takes advantage of a broader doctrinal library to focus on insurgency.

FM 3-24 frames counterinsurgency within the context of an operational environment and the differences between insurgencies. The new title, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, provides insight into the thinking behind its organization. FM 3-24 has three parts. Part 1 provides strategic and operational context, part 2 provides the doctrine for understanding insurgencies, and part 3 provides doctrine for defeating an insurgency.

FM 3-24 addresses the range of activities that the Army and Marine Corps can employ to aid a host nation battling an insurgency. Various combinations of these activities provide the United States with a range of strategic options. This can range from indirectly supporting indigenous forces to committing Army and Marine Corps units to close combat with insurgents. Regardless of the situation, commanders must develop an operational approach that meets national strategy and enables friendly forces to defeat the insurgency.


This publication is located at the following link: http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24.pdf



FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, supersedes ATTP 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, and provides commanders with tactics and procedures for exercising mission command. Updated or new materials in FM 6-0 include—

- ◆ Deletion of the mission command functional cell. The entire command post assists the commander in the exercise of mission command. Therefore, commanders do not form a specific mission command functional cell.
- ◆ Movement of the military information support element to the movement and maneuver cell.
- ◆ Creation of the information operations element in the movement and maneuver cell.
- ◆ Deletion of the G-7(S-7) as a coordinating staff officer.
- ◆ Creation of the information operations officer as a special staff officer coordinated by the G-3(S-3).
- ◆ A new chapter on knowledge management and information management (previously found in FM 6-01.1, Knowledge Management Operations).
- ◆ A new chapter on military deception.
- ◆ A new chapter on decisionmaking in execution (previously found in FM 5-0, The Operations Process).
- ◆ A new chapter on after action reviews and reports.
- ◆ An updated orders format.
- ◆ New appendixes on operational and mission variables as well as Army command and support relationships (previously found in FM 5-0, The Operations Process).

This publication is located at the following link: http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm6_0.pdf



Proponent Notes



Warrant Officer Accessions

OCMI received a number of inquiries regarding the Active Federal Service (AFS) waiver and how it applies to the Warrant Officer accession process. We want to ensure that everyone understands the philosophy behind the Army requirement and the factors involved in approval of the waiver. AR 135-100, Appointment of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Army, identifies the eligibility criteria applicable to Warrant Officer applicants. One of the items pertains to years of active federal service. The Army goal, as identified in Chapter 1 of AR 135-100, is to assess Warrant Officers with 8 or less years of service. DA G1 requires an AFS waiver for any applicant who exceeds 12 years of AFS by the date their DA Form 61, Application for Appointment is signed. This goal supports the overall intent to utilize a Warrant Officer for a viable career. The AFS waiver process assists the Army in achieving that goal.

DA G1 is the approval authority for AFS waivers and determines whether they are approved or denied on a case by case basis utilizing a number of factors. The factors range from the strength of the file, the health of the Warrant Officer MOS, the health of the accession mission for that MOS and other mitigating factors such as other waivers for that particular accession packet. Given the competitive nature of the accession boards this fiscal year, DA G1 is upholding the Army's goal by only approving accession packets with an AFS waiver request that strongly merit approval. OCMI advises MI Warrant Officers to ensure that interested applicants understand the importance of the AFS waiver and how it impacts their chances of becoming a Warrant Officer. DA G1 is still approving AFS waivers for a number of applicants; however, this is one more consideration that leaders should factor in when determining whether the applicant has the potential to become a future leader in our Corps!

For more information contact CW5 Brian Hansen, the MI Warrant Officer Proponent, at Comm: (520) 533-1181.

Revision of PMOS 35P Language Proficiency Requirements

MILPER Message 14-083, issued 26 March 2014, outlines administrative guidelines regarding identification, promotion, reclassification, and separation requirements for PMOS 35P Soldiers who fail to attain or to maintain a

Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) score of 2/2/1+ or higher. This message is effective 6 February 2014 and will expire two years from date of release.

HRC is coding all Soldiers who are sub-proficient, out of tolerance, or in remediation with IMREPR Code 9P (Loss of Qualification in PMOS) on/about 7 April 2014. The only exceptions are as follows:

1. Soldiers selected before 6 February 2014 for OCS or WOCS.
2. Soldiers selected for MSG before 6 February 2014.
3. Soldiers that have approved reclassification out of the MOS or to learn a new language at DLI.

If any of the Soldiers on the language sub-proficiency list meet the standard at a later date or after completion of remediation period, please send a DA Form 4187 with supporting documentation to HRC MI/Language Branch. They will verify and send request to HRC Retain/Reclassification Branch to remove the IMREPR Code 9P. Additionally, when the Soldier has completed remediation and DLPT testing but is still sub-proficient, then commanders must initiate separation and determine whether to retain or separate the Soldier.

For more information, see MILPER Message 14-083 at <https://www.hrc.army.mil/Milper/14-083> or contact SFC Huntley at Comm: 520-533-1451.


The Office of the Chief, MI (OCMI) is the MI Corps Personnel Proponent office and executes the personnel life cycle management functions relative to DOTMLPF for MI and Functional Area 34, Strategic Intelligence. The USAICoE and Fort Huachuca Commanding General, as the MI Proponent, enlists the help of OCMI, to ensure the Army has the sufficient number of MI Officers, WOs, NCOs, and Enlisted Soldiers, with the correct occupational specialty, correct training, and are available for assignment at the right time.

Contact Information:

OCMI Director at (Comm) (520) 533-1728/1173

OCMI Career Management Page on IKN

<https://ikn.army.mil/apps/IKNWMS/Default.aspx?webId=2330>



The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate

by Robert D. Kaplan

Random House, 2012, 403 pages,

ISBN-10: 1400069831

In the *“Revenge of Geography,”* Robert Kaplan elucidates his broad thesis that geopolitics, the influence of geography on human and state interactions, stands at the heart of every past conflict and illuminates where and why the next conflicts will occur. Citing scholars such as Morgenthau, Haushofer, Strausz-Hupé, and Spykman who in their own way looked at the rise of Nazi-Germany through lenses of idealism, societal purity, and the thirst to control the European heartland (the confluence of natural barriers, access to oceanic trade routes and central global location.) But Kaplan chose most of all, to focus on the pure geopolitics of Sir Halford Mackinder and his belief that the central Asian landmass was the pivot for global conflict as, in his view, it is landmasses and river systems and mountain ranges that encourage the rise of empires, not states. Kaplan describes in detail throughout his book that it is natural, geographically bound borders rather than arbitrary ones that promote peace, and where borders are arbitrary, is where conflict erupts and will erupt: the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, the vast swath of the Middle East to include Israel/Palestine, and in eastern Europe.

Conflicts time and time again erupt in political-geographic hotspots, areas where everyone wants power, influence or control but where no superpower has been able to hold. As an example, Kaplan describes Afghanistan as both the crossroads for greater Eurasia and the Indian sub-continent; an outlet for Russia to exert more southerly control, an outlet for Iran to spread its influence, and a pawn for both Pakistan and India in their ever evolving battle against each other. But in each instance and for all of history, no super-power has been able to cope with the onslaught of ethnic Afghan tribes and peoples, who defend their mountain homes and lands to the last man, holding grudges for generations (America today fights the direct descendants of the exact same tribes as the Russians in the 1970s and 80s and as the British did during their Afghan Campaign of the 1890s).

Kaplan points to America’s ideal location, protected from every other major super power in the world by two large oceans, as a reason for our rise to superpower status and why we’ll stay there for at least a few more decades. However, this isolation from the resources, trade routes, and peoples of Asia especially, will either serve to cause our decline, or compel our leaders to think geopolitically and engage more and more with Russia, China, and India—the superpowers which lay at the heart and rimlands of Mackinder’s Eurasian pivot.

For the Military Intelligence professional, becoming a student of geopolitics is paramount to being able to conduct the thorough predictive analysis this country will need in its future wars. As Kaplan points out, geography does not change easily or quickly, natural resources are limited both in quantity and in availability (oil in the middle East, rare earth metals in China) and the fight for these is already becoming a source of conflict. China, with its formidable size and physical barriers (Himalayan Mountains to the south, the Siberian steppes to the North and oceans to the east), is able to exert greater power because of its geography. It won’t be invaded easily and as such, can wield its economic might and control of resources in far off places such as Africa, where it can extract the resources it desperately needs to keep growing. Likewise, a greater degree of conflict occurs where resources are limited but in high demand.

Kaplan also rightly describes the confluence of geography with societal structures (religion especially) where power is derived from clan or religious affiliation but is tempered and defined by the limits of geography. The modern Middle East is a simmering pot of conflict, on all sides, there is unrest and conflict. Is the Israel–Palestine conflict about religion or land? Is the influence of Iran more about the Shia–Sunni divide or about Iran’s desire to control or influence trade routes and resources from Istanbul to Karachi?

This book shows students of history and those looking to the future where the next conflicts will occur. It has always been where geography collides with politics, where empire meets the state and where arbitrary borders fall apart. Understanding geopolitics will show MI professionals where water wars will erupt, where resources will dry up, which natural waterways and trade routes will become economic and military hot spots and where the next great superpower will emerge, or in the case of China, where it has emerged and why. America intervenes diplomatically and militarily in places where its national interests are threatened: Crimea, Afghanistan, Africa, Central and South American drug cartels and the Indo–Subcontinent. The threat is not because of people or religions, it’s the geography of those places and resources they contain that drives super powers to intervene. As we move forward, MI professionals would be better served not just reading reports and listening to communications, but by looking at a map and studying geography.



Reviewed by 1LT Raheel Alam, 304th MI Battalion, Fort Huachuca, Arizona



Contact and Article Submission Information



This is your magazine. We need your support by writing and submitting articles for publication.

When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the Military Intelligence and Intelligence Communities.

Articles about current operations; TTPs; and equipment and training are always welcome as are lessons learned; historical perspectives; problems and solutions; and short “quick tips” on better employment or equipment and personnel. Our goals are to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps and the IC at large. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how new technology will change the way we operate.

When submitting articles to MIPB, please take the following into consideration:

- ◆ Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3,000 words, double-spaced with normal margins without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words.
- ◆ We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles and it may take up to a year to publish some articles.
- ◆ Although **MIPB** targets themes, you do not need to “write” to a theme.
- ◆ Please note that submissions become property of **MIPB** and may be released to other government agencies or nonprofit organizations for republication upon request.

What we need from you:

- ◆ **A release signed by your unit or organization’s information and operations security officer/SSO stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain and that the article and any accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified. (IAW AR 380-5 DA Information Security Program).** A sample security release format can be accessed at our website at <https://ikn.army.mil>.
- ◆ A cover letter (either hard copy or electronic) with your work or home email addresses, telephone number,

and a comment stating your desire to have your article published.

- ◆ Your article in Word. Do not use special document templates.
- ◆ Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic. We need complete captions (the Who, What, Where, When), photographer credits, and the author’s name on photos. **Do not embed graphics or photos within the article. Send them as separate files such as .tif or .jpg and note where they should appear in the article. PowerPoint (not in .tif or .jpg format) is acceptable for graphs, etc. Photos should be at 300 dpi.**
- ◆ The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author’s current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information, email address, and phone numbers with the biography.

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
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Captain Chad Lorenz 2014 Recipient Lieutenant General Sidney T. Weinstein Award for Excellence in Military Intelligence




CPT Chad Lorenz was born in Texas on February 4, 1985. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 2007 with a BS in Business Management. He was commissioned as a Military Intelligence officer and branch-detailed as an Armor officer assigned to the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. After satisfying his Armor Branch detail requirement, CPT Lorenz began his career as a Military Intelligence officer and attended the Military Intelligence Captain's Career Course in 2012. He was then assigned to the III Corps Analysis and Control Element (ACE), at Fort Hood, in January 2013. As the Production Officer in the ACE prior to deployment, CPT Lorenz's diligent oversight ensured the Commander and Corps senior leadership had access to the most pertinent, up-to-date intelligence, thus improving their situational understanding for the III Corps upcoming deployment.

Once deployed to Afghanistan, he served as the senior analyst for the Regional Command East and Capital desk in the Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command. He quickly developed extensive subject matter expertise, drawing upon threat, governance, development, and Afghan National Security Forces information to produce well rounded assessments. CPT Lorenz's products always exceeded expectations and were timely and predictive. By continuously coordinating with external organizations, higher headquarters, and subordinate units, he earned a strong reputation for fostering a shared understanding of the operational environment.

CPT Lorenz was also handpicked to chair a joint, interagency working group tracking a strategic threat from the Haqqani Network to the ISAF mission. Ultimately, his efforts provided advanced warning and allowed the neutralization of a number of targets and prevented the threat from materializing, undoubtedly saving countless Coalition and Afghan lives.

Separately, CPT Lorenz completed an extensive research project in collaboration with Dr. Lester Grau of the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The project gave perspective to the ongoing conversation regarding the survivability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan post-2014, providing historical and current data to compare modern day scenarios with conditions leading up to and following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. CPT Lorenz's detailed analysis influenced both the Joint Command and ISAF Commander's views on the current and potential future situation in theater and allowed them to provide context to current events to visiting NATO and US policy makers.

After completing the deployment, he returned to Fort Hood as the Production Officer-in-Charge, III Corps ACE, in February 2014. He is currently assigned as the S2 for the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division stationed at Fort Hood.

CPT Lorenz is a graduate of the U.S. Army Air Assault School, U.S. Army Pathfinder School, and U.S. Army Signals Intelligence Officer Course. His awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal; Defense Meritorious Service Medal; Meritorious Service Medal; Army Achievement Medal; National Defense Service Medal; Afghanistan Campaign Medal with two campaign stars; Global War on Terrorism Service Medal; Army Service Ribbon; Overseas Service Ribbon; NATO Service Medal, and German Armed Forces Proficiency Badge (Gold Medal). 

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