This issue is a commemoration of the establishment of Military Intelligence (MI) as a branch on July 1, 1962 and the activation of the MI Corps on July 1, 1987. Contributors to this issue include the Command Historians of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command; the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard; the MI Noncommissioned Officer Academy; Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence, and the National Security Agency.

Through the efforts of these contributors, I hope you will gain (or renew) an appreciation of the uphill climb of MI to becoming a recognized branch of the U.S. Army and of the amazing, and at many times, critical efforts by Army Intelligence throughout American military history to protect and defend the U.S.

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U.S. Army Center of Military History at www.history.army.mil.

“Washington Studying the Plans of Battle” by John Ward Dunsmore, Fraunces Tavern® Museum,
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Document artifacts courtesy of Michael Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian, found within
“A Short History of Military Intelligence”.

Excerpt of letter, page 9, from Washington to GEN Heath, Massachusetts Historical Society.
The Military Intelligence Story: A Photo History, John P. Finnegan, INSCOM.
The Army’s Operational Intelligence Force: A Picture History, INSCOM.
Center for Cryptologic History, NSA.
If you are a member of the Military Intelligence Corps, you are probably already well aware that MI is celebrating some pretty significant milestones this year. Due almost solely to the efforts of Major General Alva Fitch, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence from 1961 to 1964, the Army established the Intelligence and Security Branch on July 1, 1962. For the first time, MI was on an equal footing with all the other branches in the Army—something it had struggled to achieve for nearly 50 years. The formation of a branch meant the Army finally had a career path in the Regular Army for intelligence officers.

It is hard to believe this happened just 50 years ago, particularly when we consider that Army Intelligence is as old as the Army itself; it was a key factor in the Continental Army’s victory over British troops during the American Revolution. While it continued to expand and mature over the years, MI often had to struggle for equality and recognition as a relevant combat multiplier, and worked hard to dispel the myth that “any Soldier can do intelligence.”

On July 1, 1987, Military Intelligence reached another critical milestone with the activation of the MI Corps as part of the Army Regimental System. Coinciding with the 25th Anniversary of the MI Branch, the event symbolically bound together the whole of MI: tactical and strategic; military and civilian; Active and Reserve components. This action culminated many years of dedication and effort on the part of MI professionals to foster unity and esprit de corps. All MI officers, warrant officers, and enlisted Soldiers who held MI as a primary MOS or Area of Concentration were automatically affiliated with the MI Corps. The regimental insignia, emblazoned with the Corps’ motto “Always Out Front,” was authorized for wear, and the official colors of the MI Corps were uncased for the first time.

As part of the Corps activation, the first Honorary Officers and Distinguished Members of the Corps were announced. These individuals were appointed to perpetuate the history and traditions of the MI Corps, enhance unit morale and spirit, and serve as ambassadors for the Corps.

When Major General Julius Parker spoke at the Corps activation ceremony 25 years ago, he stated “we have steadily matured into a community of intelligence professionals united by a common bond of mission and fellowship. What is important about the activation of the MI Corps is not that anything changed on July 1, but rather the recognition that Army Intelligence had truly arrived.”

I was born only eighteen days after the MI Branch was created in 1962, but I remember where I was in 1987 when the MI Corps was activated. I was a young Lieutenant serving in the 18th MI Battalion in Munich, Germany. The mission of that battalion, which no longer exists, was to interrogate line crossers and defectors from behind the “Iron Curtain.” It was an important and exciting mission during the Cold War. The intelligence gathered by the 18th helped the U.S. better understand the Soviets and Warsaw Pact, as well as aiding in the development of science and technology efforts.

It never occurred to young Lieutenant Potter on that day in 1987 that one day he would be the Chief of the MI Corps, or Commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, the Home of MI.

I have witnessed a number of changes in MI over the last 25 years; two stick out in my mind. First, and most importantly, is the continued professionalization of the MI Corps. Our Corps continues to look at itself introspectively, evolving and striving to become ever more professional. Second, is how technology has enhanced and aided the intelligence business—new technology allows the MI Corps to collect more, process more, and analyze more than ever before.

(Continued on page 4)
On 1 July 1987, I stood on Chaffee Parade Field as a young Sergeant. I did not totally understand the significance of the ceremony in which I was participating and the history of which I was destined to be a part. On that date in 1987, 25 years had passed since the Secretary of the Army had signed a General Order authorizing the creation of the Army Intelligence and Security Branch. If you had asked Sergeant Holiday on that day if he had any idea of what was happening, who he was, and where he was going, he would have told you absolutely not. Well, 25 years have passed since that historic date.

In my 30 years as an MI Soldier I have witnessed many changes within our Army and MI Corps. As a young Soldier and noncommissioned officer (NCO) we fought the Cold War and our focus was on training and preparation to counter the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact, and North Korea forces. We understood Order of Battle, enemy formations and the equipment that was associated with each type of organization. It was a time when our Army focused on conventional war, or what we called in those days, force-on-force fight. Training was a must and it was emphasized by our senior leaders and NCOs. We knew how to lead, plan, resource, and conduct large scale exercises to prepare for war. In contrast, today’s junior, mid-grade and senior NCOs are products of our ten-plus years at war. With an average of 4 to 5 combat deployments each, they are the best trained, skilled and disciplined fighting force the world has ever seen.

Even though each generation has faced different conflicts and challenges, the most important things I feel we share are our Army Values and The Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer. Through generations of NCOs we have built a professional fighting force that is envied by all countries; not envied in a bad way, but in our ability to instill the will to fight and win within our Soldiers. In my opinion, it is these values that we hold so close, along with the care and leadership for our Soldiers, that sets us apart from all others. Today’s Soldiers are much more complex than the Soldiers of my generation. They learn and communicate differently and their views and values vary. With this being said, the NCO is the glue that bonds Soldiers with leadership and teaches them the values, discipline, and standards that build a winning, dominate spirit. Our Army will change; policies will come and go, uniforms will change and technology will be ever-evolving. However, amidst this constant change, the NCO will always remain the constant that holds it all together.

(Continued on page 4)
(Always Out Front, continued from page 2)

On June 29, 2012, I had the honor of presiding over a ceremony recognizing the achievements of a group of current and former MI Soldiers and Civilians who were responsible for creating the MI Corps we know today. Most of us never considered what it took to create the Corps, but what these folks accomplished impacted every individual in MI and continues to touch us on a daily basis.

I’d like to take this opportunity to say THANK YOU to the founders of Army Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Branch, the Military Intelligence Corps, and to every single Soldier, Officer, or Civilian who wears the Military Intelligence insignia or works for Army Intelligence today. I am proud of what the members of our Corps do each and every day.

Always Out Front!

(CSM Forum, continued from page 3)

In closing I would like to leave you with this final thought. Being a Soldier is a tough job, but being an NCO is even tougher. We are called upon, time after time, to make tough and demanding decisions concerning Soldiers and their families. We often must neglect ourselves and our own families to take care of the needs of others. We get the call in the middle of the night when a Soldier or his family is in need. We brave the bitter elements to train a Soldier and give them confidence. We never have free time because we are constantly looking out for the Soldiers. We are the ones who show no fear but only courage because we know some Soldier is looking up to us for strength, hope, and guidance. We must lead Soldiers into harm’s way with the assurance they are the best trained and equipped fighting force in the world. Families call upon us in times of uncertainty to clarify the situation and give them hope. We do not want glory or medals, we only want to accomplish the mission and to take care of our Soldiers. We are Noncommissioned Officers, the Backbone and foundation of our Army and no one does it better!

I am proud to serve in your ranks and I thank you for what you do each and every day for our Service men and women, their families, our Army, and our Corps.

Always out Front!

Beautiful World
June and July are filled with birthdays, during which we celebrated the anniversaries of our Army, the Army Warrant Officer Corps, the MI Branch, and the MI Corps. There is so much cake to eat you have to double and triple your running distance to work it off! These were great events to reflect upon the past accomplishments and deeds of our U.S. Army as well as to commemorate them. For me, these events are also a time to reflect upon our accomplishments of today. I am very proud of the efforts of our Branch and our Corps in support of our Army’s mission.

As we set aside our plates, covered with cake crumbs, and wipe the sabers clean of icing, it is time to renew our journey forward into the future. For the MI warrant officer there is much to be done along this journey. Our destination is an adaptable, agile, flexible, and more capable MI Corps that supports mission command in Army 2020 and beyond.

There are still the current missions at hand. I am confident that you will continue to apply yourselves fully as you have done to date. We must train our Soldiers and build our intelligence teams to handle rapidly changing, complex threats and environments. Establish the performance standards that we expect of our Soldiers and teams. Empower our NCOs to keep those standards, and hold ourselves accountable for those standards. Most important we must develop our subordinates to be leaders who are “…inquisitive, adaptable and, ultimately, innovative.”

We are in the process of designing and shaping our MI structure and capabilities to meet the needs of Army 2020. The requirements for MI warrant officers in this force are many in number and quality. We need leaders with technical expertise. Given that the operational environment is filled with uncertainty, is continually changing and increasing in complexity, we must ask hard questions of ourselves to ensure we have the right skills to meet the challenges of this operational environment. It is most likely that the military occupational specialty structure we have today for our MI warrant officers will be different for Intel 2020.

Prepare for these challenges. As a professional you must attend your Primary Military Education courses. Invest yourself in that training. Pursue your undergraduate and graduate civilian education. Civilian education broadens your view of the world and can help you see the operational environment in ways you may not have otherwise imagined. Be a self-disciplined lifelong student who seeks knowledge whether in a classroom or in the kitchen reading at the table late at night when the family is asleep. Challenge yourself by seeking leader positions that take you out of your comfort zone. Remain open to any and every challenge that comes your way. You will only grow from these experiences.  

Always Out Front!  
Army Strong

In 1915, Van Deman became the head of the Army’s small intelligence staff. Van Deman, who was one of the Army’s most experienced intelligence officers, recognized the need for a more robust and efficiency system and commenced a successful one-man campaign to reinvigorate the Army’s intelligence efforts. Once the US entered World War I, Van Deman oversaw the growth and establishment of a truly national intelligence system capable of coordinating all available intelligence assets. With this growth came the creation of two intelligence-specific bodies: the Corps of Interpreters and the Corps of Intelligence Police. These two would be the first steps towards an intelligence branch.

In May 1917, Nolan was an infantry officer with a distinguished service when Gen. John J. Pershing selected him to head the intelligence section of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). Taking the best from Allied intelligence systems, Nolan created an effective intelligence staff for the AEF. Moreover, he established a parallel intelligence system at every level, so intelligence Soldiers were present from battalion to field army. This new G2/S2 system has continued to be basis for intelligence staffs into the 21st century. Knowing the important of trained intelligence Soldiers, Nolan established the MI Officers Reserve Corps to maintain the pool of trained manpower after the war.

In 1961, Fitch became the Asst. Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI). A career artillery officer who had served with distinction on Bataan in 1942, Fitch had served in a variety of intelligence positions in the 1950s. As ACSI, he faced the dilemma that reserve officers staffed more than 90% of Army Intelligence positions, and most of these officers would retire in less than three years. To correct this, he set about creating a Regular Army intelligence branch to ensure that there would be enough qualified officers to fulfill the Army’s needs. Faced with opposition from much of the Army staff, Fitch nevertheless pressed forward and, on 1 July 1962, the Army Intelligence & Security Branch was created.
Introduction
On July 1, 2012, the Military Intelligence (MI) Branch turned fifty years old. When it was established in 1962, it was the Army's first new branch since the Transportation Corps had been formed twenty years earlier. Today, it remains one of the youngest of the Army's fifteen basic branches (only Aviation and Special Forces are newer). Yet, while the MI Branch is a relatively recent addition, intelligence operations and functions in the Army stretch back to the Revolutionary War. This article will trace the development of Army Intelligence since the 18th century. This evolution was marked by a slow, but steady progress in establishing itself as a permanent and essential component of the Army and its operations.

Army Intelligence in the Revolutionary War
In July 1775, GEN George Washington assumed command of the newly established Continental Army near Boston, Massachusetts. Over the next eight years, he demonstrated a keen understanding of the importance of MI. Facing British forces that usually outmatched and often outnumbered his own, Washington needed good intelligence to exploit any weaknesses of his adversary while masking those of his own army. With intelligence so imperative to his army’s success, Washington acted as his own chief of intelligence and personally scrutinized the information that came into his headquarters.

To gather information about the enemy, the American commander depended on the traditional intelligence sources available in the 18th century: scouts and spies. To scout the enemy’s front lines, he used units such as LTC Thomas Knowlton’s Rangers and COL Elisha Sheldon’s 2d Continental Light Dragoons, combat forces that performed a vital reconnaissance function. To look beyond the front lines, however, Washington depended upon networks of spies. To ensure that his army had

**GEN George Washington understood the importance of Military Intelligence.**

- **14 JUN.** The Continental Army is established with GEN George Washington as its commander.
- **22 SEP.** CPT Nathan Hale hanged as a spy by British. Eleven days earlier, Hale had volunteered to enter Manhattan to gain information on the British Army.
- **13 AUG.** Under direct orders of GEN Washington, SGT Daniel Bissell faked desertion and served 13 months in the British Army to gather intelligence. In June 1783, he became one of three men to receive the Badge of Military Merit from Washington himself.
- **12 DEC.** 2d Continental Light Dragoons constituted. Because of their role as a reconnaissance force, the “1776” of the US Army Intelligence Seal refers to the formation of these dragoons. The seal also has an image of the dragoon’s distinctive headgear.
- **17 SEP.** The U.S. Constitution is adopted.
- **19 OCT.** Lord Cornwallis surrenders his army to Washington at Yorktown, VA.
- **25 AUG.** GEN Washington appointed MAJ Benjamin Tallmadge to head intelligence operations on Long Island. Tallmadge formed the successful Culper Ring which operated until the end of the war.
- **21 JUL.** The Culper Spy Ring’s intelligence enabled GEN Washington to deceive the British into calling off an operation against the French allies in Newport, RI.
- **1815** The Continental Light Dragoons constituted. Because of their role as a reconnaissance force, the “1776” of the US Army Intelligence Seal refers to the formation of these dragoons. The seal also has an image of the dragoon’s distinctive headgear.
- **13 AUG.** Under direct orders of GEN Washington, SGT Daniel Bissell faked desertion and served 13 months in the British Army to gather intelligence. In June 1783, he became one of three men to receive the Badge of Military Merit from Washington himself.
enough intelligence, he never willingly relied on a single source and, consequently established numerous spy networks over the course of the war. Many of these networks, like MAJ John Clark’s in Philadelphia and COL Elias Dayton’s on Staten Island, provided the Americans with critical information on British strength and plans.

One of the most effective American spy networks was MAJ Benjamin Tallmadge’s so-called Culper Spy Ring on Long Island. Tallmadge’s two main agents were Abraham Woodhull of Setauket, Long Island, and Robert Townsend of New York City (NYC). The ring took its name from Woodhull’s and Townsend’s code-names: Samuel Culper and Samuel Culper, Jr., respectively. Tallmadge started organizing the network in the fall of 1778 to provide intelligence on the British forces that occupied NYC. Initially, Woodhull would travel to the city under the guise of visiting his sister, and personally gather information. After June 1779, however, his main task was receiving and transmitting Townsend’s intelligence, although he continued to make observations of British forces on Long Island. As a merchant with British military contracts, Townsend was well-placed to gather intelligence; in addition, he often visited a coffeehouse that was frequented by British officers.

Townsend sent his reports to Woodhull via a courier, usually Austin Roe, a tavern keeper in Setauket. Roe used the excuse of buying supplies—often from Townsend—as a reason to make the trek to and from the city. Returning home, Roe placed the report in a box buried in an open field, where Woodhull recovered it, added his own observations, and gave it to Lieutenant Caleb Brewster, a Long Island whale-boat captain. Brewster then transported the report by boat across Long Island Sound to Tallmadge, who inserted his own analysis and forwarded it to Washington’s headquarters via a series of dispatch riders.

As the Culper ring matured, it adopted sounder methods. Initially, the agents submitted uncoded reports written in ordinary ink. By May 1779, this dangerous practice was replaced by the use of a secret ink, which disappeared as it dried and required a reagent to make it visible. This allowed Townsend to write his reports on blank sheets of paper, blank leaves of pamphlets, or in between lines of personal correspondence. In this way, if the British intercepted the report, neither the intelligence nor the spy would be compromised. Shortly afterwards, Tallmadge added another measure of security by developing a cipher and a codebook for his network. The cipher was relatively simple wherein each letter of the alphabet received a random substitute. For his codebook, Tallmadge assigned three digit codes to some 750 words taken from a published dictionary, and then he added 53 more three-digit codes for important proper names and locations, like Washington, New York, and Long Island. He prepared three such codebooks—one for Townsend, one for himself, and one for Washington. The disappearing ink combined with the codes and cipher gave the Culper network enough security to remain undetected by the British.

The Culper Spy Ring’s most dramatic success came in July 1780. Anticipating the arrival of a French army in Rhode Island, Washington instructed Tallmadge to gather information regarding the British situation on Long Island and in NYC. Tallmadge quickly complied and learned that the British planned to attack the French before they
had a chance to properly establish their defenses and coordinate with the Americans. Armed with this intelligence, Washington was able to maneuver his forces as if to attack Manhattan, which prompted the British to call off their attack on the French. The Culpers had supplied timely, accurate intelligence that gave Washington a decisive advantage against the British.

Most of the Culpers’ information, however, was not nearly as spectacular. Tallmadge and his agents also ascertained the location of British units, made maps and sketches of defenses, noted the arrival and departure of British ships, and gauged the status of British morale. This more mundane information, nevertheless, provided Washington with a steady flow of accurate intelligence that permitted him to make appropriate plans and conduct operations with an excellent situational awareness of the British forces in NYC and on Long Island.

The success of the Culper Spy Ring was attributable to several factors. To be sure, the courage of the network’s agents and couriers played a large role in its accomplishments. The network, however, was more than a collection of individuals, it was a system that came together through careful planning and direction. From the top, Washington was in constant contact with Tallmadge, issuing precise instructions and focusing the effort. At the bottom, each individual had specific assigned missions, and practiced solid tradecraft. In the middle, Tallmadge ensured that his agents had the resources they required—including secret ink and a system of codes—and arranged an effective system for communicating with his agents. Moreover, he provided overall direction for his intelligence organization.

When the Revolutionary War ended, the Culper ring and the rest of Washington’s spy networks ceased operations and were ultimately dismantled. More significantly, the Army largely forgot the lessons of intelligence operations learned during the war. For the rest of the 18th century and into the 19th, Army Intelligence fell dormant.

Washington's letter to GEN Heath, September 1, 1776 emphasizing the importance of intelligence collection (in bold).
Army Intelligence in the Early 19th Century

Without an intelligence minded commander like Washington at its helm, the Army of the new nation did practically nothing in the way of collecting and analyzing information about potential enemies. At the national level, the War Department’s central staff mainly concentrated on questions of administration and supply rather than operational planning. In the field, commanders served as their own intelligence officers, relying mostly on simple reconnaissance by scouts or cavalry.

At least one positive development in intelligence, however, resulted from the American experience in the War of 1812. In 1814, the War Department created a unit of topographic engineers to reconnoiter and map positions and routes in support of military operations. Over the next quarter of a century, these engineers underwent a number of reorganizations which culminated in the 1838 formation of the elite Corps of Topographical Engineers. Building upon an Army tradition that dated back to the Lewis and Clark expedition in 1803, these “topogs” conducted a series of surveys and mapping missions of the American West during the antebellum years. As a result, they were able to produce the first comprehensive maps of the Trans-Mississippi West in 1857. More important, the topographic engineers provided invaluable topographic and cultural intelligence of the regions beyond the Mississippi River, paving the way for settlement of the American West.

When the U.S. declared war on Mexico in 1846, the Army suffered from lack of operational and intelligence preparedness. During the Mexico City campaign (March-September 1847), however, MG Winfield Scott developed an effective...
intelligence arrangement for his army in the field. To perform tactical reconnaissance, Scott augmented his cavalry with his staff engineers, including CPT Robert E. Lee and 1LT Pierre G.T. Beauregard. These officers conducted scouting forays to discover potential avenues of approach and determine enemy positions. More than once, they provided critical information that allowed Scott to outflank enemy defenses.

In addition, he made widespread use of spies to gather information. LTC Ethan Allen Hitchcock, Scott’s inspector general, managed the secret service, dispersing payments and establishing contacts. In June 1847, Hitchcock hired Manuel Dominguez, a well known leader of a gang of Mexican bandits, and eventually placed him in charge of between 100 and 200 men released from prisons. The group was dubbed “The Mexican Spy Company” and worked as guides, couriers, scouts, and spies. This organization kept the Americans accurately informed of Mexican military movements during the remainder of the campaign. Between his engineers, scouts, and spies, Scott was kept adequately informed of the enemy and terrain that he faced.

While Scott’s intelligence operations were the most successful since the Revolutionary War, they remained traditional and ad hoc affairs. He did use members of his staff to gather information and manage his secret service, but essentially remained his own intelligence officer. Although CPT Lee and the other staff engineers gave him a dynamic collection asset, he relied on the same traditional sources as had Washington: scouts and spies. Once the campaign was over and Scott’s army returned to the U.S., much of the intelligence system dissolved. Even after Scott became the Army’s Commanding General, nothing was done to establish a centralized intelligence staff or agency. Once again, MI was largely forgotten until the next war.

Effective intelligence allowed MG Scott to outflank enemy defenses at the Battle of Chapultepec, 1847.
Army Intelligence during the Civil War

In April 1861, the nation once again became embroiled in conflict, this time with itself. The modern nature and large scale of the Civil War broadened intelligence gathering beyond the long-established methods of spies and scouting. With the widespread use of the telegraph to communicate between the field and headquarters, both sides attempted to tap the wires to gather intelligence. This practice quickly led to the employment of rudimentary codes and ciphers, with the Union Army having both better codes and code breakers. Less technologically innovative than the telegraph, the Civil War armies also used signal flags for tactical communications. This method was highly susceptible to enemy interception, and led to increased use of field ciphers and codes. Stationed on high ground to facilitate communications, signal flagmen could also observe enemy movements and thus became an important source of combat information. Both armies also experimented with the use of balloons, but despite initial successes, had ceased aerial operations by June 1863.

Because both the North and the South shared, for the most part, a common language and culture, Civil War armies could make use of readily available intelligence sources. Commanders on both sides were avid readers of enemy newspapers, despite the fact that they frequently printed rumors and factual errors. Captured documents could provide key order of battle intelligence. With methodical and careful analysis, the interrogation of prisoners, deserters, escaped slaves, refugees, and ordinary civilians could yield information on the enemy’s order of battle, its location, and its movements.

12 APR. Confederate forces fire on Fort Sumter, starting the Civil War.

31 MAY. Thaddeus Lowe telegraphed critical information on enemy troop movements from a balloon at the Battle of Fair Oaks, Virginia.

11 FEB. COL George Sharpe appointed to head the Bureau of Military Information, which became an effective, all-source intelligence organization. The BMI had notable successes at both the battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.

1861     1862    1863    1865

1 AUG. Allan Pinkerton organized a secret service for GEN George McClellan.

9 APR. GEN Robert E. Lee surrenders at Appomattox, VA, effectively ending the Civil War.

Allan Pinkerton (seated right) organized a secret service for GEN George McClellan.
Of the traditional sources, the scout eclipsed the spy. While often flamboyant, Civil War spies, as a whole, rarely produced the steady stream of accurate information that spies had in the Revolutionary War or even the Mexican War. On the other hand, groups of scouts that infiltrated behind the enemy front lines provided their commanders with a wide range of information from locations of fording sites across rivers to the strength of enemy positions. Without a doubt, however, the single most important intelligence asset was the armies’ cavalry units. Regardless of the information coming in from the other sources, Civil War commanders needed cavalry to provide immediate combat intelligence to ensure battlefield success.

When the war broke out, neither the Union nor Confederate armies were prepared for the war in terms of intelligence or much else. Neither had effective centralized intelligence apparatus that could make full use of the variety of intelligence sources. Instead, commanders in the field had to make their own arrangements for intelligence collection. Consequently, they hired spies, sent out scouts, and assigned intelligence missions. Some commanders personally supervised the intelligence operations, while others assigned the responsibility to various members of their staffs. The result of this decentralized activity was a hodgepodge of uncoordinated intelligence structures that occasionally worked at cross purposes.

When MG George B. McClellan took command of the Union forces in the summer of 1861, he brought in Allan Pinkerton, the head of a private detective agency, to establish an intelligence service. During the subsequent months, Pinkerton excelled at counterintelligence (CI) work and, to a large degree, shut down Confederate spy networks in and around Washington. Unfortunately, he was not as successful as an intelligence officer and his estimates of enemy strength were often exaggerated. On the Confederate side, GEN Robert E. Lee never established an intelligence service for his Army of Northern Virginia. Instead, he relied heavily on his cavalry commander, MG J.E.B. Stuart, to be “the eyes of his army.” In the West, MG Grenville Dodge, the Union commander in Corinth, Mississippi, established a network of over a hundred agents as well as a corps of scouts that ranged as far east as Atlanta, Georgia and as far south as Montgomery, Alabama. In all three of these cases, the intelligence operations were largely improvised, limited in scope, and relied heavily on the analytical skills of their commanders.

In February 1863, MG Joseph Hooker, commander of the Army of the Potomac, established the Bureau of Military Information (BMI), under the direction of COL George H. Sharpe. Unlike other intelligence agencies of the Civil War, the BMI was not a temporary expedient. Instead, it was a permanent part of the Army of the Potomac’s staff. As such, the BMI travelled with the commander, giving Sharpe almost immediate access to his commander. Normally, the bureau consisted of seventy to eighty men. Most of these were scouts, but Sharpe also had several assistants at the headquarters. Mr. John Babcock and CPT John McEntee were particularly important for Sharpe. Babcock, a civilian, was Sharpe’s chief interrogator who kept the BMI’s records, sketched maps, and compiled the Order of Battle charts. McEntee organized the scouting operations, assisted with interrogations, and established, when necessary, “branch offices” for the BMI.

Leadership of the BMI: COL George H. Sharpe (left) with Mr. John C. Babcock (2d from left) and LTC John McEntee (right).
The scouts were the BMI’s dedicated collection assets. Most of them were veteran noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and enlisted men. These veterans would venture into no man’s land or even behind enemy lines with specific instructions from Sharpe. Sometimes they would look for enemy forces. On other occasions, they would explore road networks. Often, they would link up with Southern Unionists who were operating as spies, and return with their reports. These scouts provided the basis of the BMI’s knowledge of the enemy’s location and movements.

In addition to his scouts, Sharpe obtained valuable information through systematic interrogations of enemy prisoners and deserters. Sharpe and his assistants asked every enemy captive in uniform a battery of questions: identification of his regiment, brigade, division, and corps; when and where he entered the line; location of his corps; when it arrived on the front; and how he was captured or why he deserted. They asked other questions depending upon what information they needed. Treating the answers with careful consideration to weed out exaggerations and misinformation, Babcock was able to assemble an impressive order of battle for GEN Lee’s army. By mid-1863, Sharpe’s intelligence service was well acquainted with each Confederate regiment, brigade, and division in Virginia and North Carolina as well as their commanders and locations.

Other information came to the BMI. Reports from cavalry reconnaissance, Signal Corps observation posts, captured correspondence, and communication interceptions made their way to Sharpe and his staff. Newspapers provided an important BMI source, since they shed light on the larger military, economic, and political situation in Richmond. In short, Sharpe developed an all-source collection effort, one of the first in American MI.

When Sharpe reported to his army commander, he did not present raw data, but a careful and thoughtful analysis of the enemy and the terrain situation. Based on the two pillars of scouting and interrogations, Sharpe established a standard of credibility with which to gauge other pieces of information as they arrived at the BMI. The mass of the all-source information was collated, analyzed, condensed, and presented in daily written reports to the commanders of the Army of the Potomac.

Shortly after its establishment, the BMI proved invaluable to Union operational planning. In April 1863, Hooker planned an envelopment of Lee’s army to avoid making a frontal attack on the Confederate positions around Chancellorsville. Critical to the strategy was knowledge of the enemy’s strength, location, and movements as well as an understanding of the surrounding terrain. Sharpe obliged. In mid-April, one
of BMI’s patrols discovered a weakly defended area in the Confederate lines, northwest of the main body of Lee’s army. Other patrols discovered alternate routes to the area. On top of this, Babcock developed a Confederate order of battle with an estimated enemy strength of 55,300, a figure that came within two percent of Lee’s actual strength. Acting on this accurate information, Hooker was able to place his army on Lee’s flank. Unfortunately, Hooker was unable to withstand Lee’s own brilliant flanking, and thus lost the advantage that the BMI’s superb intelligence had given him.

In June 1863, Sharpe and the BMI faced the larger challenge of tracking a moving enemy force during the Gettysburg campaign. Lee wanted to move the war away from Virginia and take it into Union territory. After his victory at Chancellorsville, he marched up the Shenandoah Valley to Maryland and Pennsylvania. Sharpe learned of Lee’s advance in late May, but could not confirm the exact locations. Quickly, he sent his scouts out to key fords and gaps—named areas of interest—to pinpoint the Confederate movements. By June 12, Sharpe was able to confirm the location and individual components of Lee’s army as it moved north. This allowed the Union forces to set off in a timely pursuit and eventually assume advantageous positions around the Pennsylvanian town of Gettysburg by June 30th.

On the first three days of July 1863, the Union and Confederate forces clashed at Gettysburg. As the armies fought on July 1 and 2, Sharpe worked to update and upgrade the picture of the enemy. Making use of information gleaned from the numerous Confederates taken prisoner, the BMI leadership projected that the Confederates had committed all of their forces except for the four brigades of MG George E. Pickett’s division. Despite being made during the high pressure situation of an ongoing battle, this estimate proved remarkably accurate. During the evening of July 2, Sharpe met with MG George G. Meade, the Army of the Potomac’s newly appointed commander, and reported that Pickett’s division had the only fresh troops available to Lee. That report virtually compelled the Union commanders to remain on the battlefield. As predicted, Lee used Pickett’s uncommitted brigades to launch one final attack on Meade’s lines on July 3. It failed, leaving the Union forces victorious.

For the remainder of the war, Sharpe and the BMI continued to provide intelligence to the Union commanders in the Virginia theater. Eventually, they supported GEN Ulysses S. Grant, commander-in-chief of all Union forces and his campaigns against Lee and his army. To maintain this support, Sharpe expanded the BMI’s sources and assets. He strengthened his ties with the network of Richmond Unionists, such as Elizabeth Van Lew and Samuel Ruth, and established five “depots” to pick up information from Van Lew’s or Ruth’s agents. Moreover, he organized a network to watch enemy railroads to detect large scale activity. In the end, Lee could not move any large body of troops without Grant knowing about it. In the spring of 1865, the BMI detected Lee’s movement from defenses around Petersburg, allowing the Union commanders to plan what would become the final Appomattox campaign.

When the Civil War ended in April 1865, the vast armies were hastily demobilized and the wartime arrangements for gathering intelligence discontinued. Despite the success of the BMI, the Army made no effort to set up a similar organization at the War Department or at any other level. Once again, the organizations and concepts that developed slowly and painfully during wartime were quickly forgotten in peacetime.
First Steps to Modern Army Intelligence

In the decades following the Civil War, much of the Army was scattered across the American West in isolated troop and company-sized detachments with the mission to police and pacify the region. To support military operations, Congress authorized the establishment of a Corps of Indian Scouts in 1866. Locally recruited, they fought alongside the Regulars, but also provided invaluable tracking and scouting skills. Into the 1880s, Army intelligence activities were largely limited to tactical reconnaissance by individual scouts and cavalry troopers in the western U.S.

Against this unlikely background, the Army established its first permanent intelligence organization at the national level. In October 1885, Brigadier General Richard C. Drum, the Army’s Adjutant General, created the Military Information Division (MID) as a small subsection in The Adjutant General’s Office. As part of its duties, Drum directed the division to collect military data on foreign armies. To support these efforts, he asked senior Army leaders to have their officers submit reports on intelligence gathered during their foreign travels. Initially, the division acted as a relatively passive repository for military related information.

In 1889, the division was able to take a more active collection role when it assumed control and responsibility for the Army’s new military attaché system. Congress had authorized the system in 1888, and the Army dispatched officers to the overseas capitals of Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. More important, the Secretary of War required all information from the attachés to go to the MID. By 1898, the Army had 16 attaché posts in Europe, Mexico, and Japan. Until the early 1940s, the attaché system constituted the foundation of the Army’s strategic collection effort.

In the decades following the Civil War, Army Intelligence was largely limited to tactical reconnaissance by individual scouts and cavalry troopers in the American West.
When the war with Spain began in April 1898, the Army for the first time entered into a conflict with at least a semblance of intelligence preparation. For six years, MID had been collecting terrain and order of battle intelligence on the situation in Cuba. When war broke out, it had already prepared detailed maps of the likely theaters of operations in the Caribbean. The intelligence on Spanish strength in Cuba was immeasurably assisted by the accurate reports on Spanish deployments received from CPT Tasker H. Bliss, the attaché in Madrid. In April 1898, MAJ Arthur L. Wagner, the MID chief, sent experienced military observers to Cuba and Puerto Rico to collect specific information on the enemy’s capabilities. 1LT Andrew S. Rowan travelled to Cuba, while 1LT Henry H. Whitney went to Puerto Rico. Both returned with valuable information before American forces deployed. As the war progressed, the MID published comprehensive handbooks for both Caribbean countries.

After the dramatic American naval victory in Manila Bay, the Army sent troops to the Philippines in July 1898. American forces gained an easy victory against the Spanish, but then fighting broke out as Filipinos sought independence. To provide information about the Filipino forces beyond tactical reconnaissance, the American commander in Manila created the Bureau of Insurgent Records to translate and collate captured documents. In December 1900, the bureau became the Division of Military Information (DMI) with a mission broader than just that of document exploitation.

The officer in charge of Manila’s DMI was CPT Ralph Van Deman, who had previously served on Wagner’s staff. Under Van Deman’s leadership, the division established a mapping section, maintained liaison with other agencies, relayed intelligence to the field commanders, and provided photographs and descriptions of known Filipino insurgents. At the local level, commanders appointed post intelligence officers to gather information on the surrounding terrain, attitudes of local villagers, and the dispositions of Filipino insurgent groups. In 1902, the division in Manila became a branch office of the MID in Washington.

A year later, the War Department’s MID itself underwent resubordination. Secretary of War Elihu Root had established the Army’s first General Staff in 1903 to perform administrative, intelligence, and planning functions. The General Staff’s Second Division acquired the MID...
In 1903, Secretary of War Root organized the Army’s first General Staff. From The Adjutant General. It was given four major duties: collecting and disseminating information on foreign countries; directing the work of the attaché system; supervising mapping, and maintaining a reference collection. For the moment, the intelligence function had achieved equal standing with other staff missions.

This status, however, would not last long. Over the next several years, the Army’s intelligence organization was caught up in bureaucratic maneuvering with unfortunate results. In 1908, the Army merged the General Staff’s Second Division (MID) with the Third Division, which was responsible for contingency and operational planning, to become the War College Division. The union proved a setback for the intelligence function at the Army level. The function was now assigned to a subordinate Military Information Committee, which no longer produced intelligence for the Army as a whole, but only for the War College Division. Over time, the committee produced less and less intelligence, despite having an extensive attaché system. By 1915, the committee was an organization on paper only.

While Army Intelligence had almost ceased to exist at the national level, some positive developments occurred in the field. In early March 1916, the Mexican revolutionary leader Pancho Villa raided Columbus, New Mexico, and killed over a dozen Americans. In response, President Woodrow Wilson ordered BG John J. Pershing to lead a division-sized punitive expedition into Mexico to hunt down Villa’s guerrilla band. Pershing, who understood the value of good intelligence, appointed MAJ James A. Ryan as the expedition’s intelligence officer. Ryan organized an effective “service of information” that provided a detailed knowledge of northern Mexico. Ryan and his successor, CPT Nicholas W. Campanole, made profitable use of local infor-
mants. Active patrolling complemented this information. In addition to a large number of horse cavalry, the expedition fielded Indian Scouts for the last time.

These traditional collection methods were supported by newly emerging technologies. MAJ Benjamin D. Foulois led his 1st Aero Squadron into Mexico with eight aircraft. The squadron made several reconnaissance flights and even brought along an aerial camera. The Signal Corps sent some of its new “radio tractors”–trucks equipped with radio sets–to support Pershing’s forces. Although procured for communications work, the equipment could easily be adapted to intelligence purposes. At times, the radio tractors were used to monitor Mexican government communications. Although the Punitive Expedition achieved only limited success and failed to capture Villa, Pershing’s forces had deployed the widest range of intelligence assets that the Army had yet managed to field.

In the same month that Villa led his raid, now-MAJ Van Deman submitted several reports to his superiors on the status of intelligence on the Army Staff. At the time, Van Deman had considerable experience with intelligence, having worked with the Military Information Divisions in both Washington and Manila, performed undercover work in China, and served as the General Staff’s mapping section chief. He had returned to the General Staff in July 1915 and found that almost no intelligence work was being performed. In his reports, he urged the re-establishment of a separate Military Intelligence Division to deal exclusively with military information. Initially, the Army leadership rebuffed or ignored Van Deman’s recommendations.

Once the U.S. entered World War I in April 1917, Van Deman had more success. After another rejection through normal channels, Van Deman discreetly lobbied Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. The secretary agreed with the major and, on May 3, 1917, established a Military Intelligence Section with Van Deman as its chief. The Army once again had a functional intelligence organization at the Army level. Moreover, the new designation “Military Intelligence” (rather than military information) was symbolic of the new approaches that Army Intelligence would take over the next eighteen months.
Army Intelligence in World War I

During WW I, the evolution of Army Intelligence proceeded along two parallel lines. In the U.S., MI evolved into a full-fledged member of the War Department General Staff. Meanwhile, in France, GEN John J. Pershing’s American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) established its own field intelligence organization to meet tactical and operational needs. Together, both lines greatly improved the intelligence function in the Army.

At the War Department, Van Deman’s MI Section began modestly. Besides Van Deman, its staff included two other officers and two civilian clerks. Its responsibilities, however, were considerable. In addition to the long-recognized task of overseeing Army attachés, the section was charged with developing policies and plans for intelligence activities and controlling the Army’s military counterespionage system. Consequently, the section not only served as a planning element but performed operational functions as well.

To accomplish these missions, Van Deman separated the section’s efforts into “positive” and “negative” intelligence. Positive intelligence consisted of collecting information from the enemy, while negative intelligence meant denying the enemy intelligence about one’s own forces. As his staff grew, Van Deman’s operations expanded in both areas.

The most innovative aspect of Van Deman’s positive intelligence collection was the establishment of a cryptologic capability at the War Department level. In June 1917, he formed the Code and Cipher Bureau, and placed it under newly commissioned 1LT Herbert O. Yardley, who had been a code clerk with the State Department. Under Yardley, the bureau prepared codes for the War Department and also performed some noteworthy feats of cryptanalysis. In one case, it broke a German cipher that led to the arrest of Lothar Witzke, a German spy. By the end of the war, the Yardley’s staff totaled 151 codebreakers, clerks, and
translators. During the war, it read almost 11,000 foreign messages, and solved about 50 codes used by eight different governments.

Van Deman also expanded collection of other foreign intelligence as resources permitted. Not only did his staff gather data on foreign armies and their capabilities, it began to collect details about worldwide economic, social, and political factors. To do so, he conducted widespread coordination with the various U.S. military and civilian agencies, as well as both British and French intelligence activities. These efforts, however, were overshadowed by the fact that the AEF’s intelligence agencies were 3,000 miles nearer the enemy and in a much better position to gather information on the European theater. The great distances between the stateside and overseas organizations discouraged cooperation and collaboration.

In terms of negative intelligence, the MI Section had to contend with the problems of possible espionage, sabotage, and subversion directed at the Army. To start, Van Deman simply increased vigilance and established physical security for the War Department offices in the Washington area. In June 1917, he set up a security force that initially performed guard functions, and later began security screening of military personnel and applicants for government employment. Later, it opened field offices in NYC and other major cities, and at embarkation points to provide CI coverage. The section also maintained an active liaison with other government agencies, especially the Department of Justice, to cope with suspected civilian subversion directed against the Army and the war effort.

Van Deman was also concerned with a potential threat from within the Army. With the military draft bringing both citizens and resident foreign nationals into the ranks, he believed that Germany, through the large German-American population, would introduce agents and sympathizers into the newly forming divisions. These agents would not only spy, but work to undermine efficiency and subvert morale. To combat this situation, Van Deman coordinated the CI efforts on Army posts nationwide. This extensive CI network would eventually include nearly 400 officers and an undercover agent network throughout the Army’s regiments, battalions and even companies. Once this system was in place, it produced a growing stream of incident reports that led to a significant expansion of the War Department’s intelligence organization.

As the War Department’s intelligence agency grew larger and its operations became more far flung, it achieved a position of greater prominence. In February 1918, the section was upgraded in status to the MI Branch and given more independence. The increase in size and complexity meant that Van Deman needed to standardize the structure and procedures for his organization. He divided his staff into eight numbered sections.
In addition to planning and conducting both intelligence and CI activities, Van Deman played an important role in establishing the first fields of specialization for intelligence personnel. In July 1917, the Army established the Corps of Interpreters (COI) to ensure it had the necessary numbers of competent linguists. The corps consisted of 17 captains, 41 lieutenants, and 72 sergeants. Van Deman and his staff oversaw the recruitment and examination of corps applicants, ensuring that the COI maintained its full authorization throughout the war. Initially, the Army allocated the interpreters to the field headquarters in France. By the end of the war, members of the corps also served on the Army Staff.

In August 1917, the Army established the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) in response to a request from the AEF in France. The AEF was concerned about the possibilities of German sabotage, espionage, and subversion directed against American troops in France and asked for 50 company grade officers proficient in foreign languages with police training. The Army decided to staff the CIP with 50 sergeants. Tasked with furnishing the appropriate personnel, Van Deman ran into difficulties, and ended up recruiting the first set of agents by placing newspaper advertisements in NYC and New Orleans. In late November 1917, as this first group was arriving in France, Van Deman requested an allotment of 250 CIP agents to assist the considerable CI program in the U.S. This was only the beginning. In France alone, over 400 CIP agents investigated 3,700 cases and neutralized 230 enemy agents.

In June 1918, LTC (later BG) Marlborough Churchill succeeded Van Deman, who departed for Europe to inspect the AEF’s intelligence operations. Three months later, GEN Peyton C. March, the new Army Chief of Staff, restructured the War Department’s General Staff. He established the MI Division (MID) as one of the four principal divisions, restoring the intelligence function to a position of institutional equality on the Army Staff. Under the new arrangements, the division continued to expand its operations. One section assumed direction of the Army’s Radio Intelligence Service, which had begun intercept operations along the Mexican Border in February 1918. By the end of the war, the service consisted of a number of collection sites, including one in Houlton, Maine, to monitor German diplomatic and agent communications. When hostilities ceased in November 1918, MID was a large organization of 282 officers, 250 CIP agents, and over 1,000 civilians that conducted both staff and operational functions.

Meanwhile Pershing arrived in France in June 1917 with a small headquarters staff, the vanguard of what would become an AEF of one million men. To properly command and control
this force, Pershing needed a modern staff organization, including an intelligence structure. To shape a modern staff, he required his officers to study the French and British staff systems. By July 1917, he had organized his staff along French lines, with staff elements for Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, and Supply. On the AEF staff, these elements were designated corresponding sections: G1, G2, G3, and G4, respectively. By the end of 1917, all AEF units from field army to battalion had adopted this structure. Thus the “2” had intelligence duties at all levels.

While the AEF’s staff organization had French roots, its intelligence system had British origins. In July and August 1917, MAJ (later BG) Dennis E. Nolan, the AEF’s G2, looked at both French and British intelligence theories and procedures. While he found both were effective, Nolan modeled his organization and operations on the British system, which stressed enemy order of battle development. By December 1917, he had his system in place.

The AEF’s intelligence system rested on two underlying principles: independence and interdependence. From battalion to army, units had enough resources and personnel to independently produce intelligence along their own fronts. Moreover, the AEF’s system was interdependent. At each level, the intelligence sections collected and studied information on the enemy, used it for their commanders, and then passed it to higher headquarters. In turn, the higher staffs studied the information, added intelligence from their own sources, reached their conclusions, and furnished this intelligence to lower staffs. This exchange of information was critical to both higher and lower intelligence sections. Upward, it provided information on the enemy; downward, it gave lower echelons a broad picture of the enemy’s situation and helped verify their conclusions.

At the battalion and regimental levels, the S2s were responsible for gaining information on the enemy along their front lines. In addition to small staff sections, they had their own dedicated scouts and observers. Scouts accompanied patrols and raids into enemy lines to obtain all possible information on the enemy and terrain. The observers established observation or listening posts that moved forward as the front lines advanced. The S2s sent their information up to the next level.

At the division level, the G2 was responsible for combat intelligence on the enemy front for a depth of two miles. The G2’s small section consisted of a deputy for combat intelligence, a commissioned interpreter, a topographic officer, and a number of enlisted men. The interpreter often oversaw the division’s interrogation of prisoners of war and collection of enemy documents. The intelligence staff supervised patrolling and other ground observations. Furthermore, the division G2 provided oversight for the intelligence officers of the regiments and battalions.
A corps G2 had responsibility for surveillance of the area between two and five miles beyond the enemy’s forward line of troops. To accomplish this, corps had larger intelligence staffs and a wider array of resources. Documents and prisoners were given a more detailed examination. Sound- and Flash-Ranging teams targeted enemy artillery and often augmented the corps observation posts. Moreover, corps intelligence assets included aerial visual observations and photographic images obtained from aircraft and balloons. Several officers and men of the corps G2 were dedicated to the interpretation and dissemination of aerial photographs and the results of visual aerial observation. In addition, each corps had its own dedicated CI element consisting of twelve CIP sergeants.

At the field army, the G2 had over 50 officers and more than a hundred soldiers. Each of the two AEF field armies included additional aerial reconnaissance units. A topographic battalion allowed the Army G2 to draw up large scale war maps and distribute graphic intelligence summaries. The First Army’s intelligence section also contained a radio intelligence section that intercepted enemy radio traffic.

At the top of this interconnected intelligence structure was Nolan’s own G2 at AEF General Headquarters. Nolan organized his large intelligence section into four divisions. The Military Information Division, or G2-A, produced finished intelligence reports and studies from the mass of information available from the AEF’s tactical units and the other divisions of the G2. The division was able to draw upon the full range of intelligence fields (human, photographic, and signals) to supply operational intelligence, and it also produced political and economic intelligence. Under the G2-A, a radio intelligence element engaged in cryptanalysis and supplied the subordinate Army sections with the necessary material to decode the messages.

The AEF’s “secret service,” G2-B, supervised both undercover collection and CI operations. The division did run some agent networks, including “train-watchers” who monitored German rail movements behind the lines. For its CI, the AEF initially depended heavily on British and French assistance, but the expansion and development of the CIP gave G2-B an instrument of its own in this field. At the end of the war, the CIP agents supported both the rear areas and provided CI coverage to corps and divisions along the front lines.

The mish-mashed G2-C (Topographic, Map Supply, and Sound- and Flash-Ranging Division), provided topographic intelligence and battle maps—over 4.5 million—to the AEF. The staff division
coordinated the activities of the 29th Engineers that manned the AEF’s large map printing facility, supplied topographic troops to the field armies, and provided administrative control over the sound- and flash-ranging troops. Finally, the Censorship and Press Division, G2-D, handled press and censorship matters and managed the AEF’s propaganda program aimed at undermining German morale. It also supervised the publication of *Stars and Stripes*, the famous troop newspaper. By the end of the war, Nolan’s intelligence organization had grown into a full-fledged theater intelligence center.

As the war progressed, the AEF’s intelligence staffs became more proficient. In mid-October 1918, the G2s and S2s of the Second Army worked together to build an accurate disposition of the German forces facing them. The process started with the AEF G2 issuing a Graphic German Order of Battle, which laid out the German army group and army sectors from the North Seas to Switzerland down to the division level. Using his own assets and analysis, LTC Charles F. Thompson, the Second Army G2, disseminated a graphic intelligence summary overprinted on a 1:100,000 map that broke down the disposition of eight German divisions into regimental sectors and included incidents of gas, artillery fire, patrolling, and machine gun fire. The IV Corps G2, LTC Joseph W. Stilwell (of later WW II fame as commander of American troops in China), in turn issued an intelligence summary that further developed the situation of the five enemy divisions in the corps area of interest. Furthermore, Stilwell ensured that aerial photographs from his observation squadrons reached the division level. This imagery included key terrain, road junctions, and enemy trench lines.

The 28th Division G2, LTC William H. Clendennin, used this intelligence to inform his regimental and battalion S2s. Meanwhile, the S2s directed patrolling and laid out observation posts that discovered the German outpost lines and points of resistance. Moreover, battalions and regiments captured German prisoners who were sent back to the division G2 for interrogation. From some of these prisoners, CPT Ernst Howald, the G2’s lead interrogator, determined the identification and placement of regiments, strength of outposts, and location of minefields. Significantly, this information placed the regiments of the German 224th Division in different locations than the army and corps summaries. Howald and his colleagues then constructed a detailed template of the enemy facing the 28th Division, including regimental sectors, battalion and company positions, command
posts, and minefields, and forwarded this estimate to corps. Subsequently, based on this information from the front, Thompson’s graphic estimates depicted the correct disposition of the 224th Division. Surveys after the war proved the accuracy of the intelligence.

The AEF built an intelligence organization parallel, but not completely similar, to the War Department’s MID. Because of Pershing’s G-staff system, Army Intelligence achieved a position of equality with other functional areas a year before it did so in the U.S. Nolan created the G2/S2 system that would become the framework for intelligence work in operational and tactical units into the 21st century.

WW I was the watershed in the evolution of U.S. Army Intelligence. The intelligence function at both the War Department and in the field was revitalized and placed on a footing of organizational equality with other major administrative and operational functions. The Army ventured into new fields of CI and cryptology and made use of the full spectrum of intelligence sources. In addition to such sources as prisoner of war interrogation, captured document exploitation, and ground reconnaissance, the newer fields of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and aerial photography played an important role. At both the War Department and theater levels, the definition of MI was enlarged to include the collection of political, economic, and social data.

Beyond the War Department and AEF staffs, Nolan’s G2/S2 system meant intelligence soldiers were present in every unit from battalion to field army. The Army also fielded intelligence related units, including topographic engineers and aerial reconnaissance squadrons. Although Army Intelligence was not yet considered an official career field, the Army began to recognize the need for specialized skills in this area and created the COI and CIP. For Army Intelligence, WW I represented a great leap forward.

CPT Howald’s notebook and map used in his interrogation of captured enemy prisoners. On the right is an epaulet from a member of the German 61st Landwehr Regiment.

IV Corps issued this graphic intelligence summary showing the German forces it faced in mid-October 1918. The corps also disseminated aerial photography of the area.
Two extraordinary couples paved the way for the U.S. Army’s cryptologic efforts in the 20th century. Their pioneering work influenced American code making and code breaking from before World War I until late in the century.

Colonel Parker Hitt (1878-1971) became actively interested in codes and ciphers while at the Army Signal School at Fort Leavenworth in 1911. He taught his wife, Genevieve Young Hitt (1885-1963), the subject as he studied. Parker Hitt’s Manual for the Solution of Military Ciphers, published in 1916, was the first modern work in the U.S. on the subject. During Pershing’s Punitive Expedition in 1916, the couple served the Army as unpaid cryptologists, breaking Mexican codes and ciphers, while Captain Hitt commanded Company H of the 19th Infantry at Fort Sill. Genevieve’s work during this time makes her the U.S. government’s first female cryptologist.

William F. Friedman (1891-1969) and Elizebeth Smith (1892-1980) were employees of Riverbank Laboratories in Geneva, Illinois, in 1916. Smith was involved in efforts to decrypt Elizabethan-era ciphers. Friedman, who developed an interest in Smith and then in her work, was the first American to apply mathematical and statistical principles to the art of cryptology. They married in 1917. Riverbank Laboratories was used by the Army’s Military Intelligence Division to train officers in the use of codes and ciphers prior to deployment with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France. The couple taught classes using Hitt’s manual as their textbook. Friedman would later be commissioned and serve in the G2 A6 Code and Cipher Section.

Colonel Hitt held many positions in the AEF, most notably Chief Signal Officer of the 1st Army. He had few formal responsibilities for cryptologic operations during the war, but was widely consulted and influenced the preparation of code books. Friedman would later call him the “father of modern American military cryptology.”

Genevieve Hitt served as a cryptologist for the Southern Department’s Intelligence Office in both unpaid and paid capacities during the war. After the war, Elizebeth Smith Friedman would work for the Signal Corps, the Navy, the Coast Guard, and the Treasury Department. She achieved fame breaking the codes of the “rum runners” during Prohibition. William Friedman worked for the Signal Corps in the 1920s and was put in charge of their Signal Intelligence Service in 1930. There he led efforts both against foreign ciphers and in development of U.S. cryptographic systems; his work was critical to American cryptologic success in World War II. He served in leadership and advisory roles until 1955 with the Signal Security Agency, the Armed Forces Security Agency, and the National Security Agency (NSA). Much of what is done today at NSA can be traced to William Friedman’s pioneering efforts.
During World War I, for the first time in the United States Army, intelligence soldiers were placed at every echelon from battalion to field army. Here are some of those pioneering soldiers.

The G-2 Section of the 82nd Division. Maj. J.C. Lee, the G-2, won a Silver Star for gallantry when leading a patrol that penetrated the enemy lines.

Sgt. William Ollion and the other members of the Intelligence Section conducted patrols and provided Observation Posts for the 3rd Battalion, 310th Infantry. Members of the section were often cited for bravery and devotion of duty.

1st Lt. C. Barrell Cox, the intelligence officer for the 1st Battalion, 360th Infantry, fought with his battalion from August - November 1918.
Army Intelligence during the Inter-War Years

In the years immediately following WW I, the Army attempted to build upon the intelligence experiences it had gained. The MID issued a series of comprehensive handbooks covering various areas of interest for the Army, including Mexico and Russia. In 1920, GEN March, the Chief of Staff, distributed *Intelligence Regulations*, the first attempt to create Army-wide intelligence doctrine. These regulations were based on the AEF’s operational experiences with intelligence. In addition, the Army’s tactical units adopted the S2 system for their intelligence staffs. When Pershing succeeded March as Chief of Staff in 1921, he reorganized the War Department General Staff along the lines of the AEF’s General Staff. Consequently, the chief of the MID became the Army G2. The first officer to hold the position was, not surprisingly, BG Nolan.

Earlier in the year, Nolan had established the MI Officer Reserve Corps (MIORC) to retain the services of the large number of officers who had served in intelligence positions throughout the war. These officers would provide a pool of trained manpower when the Army mobilized for another war. In the 1920s and 1930s, the MIORC’s numbers ranged between 400 and 800 officers.

These early positive steps, however, soon wavered as the U.S. returned to a peacetime footing and underwent the retrenchment made necessary by the worldwide depression. By 1927 the Army had shrunk to less than three percent of its wartime strength and budget. The strength of the Army G2’s staff, still referred to as the MID, fell from 230 officers, enlisted men, and civilians in 1920 to less than 70 in 1936. Lack of funding forced the G2 to cut back a number of its military attaché posts, which remained its principal means of gathering foreign intelligence. Without a serious threat of foreign espionage and subversion against the Army, the MID’s Negative Branch was discontinued. Moreover, the Army lacked sufficient general officer authorizations to retain all of the General Staff division chiefs. The Army G2 often remained a colonel throughout the 1920s and 1930s, thus essentially relegating the position to the second-class status.

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<td>2 APR. The Army established the MIORC to retain the services of the large pool of officers who served in intelligence positions during World War I.</td>
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<td>22 APR. The Army Signal Corps established SIS consolidating code-breaking and code-making functions.</td>
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<td>12 NOV. The Washington Naval Conference begins. Yardley’s Black Chamber aids the American negotiators by providing decrypted traffic of the Japanese delegation.</td>
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<td>1 JUN. Herbert Yardley wrote <em>The American Black Chamber</em>, an expose of American code-breaking. It was a major diplomatic embarrassment for the U.S., and damaging to American intelligence efforts.</td>
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Of the two specialized corps formed during WW I, only the CIP survived through the inter-war period. In March 1921, the Army dissolved the COI, and the CIP withered to just 16 noncommissioned officers in 1934, most of whom were used as classified file clerks rather than as CI investigators. Only in the overseas departments and in the Eighth Corps Area on the Mexican border did CIP agents still provide useful CI services.

Despite the problems facing Army Intelligence, it was able to experiment with new technologies such as aerial photography and radar during the years between the wars, but achieved its greatest successes in the field of cryptology. In the fall of 1919, Yardley, now retired from the Army, set up a clandestine government cryptanalytic unit in NYC. Jointly funded by the Army and the State Department the small civilian staff, dubbed the Black Chamber, worked mainly on diplomatic code breaking. It achieved several notable successes, the most important of which was breaking the Japanese diplomatic code in time to give American diplomats a key negotiating edge during the Washington Peace Conference of 1921-1922.

By 1929, however, Yardley’s unit had become increasingly less relevant. Its diplomatic intelligence met no direct military requirement for an Army that was already strapped for funding. Thus, when the State Department withdrew its backing for the project, the Army followed suit and the Black Chamber was closed. Anticipating the closure, the Army had already begun to place all of its cryptologic functions under the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. In 1930, the Army established the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) under William F. Friedman, who had served as a cryptographer with the AEF. Friedman quickly began to recruit a small, but talented staff.

By the mid-1930s, the SIS had established a chain of monitoring stations in the Philippine and Hawaiian Departments, and in the Western and Southwestern U.S. In 1939, these sites were placed under the control of the 2d Signal Service Battalion.
Signal Service Company, a centralized radio intelligence unit located at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. This combination of the SIS analysts and an intercept organization would represent one of the Army’s greatest strengths in the intelligence field.

The SIS’s greatest achievement was the breaking of PURPLE, a Japanese cipher machine used for diplomatic communications. Japan, which had begun an aggressive expansion against China in the 1930s, introduced the new machine in early 1939. For eighteen months, the SIS joined with the Navy in an intense effort to crack the cipher. Finally, in September 1940, they discovered an exploitable pattern, and within a week, they had produced the first two translated “solutions” of Japanese diplomatic messages. SIS experts then built an analog machine that allowed the U.S. to read the messages as fast as their intended recipients. The resulting decrypts of Japanese diplomatic communications were assigned the code name MAGIC, and their contents were closely controlled. Over the next five years, MAGIC would be the Army’s single most important intelligence source.

As the SIS struggled with breaking the Japanese code, WW II had broken out in Europe, and German forces had occupied much of that continent. Despite an official position of neutrality, the U.S. slowly began to expand its Army and its intelligence activities. In 1941, at the Army level, MID grew to a strength of almost 850 officers and civilians, more than ten times the total a year earlier. With war in Europe and China, MID refocused collection activities on Germany and Japan, as well as Latin America. The attaché system, Army’s traditional strategic source of information, had grown to encompass 136 attachés on duty in 50 countries. At the same time, the SIS also underwent expansion and the Army activated tactical radio intelligence companies.

To assist the growing number of intelligence officers in field units, the Army issued a series of doctrinal manuals that covered topics ranging from combat intelligence and observation to the examination of prisoners and the use of aerial photography. As world tensions intensified, the Army’s need for security correspondingly increased, and the CIP’s strength continued to expand throughout 1940 and 1941, exceeding 500 individuals by May 1941. By the time the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Army Intelligence had taken major strides toward preparing for war.
Army Intelligence in World War II: The Homefront

The conduct of Army Intelligence during WW II resulted largely from the foundations laid during WW I. At the national level, the Army G2 functioned as an equal member on the General Staff. Intelligence support to the field commanders came from G2/S2s at every echelon. The Army relied heavily on collection sources such as aerial photography and radio interception that had been developed a quarter-century earlier.

The Army G2 and his MID staff were at the head of Army Intelligence. Unlike the WW I agency, this MID after 1942, had no operational functions. Instead it formulated policy, made plans, and supervised intelligence on an overall basis. It also coordinated intelligence activities with the Navy and Army Air Forces. Moreover, it oversaw operations of the Army’s three intelligence organizations: the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), the Signal Security Agency (SSA), and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC).

In March 1942, the Army organized MIS to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence at both strategic and tactical level. By the summer of 1942, the service, headed by BG Hayes A. Kroner for most of the war, began publishing a series of unclassified intelligence products for the field. These publications covered enemy tactics, organizations, and equipment at the tactical level and were widely distributed. As much as possible, they were specifically customized for use by the front line commanders and intelligence officers, often taking the form of lessons learned as much as intelligence. For example, MIS disseminated the comprehensive Company Officer’s Handbook of the German Army in the months immediately before D-Day.

At the strategic level, the Army leadership increasingly came to rely on information from
communications intelligence. To properly exploit this important source of intelligence, the Army created the Special Branch in May 1942 and placed it in Kroner’s organization. COL (later BG) Carter W. Clarke led the branch with COL Alfred W. McCormick as his deputy. The branch placed information from intercepted traffic into the larger intelligence picture. At first, the branch evaluated and processed MAGIC information almost exclusively. After May 1943, the branch had access to ULTRA intelligence, which was derived from the British breaking of the highest German radio codes. The British agreed to share this intelligence with the U.S. Army on an unrestricted basis, in exchange for reciprocal access to American MAGIC intelligence.

Access to ULTRA provided the Army with information having both strategic and operational value in the war against Germany. Ironically, so did MAGIC. Through MAGIC, Army Intelligence read the messages of Baron Hiroshi Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany. A former general in the Japanese Army, Oshima was a keen observer and sent hundreds of detailed reports to Tokyo on the status of German forces, defenses and intentions.

To supplement the incoming communications intelligence, the MIS exploited other sources of information as well. At Fort Hunt, Virginia, it established a strategic prisoner-of-war interrogation center for high ranking German prisoners. It constructed a similar facility at Camp Tracy, California for Japanese prisoners. Both of these were joint service operations. The MIS also operated the Military Intelligence Research Section, with offices in Washington, D.C. and London, to exploit captured documents. Finally, military attachés remained a mainstay of Army’s strategic information collection. During the war, the service reached peak strength of 1,500 officers, 2,000 enlisted men, and 1,100 civilians.

1 JAN. The CIP was redesignated, more appropriately, the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), clarifying its lack of a police function.

2 APR. The Army’s first and only Intelligence Officer Candidate School opened in Chicago. After the initial class, however, the Army leadership decided that MID did not have a sufficient demand for officer personnel to justify an MI OCS.

MAY. The Army G2 created the Special Branch within the MIS. The branch integrated information from intercepted communications into the larger intelligence picture.

1 MAY. The Army Map Service began production of 500 million WWII topographic maps.

14 JUN. The Army assumed control of Arlington Hall, near Washington, DC. It would become the center of the Army’s code-breaking and communications security efforts for the next five decades.

1942
At the beginning of 1942, the SIS had operated seven small fixed collection sites stretching from Fort Hancock, New Jersey to Fort McKinley in the Philippines. Between these field sites and its headquarters, the SIS consisted of about 330 personnel. Once the war began, the SIS had shifted its focus to reading Japanese military traffic, which relied on different cryptologic principles than the Japanese diplomatic communications. This required an expansion of both the headquarters analytical elements and the field collection sites. The latter was accomplished with the establishment of two large collection sites at Vint Hill Farms in Warrenton, Virginia and Two Rock Ranch near Petaluma, California.

To accommodate the growing headquarters and to provide a more secure location, the SIS moved from downtown Washington, D.C. to Arlington Hall, a former girls’ school in Arlington, Virginia. The soldiers at both Arlington Hall and the field sites came under the administrative control of the 2d Signal Service Battalion (formerly company). During the ensuing year, the SIS underwent two name changes: first, to the Signal Security Service in 1942 and then to the SSA in 1943. Although William Friedman remained at the heart of the organization, COL (later BG) Preston W. Corderman became its commander.

As the war progressed, the SSA made steady progress against the Japanese military codes. Once the
Japanese messages proved readable, the agency dramatically expanded; in 1943, it grew tenfold, recruiting a largely civilian work force. To process the increase in material, it employed a battery of 400 IBM punch card machines. It also extended its intercept operations with fixed collection sites in India, Eritrea, and Guam as well as Alaska and Hawaii. Arlington Hall additionally received intercepts and information from American tactical field radio intelligence units supplemented by material forwarded by the British and other allies. By the end of the war, the SSA consisted of 10,371 (777 commissioned officers, 15 warrant officers, 3,918 enlisted men and women, and 5,661 civilians).

For most of the war, the SSA fell under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Signal Corps. In December 1944, however, the MIS gained operational control of the agency and began to direct its collection, processing, and analytical priorities. This meant that both the primary user and producer of the Army’s single most important source of high grade intelligence fell under the same intelligence authority.

On January 1, 1942, the Army changed the name of the CIP to the CIC. The new designation better reflected its duties, since it did not include police functions. At first, however, the CIC performed much the same duties as the CIP had performed in WW I: investigating reports of subversive activities. Local commanders, not the corps, however, directed these investigations. Since it did not control the CI operations, its mission was largely administrative: to recruit, train, and administer the Army’s CI personnel.
In January 1943, the CIC moved its headquarters to Baltimore, Maryland on the campus of Goucher College. From there, it oversaw a new role for its agents. Besides the continued need for investigators in the U.S., CIC agents had begun to deploy overseas with tactical units. The CIC established a staging area for deployments at nearby Camp Holabird, beginning a long association between Army Intelligence and the installation. By July 1943, the corps had an authorized strength of 543 officers and 4,431 enlisted personnel.

After the Inspector General issued a report critical of CIC investigative procedures, the Army directed that the Corps would be employed largely in the overseas theaters. Most of the agents who remained in the U.S. merged with the criminal investigators of the Provost Marshal General’s Office to form a new consolidated Security Intelligence Corps that operated under the control of the service commands. Furthermore, the Army closed the CIC staging area and abolished the Chief, CI Corps position.

The Manhattan Project, the program to develop the atomic bomb, provided one of the few exceptions for the employment of CIC agents in the U.S. Since the spring of 1942, a CI detachment under the command of MAJ (later LTC) John Lansdale, Jr. had provided security for the project. When the project moved its headquarters from Chicago to Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Landale’s agents established and monitored procedures to prevent loss of classified material. Over two years, they also conducted about 1,500 investigations to reveal possible leaks caused by careless talk or mishandling of classified documents. Finally, the detachment set up special agents in the project’s offices, plants, and laboratories to uncover security breaches and espionage directed against the project.

With the end of the war in Europe in May 1945, the role of Army CI in post-war Germany increased. Moreover, the pending occupation of Japan would make even further demands upon CI agents. The Army, however, lacked an effective means to adequately procure new CI specialists or even redeploy the ones that it had. The weakening of the CIC had deprived Army CI functions of essential institutional support. Consequently, the Army re-established the Office of Chief, CIC, in July 1945, and organized a new CIC Center and School at Camp Holabird a few months later. In August, the Provost Marshal released the agents of the Security Intelligence Corps to the G2, Army Service Forces, where it eventually merged back into the CIC.

The CIC, SSA, and MIS all provided support to the War Department effort in the U.S. In addition, all three organizations provided manpower to support the field units in the theaters of operations across the globe. The CIC deployed 241 detachments, over 85 percent of its strength, overseas. As the war progressed, these detachments matured into 17-man units for each combat division with larger organizations attached to higher echelons and the rear areas. The MIS supplied four types of intelligence specialists to the theaters: Interrogator of Prisoners-of-War, MI Interpreter, Photo Interpreter, and Order of Battle. The first three teams consisted of two officers and four enlisted men, while the order of battle teams had a single officer and two enlisted men. Division G2s normally received two interrogation teams and one of each of the other types. Higher formations received a larger number of teams.
In Europe alone, MIS deployed 3,500 officers and men organized into specialist teams. Rather than just teams and detachments, the SSA sent radio intelligence platoons and, later, companies to support the field. By the end of the war, the agency generally deployed a company to support each corps, field army, and army group. It also deployed theater-level special SIGINT staffs to provide analytical support to the radio intelligence companies. The MIS teams and the CIC detachments both were attached to the various G2s; the SSA's radio intelligence companies, however, belonged to the unit's signal section, with the G2s normally exerting operational control.
Army Intelligence in WW II: Europe

During the months after D-Day, the U.S. Army fielded two army groups, six field armies, fifteen army corps, and sixty-one divisions to northwest Europe. The Army Intelligence system that supported these combat elements stretched from the front lines to offices in England. It relied on a full range of intelligence sources from infantry patrols and prisoner interrogations to signals traffic analysis and aerial imagery. To a large degree, its success depended on the quality of the G2 and S2 staffs that supported every level from battalion to army group. One of the most effective and successful of these staffs was the Third Army’s G2.

LTG George S. Patton, the Third Army’s commander, valued good intelligence. Willing to take risks and exploit unexpected openings, he was the kind of leader who wanted to know everything about the enemy. As a result, he appreciated the efforts of the army intelligence system led by COL Oscar W. Koch, his G2. Koch had gained valuable experience as Patton’s intelligence officer in both the North African and Sicilian campaigns.

When Koch became Third Army G2 in February 1944, he used his experiences to organize his shop into five functional branches: Administration, Combat Intelligence, G2 Air, Security, and Auxiliary Agencies. This staff provided situational awareness and developed targets for Patton and his headquarters. It also coordinated the intelligence collection efforts within the army, and exchanged tactical information with subordinate and higher headquarters. Finally, it supervised the MIS and CIC teams that it received from the theater. Although the G2 itself was relatively small, with only 19 officers and 25 enlisted men, it ballooned to over 400 officers and men with its MIS and CIC attachments. Koch’s G2 team moved to France in early July and became operational in August 1944.

Koch and his staff relied heavily on the Third Army’s corps and division G2s to develop the enemy situation in their own sectors. They also had a variety of sources available at the Army level to take a broader and deeper look at the German forces facing Patton.

Prisoners of war were by far the most important single intelligence source. By one estimate, over one-third of all combat intelligence came from prisoners of war during WW II. This success partly stemmed from the great number of German prisoners (four army interrogator teams could handle over 5,000 prisoners a day). An incident in December 1944 proved the value of prisoner interrogation. As the Third Army prepared to assault the Siegfried Line, the G2 learned that a captured German general knew details about the defenses facing the Third Army. After Koch discovered the German was cooperative, he arranged to question him. As it turned out,
not only did the general know about the defenses, he had helped construct them. Working with maps and aerial photographs supplied by Koch’s section, the German officer located enemy defenses and weak spots. Once verified, the G2 placed this data on overprinted maps and prepared to distribute them to all units. Unfortunately, the Battle of the Bulge interrupted the Third Army’s use of this intelligence; instead, the G2 gave it to the Seventh Army, which employed it to great advantage.

The Third Army’s deep collection asset was the 10th Reconnaissance Group of the XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), the Third Army’s air component. This asset was coordinated by the G2 Air, under COL Harold M. Forde. With only a small planning group at Army Headquarters, the rest of Forde’s staff served with the XIX TAC. At TAC’s command post, the air reconnaissance coordinating officer consolidated corps and army air reconnaissance requests. At the airfields, ground liaison officers briefed and debriefed pilots and disseminated the results. At the photo squadron’s airfield, MIS photo interpreter teams manned the photo center, interpreting photographs and preparing reports.

Through the G2 Air, Koch sent aerial reconnaissance missions out to 150 miles in front of the Army. Aerial observation brought in information on enemy movements and troop concentrations. During the Third Army’s dash across France, this observation was so effective that the Germans were never able to mass forces to threaten the army’s exposed flank. Aerial photography provided detailed information about terrain and enemy defenses. It was especially useful in locating artillery positions. In one case, before a XII Corps attack in November 1944, photo intelligence was so accurate it pinpointed 221 enemy artillery positions, allowing Third Army preparatory fire to obliterate them.

After prisoners of war and aerial reconnaissance, radio intelligence was the most profitable collection source. Working with smaller corps companies, the 300-man 118th Signal Radio Intelligence Company intercepted German radio traffic, located outstations, and conducted limited traffic analysis and cryptanalysis. The 118th also coordinated the work of the corps companies and disseminated combat information to the G2. Their information proved especially useful in fluid situations such as the
breakout across France in August 1944. Using intercepted radio messages from panzer and panzer grenadier divisions, the Third Army’s radio intelligence companies pieced together their order of battle and followed their movements. As the campaign progressed, the G2 improved at integrating this knowledge into the general intelligence picture.

The Third Army’s window into strategic SIGINT was MAJ Melvin C. Helfers, its Special Security Officer. He evaluated the ULTRA intelligence, presented it to Patton and Koch, and helped fuse it with other intelligence. Although ULTRA gave several dramatic warnings of German counterattacks, it mainly acted as a guide to the mass of information coming from other sources. It fit in well with Koch’s concept of all-source intelligence.

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Helfers presented the ULTRA intelligence in daily 0900 briefings. Besides Patton and Koch, only six other officers were authorized to attend. Using a special situation map, Helfers spoke from notes using frequent map references. He used information from other G2 sources to develop the most complete intelligence picture possible. Patton was so impressed by the value of ULTRA that he never passed up a special briefing. Koch incorporated Helfer’s information into his estimates of the enemy. The major could bring an urgent ULTRA message to Koch at any time. If necessary, Koch called it to the attention of the G3 or the chief of staff.

By 1944 each army had a special intelligence detachment from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). At Third Army, the G2 and the detachment had an excellent relationship. The OSS detachment recruited agents and inserted them behind German lines to gather information. The detachment successfully sent over 100 missions behind enemy lines and provided invaluable information to the G2.

For the Third Army G2, all sources of information were important. One asset’s limitation was compensated for by another’s strength. If poor weather grounded 10th Reconnaissance Group planes, the G2 could gather information from prisoners, ULTRA, and troops in contact. Besides complementing each other, sources supplemented each other. For example, the 118th Signal Radio Intelligence Company obtained radio frequencies and call signs through interrogation and captured document teams. The result of this all-source effort was a balanced and flexible Third Army collection system.

This balanced collection effort helped Koch accurately estimate the enemy situation. But, more important, his thinking was always clear and detached. In late July 1944, the Allies broke out of the Normandy beachhead. In August and September, the American First and Third Armies raced across France. The Allies were optimistic the war would soon end, but Koch remained cautious. At the end of August 1944, he estimated that despite huge losses, the Germans maintained a cohesive front and had not been routed. Koch reported they were still bringing new units into battle, although this did not give them new offensive power. With weather and terrain on their side, Koch believed the Germans would play for time and wage a last ditch struggle. For Koch, the war wasn’t over.

As the Allies approached the German border, German resistance stiffened and the Allied advance slowed to a crawl. Yet, optimism remained. Other Allied intelligence officers believed the heavy fighting was sapping the Germans’ strength...
and they would not have the force left for an offensive action.

Koch continued to watch throughout the autumn. By the end of October, he noticed the Germans were withdrawing panzer forces from the front and were building up forces in the Eifel area opposite the First Army, to the north of Patton’s Third Army. Because those enemy forces in Eifel could threaten the Third Army’s projected offensive southeast toward Frankfurt, Koch paid close attention to them. During November, the Army G2 planned aerial surveillance of Eifel’s railroad marshalling yards and road intersections. Despite poor flying weather, photo interpreters traced the progress of hundreds of railroad trains carrying armor and vehicles.

During his December 9, 1944 briefing, Koch outlined German strength and capabilities in Eifel. By Koch’s estimate, the Germans had nine divisions (four in contact) facing the First Army’s VIII Corps. That force was two and a half more divisions in equivalent strength than stood against the entire Third Army. The G2 concluded that the German divisions could be used to meet threats from the First or Third Armies, divert Allied reinforcements to Eifel, or launch a spoiling or diversionary attack.

Several factors favored the last possibility. The Germans had a tactical reserve of 105 tanks in two panzer divisions in Eifel. Of the nine divisions, the five in reserve were rested and refitted. To support ground forces, the Germans had marshaled 1,000 fighter planes. While the terrain was unfavorable for Allied winter operations, it favored a German offensive.

Based on Koch’s briefing, Patton decided to continue the plans for the Third Army operation toward Frankfurt. However, he directed that limited preparations begin to meet the potential German spoiling attack. Later, Patton would use the outline planning to counter a German threat bigger than even Koch calculated. On December 19, Patton had his army shift the attack’s direction and rip into the southern flank of a 20-division German counteroffensive. By Christmas, the Third Army had relieved the besieged city of Bastogne, a critical road junction, and had driven a salient into the German’s exposed flank. The tide had finally swung against the Germans.

Patton did not change his offensive plans because Koch briefed him on a potential threat to the north. By telling Patton of the potential threat’s capabilities, Koch started his commander and staff thinking about how to react to such a situation. It was the Third Army’s rapid and unexpected shift of direction that broke the back of the German’s counteroffensive in the south.

Although the Battle of the Bulge provides the most specific examples, the Third Army G2 was successful throughout the nine month campaign across Europe. Through the G2’s all-source collection effort and objective assessments of the enemy’s capabilities, the Third Army was never shocked into inaction and could often take advantage of the enemy’s vulnerabilities.
This illustration not only lays out the G2/S2 system of World War II, but it also captures the sardonic attitude toward intelligence work. From *Combat History of the 44th Infantry Division, 1944-1945* (1946)
During World War II, the Army’s Military Intelligence Division (MID) published a series of periodic intelligence products. Each targeted a different audience among the Army’s almost eight million Soldiers.

**Intelligence Bulletin:** This monthly publication averaged 90 pages and was heavily illustrated with pictures and drawings. Designed for the junior officer and Soldier who were in the theaters of operations or expected to enter them, it covered enemy tactics and weapons at the company, battalion, and regimental levels. To obtain the widest distribution possible, the Intelligence Bulletin was unclassified.

**Military Reports:** This publication initially reported on the trends and developments of the allied armies, especially the British Imperial Forces. After April 1944, it was used to disseminate “CONFIDENTIAL” information on all armies taking part in the war. Published monthly, it averaged 60 pages.

**Tactical and Technical Trends:** Initially appearing every two weeks, this publication contained notes on enemy small-unit organizations, equipment and tactics. Classified as “RESTRICTED,” each issue averaged about 50 pages with illustrations and charts.

**Special Series:** This series dealt with subjects requiring comprehensive treatment (50-250 pages) such as German tactical doctrine, Japanese infantry weapons, or artillery in the desert. The MID’s primary consideration in selecting topics for this series was to disseminate information of immediate applicability.
Army Intelligence in WW II: The Pacific

Halfway around the world from the Third Army G2, MG Charles A. Willoughby operated in a different operational and geographical environment. Willoughby was the G2 for GEN Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), a vast underdeveloped region stretching from Australia through New Guinea to the Philippines. As chief intelligence officer for a theater, Willoughby’s intelligence organizations were multinational and inter-service, and like Koch’s intelligence system, they relied on a variety of intelligence sources.

During the spring and summer of 1942, Willoughby organized his theater G2 staff. The Administrative Section managed the G2’s personnel and financial matters, while the Operations, Order of Battle, and Plans and Estimates Sections provided intelligence analysis and managed the distribution of intelligence products. Together, the staff acted as a modest joint intelligence center, and participated in joint intelligence planning. Moreover, it coordinated the theater’s collection agencies.

In mid-1944, the G2 organization consisted of thirty-six officers and a hundred or so enlisted men. Despite being the intelligence staff for a joint, multi-national theater, Willoughby’s G2—reflecting MacArthur’s headquarters as whole—was largely organized along Army lines and led by American Army officers. Willoughby did maintain regular coordination with the chief intelligence officers for both the Navy and Army Air Force in the theater. The SWPA intelligence collection agencies, however, were both multi-national and inter-service.

The most important of these agencies was the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS). LTC (later COL) Sidney F. Mashbir commanded the ATIS for most of the war. Although Mashbir’s men did interrogate captured Japanese soldiers, the section largely exploited vast amounts of captured documents and ensured that the resulting translations were available for use by the G2 and the other SWPA intelligence agencies. At its peak, the section had over two thousand officers and enlisted men; about one-third of whom provided direct support to tactical forces when it sent its interrogators to support army, corps, and division G2s in the field. Although Australians and Americans provided the bulk of the ATIS, British, Canadian, and New Zealander linguists also served with the section.

Over the course of the war, the ATIS translated over 20 million pages of captured documents. Without a doubt, however, the most important of these was the Japanese Army’s “Register of Army Officers.” Captured in May 1943, this three-volume document presented the SWPA intelligence analysts, for the first time, with a complete picture of the organization of the Japanese armies in the field. Within a few weeks, the entire document had been printed and distributed to every Allied intelligence staff in the entire Pacific. It formed the basis for all subsequent order of battle analysis by the SWPA G2.

The Allied Geographical Section (AGS) was headed by Australian Col. William V. Jardine-Blake. It prepared the terrain information that MacArthur’s and subordi-
nate headquarters needed to conduct planning and operations. This was no small task because detailed geographic information and maps simply did not exist for much of the Southwest Pacific. Nevertheless, the AGS produced terrain studies for each operation. Supported by maps and photographs, these handbooks contained descriptions of terrain features, landing beaches, transportation conditions, and health conditions, and were widely distributed to commanders, staffs, and troops before each operation. Due to the great need for geographic information, Willoughby later judged that the AGS was, next to ATIS, the most important and productive of the G2’s intelligence agencies.

The last of the agencies under the G2’s direct control was the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB), which was an umbrella organization embracing a variety of intelligence and special operation groups. Another Australian, Brigadier C.G. Roberts, headed the bureau. By mid-1944, it consisted of five major sections: two functional and three regional. The functional sections dealt with special operations, while the regional ones—the Northeast (eastern New Guinea and the surrounding islands), the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines—dealt mainly with gathering intelligence. Unfortunately, the dual function of gathering intelligence and conducting special operations and sabotage often competed with each other.

Despite the competing functions, the AIB made several valuable contributions to SWPA’s intelligence operations. The Coastwatchers, the highly effective network of observation posts along the coasts of New Guinea and the Solomons established by the Australians in 1939, provided valuable information on Japanese air and naval movements. The AIB also sent out field parties to reconnoiter New Guinea’s coastal areas and provide pre-assault reconnaissance and assault wave guidance.

Although Willoughby did not have operational control over the Central Bureau, SWPA’s communications intelligence agency, he did benefit from its information. Like the other intelligence organizations, the Central Bureau was a multi-national and joint unit. Using communication interception from four American radio intelligence companies and ten similar British Commonwealth units, the bureau provided cryptanalysis initially from its main headquarters in Brisbane, Australia. As the war progressed, it sent an advance echelon to accompany MacArthur’s headquarters in successive forward deployments. COL Spencer B. Akin, MacArthur’s chief Signal officer, directed its operations with the technical assistance of one American and two Australian deputies. By 1943, the bureau consisted of over one thousand personnel.

Initially, the Central Bureau’s intelligence came from traffic analysis rather than decryption of Japanese communications. Through the scrutiny of radio call signs, message addresses, and priorities, traffic analysts reconstructed Japanese radio networks, and deduced the lines of command. In 1942 and 1943, the Bureau made three major cryptanalytic breakthroughs. First, it solved the Japanese air-to-ground (pilot to ground controller) radio codes which allowed the SWPA G2 to detect the enemy’s air force deployments in the theater. Then, in April 1943, the bureau, in conjunction with the SSA at Arlington Hall, broke
the Japanese Army’s Water Transportation Code, which provided detailed knowledge of Japanese convoy movements. Finally, it decoded the Japanese Army’s mainline code. Not only did this intelligence provide MacArthur’s forces with invaluable targeting data, it also gave precise information to Willoughby and his analysts on the location and movements of Japanese forces.

In addition to these four intelligence agencies, Willoughby also received and used intelligence obtained through Navy and Army Air Forces channels. Both services ran their own communications intelligence networks and provided the information to the SWPA G2. Naval intelligence proved particularly useful in the earlier parts of the war since the Japanese Navy initially controlled enemy forces in the Southwest Pacific. Throughout the war, Willoughby relied on the Fifth Air Force for aerial reconnaissance and photography. Although the SWPA G2 never had anything as sophisticated as Koch’s G2 Air system for coordinating and processing aerial intelligence, Willoughby was able to regularly receive aerial and photo reconnaissance reports.

By the spring of 1944, Willoughby’s G2 staff was capable of gathering, integrating, and evaluating all forms of intelligence. The SWPA intelligence analysts collaborated with the agencies and the agencies with each other to produce better intelligence. For its terrain studies, AGS relied heavily on information from the Fifth Air Force’s reconnaissance flights. The long-range reconnaissance parties also provided terrain information for the AGS. The ATIS regularly forwarded its material to the G2’s Order of Battle Section, allowing the order of battle team to maintain and improve its data base. This task was aided immeasurably by the capture of the Japanese army register. Mashbir’s unit also developed standing instructions to expedite sending captured cryptologic materials back to the Central Bureau. On its part, the Central Bureau regularly exchanged information with the naval radio intelligence organization. It also had authority to forward any order of battle information obtained from decoded messages directly to the SWPA G2.

In 1943, Australian and American forces advanced northwestward through the jungles of New Guinea. MacArthur planned to move along the island’s northern coast to advance toward the Philippines, his ultimate objective. He envisioned a series of amphibious operations that would bypass and then entrap the Japanese defenders. Unfortunately, the amphibious landings of 1943 proved too shallow, and Japanese forces were able to escape to the west. Assisted by the formidable New Guinea terrain, the bat-
tered Japanese were able to continue to block MacArthur’s route and frustrate his plans for a rapid return to the Philippines. In the early months of 1944, Willoughby used SWPA’s intelligence system to look for ways to accelerate the advance.

Initially, Willoughby and his staff examined the possibility of an operation against Aitape, about 250 miles behind enemy lines. In February, the G2 began to look 100 miles deeper, at Hollandia. For his assessments, Willoughby benefitted greatly from the capture of the entire code library of a Japanese division in mid-January. These codebooks brought a huge windfall to the SWPA intelligence agencies. The Central Bureau began reading the thousands of Japanese messages that yielded order of battle data and planning information to the G2 analysts.

In his February 1944 estimate on the enemy at Hollandia, Willoughby noted that the Japanese continued to develop their coastal defenses in the center of New Guinea. He estimated that the enemy had about 42,000 troops defending from the front lines near Madang to about 150 miles to the west at Wewak, but fewer than 3,000 at Hollandia. With the Japanese relatively weak at Hollandia, Willoughby suggested an amphibious landing there. Largely based on this estimate, MacArthur told his staff to begin planning for an operation against the Japanese at Hollandia in April 1944.

In March and April, with the operational planning in motion, the SWPA G2 kept MacArthur and the rest of the staff apprised of the enemy situation in central New Guinea as well as developing a detailed disposition and strength at Hollandia. In late March, Willoughby detected the enemy shifting forces westward. He also noted an increase in the strength of enemy forces at Hollandia, although they remained mostly base defense and support units. He continued to believe that the greatest threat to the landings would be from the Japanese air forces. Still, the G2 noted that the Japanese continued to assume that the next Allied attack would come in the Wewak area, well to the east of Hollandia.

On 22 April, American troops landed at Hollandia to the surprise of the Japanese defenders, and within four days achieved a significant victory. Intelligence played a large role in this success. It was the G2 that found the weak point in the Japanese defenses, deep behind the front lines. When Willoughby warned of the threat of the enemy air forces, MacArthur launched his bombers in a devastating raid that destroyed the Hollandia airfields. As the ground forces prepared for the operation, MacArthur increased his assault troop strength based on his G2’s assessment of the increased strength of the enemy garrison.

To fuel these estimates of the enemy situation in New Guinea, the Central Bureau provided invaluable SIGINT; however, the other theater intelligence agencies also supplied meaningful information to the G2 on the enemy and terrain. The AGS provided important terrain information to G2 planners as well as Terrain Handbooks to the companies and platoons that made the landings. Captured documents from the ATIS also furnished important information for the operation. Without the divisional codebooks found in January 1944, the Central Bureau might not have had its great success against the Japanese Army’s communications. Both Fifth Air Force’s aerial reconnaissance and the AIB’s Coastwatchers were the best sources for information on enemy barge locations and traffic, which had become as important as any other indicator of Japanese troop disposition and activity in early 1944. In short, the Allies achieved victory at Hollandia using intelligence from every source.

The successful landings at Hollandia showed Willoughby’s intelligence operation at its most effective. The SWPA G2 and its intelligence agencies continued to serve MacArthur and his forces until the end of the war. Willoughby himself continued as MacArthur’s intelligence officer through the occupation of Japan and into the Korean War.
Army Intelligence in the Cold War and Korea

In the decades after WW II, Army Intelligence lost some of the scope and authority that it had held since 1918. Between 1947 and 1961, the U.S. established a series of intelligence agencies: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947, the Armed Forces Security Agency (later the National Security Agency [NSA]) in 1949, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1961. Each of these agencies acquired responsibilities and resources for intelligence direction and production from the Army. To DIA, the Army surrendered one of its longest held intelligence functions, the control of the military attaché system, which had an important source of foreign intelligence since 1889.

While Army Intelligence was relinquishing most of its national-level intelligence responsibilities, it was also losing its position and status on the Army Staff. As a result of a reorganization in 1956, the Army Staff had deputy chiefs of staff for the personnel, operations, and supply functions, each with the rank of lieutenant general. The chief of Army Intelligence, however, remained a major general with the title of assistant chief of staff for intelligence (ACSI).

During the 1950s and early 1960s, the largest Army intelligence organization was the Army Security Agency (ASA). On September 15, 1945, it had replaced the SSA as the Army’s SIGINT element. The agency’s primary collection assets were a number of large fixed field stations that stretched from the U.S. to Germany to Turkey and Africa to the Pacific. Supplementing these resources, smaller mobile formations operated from semi-fixed locations. Through large regional headquarters in Germany and the Pacific, the ASA exercised tight control of these overseas elements, but it centralized direction and processing at its Arlington Hall headquarters. After 1951, a major general commanded the ASA, and after 1955, he reported directly to the Army Chief of Staff.

The Chief, CI was also a major general, but, unlike the ASA commander, he never obtained control over operations in the field. The CIC Center remained largely an administrative and training organization.
The CIC’s largest mission was supporting the Army’s occupation forces. More than half of its strength was deployed overseas in two over-sized units: the 66th CIC Detachment in Germany and the 441st CIC Detachment in Japan. The demands of security during the Cold War, with the constant threat of espionage by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, meant the corps had a significant role in the U.S. as well. By the end of the decade, six tailored CIC detachments provided support to the geographically-based army areas while another supported the Military District of Washington. Overall, the CIC’s operations were decentralized and controlled by area and theater commanders.

In June 1950, the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula caught Army Intelligence flatfooted, and it initially struggled to meet requirements and demands. To support the field commanders CIC and ASA units had to be hastily organized and sent to Korea in the early months of the war. By the end of the war, intelligence operations had been generally conducted on the same lines as those of 1944-1945. Augmented with teams of intelligence specialists, unit G2s and S2s, from field army to battalion, gathered and provided intelligence to their commanders. Instead of small independent companies or detachments, however, the Army began to employ larger intelligence formations in the field.

The Korean War marked the first time that intelligence personnel were organized into groups and battalions. During the war, the Army fielded two types of intelligence units specifically to meet the needs of combat forces: Military Intelligence Service and Communication Reconnaissance. The Military Intelligence Service (not to be confused with the WW II’s MIS) organizations gathered intelligence specialists, such as photo interpreters, interrogators, and order of battle technicians, into larger administrative units. The Army established three such groups at the theater level: the 500th in Japan, the 513th in Germany, and the 525th at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. These groups attached their specialists in tailored battalions, companies and platoons to support G2s down to division level.
The ASA also fielded group-sized formations to directly support units in the field. By the end of the war, the 501st Communication Reconnaissance Group was supervising the operations of three attached battalions, and five companies in support of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea. Following suit, the CIC upgraded its large detachments to group status, including the 66th CIC Group in Germany (1952) and the 111st CIC Group in Fort McPherson, Georgia (1958). Additionally, the 902d CIC Group (1952) became responsible for specialized and high-level activities under the ASCI's direct control.

At the Army level, successive ACSIs sought to centralize Army Intelligence, concentrating their efforts at Fort Holabird. In 1954, the CIC Center became the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, with MG Boniface Campbell as its Commanding General. Over the next few years, Campbell assumed control of several important intelligence organizations, including the Army Photographic Interpretation Center and the Army's investigative files in the G2 Records Facility (later known as the Investigative Records Repository). In January 1961, MG John N. M. Willems, the ACSI, established a consolidated Intelligence Corps, ending the CIC's four decades of service. Commanded by MG Richard G. Prather, the 5,000-man corps was to supply administrative supervision of both Army CI and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) assets.

Six months later, however, the establishment of the Army Intelligence and Security Branch eclipsed the formation of the Intelligence Corps. MG Alva R. Fitch, the ACSI, had vigorously campaigned for a separate intelligence branch to ensure that the Army would have enough qualified intelligence officers to meet its needs. Despite opposition, Fitch persevered and the Army Chief of Staff signed the order creating the Army Intelligence and Security Branch on July 1, 1962. Although initially limited to about 4,000 officers, the branch encompassed all fields of intelligence, including signals, strategic, imagery, combat, human and CI. This critical first institutional step would be built upon over the next five years, culminating in the branch's re-designation as the Military Intelligence Branch on July 1, 1967. By that time, Army Intelligence was involved in the conflict in Vietnam.
Army Intelligence in the Vietnam Era

Until 1965, the Army’s involvement in Vietnam had largely been advisory and thus the scope of its intelligence activities had been limited. The U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) received intelligence support from several Army Intelligence detachments and some two hundred officers serving as advisors with South Vietnamese troops. In addition, the ASA’s 3rd Radio Research Unit provided cryptologic support, with both aerial and ground-based assets. As the number of U.S. combat troops grew after 1965, the need for operational intelligence increased.

MG Joseph A. McChristian, the MACV Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, oversaw the build-up of intelligence organizations and operations. At the theater level, his enlarged J2 staff directed operations in both the joint and multi-national arenas. Moreover, he realized that it was essential that American intelligence operations were combined with those of South Vietnam. While the Americans could provide manpower, money, equipment, and organization, the South Vietnamese knew the terrain, enemy, and, most of all, the language.

With this in mind, by late 1966, McChristian and Colonel Ho Van Loi, his Vietnamese counterpart, established four multi-national intelligence organizations: Combined Military Interrogation Center, Combined Document Exploitation Center, Combined Materiel Exploitation Center, and Combined Intelligence Center. Both American and South Vietnamese intelligence personnel manned each of the centers, often working side-by-side. To further the integration of the combined intelligence effort, South Vietnamese intelligence detachments served with American divisions and separate brigades, meanwhile American detachments served with the South Vietnamese divisions.

To plan, direct, and conduct general (non-cryptologic) intelligence operations in Vietnam, the Army deployed over 3,500 intelligence soldiers by June 1967. Working directly under the J2’s operational control, the 525th MI Group supplied the command and control headquarters for two other groups and two battalions. The 136th MI Group provided CI support while the 149th MI Group directed collection in the field. The 1st MI Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance Support) oversaw the Army’s aerial reconnaissance assets as well
as interpreting, reproducing, and delivering Air Force imagery to Army units. The 519th MI Battalion provided personnel and support for the four combined intelligence centers. Later in the war, the 136th and 149th MI Groups were inactivated and their operations divided among six provisional battalions stationed throughout South Vietnam. Each of these battalions performed CI, collection, and direct support functions.

Over six hundred American advisors supplemented these intelligence activities. Working with their South Vietnamese opposite numbers at the district level, they were a source of tactical MI and increasingly became involved in uncovering the Viet Cong infrastructure. This was done through a network of District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers in the countryside.

For SIGINT support to forces in Vietnam, the ASA, commanded by MG Charles Denholm, deployed about one-fifth of its total strength to Southeast Asia. After 1966, the 509th Radio Research Group commanded two radio research battalions, an aviation battalion, and a fixed field station. To provide direct support to tactical units, the ASA attached specially tailored companies and detachments to American divisions and brigades. These direct support units’ primary mission was to respond to the needs and desires of their tactical command with a secondary mission to

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**1 JUL.** The U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) established at Fort Holabird to control all CI in the U.S.

**20 JUL.** The Army assigned first OV-1 Mohawk aircraft to Vietnam. The aircraft proved to be an effective intelligence platform for a variety of systems.

**27 MAR.** The first U-6, Beaver, aircraft outfitted with Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) equipment arrived in South Vietnam.

**1 AUG.** The Foreign Science and Technology Center was established to consolidate the Army’s scientific and technical intelligence efforts.

**14 NOV.** U.S. Army units engage North Vietnamese elements in the Ia Drang Valley.

**1962**

**53**

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**26 SEP.** CPT Roque Versace, S2 Advisor, Military Assistance Advisory Group, died after two years of captivity as a Viet Cong prisoner of war. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor in 2009.

**1965**
support the theater and national communications intelligence efforts. Divisional special security officers additionally disseminated the most sensitive intelligence derived from national-level systems. Consequently, intelligence only available to the highest level commanders in WW II now could be put to tactical use.

The basis for intelligence support to the tactical commanders remained the interdependent G2/S2 framework. A company-sized MI detachment augmented the division G2 staff. These divisional detachments included CI, order of battle, imagery interpretation, and interrogation sections. The latter section was the largest of the four, since a division was likely to take a substantial number of prisoners. At the brigade level, smaller 30 man MI detachments supported the S2s. South Vietnamese intelligence detachments complemented both division and brigade MI detachments, supplying critical linguistic expertise.

In Vietnam, Army Intelligence continued to rely heavily on tried and true sources of information such as prisoner interrogation, captured documents and aerial photography. SIGINT saw widespread use at both tactical and theater levels. However, new technical innovations came to the fore. Divisions and brigades productively used devices like unattended ground sensors and airborne personnel detectors (“people sniffers”). More important, technological advances greatly enhanced the Army’s aerial reconnaissance assets. Infrared and side-looking airborne radars complemented the more traditional visual and photographic aerial surveillance methods. Likewise, ASA field units increased their effectiveness with newly developed airborne radio direction finding. This increasing use of technology in Vietnam was one of the lasting effects on Army Intelligence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 NOV.</td>
<td>The 525th MI Group arrived in South Vietnam as the C2 headquarters for the intelligence effort.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 JUN.</td>
<td>The 509th Radio Research Group assumed control over the ASA's efforts in Vietnam.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 JUL.</td>
<td>The Army Security and Intelligence Branch was renamed the MI Branch. It was also changed to a combat support branch from a service support branch.</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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<td>30 JAN.</td>
<td>Communist forces open Tet Offensive in Vietnam.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 FEB.</td>
<td>1LT George K. Sisler, assistant intelligence officer of the 5th SF Group, was killed in Vietnam and later awarded the Medal of Honor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUL.</td>
<td>The U.S. Army Intelligence School and the USASA Training Center implemented a new consolidated course of instruction for the MI Officers Advanced Course. Prior to this, both schools conducted different advanced courses focused on their specialties.</td>
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Members of a divisional MI detachment plot suspected enemy positions on a map.

An American interrogator and South Vietnamese interpreter question a Viet Cong prisoner.

7 FEB. 1LT George K. Sisler, assistant intelligence officer of the 5th SF Group, was killed in Vietnam and later awarded the Medal of Honor.

30 JAN. Communist forces open Tet Offensive in Vietnam.

JUL. The LEFT BANK, EH-1, heliborne direction-finding platform became operational, giving the local tactical commander direct support.
At the same time that Army Intelligence was engaged in combat operations in Vietnam, it was also actively involved in activities on the American home front. The U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) was the main player in these operations. Formed in July 1965, USAINTC held centralized direction over all CI elements in the continental U.S. (CONUS). Commanded by a major general, it consisted of seven MI Groups and controlled a nationwide network of 300 resident and field offices.

Initially, the agents from the command began to gather security and other information to support the potential use of Federal troops to restore order in civil disturbances, especially urban riots. Eventually, however, the command relapsed to the counter-subversion missions of WW I and early WW II, and started to collect information on the growing anti-war movement. When the domestic intelligence program became public knowledge in 1970, the political and public backlash quickly ended the program and, ultimately, USAINTC itself. Within two years, the command had lost much of its responsibilities and resources and was commanded by a colonel.

During the period immediately after the Vietnam War, Army Intelligence, like the rest of the Army, faced reductions, but it also faced public indignation over the perceived abuses of the domestic intelligence programs. In 1974, the Army replaced USAINTC with the smaller U.S. Army Intelligence Agency (USAINTA) stationed at Fort Meade, Maryland. Intended as a low-profile organization with narrowly mandated missions, it had just two MI groups, the 902d and the 525th, and a variety of other CI activities such as polygraph and technical countermeasures. Meanwhile, the ASA was undergoing retrenchment as well. As a result, the agency inactivated more than 25 percent of its units, closed its two regional headquarters in Europe and the Pacific, and shut down long established field stations. At the top, the ACSI staff was reduced by one-third. In short, Army Intelligence stood at low ebb.

1971

23 MAR. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca was named "Home of MI." Training moved from Fort Holabird to Fort Huachuca over the next two years.

29 MAR. The MI Officer Basic Course began at USAICS. The nine-week course was one of the first basic courses to regularly graduate women.

1972

JUL. The GUARDRAIL I system became operational in Europe. This successful implementation proved the advantages of a remotely controlled collection system on a piloted aircraft.

1973

Army Intelligence and the IOSS

Facing more cutbacks, the Army undertook a major reorganization of its intelligence components. At the end of 1974, GEN Frederick C. Weyand, the Army Chief of Staff, commissioned the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) to reconfigure the Army’s intelligence structure that had grown somewhat haphazardly since World War II. For eight months, a panel of senior officers headed by MG James J. Ursano conducted the study. In August 1975, the Ursano panel released its report which was critical of Army Intelligence.

At the top, it found that the ACSI did not facilitate proper supervision of all intelligence agencies, especially SIGINT. The report also concluded that the Army’s intelligence production was fragmented among too many agencies. Finally, it sharply criticized the ASA. The agency, it stated, was not able to adequately meet the requirements of tactical commanders. Moreover, the ASA had developed its own personnel, training, and research and development systems and, in many ways, was functionally independent of the Army. This independence created “a stovepipe” of SIGINT that worked against the effective development of all-source intelligence.

To correct these problems, the IOSS recommended a radical change in Army Intelligence structure. First and foremost, it proposed dismembering the ASA to bring SIGINT operations and organizations more in line with the rest of the Army. The agency’s training center should fall under the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and its research and development activities should move to U.S. Army Materiel Command. Next, ASA’s tactical units would be resubordinated to the field commanders, specifically at the corps and divisional levels. These units would merge with other MI assets to form units with all-source capabilities. The Army began implementing the IOSS proposals in 1976. The proposals would lead to a more sweeping reorganization of Army Intelligence and result in the formation of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command and the Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) organizations.

On January 1, 1977, the ASA was re-designated as the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) with MG William I. Rolya as the first commanding general. Headquartered at Arlington Hall Station in Virginia, INSCOM was considerably smaller than its ASA predecessor, but it still controlled a vast array of diverse assets. Initially, these included four theater MI groups, a variety of CI and HUMINT functional units, and eight fixed field stations. Initially, USAINTA operated as a separate command under INSCOM, but the two headquarters merged on October 1, 1977, thus completing the integration of Army-level intelligence organizations. In broad terms, this new organization was to perform multidisciplinary intelligence, security, and EW functions at the echelons above corps.
Theater intelligence groups were INSCOM’s centerpiece. These groups were multidisciplinary elements, formed by integrating former ASA assets into existing intelligence units. Originally, INSCOM had four such units: the 66th MI Group in Germany, the 470th MI Group in Panama, the 500th MI Group in Japan, and the 501st MI Group in Korea. INSCOM tailored the four groups to meet theater-specific requirements, and each of them varied in size, mission, and composition.
In 1982, INSCOM added another theater intelligence group—the 513th MI Group at Fort Monmouth. The 513th MI Group’s primary mission was to support possible operations of the newly organized U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which had been set up to defend American interests in the Middle East. In case of war in Europe, the 513th would deploy to Germany to support U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). The 513th’s activation signified INSCOM’s commitment to provide deployable support to the Army. Regardless of size, composition, or location, the Army theater commanders largely retained operational control of these groups.

By bringing together the full spectrum of intelligence disciplines, INSCOM provided the Army with a single instrument to conduct and coordinate intelligence operations at the level above corps and to provide finished intelligence adapted to meet the Army’s needs. The new command established a framework for the various elements of the Army’s intelligence system to cross-cue one another, resulting in a collective effort where the whole was greater than the sum of the parts. It also provided a central organization for the administration of personnel and logistics in support of national agencies and theater commanders. Moreover, INSCOM provided a base on which the Army could build an expanded intelligence program.

The second part of the IOSS reforms was the creation of CEWI tactical units. Since the mid-1970s, each Army division had contained an organic MI company which combined interrogators, CI specialists, and imagery interpreters with remote sensors and ground surveillance assets. Under the IOSS proposal, this company would be consolidated with a tactical ASA company to place all intelligence and EW assets into a single unit organic to a division.

In October 1976, the Army activated the first of these battalions, the 522d MI Battalion (CEWI), for testing under the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas. Based upon this testing, the Army adopted a battalion that provided the division commander with operational control over a variety of collection assets from all of the intelligence fields. In addition, the battalion afforded the division’s headquarters with a single element to receive the bulk of its intelligence information. By 1988, each of the Army’s eighteen divisions had an organic CEWI battalion.

Although the focus of the CEWI concept was the divisional battalions, it was quickly expanded to both the corps and separate brigade levels. At the corps level, the Army established CEWI groups (later brigades) of three components: an operations battalion, an interrogation and exploitation battalion, and a newly organized aerial exploitation battalion (AEB). In 1978, the first such group, the 504th MI Group (CEWI), was formed to support III Corps at Fort Hood. Four more groups followed: the 525th for the XVIII Airborne Corps (1979); 205th for V Corps (1983); 207th for VII Corps (1983), and the 201st for I Corps (1987). Additionally, separate brigades and armored cavalry regiments received CEWI companies.
To correct the IOSS criticism of fragmented intelligence production, the Army established the Army Intelligence Agency (AIA) in July 1984. Operating as a field agency under the ACSI, the AIA combined the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC), the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) and the Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC). Together, these organizations gave the Army a single production capability with over 1,500 personnel, making it the largest Army intelligence production organization since 1961 and the creation of DIA.

By the end of the 1980s, the Army had fully implemented the IOSS reforms. Army Intelligence had dedicated assets to support every level in the Army: INSCOM’s brigades supported the national and theater level while the organic CEWI brigades and battalions supported every corps and division. The Army had a consolidated production organization in the AIA. To provide overall oversight for these assets, the Army upgraded its intelligence position on the Army Staff, and the major general ACSI became a lieutenant general with the title, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT). LTG Sidney T. Weinstein became the first DCSINT in May 1987. Two months later, on July 1, 1987, the Army established the MI Corps as a “whole-branch” regiment, under the newly implemented U.S. Army Regimental System. The integration of the noncombat arms into this system provided a means to enhance esprit de corps and emphasize the Army’s heritage and traditions. The Corps signified that Army Intelligence had become a single, cohesive community in the Army’s mainstream.

As Army Intelligence solidified its position in the Army, it scored two significant CI triumphs. In 1988, Army CI agents in Europe tracked down Clyde Conrad, a retired Army NCO who was a key figure in an espionage ring that betrayed the war plans of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the Hungarian intelligence service. Later, INSCOM’s Foreign CI Activity arrested Army Warrant Officer James Hall, who had sold American secrets to the Soviets.
Army Intelligence in Operations \textit{JUST\ CAUSE} and \textit{DESERT\ SHIELD/DESERT\ STORM}

When the Army designed CEWI units, it did so largely to fight on a conventional battlefield, most likely in Europe. Ironically, their first operational use occurred in the unconventional environment of the Caribbean. In October 1983, CEWI elements from Fort Bragg deployed to Grenada as part of Operation \textit{URGENT\ FURY} to rescue American medical students after a military coup on the island. Six years later, when the U.S. launched Operation \textit{JUST\ CAUSE} to depose Panamanian strongman Manuel Noreiga, the Army deployed elements of a corps CEWI brigade and two divisional CEWI battalions. Brigade soldiers interrogated key members of Noreiga’s Panamanian Defense Force, screened documents, and served as the nucleus of the Joint Task Force (TF) Panama J2. Although the divisional intelligence battalions employed their Low Level Voice Intercept Teams and other SIGINT assets, it was their limited teams of interrogators and CI specialists that yielded the most intelligence.

INSCOM’s 470th MI Brigade immeasurably helped the \textit{JUST\ CAUSE} intelligence operations. The brigade had been in place in Panama for decades. As American TFs fought Noreiga’s forces, the 470th deployed its assets to support the operation. Intimately familiar with both the terrain and the disposition of Panama’s armed forces, brigade teams provided spot reports throughout Panama City. Using their sources, 470th Soldiers obtained critical information on troop movements and locations of weapons caches. After the fighting, they helped identify and apprehend a number of Noreiga’s top aides. For the operations during and after the fighting, in-theater assets combined with deployed tactical MI units to provide effective intelligence support.

Less than a year later and halfway across the world, American ground, naval, and air forces under the control of CENTCOM deployed to Saudi Arabia in reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. To support these forces, Army Intelligence would make one of its largest single efforts since WW II.

\textbf{1989}

- 20 JAN. \textit{Operation Just Cause} in Panama begins.
- 9 NOV. Berlin Wall is torn down.

\textbf{1990}

- 2 AUG. Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, precipitating the 1st Gulf War.
- 1 OCT. TRADOC assumed command of Fort Huachuca.
- DEC. USAICS deployed its Pioneer UAV Platoon to Saudi Arabia.

- 2 JUN. INSCOM dedicated the MG Dennis E. Nolan Building on Fort Belvoir. It was the first Army intelligence headquarters to be specifically designed for its purpose.
The Army deployed two corps and eight divisions with their organic MI units, amounting to two brigades and fourteen battalions. INSCOM additionally deployed its 513th MI Brigade and other elements to provide support at the theater level. Finally, the AIA concentrated its efforts to produce tactical intelligence for the American ground forces in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO).

Within the KTO, the U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT) G2 acted as the fulcrum for Army Intelligence. Throughout the fall of 1990, Army planners thought that XVIII Airborne Corps G2 and the 525th MI Brigade could coordinate intelligence operations for the defense of Kuwait. However, when CENTCOM changed the Army’s mission to a two-corps offensive, ARCENT needed a larger intelligence headquarters. In December 1990, BG John F. Stewart became the ARCENT G2. Under Stewart, the G2 was energized and expanded. The growth of the G2 was accomplished largely with personnel from the 513th MI Brigade. In December, the G2’s strength was about 700, but on the eve of the ground offensive, it was close to 1,900.

Despite becoming functional only in the weeks before the ground offensive kicked off, the ARCENT G2 made tremendous strides in establishing an operational intelligence system. Stewart had the G2 synchronize intelligence collection, products, and dissemination with the planned operations, and provided “key reads” of the enemy situation for the tactical commanders. The G2 also assumed the sometimes contentious role of making battle damage assessments (BDA) of the CENTCOM bombing campaign. Although challenged with conflicting reports and analysis from the air forces and the national agencies, the G2’s BDA was generally correct. Finally, the ARCENT G2 established a series of communication links which allowed the G2 to quickly exchange battlefield reports with the corps, and to connect with the Army analysts and databases at AIA.

BG John Stewart, the ARCENT G2, with the Army Intelligence officers from Operation DESERT STORM.

1991

14 JAN. Joint STARS flew first operational mission in support of the Gulf War.

5 DEC. U.S. Army participates in Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia.

1992

30 SEP. With the end of the Cold War, the Army began to close its fixed field stations.

10 DEC. Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) became operational, providing a viable, but cost-effective airborne intelligence system.
The connection between ARCENT and AIA was particularly valuable. The agency’s analysts produced a series of tactical 1:50,000 scale templates that depicted every Iraqi division in the KTO. Accurate to 400 meters, the template showed weapons locations and fortifications and provided field commanders with a blueprint of the Iraqi obstacle system. Digitally transmitted to the ARCENT G2, the template overlays were transferred to maps and produced into overprinted map sheets and sent to division and brigades. Afterwards, AIA delivered daily updates to ARCENT. The agency also augmented ARCENT G2 with specialists and technicians and provided analysts to the Department of Defense’s Joint Intelligence Center, which was set up to support CENTCOM’s operations. In short, AIA provided deployed intelligence assets the capability to “reach back” to expertise and information.

During Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, several factors hampered the efforts of Army Intelligence. Foremost, the requirement to build up military power in KTO meant that intelligence assets were deployed after the combat units that they were meant to support. Once in place, the collection assets were limited to behind the border operations to mask the intentions of CENTCOM’s ground forces. This was a critical issue because Army Intelligence normally depended on the information from forces in contact to develop the disposition of enemy forces along the front. Also, the Army lacked enough Arabic linguists—a deficiency it had to make up by creatively using nearly 300 Kuwaiti volunteers, mostly college students, who were quickly trained and sent to the KTO by the Army.

Because of the slow build up of intelligence elements, the Army forces initially relied heavily on national sources. While it never lost its reliance on those assets, as forces arrived, the Army did deploy its own collection means. As their SIGINT assets became available, theater, corps, and divisional MI units deployed them along the fronts. Initially hindered by Iraqi radio silence, once the allied attack started and forced the Iraqis to reposition, Army SIGINT picked up some useful intelligence on movement and identification of Iraqi units. Also, some Army electronic jamming operations drove the Iraqis to use less secure communication methods that were intercepted. These operations allowed analysts to develop one of the more accurate methods for targeting Iraqi mobile surface-to-surface missiles. In addition to the division and corps prisoner confinement centers, the Army established two Joint Interrogation Facilities to process and gleam intelligence from prisoners, deserters, and other line crossers. Together the facilities processed over 70,000 enemy prisoners by the end of the war. In some cases, the interrogations obtained important tactical information.

Throughout the campaign, Imagery Intelligence remained the most demanded intelligence source. Tactical commanders had an insatiable demand for imagery. This desire was understandable because diagrams and analysis on maps were only poor substitutes for actual overhead pictures. Two imagery systems were pressed into service, although they were only in developmental stages: Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, an airborne system that could detect moving targets on the ground, and unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV), drones with television cameras or other sensors. Both systems proved extremely successful, but only VII Corps, as the main effort, had use of the UAVs. To disseminate other imagery, Army Intelligence established four satellite links to the corps and ARCENT. Nevertheless, despite these noteworthy efforts, imagery dissemination still required a huge amount of manpower with daily couriers from ARCENT carrying 200 pounds of annotated photographs, overprinted maps with templates, and other intelligence documents to the headquarters throughout the theater.

In the end, GEN John J. Yeosock, ARCENT commander, noted that “The enemy was exactly where intelligence said he was, disposed as intelligence described...tactical intelligence was superb.” While Army Intelligence was ultimately successful, Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM pointed to new challenges that it would face in the future. No longer would the Army have the advantage of facing a familiar enemy on familiar terrain on a European battlefield. Consequently, Army intelligence would need to be able to project itself into a theater of operations quickly and effectively with improved dissemination capabilities to focus intelligence down to the tactical commanders.

Because of the nature of the desert war, IMINT was the key intelligence discipline in the prosecution of DESERT STORM. An imagery interpreter of the 513th MI Brigade.

An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) blasts off into the sky during Operation DESERT STORM. Employment of UAV’s such as the one shown here provided field commanders with a new collection mechanism.

To bolster U.S. Army Signals Intelligence assets in the Gulf, INSCOM deployed elements of the 204th MI Battalion from Europe.
Army Intelligence in the 1990s

After Operation DESERT STORM, the Army began to feel the effects of the end of the Cold War in 1989. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, it began to withdraw much of its presence in Europe and became largely based in CONUS. The Army became concerned with force projection, deploying from numerous bases over long distances. Army Intelligence had to adapt to this new environment.

In the 1990s, Army Intelligence developed new concepts to support the Army in its strategic power projection. Intelligence operations would be conducted with a flexible, tailorable “system of systems.” The cornerstone of this structure was the fact that no echelon had all the intelligence assets it needed to fully support the commander’s intelligence requirements. Consequently, the structure needed to be seamless where national and theater assets provided meaningful tactical information for the field as well as strategic intelligence for the national decision makers. With reliable, automated communications, tactical units could pull what information they needed from the system, while strategic and theater assets could push critical intelligence downward. These communications also allowed split-based intelligence operations, where some intelligence assets deployed forward into the active theater while others remained in the U.S. or other sanctuaries. This reduced the necessity to deploy all essential intelligence assets and, at the same time, allowed for continuity of intelligence coverage.

A key element of this concept was the Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE). The DISE was an intelligence team that brought together a suite of communications and automation capable of deploying with the Army’s early entry forces. Its size depended on its mission. A DISE could be part of a divisional battalion deploying to support one of its brigades or a team of INSCOM theater analysts supporting a joint TF. Later, if necessary, the elements could be expanded into full intelligence production and dissemination activities. The DISE would allow deployed commanders at every level to tap into the larger intelligence system.

Not everything changed, however, under the emerging concepts. G2s and S2s continued to manage intelligence collection, production, and dissemination within their units. They set priorities and synchronized intelligence with tactical operations. MI brigades and battalions remained at the corps and division levels to perform situation and target development and force protection with a variety of collection assets. Likewise, INSCOM still provided tactical support through its theater brigades and leveraged strategic assets to meet the needs of the Army Service Component Commands. INSCOM also continued to provide important functional intelligence support for the Army. The 902d MI Group was the Army’s principal CI organization, providing polygraph examinations, technical services countermeasures and counterespionage operations in CONUS. Meanwhile, the 704th MI Brigade provided Army cryptologic personnel to the NSA.

1993  1994
ASAS Block I fielding began.
ASAS was a modular, deployable computer-assisted intelligence processing, analysis and reporting system.
9 SEP. The U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens completed move to Fort Huachuca as last class graduated at Devens.
21 JUL. The TROJAN SPIRIT II system fielded. For the next decade, it provided the linchpin of connectivity for the Army’s intelligence system.

1995  1996
1 NOV. INSCOM established an RSOC at Fort Gordon, signifying a restructuring of Army cryptologic organization.
2 DEC. Deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia begins.
9 SEP. The U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens completed move to Fort Huachuca as last class graduated at Devens.
1 OCT. The NGIC was formed from the resources of FSTC and ITAC.
21 SEP. In Korea, the last Mohawk aircraft retired.
Army Intelligence put these concepts into effect in a series of contingency operations throughout the 1990s. A number of these occurred in the Balkans where NATO led a series of peace-enforcing and peace-keeping operations into remnants of the former Yugoslavia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-2004), the Army provided forces for the division-sized TF Eagle, which first enforced a cease fire, then helped stabilize the country as part of Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT FORGE. In Kosovo (1999-2012), the Army’s brigade-sized TF Falcon established a secure environment as part of Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. The Army conducted similar peace operations in Somalia (1992-1994) and Haiti (1994 and 2004).

In all of these operations, the participating units deployed with their organic intelligence assets to perform indications and warnings, situation development and force protection. Meanwhile, the higher echelons provided DISEs that varied in size and capabilities. During Operations RESTORE HOPE and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in 1994, INSCOM’s 513th MI Brigade provided a robust Corps MI Support Element to supplement the XVIII Airborne Corps’ Analysis and Control Element (ACE) in its analytical, collection, and production operations. In Bosnia, INSCOM’s 66th MI Group deployed analysts, links to national assets, and communication systems to support the multi-national force headquarters as well as the American TF Eagle in 1995. The group’s DISE became the core for the U.S. National Intelligence Cell with the addition of teams from the national agencies. Four years later, the 1st Infantry Division G2 sent much of its ACE to support the commander of U.S. Kosovo Force (KFOR). The division also deployed Analysis and Control Teams to support the U.S. and allied battalions in the American sector. Backing all these DISEs were larger theater intelligence capabilities in sanctuary and national intelligence centers in the U.S.

Besides developing techniques and systems to support force projection, Army Intelligence honed its experience in the post-Cold War world. The distinction between strategic and tactical intelligence faded with the presence of DISEs and teams from the national agencies. These elements meant that intelligence from national and theater agencies was more readily available for tactical use. Furthermore, intelligence of tactical value may have strategic consequence as well. In this new environment, Army Intelligence also tackled the problems of sharing information with multi-national partners, some of whom had previously been enemies only a few years before, like the Russians and Poles. MI leaders and Soldiers had to adapt to a new problem set, analyzing political elections, treaty compliance, and unauthorized movements. Instead of databases of order of battle and target folders, deployed intelligence analysts created lists of high-value personalities, weapons storage sites, and even license plates.

Intelligence for this new type of analysis came from an odd mixture of old and new sources. Always important, SIGINT collection normally had to be adapted, frequently with off-the-shelf commercial equipment. UAVs proved to be excellent intelligence assets in peace operations. With a low-profile presence, they were flexible and accurate, and often provided verification of treaty violations or extralegal activities. Remote sensors made a comeback after falling into disuse after Vietnam. They were useful in detecting
treaty violations or smuggling routes as well as force protection. Most of all, tactical HUMINT became increasingly important. MI leaders task organized CI/HUMINT teams to provide information about individuals, groups, and in their areas of interest. New G2X staff elements began to manage CI/HUMINT resources and coordinate their efforts. Linked to the increasing use of HUMINT, Army Intelligence used non-traditional sources more and more. These sources included international and non-governmental organizations who had established contacts and relationships in the local communities.

At the Army level, INSCOM reorganized some of its assets. The command regained the Army’s intelligence production agencies when the AIA was inactivated and merged them to form the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) in 1995. INSCOM also became the executive agent for two new mission sites with cutting-edge technologies in Bad Aibling, Germany and Menwith Hill, United Kingdom. At Fort Gordon, Georgia, INSCOM set up a Regional Security Operations Center (RSOC) comprising personnel of the newly organized 702d MI Group (later redesignated the 116th MI Group). The 513th MI Brigade moved to Fort Gordon, and collocated with the RSOC, allowing the theater brigade personnel to take part in national missions.

**Army Intelligence in the 21st Century**

The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, propelled the U.S. and its allies into the Global War on Terrorism. The war demanded a truly global intelligence effort. As a result, INSCOM, with its ability to draw on Soldiers and information around the world, played a major role. Combat operations began when coalition forces deployed to Afghanistan in October 2001 to launch Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Osama bin Laden, leader of the Al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for the attacks, was believed to be based in the rugged mountains of Afghanistan.

The scope of combat expanded in March 2003 when the U.S. and its allies invaded Iraq with the object of deposing its leader, Saddam Hussein, who was thought to be harboring weapons of mass destruction. To support this operation, known as IRAQI FREEDOM, the 513th MI Brigade initially manned joint intelligence centers and supported Army tactical commanders with intelligence. INSCOM’s other theater intelligence brigades tracked terrorist activities in their areas, established new priorities to better support worldwide operations, and provided individual Soldiers and team reinforcement to both Afghanistan and Iraq. From the U.S., NGIC sent customized intelligence products to the field; of particular note, it worked on counter-improved explosive device (IED) techniques and technologies. Furthermore, after December 2003, INSCOM acted as the executive agent for contracting linguists, providing over 14,000 interpreters and translators proficient in 30 languages worldwide by 2010.

In the active theaters, Army Intelligence fielded new technologies that assisted intelligence gathering and reporting. In some cases, the technology permitted new intelligence fields to emerge. Biometrics, the identification of humans by their unique characteristics or traits, became usable at the tactical level to recognize and track individuals of security interest, a critical capability in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. At the same time, the emergence of geospatial intelligence, a combination of imagery and geospatial informa-
The Army deployed a prototype of the Prophet system to support Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The Prophet is the Army's next generation, multi-discipline collection, jamming, processing, and reporting system.

In 2003, after 21 days of major combat operations, U.S.-led forces toppled the regime of Iraq dictator Saddam Hussein.

1 JUL. The Military Intelligence Readiness Command was established to facilitate the training, deployment and use of U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers for operational requirements.

OCT. The Army deployed a prototype of the Prophet system to support Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The Prophet is the Army’s next generation, multi-discipline collection, jamming, processing, and reporting system.

2001

2003

2005

11 SEP. Terrorists attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

20 MAR. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM begins.

JUL. INSCOM conducted Operation MORNING CALM to test and evaluate the effectiveness of intelligence concepts and organizations.

As a result of Army Transformation, USAIC absorbed an increase of 3,500 students in enlisted specialties of intelligence analyst, CI agent, interrogator, and UAV operator and in the Officer Basic Course.

Until 2007, corps and divisions rotating through Iraq or Afghanistan deployed with their organic intelligence units, usually supplemented by theater and national resources. As operations continued, the Army began to convert to a brigade-based force. Now, it needed a more robust intelligence collection and analysis capability at the brigade combat team (BCT) level. The new BCTs had an organic MI company with HUMINT, SIGINT, UAVs, and analytical assets. Because the brigade and its battalion intelligence officers needed to better detect, track, and target enemy activities, the brigade and battalion S2 sections grew in size. Part of the growth included a S2X to coordinate the increased HUMINT assets.

Even with the significant increase in BCT intelligence capabilities, past experiences indicated that the brigade would sometimes need additional intelligence resources. This would not come from the division level, however, since the last divisional MI battalion had been inactivated in March 2007. Instead, reinforce-
The assignment of all AEBs to INSCOM allowed the command to assign the battalions with its theater MI brigades. The command then implemented a “capabilities-based” rotation of the low-density, high-demand aviation assets. This rotation allowed for centralized decision making at the aircraft fleet level, but decentralized execution for those battalions supporting both Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Assignment of the AEBs to a single command allowed increased readiness through consolidation of linguists and analysts and more efficient use of regionally focused expertise, national resources, and funding.

In addition to pushing significant MI assets to the BCT level and the restructuring of the corps intelligence brigades, Army Intelligence fielded several new organizations to better support the field. With HUMINT a vital—perhaps the most vital—source of intelligence in COIN operations, the Army activated its...
first interrogation and debriefing battalion, the 201st MI Battalion, in April 2005. Three more followed in the next few years. Army Intelligence designed these battalions specifically to operate within a joint interrogation and debriefing center (JIDC). The battalion’s personnel and equipment formed the JIDC nucleus, and could easily be augmented with resources from other services.

To detect IEDs, the Army fielded TF ODIN (observe, detect, identify, and neutralize) in October 2007. Relying heavily on a variety of new non-standard imagery technologies, the TF used both manned and unmanned aerial assets to detect and counter IEDs. Organized into three companies, it had its own teams of imagery and all-source analysts to provide real-time examination of the TF-produced imagery. Initially used in Iraq, TF ODIN was later successfully used in Afghanistan.

Finally, in October 2011, the 780th MI Brigade activated at Fort Meade. Its mission was to support U.S. and Army Cyber Commands with their missions to provide proactive cyber defense. With its two battalions, the brigade was capable of conducting SIGINT, computer network operations, and when directed, offensive operations, in support of Army and joint operations worldwide. It also had a defensive capability. The 780th MI Brigade, TF ODIN, and the 201st MI Battalion are all examples of how Army Intelligence continually innovates and adapts to meet the intelligence needs of the Army.

**Conclusion**

In 1776, GEN George Washington wrote “As it is of great consequence to gain intelligence of the enemy’s intended operations, I cannot but recommend your attention to this subject, and that you will concert some measures...for establishing a channel of information.” In 2012, the Army has incorporated its first Commanding General’s recommendations. MI Soldiers serve at every level from national agencies in the U.S. to tactical units in the field. G2/S2 from the Army to battalion staffs direct the intelligence effort at their levels. The Army has fifteen MI brigades or groups, forty MI battalions, seventy-three MI companies, and one intelligence production center. In short, MI remains a vital part of the Army and Army operations.

*The Tradition Continues.*
**CHIEF, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION**  
*(AFTER 18 FEBRUARY 1918)*

**COL Ralph H. Van Deman**  
May 1917 - Jun 1918

**BG Malborough Churchill**  
Jun 1918 - Aug 1920

**ASSISTANT CHIEFS OF STAFF, G2**

**BG Dennis E. Nolan**  
Sep 1920 - Sep 1921

**BG Stuart Heintzelman**  
Sep 1921 - Nov 1922

**COL William K. Naylor**  
Nov 1922 - Jun 1924

**COL James H. Reeves**  
Jul 1924 - Apr 1927

**COL Stanley H. Ford**  
May 1927 - Sep 1930

**BG Alfred T. Smith**  
Jan 1931 - Jan 1935

**BG Harry E. Knight**  
Feb 1935 - Nov 1935

**COL Frances H. Lincoln**  
Nov 1935 - Jun 1937
July - September 2012

**Directors of Intelligence**

- **COL E. R. Warner McCabe**
  Jul 1937 - Feb 1940

- **BG Sherman Miles**
  Apr 1940 - Jan 1942

- **BG Raymond E. Lee**
  Feb 1942 - May 1942

- **MG George V. Strong**
  May 1942 - Feb 1944

- **MG Clayton Bissel**
  Feb 1944 - Jan 1946

- **LTG Hoyt S. Vandenburg**
  Jan 1946 - Jun 1946

- **LTG Stephen J. Chamberlin**
  Jun 1946 - Oct 1948

**Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, Intelligence (after 1 March 1950)**

- **MG S. Leroy Irwin**
  Nov 1948 - Aug 1950

- **MG A. R. Bolling**
  Aug 1950 - Aug 1952

- **MG R. C. Partridge**
  Aug 1952 - Nov 1953

- **MG Arthur G. Trudeau**
  Nov 1953 - Aug 1955
DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
(AFTER 1 MAY 1987)

LTG Sidney T. Weinstein
Aug 1985 - Sep 1989

LTG Charles B. Eichelberger
Nov 1989 - Sep 1991

LTG Ira C. Owens
Oct 1991 - Feb 1995

LTG Paul E. Menoher, Jr.
Feb 1995 - Feb 1997

LTG Claudia Kennedy
May 1997 - Jul 2000

DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF, G2
(AFTER 2000)

LTG Robert W. Noonan
Jul 2000 - Jul 2003

LTG Keith B. Alexander
Jul 2003 - Jul 2005

LTG John Kimmons
Aug 2005 - Feb 2009

LTG Richard P. Zahner
Feb 2009 - Apr 2012

LTG Mary A. Legere
Apr 2012 - Present
### Commanders – U.S. Army Security Agency

<table>
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<td><strong>BG Preston W. Corderman</strong></td>
<td>Sep 45 - Mar 46</td>
<td><strong>MG James H. Phillips</strong></td>
<td>Aug 56 - Jul 58</td>
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<td><strong>COL Harold G. Hayes</strong></td>
<td>Apr 46 - Jan 49</td>
<td><strong>MG Thomas S. Timberman</strong></td>
<td>Jul 58 - Mar 60</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BG Carter W. Clarke</strong></td>
<td>Jan 49 - May 50</td>
<td><strong>MG William M. Breckinridge</strong></td>
<td>Apr 60 - May 62</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BG William N. Gillmore</strong></td>
<td>Aug 50 - Feb 51</td>
<td><strong>MG William H. Craig</strong></td>
<td>Jul 62 - Sep 65</td>
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<td><strong>MG Robinson E. Duff</strong></td>
<td>Aug 51 - Dec 52</td>
<td><strong>MG Charles Denholm</strong></td>
<td>Sep 65 - Feb 73</td>
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<td><strong>MG Harry Reichelderfer</strong></td>
<td>Jan 53 - Jun 56</td>
<td><strong>MG George A. Godding</strong></td>
<td>Mar 73 - Aug 75</td>
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<td><strong>BG Samuel P. Collins</strong></td>
<td>Jun 56 - Jul 56</td>
<td><strong>MG William I Rolya</strong></td>
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### Commanders – U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC)

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<tr>
<td><strong>MG Charles F. Leonard, Jr.</strong></td>
<td>Jan 65 - Nov 65</td>
<td><strong>BG Orlando C. Epp</strong></td>
<td>Feb 71 - Jun 72</td>
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<td><strong>MG Eliac C. Townsend</strong></td>
<td>Nov 65 - Jun 67</td>
<td><strong>COL James R. Waldie</strong></td>
<td>Jun 72 - Sep 72</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MG William H. Blakefield</strong></td>
<td>Jun 67 - Feb 70</td>
<td><strong>COL N. Dean Schanche</strong></td>
<td>Oct 72 - Jun 74</td>
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<td><strong>BG Jack C. Matthews</strong></td>
<td>Feb 70 - Jan 71</td>
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### Commanders – U.S. Army Intelligence Agency (USAINTA)

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<tr>
<td><strong>COL William S. Wolf</strong></td>
<td>Jul 74 - Jun 75</td>
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<td><strong>BG Edmund R. Thompson</strong></td>
<td>Jul 75 - Aug 77</td>
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<td><strong>BG James E. Freeze</strong></td>
<td>Aug 77 - Oct 77</td>
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### Commanders – U.S. Army Intelligence Agency (AIA)

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<td><strong>Dr. Ranklin Clinton (Director)</strong></td>
<td>Dec 84 - Aug 85</td>
<td><strong>MG John F. Stewart</strong></td>
<td>Aug 89 - Dec 90</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MG Stanley H. Hyman</strong></td>
<td>Aug 85 - Mar 87</td>
<td><strong>BG Patrick M. Hughes</strong></td>
<td>Dec 90 - Apr 92</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MG Paul E. Menoher</strong></td>
<td>Mar 87 - Aug 89</td>
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### Chiefs, Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)

*(prior to January 1st, 1942, Chiefs, Corps of Intelligence Police)*

<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Maj Garland Williams</strong></td>
<td>Jan 41 - Aug 41</td>
<td><strong>BG George V. Keyser</strong></td>
<td>Apr 47 - Jan 48</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CPT Donald B. MacDonald</strong></td>
<td>Aug 41 - Oct 41</td>
<td><strong>BG Edwin A. Zundel</strong></td>
<td>Jan 48 - Jun 49</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LTC H.G. Sheen</strong></td>
<td>Oct 41 - Jun 42</td>
<td><strong>MG John K. Rice</strong></td>
<td>Jun 49 - Aug 51</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LTC Hugh D. Wise Jr.</strong></td>
<td>Jul 42 - May 43</td>
<td><strong>MG Philip E. Gallagher</strong></td>
<td>Aug 51 - Aug 51</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>COL Harold R. Kibler</strong></td>
<td>May 43 - Feb 44</td>
<td><strong>MG George B. Barth</strong></td>
<td>Aug 53 - Oct 53</td>
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<td><strong>Office of Chief Abolished</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>COL Harold R. Kibler</strong></td>
<td>Jul 45 - Jan 46</td>
<td><strong>MG Boniface Campbell</strong></td>
<td>Oct 53 - Nov 56</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>COL Meredith C. Noble</strong></td>
<td>Jan 46 - Apr 47</td>
<td><strong>MG Richard G. Prather</strong></td>
<td>Nov 56 - Dec 60</td>
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Commandants of the U.S. Army Intelligence School (USAINTS)
Fort Holabird (1946 - 1971)

<table>
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<th>Commandant</th>
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<tr>
<td>COL M.C. Noble</td>
<td>Jan 46 - Jul 47</td>
<td>MG Garrison B. Coverdale</td>
<td>Aug 61 - Jul 63</td>
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<td>BG George V. Keyser</td>
<td>Jul 47 - Jan 48</td>
<td>MG Richard Collins</td>
<td>Aug 63 - Nov 64</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG John K. Rice</td>
<td>Aug 49 - Aug 51</td>
<td>COL Peter N. Derzis</td>
<td>Oct 65 - Jul 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Phillip E. Gallahger</td>
<td>Aug 51 - Aug 53</td>
<td>COL Richard S. Smith</td>
<td>Aug 66 - ?</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Boniface Campbell</td>
<td>Oct 53 - Nov 56</td>
<td>COL Charles W. Allen</td>
<td>Jul 69 - Sep 71</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Richard G. Prather</td>
<td>Nov 56 - Aug 61</td>
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Note: When COL Allen relinquished command of the Intelligence School it had been relocated to Fort Huachuca and become known as the US Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS).

Commandants of the U.S. Army Intelligence School
Fort Devens (USAISD)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Commandant</th>
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<tr>
<td>COL Bernard F. Hurless</td>
<td>Mar 49 - Aug 54</td>
<td>COL John J. McFadden</td>
<td>Aug 70 - May 72</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Loren D. Pegg</td>
<td>Sep 54 - Jul 57</td>
<td>COL Robert W. Lewis</td>
<td>May 72 - Jul 74</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Ralph E. Jordan</td>
<td>Aug 57 - Jun 58</td>
<td>COL R.B. Mosser</td>
<td>Jul 74 - Jul 76</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL John C. Fairchild</td>
<td>Jun 58 - Jul 58</td>
<td>COL Bill C. Powell</td>
<td>Jul 76 - Jul 78</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Charles H. Hiser</td>
<td>Aug 58 - Jun 60</td>
<td>COL Stanley G. Kozlowski</td>
<td>Jul 78 - Oct 81</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Edwin L. Atkins</td>
<td>Jun 60 - Aug 60</td>
<td>COL Joesph F. Short</td>
<td>Oct 81 - Sep 85</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Marshall W. Frame</td>
<td>Aug 60 - Jul 63</td>
<td>COL Francis X. Toomey</td>
<td>Sep 85 - Sep 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Phillip B. Davidson, Jr.</td>
<td>Jul 63 - Dec 64</td>
<td>COL (P) Floyd L. Runyon</td>
<td>Sep 86 - Jan 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Kenneth R. Linder</td>
<td>Dec 64 - Jun 66</td>
<td>COL Robert S. Troth</td>
<td>Jan 87 - Aug 90</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL William T. Riley, Jr.</td>
<td>Jun 66 - Aug 67</td>
<td>COL Michael E. Phenegeter</td>
<td>Aug 90 - Apr 93</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Harold S. Whitlock</td>
<td>Jun 70 - Aug 70</td>
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Note: On 1 Oct 1976, USASATC&S became part of USAICS, Fort Huachuca. The school that remained at Fort Devens became USAISD. From that time forward, the Commander of USAISD became the Deputy Commandant, subordinate to the Commanding General, USAICS. USAISD began consolidating with the Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca in 1992, and ceased to exist on 27 May 1994.
Command Sergeant Majors
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
1977 – Present

CSM Lee K. Stikeleather
Jan 77 – Sep 79

CSM Douglas B. Elam
Oct 79 – Oct 81

CSM George W. Howell, Jr.
Mar 82 – Dec 84

CSM Sammy W. Wise
Dec 84 – Jul 87

CSM Raymond McKnight
Jul 87 – Jun 93

CSM James A. Johnson
Aug 93 – Jul 95

CSM Sterling A. McCormick
Jul 95 – Jul 98

CSM Ronald D. Wright
Jul 98 – Jul 01

CSM Terence McConnell
Jul 01 – Nov 03

CSM Maureen Johnson
Nov 03 – Jun 07

CSM Joseph J. Paul
Jun 07 – Nov 09

CSM David C. Redmon
Nov 09 – Present
COMMANDERS
U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER AND SCHOOL, FORT HUACHUCA
1971 - PRESENT

COL Elvin J. Dalton
Sep 71 - May 73

BG Harry H. Hiestand
May 73 - Jul 75

BG Eugene K. Kelley, Jr.
Aug 75 - Aug 77

BG Albert N. Stubblebine, III
Aug 77 - Jul 79

BG James A. Teal, Jr.
Jul 79 - Oct 81

BG Roy Strom
Oct 81 - Nov 81

BG Richard W. Wilmot
Dec 81 - Aug 82

MG Sidney T. Weinstein
Aug 82 - Aug 85

MG Julius Parker
Aug 85 - Sep 89
Note: COL Allen was the commander of the Intel School at Fort Holabird when it was moved to Fort Huachuca in 1971. He remained in the role until COL Dalton took over in September 1971. His photo is unavailable.
Note: While there were occasional CSMs of the Intelligence School prior to 1984, the TDA eliminated the authorization for the position in 1976. The first CSM of record after that was CSM Sammy W. Wise, who was serving as the CSM of USAICS as early as 1 Feb 84, although it is unknown when he assumed that responsibility (photo unavailable). Since 1984, the position has been continuously filled.
A Brief History of Training in Army Intelligence

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Although Soldiers and civilians of the U.S. Army have been conducting Military Intelligence (MI) operations since 1776, training in the field did not occur until the 20th century. For much of the Army’s early history, MI training was neglected primarily because officials believed it a task any Soldier could perform; specialized skills or training were unnecessary. As a result, training was either non-existent or obtained on the job. Great strides were taken in the early 1900s, but training continued to be hampered by a lack of qualified instructors, funding, and training materials. In addition, it mirrored the Army’s larger pattern of achievement in wartime and decline in peacetime. Leaders failed to foresee the need for a comprehensive training program during peacetime in order to be able to field a skilled and ready intelligence force during wartime. It was mid-century before MI training finally became standardized and perpetual, and the following sixty years were characterized by gradual integration and continual growth which culminated in the prominent “Home of Military Intelligence” the Army values today.

Intelligence Training During World War I

When the U.S. declared war on Germany in April 1917, the Army had no MI organization to speak of, let alone any intelligence specialists or training to prepare those chosen for this important undertaking. MI was little more than an unmanned committee buried in the War College Division (WCD) of the War Department General Staff (WDGS). Even less attention had been given to a training program for intelligence professionals. In fact, the only attention given to it was in an Army textbook entitled The Service of Security and Information. Published in 1893, the book’s author, Captain (later Colonel) Arthur L. Wagner, called attention to the importance of intelligence gathering to the American military leader. Wagner was one of the first Army leaders to press for MI to be an arm of military operations and outlined practices of reconnaissance, patrols, and advanced and rear guards.

More vocal advocates would follow in Wagner’s footsteps, and by the end of 1917, steps were being taken to rectify the neglected status of MI. Due almost solely to the persistence of Major Ralph Van Deman, who had served in Army Intelligence in various capacities off and on since 1898, the Military Intelligence Section was created within the WCD. This organization grew throughout World War I into the Military Intelligence Division (MID), one of four operating divisions of the WDGS. From an initial staff of five, it grew to more than 1,600 personnel by the end of the war. The MID was divided into two sections: Negative Intelligence or Counterintelligence (CI), and Positive Intelligence, which included all other disciplines of the field.

As Van Deman struggled to establish the new MID, the Army was already deploying forces overseas to the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), including intelligence officers down to the battalion level and enlisted personnel in various specialties. Training for these personnel had to be formulated hastily, but MID lacked experienced personnel to develop or conduct the training. For specialized disciplines, Van Deman initially turned to civilian organizations with skills similar to those needed by intelligence personnel: aerial photography and radio intercept operations were taught at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, and cryptology instruction was offered at Riverbank Laboratories in Illinois. As the numbers of students increased, the bulk of the School of Aerial Photography moved to Rochester, New York, but advanced training remained at Cornell. Advanced training for officer pilots and observers was also conducted at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Langley, Virginia. Riverbank Labs trained three classes of Army officers in the fields...
of cryptology and cryptanalysis by early 1918, at which time MI-8, the Code and Cipher Section of the MID, estabished its own training.

In the field of Negative Intelligence, MI-3 Section (Counter-Espionage in the Military Service) personnel prepared official instructional materials on counterespionage subjects and disseminated them to the newly created Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP). Beginning in July 1917, MI-3 published 11 manuals and three regular periodicals to keep personnel apprised of the latest developments in the field. Despite these early attempts to develop standardized doctrine, CIP agents received their actual instruction from French and British CI personnel upon their arrival in Europe and then continued to advance their skills on the job.

Officers selected for intelligence duties received no training until the fall of 1917, when a two-week field intelligence course at the Army War College provided rudimentary instruction for division intelligence officers prior to their deployment. A month later, however, the AEF commander complained about the lack of training and recommended division officers deploy prior to their units to receive intelligence training in Europe. Relying upon British allies for instruction, Americans assigned to intelligence duties such as interrogation or captured document analysis initially went to the British Army Intelligence School at Harrow, England.

By late July 1918, the U.S. Army Intelligence School at Langres, France, began operation and continued throughout the war. British, French, and American instructors taught two six-week courses and one eight-week course, averaging 46 students each. The main topics of instruction included detailed study of the enemy army, examination of prisoners and documents, and topography, including the analysis of aerial photographs and maps. Being so close to the war front, the school stressed realistic training and students were able to interrogate German prisoners and analyze actual captured documents and aerial photographs. Perhaps equally important, students learned the routine of intelligence work in regiments, divisions, and higher echelons.
The need for trained division intelligence officers in the field meant that enrollment far exceeded the number of spaces available. Colonel (later BG) Malborough Churchill, who had taken over MID from Van Deman in June 1918, advocated for a similar training facility in Washington, D.C., and organized the first training element, MI-9, as part of his section. Colonel Frederick L. Dengler, who returned from France for the specific duty of establishing MI-9, coordinated training requirements with the AEF G2. Dengler clearly understood the need for advanced training for intelligence personnel at all levels and ranks, and he arranged for combat-experienced veterans as instructors. He also advocated for standard equipment as training aids, the development of training films and regularly published training bulletins.

MID’s creation of its own training section soon ran afoul of the Chief of the Training and Instruction Branch, War Plans Division, who claimed training fell within its boundaries alone and Dengler could serve in an advisory capacity only. To solve this dispute, Dengler transferred to the Training Branch, where he continued to work on training for “positive intelligence personnel,” and yet remain responsive to MID requirements. Training for negative intelligence personnel remained an MID responsibility.

The war ended before the organization could implement all its training plans. The difficulty stemmed in part from a lack of properly trained and qualified personnel and a relatively shallow pool of civilian counterparts from which to draw. In addition, MID could not control its own training, particularly for positive intelligence personnel, and was relegated to an advisory role. Despite recognizing the importance of standardized training, MID did not reach a point at which it could establish uniform policies, doctrine, techniques, or procedures to guide its training. Throughout the war, MID struggled to create adequate training as much as it did to establish itself as a departmental agency. As the Army returned to a peacetime footing, MID made a concerted, if mostly unsuccessful, effort to ensure the U.S. would not enter another war lacking trained intelligence personnel.

**The Interwar Years**

Although postwar intelligence training continued to be inhibited by a lack of qualified personnel as well as a lack of funds across the Army as a whole, its importance was not lost on leaders in the field. A few years after the Armistice, Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill, now the Assistant Chief of Staff (ACoS), Director of Military Intelligence, WDGS, argued for the continuance of MI training so that the lessons of the war would not be lost. Responsibility for the training, however, still fell under the ACoS, War Plans Division, whose director refused to acknowledge the authority of MID. This clash over training responsibilities would linger into the 1940s.
MID officials, recognizing their obligation to train intelligence personnel, established a Troop Subsection in the Collection Section (MI-5). The mission of the subsection was to prepare instructions and methods for limited intelligence training being undertaken within service schools and at the General Staff College. In February 1922, the subsection became the MI-4 Training Section, although with a strength of only two officers and two civilians, little could be accomplished. MI-4 did recommend that any local intelligence schools organized in the event of sudden mobilization adopt a standard training outline published by MI-4. In 1924, the section published Training Regulation (TR) 210-5 Combat Intelligence Regulations and began preparation of TR 210-10 Tactical Interpretation of Aerial Photographs as well as a correspondence course for the MI Officer Reserve Corps (MIORC), which had been established in 1921 and was comprised of AEF veterans.

A two-week training course was held in Washington, D.C. in 1927, and additional correspondence courses were created with a resulting increase in enrollment by the mid-1930s. By October 1933, MID had revised four courses (Command Staff Functions; Military Intelligence Organization and Functions; Intelligence Documents, and Military Maps) and was working on three more (Combat Intelligence; Collection, Evaluation and Dissemination of Combat Intelligence, and Map Compilation and Reproduction). In 1938, MID began offering military translator examinations to test the language proficiency of some MIORC officers. This allowed the organization to develop a list of certified language officers in the event of war.

In addition to focusing on MIORC personnel training, MID’s Counterintelligence Branch established the CIP Investigators Training School at the Army War College in February 1941. The first class was comprised of 188 enlisted students. Former Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agents and civilian detectives with MIORC commissions taught approved techniques of police criminal investigations, observation and description, espionage and counterespionage, bombs, sabotage devices, and undercover work. Instructors were also sent to Hawaii and the Philippines to establish accredited CIP schools, and courses for CIP agents were given at several other schools around the country.

MID also began developing a series of basic field manuals to replace the Provisional Combat Intelligence Manual published 20 years earlier and the training regulations published in 1924. The first manual published in 1938 included three sections: Combat Intelligence (to replace TR 210-5); Tactical Interpretation of Aerial Photographs (to replace TR 210-10), and Examination of Prisoners, Desereters, Inhabitants, Repatriates, Documents and Material. This manual was replaced in 1940 and 1941 by the 15 manuals of the FM 30 series, which covered the subjects of Combat Intelligence; Observation; Examination of Enemy Personnel, Repatriates, Documents and Materials; Military Maps; Role of Aerial Photography; CI, and the Identification of U.S. and Foreign Aircraft, Armored Vehicles, and Naval Vessels. For the first time, MI had standardized procedures and practices for operations throughout the field.

While MID struggled to provide training for combat intelligence and counterintelligence personnel, the Army Signal Corps experienced similar challenges in training Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). The Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) had been founded in 1930, under the leadership of William F. Friedman, to handle all cryptologic functions for the Army. Its Training Branch conducted short courses in cryptology from 1930 to 1933, despite the absence of funding, and also developed extension courses for MIORC personnel to ensure a cryptology manpower pool would be available for wartime mobilization. Much of these courses was based on Friedman’s six-volume series of Military Cryptanalysis textbooks. A 16-month, inclusive program of instruction was devised to cover elementary and advanced cipher and code solution, code compilation, machine ciphers, secret inks and code solution in the field. On September 4, 1934, the SIS school opened. Although the coursework was extensive, only two officers trained at the school each year, with the result being that only a few SIGINT officers were available in 1941.

On the eve of World War II, some positive steps had been taken in MI training, but deficiencies remained. The G2 and G3 were working in greater harmony, but MID still lacked responsibility for intelligence training, with the exception of counterintelligence. Training of intelligence personnel was essentially limited to the few courses offered within the service schools and the correspondence courses MID and SIS had
created for the MIORC. A few officers had also been sent to England for combat intelligence training. Unfortunately, the lack of funds meant that training had reached few of the MIORC officers and training in specialized activities was nearly non-existent.

**World War II**

During WW II, general supervision of intelligence training rested with the Training Branch of the War Department’s Military Intelligence Service (MIS), formed in March 1942 as an operating agency of the G2. The battle between the G2 and G3 was finally settled in July 1942, when the newly published AR 10-15 gave MID undisputed staff responsibility for field intelligence training. Still, the War Department did not have a single intelligence school; instead, training in various specialties was taking place at locations around the U.S. Although this would change drastically during the course of the war, the Training Branch initially exercised staff control of the Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS), the CIP Investigators Training School, and the Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC).

The Fourth Army opened a Japanese language school at the Presidio of San Francisco in November 1941. The main body of students was comprised of second-generation Japanese-Americans (called Nisei), and the training focused on Japanese military vocabulary and forms of writing. In the spring of 1942, the school became the MISLS and moved to Camp Savage, Minnesota. The school moved again in August 1944 to better facilities at Fort Snelling, Minnesota. Training ranged from six to nine months and included interrogation, captured document analysis, map reading, cultural studies, radio monitoring, and order of battle. Some Chinese language instruction also took place at the MISLS, but Russian and Chinese language specialists trained primarily at various universities under MIS supervision. Also, in late 1945, several classes of Women’s Army Corps Nisei trained in written Japanese to serve as translators. Graduating its last class on June 8, 1946, the school had trained 6,000 men in various languages, 4,800 of which were Japanese linguists who went on to serve as members of interpreter/interrogator teams in the Pacific Theater.

The CIP Investigators Training School, established at the Army War College at Fort McNair in early 1941, soon outgrew its allotted space and relocated to Chicago, Illinois. Training began there in November 1941 and two months later, when the CIP was redesignated the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), the school became the CIC Investigators Training School. Influenced heavily by the FBI, training focused on the principles of observation and description, espionage and counterespionage, and undercover work, all primarily for duty in the U.S. or base areas overseas. The school moved to larger facilities in November 1942, at which time it became the CIC Advanced Training School, still under MIS control. New courses, such as counter-sabotage, travel control, troop security, and Allied and enemy political intelligence and police systems, were taught by instructors with combat experience. These courses emphasized overseas duties where CIC agents were now attached to tactical units. Beginning in mid-1943, graduates also spent four weeks in combat and weapons train-
ing at several staging areas in Maryland prior to deployment. Before the school transferred to the control of the Provost Marshal General in early 1944, 3,000 enlisted personnel and 1,000 officers graduated.

While advanced training continued in Chicago, introductory CI training became the responsibility of the service commands. The Third Service Command was the first to offer this training at Goucher College in Baltimore, Maryland. The four-week course had two available tracts, one in military or basic skills and the other in investigative skills. Graduates apprenticed in Service Command field offices before becoming special agents and thus eligible to attend advanced training.

Beginning in 1944, personnel newly assigned to the CIC began training for overseas duty at the Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC) at Camp Ritchie, Maryland. Unfortunately, the majority of the nearly 1,200 CIC officers and enlisted students who attended through 1944 were enrolled in MITC’s General Intelligence Course and agents received only about 80 hours of specialist training. This lack of focus on CI training decreased the effectiveness of field agents. While attempts were made to develop more CI-focused courses at MITC, by July 1945, the Intelligence Division of the Army Service Forces established a new CIC Center and School at Fort Meade, Maryland. The CIC Center moved to Camp Holabird, Maryland shortly thereafter. During the war, CIC personnel also trained at various locations around the world, such as Melbourne and Brisbane, Australia; Oran, North Africa; and Shrivenham, England.

The MITC at Camp Ritchie, which began operations on June 19, 1942, came closest to fulfilling MID’s wishes for a centralized school. Under the direction of the MIS, it was staffed largely by MID and MI Reserve officers. The initial class of students, all officers, was granted admission based on letters of recommendation from their commanders. All subsequent classes were comprised of both commissioned and enlisted students to meet the demand for a variety of trained intelligence specialists overseas. Students either applied for admission or were assigned on a quota basis from the Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces. Marine Corps and international students also attended MITC.

General intelligence courses ran about eight weeks in length; the first five focused on basic instruction in intelligence procedures. The remaining three weeks were reserved for specialty training. The school’s curriculum changed to meet the express needs of field units overseas and to incorporate lessons learned. It began with courses in interrogation, interpretation, and translation, and quickly expanded to include terrain studies, signal communications, captured document analysis, staff duties, CI, order of battle, photograph interpretation, and familiarity with enemy small arms. In February 1944, the Secretary of War gave the MITC the added mission of training division intelligence personnel. A month-long course was inaugurated to teach foreign maps and equipment, enemy tactics, POW interrogation, photo interpretation, CI, order of battle, staff work, and the employment of specialist intelligence teams.

As mentioned previously, CI personnel also trained at MITC during the final year of the war. One special group of specialists trained at MITC came to be known as the “Ritchie Boys.” These drafted German refugees and European Jews received specialized training before being sent into the European Theater in six-person teams assigned to combat divisions or to the CIC. Once overseas, they interrogated German prisoners, prepared propaganda leaflets, and interpreted German documents and maps.
MITC used the 30 series of field manuals developed prior to the war as the basis of its lesson plans. Teaching methods included lecture, conferences, demonstrations, plays, practical exercises, and the use of training aids and films. When possible, instructors incorporated captured documents, maps, German prisoners, and G2 reports from the theaters, and brought in guest instructors from Allied countries. Courses concluded with field exercises ranging from two to eight days, depending on the specialty. For realism, MITC had full-scale models of German and Japanese armored vehicles and tanks, and a life-size replica of a German village square for street fighting and specialized CI training. There were also Indoor Combat Firing, Infiltration, and Silent Movement Courses.

The MITC trained just under 20,000 combat intelligence specialists during WW II. Commanders overseas gave the training mixed reviews. Because of the short classes, MITC’s graduates were only minimally satisfactory at their duties and in particular lacked basic military training. To give them the added knowledge and skills for intelligence work in a combat zone, an additional training program was set up under the general direction of the Training and Operations Branch, G2 Section, European Theater of Operations, in the spring of 1943.

Through late 1944, the collection of Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and SIGINT was a function of the Signal Corps. Although MID was responsible for the analysis of the intelligence collected, training did not fall within the MIS, but instead under the Signal Corps. The SIS, which would become the Signal Security Agency (SSA) in 1943, began schooling enlisted personnel in cryptanalysis in July 1940 at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. In March 1941, this evolved into an Enlisted Cryptographic School. In December, the school was redesignated the Cryptographic Division of the Enlisted Men’s Department, Signal Corps School. Officers, small numbers of whom had been training with SIS since 1934, also began training at the Cryptographic Division, in March 1942. After ten weeks, the first 15 officers graduated and transferred to the Army Air Forces for cryptographic security duties. Because of the accelerated demand for officers, the crowded Fort Monmouth classrooms operated in two shifts.

On October 5, 1942, the Cryptographic Division transferred from Fort Monmouth to Vint Hill Farms Station, Virginia, and became known as the Signal Corps Cryptographic School. It trained both officers and enlisted students in two shifts until new facilities were completed in May 1943. In 1943
alone, it trained 230 officers and 2,300 enlisted students. After June 1944, it became known as the Vint Hill Farms School with a focus on cryptanalysis, traffic analysis, and cryptographic equipment maintenance.

In addition to the training at Vint Hill Farms, SSA operated a Civilian Training School at Arlington Hall Station, which had begun in 1939 in Washington. It also ran the Signal Security School, as the extension courses and correspondence courses were called. Tactical SIGINT training controlled by the SSA took place at Camp Crowder, Missouri, and Fort Monmouth. Using reports from the theaters of operation, the SSA staff attempted to keep courses current and to identify strengths and weaknesses of the training. Individual study was stressed, but lectures, demonstrations, and team instruction were often used in cryptanalytic and traffic analysis courses. Field and technical manuals, special texts, documents, devices, charts, and mock-ups were all used in instruction.

In addition to the various intelligence training efforts mentioned above, one final WW II training effort should be mentioned. In April 1942, the first and only MI Officer's Candidate School opened at the Illinois Women's Athletic Club in Chicago, Illinois. The course included general military subjects, mapping, reconnaissance, combat intelligence, investigative procedures, and domestic intelligence. In June, after the first 30 candidates graduated and were commissioned, Washington officials closed the school because they did not believe MID had sufficient demand for officer personnel to justify such a school.

Positive Steps in the 1950s

After the war, specialty intelligence training continued in several venues, including CI at Fort Holabird and SIGINT at Vint Hill Farms and Arlington Hall Station under the direction of the SSA, which became the Army Security Agency (ASA) in September 1945. In addition, in 1946, a Strategic Intelligence School opened in Washington, D.C., to train the Army’s attachés. In 1962, this school merged with its Navy counterpart to become the Defense Intelligence School. The MISLS was redesignated the Army Language School in 1946 and moved to Presidio of Monterey in California. The Army Language School remained under the control of the Intelligence Division until 1950 when it was resubordinated to Sixth Army Headquarters. It would later become the Defense Language Institute. Overseas, training began shortly after the war at places like Oberammergau, Germany, a facility in a former SS barracks and run by the 7712th Intelligence School, and the Army Intelligence School in Austria, specifically for map reading.

The MITC at Camp Ritchie phased out in October 1945, once again leaving the Army without a general intelligence school. The Army Ground Forces, however, activated an
intelligence school at Fort Benning, Georgia, in October 1945 to alleviate the gap and capture the lessons of WW II. The following month, the school moved to Fort Riley, Kansas, to operate under the administrative purview of the Commandant, The Cavalry School. The new Intelligence School opened on July 1, 1946.

The school had three departments: a Department of Aerial Reconnaissance for photo interpretation and air intelligence; a Department of General Subjects for general intelligence, Army extension courses, and training literature; and a Department of Order of Battle and Interrogation of Prisoners of War with an additional section for exploitation of enemy documents. Although the Intelligence School sought a faculty comprised of combat-experienced officers with extensive intelligence experience, turnover was high due to the army’s drawdown and readjustment of its personnel.

The Cavalry School also taught a six-week course in reconnaissance, scouting, and patrolling, upon completion of which officers rotated into a 12½-week Officers’ Intelligence Course at the Intelligence School. Graduates of this course were considered qualified as G2s or S2s. For enlisted personnel, separate seven-week courses trained photo interpreters and interrogators and analysts. An Aggressor Center was even established to provide an enemy force for training realism. The curriculum, however, focused on training graduates to act as instructors on the assumption that, in the event of an emergency, the Army would face an immediate need to train large numbers of personnel.

The emergency anticipated by the Intelligence School planners came in June 1950 when North Korean forces attacked the Republic of Korea. As intelligence specialists graduated from the Intelligence School, they shipped off to MI units supporting tactical forces in South Korea. Detachments of MI specialists, CIC, and ASA personnel were attached to each division. Again the Army found peacetime intelligence training had been inadequate. This inadequacy would prove the final impetus to fix the problem.

Immediately following the Korean War, MI experienced rapid growth in personnel and organizational structure, as well as a greater emphasis on professionalism, human intelligence (HUMINT), and integrated training. Some of the Army’s efforts at creating standardized training and retaining experienced personnel in peacetime took place at Fort Holabird, where the Army had been teaching CI since 1945. As early as August 1954, HUMINT and geographic area (called Field Operations Intelligence at that time) students began training side-by-side with CI students, leading to a redesignation as the Army Intelligence Center under the direct control of the Assistant Chief of Staff (ACoS), Intelligence.
It was not until almost a year later, however, on May 1, 1955, that the Army consolidated CI, combat intelligence (order of battle techniques, photo interpretation, POW interrogation, and censorship), and area studies at the U.S. Army Intelligence School (USAINTS) at Fort Holabird. Intelligence training at Fort Riley transferred to Fort Holabird, essentially centralizing all intelligence training (except attachés and SIGINT) at one location.

While USAINTS was growing into a consolidated combat intelligence training center in Maryland, a second primary intelligence school was being established at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. In 1948, the ASA School at Vint Hill Farms, moved briefly to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, where it consolidated enlisted and officer cryptologic training, the latter of which had been taking place at Arlington Hall Station since 1947. In April 1951, during the height of the Korean War, the school relocated to larger facilities at Fort Devens.

The ASA School at Devens continued to offer both officer and enlisted training opportunities. Officers enrolled in one of three courses depending on their specialty: Communications Analysis, Communications Security and Security Officer, Cryptographic, or Radio Intelligence. Enlisted personnel took courses in Analysis, Morse Intercept, Non-Morse Intercept, and Crypto-equipment Maintenance. As part of their training, all students at Fort Devens received a two-week course in Direction Finding. In addition to resident courses, Devens staff members prepared extension courses in communications security, administration and material, and a cryptanalytics major. In 1955, the school assumed the mission of training electronic intelligence (ELINT) and electronic warfare (EW) specialists. Two years later, the school was renamed the U.S. ASA Training Center and School (ASATC&S).

Another avenue of training began to develop during the 1950s in the U.S. Army Reserves. In 1946, the War Department divided the U.S. into six geographic areas, each under the jurisdiction of a numbered army of the Army Ground Forces. Called CONUS Army Areas (CONUSA), each planned for a separate MI
Summer Camp, a two-week refresher course that included lessons learned, map reading, range firing, analysis of possible future threats, and limited language training. By 1949, all CONUS Armies were participating in the program. Five years later, USAINTS formalized all CI training offered at the camps and also provided materials for censorship training. The summer camps became known as Army Area Intelligence Schools in 1959 with programs of instruction directed by the Continental Army Command (CONARC), successor to the Army Ground Forces. Shortly thereafter, they became known as Intelligence Training Army Area Schools (ITAAS).

ITAAS continued to operate in two-week increments only in the summer. Courses were taught specifically for Reservists by Reservist instructors and included officer and enlisted options. For enlisted personnel, Military Occupation Specialty (MOS)-qualifying and non-MOS courses were provided. Due to classification and security issues, SIGINT personnel did not attend ITAAS, but instead attended resident courses at Devens.

The ITAAS did not fall under the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) School System and, therefore, they were run on an ad hoc basis at the whim of CONARC. USAINTS provided as much training material and support as possible, and programs of instruction provided by USAINTS closely mirrored or were complemented by the extension courses provided by Holabird. At this time, however, no regulations existed to ensure standardization with the instruction provided at the service schools. Soldiers who were already MOS-qualified were expected to attend Annual Active Duty for Training with the tactical unit their MI detachment or company supported. Other MI Reservists who wished to attend service school training competed with Active Duty students for seats. In times of war, when the numbers of active MI personnel increased, Reservists found it nearly impossible to obtain a slot.

**1960s and Vietnam**

In 1962, MI reached a significant milestone when the Army created the Intelligence and Security Branch. One impetus for this action was a need for professional MI officers to lead MI units, more of which were being fielded by the Army. While the new branch integrated combat intelligence personnel and the SIGINT personnel of ASA, training for the two remained divided between the schools at Holabird and Devens. Over the next decade, the Army struggled to meet the growing need for MI specialists in Vietnam.

USAINTS at Holabird continued to grow and added more classes to its catalog. By 1965, the student population had more than doubled: average daily attendance was nearly 1,200 with an annual student output of 5,000 graduates. Personnel from the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, as well as civilians and international students, also attended the school. The 32 courses offered fell into three categories: educational or technical non-MOS-producing courses; specialist MOS-producing courses, and industrial security. A 34-week Officers Career Course was also offered. In addition to developing curriculum and training materials for resident classes, Reserves training, and extension courses, USAINTS developed instruction for Army schools in the Caribbean, Panama, and Okinawa, and provided mobile training teams (MTTs) to conduct intelligence training as requested by foreign governments under the Military Assistance Program.

At Fort Devens, the ASATC&S was also operating at full capacity and graduated up to 1,800 students annually. Courses were offered for collectors and analysts for Morse, voice, printer, and ELINT, as well as electronic maintenance personnel for SIGINT and EW equip-
ment. During the Vietnam War, the school injected realism into its training with its “Vietcong” demonstration platoon and a mock Vietnamese hamlet. Students were taught the basics of survival, evasion, resistance, and escape, and prisoner-of-war conduct. SIGINT training was also taking place at other locations around the nation. For example, Two Rock Ranch Station in Petaluma, California, provided tactical training, to include soldierization, equipment familiarization, and target training for SIGINT personnel.

Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) training began at Devens in the early 1960s but was moved to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in 1968. The Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition Training Command had been established at Fort Huachuca in 1957 to teach surveillance technicians the skills of operating and maintaining new families of sophisticated electronic equipment related to new developments in the field of radar and infrared. Initial training focused on ground surveillance radar and aerial surveillance drones and eventually included manned aerial surveillance systems, beginning with the U-23 aircraft equipped with an early version of the side-looking airborne radar. The U-23 was gradually replaced by the OV-1 Mohawk aircraft, a mainstay of Army aerial surveillance throughout the Vietnam War. The school would become known as the Combat Surveillance School in 1963 and, five years later, merged with ASA’s EW School. The Combat Surveillance and Electronic Warfare School had responsibility for training combat support skills, unattended ground sensors, and equipment maintenance, in addition to ARDF. By 1969, the school had graduated more than 54,000 enlisted men.

The year 1967 proved to be another milestone for MI. On July 1, Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson approved the recommendations of the Norris Board, a body charged with looking at the Army’s intelligence programs and organization. As a result, the Intelligence and Security Branch became the Military Intelligence Branch and changed from one of combat service support to combat support. Additionally, the Army began studying the possibility of centralizing training for the many intelligence specialties, an idea first proposed following WW I.
Consolidation and the Home of MI

In 1970, three separate intelligence schools existed in the U.S.: the ASATC&S at Fort Devens, the Army Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, and the Combat Surveillance and Electronic Warfare School at Fort Huachuca. The ACoS for Intelligence, Major General Joseph A. McChristian, briefed an idea for an Intelligence Center to the Army Chief of Staff. General McChristian felt that “over the years as these schools were separated..., that not only were we failing to have people in intelligence train together and work together and exchange ideas together, but we were bringing about a split in the...Military Intelligence Branch itself.” He elaborated upon his concept for a home of Military Intelligence:

...My concept is basically this: A home where all intelligence schools, all intelligence units, and all intelligence activities of the Army that are not required to be located someplace else, are established for the first time in our history where they can work together, and find out how one can help the other; because it is team work, you do not do intelligence in compartments. They must help each other on the battlefield.

Neither Fort Holabird nor Fort Devens could accommodate the center envisioned by McChristian. The school at Holabird, in particular, was hemmed in by industrial complexes. In early 1970, the Blakefield Board, named after its chairman, Major General William Blakefield, commandant of the Intelligence School at Holabird, undertook a study of several possible sites and recommended Fort Huachuca be adopted. The Southwest post had advantages of a large area in which to train, an uncluttered electromagnetic spectrum, an existing airstrip, and open airspace. In November 1970, the Army Chief of Staff approved the move of the Army Intelligence School from Holabird to Fort Huachuca. Consequently, Fort Huachuca became the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS), the “Home of Military Intelligence” on March 23, 1971. The move was completed just six months later as the last class graduated at Fort Holabird on September 2.

The school at Fort Huachuca quickly grew with the addition of a school support element in 1972 and the implementation of the first Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course (MIOBC). Prior to this, new MI officers had to attend the basic course at the Infantry school. The school also maintained the MI Officers Advanced Course (MIOAC), which had combined advanced officer instruction for all intelligence specialties, both MI and SIGINT, five years earlier at USAINTS. In addition to the MIOBC and MIOAC, the school offered nearly 40 courses of instruction and began NCO Basic and Advanced courses for Sergeants in the Special Intelligence Career Group (CI). Warrant Officer courses were also under development. In July 1973, USAICS absorbed the 20 training courses being conducted by the Combat Surveillance and Electronic Warfare School.

In addition to the training mission, USAICS had the added mission of combat development as it related to intelligence doctrine, organization, and material studies. By mid-1973, it was the proponent for tactical intelligence, CI, aerial and ground surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation operations. This expanded role called for a higher graded commandant and, on May 7, 1973,
Brigadier General Harry H. Hiestand became the first general officer to command the Intelligence Center and School.

While USAICS grew at Fort Huachuca, the ASATC&S at Fort Devens continued to train SIGINT Soldiers in the areas of Morse, Non-Morse, and equipment maintenance. Because the Air Force had Executive Agency responsibility for cryptologic analysis and reporting and the Navy had responsibility for non-Morse communications signals, the ASA School established detachments at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas, for voice intercept and traffic analysis enlisted training and at the Naval Technical Training Center, Corry Station, Florida, for non-Morse training. Devens retained its responsibility to train Army Morse Intercept students.

An Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS), ratified by the Army leadership in 1975, paved the way for the eventual consolidation of all MI training at USAICS. The ASA Training Center and School at Fort Devens transferred to U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) control, and that headquarters, in turn, placed the school under the command of USAICS at Fort Huachuca in October 1976. The ASA School became the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Devens (USAISD). Responsibility for all intelligence training was finally consolidated in one organization, but the sites for that training remained scattered at four separate campuses: Fort Huachuca, Fort Devens, Goodfellow Air Force Base, and Corry Station. Another change resulting from this shift to TRADOC was the adoption of the TRADOC School Model 76, which called for less institutional training and more self-paced, self-taught learning. This led USAICS and USAISD to institute more field training and emphasize the use of simulators, multi-media, and extension courses in an effort to get trained personnel to the field quicker.

At the same time that the Army was downsizing following the Vietnam War, it was also expanding its tactical force structure. MI did the same, shifting away from strategic intelligence, particularly in SIGINT, and toward tactical intelligence. IOSS called for the creation of Combat and Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) units, which integrated all intelligence specialists into single units at division and corps level. These factors led TRADOC to direct USAICS to cross-train officers in the three primary disciplines (HUMINT, SIGINT, and Imagery Intelligence [IMINT]), reversing the previous trend to train specialists. As a result, USAICS adjusted its training to develop All-Source Intelligence Officers who could provide field commanders with the best possible view of the enemy threat in their area of operations. SIGINT officers were trained at USAISD in one of three sub-specialties: 37A Tactical Electronic Warfare (EW)/Cryptologic Operations, 37B Strategic SIGINT, and 37C Signal Security to prepare them for eventual qualification as 37D EW/Cryptologic Staff Officers. Specialty training continued in the senior enlisted and warrant officer ranks.
In 1978, USAICS stood up an Office of Reserve Training (ORT), the only such organization in a TRADOC school. The office’s mission was specifically to fix problems that had developed with the training of Reserve Component personnel. It took responsibility for producing training materials for export to the ITAAS and other Reserve schools and offered MOS-qualifying resident courses tailor made for Reserve students. One of ORT’s primary goals was to ensure standardization of all MI training, and its personnel conducted formal inspections and evaluations of all field programs. This office continued to monitor Reserve training efforts until eliminated by TRADOC in 1983.

For Reservists on the SIGINT side, when the ASA School transferred to USAICS control, ASA conformed to the TRADOC requirement and built a two-week MOS-qualifying course, but due to continuing issues with classification of SIGINT training materials, the course was held at Fort Devens. In the late 1970s, however, a new type of facility was created specifically to solve this problem. Called the Consolidated Training Facility (CTF), the first one opened in an unused Navy Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) in St. Paul, Minnesota. Eventually, CTFs would open within each of the CONUS Army Areas and would be renamed Regional Training Sites-Intelligence.

More changes came to Intelligence training in the 1980s. USAICS took over Specialty 37 officer training from Fort Devens in 1982. This resulted from a TRADOC-directed Review of Education and Training for Officers, a comprehensive look at the jobs an MI officer performed. The study reinforced the need for all-source intelligence officers and concluded that instruction in all officer specialties (35A Tactical Intelligence; 35C IMINT; 36 CI, HUMINT, Signal Security, and 37 SIGINT/EW) would best be accomplished in a revised MIOBC at Fort Huachuca. The transfer of Specialty 37 courses consolidated all intelligence officer training at Fort Huachuca for the first time. It also allowed Fort Devens to concentrate on training in the enlisted Career Management Field (CMF) 98 (EW/Cryptologic Operations) in light of increased requirements to man the new CEWI battalions.

Through the 1980s, USAICS continued to gain additional responsibilities. In 1985, the center and school added proponenty for Remotely Piloted Vehicles/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (RPV/UAV), Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), battlefield deception, and battlefield weather operations, all with associated large increases in the training load. New courses, like DoD Strategic Debriefing, were added, and the new concepts of Intelligence in Terrorism Counteraction, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, and counternarcotics operations were incorporated into the various enlisted and officer courses. On the other side of the country, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved USAISD as the site of consolidated Manual Morse Cryptologic training for all four services. The Air Force activated its 3485th School Squadron at Devens in October 1986 and transferred its training from Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi. Navy and Marine Corps students followed in 1987.
The year 1987 was a milestone for MI, cementing its importance in the military organization. On July 1, the Military Intelligence Corps was activated. Additionally, the 1st School Brigade, which had provided command and control for the 2,000 soldiers assigned to the Intelligence Center and School since 1973, was redesignated the 111th MI Brigade (Training) on March 17. The unit allowed more hands-on training, field training, and realism for MI soldiers. At the same time, the 112th MI Brigade activated at USAISD to meet the needs of the training community at Devens. USAICS also began its own NCO Academy that year, one that would become a model for other academies.

On October 1, 1990, TRADOC assumed command of Fort Huachuca as part of the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) initiative. The U.S. Army Information Systems Command, which had been the senior mission on post since the 1960s, became a tenant activity and USAICS replaced it as the controlling headquarters. It was at this time that USAICS became known as the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC).

The 1988 BRAC committee also announced the closure of Fort Devens and transfer of its remaining training elements to Fort Huachuca. A small Forward Transition Support team from Devens arrived in August 1992 and a large influx of personnel began arriving two years later. Ever since the 1967 Norris Board had endorsed the concept of all intelligence training being conducted at a single site, planning had been moving in that direction. After September 9, 1994, when the last class graduated at Fort Devens, all MI disciplines were taught at Fort Huachuca, now the “Home of Military Intelligence” in an all-embracing sense. The USAIC student population was comprised of enlisted personnel and officers from all services and several allied nations, and graduates came away from the school with knowledge about their specialty, as well as how they fit within the MI Battlefield Operating System.

The early 1990s also brought change to Reserve intelligence training. In 1992, the Army Chief of Staff directed the TRADOC commander to develop a Total Army School System (TASS) to train both Active and Reserve component students to identical standards. Although always a goal of the service schools, the concept of standardization had been difficult to meet due primarily to a lack of staff, funding, and equipment. With the Chief of Staff’s backing, however, the new system established standardized accreditation requirements, instructor certifications, and evaluation criteria. In 1993, five Reserve Forces Intelligence Schools, which had replaced the ITAAS, were located at Fort Devens, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and Fort Huachuca. By October 1996, these schools had each been replaced with a TASS Battalion.

In 1995, five Regional Training Sites-Intelligence (the former CTFs) were located at Fort Sheridan, Illinois; Camp Bullis, Texas; Camp Parks, California; Fort Dix, New Jersey; and Fort Gillem, Georgia. These were renamed Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISC) and their mission expanded to include language proficiency testing and refresher training and training assistance on new equipment fielded to units. Unless equipment was classified, MTTs traveled to home stations to conduct new equipment training.
Over the remainder of the 1990s, USAIC continued to train MI soldiers in more than 40 basic specialty and NCO courses, 12 warrant officer technical fields, as well as officer basic and advanced courses. USAIC offered courses for EW, cryptologic operations, interrogation, ELINT, and aerial surveillance. With its Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) doctrine, MI began incorporating more advanced technology into its collection and processing operations, necessitating a variety of system-specific courses, such as ASAS, Guardrail Common Sensor, Trojan Spirit, Common Ground Station, and UAVs. With declining resources, Distance Learning (dL) became a critical concept in the mid-1990s as the “Classroom Without Walls” brought training to soldiers instead of soldiers to training, thus saving critical travel funds.

### Into the New Millennium

By 2000, USAIC had become a world-renowned training institution. Its mission was to conduct IEW training for soldiers, leaders, and members of all services; articulate IEW requirements for materiel systems; develop IEW concepts, doctrine, and organizations; exercise proponentcy for the 30,000 soldiers and civilians within the MI Corps; and command and operate the Fort Huachuca installation. The 111th MI Brigade, which had been the only intelligence training brigade in the Army, was joined by the 112th MI Brigade (Provisional) to streamline training operations. The primary training continued to be conducted at Fort Huachuca, with one battalion operating at Goodfellow Air Force Base and one company at Corry Station. Additionally, USAIC was now the DoD training agent for all UAV instruction and boasted the only UAV range in the U.S. The student throughput averaged approximately 8,500 annually.

With the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the Army Intelligence Center began rapidly adapting its training environment to mirror the operational environment. So MI professionals arrived at their units fully trained, the school monitored current tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) being developed in the field and transitioned them back to the school. With terrain and altitude similar to that in Afghanistan, Fort Huachuca allowed for more realistic training than any other location in the U.S.
The student population quickly grew to meet wartime requirements. In 2005 alone, USAIC absorbed an increase of 3,500 students in the enlisted fields of Intelligence Analysts, HUMINT Collectors, CI Agents, UAV Operators, and in the MI Officer Basic Course. This was the largest increase in TRADOC history.

By 2006, more than 120 programs of instruction were offered with course lengths running between 5 to 44 weeks, to a programmed training population of more than 12,000 students at Huachuca, Goodfellow, and Corry Station. In addition to the technical and tactical MI training conducted by the 111th MI Brigade and the NCO Academy, USAIC created two new organizations to handle changes to the training curriculum. The Human Intelligence Training-Joint Center of Excellence (HT-JCOE) opened to provide standardized advanced HUMINT training to personnel from all military services and other national intelligence organizations. Also in 2006, the TRADOC Culture Center opened to provide mission-focused culture education and training materials for the Army, sister military services, and other government organizations. While USAIC added these new organizations, it transferred responsibility for training UAV Operations to the Aviation Center.

By 2010, the annual resident student population at Huachuca, Goodfellow, and Corry Station increased to more than 21,000 with around 3,000 in training daily. Another 109,000 Soldiers worldwide were reached by MTTs for specialized training in Cultural Awareness, HUMINT Collection, Tactical and Interrogation Training, and Strategic Debriefing. Recognizing the challenges posed by rapid technological changes, particularly in the cyber world, classrooms were updated with the latest Information Technology infrastructure, training was infused with gaming technology; and the Distributed Common Ground System-Army was fielded and incorporated into training, allowing MI personnel worldwide, whether operational or at the school, to tap into more than 300 Joint, National, and Coalition data sources. New courses are in development to train enlisted cryptologic network warfare specialists.
In addition to Fort Huachuca, Goodfellow, and Corry Station, National Guard and Reserve training took place at Camp Williams, Utah; Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Georgia; and at Fort Devens. This training was primarily for the HUMINT, CI, and Intelligence Analyst enlisted fields, although the 1/100th TASS at Devens also provided Advanced and Senior Leader Courses for the three disciplines.

An example of both evolution and revolution, MI training has come a long way in the past 100 years. In 1917, intelligence personnel attended hastily created specialty training and relied on Allied instructors to teach them the basic procedures of their jobs. Training focused primarily on one discipline with little concern for developing an overall intelligence picture. Schools were temporary, opened in times of war and immediately closed upon the declaration of peace. In contrast, today, intelligence courses are carefully crafted and continually updated with the most current TTPs. While enlisted students train for a specialty, MI officers focus on all-source intelligence so they can provide commanders with the most comprehensive understanding of the battlespace. MI training continues in war and peace to ensure an always ready pool of experts. Equally important, the Army now stresses standardized training for both Active and Reserve Component students.

Built upon the foundations of the early MI training institutions, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence at Fort Huachuca was the realization of a 50-year-old dream for a centralized school. For more than four decades, it has continued to be the focal point for quality training, combat developments, doctrine, and force structure for intelligence professionals. It has ensured that the thousands of Soldiers who have passed through its gates have been thoroughly trained to provide both tactical and strategic commanders with the intelligence needed to protect the nation’s security and interests. There is little doubt it will continue to train many generations of MI Soldiers and officers to meet whatever threats arise in the future.

Students conduct detainee operations during a field exercise at Fort Huachuca.
On July 1, 1987, the Military Intelligence (MI) Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) was activated and established as a new training department within the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Major General Julius Parker, Jr., the Commanding General of USAICS, appointed SGM Manfred David as the first Academy Commandant. On the same date, Company B, 1st Battalion, 112th MI Brigade, at Fort Devens, Massachusetts was redesignated the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School NCO Academy (Provisional), with SGM James H. Kelley, Jr., as the Commandant.

Establishing the NCO Academy and assigning a few initial staff members signaled the beginning of a long-standing commitment by the USAICS leadership to train NCOs and tie such training to career progression through promotion. SGM David’s initial task was to establish a physical presence as an academy. In 1987, the Academy at Fort Huachuca had no physical or dedicated academic facilities, but rather used a smattering of classrooms spread throughout the World War II-era wood buildings known as “Splinter Village.” In addition, the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) course content and training execution decisions were made by staff, both officers and NCOs, from the various other training departments. The NCO student population attended a number of career management field (CMF) 96-series military occupational specialty (MOS) Basic NCO Courses (BNCOC) and a consolidated CMF 96, 98, and 33 Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC).

In February 1988, SGM David was replaced temporarily by CSM Thomas V. Crosby, and on June 17, 1988, CSM John P. O’Connor assumed command of the NCO Academy. Four months later, CSM O’Connor presided over a formal ceremony during which the academy was assigned its own unit identification code and was placed under the command and control of the USAICS Command Group. Thereafter, the NCO Academy Commandant reported directly to the MI Corps Command Sergeant Major.

Through the next few years, the academies at both Huachuca and Devens took responsibility for more of the NCOES training requirements. Simultaneously, each site, under the superior leadership of CSM O’Connor and SGM Kelley, acquired and trained headquarters staff personnel and instructor cadre while designing, developing, and implementing new MOS-specific basic courses. As testimony to their achievements, both academies earned “Full Accreditation” ratings from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1989, their first year of eligibility.

As a result of the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Act decisions, all MI NCOES training was consolidated at Fort Huachuca. The physical move of the courses occurred over approximately 18 months. CMF 98 BNCOCs were the first to move; the last elements to depart Fort Devens included the MOS technical training courses for CMF 33. The last BNCOC class at Fort Devens graduated in August 1994.

To accommodate the influx of new students, new dedicated academic facilities were constructed for the NCO Academy at Huachuca. On July 9, 1993, formal dedication and ribbon cutting ceremonies established the current NCOA location. Ice Hall, the main academic facility, was dedicated in honor of CSM Clovis D. Ice, an MI and Special Operations Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) NCO. The building housing the academy headquarters and barracks was dedicated in honor of Master Sergeant John R. Wilson, a Counterintelligence (CI) NCO. The academy also established a training presence in Rowe, Nicholson, and Friedman Halls in the early 1990’s.
Many challenges to the NCOES training mission have occurred since the consolidation of the two academies in the early 1990s. The rapid development and integration of technology, both hardware and software, into the everyday operational world of intelligence NCOs drove demands for equally rapid changes to the training arena. In the mid-1990s, the most significant challenges came with developing effective training for the MI flagship system—the All-Source Analysis System. By the turn of the century, however, as lessons were learned during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, a continuous and almost dizzying array of requirements were generated to keep NCO skills current and relevant to the operational environment. Doctrine and critical tasks evolved continuously.

In January 2001, the Secretary of Defense awarded the Army Superior Unit Award (ASUA) to the NCO Academy. The academy colors carry the multi-colored, ASUA streamer with the dates “1999-2000.” In part, the award citation reads, “…for superior development and execution of NCOES training for the period October 1999 through October 2000.”

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2001, the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) separated Army common core subjects and intelligence-specific training into Phase I and Phase II, respectively. Phase I for both ANCOC and BNCOC were considered separate courses, independent of the intelligence-centric training, and each was 2 weeks and 2 days in length. The ANCOC Phase I, Army Common Core, was eliminated with the start of FY 2005 training. By comparison, the BNCOC, Phase I, remained in place through FY 2009. It was eventually replaced with a web-based, 80-hour distance learning (dL) product in FY 2010, which the students execute from home station.

In 2009, the Department of Army (DA)-directed NCOES Transformation generated significant change to every NCOES course. Academy personnel conducted exhaustive top-to-bottom reviews of 11 individual courses. On the surface, the names changed from BNCOC and ANCOC to Advanced Leader Course (ALC) and Senior Leader Course (SLC), respectively. Underneath, however, there was a tremendous effort made to continuously upgrade, conduct pilot programs, and finally execute new courseware. SLC was completely retooled and incorporated a number of tasks previously associated with the First Sergeant Course, which was eliminated. In addition, many Skill Level 4 tasks more commonly associated with SLC were moved to the ALC. SLC continues to be a dynamic, evolving course and is well-received by senior NCO students.

Another element of NCOES Transformation was the new Advanced Leader Course-Common Core (ALCCC) launched by DA in October 2009. It signaled the start of the Structured Self Development (SSD) strategy linked to selection for attendance at resident training and ultimately promotion. When executed in June 2013, the 80-hour web-based SSD III will be a prerequisite to selection for and attendance at SLC.

FY 2009 brought the inaugural ALC for MOS 09L (Interpreter/Translator) and the transfer of the MOS 35K (formerly MOS 96U, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations Supervisor) ALC from Fort Huachuca to Fort Rucker, Alabama, under the mission command of the Aviation Center. The following year, the last classes of NCOs graduated from the MOS 35H (Common Ground Station Operator) ALC when the skills of MOSs 35H and 35G (Imagery Analyst) were consolidated. By mid-2011, an ALC training stra-
egy was in development for the newly designated MOS 35Q (Cryptologic Network Warfare Specialist). As of mid-2012, most of the training plans are in the design phase; poised to begin development in the near future. The training lab and classroom are under construction in Friedman Hall, and the training strategy promises to be truly “cutting edge.”

Other achievements of the NCOA over the past ten years include the addition of 2X CI/HUMINT Management skills in 35M and 35L ALC; coordination with the National Security Agency’s Associate Directorate for Education and Training to allow SIGINT NCOs attending ALC an opportunity to earn National Cryptologic School credit; coordination with Cochise Community College for the award of upper-level course credit toward degrees in Intelligence Operations; and “right-seat ride” and on-site assistance to U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard NCOES instructors.

By most accounts, and especially those of the Intelligence Center’s senior leadership, the staff and cadre of the NCOA has performed above standards and served the NCO population well—a tribute to the hard work and dedication of the NCOA’s small group leaders. Today, with the assistance of many specialized teams and uniquely qualified personnel from across USAICoE, the NCO Academy small group leaders deliver first rate training in facilities that are the envy of every other NCO Academy within TRADOC. While the academy is no longer a tenant in Rowe or Nicholson Halls, its footprint in Friedman has grown significantly. The annual throughput for all NCOES courses ranges between 1,500 and 1,700 students, a number which has remained consistent over the years.

Through two-plus decades of numerous USASMA and TRADOC accreditations, the academy has always been successful and frequently cited by external authority for numerous “best practices.” The two most recent TRADOC accreditations, October 2008 and August 2011, each resulted in the NCO Academy being designated as an “Institution of Excellence,” the highest rating.

In the 25 years since its activation and under the leadership of more than a dozen different commandants, the headquarters staff and the men and women of the training teams, both military and civilian, have served with distinction and honor while training the NCO leaders of tomorrow.
Knowlton’s Rangers: Part of an Elite Military Intelligence Tradition

by Ruth Quinn, Staff Historian, USAICOE Command History Office

“Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.”

In 1995, the Military Intelligence Corps Association (MICA) and the MI Corps designated Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Knowlton as the “MI Hero.” Subsequently MICA created the Knowlton Award to be presented to individuals who have demonstrated excellence or superior support to Military Intelligence. Thomas Knowlton’s story is a tragic one, and the organization known as Knowlton’s Rangers was short-lived; but that story has been told in many sources—the purpose of this article is not to replicate that story. However, the unusual mission of Knowlton’s Rangers in providing combat intelligence links them to a long legacy of serving “Always Out Front,” going back to before America had an Army. Their spirit of courage and self-sacrifice is a heritage that continues today.

In his book on the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs) of Vietnam, Michael Lee Lanning relates the history of the Ranger concept from its origins. He notes that by the time European settlers moved across the ocean to colonize the New World, combat had become standardized: long lines of troops facing each other across an open field. America, however, presented a problem. The terrain was a wilderness, with thick, virgin forest and unknown, unmapped territory. There were no roads for large troop movement, and the enemy was often unseen, striking from ambush against any intruder—man, woman, or child. If Europeans were going to survive in this foreign land, they were going to have to learn to live and fight more like the Native Americans.

Some of these colonists excelled in frontier skills—scouting, tracking, hunting, observing. They patrolled large areas, a practice known as “ranging” to scout for danger. These early frontiersmen became known as “Rangers,” and their unique skills, willingness to put themselves in harm’s way to protect others, and supreme courage in the face of danger have become the trademarks of all Army Rangers ever since.

Captain Benjamin Church commanded the first known military unit of Rangers in North America, which fought against an Indian revolt in 1675. Church’s Rangers, made up of skilled white colonists and friendly Indians, operated in terrain where regular militia units could not function. Later, during the French and Indian War (1754-1763), Major Robert Rogers organized an elite unit of woodsmen to support British operations against the French. Rogers’ Rangers received unique training in wilderness warfare that was highly valued by British commanders, given their assignment in the great wilderness of New England.

Knowlton learned the Ranger profession with these men. In a biography of Knowlton published in a 2010 edition of MICA’s newsletter, The Vanguard, W.F. Morgan states, “Private Thomas Knowlton would gain his early military experience in the same regiment as Captain John Durkee and Major Israel Putnam, both, who had trained and served with Roger’s Rangers.” Knowlton’s early Ranger experiences would become invaluable later in the Revolutionary War.

By the time George Washington took command of the Continental Army in 1775, the tradition of the Army Ranger was already well established. The concept involved an elite, specially trained, and highly mobile unit that could be called upon in special situations to perform dangerous and difficult missions. General Washington had a need for just such a unit. Knowlton’s Rangers were commissioned to conduct long-range patrols behind enemy lines and capture prisoners for interrogation. Orders detailing the mission were received by (then) Major Knowlton on July 18, 1776, from Brigadier General Hugh Mercer, who told him to get as near the enemy as possible without being discovered and, “should you be successful enough to take any of the British Troops as Prisoners, secure them well and treat them with humanity.” How many missions Knowlton led his Rangers on in the next two months is unknown, but it is clear he received orders directly from George Washington on September 16, 1776.
When the Long Island Campaign ended on August 27, 1776 with the British in control of New York, General Washington badly needed to regain that stronghold. Feeling paralyzed by a lack of intelligence, he sent numerous requests to Generals Heath and Clinton, saying that it was "of great consequence to gain intelligence of the enemy’s designs, and of their intended operations." He did not receive a satisfactory response. On September 16, 1776, in obvious frustration, Washington told the President of Congress, John Hancock, "I have sent out some reconnoitering parties to gain Intelligence if possible, of the disposition of the Enemy." He was referring to Knowlton’s Rangers. To fill in the information gaps, Washington had also decided to send one lone spy behind enemy lines; his volunteer came again from Knowlton’s Rangers.

Captain Nathan Hale, one of Knowlton’s company commanders, knew the dangers of this mission. When a classmate of his from Yale tried to talk him out of volunteering, Hale replied, "I am fully sensible of the consequences of discovery and capture in such a situation... If the exigencies of my country demand a peculiar service, its claims to perform that service are imperious." Hale would never return from this "peculiar service," for he was executed by the British as a spy one week after volunteering. His commander also died, but from wounds he received during the Battle of Harlem Heights. Knowlton’s loss was personally mourned by General Washington. While this incident hardly represents a success, it illustrates an early use of the Rangers for intelligence gathering. It was a practice that would be repeated many times in the years to come.

An excellent example of this tradition, 168 years later, was embodied in Second Lieutenant (later Colonel) Harvey Cook, whose first job upon entering active duty in 1941 was teaching hand-to-hand combat at Camp Ritchie, Maryland. He was soon recruited by the 2nd Ranger Battalion as their S2, or intelligence officer. On D-Day, June 6, 1944, Captain Cook scaled the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc with his fellow Rangers and was awarded the Silver Star for gallantry in action. He would later receive three Bronze Star medals for service in WWII and Korea, and would see action again in Vietnam. Colonel Cook’s 30-year career epitomizes the courage, willingness to serve, and special skills, particularly in the intelligence realm, that Rangers have proudly displayed since their beginnings.

America’s current War on Terror is no different. In May 2008, a Signals Intelligence Analyst and member of the 75th Ranger Regiment was on a mission to locate an enemy insurgent in Afghanistan. His team, comprised entirely of Rangers, deployed on a rare daylight raid of a Taliban compound. These Rangers had to enter multiple buildings, and the enemy could see them coming. The danger was clear and present. Although the Intelligence Soldier was inexperienced, he understood his mission, knew the target, and had the training and equipment to do his part. He was also part of an elite team of Rangers who had trained together and knew they could trust each other. When the shooting started some of the Rangers were wounded; one was killed. One earned a Medal of Honor. Most of the Rangers on that team remain anonymous, true professionals. But they all share a heritage of common values. Nathan Hale, Harvey Cook, and today’s MI Soldiers serving in the 75th Ranger Regiment, following in the tradition of Knowlton’s Rangers, put their special intelligence skills to use in dangerous missions that require self-sacrifice, remarkable courage, and a willingness to lay down their lives for their friends.
The Military Intelligence Sphinx

From ancient times to present, the sphinx has represented both wisdom and strength. Because of its association with these virtues, the sphinx was selected by the War Department in 1923 as the most appropriate symbol to represent the newly established Military Intelligence (MI) Officers’ Reserve Corps, an association of World War I veterans with experience and interest in intelligence.

Through the years, the sphinx remained the principal heraldic symbol of MI, and in particular, Counterintelligence. It was used on the MI Reserve Branch flag, and on the crests for the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) School, and later the U.S. Army Intelligence School. When the U.S. Army Intelligence Command was organized as a major Army command from 1965 to 1975, the sphinx was on the command’s shoulder patch. In 1987, the MI Corps was established, and its crest combined the golden sphinx with a crossed key and lightning bolt on an oriental blue shield. Today, a five-foot bronze sphinx statue stands guard at Alvarado Hall on Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Her origins are steeped in the mystery and legend of a variety of unverified stories.

Her known history begins in 1953, when she was rescued from a salvage area at Fort Meade, Maryland and was placed in front of the CIC Center Headquarters at Fort Holabird, Maryland. Since that time, she has maintained a physical presence within Military Intelligence.

In July 1973, Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence Command moved from Fort Holabird to Fort Meade, and the sphinx moved as well, to a new pedestal in front of Nathan Hale Hall.
When the U.S. Army Intelligence Command was discontinued in June 1974, she moved to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca. There, she was relocated several more times, first to the front of the original MI Museum, then to the courtyard at Riley Barracks, and in 1993, to the front of Rodney Hall.

In 2008, the MI Sphinx completed what is hoped to be her last move to Command Headquarters for the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence.
Military Intelligence Corps
Regimental Crest
Symbolism

Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors associated with the MI Corps. The key, flash, and sphinx symbolize the three basic categories of intelligence. The key signifies the cornerstone mission of MI, unlocking the enemies' secrets (tactical intelligence). The flash represents Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare. The sphinx, symbolizing wisdom and silence, represents Human Intelligence. The gold background of the crest symbolizes the achievements made by MI since the first Army Intelligence unit was created in 1776. The Military Intelligence Corps Motto is “Always Out Front.”

Background

The regimental insignia was originally approved on July 28, 1986, but was revised on March 24, 1987 to change the sphinx from enamel to recessed and gold-plated.

Military Intelligence
Branch Crest
Symbolism

The sun, composed of four straight and four wavy alternating rays, is the symbol of Helios who, as God of the Sun, could see and hear everything. The four straight rays of the sun symbol also allude to the four points of the compass and the worldwide mission of Military Intelligence. The placement of the sun symbol beneath the oriental blue rose (an ancient symbol of secrecy) illustrates the Latin phrase sub rosa, meaning “in secret; under circumstances forbidding disclosure.” The partially concealed, unsheathed dagger alludes to the aggressive and protective requirement and the aspect of physical danger inherent in the mission. The color gold signifies successful accomplishment and the dark blue (designated as the national color in the General Regulation for the Army, 1825) signifies vigilance and loyalty.

History

Authorized insignia are unique reflections of an organization’s history, mission, and achievements. The MI Branch insignia was designed by the chief of the Creative Heraldry Division, U.S. Army’s Adjutant General Office, LTC (R) Stafford Potter, U.S. Marine Corps. It was officially adopted on July 1, 1962, the day the Army Intelligence and Security Branch was formed. The Army Intelligence and Security Branch was redesignated the Military Intelligence Branch on July 1, 1967.
MI Traditions

MI Soldier’s Creed

I AM A SOLDIER FIRST, BUT AN INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL SECOND TO NONE,

WITH PRIDE IN MY HERITAGE, BUT FOCUSED ON THE FUTURE. PERFORMING THE FIRST TASK OF AN ARMY: TO FIND, KNOW, AND NEVER LOSE THE ENEMY

WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY AND OF TENACITY, PROFESSIONAL AND PHYSICAL FITNESS, AND ABOVE ALL, INTEGRITY—FOR IN TRUTH LIES VICTORY.

 ALWAYS AT SILENT WAR WHILE READY FOR A SHOOTING WAR, THE SILENT WARRIOR OF THE ARMY TEAM.
Chief Warrant Officer Two Kenneth D. Allen, former Director of the 18th Army Band at Fort Devens, is credited with writing the MI Corps March. Lieutenant Colonel Porfirio Montes, then commander of the 306th MI Battalion and Major David Bilyeu, the executive officer of the 112th MI Brigade, provided the lyrics. Allen first composed his march in 1990 and collaborated with Montes and Bilyeu on the lyrics in 1992.

Prior to 1992, the MI Corps had unofficially used a march composed and copyrighted in 1988 by Sergeant Steven Christensen stationed at Fort Lewis. Christensen’s march, however, had never been approved by the U.S. Army Band. In May 1992, Colonel Lanning Porter, the Assistant to the Chief of Military Intelligence, proposed a “playoff” of the two marches at the June 10, 1992 Colonels’ Mess. Recorded versions of both marches and a vocal rendition of Allen’s version were played, after which a simple majority vote was taken. Attendees unanimously chose Allen’s version. The official MI Corps March was played for the first time on July 2, 1992 as part of that year’s MI Hall of Fame ceremony.
ASA Monument: Erected in 1969, this monument honors ASA Soldiers who died as a result of hostile action. The monument has the names of 37 fallen Soldiers, ranging from the Korean War (1), the Dominican Republic intervention (2), and the Vietnam War (34). Initially, it stood at Arlington Hall Station, and now stands in front of the Nolan Building at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

MI Corps Memorial Wall: Dedicated on 1 June 2000, the Memorial Wall pays tribute to members of the MI Corps who have given their lives since the inception of the Corps in 1987. The Wall lists the names of 78 intelligence professionals, both military and civilian, the majority of whom were killed in the past ten years during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (34), and ENDURING FREEDOM (21). It is on display in Alvarado Hall at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Aviation Memorial Park: Installed in April 2010 at the Army Intelligence Aviation Memorial Park, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, this plaque honors Army Intelligence personnel killed in aviation-related accidents over the past 50 years. The memorial lists 70 incidents in which 139 individuals were killed, including 92 in Southeast Asia, 12 in Germany, and 29 within the United States. The earliest incident occurred in 1963 and the most recent in 2001.

INSCOM Memorial: Built in 1998, this memorial honors INSCOM Soldiers who have fallen since 1988. Standing in front of the INSCOM headquarters at the Nolan Building, the memorial has the names of 27 INSCOM Soldiers. One of these died in Bosnia, 12 died in aircraft crashes, and 14 died in Iraq/Afghanistan.
Captain Gilbert Juarez
2012 Recipient
Lieutenant General Sidney T. Weinstein Award for Excellence in Military Intelligence

Captain Gilbert Juarez was born on June 6, 1981 in San Antonio, Texas. Following his graduation from the University of Texas in San Antonio with a Bachelors degree in Political Science, he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army. After attending the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, he was assigned to 1-82 Field Artillery Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division in August 2004. He then deployed to Camp Cuervo, Iraq where he served as a Platoon Leader and Information Operations Officer in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II. In this capacity, he led numerous offensive operations against the Madhi Army and other networks operating in the Diyala Province, as well as developing over 35 civil-military projects to enhance Iraqi quality of life. Most notably, was the development of the first farmer cooperative established in Baghdad for the United Farmers of Iraq.

He later served as the 1st Brigade Special Troops Battalion S4. CPT Juarez was then selected as the Executive Officer for Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Brigade Combat Team, where he deployed to Camp Taji, Iraq in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 06-08. After being promoted and serving a year in the position, he transitioned to his primary branch as an Intelligence Officer. CPT Juarez served as the Brigade S2 Targeting Officer during a 15-month surge. His targeting efforts led to the detection of over 70 High Value Individuals; the resulting pressure caused three major threat groups to reconcile with coalition forces.

After completing the Military Intelligence Captains Career Course, he was assigned to the 89th Military Police Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas as the S2 in April 2008. CPT Juarez deployed to Camp Cropper, Iraq in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 09-10, where he was responsible for orchestrating the counterinsurgency (COIN) “inside the wire” program for five battalions and over 32,000 detainees, stretching across three Theater Internment Facilities. He developed a behavioral vetting process (BVP) that effectively identified and segregated the reconcilable detainees based on observations, COIN reporting, and circumstances of capture.

The BVP was subsequently adopted by TF-134 Commanding General Detention Operations and published in the Detainee Operations Handbook. CPT Juarez was also nominated to train COIN “inside the wire” methodology to units preparing to support detention operations at Camp McGregor, New Mexico during the deployment. Upon return, he led the intelligence effort for the closure of Camp Bucca, the transition of the Taji TIFRC and the eventual Camp Cropper handover.

After redeployment, he was assigned to the 303rd MI Battalion, 504th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade as the Battalion Assistant S3. He was then nominated for command. As the Charlie Company Commander, he deployed to Forward Operating Base Fenty, Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 11-12, where he commanded a multi-discipline company consisting of 18 teams spread across 12 locations in Regional Command-East.

CPT Juarez’s military education includes the Field Artillery Officers Basic Course and the Military Intelligence Captains Career Course. His awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal; Army Commendation Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters; the Army Achievement Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster; the Afghanistan Campaign Medal; the Iraq Campaign Medal with three campaign stars; the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal; the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, and the Combat Action Badge.

112 Military Intelligence
DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE MI CORPS

The Honorary Officers and the Distinguished Members of the Corps are essential to the accomplishment of the Corps’ purpose—to establish a sense of esprit de corps within Military Intelligence, unifying MI soldiers and civilians in a common bond of mission and fellowship. Living legends of MI, they link today’s intelligence soldiers and civilians with our proud past. These special appointees represent every aspect of the MI profession. The Honorary Colonel, Honorary Chief Warrant Officer, and Honorary Sergeant Major of the MI Corps each serve for 3-year terms (renewable once), and then they become Distinguished Members. The tenure of the Distinguished Members is indefinite.

HONORARY COLONELS OF THE MI CORPS
- LTG JAMES A. WILLIAMS (1987 - 1990)
- LTG SIDNEY T. WEINSTEIN (1990 - 1994)*
- LTG PHILLIP B. DAVIDSON, JR. (1994 - 1995)*
- COL JOHN A. PATTISON (1998 - 2006)
- COL RICHARD E. ALLENBAUGH (2006-2012)
- COL ALFRED H. ELLIOTT III (2012-)

HONORARY SERGEANTS MAJOR OF THE CORPS
- CSM LOUIS A. ROTHENSTEIN (1990 - 1994)
- CSM ROBERT T. HALL (2006-2012)
- CSM JAMES A. JOHNSON (2012- )

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICERS OF THE MI CORPS
- CW5 MICHAEL FRIED (2001-2007)
- CW5 LON D. CASTLETON (2007 - )

*Deceased

CURRENT DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE MI CORPS
- COL RICHARD E. ALLENBAUGH (2012-Present)
- CW5 MICHAEL L. FRIED (2007 - Present)
- COL HARRY K. FUKUHARA (1993 - Present)
- CSM ROBERT T. HALL (2012-Present)
- CSM GEORGE W. HOWELL JR. (1990 - Present)
- CSM DAVID P. KLEHN (2000 - Present)
- CSM STERLING T. MCCORMICK (2006 - Present)
- COL JOHNSON A. PATTISON (2006 - Present)
- CSM LOUIS H. ROTHENSTEIN (1994 - Present)
- MG EDMUND R. THOMPSON (1987 - Present)
- LTG JAMES A. WILLIAMS (1990 - Present)
FORMER DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE MI CORPS

LTG PHILLIP B. DAVIDSON, JR. (1995 - 1996)*
LTG ALVA R. FITCH (1988 - 1989)*
MG JAMES E. FREEZE (1987 - 1993)
MG GEORGE A. GODDARD (1987 - 1993)*
MG GEORGE A. GODDING (1987 - 2008)*
CSM CLOVIS D. ICE (1990 - 1991)*
CW3 ANN M. MCDONOUGH (1988 - 1995)*
LTG WILLIAM E. POTTs (1987 - 2005)*
LTG WILLIAM I. ROLYA (1987 - 1990)*
COL ABRAHAM SINKOV (1987 - 1998)*
COL WILLIAM F. VERNAU (1988 - 1993)
BG GEORGE J. WALKER (1998 - 2005)*
LTG VERNON A. WALTERS (1987 - 2002)*
LTG SIDNEY T. WEINSTEIN (1994 - 2007)*
COL NORMAN S. WELLS (1987 - 1993)
LTG SAMUEL V. WILSON (1987 - 1993)

*Deceased

Current Honorary Officers of the MI Corps

Colonel
Alfred H. Elliot III

Command Sergeant Major
James A. Johnson

Chief Warrant Officer Five
Lon D. Castleton

Military Intelligence
Sergeant (Chief) William Alchesay

Probably the most famous of Apache Scouts, Sergeant William Alchesay, or “Little One,” was born between Globe and Show Low, Arizona. He enlisted on 2 December 1872 at Camp Verde, Arizona, and became First Sergeant of A Company, Indian Scouts, commanded by Lieutenant Charles B. Gatewood, 6th U.S. Cavalry.

Sergeant Alchesay participated in major campaigns in the Tonto Basin area in 1872 and 1873 under Major General George Crook. General Crook had been sent to the Arizona Territory in 1872 to bring an end to years of warfare with the Indians by negotiating peace and moving the Indian tribes to reservations. By fall of that year, he facilitated a relative peace by crafting a treaty with Cochise, a chief of the Chiricahua Apache tribe. In November General Crook began a winter campaign to quell the remaining renegade Indians who refused to surrender. The general knew that under pressure from cavalry patrols, the Indians would be forced to retreat into the mountains to try to survive the snow and low temperatures. His target area was the Tonto Basin where Western Apache and Yavapai Indians had been raiding and eluding U.S. troops for several years.

Believing it would take Apaches to find Apaches, General Crook hired Apache warriors who wanted peace to help the cavalry find those who wanted war. Sergeant Alchesay was one of ten Indian Scouts who guided Crook’s columns during the winter campaign of 1872-1873. He received the Medal of Honor in 1875, cited for “gallant conduct during the campaigns and engagements with Apaches.” General Crook gave a large share of the credit for his success in these battles to these valiant Apache scouts.

Sergeant Alchesay also advised General Crook during the Geronimo Campaign in 1886. Alchesay convinced Geronimo to surrender and negotiated the peace talks. He and Geronimo remained close friends until Geronimo’s death in 1909. After serving over fourteen years for the Army, Alchesay became the Chief of the White Mountain Apache Tribe until he retired in 1925. He made numerous trips to Washington D.C., visiting with President Grover Cleveland and acting as a counselor to Indian Agents in Arizona Territory.

Chief Alchesay died in 1928, a chief to his own people and to the U.S. Army which depended so much on his abilities.
Colonel Joseph M. Blair III

Joseph M. Blair III entered the Army in 1964 after graduating from Army Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) and being commissioned as a Second Lieutenant. Lieutenant Blair attended the Armor Officer’s Basic Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky and was then assigned to Fort Hood, Texas. While at Fort Hood, Lieutenant Blair served in a number of positions including S2, S3, and Company Commander in the 1st Battalion, 13th Armor, 1st Armored Division.

Four years later, Blair was assigned to the 4th Military Intelligence (MI) Detachment, 4th Infantry Division, serving in combat as a Counterintelligence Chief in the Central Highlands of the Republic of Vietnam. Captain Blair attended the MI Officers Advanced Course at Fort Holabird, Maryland and was subsequently assigned as first J3, and then J2 of the UN Command in the Republic of Korea in 1971.

Upon his return from Korea, Major Blair completed a tour at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS), at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, where he developed combat intelligence courses. This was followed by assignments as Company Commander, Deputy G2, and then G2 of the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado. In 1981, he led the ROTC program at the University of Michigan, and was later assigned as the G2 of the 193rd Infantry Brigade, and U.S. Army Panama.

From 1982 to 1985, Lieutenant Colonel Blair commanded the 125th MI Battalion, 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. After attending the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania in 1986, Colonel Blair became the Director of Academic Policy, where he developed the annual curriculum. He then returned to Fort Huachuca to command the 111th MI Brigade. Two and a half years later, he became the G2, Third Armored Mobile Corps at Fort Hood, Texas.

COL Blair’s last assignment was again at Carlisle Barracks, as the Director of Operational and Strategic Level War Fighting Courses. COL Blair spent his career focused on mentoring and serving others. He was a leader in the development and evolution of the tactical intelligence concept. COL Blair was an innovator in MI; he recognized early on the importance of training soldiers in cultural awareness, and instituted this practice for soldiers of all ranks at USAICS.

COL Blair retired in 1994 after 30 years of dedicated service to the U.S. Army. His awards include the Legion of Merit; Bronze Star Medal; Meritorious Service Medal; Joint Commendation Medal; Army Commendation Medal; Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, and National Defense Service Medal. He also wears the Meritorious Unit Citation, Vietnamese Civil Action Honor Medal, and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry. He is married to the former Catherine Elizabeth Donnet, an interior designer and landscape architect. They have two daughters, attorney Jennifer Genstler, and Catherine Chatham, a cartographer. COL and Mrs. Blair have one granddaughter, Jade Elizabeth Chatham.
Major General Oliver W. Dillard

Oliver W. Dillard enrolled at the Tuskegee Institute at age 15. The Army had just started the Tuskegee Airman Program and he proudly wore the uniform of an ROTC cadet. In 1945, Private Dillard was drafted, and he reported to Fort McClellan, Alabama, for basic training.

Dillard was sent to Bavaria to serve as an Administrative Specialist in the 349th Field Artillery Group. After completing Officer Candidate School in 1947, Second Lieutenant Dillard emerged as honor graduate of his Infantry Officers Basic Course.

Lieutenant Dillard was assigned to the all-Black 365th Infantry Regiment at Fort Dix, New Jersey, as platoon leader and battalion operations officer. In 1950, he was assigned to the 24th Infantry Regiment, one of the famous Buffalo Soldier units, in Japan. Half way into the voyage from San Francisco to Japan, North Korea invaded South Korea, and America was at war. Lieutenant Dillard immediately headed to Pusan, South Korea with the 24th Infantry Regiment where he served as the Intelligence Officer for 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division.

In 1954, Captain Dillard returned to Germany with the 4th Infantry Division, this time as company commander, and later as the Regimental Communications Officer. In 1957, Major Dillard attended Command and General Staff College, one of only three Black officers in his class.

In 1960, he served as Deputy Chief of Mission, and later as the Operations Officer, to the U.S. Military Mission in Monrovia, Liberia. Leveraging his Korea, Germany, and Africa experiences, the Army assigned Dillard to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) to lead the Foreign Intelligence Assistance Section, Special Warfare and Foreign Assistance Branch in Washington, D.C. from 1962 to 1964.

In 1964, Lieutenant Colonel Dillard became the first Black officer to attend the National War College. In 1966, he was selected to command the 2nd Battalion, 5th Combat Support Training Brigade. The following year, he assumed command of the Brigade, and was promoted to colonel in 1969.

Colonel Dillard served with U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), as a Province Senior Advisor for Kontum Province. After two years of distinguished service, Dillard returned to Washington, D.C., as the Deputy ACSI, the first Black officer in this position. He was promoted to Brigadier General, only the fifth Black general in Army history and arguably the first Black general officer serving in Military Intelligence. BG Dillard returned to Saigon for duty as MACV Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, the precursor to the counterinsurgency program used in Iraq. Following the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, he left Vietnam when MACV disbanded.

BG Dillard served as the first Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSINT) for the new U.S. Army Forces Command at Fort McPherson, Georgia. In 1974, he served as the 2nd Armored Division’s Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver at Fort Hood, Texas, where he worked diligently for operations and intelligence integration. From 1975 through 1978, Dillard served as the DCSINT, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army in Heidelberg, Germany. His use of U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command assets ensured a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding and countering Soviet forces at the height of the Cold War. As his final assignment,
Dillard served as the Commanding General, U.S. Army Readiness Region II at Fort Dix until 1980, when he retired.

Major General Dillard worked himself up from private in a segregated Army during World War II to Major General in an all-volunteer Army, defending America for almost 35 years. MG Dillard’s awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster; the Silver Star; the Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters; Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster; Air Medal; the Army Commendation Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster; the Purple Heart; the Good Conduct Medal, and the Combat Infantryman Badge. General Dillard and his wife, Helen, live in Florida and are the proud parents of four children.

Private First Class Parker F. Dunn

Parker F. Dunn lost his mother at a young age and was raised by his aunt and uncle. He felt the call to serve his country when the U.S. entered into World War I. Though he was initially rejected from enlistment three times due to his eyesight, he did not give up. Parker Dunn was known for his tenacity; he finally entered the Army in April 1918 and was assigned to a rifle company. Although he was assigned to A Company of the 1st Battalion, 312th Infantry Regiment, 78th Infantry Division, he deployed to Europe as part of a newly formed Intelligence Section under the 1st Battalion. As he boarded the train to Camp Dix, New Jersey, Private Dunn was overheard saying, “I want to do something big for my country.”

Dunn was with the 78th Infantry Division troops that attacked enemy forces near St. Mihiel, France in September 1918. The offensive overran the German forces in just two days, forcing their retreat. As part of the Intelligence Section, Private Dunn gathered information and observations from the front lines for his battalion commander.

In October 1918, in the Argonne Forest of France, the 78th Infantry Division came under heavy German machine gun and artillery fire, forcing American troops to jump into a nearby river for cover. Private Dunn and the Intelligence Section were tasked to build a bridge in order to gain better access to the village. In the stalemate that followed the Battle for Grand-Pré, the commander needed to get a message back to an infantry company that was in reserve, giving them the mission to exploit a weakness in the German defenses.

PFC Dunn courageously volunteered for the mission and was shot numerous times in his attempts to deliver the message. He tried repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, to complete his mission, in spite of his wounds. Shortly after Private Dunn died, the reserve company did manage to ascend the hill and penetrate the enemy position. The capture of Talma Hill facilitated an American advance on 1 November 1918, which contributed in the final successful push by the 78th Infantry Division. PFC Parker F. Dunn received the Medal of Honor posthumously in 1922. The citation reads: “When his battalion commander found it necessary to send a message to a company in the attacking line and hesitated to order a runner to make the trip because of the extreme danger involved, Private First Class Dunn, a member of the intelligence section, volunteered for the mission. After advancing but a short distance across a field swept by artillery and machinegun fire, he was wounded, but continued on and fell wounded a second time. Still undaunted, he persistently attempted to carry out his mission until he was killed by a machinegun bullet before reaching the advance line.” Private First Class Dunn’s father accepted the award on his son’s behalf.
Colonel John G. Lackey III

John G. Lackey, III graduated from The Citadel in South Carolina in June 1961 with a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science and commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) as a Second Lieutenant in Military Intelligence. Fifteen years later, he also earned a Masters Degree in History from The Citadel.

Following completion of the Basic Infantry and Image Interpreter Officer Schools, Lieutenant Lackey’s first assignment in 1962 was Platoon Leader of an Aerial Surveillance Platoon in the XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. During the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis LT Lackey served as the Senior Air Reconnaissance Liaison Officer to U.S. Strategic Command. In 1963, he studied Vietnamese at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, with a follow-on assignment to the 441st Intelligence Corps Detachment, 1st Special Forces in Okinawa.

While in Special Forces, Lackey served two temporary duty tours in Vietnam and one in Taiwan with the Special Action Forces. Upon completion of the Okinawa tour, Captain Lackey moved to the U.S. Army Intelligence School in January 1967, where he attended the MI Officers Advanced Course and taught tactical intelligence. His next assignment was in Vietnam as an intelligence officer with the 5th Special Forces Group. He served as the Intelligence Operations Officer, the Assistant S2, and the S2.

In April 1969, Major Lackey assumed command of the 218th MI Detachment, XVIII Airborne Corps. After attending Command and Staff College, he returned to Vietnam where he was the Senior Operations Advisor, Pleiku Province. In 1972, he was an ROTC instructor and Tactical Officer at The Citadel.

In 1976, Lieutenant Colonel Lackey served as the Executive to the Director of Foreign Intelligence, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. The next year, he became an assistant to the Director of the Army Staff. After two years on the Army staff, Colonel Lackey returned to his Army roots in December 1978 to command the 1st MI Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance Support) at Fort Bragg. He attended the Naval War College, at Newport, Rhode Island in 1981, and was then slated to be the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg.

COL Lackey moved to U.S. Army Europe where he served as the Chief of Plans, Training and Force Management Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence until he assumed command of the 66th MI Brigade in 1984.

COL Lackey commanded a special mission unit from 1986 to 1989. He then became the Director of Intelligence, J2 of the Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg. During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, he served as the Chief of Staff of the Joint Special Operations Task Force conducting the coalition SCUD hunts. COL Lackey retired from the U.S. Army on 1 August 1991 with thirty years of Active Duty service.

COL Lackey’s awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal; four awards of the Legion of Merit; two Bronze Star Medals; the Purple Heart; three awards of the Meritorious Service Medal; four Air Medals; five Army Commendation Medals; the Cross of Gallantry; the Combat Infantry Badge; the Master Parachutist Badge; the Vietnam Service Medal with nine stars, and the Southwest Asia Service Medal. He is married to the former Marian Kay Hawkins of Charleston, South Carolina. They reside in Mount Pleasant and have two children: Dr. Leigh Butler and Mrs. Laura Cotton.
Major General James A. Marks

James “Spider” Marks is the son of a soldier who was the son of a soldier. As a third generation West Pointer, Marks recalls few discussions about career options. After commissioning in 1975, he married Marty Tallman, who worked for Colonel Jack Pattison, then the G2 of the 101st, and took command of an Infantry company for General Dave Bramlett, then the Commander, 1-503 Infantry.

Assigned to U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), Marks became the aide-de-camp to Admiral William Crowe, U.S. Navy, PACOM Commander-in-Chief and future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this position, Marks learned that informed strategic decision making does not always lead to informed actions on the ground.

As a Major in 1986 and a Lieutenant Colonel in 1992 in XVIII Airborne Corps, Marks led early efforts to push national intelligence to better inform tactical decisions. He served in the 525th MI Brigade, the 82nd Airborne Division, and 7th Infantry Division. Marks was the Senior Intelligence Officer for Joint Task Force-Los Angeles and Commander of the 107th MI Battalion, Fort Ord, California, during the 1992 LA riots.

As the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army in 1995 and a brigade commander at Fort Hood in 1996, Colonel Marks’ mission was to drive digitization and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles into the tactical force. Selected to Brigadier General, Marks became the Executive Officer to the Commanding General, Stabilization Force in Bosnia during Operation ALLIED FORCE, the military operation that resulted in the arrest of the war criminal, Slobodan Milosevic.

Following his duty as the Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, U.S. Forces Korea, General Marks assumed command of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School on the morning of 9/11. As the new leader of the MI Corps, Marks created the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command model for support to formations in combat through routine deployments of Fort Huachuca Mobile Training and Assessment Teams to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Joint Task Force-Guantanamo.

Promoted to Major General in 2004, Marks was handpicked to conceive, design, and lead the intelligence team for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. As the Intelligence officer for the Combined Forces Land Component Command, General Marks and his team enabled U.S. Central Command to achieve a lightning victory against Saddam Hussein’s military. Upon his return to Fort Huachuca in June 2003, Marks began a process to capture lessons learned from combat and integrate them into training.

MG Marks continues to be a spokesman for Soldiers and the Military Intelligence Corps. He is a military analyst for CNN, an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, and a routine guest lecturer at the Army War College and West Point.

Marks is an Honor Graduate from the U.S. Army Ranger School and graduate of Airborne School, Air Assault School, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, and the Army War College. His awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal; Defense Superior Service Medal; Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster; Bronze Star, and multiple Expeditionary and Service Medals.
Colonel James V. Slavin

James V. Slavin received his commission through the U.S. Military Academy on 2 June 1975. In 1977, Lieutenant Slavin served in his first assignments as an Infantry Battalion S2 and Infantry Company Commander for 506th Infantry Battalion (CURRAHEE), 101st Airborne Division. After earning his first Master’s Degree, he went on to become the Detachment Commander at Field Station Augsburg, Germany. While at Field Station Augsburg, Lieutenant Slavin was promoted to Captain, and served as Watch Officer and later, Battalion S3.

In 1983, Captain Slavin served one year as an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy. In 1986, he became the Operations Officer for the 525th MI Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina where he excelled and was selected to serve as the 519th MI Tactical Exploitation Battalion S3, and later as the Battalion Executive Officer, very challenging positions for a young officer. Major Slavin next served as the assistant G2 of Operations and later Deputy G2 of the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California. While there, he instituted, for the first time, Counter Drug Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield methodology.

MAJ Slavin was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel during his assignment as the Regional Division Commander, Joint Intelligence Center, Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia. In 1998, LTC Slavin returned to Fort Bragg to serve as the Director of Intelligence for Special Operations Division, Delta Force, only leaving this unique assignment to serve overseas at Camp Zama, Japan as the G2 of U.S. Army Japan. During his time in Japan, Colonel Slavin was selected by Admiral Dennis Blair, Pacific Command Commander, to command the U.S. Support Group (East Timor), deploying just days after 9/11.

COL Slavin served in several Intelligence positions at Fort Huachuca, Arizona and in 2003 became the Director of Joint and Allied Doctrine for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia. He finished his Active Duty career as a Strategic Planner for the Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq. He retired from the U.S. Army in 2005 after 30 years of service. He serves today within the Army’s Senior Executive Service as the Director of TRADOC’s Joint Training Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations Integration Center.

COL Slavin’s awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters; Bronze Star; Defense Meritorious Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters; Meritorious Service Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters; Army Commendation Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters; Army and Air Force Achievement Medals; the Joint Meritorious Unit Award; the Army Superior Unit Award; the National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Service Star; the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal; the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal; the Humanitarian Service Medal; the Army Service Ribbon; the Overseas Service Ribbon; the Air Assault Badge, and the Master Parachutist Badge. He earned a Bachelor of Science Degree from the U.S. Military Academy, a Masters of Public Service from Western Kentucky University, and a Masters of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.
Chief Warrant Officer Five Richard L. Swarens, Jr.

Richard Swarens began his military career in 1982 when he enlisted in the U.S. Army as a 97B, Counterintelligence (CI) Assistant. He completed tours as a CI agent’s assistant at the 311th MI Battalion, 101st Airborne/Air Assault Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky and as a CI special agent and noncommissioned officer at Fort Sam Houston, Texas with the 902nd MI Group. In February 1988, Mr. Swarens was appointed as a CI Warrant Officer.

Upon completion of the Warrant Officer Certification Course, Chief Swarens returned to the 311th MI Battalion, 101st Airborne/Air Assault Division as a CI Technician and Battalion S2. While there, he deployed his team as the first tactical CI team into Saudi Arabia in support of the 101st during Operation DESERT SHIELD. During this time Chief Swarens provided timely, accurate investigations into numerous incidents that threatened the Division sector, and when Operation DESERT STORM began, Swarens’ team air-assaulted into Iraq to collect valuable information on Iraqi forces.

In May 1992, Chief Swarens took charge of the S2 shop in the 18th MI Battalion in Germany. He taught himself automated systems and architectures, which was critical, as the unit was tasked by the Secretary of Defense to develop a Department of Defense model of Human Intelligence computer architecture. Swarens was the driving force in creating and implementing the new architecture’s security procedures. He obtained security accreditation for the first collateral local area network, thus breaking new ground for U.S. Army Europe and personally becoming a driving force behind the ADP security field.

In December 1993, Mr. Swarens became the Operations Officer of the CI Detachment, where he developed a liaison program to maintain and strengthen the relationships with supported units and host nation counterparts. He also led the first vulnerability threat assessment for the Port of Antwerp, Belgium, for Military Traffic Management Command.

In 1994, Chief Swarens volunteered to deploy in support of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. As the only American CI officer in a Combined Task Force operating in a hostile zone in Northern Iraq and Turkey, he developed new procedures to track and assess threats, briefing the commander and his staff daily on the threat environment. Upon returning to his unit, Mr. Swarens was selected to command a CI detachment providing support to the Netherlands, Belgium, Northern Germany, and Luxembourg.

During two years as Chief of the CI Training Committee at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, Chief Swarens restructured all CI training in the 111th MI Brigade, establishing the foundations for resident CI training today. In 1999, he was assigned to the 3rd Army G2 Section, where he volunteered to deploy in support of Operation BRIGHT STAR in Alexandria, Egypt. He became the lead security interface with Egyptian forces on 9/11.

In 2002, Mr. Swarens was chosen as the Deputy Director of Security in the White House Military Office (WHMO), advising the Director of Security in military support of the President. After a highly successful 26-year career, CW5 Swarens retired in 2008, although he continues to serve at the WHMO as a civil servant. His awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal; Bronze Star Medal; Defense Meritorious Service Medal; Army Meritorious Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters; Army Commendation Medal with four Oak Leaf Clusters; Joint Service Achievement Medal, and Army Achievement Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters. He and his wife, Cheryl, and their daughter, Megan, reside in Virginia.
# MI Hall of Fame Members

1987 - Present

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<th>Name</th>
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2013 Military Intelligence Corps
Hall of Fame Nomination Criteria

1. Commissioned Officers, Warrant Officers, Enlisted Soldiers or professional civilians who have served in a Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position in the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination.

2. Only nominations for individuals will be accepted. Individuals cannot be self-nominated. No unit or group nominations will be considered.

3. Nominees may not be serving on active duty and must have been retired a minimum of three years before consideration; however, they may be employed by the U.S. Government in either a civilian or contractor position, to include continued service in an intelligence role. Government civilians who have not previously served in uniform but who are otherwise qualified and have been retired a minimum of three years may be considered.

4. Temporary retirees for medical or other reasons and members of the Active Reserve or National Guard are not eligible until they have transitioned to permanent inactive or retired status.

5. Although nominees must have served with Army intelligence in some capacity, the supporting justification for their nomination may include accomplishments from any portion of their career, not merely their period of service in Army intelligence. For example, an NCO who served in Army MI and then, after retirement joined the Defense Intelligence Agency as a civilian, is eligible for Hall of Fame consideration once he/she has been retired three years from service in uniform, by virtue of his or her Army service. However, his or her justification may include achievements from both military and civilian careers, even though his or her civilian intelligence service was not in an Army intelligence unit.

6. A nominee must have made a significant contribution to Military Intelligence that reflects favorably on the Military Intelligence Corps. When appropriate, the nomination may be based on heroic actions and valorous awards rather than on documented sustained service and a significant contribution to Army intelligence.

Nominations should be sent to:
Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, ATTN: ATZS-HIS, 1889 Hatfield Street, Building 62723, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000. DSN 821-4113 or commercial (520) 533-4113. Email: lori.tagg@us.army.mil or timothy.quinn@us.army.mil. Nominators will be notified of a packet’s receipt and the date of the next Nomination Board.
Introduction
The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Military Intelligence (MI) operational and training support to active component missions have been, and will continue to be, a true test of leadership. Throughout most of the last decade, a dynamic shift from a strategic reserve force to an operational force was necessitated by USAR engagement in various overseas contingency operations. Although the shift did come with significant challenges, USAR MI forces have proven themselves in combat and peacetime as relevant and integral to the total MI force structure.

Geographic C2 Concept
The command and control (C2) for USAR intelligence forces was a Senior Intelligence Officer who was also the G2 for the USAR Command (USARC). Prior to 2005, USAR intelligence organizations fell under a myriad of functional and operational organizations mixed with many types of units in geographic regions roughly aligned with Federal Emergency Management Agency regions and some overseas locations in Europe, Asia, Alaska, and Hawaii.

The USARC G2 had five direct reporting Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISCs), previously called Reserve Training Sites-Intelligence and one MI Augmentation Detachment (MIAD), also known as the MI Special Training Element Program (MISTE). The ARISC mission is to sustain and improve the readiness of USAR MI soldiers and units to perform individual and collective tasks through a training program supporting unit METLs and MI skills directly related to battlefield success.

The MIAD was an organization that would fund specialized intelligence professionals for travel to Inactive Duty Training battle assemblies, formerly known as “drills,” and annual training with MI units where the Soldier’s skills would be best utilized.

Prior to 2005, USAR MI battalions did not report to MI brigades but to Area Support Groups (ASG) which were similar to active duty brigades or in many cases directly to the Regional Support Command. Although these USAR MI battalions were administratively controlled by the different ASGs, their operational control was determined by their “war-trace.” The war-trace related to an active duty MI organization with a specific area of responsibility and mission. USAR MI forces would backfill their respective war-trace active duty units with individuals, teams, or entire units. Some of the tactical MI battalions were also affiliated with Army National Guard maneuver divisions. There were also numerous MI Army Reserve Elements and MI Detachments. These units had a predominately strategic mission and supported such organizations as the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Ground Intelligence Center, the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific and U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.

Generating Force Structure for MI
USAR training of MI Soldiers in Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) specific courses, as well as MI noncommissioned officer educational courses (NCOES) was the mission of five separate MI Total Army School System (TASS) training battalions, also located regionally. Like the operational intelligence units, training battalions directly reported to different divisions and different regional support commands.

Transformation to Functional Operational Command (2005-Present)
Major General Gregory Schumacher was the first commander of the Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC). The MIRC, formed in July 2003 and activated on 15 September 2005, at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, pooled USAR MI organizations to improve C2, mission management, and readiness.

The vision of the MIRC was “To be the preeminent provider of trained and ready Army Reserve intelligence forces complementing active component...”
intelligence capabilities in support of Combatant Command and the Intelligence Enterprise requirements.” The MIRC motto “Always Engaged” would be indicative of its continuous support to our Army at war. The new command was to provide C2 for over 40 tactical and strategic USAR MI units.

The newly activated MIRC was the solution that would provide the necessary reserve intelligence support to Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, Noble Eagle, and New Hope. Now having the C2 of all functional USAR intelligence forces, the process of mobilizing individuals, teams or entire MI units within the MIRC would become nearly seamless.

**USAR MI Support to the Operational and Generating Forces (2005 to Present)**

Since its inception the MIRC has deployed over 6,000 Soldiers, both as individual augmentees, as well as units in support of numerous contingency operations throughout the world and providing operational intelligence support to nearly all national intelligence agencies. The MIRC continues to refine its C2 structure, as well its capabilities, and will continue to be the premier provider of military intelligence support to the overall MI force structure.

From 2004 to 2008, the USAR mobilized a USAR MI Training Battalion to support the increasing demand for MI Soldiers overseas. The unit consisted of cadre from all five USAR MI TASS Battalions and some augmentation from the Army National Guard. The “Mobilize-Train-Deploy” Battalion, as it was known, trained over 500 MI professionals for MOS reclassification requirements and NCOES.

Concurrently, the 100th USAR Training Division established the 1st MI Training Brigade (USAR) and consolidated the MI Training Battalions under that Headquarters. This improved C2 for the battalions has greatly improved the current and future training of USAR MI Soldiers by ensuring a one-standard training model.

**Requirements and Resources Drive Change**

Moving from a strategic to operational posture in a few years, then developing and enhancing support to the operational USAR MI forces could not have occurred without the requirement demands and resourcing from the recent and current operations. The improvements in C2, performance, readiness, and force generation standards are unmatched in the history of the USAR. USAR MI will continue to excel in providing trained, ready, and seasoned intelligence Soldiers and units to deter conflicts or win the fight. 🌟
The Army National Guard (ARNG) has fought in every American war, from the 1600s to present combat in Afghanistan. Throughout this enduring history, select Guard Soldiers and Officers were ‘Always out Front’ providing intelligence support. As the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps carries on the tradition of providing the world’s finest intelligence Soldiers to support America’s warfighters, the ARNG MI Soldiers and Officers recognize those who went before today’s generation. That generation fought and won a long hard battle fifty years ago to establish the Intelligence and Security Branch as a basic branch (later renamed the MI Branch), including for the first time both active and reserve component (RC) intelligence professionals.

The MI Corps’ activation in 1962 began the evolution of ARNG MI units. The ARNG’s first organized MI units, created in the 1960s, were the 142nd MI Company (Linguist) in Utah and the 151st Aviation Battalion in Georgia (equipped with Mohawk surveillance aircraft). During the 1980s, there was a dramatic shift of tactical MI support from the U.S. Army Reserve to the ARNG for the Guard’s combat units. MI tactical support for combat units was organized into a multi-disciplined battalion for each division, and similarly structured units for Armored Cavalry and Separate Brigades. In 1988, the first ARNG Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) unit was organized as the 629th MI Battalion, an organic element of the reactivated 29th Infantry Division (Light) of the Maryland-Virginia ARNG.

The ARNG expanded its linguist support capabilities during the 1980s with the organization of the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist) in Utah (federally recognized on 1 April 1981). Utah’s 142nd MI Company was upgraded to a battalion and would be followed by the 141st MI Battalion (Linguist), activated on 8 October 1988. Over the next decade additional linguist battalions were activated to provide a robust enabler to the total force.

After Operation Desert Storm, the Army began to re-examine its CONUS-based force structure to ensure the capability of winning two simultaneous major conflicts. Based on a Department of Defense “Bottom Up” review, the Army ended its practice of using Guard brigades as “Round Out” elements dedicated to certain Active Component (AC) Army divisions. Instead, these brigades were designated as the primary “follow up” force. Termed “Enhanced Brigades,” 15 such units were identified and each contained an organic MI company. In the last half of the decade ARNG MI force structure continued its growth adding an additional seven MI battalions, each organic to the division it supported, as well as creating two Tactical Exploitation Battalions (TEB) aligned with AC Army Corps.

In the years following the events of 11 September 2001 and the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army would begin a robust transformation on the brigade level. The redesign of Army MI structure caused the ARNG TEB battalions to transition into Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BfSB) MI battalions and the transformation of a robust MI Company within each of the ARNG’s 28 brigade combat teams (BCTs).

ARNG MI force has evolved from the 2,000 Soldiers authorized in the 1980s focused on a cold war strategy with limited analysis and national level access. Today, it exceeds 9,500 intelligence professionals supporting operations throughout the world including Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Kosovo, and building partner capacity through 63 Partnership for Peace initiatives.

By 2016, the Army National Guard will possess an MI Force that is continuously engaged in the operating environment. Units in garrison will provide tactical overwatch and core processing, exploitation, and dissemination support to the units they will relieve in theater. ARNG MI unit training strategies enable operational environment and mission-based proficiency. Training is output oriented and
performance-centric, a blend of tactical and technical training and operational missions. Each BCT MI Company, each BfSB, each MI BN, and each Division headquarters are equipped with a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility, are connected to the enterprise, and are capable of deploying into the contemporary operating environment with full situational awareness.

As the Army shapes and wins current and future conflicts, the ARNG MI force is prepared to continue the integration developed with the AC over the last decade. As the MI Corps moves toward the vision of Army Intelligence 2020, the ARNG will partner with the AC to build the MI Force of the Future with a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment to provide the best trained, equipped, and ready intelligence forces to enable decisions to win and respond to contingencies.

The ARNG looks forward to the next 50 years, and as we recognize the generation that established the MI Corps, we strive to continue and expand upon that legacy. Our goal during the MI Corps’ centennial celebration is that our actions are viewed as visionary, and the conditions are set to never see an MI Soldier at rest, no conflict results in a cold start, and a new generation of MI professions that are unmatched and ‘Always out Front.’

Sources


Our MI Enlisted Soldiers serve in one of the 13 Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) under Career Management Field (CMF) 35. Our newest MOS, 35Q, Cryptologic Network Warfare Specialist, became effective in April 2012 and recruitment of future soldiers has recently begun to fill many of the approximately 500 positions. MOS 35F Intelligence Analyst remains our largest enlisted MOS with a little over 11,000 35F Soldiers in the Active, Guard, and Reserve forces.

### 2012 MI Enlisted MOSs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35F</td>
<td>Intelligence Analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35G</td>
<td>Geospatial Intelligence Imagery Analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35L</td>
<td>Counterintelligence (CI) Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35M</td>
<td>Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35N</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35P</td>
<td>Cryptologic Linguist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35Q</td>
<td>Cryptologic Network Warfare Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35S</td>
<td>Signals Collector/Analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35T</td>
<td>MI Systems Maintainer/Integrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35X</td>
<td>Intelligence Senior Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35Y</td>
<td>Chief CI/HUMINT Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35Z</td>
<td>SIGINT Senior Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09L</td>
<td>Interpreter/Translator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Recent and Future Changes

**MOS 09L Interpreter/Translator:** In 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed the recruiting and training of heritage and native speakers with the goal of integrating them into our formations to improve combat effectiveness. In 2005, the Department of the Army G1 appointed MI as the personnel proponent for the MOS 09L. 09L Soldiers served with distinction during the war and will continue to support the force from one of the two Translator/Interpreter Companies.

**Deletion of MOS 35H Common Ground Station Operator:** In the fall of 2011, the MOS 35H was merged with MOS 35G. Former 35H Soldiers are receiving 35G transition training at the Intelligence Center of Excellence.

**Creation of MOS 35V SIGINT Senior Sergeant:** In fall 2014, MI Branch will implement a new MOS, 35V Senior SIGINT Sergeant/SIGINT Chief, as the new merger MOS for our MSG/E-8 SIGINT NCOs. SIGINT MSGs who carry the MOS 35Z will be reclassified into MOS 35V.

**Renaming and Recoding of 35Z:** Simultaneous with the stand-up of MOS 35V, all MI E9 CMF 35 Soldiers will become MOS 35Z.

**Deletion of SRC 35W:** SRC 35W was originally used as a feeder for MOSs 35N and 35P. All 35Ws that met the minimum language requirement upon graduation from the Defense Language Institute attended MOS 35P Advanced Individual Training and were classified MOS 35P upon completion. Recruiting directly into MOS 35P allows a more accurate tracking of Soldiers during the acquisition and training process. Deletion of SRC 35W was effective in July 2011.

**Digital Media Collector:** Effective 1 November 2011, the Additional Skill Identifier 1D was established to identify MI Soldiers who have successfully obtained certification as a Certified Digital Media Collector from the Department of Defense Cyber Investigations Training Academy.
Recent and Future Changes

**MI Prerequisites:** Must be an Advanced Leaders Course graduate, must have three or more NCOERs in the corresponding MI Enlisted MOS, four years MI enlisted experience and must have, or be eligible for TS/SCI access.

**MOS 352N/352P Merger:** In fall 2013, these two Areas of Concentration will merge in order to achieve a training cost savings and greater support to mission requirements. The 40 MOS 352P authorizations and approximately 50 MOS 352P Warrant Officers will be reclassified to 352N and the MOS 352P will be deleted.

**350Z Attaché** Positions to be filled by 351Ms: Beginning in fall 2014, Army Attaché Warrant Officer positions (formerly 350Z) will be recoded to 351Z and filled from existing MI WOs from MOSs 351M, 350F, and 351L and others by exception and proponent approval who will then complete attaché training. Though this is a very small MOS consisting of approximately 50 authorizations, 351Zs will continue to provide critical support in U.S. embassies world-wide.

**Additional Skill Identifiers for SIGINT warrants in the area of Cryptologic Network/Cyber Operations:** As of 1 March 2011, SIGINT Warrant Officers who complete the Joint Cyber Analyst Course, NETA 2008 or NETA 3001 courses, or Remote Operations Center Interactive Operator Boot Camp Course will be awarded an applicable ASI based on the course or equivalent training. The ASIs are Q1, Q2, and Q3.

**2012 Officer Snapshot**

There are currently four officer Areas of Concentration (AOC), one Functional Area and one former AOC which is now a Skill Identifier.

**Recent and Future Changes**

**AOC 35C to AOC 35D with Skill Identifier 1D (Imagery Intelligence Officer):** The effective date of this action was 30 September 2010. 35C was simply too small to be a viable officer AOC.

**Revision of AOC 35F HUMINT Officer:** This AOC was revised in 2011 and requires officers to successfully complete the MI Captain’s Career Course and training at the HUMINT Training Joint Center of Excellence.

**FA34 Regionalization:** MI Branch is working currently to regionalize FA34 Strategic Intelligence Officers beginning with their training and in their utilization in the force.

**Key Developmental Position Reductions:** MI officers can expect to see fewer positions identified in DA PAM 600-3 Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management as key developmental. Serving as a Battalion/Brigade/Division S2/G2 and/or MI Commander will remain critical for MI officers.

“Sustain high quality MI Force–Soldiers, Civilians–AC/RC”

–Lieutenant General Legere, Army G-2, April 2012
When submitting articles to *MIPB*, please take the following into consideration:

- Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3,000 words, without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words.
- Please note that submissions become property of *MIPB* and may be released to other government agencies or nonprofit organizations for re-publication upon request.

**What we need from you:**

- A release signed by your operations security officer/SSO stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain OR that the article and accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified/FOUO (IAW AR 380-5, DA Information Security Program).
- A Public Affairs release if your installation or unit/agency requires it. Please include that release with your submission.
- Your article in Word and any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic. We need complete captions (the 5 Ws), and photographer credits. Do not embed graphics or photos within the article. Send them as separate files such as .tif or .jpg and note where they should appear on the article. PowerPoint (not in .tif/.jpg format) is acceptable for graphs, figures, etc. Photos should be at 300 dpi.
- The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author’s current duty assignment, relevant assignments and civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information and email address with the biography.

We will edit the articles and put them in a style and format appropriate for *MIPB*. From time to time, we will contact you during the editing process to help us ensure a quality product. Please inform us of any changes in contact information.

Send articles and graphics to sterilla.smith@us.army.mil. Contact numbers are: 520.538.0956/DSN 879.0956. Our fax is 520.538.1005.

To commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Military Intelligence Branch and the 25th Anniversary of the MI Corps, the MI Corps Association commissioned Marc Wolfe, a renowned artist of recent military actions, to paint the first Military Intelligence heritage artwork. The painting was presented to the Chief of the MI Corps to recognize these important anniversaries.

**The Birth of American Intelligence Operations, September 1776**

During the Revolutionary War, GEN George Washington, Commander in Chief of the Continental Army wrote, “The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged. . . .” MI has since been an important part of Army operations in each of the nation’s conflicts.

This scene depicts the planning for one of the first known Army intelligence missions. In September 1776, Washington, LTC Thomas Knowlton, and CPT Nathan Hale met at Army headquarters in New York City to finalize the plan for CPT Hale’s covert mission to Long Island to ascertain British Army movements and intentions.

Following declaration of independence on July 4, 1776, the New York campaign was critical to the newborn republic. After defeat at the Battle of Long Island in late August, Washington needed to determine the location of a British invasion of Manhattan Island and one method to do so was to send a spy behind enemy lines. Hale was the sole volunteer for this important but dangerous mission.

On September 1, 1776, General Washington organized “Knowlton’s Rangers,” the first Continental Army unit dedicated to tactical reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. During the Boston Campaign, Knowlton served courageously at the Battle of Bunker Hill and led the successful raid on Charlestown to capture British soldiers for questioning. Subsequently on September 16, 1776, during the Battle of Harlem Heights, he commanded the reconnaissance force that found, engaged, and repulsed the initial British advance. After rejoining the fight later that day, Knowlton was killed in action bravely leading his regiment in the American victory. The loss of this experienced, dynamic, and able leader impacted the young Continental Army. For his gallant exploits, leadership, and command of the first U.S. Army unit...
designed for intelligence operations, the MI Corps designated LTC Knowlton as its “MI Hero” in 1995. The Knowlton Award recognizes distinguished professionals who contribute significantly to the promotion of Army Intelligence.

From Knowlton’s Regiment, Hale stepped forward to conduct intelligence missions against British forces on Long Island, ultimately giving his life for his country. A 21-year old Yale College graduate and teacher, he had not seen action in the Boston or Long Island Campaigns and felt compelled to contribute to the Continental Army he had joined a year earlier. He saw this mission as a crucial opportunity to serve the patriotic cause. Thus, he dutifully volunteered to collect information against the British Army. According to a subordinate, CPT Hale met with Washington on two occasions prior to departing. This scene portrays the final meeting.

Dressed in the guise of a school teacher, Hale crossed Long Island Sound from Connecticut and began his mission. After the British captured New York City, it was set ablaze under suspicious circumstances after midnight on September 21. The British immediately began to arrest local civilians for questioning. Hale was detained, found to have notes on the British Army, and was immediately charged as a spy. According to the standards of the time, undercover spies were hanged as illegal combatants. Without a trial, he was executed on September 22, 1776. His last words were believed to be, “I only regret that I have but one life to give for my country.” Nathan Hale was the first American executed for conducting intelligence operations.

GEN Washington’s use and staunch advocacy of intelligence operations coupled with the distinguished service and sacrifice of LTC Thomas Knowlton and CPT Nathan Hale serve as a constant reminder to all MI Corps Soldiers of our significant heritage as well as the hazards of the Military Intelligence profession.

For more information on the print and its availability, please go to www.micorps.org.
Corps of Interpreters:
On 14 July 1917, the War Department established a Corps of Interpreters, a new organization to provide competent interpreters for the expanding World War I Army. Initially, 58 officers and 72 sergeants made up the corps. The Army allocated them to the field headquarters in France. By the end of the war, interpreters were also serving on the Army Staff. The corps was dissolved in March 1921.

Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP):
On 13 August 1917, the Army established the CIP in response to a request from the American Expeditionary Force for men to perform counterespionage duties in France. Initially, 50 enlisted men made up the corps. By the end of the year, the corps numbered 300, with 250 agents serving in the United States. The CIP remained in existence after the end of World War I and became known as the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) on 1 January 1942. The Counter Intelligence Corps became the Intelligence Corps in 1 January 1961 before merging into the Army Intelligence and Security branch in 1962.

Military Intelligence Officers Reserve Corps (MIORC):
On 4 August 1921, the Army established the MIORC to retain the services of the large number of officers who had served in intelligence positions throughout World War I. The MIORC’s numbers ranged from 400 to 800 in the inter-war years. Although only existing in the Reserves, this corps provided valuable intelligence expertise to the World War II Army. The MIORC evolved into the Army Intelligence branch in the U.S. Army Reserves in 1952.

Army Intelligence and Army Security Reserve Branches:
In 15 December 1952, the Army established two reserve branches: Military Intelligence and Army Security. The latter branch consisted of cryptologic specialists while the former retained the general intelligence personnel. Eventually the two branches had both an officer and enlisted component; the first time that officers and enlisted shared a branch. The branches, however, were open to only Reserve personnel, so, in essence, remained manpower pools for future mobilizations. In 1958, the Military Intelligence branch became the Army Intelligence branch. Both reserve branches were rescinded in 1963.

Military Intelligence Branch:
On 1 July 1962, the Army established the Army Intelligence and Security (AIS) branch as a basic branch of the Regular Army. Five years later, on July 1967, the AIS branch became the Military Intelligence branch. In addition, its status was enhanced by raising it to a combat support branch. Rather than reflecting diversity, the new name reflected the unity of the intelligence mission.