# MIPB

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin
October - December 2011 PB 34-11-4

# Human Terrain System

# HTS Director's Message

We welcome the opportunity to share the experiences, challenges, and accomplishments of the U.S. Army Human Terrain System (HTS). HTS is a complex and unique organization that deploys and operates in direct support of deployed commanders and staffs. The mission of HTS, an intelligence enabling capability, is to: recruit, train, deploy, and support an embedded, operationally focused sociocultural capability; conduct operationally relevant, sociocultural research and analysis; develop and maintain a sociocultural knowledge base to support operational decision making, enhance operational effectiveness, and preserve and share sociocultural institutional knowledge.

Since 2007, HTS deployed operational support in Iraq and Afghanistan owes its success to the professionalism and dedication of the HTS military, DA civilian, and contractor team. Our unique tapestry of backgrounds, education, and experience is woven with a dedication to provide commanders and staffs with relevant, embedded sociocultural research, analysis, and operational support.

HTS provides a strong, vibrant capability that commanders and staffs value and support. In mid 2010, TRADOC recognized the need to transition HTS from an entrepreneurial project to an enduring program capable of supporting current and future missions in all phases of operation. The HTS story is one of challenges, rewards, stumbles, and successes. Over the past 15 months we have demonstrated our ability to learn from our experiences and deliberately adapt our training curriculum, adjust team composition, standardize feedback processes, and disseminate sociocultural products. Since July 2010, HTS has established policies and procedures in areas as diverse as ethical certification, human resources, peer product review, civilian evaluations, team product quality control, and individual position qualification. The entire HTS team has worked tirelessly to establish and strengthen collaboration within the Army and throughout DOD, the Intelligence community, and NATO. Our mission priority remains support to ongoing CENTCOM operations. Looking ahead and in response to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012-2016 Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff capability gap assessment and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) tasking, we developed the HTS concept of operation to support all combatant commands in Phase 0 (pre-conflict) missions. We continue to work with OUSD(I) to demonstrate the HTS Phase 0 capability in FY 2012.

This MIPB issue on the Human Terrain System includes articles written by HTS personnel working in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the CONUS support elements. Each article represents the author's perspective based on their unique experience working in or with HTS. Our diverse topics are divided into three sections. The first section includes articles written from a project or theater level perspective. These diverse topics include: the role of the sociocultural research and analysis capability to build partner capacity; the practicalities of a joint approach to sociocultural capabilities; the Social Science Research and Analysis (SSRA) indigenous survey, polling and analytic capability; and ethical considerations of data gathering with local populations.

The second section focuses on the methods of social science analysis and contains four articles. These articles present perspectives from a deployed division level human terrain analysis team in Iraq; application of the geo-statistical forecasting model to SSRA survey data; the correlation of universal drivers of human conflict with the counterinsurgency strategy, and language and communication strategies when gathering and interpreting data in a multilingual society.

*(Continued on page 3)*

# MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

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**Purpose:** The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence and Fort Huachuca publishes the **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin** (**MIPB**) quarterly under the provisions of **AR 25-30**. **MIPB** presents information designed to keep intelligence professionals informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; problems and solutions, etc., can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of professional development.



By order of the Secretary of the Army:
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## FEATURES

### HTS Project Wide Perspective



### Social Science Analysis



### Case Studies



## Departments

# ALWAYS OUT FRONT

by Brigadier General Gregg C. Potter
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## An Update on Modeling and Simulation in the MI Community

Modeling and Simulation (M&S) are critical in further developing and providing insights for the Army of 2020. M&S provides a logical and cost effective means to evaluate future force structure, doctrine, concepts and material solutions. It allows us to evaluate intelligence activities without the high cost (or risk) associated with combat.

Today, the Army's functional Centers of Excellence (CoEs) are leveraging M&S technology to support modernization, experimentation, the exploration of new theories, and to create a realistic environment for training. We are testing and evaluating how the Army will fight in 2020 without the constraints of time and space. Most importantly, M&S provide us the flexibility to adjust as insights are gained.

With the high cost of new systems, flexibility is essential to ensure proper stewardship of our resources. Given the uncertainty of the operational environment (OE) the Intelligence Warfighting Function is likely to face, M&S is a critical investment for our future. Future budget constraints and a decrease in operational deployments will place an increasing reliance on M&S for both the experimentation mission and the training mission.

For maneuver training, the Army is leveraging avatars with X-Box like software, and "low overhead drivers" to attempt to replicate the OE. For many combat arms training scenarios, current technology works well to meet some training objectives. From a combat arms perspective, evaluating a Soldier's ability to properly identify and engage targets within an urban setting is relatively easy. However, for intelligence training, simulations must model current and emerging technology to create a rich virtual environment which challenges MI collectors and analysts. These simulations must support individual and collective training for each intelligence discipline with highly accurate depictions of threat models and systems. This is especially important, considering the security and regulatory limitations associated with live environment training and some of the restrictions placed on real world collection (in training areas).

Replicating an environment in which MI Soldiers freely task multiple collection sources without pre-defined limits, and across large operational areas, remains a challenge. Accurately replicating the volume of intelligence reporting from all intelligence sources needed to produce an all-source analytic assessment is also a major challenge. To date, these complex Intelligence Warfighting Function issues are generally replicated, at the staff level, by formatted messages from large scale constructive simulations. In many instances, augmenting the constructive simulation by creating unstructured data with the added human dimension has predominately occurred through "white cell" injects that do not accurately reflect the challenges associated with collection or analysis.

Considering these variables, simulations to support MI training must be flexible and have the ability to be tailored to unique training objectives. In the Training, Exercises, and Military Operations domain there are two programs of record (PORs) established to support this requirement: the Intelligence Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer (IEWTPT) and the WARSIM Intelligence Model (WIM). These capabilities are either fielded or scheduled for fielding at various training centers. WIM is the intelligence model associated with the WARSIM maneuver driver. It is combat developed by the National Simulations Center and fielded by PM CONSIM. The IEWTPT is the USAICoE POR training device for MI/ISR simulations. It provides simulations enhancement and exercise control tools. It can be used in the stand alone mode or in conjunction with a constructive simulation. IEWTPT includes:

- The MI systems interface for analytical task training using simulations.
- The Technical Control Cell, an exercise control and simulation delivery capability (Signals Intelligence Sim and others).
- The Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Control Cell avatar-based simulation to train basic HUMINT skills and tactical questioning.

The IEWTPT is continuously evolving and, with or without the constructive simulation, is a valuable and cost effective training enabler. The Intelligence CoE is constantly reassessing these training capabilities, especially the IEWTPT, to better support emerging and future training requirements.

The Advanced Concepts and Requirements domain leverages live, virtual and constructive simulation capabilities. In the near future, USAICoE Concepts and Experimentation will leverage those M&S PORs, and other tools to support modernization. Our current experimentation process uses Soldiers with operational experience to enhance and collaborate on M&S capabilities. We are committed to improving capabilities to support MI force modernization. Over the next couple of years, my action officers will work to significantly advance Intelligence M&S capabilities. Current requirements include improved future threat capabilities, the complex environment, and more innovative dynamic tools. Technology today is more immersive and virtual, provides faster computing, and offers autonomous capabilities.

We are at least two to three years away from a technological solution that will accurately replicate more of the Intelligence Warfighting Function's ability to plan, prepare, collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence in a complex dynamic environment. This is our challenge to solve. As the Army evolves, organizations change, and our enemy becomes more complex, we must accurately represent our Warfighting Function to ensure full integration within mission command and across all warfighting functions. Modeling the complexities of a future OE is only accomplished through simulation. Determining what goes into the future OE remains an exercise in cognitive creativity. One size will not fit all. The challenge is to determine the tradeoffs between resolution and fidelity. I challenge the MI community to collaborate better and work towards advancements in Intelligence related M&S capabilities. If you have a creative idea, know of an existing technology, or have a software background, we need your help. Please contact: Mrs. Marnie R. Vance, Intel EAE, (520)533-4667 or at marnie.vance@us.army.mil.

**Always Out Front!**

*(Continued from Inside Front Cover)*

The third section includes six case studies. The varied topics include: working in Northern Iraq's geographically diverse region and managing a division's expectations; the strength of the HTS team approach; operational relevance of local women's perceptions; efforts to gain mutual understanding between U.S. military chaplains and local religious leaders, and lessons learned on how to become an important asset to the command.

We owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Margaret Ostrenko who not only conceived the idea for a HTS focused MIPB issue, but then relentlessly encouraged all HTS teammates to submit abstracts and articles. Ever smiling, she coaxed, cajoled, and corralled us to publication.


It is our privilege to work with units serving in Operation Enduring Freedom and in Operation Iraqi Freedom/ Operation New Dawn to further sociocultural understanding, demonstrate its operational relevance, and serve with the amazing U.S. military forces, ISAF forces, and DOD organizations.

**Colonel Sharon R. Hamilton**
**Director, Human Terrain System**

# THE REQUIREMENT FOR SOCIOCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING IN FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

**by Colonel Mark C. Bartholf**

## Introduction

Ten years of irregular warfare and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have clearly demonstrated the need for, and the benefit of, sociocultural understanding of local populations. Commanders and staffs have overwhelmingly acknowledged the benefit of having access to sociocultural experts, information, and analysis as they prepare for, execute, and assess both civil engagement and combat operations. The requirements for these capabilities are documented, approved, funded, and currently being used at echelons from squad to theater.

An unclassified version of the Afghanistan and Iraq Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) for sociocultural understanding provides a clear description of the operational capabilities gap:

> ***"U.S. forces continue to operate in Afghanistan lacking the required resident and reachback sociocultural expertise, understanding, and advanced automated tools to conduct in-depth collection/consolidation, visualization, and analysis of the operationally relevant socio-cultural factors of the battle space."***

In Iraq, the command stated that:

> ***"...detailed knowledge of host populations is critical in areas where U.S. forces are being increased to conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq. US forces continue to operate in Iraq without real-time knowledge of the drivers of the behavior within the host population. This greatly limits Commanders' situational awareness and creates greater risks for forces."***

The capability gaps identified in the consolidated and approved U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) JUONS drove significant changes in training and organizations across the Combatant Commands (COCOMS) and services. There was a clear need for operationally relevant, sociocultural pre-deployment training and expertise to understand, analyze, and communicate population-centric information. The services reacted by ramping up their pre-deployment training and flooding units with cultural smart cards. USCENTCOM established a staff element to analyze the human terrain. The U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity fielded support teams, and the U.S. Army fielded the Human Terrain System (HTS).

This is not the first time the Department of Defense (DOD) has reacted to this type of stimulus from a combat theater and created rapid solutions. Military history is replete with examples of good ideas that were not sustained and it raises some critical questions. Now that we have a sociocultural capability resident in our organizations during this period of conflict, what do we need to do to keep it? Are these capabilities actually relevant outside Afghanistan? Are they needed for worldwide peacetime engagement and future full spectrum operations? Lastly, and most importantly, have the necessary steps been taken to articulate sociocultural needs and requirements sufficiently to ensure that the capabilities will exist into the future?

The answer is clear and can be demonstrated through evidence from the U.S. Army and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), both of which have documented the need for sociocultural capabilities in the future...***DOD has established overwhelming evidence documenting the need and requirement for Sociocultural Capabilities in future Full Spectrum operations.***

In this article, we use four key sources for this assertion: studies and analysis, Joint and Army doctrine and concepts, policy decisions by OSD and Army leadership, and emerging indicators from COCOMs and DOD. From these four sources of evidence, three broad sociocultural requirements emerge:

- **Experts**: The Army and DOD require capabilities for sociocultural understanding of local populations.

- **Information Management**: The Army and DOD require the capability to gather, store, aggregate, process, analyze, visualize, produce, and share sociocultural information.
- **Training:** The Army and DOD require the capability to train personnel on sociocultural research and analysis as well as sociocultural information management.

We also address the resident capabilities within HTS that can be applied within the operational environment to support security cooperation and building partner capacity.

## Studies and Analysis

In the last five years, studies and analysis conducted within DOD highlight the need for sociocultural support to current and future operations. The Defense Science Board (DSB) 2006 Summary Study Report "*21st Century Strategic Technology Vectors*" identified preparing the human terrain as one of four operational capabilities necessary for future operations, underpinning the operational need for applications of social science to support sociocultural understanding of the human layer of an area of operations (AO).

The 2009 DSB *Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics* highlights the value of sociocultural understanding as well. The DSB uses HTS as an example of sociocultural support which "seems likely to provide useful support to military units." The DSB also noted "baseline knowledge of the cultures and societies in areas where future operations might be conducted is more effective than developing critical 27capabilities and knowledge at the last minute." It reinforces the need for continued development within the sociocultural realm and further reinforces the point by stating: "Such knowledge of human dynamics may also reduce the need for or scope of future military intervention."[1]

The February 2011 DSB Task Force on Defense Intelligence "Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations suggests ISR officers:

> ***"...should take the time and expand their efforts to become more knowledgeable in the human terrain and cultural features of their areas of responsibility in order to be more responsive to operational commanders... [in order to] provide a richer understanding of the situation–an understanding that includes the context in which decision must be made as well as the numbers of things in the area."***

It goes on to qualify "more knowledgeable in the human terrain and cultural features" by stating the types of information (anthropological, sociocultural, historical, human geographical, educational, public health), the timing of the information (before the start of hostilities), and the depth of knowledge (a deep/thorough understanding)."[2]

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is currently conducting a Capabilities Based Analysis on Building Partner Capacity, which is a Joint Capabilities Area and a cornerstone of security cooperation activities. This analysis reveals a significant number of capability gaps that highlight the need for enhanced sociocultural understanding and information management in order to effectively engage with and influence partners. These gaps range from tactical to the theater commands, and extend to the institutional generating structure of the Army.

## Joint and Army Doctrine and Concepts

Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan executed their doctrinal warfighting tasks superbly but found it did not help them in understanding the complex operational environment when the "kinetic" combat mission ended. Army and Joint doctrine along with concepts for irregular warfare were updated to emphasize the need for understanding populations within which the military operates. Numerous publications have been rewritten or updated based on lessons learned from current operations.

FM 3-0 Operations is the capstone manual for conducting land operations and states that "Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational environment but also the population's influence on it." The manual touches on the nuances of culture stating that "people base their actions on perceptions, assumptions, customs, and values." Further, it emphasizes that basic cultural awareness is required in order to build rapport and reduce misunderstandings, and then reminds us that "cultural awareness requires training before deploying to an unfamiliar operational environment and continuous updating while deployed." It is certain that a unit will continually update their cultural awareness while deployed, but what if they are using the wrong set of perceptions and assumptions?

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency, published in 2006, recognizes the need for "thoroughly understanding the society and culture in which [operations] are being conducted" and emphasizes six sociocultural factors that require analysis in COIN operations. The list focuses analysis on society, social structure, culture, language, power and authority, and interests.

FM 2-0 Intelligence specifically cites use of HTS teams to support sociocultural research and states they are one of "five emerging capabilities that impact intelligence operations." It also specifically highlights the need to understand and integrate sociocultural factors into the military decision making process (as part of Civil Considerations).

> ***"The Army uses the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, peoples, and events (ASCOPE) characteristics to describe civil considerations as part of the mission variables mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC) during intelligence preparations of the battlefield (IPB) and mission analysis. Relevant information can be drawn from an ongoing analysis of the operational environment using the operational variables political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment and time (PMESII-PT). Additionally, the human terrain analysis team can provide detailed information and analysis pertaining to the socio-cultural factors involved in the operation."*** [3]

We see the same trend in future concepts where *Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Conflict* identifies human terrain as both a gap and a required capability. The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept clearly identifies the population as the focus for operations:

> ***"...[Irregular Warfare] (IW) focuses on the control or influence of populations, not on the control of an adversary's forces or territory... The struggle is for control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population. The foundation for IW is the centrality of the relevant populations to the nature of the conflict."*** [4]

> ***"What makes IW different is the focus of its operations–a relevant population–and its strategic purpose–to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of, that relevant population through political, psychological, and economic methods."*** [5]

The IW concept goes on to direct attention to "the will of the people" by describing the "central idea" of the concept as: Focus[ing] on addressing the underlying economic, political, cultural, or security conditions that fuel the grievances of the population, rather than on applying military power directly against the military and paramilitary forces of adversaries."[6]

Under **Intelligence Preparation of the Environment,** the IW concept calls for the Intelligence Community to utilize "operational support networks of anthropologists and other social scientists with relevant expertise in the cultures and societies of the various clans, tribes, and countries involved."[7]

Under **Operational Preparation of the Environment,** the IW concept projects that Joint Force Commanders:

> ***"will position small forward-based joint teams in or adjacent to all priority countries. The teams will be composed of career-tracked regional specialists who have or are developing expertise in the languages, customs, attitudes, and cultures of their region. These teams will prepare for future joint force operations by gaining understanding of the relevant populations, cultures, political authorities, personalities, security forces, and terrain within potential operational areas. The teams will assist in the training and preparation of friendly security and irregular forces to wage IW. The teams will use their cultural understanding of the population to influence the indigenous people in terms meaningful to them and through their own key communicators."*** [8]

It is clear that recent doctrine as well as future concepts demonstrate the centrality of populations and need for sociocultural understanding.

## DOD and Army Policy Decisions

DOD Policy initiatives clearly demonstrated the need for an enduring analysis and knowledge management capability when OSD approved the Mapping the Human Terrain (MAP-HT) Tool Kit as the number 2 priority Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration (JCTD) in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007. MAP-HT is a comprehensive hardware and software toolset designed to enable research, consolidation, visualization and dissemination of structured sociocultural data.

As part of the OSD Human Terrain Initiative, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))

established three core competencies for human terrain capabilities to achieve the strategic objective of applying social science to positively affect decision processes and operations from strategic to tactical levels. These goals highlight the three required sociocultural capabilities: sociocultural understanding, information management, and training.

- ***Build the human terrain knowledge base.***
- ***Build new human terrain visualization and analysis tools.***
- ***Recruit, train, and deploy human terrain experts to support commanders.***

***–USD(I) brief to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence staffer, 8 March 2008.***

For several years, the Defense Intelligence Agency led an ISR Council-directed work group to enable sociocultural data and databases to be shared across DOD. In FY 2011, the Defense Intelligence Sociocultural Capabilities Council was established by USD(I) to develop and institutionalize sociocultural capabilities across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

In parallel with the growth of HTS requirements and supporting capabilities, COCOMs and OSD have initiated and funded other sociocultural capabilities. USD(I) funded an initiative to place sociocultural analysts in the USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USEUCOM commands. USSOCOM is currently establishing its sociocultural staff to support current and future operations.

As part of OSD's overall way ahead plan for sociocultural analysis, the Consolidated Intelligence Guidance tasked the Army to establish and operate a human terrain/sociocultural knowledge base and support center for DOD:

***"commence development and maintenance of a sociocultural knowledge infrastructure on behalf of the Defense Intel Enterprise by May 2012 to support the availability, analysis, and storage of sociocultural data to satisfy COCOM sociocultural information requirements."***

The Army has also documented the need for sociocultural capabilities in support of future full spectrum operations. Three examples are the brigade combat team (BCT) modernization, the Army Posture Statement, and the Army Campaign Plan.

The Army's 2009 *Task Force 120/BCT modernization* effort confirmed the capability gap in the future BCT and proposed Human Terrain Teams (HTT) in the capability packages.

***"Need to develop and field new organizations (e.g., HTTs) to provide commanders a more holistic perspective on operations conducted among the population"***

***–ARCIC Task Force 120 White Paper: "Comprehensive Lesson Learned" 9 June 2009***

The 2010 *Army Posture Statement* made a clear link between future operations, Civil Considerations, and sociocultural understanding. It also acknowledged the multiple documented sources for sociocultural requirements.

***"The conditions of irregular warfare, counter-insurgency operations, and stability operations have placed a premium on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations. Civil considerations focus on the socio-cultural aspects of the local populations that commanders and staffs must consider in the military decision-making process. This reality is well documented in Office of the Secretary of Defense studies and analyses, Army doctrine and concepts, and in operational requirements and feedback from commanders in the field. Social science research and analysis will continue to be a critical capability in both post operations and in peacetime engagements."***

***–2010 U.S. Army Posture Statement***

The FY 2011 *Army Campaign Plan* includes "operating and sustaining deployed HTS teams" and "institutionalizing the HTS capability" as assigned Army tasks.

## Emerging Indicators from COCOMs and DOD

USD(I) recently conducted coordination visits with COCOMs to determine their sociocultural needs and requirements. COCOMs identified a capability gap in embedded sociocultural understanding in their AOs across all operational milieus–routine, crisis, conflict, and post combat. The capability gaps below confirm the need for both sociocultural understanding and information management, as well as the need to train these capabilites:

- Analytical capability:
  - Deployable social science research and analysis.
  - Reachback capability.
  - Trained and experienced personnel using structured research methods.

- Knowledge base.
- Training.

From 2009 to 2011, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) established emerging requirements. Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) requested the MAP-HT JCTD capabilities. The fielding began in September 2009 to Civil Affairs units. At the same time HTS provided personnel to support to AFRICOM Headquarters and CJTF-HOA. In June 2011, AFRICOM requested and integrated an HTS pilot program to support sociocultural requirements. The requirement was also documented in their integrated priority list.

In 2011, the Joint Staff Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board validated that HTS is an enduring capability with applications to Phase 0. Phase 0 operations are shaping missions. Shape phase missions, task, and actions are those that are designed to dissuade or deter adversaries and assure friends, as well as set conditions for the contingency plan.



**Source: Joint Capability Management System**

## The Role of HTS in Supporting Future Sociocultural Requirements

The U.S. Army HTS was created in response to the USCENTOM JUONS and successfully deployed teams into Iraq and currently supports U.S. and NATO units across all echelons of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Since its inception, the commanders in the field have repeatedly requested the capability and overwhelmingly supported the concept in U.S. Army and Theater directed assessments in 2010 and 2011. HTS funding requirements have been consistently validated from FY 2007 to FY 2011, first by the Joint Rapid Acquisition Council and later in the Army base budget. Congressional language has further supported the enduring capability:

***"The committee continues to support the concept behind the Human Terrain Teams (HTT) and the overall Human Terrain System (HTS). In the committee report (House Report 110-652) accompanying the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the committee expressed support for expansion of the HTT concept, including to other combatant command areas of responsibility."***

***–House Armed Services Committee, Committee Report to House Resolution 2647***

HTS maintains the following operational support capabilities to improve sociocultural understanding, manage information, and train personnel:

- Project Office to manage the overall HTS effort and coordinate with HQDA, OSD, and COCOMs.
- Reachback Research Center to provide direct support to deployed teams, conduct in-depth analysis, and to populate and maintain the HTS knowledge repository.
- Training course at Fort Leavenworth to train deploying HTS personnel.
- Knowledge Management and Information Technology supports the MAP-HT tool kit, a Civil Considerations Data Model (for structured data), and sociocultural knowledge repositories linked to the developing Cultural Knowledge Consortium. HTS maintains both classified and unclassified unstructured data repositories (NIPR, SIPR, and CENTRIX). Development efforts are on-going as the analytical tools and database structure merges with the U.S. Army program of record, Distributed Common Ground System-Army, and the implementation of Land ISR Net.

Sociocultural capabilities are envisioned as a critical resource for combatant commanders to implement theater engagement strategies. Social science research and analysis capabilities can be employed prior to conflict to focus on specific topics or geographical areas of interest. Relevant human terrain data and information can be gathered and shared through directed field research deployments, research studies, and open source research activities. These activities will inform decisions through understanding of the operational environment during shaping and pre-conflict (Phase 0), then enable a responsive capacity for the COCOMs through crisis into stabilization activities.




## Lessons Learned: Full Spectrum Sociocultural Capability

In 2010, through liaison and coordination with the geographic COCOMs, HTS documented the staff's sociocultural expectations and requirements. Each COCOM currently uses an independently developed sociocultural cell to provide analysis of the COCOM's area of focus, primarily through open source analysis. In 2011 HTS developed a concept of operations (CONOP) to address the validated sociocultural capability gaps identified in the Joint Staff FY 2012-2016 Capability Gap Assessment Results and Recommendations for Mitigating Capability Gaps Memorandum, JROCM 096-10, dated 9 June 10.

In the CONOP, HTS provides an enduring, operationally relevant sociocultural capability to commands when requested. The addition of HTS in Phase 0 staff activities complements current sociocultural efforts throughout government, academia, and industry. Deployable elements are tailored to meet the specific operational requirements of the COCOMs, the defense intelligence community and other U. S. Government customers. HTS has flexibility in it's organizations and methods to meet rapidly changing requirements and can augment existing sociocultural capabilities or fill current or projected capability gaps.

It can assist in filling sociocultural knowledge gaps through initial planning efforts and follow up with tactical gathering and validation, supported by an organic reach-back capability. HTS provides personnel trained in the use of structured research methodologies from a variety of social science disciplines with regional field research and/or deployment experience. HTS can significantly enhance the COCOMs' current sociocultural capability with the addition of trained personnel, reachback support, and specialized database structure and access to the Cultural Knowledge Consortium.

Through its training, reachback capability and teams HTS provides operationally relevant sociocultural support in the following areas:

- Data acquisition and acquisition strategy.
- Cultural friction points–identification of locations for detailed research focus.
- Support to planning and sociocultural research.
- Expert advice on analytical methods and tools.
- Support with doctrine and training.
- Consolidated reach-back analytic support.
- Enduring capability to preserve local sociocultural knowledge and monitor the AOs during relief in place/transfer of authority or when transitioning from Phase 5 (Enable civil authority) to Phase 0 operations.

When deployed in a Phase 0 environment, the HTS capability suite becomes a powerful tool in providing current, verified, sociocultural research and analysis for sociocultural understanding and preparation for Phase 1 (Deter).

## Summary

Evidence from recent studies and analysis, doctrine and future concepts, DOD and Army policy decisions, and recent actions by COCOMs, Department of the Army, and OSD clearly establishes the operational need for, and documented requirements for sociocultural capabilities in the future. The Army and DOD will continue to require three sociocultural capabilities:




- **Experts:** The Army and DOD require capabilities for sociocultural understanding of local populations.
- **Information Management:** The Army and DOD require the capability to gather, store, aggregate, process, analyze, visualize, produce, and share sociocultural information.
- **Training:** The Army and DOD require the capability to train personnel on sociocultural research and analysis as well as sociocultural information management.

HTS will continue to be one of the tools in the DOD tool kit to meet future sociocultural information requirements. As a mature and funded Army capability, HTS is well positioned to continue to perform its operational support mission.

**Endnotes**

1. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics, March 2009, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Washington, D.C., 41.

2. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence, *"Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations,* February 2011, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Washington, D.C. 20301, 27.

3. FM 2-0 Intelligence, March 2010, paragraph 1-88.

4. Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0, 11 September 2007, 8.

5. Ibid., 7.

6. Ibid., 20.

7. Ibid., 22.

8. Ibid., 22

**HTS Mission Statement**

**Task:** Recruit, train, deploy, and support an embedded, operationally focused sociocultural capability; conduct operationally relevant, sociocultural research and analysis; develop and maintain a sociocultural knowledge base.

**Purpose:** To support operational decision-making, enhance operational effectiveness, and preserve and share sociocultural institutional knowledge.

# One of the Eggs in the Joint Force Basket: HTS in Iraq/Afghanistan and Beyond


**by Steve Chill, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC (Retired)**

***The views expressed are those of the author and not those of U.S. Army, TRADOC, HTS, DA, and DOD.***

*Marine Corps Operating Concepts-In an intervention military leaders will be predisposed toward military solutions and assessment criteria, but when countering irregular threats they will likely be secondary to political, ideological and administrative issues. Political, economic, and social initiatives, with their respective assessment criteria, will take precedence.*[1]

*Chief of Staff of the Air Force-The best way that we, as the U.S. Armed Forces, will achieve the necessary level of language skills and cultural competencies is through a holistic Joint and Interagency approach.*[2]

## Introduction

One would think that after decades of global engagement and ten years of concentrated counterinsurgency/nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) would have established a Joint capability to better understand populations (human terrain). Instead, we have four distinct service efforts, several Combatant Command (COCOM) efforts, a plethora of Joint Staff and DOD efforts, Coalition Nation efforts, and a general understanding that something ought to be done…but just not together. Additionally, these disjointed military efforts rarely interact with a civilian "structure" that includes the Department of State, academia, and various civilian organizations.

Within this bounty of efforts, however, a consensus about human terrain capability gaps has emerged. They are:

- A need for human terrain experts that provide direct support to commanders and staffs at the tactical and operational level through direct engagement with the local population.
- A need for a research and analysis reachback capability that provides direct support to forward staffs.
- A need for data collection and sharing in both deployed and CONUS organizations.

Bringing the disparate efforts together in these three areas will deliver much needed human terrain cohesion to our current fights in Iraq/Afghanistan as well as preparing us to better understand the populations we engage on a day to day basis around the globe.

## Need for Sociocultural Understanding

In 2006 and 2007 the commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan realized that they did not have the staff or information to understand the populations they were working within and once they figured it out, it was time to rotate home. There was a critical need for cultural understanding that persisted outside of the relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) schedules. This sociocultural gap was identified and support was requested through multiple Operational Needs Statements (ONS) and Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements (JUONS).

JUONS were signed by Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I) and Combined Joint Task Force 82 (Afghanistan). The CENTCOM JUONS established the requirement for a Human Terrain System (HTS) that supported across the echelons of command in theater. Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) were cre-

ated to support brigade combat teams (BCTs) and regimental combat teams (RCTs). Human Terrain Analysis Teams (HTATs) were created to support the Division/MEF level commands. HTTs and HTATs were focused on coalition and U.S. forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The JUONS also requested the creation of a training pipeline for the teams, a knowledge management/analysis capability and a reach-back capability for the teams.

The Joint Improvised Explosive Devise Defeat Organization funded an HTS Proof of Concept as a counter-IED initiative. Research indicated that many IED attacks were generated as a result of actions that violated sociocultural mores and required violent retribution. Sociocultural understanding was believed to provide a tool to help shape military operations and avoid cultural conflict that spurred violent reaction. The Joint need for HTS was then validated.[3]

The HTS program was born out of a critical need identified in a combat zone by the Joint Commanders. Assistance was rapidly fielded to support these Joint Force Commanders in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The need was articulated from the joint warfighter in combat and although HTS is an Army capability it was not designed to support just one service.

While the Joint need that created HTS is well documented, there remain emerging needs not covered by the aforementioned series of actions. HTS organized and responded to this particular joint need focusing on staff support, reachback and Information Management/Knowledge Management (IM/KM) at the staff level. Other needs address other sociocultural gaps.

## Current Efforts

The counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan forced the Services, the Joint Staff, and the COCOMs to figure out how to engage the local population to ensure military success. Military doctrine has adapted during this period and now clearly emphasizes sociocultural competence. The military staffs have created organizations to gather, analyze, and train sociocultural aspects of the operational environment. Several prominent efforts include:

- USCENTCOM–HTS.
- USAFRICOM–Sociocultural Research and Advisory Teams.
- USSOUTHCOM-Sociocultural Dynamics Program.
- Army-U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Tradoc) Culture Center and HTS.
- Marine Corps-Marine Corps Center for Advanced Cultural Learning.
- Air Force–Air Force Language, Region and Culture Program.
- Navy–Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness Strategy.

Along with these DOD efforts is a strong effort by our Afghanistan Coalition partners to develop their own HTS-like sociocultural expertise, reachback and IM/KM capabilities. Adding to the mix are interagency efforts (DOS, USAID, DEA, DNI, U.S. Treasury) as well as non-government organizations such as industry and universities.

Unfortunately, there was no overarching whole-of-government or DOD Joint strategy that brought these Service solutions together or forced the Services to interact with each other. The efforts are, therefore, disjointed.

Despite all of the individual efforts, we remain socioculturally challenged for this type of warfare. If we don't pursue a more cohesive sociocultural fight, then we risk, at a minimum, more casualties and at worst mission failure. Conversely, if our sociocultural fight is cohesive we allow for quick turnover to a host nation government with a faster U.S. withdrawal, less U.S. casualties, and less U.S. money spent.

## Staff Support for Sociocultural Expertise

Commanders at all levels recognized early on in Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF) that they had no staff section providing sociocultural expertise. The first element of the Joint Need that HTS developed was the HTTs/HTATs. There are HTTs/HTATs at the Joint (regional) Commands, Army Commands, Marine Commands and Coalition Commands. HTTs and HTATs are designed as staff support for the Commander but they do have some important differences from regular staff.

HTS teams do not duplicate existing staff functions. They collect and process unclassified, population-focused information for the commander and staff. They inform the staff sections during course of action development and assist in post operation

assessments. The information gathered, analyzed and presented focuses on the attitudes, perceptions and reactions of the population to the military, economic, diplomatic, and information environments. In this way they differ significantly from individual staff sections such as intelligence. Ethnic, tribal, district, and other population-centric areas do not conform to military boundaries, and the HTTs/HTATs can share cross boundary information to better inform the staff on both their area of operation as well as their area of interest. This population focus can't be duplicated by staff sections that have to correctly focus on the enemy in their Commander's area of responsibility (AOR). The HTS focus allows continuity in time (RIP/TOA) as well as in space (adjacent U.S. and coalition forces).

HTTs/HTATs consist primarily of Department of the Army civilians, though Reserve military personnel have served on HTS teams at all levels. HTS civilians have several advantages over their military teammates. They can interact with indigenous people as a non-uniformed member of the team and as fellow civilians. They can gather information and data that may not be as readily offered to or perceived by military personnel conducting their operations. Additionally, they utilize social science research methodology which includes quantitative and qualitative methodologies that complement the military decision making process. There are often Reserve or retired military personnel on the teams that can assist in team integration into the staff and in navigating the sometimes confusing military staff structure. As civilians, they are not wed to one service.

The HTT/HTAT personnel rotate as individuals throughout the year and not as part of a team. This type of rotation has proven extremely valuable to units during their rotations to maintain situational awareness, especially when they are from different services. HTTs and HTATs maintain a geographic and cultural perspective and add a level of consistency and understanding among the Services. Coalition partners have benefited from this type of rotation as well.

Finally, the HTS program has taken much of the joint burden on itself in pioneering the recruitment and use of social scientists on the battlefield. The program has worked closely with the Army Human Research Protection Office and DOD entities to move forward the major legal/ethical/policy issues for the implementation of social sciences in military units in combat. In addition, they have worked to implement lessons learned to further develop a system to determine which social science disciplines are best suited in certain situations and areas. Future efforts would do well to take advantage of the HTS experience.

## Joint Path Forward

The HTS program has decided to welcome qualified personnel from both the U.S. Marine Corps and NATO countries as members of HTTs/HTATs. As the Navy and Air Force develop their sociocultural programs, HTS will support their entry into HTT/HTATs. The HTS program is supporting all of the Service and Joint Commands; therefore, the natural progression is to integrate different Service personnel into the support forward.

Secondly, other "sociocultural units" providing support to the warfighters should take the opportunity to coordinate with the HTS program in order to create a better package for the Commanders forward. Currently, warfighters fall in on a host of sociocultural support that is not uniform or consistent. This support comes from the DOD, other government agencies, non-government organizations etc. HTS recognizes that the HTTs and HTATs do not cover the entire spectrum of sociocultural needs and efforts. Coordination between the different efforts prior to deployment would create a more cohesive and understood package for the Commanders.

## HTS Reachback Support

The unclassified version of the Afghanistan JUONS provides a clear example of the operational gap.

***"U.S. Forces continue to operate in Afghanistan lacking the required resident and reach-back sociocultural expertise, understanding, and advanced automated tools to conduct in-depth collection/consolidation, visualization, and analysis of the operationally-relevant sociocultural factors of the battle space." [4] The HTS reachback effort answers, in part, this joint need.***

The HTS Reachback Research Center (RRC) is a "CONUS-based research and analysis element within the HTS that provides direct support to deployed HTS personnel. The RRC consists of social scientists, as well as uniformed, civilian, and contract analysts, organized in regionally-focused cells.

Accessing open source and classified information, the RRC provides in-depth analysis to support the forward deployed HTS personnel to address immediate requirements of in-theater military units."[5]

The use of reachback has both advantages and disadvantages. Advantages of reachback include the ability to access expertise that is not in theater and the ability to coordinate where movement and information sharing is easier (CONUS). Reachback support is helpful for deep-dive projects or extensive research and coordination but is typically not time-sensitive enough for the warfighter. The more immediate needs of the Joint Commander and Staff are better served by personnel who are on site and a part of the unit's battle-rhythm.

HTS reachback supports the joint warfighter through direct support to the HTTs/HTATs rather than to the forward staffs writ large. The HTS reachback support is used by HTTs/HTATs to answer sociocultural requests for information (RFIs) that require research beyond the capabilities of the HTT/HTAT. Reachback capabilities are largely transparent to the Joint Commander and his staff, as all sociocultural RFIs are simply directed to the resident HTT/HTAT. There are other agencies and organizations which have a general support role in supporting the specific staffs. These agencies and organizations often possess a reachback capability as well.

The Joint reachback picture for sociocultural support is disjointed. There has been little serious effort to coordinate the efforts of the dozens of reachback capabilities that exist in CONUS. TRADOC has begun work on an unclassified Cultural Knowledge Consortium (CKC) which will establish a support network within the future cloud concept. Until this concept is realized, HTS stands ready to coordinate with or support other reachback efforts.

## Data Collection and Sharing

Oftentimes OEF/OIF forces turn over battlespace to forces of a different service or a different country. The entire focus of the sociocultural understanding is also turned over. Unfortunately, it is turned over in MS Word, PowerPoint, Excel, TIGR, Marinelink, CIDNE, Palantir, hard paper documents, emails, and a glut of others–a true 20th century effort. We are in the 21st century. The age of the data dump should be over. Sociocultural data resides in many databases and there is no Joint Service database that is a one stop shop for all such data (hence the JUONS need).

While the military forces rotate in and out of a population, the civilians remain the same. For example, in Afghanistan we have had at least ten different regiments/BCTs and at least ten different battalions operating in every single village in the entire country. The population for these 10 rotations has generally remained the same. The accumulated data has not been well managed.

The current IM/KM construct exists mainly on intelligence systems, which presents several problems. Intelligence systems are firewalled by their classification. Unclassified data that is not vetted does not always rate entry into Intel systems. Sociocultural information is mostly unclassified and keeping it as such necessitates an unclassified system. Intelligence staffs and organizations can certainly make use of unclassified sociocultural information. The problem is that other staff sections, units in training, foreign militaries, and U.S. civilians may also need that information. HTS has started the work to create a joint IM/KM system.

While the goal of establishing a single classified system is highly doubtful, the idea of a single unclassified system or cloud (i.e., CKC) is still possible and has application post-conflict. Joint forces should have access to an unclassified system or cloud that supports security cooperation and building partner capacity operations and exercises worldwide.

Mapping the Human Terrain (Map-HT) toolkit is DA's first effort (and the DOD's first serious effort) to develop an unclassified long term IM/KM capability. It incorporates an unclassified database that can be used to perform link analysis and text extraction. Map-HT has been developed over several years and the Army has decided to press forward with a more robust fielding.

Services and COCOMs should adapt Map-HT or offer an alternate system that will allow for the sharing of unclassified sociocultural information. Map-HT is being developed as part of the DCGS-Army architecture and the planned DA intelligence cloud efforts. The lack of an unclassified Joint IM/KM system or approach is something that can be rectified with a little bit of coordination. HTS stands ready to effect this coordination.

## Conclusion

Ten years of continuous warfare has left the U.S. Military with a host of lessons learned for counterinsurgency warfare, not the least of which are the sociocultural lessons. Simple lessons such as "populations don't conform to military boundaries," "staffs conducting counterinsurgency need access to the sociocultural information for their AOR", and "sharing data on the population is good for counterinsurgency forces" have been learned. All seem obvious, yet we still struggle with solutions for these lessons. HTS has focused joint solutions on three of the key gaps in the Joint Commander's warfighting capabilities: staff augmentation, reachback, and data sharing. The next step is to make the solutions as joint as the need.

**Endnotes**

1. Marine Corps Operating Concepts, 3rd Edition, June 2010, 120.

2. General Norton Schwartz, *DOD Language and Culture Summit: Strengthening Air Force Language Skills and Cultural Competencies*, 26 January 2011, accessed at http://www.af/mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110126-045.pdf.

3. HTS Background, 2011 at http://HTS.army.mil/htsAboutBackround.aspx.

4. HTS Background.

5. HTS Components, 2011, at http://hts.army.mil/htsComponentsCONUS.aspx.

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

# HTS Training and Regulatory Compliance for Conducting Ethically-Based Social Science Research

**by Christopher A. King, PhD, Robert Bienvenu, PhD and T. Howard Stone, JD, LLM**

## Introduction

The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a U.S. Army enduring capability that began in 2006 as a Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization proof of concept. In 2007, the Department of Defense (DOD) validated and funded a U.S. Central Command Joint Urgent Operational Needs statement for sociocultural support to Iraq and Afghanistan. HTS was formed because of a lack of much needed sociocultural information in both Afghanistan and Iraq as indicated through Pentagon debriefings by returning military commanders.

Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) and Human Terrain Analysis Teams (HTATs) composed of individuals with social science and operational backgrounds, acquire operationally relevant understanding of local populations through interviews and interaction with individuals within that local population in a commander's area of operations (AO).[1] With the success of the first HTT in early 2007, HTS has grown from a contractor-only proof-of-concept to an enduring capability operated by government civilian and military employees with line item funding through Fiscal Year 2015.

Since its beginning in 2006, HTS has experienced considerable growing pains similar to other emerging and rapidly developing programs. However, HTS has consistently provided relevant sociocultural information to military commanders. As a reflection of the value of its work, HTS now supports both U.S. Army and Marine Corps commands, as well as nine other coalition countries in Afghanistan. Future operations are under development with U.S. commands world wide.

HTS deploys applied social scientists from all social science disciplines, including sociology, psychology, and political science. Early in its development HTS attempted to attract anthropologists who historically have cultural experience with groups of people not native to the researcher. These social science disciplines employ qualitative and quantitative methodologies relevant to conducting field interviews in semi- and non-permissive environments.[2] This diversity in academic training and disciplinary backgrounds has positioned HTS social scientists to successfully provide high quality sociocultural data aimed at improving understanding of the different sociocultural contexts and settings. This capability is relevant to a vast array of military and civilian organizations to include Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the United Nations, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. State Department.

## HTS Training Curriculum Redesign

The training of HTS personnel has matured significantly. Since the first field team returned from Afghanistan, HTS has worked to assemble the best practices and lessons learned of returning personnel from the field. The systematic review of feedback provided by previously deployed personnel and training program staff resulted in the slow but deliberate redesign of a training curriculum that officially launched in 2009. The HTS Training Curriculum is based on the *Experiential Learning Model (ELM*) developed by David Kolb (1984) that The Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth has successfully utilized in curriculum development for many years.[3]

The HTS adapted Kolb's learning model to its curriculum in January 2011. Following his model, the HTS Learning Cycle begins and ends with practical exercises that are often conducted as group projects. This process enables students to hone their group dynamics skills. Feedback from the field indicates that the ability to work effectively as part of a small unit is vital to the success of HTS teams. In addition, it gives students the opportunity to apply the skills they learn in class. Over one third of the total curriculum is devoted to practical exercises designed to duplicate real world requirements.

The HTS Training Curriculum is oriented around three core concepts. *First*, the curriculum is designed to focus on blending civilian analytic expertise with an understanding of military needs and

operations. *Second*, through the use of an educational model that emphasizes practical exercises replicating effective social science methods used to support military operations, the curriculum aims to foster team dynamics and effectiveness while building on social science expertise and fieldwork experience. *Third*, the curriculum frames social science "research" in terms of concepts readily understood by the U.S. military and its coalition partners.[4]

A key component of the new HTS Curriculum is the Individual Track Training (ITT). During the ITT training period, HTS candidates receive specialized position-specific training. For example, the Social Scientist ITT is designed to use iterative practical applications to develop plans for data gathering and analysis. Throughout the course, reading and discussions are used to add context and review basic skills necessary to complete the exercises. The core exercises are bookended with a joint Social Scientist/Team Leader planning exercise to enable integration and support future coordination between the two job positions moving into the final exercise.

The HTS Training Curriculum, delivered over 50 training days at HTS's Fort Leavenworth, Kansas training facility, consists of four blocks of instruction: *Foundations* (10 days); *Research Operations (*20 days); Position-Specific *Individual Track Training* (ITT-10 days), and *Research Operations Exercise* (10 days). (*In the interest of brevity, only the Social Scientist ITT block of instruction will be highlighted in the discussion of the ITT.*) Additionally, cultural and language sessions are intermixed throughout instruction that highlight relevant cultural issues with an introduction to regional languages. The training culminates in capstone exercises in which students form research teams and are evaluated on their understanding of HTS collective and individual tasks through simulated exercises.




**Flowchart of HTS Training**

The HTS Foundations segment provides an introduction to the history, mission, and organization of HTS and the cultural and operational context in which it operates. Further, the course imparts to HTS candidates a working knowledge of the structure and culture of the military, the basics of small team dynamics and conflict resolution, counterinsurgency theory and doctrine, as well as the operations process and how HTS integrates into that process.

During the Research Operations (RO) module, HTS candidates learn the skills necessary to conduct ethically based social science research in an operational environment.[5] The RO sequence begins with candidate self-assessment and the creation of individual learning goals, followed by an interactive approach to learning that includes a mix of analytic, didactic, and experiential events aimed at building or enhancing the knowledge and skills of individual candidates. A central component of the RO course is the HTS research design cycle, applying actual field scenarios in which deployed HTS teams executed field research that employed both quantitative and qualitative methods. Candidates also receive instruction on the historical background and the role of Institutional Review Boards (IRB) in the review and oversight of human subject research, interviewing, and field note taking techniques, as well as data gathering and analysis.

The Social Scientist ITT block of instruction focuses on the Social Scientist core individual tasks in the context of military operations. Upon completion of the Social Scientist ITT, HTS social scientist candidates are expected to demonstrate proficiency in planning and designing ethically-based data gathering and analysis that meets requirements of deployed military units or combatant commands. Through the usage of iterative practical applications the Social Science ITT exercise has four phases: use of secondary source information to build a baseline assessment; design of quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods designs; data gathering and analysis techniques; and development of assessments protocols.

Additional topics covered during the Social Scientist ITT include military briefings, the USAID District Stability Framework, review of previous HTS products, and the Army as a cultural system.

In addition to the ITT, all HTS candidates receive ten hours of ethics training, with an additional twelve hours for social scientists. HTS also requires all candidates to complete research ethics education provided by the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI).[6] Upon graduation from training HTS candidates transition to Department of Army Civilian employees and depart for an additional ten weeks of training at Fort Polk, Louisiana where they receive advanced training in working in a military environment. Training includes additional culture and language instruction, combat life saving, driver training, weapons familiarization, and working in urban and rural environments.

## HTS Social Science Research in Real Time

In order to ensure standardized regulatory oversight of the HTS team projects by HTS leadership, theatre commands, and applicable DOD organizations, HTS enacted in 2011, a process for the review and tracking of projects, including use of the Project Tracker Compliance and Review Form (PTCRF).

The review and tracking process and the PTCRF were created in collaboration with the U.S. Army Human Research Protections Office (AHRPO). AHRPO is an office within U.S. Army Headquarters under the Office of the Surgeon General. It is charged with oversight of Army-supported or conducted human subject research that is subject to 32 CFR 219, the DOD Common Rule equivalent. Working with AHRPO since the fall of 2010, HTS identified the need for appropriate IRB review, investigator education, and appropriate protections with regard to human subjects research activities. AHRPO is working with HTS to develop and implement a program of human subject protection oversight as required by applicable DOD and Army regulations. Use of the PTCRF and implementing oversight procedures is intended to assist HTS personnel, including investigators, to identify those HTS activities that may be subject to 32 CFR 219 and other DOD or Army regulations for required regulatory review. The PTCRF also provides HTS leadership and theatre commander with administrative oversight of the type of projects HTS teams (including the Reachback Research Center and Social Science and Research Analysis) conduct.

When the Team Leader or the Social Scientist submits a request for approval to commence a research project to the HTS Social Science Directorate (SSD) through submission of their PTCRF, he or she must first describe the type of activity that the team is conducting. HTS conducts two broad types of activities: Operational Support and Human Subjects Research.

Operational Support (OS) is provisionally defined by AHRPO as *a command directed activity, which may use methods found in the social sciences, with the objective of obtaining information to support military operations in a particular AO*. The primary purpose of OS is to provide a deeper understanding of the local population in a particular AO in direct support of military operations. OS is not considered "research" as that term is defined in 32 CFR 219.102(d) because OS activities are not designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge. However, OS projects as implemented in HST still require the same ethical field procedures as Human Subjects Research (HSR). For example, all interviews and photographic images are obtained using informed consent and all data recorded kept in a safe and secure manner.

In contrast, Human Subjects Research (HSR) may be subject to 32 CFR 219. In the federal regulations addressing HSR, research is defined as a systematic investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge (32 CFR 219.102(d)). The term Human subject is defined as a living individual about whom an investigator conducting research obtains data through intervention or interaction with the individual, or identifiable private information (32 CFR 219.102(f)). Where these conditions are met, the requirements defined at 32 CFR 219 are invoked and HTS HSR is subject to applicable DOD and Army regulations for the protection of human subjects.

One attribute used to distinguish OS projects is that they are tasked to personnel assigned to a military command by a commander or command staff in support of a local military project or mission. For example, a military commander may wish to under-

stand the attitudes of inhabitants of nearby villages toward insurgents operating in the area and task a HTS team to gather this information. Such OS projects do not require IRB review and approval.

If a HTS activity is designated as HSR, the HTS HSR project may not begin until HTS SSD and appropriate human research review and approval is obtained in accordance with applicable DOD and Army regulations. The HTS SSD reviews all projects to determine whether the research qualifies as research; involves human subjects; is Exempt or Non-Exempt HSR, and is in compliance with DOD ethical standards. Additionally, the HTS SSD will also use the PTCRF as a means to ensure all projects are also following HTS policies and procedures for conducting research.

If a project is determined to not be HSR or exempt HSR then the SSD will indicate to the team proposing the project to proceed. However, if HTS SSD determined the project is non-exempt HSR, as defined by 32 CFR 219, then the project will undergo IRB evaluation in accordance with applicable DOD and Army regulations. HSR projects deemed non-exempt do not commence until approved by an IRB. In limited circumstances, a project may require further administrative review at a higher Army level.

From its inception, HTS personnel have continually strived to bring relevant and timely sociocultural information to military commanders in the field, using ethically-based social science research methods. In five short years HTS has matured from a predominantly contractor-based proof-of-concept to a government civilian and military led enduring capability. Without a doubt there were significant challenges in the evolution of HTS.

However, HTS and its personnel have faced these challenges, conscientiously improving the training of personnel and by consistently producing high quality sociocultural information gathered through ethically-based social science methods. New challenges lie ahead as HTS transforms from work in Iraq and Afghanistan, to assisting the U.S. government in other parts of the world. Additionally, HTS has transformed its curriculum into a state-of-art program for training social scientists to work in semi- and non-permissive environments.

This training also has the capability to assist social scientists from other nations undertake social science research anywhere in the world. HTS is now coordinating with ABCA (America, Canada, Great Britain, Australia/New Zealand) Armies to better enhance their own sociocultural capabilities. The purpose of this is to reduce redundancies, create standards and increase collaboration and working relationships among nations. This shift is embraced through the continued refinement of training to conduct social science research in non-permissive, semi-permissive, and fully permissive research throughout different parts of the world.

The concept of social science support to the military in a combat theater has received mixed reviews. The social science community criticized HTS for potentially sacrificing social science ethics in order to properly support the military commanders. This was not the case. It did, however, highlight the need to constantly update and expand the rigor HTS places on its employees concerning ethics. It also highlighted the need to clearly differentiate the HTS methodology and ethics concerning social science research for non-lethal activities. Critique of HTS by some in the academic community has been productive in that we have channeled this into a state of the art review process. The internal process is founded in social science ethical processes and sets clear standards for oversight and review of all projects. It provided confidence to the team members that what they are doing is consistent with conventional professional ethical standards. Indeed, nothing else could be more important to the success of the HTS mission since we are the ones to advise our units about the sensitivities, mores and morals of the local population. To undermine these is to undermine the governance and stability we hope to create for the good of all.

**Endnotes**

1. JP 3-0 Joint Operations, 11 August 2011. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.

2. Ibid. A *permissive environment* is defined as the operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. A *semi-permissive environment* is where special procedures are required due to limitations on infrastructure availability. There will be medium-to-low risk acts of aggression or war from enemy, terrorist or insurgent actions (direct or indirect) affecting movement or interaction with

the local population. *Non-permissive environments* require force protection and life support. There will be a high risk or actual occurrence of acts of war or aggression from enemy, terrorists or insurgency (direct or indirect) affecting mobility and interaction with the local population.

3. David A. Kolb, *Learning Style Inventory* (Boston: Hay Group, Inc., 1999) and D.A. Kolb, *Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development*. Englewood Cliffs (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1984).

4. The use of the term research is not to signify that all HTS projects fall under the category of HSR. By using the term research we mean a framework for data gathering and analysis of information. It does not refer to activities specifically designed to produce generalizable knowledge.

5. JP 3-0.*Operational Environment* (OE) is defined as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.

6. The CITI was founded in March 2000 as collaboration between the University of Miami and the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center to develop a web based training program in human research subjects' protections. See https://www.citiprogram.org/Default.asp?

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**Check out the HTS Home Page at http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/**




***The views expressed are those of the authors and not those of the U.S. Army, TRADOC, HTS, or ISAF.***

## Introduction

The Afghanistan Theater Coordination Element (TCE) and Theater Support Office (TSO) are located in Kabul and are the Human Terrain System (HTS) elements that support Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The TCE is responsible for providing human terrain research and data to the ISAF staff sections and theater-wide support to the other 30 HTS teams in Afghanistan. The TCE has four functions. First, it serves as the head of HTS in theater and directly represents the HTS Program Director while providing guidance to HTS teams located throughout Afghanistan. Second, the TCE team leader serves as the Deputy Director of the Consolidated Stability Operations Center (CSOC), intended to provide the Commander ISAF (COMISAF) and Commander ISAF Joint Command (COMIJC) with a focused information gathering and analysis capability to address their population-centric information requirements.[1]

Third, the TCE provides oversight and coordination for the HTS Afghanistan Social Science Research and Analysis (SSRA) capability. The SSRA provides HTS teams with the capability to conduct locally contracted polling, focus groups, depth interviews and subject matter expert projects in support of the Theater Campaign Plan and operational and tactical mission requirements. Finally, the HTS Social Science Mobile Knowledge Team (SSMKT) provides meta-analysis of HTS team production and in theatre training support and mentorship to the 31 HTS teams in Afghanistan.

The TSO provides HTS field teams with administrative and logistics support on behalf of the HTS Project Headquarters located at Newport News, Virginia. Typical administrative tasks include but are not limited to managing in and outbound HTS team personnel, in-country transfers, processing of performance evaluations, responding to team issues affecting performance, and coordinating tasks with the HTS headquarters. Logistics tasks include the movement of personnel and equipment within, into and out of Afghanistan. This includes the replacement of personnel, inventorying of equipment, the initial fielding of the Mapping the Human Terrain (MAP-HT) toolkit, and emergency evacuations.

## Full Spectrum Integration

Up to two TCE social scientists, usually the SSRA Social Scientist and one other, are located at ISAF Headquarters where they support various Staff Operational Planning Teams (OPT) and Working Groups (WG) including those associated with the Deputy Chief of Staff Communications (DCOS COMM), Deputy Chief of Staff Operations (DCOS OPS), the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force–Shafafiyat, Force Reintegration Cell (FRIC), and various agencies and commands that interface with the headquarters. The social scientists provide the OPTs and WGs with human terrain analysis and research that supports their efforts.

Participation in these efforts enables the social scientists to get involved at the start of planning cycles so they are aware of potential issues and the information requirements COMISAF and the Staff will have with regards to the population, often months in advance of when the data and analytical products are required. This allows the TCE to design and implement research projects or request analytic products from the HTS SSRA and Reachback

Research Center (RRC), and ISAF CSOC in support of strategic planning efforts, and, just as importantly, have them available when they are needed.

## Support to the CSOC

The TCE CSOC support element works with other government agencies at the CSOC to provide COMISAF and CJ2 with an aggregate human terrain picture. The CSOC members, to include HTS TCE, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Atmospheric Program-Afghanistan, answer questions posed by COMISAF and the Staff about important issues affecting the population and their support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and ISAF.

The CSOC elements gather, review, analyze, and report information to COMISAF, providing him with an in-depth understanding of the population's perceptions and their potential impact on ISAF's strategy and operations, and those of its Afghan partners. Human terrain information ranges in scope from an assessment of the population's attitudes regarding security, governance, economics, development, and communications, to a perception survey outlining an area's perceived readiness for transition of security control from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), to a subject matter expert (SME) analysis of the sociocultural elements affecting recruitment of southern Pashtun men into the ANSF.

When the CSOC receives a request for information (RFI), the TCE support element looks at available human terrain research on the HTS servers, MAP-HT, the Combined Information Data Network Exchange, Afghan Wiki, and other data storage sites. By fusing HTS data with that of its partner CSOC organizations and open source materials, the CSOC produces integrated analytic products that answer COMISAF's information requirements. When reliable data is not readily available for analysis the TCE, in collaboration with the IJC Human Terrain Analysis Team (HTAT) may develop and implement a field research project to gather primary source data.

When time permits, the TCE may also develop SSRA requirements to gather polling and/or qualitative information or conduct an SME study. In addition to responding to COMISAF's RFIs, TCE members supporting the CSOC sometimes travel to the various Regional Commands (RCs) and assist the Stability Operations Information Center (SOIC) in the development of District Narrative Assessments (DNA).[2]

## Social Science Research and Analysis (SSRA)

The SSRA is the third pillar of HTS along with the HTS field teams (Human Terrain Teams (HTTs)/ HTATs) and RRC, and provides HTS with a contracted indigenous full-service research capability, to include a robust SME network.[3] SSRA projects support all levels in theatre, from tactical-level commanders, to operational planners and strategic decision makers. An HTS Social Scientist posted at ISAF headquarters coordinates SSRA research efforts, collaborating with HTS teams and their supported units on the design of complex quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-method research projects that deployed HTS teams are not capable of executing due to logistical, resource, and security constraints.

Methodological rigor is paramount to the SSRA research process and safeguards are put in place to ensure that products are statistically reliable given security, logistical and budgetary constraints. Once projects are designed and developed, the SSRA team implements data collection in collaboration with local research organizations, enabling comprehensive research in areas that are inaccessible to HTS team members. The use of indigenous interviewers eliminates much of the bias associated with ISAF or expatriate personnel interacting with the local population.

Once information is collected, Afghan national researchers assist expatriates to analyze the data, ensuring that local insights and cultural context are intrinsic to SSRA products. SSRA deliverables include comprehensive reports and presentations, sometimes accompanied with the supporting raw data. Once the requesting team and its supported unit has the opportunity to internalize and socialize their SSRA products, the unclassified reports are posted on the HTS data repository and other information networks for others to access.

## Social Science Mobile Knowledge Team (SSMKT)

HTS launched the SSMKT in December 2010 to provide onsite mentoring and assistance to field teams

throughout Afghanistan. From December 2010 through June 2011, SSMKT embedded with over 70 percent of HTS teams offering support and guidance on a number of knowledge domains including, but not limited to: guidelines for professional practice; social science research design methodologies; fieldwork techniques for research in a non-permissive environments, research ethics as relates to DOD Directive 3216.2 *Protection of Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical Standards in DOD-Supported Research*, and information management. The HTS team members shared best practices and lessons learned and provided candid insights into the challenges deployed HTS personnel face, offering an invaluable feedback loop for program development that was captured in a series of SSMKT reports.

In an effort to provide HTS, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and Department of the Army leadership with an in-depth review of the depth, breadth, and scope of social science research conducted by HTS in Afghanistan, the SSMKT analyzed over 1,400 reports generated by the thirty HTTs and HTATs deployed in Afghanistan, as well as the RRC and SSRA capabilities for the period of January 2010 through June 2011. The analysis sorted HTS products into a number of categories to include: report classification, report type, RC, province, and district. The products generated by HTS in fiscal year (FY) 2010 and the first two quarters of FY 2011 are based on interactions with over 100,000 Afghans throughout the country and highlight the attitudes and perceptions of the Afghan population on a number of topics to include: security, governance, development, economics, tribal dynamics, religious engagement, transition, and reintegration.

## Summary

The HTS TCE and TSO provide a means to coordinate elements and capabilities of the program to allow support to commanders and staffs at all levels of effort, from tactical to strategic commands. By overseeing in-country administrative and support functions, and maintaining a robust link between the program's headquarters and the teams deployed in theater, the TSO ensures that deployed HTS personnel are able to focus on their primary mission of providing supported commanders with operationally relevant sociocultural information. And by integrating ISAF HQ strategic and operational planning and assessment efforts, contributing to the CSOC's integrated analytic products, and providing teams with a full-research capability and in-theatre training and mentoring, the TCE ensures that sociocultural information is efficiently managed and accessible to all stakeholders.

In a counterinsurgency campaign where people are the decisive terrain, the HTS elements at ISAF Headquarters ensure that commanders' situational awareness is enhanced at all echelons, enabling informed decision making and improving operational effectiveness to reduce risks to forces and to better protect and serve the Afghan people.

**Endnotes**

1. During the First Quarter 2011 the Civilian-Military Integration Program (CMIP) was established by ISAF to promote information sharing, support requests, synchronize activities, and compile relevant information of the civil/cultural environment that contributes to assessing and answering specific COMISAF and COMIJC information requirements as they pertain to stability, governance, economics, crime, and corruption within Afghanistan. CMIP now sponsors the HTS teams at the RC level and above. Human Terrain Analysis Teams at the RC-level commands are integrated with the SOIC and the team at ISAF Headquarters (TCE) is integrated with the CSOC.

2. These DNAs are done for ISAF key districts and help local Commanders better understand their area of operation in relationship to people, governance, the local economy, rule of law, and security.

3. At the time of writing, BAE Systems subcontractor GLEVUM Associates provides the HTS contracted SSRA capability.

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*John Roscoe currently serves as a Social Scientist for HTS, managing the SSRA capability. He is part of the TCE in Kabul. Prior to joining HTS, Mr. Roscoe specialized in directing programs and managing social science research projects in challenging environments. Between 2003 and 2010 he worked extensively in Iraq for a number of private and public clients, including MNF-I, MNC-I, I MEF, II MEF, and USAID. Mr. Roscoe received his education from Victoria University of Wellington (Politics), New Zealand; Cardozo School of Law (Law), NY; and, the University of Oxford (Sociology), UK.*

# Development of HTS Social Science Standards of Practice

HTS 101

by Sandra B. Doherty and John H. Calvin

## Introduction

The military has always had staff members responsible for defining relevant blue and red layers. More recently, Human Terrain System (HTS) Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), Human Terrain Analysis Teams (HTATs), the Research Reachback Center (RRC), and the Social Science and Research Analysis (SSRA) capability have provided commanders and staff the ability to visualize and understand both the green and white layers.[1] By identifying local dynamics, grievances, motivations, and attitudes toward governmental effectiveness, HTTs and HTATs inform supported unit's nonlethal courses of action, assist units in preventing friction with members of the local population, and track the second and third order effects that are likely to occur based on planned unit operations. This capacity allows a commander to fully account for all the elements (red, blue, green, and white layers) in his or her operational environment.

Commanders in both Iraq and Afghanistan use sociocultural studies across the spectrum of military operations. Several have testified that the area of greatest need for sociocultural input is during operational planning. This article discusses HTS initiatives to standardize report structures in an effort to improve methods for integrating sociocultural information and analysis into the military decision making process in the highly complex and dynamic environment of counterinsurgency operations. This article emerges out of an organizational examination of HTS report production for the period January 2010 through June 2011.

The operational planning process occurs within extremely compressed timeframes. Military planners are experienced and sophisticated thinkers but limited by high operational tempos. They are challenged with thoroughly reviewing the findings of a lengthy sociocultural report, looking for points of value applicable to, and necessary for the planning process. To this end, HTS is launching a standardization initiative in Fiscal Year 2012, beginning with the employment of a systematic research methodology employed by all field teams to create useable social science research for military planners at the brigade, regiment, division, and corps levels. This initiative will be followed by the implementation of a series of HTS product templates that will allow for greater ease of product review by HTS customers.

The impetus behind the standardization initiative was a systematic review of all HTS Afghanistan (HTS-A) reports produced in 2010 (approximately 1,000 reports) and the first half of 2011 (600 reports). In an effort to provide HTS customers with a holistic understanding of the HTS contribution to the aggregate human terrain picture in Afghanistan, the HTS Director tasked the Social Science Mobile Knowledge Team (SSMKT) to conduct an analytical review of all HTS-A reports produced in 2010.[2]

The review documented individual HTS team product development cycles, social science methodologies, and classification and dissemination practices; provided clarity on extant HTS-A product types; detailed HTS-A production by Regional Command (RC), province, and district; and allowed HTS Project Leadership to review products with regard to content, operational relevance, and compliance with Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3216.2.

The 2010 HTS-Afghanistan Meta-Analysis Report was released in January 2011. The SSMKT continued the HTS Afghanistan analysis in 2011 and on 6 April 2011, and released HTS-Afghanistan First Quarter 2011 Performance Review, an overview of the 280 HTS-A reports produced from January through March 2011. Both reports were distributed internally as well as externally to Director and Staff of ISAF Civil-Military Integration Program and Director and Staff of ISAF Civilian Stability Operations

Center. The HTS Social Science Directorate (SSD) assumed responsibility of the Quarterly Review in July 2011 and released the HTS-Afghanistan First Half 2011 Performance Review on 18 August 2011. At the time of this writing the SSD is completing the HTS-Afghanistan Third Quarter 2011 Performance Review.

## HTS Research Design Cycle

HTS reports are as diverse as the units the teams support. Operationally relevant HTS research reports may take the form of a single slide storyboard mapping the formal and informal leadership of a particular village, a sociocultural training brief on the implications of community engagement during Ramadan, an attitudinal survey on constraints to local governance, or a comprehensive ethnographic report outlining the social, economic, political, and ethnic landscape of a particular district. While HTS reports vary in style, content, and presentation, all HTS research is grounded in a structured research methodology which HTS candidates are exposed to during the pre-deployment HTS training at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Utilizing a nine-step research design process, HTS research focuses on specific research objectives that address known requirements. These are either explicit (in the form of commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs), priority information requirements (PIRs), and directed missions) or implicit (on the basis of lines of operation (LOOs) or commander's guidance).[3] HTS teams, along with the supported unit, identify knowledge gaps between the current baseline knowledge and known requirements. Assessments of baseline knowledge are iterative and continually updated by HTS teams from documents and sources generated by deployed HTS teams, RRC, and SSRA capability.

Prior to the execution of field research, HTS teams design an appropriate collection protocol that outlines the specific process by which the team will gather information required for analysis. The collection protocol explicitly includes the following required components: team composition, research methodology, use of specific research instruments, the situation(s) in which the team will be operating, how the team will conduct information gathering, all support elements required for mission success, and all relevant elements of collaboration, command and control.




**Nine Step Research Design Process**

Once data is gathered, HTS teams employ an analysis protocol that defines the specific analytical methods that will be used to answer the research question. All methods defined within the analysis protocol are synchronized with the expected data outputs defined in the collection protocol. Each form of analysis has its own strengths, limitations, and potential outputs. The type of research question(s) will guide the selection of the appropriate analytical tool. Below are five methods for analyzing data:

- *Structural analysis*. Used to gain an understanding of structures, systems and processes underlying the people, organizations and capabilities within an area of operations. Structural analysis may also include geospatial analysis, which is used to analyze the spatial and geographical patterns of people, organizations, capabilities, and events in space and time.
- *Cultural domain analysis*. Used to develop an understanding of norms, standards, and commonly held beliefs of people and organizations.
- *Text analysis*. Used to identify and then confirm patterns or themes from written and verbal mediums.
- *Quantitative analysis*. Used to analyze large amounts of complex, numerical data.
- *Mixed Method analysis*. Used to analyze a variety of data.

The final and most critical aspect of the HTS research cycle is the support to decision making HTS teams provide to commanders and their staffs.

This support includes: providing situational sociocultural awareness, providing input into course of action development providing effects analysis (including 2nd/3rd order effects), recommending mitigation strategies, and providing unit specific sociocultural training (including capabilities briefs). Operationally relevant sociocultural knowledge should assist the commanders and staff in understanding the environment in a way that enables culturally astute decision making and enhances operational effectiveness.

## HTS Report Taxonomy

HTS has recognized that military planners are often limited by high operational tempos and as such developed a report taxonomy that aims to provide customers with a structured format to view human terrain information that is clear, concise, and succinct. In the same vein as a running intelligence estimate and a graduate thesis, both follow a set structure and format mandated from their requisite fields. HTS developed a series of report templates that distill human terrain information into a systematic structure. A brief discussion of nine different report types that are produced by HTS teams follows.

- *Area Assessment:* Details the physical and human terrain, infrastructure, governance, economics, ethnic and tribal breakdowns of a particular area.
  *Example:* HTAT in RC-South recently conducted an analysis on the themes of honor, trust, and humility in Pashtun culture based on primary source research provided by the six HTTs operating in the region.
- *Attitudinal Survey:* Details findings of structured qualitative question sets, these reports currently represent a majority of HTS reporting.
  *Example:* At the request of ISAF Headquarters, HTS recently undertook a series of attitudinal surveys in a number of key provinces examining Afghan attitudes towards and perceptions of the capacity of the local government to take responsibility for security and governance. Substantive questions measured respondent's views of government, preferences for justice and dispute resolution, presence of the criminal justice system, impact of the international community, and perceived readiness of Afghan forces to take the lead in governance and security.
- *Course of Action (COA) Analysis:* Details second and third order sociocultural effects of specific COAs on the local population.
  *Example:* Research undertaken by an HTT in Paktika province gauged the local population's attitudes towards a combat outpost closure and District Center relocation. The HTT research suggested that such a COA would be in direct opposition to local elders stated wishes, which in turn would weaken tribal elders' power and reinforce historical feelings of abandonment and neglect by GIRoA.
- *Cultural Knowledge Report:* Details apects of local culture primarily developed through secondary source research.
  *Example:* In response to a request for research, the HTS RRC produced a report on Deobandism, the fundamentalist Islamic sect that preaches strong anti-Western rhetoric, noting that during the 1990s the Taliban was largely comprised of Deobandi madrassah graduates educated in the Afghan refugee camps in Afghanistan.
- *Economic Study:* Focuses on economic information such as market reports and pricing indices.
  *Example:* Based on fieldwork conducted in a number of districts in Kandahar province, an HTT identified significant changes in regional commodity prices and highlighted the adverse impact this has on the area's impoverished population, many of whom remain trapped in debt cycles reliant on narco-lenders and others who charge abnormally high interest rates.
- *Ethnographic Report:* Highlights aspects of local culture principally developed through primary source research, to include structured and semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and direct observation.
  *Example:* To resolve information gaps with regard to influential non-GIRoA elders in a particular district, an HTT in Helmand province conducted a month long mission engaging with both formal and informal district leadership to identify those elders who may be equipped to support and/or field a District Community Council or Afghan Local Police initiative.
- *Observation Report:* Describes observations during specific events such as a key leader engagement or shura.
  *Example:* An HTT operating in Helmand province recently attended a series of religious

shuras sponsored by the supported unit and identified means of engaging with key religious figures.

- *Personal Interview:* A personal interview is the result of in-depth one-on-one meetings with both informal and formal leadership. *Example:* A HTT working in RC-East conducted several interviews with a leading district leader in order to elicit his assistance as a mediator between district shura attendees, GIRoA, Afghan National Security Forces, and Coalition Forces representatives.
- *Sociocultural Training:* Describes population-specific information to raise the level of cultural understanding of unit staff and subordinate units. Training will vary in specificity from broad themes to specific issues depending upon the level of knowledge of the unit.
  *Examples:* Information on holidays, cultural practices, religious rituals, ethnic and tribal overviews. In preparation for Ramadan, a number of HTTs and HTATs provided situational awareness on the religious and cultural significance of Ramadan and its operational significance.

## Conclusion

HTS teams at all levels develop products that contain a vast amount of detailed information. It is extremely important to deliver to supported units exactly the information that they need in a timely and useful format. The goal of HTS is to deliver on this promise by continuing to review HTS report production and develop best practices that ensure ever increasing quality of the social science research and analysis being conducted. These practices will ensure that HTS reports meet all DOD research rules, regulations, and government guidelines.

HTS products are as diverse as the units the teams support. The diversity of product presentation notwithstanding, there is a commonality of information that supported units require for operational planning. Standardization of HTS products along the lines of best practices will enable supported units to locate relevant data more quickly to better inform the operational planning process.

**Endnotes**

1. HTTs are deployed by HTS to support brigade combat teams (BCTs) and regimental combat teams (RCTs) commanders. HTTs integrate into the BCT/RCT staff, conduct unclassified open-source and field research, and analyze human terrain information in support of the commander's military decision making process (MDMP). HTATs support echelons above BCT and RCT, integrate into the commander's staff, conduct unclassified open-source and field research, synthesize the information from HTTs deployed with subordinate units, and analyze human terrain information in support of the commander's MDMP.

The HTS RRC, located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and Oyster Point, Virginia, conducts large-scale research projects and responds to Requests for Information from deployed HTTs and HTATs, utilizing both open source and classified research materials; synthesizing information supplied by deployed HTTs and HTATs in order to develop an aggregate human terrain picture of Afghanistan; and maintaining a sociocultural knowledge repository for all HTS information. The SSRA element provides HTS with a contracted indigenous full-service research capability. SSRA projects are conducted at the request of the units that HTT/HTATs support.

2. The SSMKT is a component of the HTS Afghanistan Theater Coordination Element based in Kabul, which provides onsite assistance and mentoring to deployed HTTs and HTATs. SSMKT was initially conceptualized to serve as a short-term solution to raise the operational social science bar in theater. The initial mandate was to provide HTS teams with social science-centric assistance.

3. Research objectives are stated outcomes that should result from the conduct or completion of research. Objectives may include: providing sociocultural situation awareness, input to course of action development, analysis of effects, and mitigation strategies. Examples of accomplishing these objectives may include: providing solutions to a specific problem, fulfilling an identified knowledge gap, evaluating consequences or outcomes of events, mitigating consequences of friendly or enemy actions, among other objectives.

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# HTS Support to Information Operations: Integrating HTS into COIN Operations

**by Kevin Casey and Major Ian McCulloh, PhD**

***The views presented in this article are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the HTS, TRADOC, or DA.***

## Introduction

Modern counterinsurgency (COIN) is conducted in a complex and multifaceted global information environment that is impossible to control and provides advantages to asymmetric adversaries. In the war of ideas over the allegiance and support of the population that is at the heart of COIN, insurgents have the distinct advantage of being physically, mentally, and culturally embedded in the population. This new information environment and the nature of COIN created significant challenges for information operations (IO) in Iraq. Insurgents' information and cultural advantages empower them by negating their lack of resources and leveraging their cultural strength while negating our resource strengths and multiplying our cultural weaknesses. Human Terrain System (HTS) Teams at the tactical level can help confront both of these challenges.

We present a simple methodology based upon cultural domain analysis in targeted populations and thematic analysis of insurgent propaganda to develop culturally resonant IO themes that counter insurgent ideologies. This methodology was originally fielded in Mosul, Iraq, in 2010 to help counter the rising influence of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Results from this study are presented as are lessons learned for HTS support to IO during COIN are discussed.

## The Problem: IO in Iraq

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the difficulties of conducting IO in asymmetric environments. IO is widely recognized as being central to a COIN fight and successful IO has been shown to be a central element of insurgent victories in past conflicts.[1] From the strategic to the tactical level, counterinsurgencies are struggles over ideas and perceptions. Inadequacies in U.S. IO in Iraq became apparent from the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom.[2] Much of this inadequacy was due to the inability to understand the cultural environment which provided the context of IO.[3]

Within this complex information and cultural environment, U.S. IO sought to bolster the legitimacy of the Government of Iraq (GOI) and the political process while discrediting the insurgents.

While these objectives were clear, finding messages and wording that "resonated with the hopes, desires, and fears of the population" proved elusive.[4] Critics of U.S. IO in Iraq point to the inability to truly understand target populations and to rely too much on IO themes that sound reasonable from our perspective. This led to what some have identified as "mirror-imaging"–projecting our own assumptions and beliefs onto the population.[5]

To combat these deficiencies, Bilingual/Bicultural Advisors (BBAs) were employed widely throughout Iraq to add cultural fluency to IO. While BBAs play an important role in interpreting the cultural landscape and developing appropriate IO themes they also have important limitations. BBAs are not trained in scientific methods to interpret public opinion and often rely on outdated cultural information. The authors met with over a dozen BBAs throughout Iraq. Their stories were very similar. Most were born and raised in Iraq and speak fluent Arabic. They left Iraq anywhere from 10 to 30 years earlier. They are viewed as the cultural experts because they speak the language and were born into the culture. While their insight is important, it must be remembered that their advice is often based merely on informed opinion. Most importantly, what BBAs lack is the kind of granular, locale-specific and evolving awareness that can assist in fashioning targeted, precise IO messages.

Culture changes constantly and a failure to understand this can have negative consequences in IO.

For example, consider the word "sick" in American culture. With adolescents growing up in the recent decade, the word "sick" refers to something that is "crazy, cool, insane."[6] To people living in the U.S. 10 to 30 years ago, the word "sick" had a different definition–"afflicted with ill health or disease; ailing" or "mentally, morally, or emotionally deranged, corrupt, or unsound: a *sick mind*." Now consider the development of an IO campaign to discredit a group of insurgents: "Those people are sick." The American who lived in the U.S. 10 to 30 years ago would understand this to mean that the group is mentally deranged or morally corrupt. However, an American adolescent today would interpret this to mean that the group is really cool and hip. Rather than being an abstract issue, this problem actually negatively impacted U.S. IO in Iraq on numerous occasions. In the summer of 2010 an IO campaign was pursued to portray several individuals and insurgent groups as criminals. Unfortunately, the Arabic language used presented these people in more of a "Robin Hood" fashion and may have actually assisted in their recruitment.

## Cultural Domain Analysis in Mosul

During the summer of 2010, Mosul had become an important base for AQI. The organization routinely extorted money from local businesses to fund its operations throughout Iraq.[7] U.S. Forces (USF) and Iraqi efforts succeeded in limiting the amount of foreign funding and fighters, making the organization more dependent on the population of Mosul and other Sunni Arab areas for funding and recruiting. While attacks had dropped significantly in Mosul, high profile attacks attributed to AQI had been positive trending since January of that year.[8] Additionally, USF had withdrawn from Mosul City and Iraqi local and Federal Police (FP) were frequent targets of AQI. Solving the Mosul problem was essential in limiting AQI's influence across the country.

An informal IO and non-lethal targeting working group including representatives from Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Operations Integration Center (COIC), the USF Iraq IO Targeting Section, HTS, and the USF-Iraq (USF-I) J2 Targeting Section was formed to look at the issue of AQI in Mosul. A targeted IO campaign for Mosul was needed; however there was a serious concern about repeating the mistakes made in Baghdad only a few months earlier. We proposed conducting further assessments and research in Mosul to help develop and refine messaging themes and language.

At the time, Mosul was a non-permissive environment for USF. Local units rarely conducted missions of any sort within the city. With this in mind, we developed a social science-based research design that focused on gathering as much pertinent data in as little time as possible as we knew missions there would be very constrained.

We suggested the use of a rapid ethnographic technique known as Cultural Domain Analysis (CDA). CDA has been recognized as a simple and powerful tool for eliciting cultural information from a relatively small group of respondents. As such, this technique is well suited to rapid ethnographic assessments in non-permissive and semi-permissive environments. A cultural domain is a set of words or ideas that a group of people understand to somehow belong together. Studying cultural domains generally begins with eliciting free list responses. Respondents are asked to list all the words, objects, or ideas that they associate with the topic of interest. The frequency with which words are repeated across respondents reveals the concepts that are most central to that topic for the population.[9]

For our CDA in Mosul, we choose the topics of the "hero" and the opposite of the hero. This topic was chosen for two reasons. First, we knew that AQI presented itself as heroes and guardians of the Sunnis of Mosul. Second, concepts such as "hero" are value laden and culturally defined, suggesting they would elicit richer and more detailed responses. A pilot study was first conducted using a nine member contracted Iraqi focus group in Mosul. Questions were tested for response time, cultural appropriateness, and data quality. Upon review of the pilot study, the HTS team social scientist and the COIC Deputy in coordination with the IO campaign manager narrowed the CDA collection to two questions: "What are characteristics of a hero?" and "What are the characteristics of the opposite of the hero?"

Additionally, content analysis was conducted on AQI martyrs' eulogies found within their propaganda. A list of descriptors that were used to describe the martyr was gathered from each text.[10] The frequency of usage of each descriptor was re-

corded in the individual texts. The frequency with which a descriptor word is used in a text to describe a martyr is assumed to correlate with the importance of that word to the idea of martyr with AQI's propaganda. This allowed us to compare the image of the hero held collectively by Moslawis with that propagated by AQI.

## Mission Preparation

Several challenges faced the CDA mission in Mosul. The first issue was trust. Senior military leaders were very skeptical of the importance of the mission. Most officers are not trained in ethnography or social science and many do not even view the disciplines as science, requiring data and proper statistical analysis. There was a cultural bias within our own military. Many believed that while HTS social scientists may know their discipline, they did not understand warfare since they were civilians. As such, they could not see the value that HTS brought to the fight, or they did not feel comfortable in knowing how to integrate social scientists into military operations. Fortunately for the Mosul CDA mission, the IO failures in Baghdad and the simplicity of the CDA ethnography method allowed senior leaders to see the importance of the mission and approve of its execution.

The primary concern of the mission was the security of the team (civilian social scientists and interpreters). There had not been any patrols into the crowded markets of Mosul for about 5 to 6 months. Al-Qaeda held a strong presence in the city as well. In fact, the chief of the Iraqi Federal Police in Mosul was initially uncomfortable with the security of the mission.

To address the security concerns, the Stability Transition Team (STT) operating in Mosul provided transportation and security for the mission, partnered with the 3rd Iraqi Federal Police. The STT leadership was able to see the value of the mission and was motivated to provide support. The leader of the CDA mission had served in the 1st Special Forces Group with the STT leader about 10 years earlier and although they did not know each other at the time, their shared military experience provided confidence and trust. In a meeting with the chief of the Iraqi Federal Police, the CDA mission leader discovered that the chief was former Iraqi Special Forces and had a strong admiration for West Point, where the mission leader had served as a professor. After sharing a few stories of similar experiences, the chief felt comfortable enough to authorize the partnered mission into Mosul.

The Iraqi Federal Police did an excellent job of providing cordon and outer security for the CDA mission, while the STT members acted as bodyguards for the social scientists. Data collection was limited to one hour on station and focused on speaking to vendors in the markets. In one of the markets, there was suspicious activity in the second floor residences above the market in a couple locations, which provides perhaps the biggest challenge to any HTS mission: balancing security with mission accomplishment.

The tradeoff between an ethnography focused mission and security is a difficult problem. The civilian social scientist is not trained in combat operations and may not be able to adequately assess the security and safety of a situation. On the other hand, the soldier is not trained in ethnography and is not able to adequately assess whether potential security measures might bias data collection or even determine how much time is needed on station to complete the mission. Success of the mission depended upon rapid collection of data. The time spent developing the research design, honing our research questions through discussion and pre-testing, and the ease and speed of CDA as a method allowed us to collect the required responses for a valid sample on two short missions. This limited the exposure of the researchers, linguists, and the U.S. and Iraqi forces providing security while ensuring adequate research to develop IO messaging.

It is critically important to discover the balance to ensure that the HTS can serve as a combat multiplier. The value of an ethnographic approach such as CDA is as much of a combat multiplier as sources of intelligence. Traditional military intelligence is limited in that there is no necessary scientific background to collect current cultural data. A reliance on sources lacking trained social scientists such as BBAs or soldier first-hand accounts can lead to outdated or scientifically biased data that result in failed operations such as the IO campaign in Baghdad.

## Results

***Mosul CDA***. Responses collected in the Mosul CDA were transcribed and coded in Arabic, then

translated into English. The translated data was analyzed using Visual Anthropac 1.0 Freelists to reveal the frequency, average rank, and salience of responses. Responses that were mentioned by more than one respondent (see Table 1) were interpreted as representing a shared assumption about the nature of the hero.

**Table 1. Responses of Mosul residents to the question: What are the qualities of a hero?**

| Item | Frequency (%) | Average Rank | Salience | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Courage | 36.4 | 2.38 | 0.293 | 1st Tier Response |
| Generosity | 27.3 | 2.67 | 0.171 | |
| Morals | 25 | 2.36 | 0.172 | |
| Sincerity | 20.5 | 3 | 0.148 | |
| Trustworthiness | 20.5 | 3.44 | 0.114 | |
| Helping | 11.4 | 3.2 | 0.041 | 2nd Tier Response |
| Chivalry | 9.1 | 2.5 | 0.064 | |
| Good | 9.1 | 2.25 | 0.049 | |
| Manliness | 9.1 | 4.5 | 0.049 | |
| Vigilance | 9.1 | 3 | 0.065 | |
| Concerned with the Family | 6.8 | 2.67 | 0.028 | |
| Religion | 6.8 | 1.67 | 0.061 | |
| Truth | 6.8 | 2.67 | 0.04 | |

***AQI Martyr Eulogies.*** The frequency of usage of each descriptor of a martyr in AQI eulogies was recorded in the individual texts. The descriptors of each text were then arranged according to frequency. These descriptor lists were then used as freelists and analyzed using Visual Anthropac 1.0 Freelists. This ranked the descriptors across all the texts by frequency, average rank and salience (See Table 2).

The AQI martyr eulogies contained a list of frequently used descriptors that occurred in all or most cases. This suggests that AQI has a clear and consistent messaging agenda. This image of the martyr, however, conflicts with the image of the hero as described by *Moslawis*. A hero for Moslawis is characterized by the possession of a recognized set of values and principles. Attributes that addressed physical strength and prowess generally ranked low compared to those representing virtue and morals. While the hero is seen protecting family and community, no respondents mentioned fighting or struggling against enemies, nor jihad or martyrdom. Islamic State of Iraq martyrs, on the other hand, are distinguished by their waging of jihad, fighting and struggle against enemies, as compared to the hero described by *Moslawis* who solves problems peacefully.

**Table 2. Descriptors of martyrs found within AQI martyr eulogies.**

| Item | Frequency (%) | Average Rank | Salience | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| jihad | 100 | 1.91 | 0.927 | 1st Tier Response |
| martyr | 100 | 2.73 | 0.859 | |
| paradise | 72.7 | 9.13 | 0.378 | 2nd Tier Response |
| enemies | 63.6 | 4.57 | 0.462 | |
| hero | 54.5 | 8.83 | 0.3 | |
| faith | 54.5 | 11.5 | 0.255 | |
| reward | 45.5 | 8.2 | 0.231 | 3rd Tier Response |
| noble | 45.5 | 13.6 | 0.204 | |
| lion | 45.5 | 14 | 0.164 | |
| fight | 36.4 | 7 | 0.244 | |
| sacrafice | 36.4 | 14 | 0.152 | |
| brave | 36.4 | 9.75 | 0.216 | |
| righteous | 36.4 | 13.25 | 0.157 | |
| generous | 36.4 | 11.75 | 0.192 | |
| umah | 36.4 | 6.25 | 0.233 | |
| patient | 36.4 | 12.5 | 0.172 | |

## From Research Results to Messaging

As a result of our thorough mission analysis, research design and coordination with IO production assets, the results of this study were of immediate practical use to the staff. The results of the CDA provided a wealth of Arabic words and ideas that preserved elements of the Moslawi dialect and could be used in counter-AQI messaging. Additionally, the comparison with AQI martyr's eulogies showed clear domains where Moslawis were at odds with the organization and its goals. Subsequent analysis of results provided further insights that informed several products of an IO campaign aimed at limiting AQI's influence in Mosul.

## Lessons Learned

Cultural and ethnographic data gathering should be treated like any other validated form of information that contributes to intelligence. It is an important combat multiplier for conducting military operations and it requires individuals with unique skills to accurately collect data. Missions require planning and resources on the same level as any other intelligence collection effort in the reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

CDA as a method has several distinct advantages. First, it generally requires a small number of respondents for representative sample, with 30 to 40 being a commonly cited number. This allows for ease of collection in non-permissive environments. Second, interviews are simple and generally progress quickly, allowing for more rapid data collection.

Third, since collection for a CDA does not directly ask about sensitive topics such as insurgent groups or support for the government, response bias is not a concern. Fourth, this method is particularly suited for IO development as it can capture regional and dialectical words and phrases that are appropriate for message development.

While we have focused on the collection of ethnographic information, it is important to keep in mind that the HTS mission is an intelligence enabler. While they certainly have a role in collecting a unique form of information as highlighted in this paper, they also serve as cultural experts to the command. As such, they provide a technical domain expertise in the same manner as a chemical, military police, engineer, or medical officer would. HTS is responsible for providing cultural input for mission planning across all operations. IO is only one example.

Placing a military officer in charge of the HTS team who possesses a graduate degree in social science is highly desirable. Civilians are not placed in charge of any other staff section or tactical unit in the military. The military plans for officers serving on special staff to receive proper training and experience for their role. Many Army officers pursue master's degrees sometime after their company command. Therefore, there are officers available who possess an understanding of social science. While their level of education may not be sufficient to effectively plan and conduct an ethnographic study, their education is important for their ability to understand the social scientist and bridge the gap between military operations and ethnography. The ideal situation of course, is to identify field grade officers with PhDs in an applicable social science and assign them as human terrain team leaders.

**Endnotes**

1. SWJ Editors, "Information Operations on the Counterinsurgency Battlefield," *Small Wars Journal,* 22 February 2009. Accessed at http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/information-operations-on-the-counterinsurgency-battlefield.

2. Major Norman Emery, "Information Operations in Iraq," *Military Review*, May-June 2004, 13.

3. Major Stephen C. Rogers, "*Improving Information Operations with a Military Cultural Analyst*," School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 25 January 2005.

4. Deirdre Collings and Rafal Rohozinski, "*Shifting Fire: Information Effects in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations*," Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 2006, 31.

5. Ibid., 36.

6. Found at http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=sick.

7. Saad al-Mosuli, "Al-Qaeda Turns to Mafia Tactics in Mosul" *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, ICR Issue 339, 7 June 2010. Accessed 3 December 2010 at http://iwpr.net/report-news/al-qaeda-turns-mafia-tactics-mosul.

8. Asharq al-Awsat, *"Iraq: Al-Qaeda Extorting Businesses in Mosul"* 9 September 2010. Accessed 3 December 2010 at http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp? section=1&id=22250.

9. H. Russell Bernard, *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Third Edition* (New York: AltaMira Press, 2002), 280-297.

10. Translations of 10 martyr eulogies from the Islamic State of Iraq were gathered for analysis from the Open Source Center on 30 November 2010. Texts were accessed through translations made available by the Center at https://www.opensource.gov. The following texts were used for analysis:

"Iraq: "Forum Member Posts Eulogy of Yemeni Jihadist," GMP20090704535001.

"ISI Claims 2 Martyrdom-Seeking Attacks on U.S. Forces in Iraq on 12, 14 May," GMP20100621058001.

"Forum Participant Posts Eulogy of ISI Martyr Abu-Umar Al-Shami," GMP20101103176001.

"ISI Releases 38th Edition of 'Biographies of Prominent Martyrs' Series," GMP20091130101001.

"Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad Eulogizes ISI Leaders Al-Baghdadi, Al-Muhajir," GMP20100428083004.

"Writer Abu-Muhammad Al-Maqdisi Eulogizes ISI Leaders Al-Baghdadi, Al-Muhajir," GMP20100426050012.

"Eulogy of Iraqi Jihadist Doctor by Jihadist Writer Husayn al-Ma'adidi," GMP20101102121001.

"Islamic Group in Iraq Eulogizes ISI Leaders Al-Baghdadi, Al-Muhajir," GMP20100505101001.

"Al-Ma'sadah Media Interviews Mother of 'Martyr' Abu-Sa'd al-Tunisi" GMP20100825142006.

"Forum Contributor Eulogizes Al-Zarqawi's Lieutenant Sulayman Khalid Darwish," GMP20091117342001.

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# Local Conflict Assessment Framework:

# Analyzing Perceptions and Sources of Violence




by John Thorne

***The views expressed are those of the author and not those of the U.S. Army, TRADOC, and HTS.***

## Drivers of Human Conflict are Universal

Three elements can be described as the universal drivers of human conflict: security fears, economic interest, and identity/honor.[1] Assessing local nationals' (LN) perceptions of these elements during expeditionary counterinsurgency (COIN) operations is critical for understanding the propensity of unintended conflicts caused through the use of Civil Affairs (CA). These tactics will inevitably disrupt local systems, and in worst-case scenarios cause unintended instability and violence. As many in Afghanistan have learned, in the use of "money as a weapons system" it is very possible to have collateral damage.[2] This article seeks to provide a framework for identifying sources of instability and understanding the roots of local level conflicts.

The U.S. military has produced several manuals covering numerous levels of assessment and planning to guide COIN practitioners in the conduct of CA operations. These manuals discuss COIN Lines of Effort and Full Spectrum Operations Stability Tasks as interrelated activities that "aim to stabilize the environment enough so that the host nation can begin to resolve the root causes of conflict and state failure."[3] CA is also used to foster short-term cooperation with the LN population. However, the reader of these manuals is left without a clear guide for assessment if a COIN operation (such as CA or development assistance) could trigger immediate or long-term motivations for violence in the LN population or exacerbate sources of instability.[4]

**This article posits that COIN operations can motivate LN violence by causing shifts in perceptions of relative power or well-being, or through perceived threats to identity.** However, unintended conflict could be avoided through an assessment of the LN population's frustrations, perceptions of unfairness, and motivations to engage in violence. Analysis of LN perceptions can assist in the planning of effective CA operations to meet the immediate security goals of the counterinsurgent while promoting longer-term stability and sustainable development.[5]

## Current Frameworks Only Provide Broad Guidance

The interagency conflict diagnosis framework in FM 3-07 provides a macro level framework, but it is not very specific in providing an analytical framework for assessing specific triggers of violence at the local level. In a discussion of an operation's context, popular grievances, drivers of conflict, and windows of vulnerability and opportunity, the reader is told in a single bullet-point to "describe identity groups who perceive threats to their identity, security, or livelihood."[6] This is a rather large and important task for which a framework could be useful.

This paper provides a framework, the Local Conflict Assessment Framework (LCAF), for understanding universal motivations for violence during the planning and conduct of expeditionary COIN operations. LCAF examines perceptions of threats to their security, identity, and livelihood that can occur during CA operations. This framework can fit into existing methodologies that seek to understand drivers of instability, including the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF) discussed in FM 3-07, the "implementation strategies" discussed in the PRT Playbook, the Operational Environment of COIN assessment criteria discussed in FM 3-24.2 and the District Stability Framework's third stage: "Identify and address the root causes of instability."[7,8]

## Perceived Threats to Absolute and Relative Standing

LCAF examines perceived threats to security, identity, and livelihood to provide a framework for an outsider making inquiry into what LN populations find important during COIN operations. These are interrelated factors, many of which are intimately related to perceptions of unfairness that universally can motivate an individual or group to respond with violence. Both absolute and relative changes should be assessed during the impact prediction assessments in CA operational planning.

In each of the three LCAF categories relative standing has varying reference points which will depend on who the assessment targets (individuals or groups) perceive as their rivals, and in the analysis one must determine the applicable competitors (or out-groups) that are perceived as salient. It should be noted that perceived threats to LN security, identity, or livelihood will not necessarily instigate violence or create a source of instability, and may merely be a frustration. Perceptions of unfairness can be highly subjective and can have varying effect upon LN motivations. Lastly, there can be instances when LN populations find it advantageous to hide their motivations from an outside entity.

***Security/Fear***. The perception of security is one of the most basic motivations for human action. Changes in relative power can instigate actions taken for self or group preservation which can be violence or threats thereof. The LN power dynamics in an area can shift quite easily with an influx of cash during COIN operations. A shift in relative power between individuals and groups could create dissonance between the role played in the area and reputation of one's ability to perform their role, which is discussed in further detail below in conjunction with Identity/Honor. With regards to security and fear, LCAF asks the following questions, with several possible realms for inquiry:

***How will the assessment target's relative security be affected by the operation?*** [9]

***Do they perceive themselves as weaker or stronger as a result?***

***Will they be driven to violence by the change?***

**1. Instruments of Violence**

- How will the change in income distribution affect local relative power levels?
- Can weapons be readily purchased?
- Are development projects or grants changing perceptions of security? (For example, trucks or buildings can act as possible weapons platforms.)
- Have geographic barriers been altered, changing perceptions of physical security? (For example, a four-season road or new bridge that intended to encourage trade might make it easier for rivals to violently engage each other.)

**2. Internal Social Dynamics and Politics**

- Will the operation affect group cohesiveness or how the group's political decisions are formed?
- Have new individuals been empowered, altering or weakening group internal dynamics?
- Will outsiders view the individual or group as stronger or weaker as a result of the operation? If stronger, will retaliatory actions be taken? If weaker, will the individual or group lose independence?

**3. External Alliances**

- How will the operation affect an individual or group's perceived alliances?
- Has the operation created, destroyed, strengthened or weakened alliances?

***Identity/Honor.*** Threats to identity or honor can be caused from perceived challenges to one's reputation to secure their role in society. Honor and self-

worth can derive from one's reputation to protect economic and security interests (discussed above), as well as one's role within the ASCOPE categories, relative to competitors.[10] Perceptions of unfairness can exacerbate frustrations relating to Identity and Honor, especially if the unfairness was caused by an outside actor such as an expeditionary counter-insurgent. LCAF asks the following questions, with several possible realms for inquiry:

***How will the assessment target's roles and reputation be affected by the operation?***

***Will perceptions of unfairness become a source of instability?***

***Will they be driven to violence by the change?***

**1.** What is the target's reputation and what is at stake in order to protect **economic** interests, and how could this reputation change as a result of the operation?

**2.** What is the target's reputation and what is at stake in order to protect **Security** interests, and how could this reputation change as a result of the operation?

**3.** How could the target's role change within the **ASCOPE** categories? Here are some examples:

- **Area**: Farming a particular territory, traveling in geographic areas.
- **Structures**: Accessing places of worship, government buildings, farms.
- **Capabilities**: Use of infrastructure, accessing health facilities, markets.
- **Organizations:** Participation in religious, political, or criminal groups.
- **People**: Access to key leaders and family members, media, business partners.
- **Events**: Participation in holidays, harvests, religious events, funerals, weddings.

**Livelihood/Interest**. Perceived changes in LN livelihoods and well-being relative to out-groups can cause frustrations and jealousies and possible motivations for violent recompense. CA operations will directly and indirectly affect income levels in numerous ways, and a relative shift in well-being might only become obvious in the long term when differential growth rates show disparities in income. LCAF asks the following questions, with several possible realms for inquiry:

***How will the assessment target's economic interests, relative to their economic rivals, be affected by the operation?***

***Will they be driven to violence by the change?***

**1. Goods and Services**

- Will the operation affect the prices and wages received for goods and services?
- Will it affect the quantity of goods sold or hours worked?

**2. External Costs and Economic Threats**

- Will the operation affect business competitors?
- Will the operation affect related or complementary industries necessary for survival?
- Will the operation affect the costs of inputs?
- Will there be a change in taxation or regulatory over-sight? (For example, an increase in government capacity can change corruption levels, both for the better or the worse.)

**3. Wealth**

- Will others perceive relative economic gains or losses as unfair?
- How will the operation affect the value of liquid assets?
- How will the operation affect the value of non-liquid assets?

**4. Economic Goals**

- What are the LN business strategies and tactics that could be affected by the operation?
- Who are they providing for?
- Have family members, friends, associates experienced a change in relative well-being?

## Conclusion

**LCAF examines frustrations and possible motivations for violence.**

Navigating the human terrain is challenging for a deployed military; LCAF seeks to provide a framework for examining universal drivers of human conflict and sources of frustration. Human motivations are universal: Fear, honor, and economic interest have been the interrelated sources of conflict in all of human discord's recorded history. Identifying how COIN, CA, and development assistance operations affect perceptions of security, identity, and livelihood is a challenge. LCAF aims to assist in the analysis of the human terrain to prevent inadvertent creation of sources of instability.

**Endnotes**

1. These concepts were originally discussed in the 5th century BC by Thucydides in his *History of the Peloponnesian War* and continue to provide a useful framework for analysis.

2. *Money as a Weapon System-Afghanistan*, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Publication 1-06, Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) SOP, February 2011.

3. These include FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency, Chapter 3. COIN LOEs are conceptual categories which the COIN force and HN government can use in developing operations: establishing civil security and civil control; supporting HN security forces; supporting to governance; restoration of essential services; support to economic and infrastructure development; and conducting information engagement. See also FM 3-0, Chapter 4 and FM 3-07 Stability Operations, Chapter 3, paragraph 3-6.

4. *The PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Center for Army Lessons Learned, September 2007) advises the reader to use FM 3-07 for assessment tools.

5. The U.S. Agency for International Development's *"Principles of Project Selection"* is discussed in FM 3-07 and FM 3-24.2. These guiding principles are supportive of COIN LOEs: Host Nation Ownership, Capacity Building, Sustainability, Selectivity, Assessment, Results, Partnership, Flexibility, and Accountability.

6. FM 3-07, Appendix D, paragraph D-21, bullet 1.

7. FM 3-07, Appendix D, paragraphs D-34 to 62.

8. In the DSF methodology identifying the root causes of instability is the process of understanding local issues that: 1. Decrease support for Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; 2. Increase support for Anti-Government Elements, and 3. Disrupt the normal functioning of society.

9. Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). This portion of the framework intentionally mirrors Van Evera's Offense-Defense Theory. He presents the hypothesis that violence between states could be more likely if offensive actions are perceived as easier than defensive actions. The four realms discussed here are adopted from Van Evera's International Relations theory, and altered to be applicable at a micro level of analysis.

10. For a further discussion of ASCOPE see FM 3-24.2, Chapter 1, Section 3.

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

# Geo-statistical Forecasting Using Attitudinal Survey Data in Afghanistan

**by Major Patrick Reanier, USAR**

***The views expressed are those of the author and not those of U.S. Army, Army TRADOC G2, or HTS.***[1]

## Introduction

The Human Terrain System (HTS) Reachback Research Center (RRC) provides operationally relevant on-demand sociocultural dynamics research. It utilizes attitudinal survey data to analyze and support research requests that focus on perceptions and related demographic information in Afghanistan to support the HTS RRC research efforts.[2]

The attitudinal survey data comes from an HTS contracted function referred to as Social Science Research and Analysis (SSRA) operations. SSRA provides relevant practical, qualitative and quantitative social science studies conducted in the area of operation. SSRA data is compiled and aggregated to varying degrees at national, provincial, and district levels. For a variety of reasons, not all districts within Afghanistan can be sampled, largely due to ongoing armed-conflict activities. The lack of survey data for those districts begs the question, "What do we do about those areas where we have no attitudinal survey results?"

One method the RRC has considered using to mitigate this attitudinal information gap is what in geospatial information science (GIS) is called "geo-statistical forecasting." Geo-statistical forecasting uses computer-based modeling with a GIS application (such as ESRI ArcGIS) to sample both location and thematic attributes. In this study, we used the results from a specific attitudinal survey question, interpolating the survey responses based upon relative location and thematic attribute values as compared to other sample point locations–in this case attitudinal survey locations in the various districts in Afghanistan for which we have survey results.

We chose to use geo-statistical forecasting to determine whether local Afghans sampled in the SSRA survey would report improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to Afghan authorities. The Afghans surveyed had to choose from four alternative responses:

- Very likely to report IEDs to Afghan authorities.
- Somewhat likely to report IEDs to Afghan authorities.
- Somewhat unlikely to report IEDs to Afghan authorities.
- Very unlikely to report IEDs to Afghan authorities

To conduct the analysis, we first took the results of this question from the survey and mapped that information thematically at the district level in Afghanistan. The result of that process is shown in Figure 1. The color schema in the map is:

- Dark Green: Very likely to report IEDs to Afghan authorities.
- Light Green: Somewhat likely to report IEDs to Afghan authorities.
- Light Orange: Somewhat unlikely to report IEDs to Afghan authorities.
- Red: Very unlikely to report IEDs to Afghan authorities.




**Figure 1. Select Districts in Afghanistan: Attitudinal Survey Data-Likelihood of Afghan Civilians to Report IEDs to Afghan Government Authorities.**

There are areas of clustering of both 'like' and 'unlike' results on the map. There are also areas (districts) where there are no results at all. The uncolored areas are the districts for which we had no survey data.

It is important to note that in collecting the survey data, certain inherent biases should be understood when interpreting the results in the SSRA attitudinal study:

- Study participants are persons living in or had the inclination to travel to district capitals.
- Study participants are persons willing to participate in answering the questions in the study.
- Certain districts may be overrepresented because they are, for one reason or another, more accessible to polltakers.
- It is difficult to account for study participants who respond to questions with answers that they believe the polltaker wants to hear, and not necessarily what the participants themselves believe.
- Motivations for positive or negative responses to questions regarding cooperating with Afghan authorities can vary greatly and may not always stem from issues directly related to the current Afghan conflict.
- District population densities were not accounted for in the analysis and are a subject for follow-on investigation and analysis.
- Because of gender inequality and societal norms in Afghan society, access of polltakers to Afghan women also presents an inherent under representation of women in this study.

To address the question of Afghan districts where there are no attitudinal survey results for our IED reporting question, we used geo-statistical forecasting to fill in the gaps as is shown in Figure 2. The GIS geo-statistical forecasting capability creates a forecast surface that is both geographically and thematically referenced to our area of study in Afghanistan. The color thematic schema in the map matches that of the map (See Figure 1).

Figure 1 Large. Online Version Only.



The difference in Figure 2 is that the GIS program samples from the known attitudinal survey results, and in a probabilistic manner interpolates our known results to our unknown areas. In essence, through this process GIS is making an educated guess as to what the prevailing attitudes of the Afghans are in the un-sampled districts.

The GIS rule-of-thumb to keep in mind when viewing the maps in Figures 1 and 2 is that 'things that are closer together tend to be more alike and things that are further apart tend to be less alike."[3] The other GIS axiom to keep in mind when viewing the map in Figure 2 is that predicted values toward the edges of the mapped area tend to be less accurate than the predicted values more toward the center of the map. Results should only be considered within the territorial limits of Afghanistan.[4] The forecasted results in Figure 2 tend to coincide with the centers of gravity (COGs) of conflict in Afghanistan based upon what the author has observed previously from other Afghan conflict analytical efforts.

Next, the RRC took the mapped results from both sampled and forecasted maps and overlaid them together in a third map (Figure 3) for comparison. In looking at this third map, we attempted to identify three things:

- Places where districts/areas of similar thematic values spatially cluster.
- Places where districts/areas of dissimilar thematic values are spatially adjacent.
- Places in districts/areas where the thematic values are mixed and neither likely nor unlikely to report IEDs to authorities.

Areas where thematic values in the map are similar and clustered represent COGs for populations who oppose or support the Afghan government authorities. Areas where there are dissimilar thematic values spatially and immediately adjacent to each




**Figure 2. Estimated Likelihood of Afghan Civilians to report IEDs to Afghan Government Authorities.**

**Figure 2 Large. Online Version Only.**




**Figure 3. Sampled and Estimated Likelihood of Afghan Civilians to Report IED to Afghan Government Authorities.**

other may represent social and geographic cleavages that require further investigation to understand and may be usable in civil-military information programs. Finally, areas where there appears to be a strong inclination to neither "cooperate" nor "not cooperate" in reporting IEDs to Afghan authorities may present areas of mixed sociocultural dynamics that may offer opportunities to benefit from and be useful to our civil-military information capabilities.

Future investigation of the subject matter described here will utilize additional map overlay analysis that will seek to show the correlation between "expected reporting habits" and actual threats. If this data becomes available, more analytical mapping showing actual IED reporting to authorities would also be helpful to advance the study described in this paper.

Finally, the RRC compared the combined results to ethnographic mapping of Afghanistan seeking correlation between the two topics. What we found is that areas that are Pashtun tend to be less cooperative in reporting IEDs to Afghan authorities. Conversely, we also found that areas that are, for example, majority Hazara tended to be more likely to report IEDs to authorities. The key is locating areas where these dynamics are mixed and civil-military information programs can be applied to sway the opinions of the "fence-sitters" who may be open to influence from the Afghan government and coalition allies. This may ultimately lead to inroads into population COGs that are currently opposed to cooperating with Afghan authorities, whether on IED reporting or other important issues.

Additionally, when analyzing the various Afghan ethnic groups and their aggregated responses to the IED reporting attitudinal survey question, the majority consensus of responses from all Afghan ethnic groups in the survey reported that they are somewhat or very unlikely to report IEDs to Afghan authorities. Yet the map shows that there are many areas in Afghanistan reported in this study where populations are likely to report IEDs to Afghan authorities.

One possible interpretation of this dynamic is that

**Figure 3 Large. Online Version Only.**

the decision as to whether or not to cooperate with Afghan authorities is one made at the local level, for reasons that require further investigation. One finding from the SSRA study that may provide some insight is that Afghan urban communities of diverse ethnicity and tribal makeup are more likely to report IEDs to Afghan authorities.

Additional supporting categorical comparisons derived from the HTS SSRA study:

- On average, both Afghan men and women almost equally are somewhat unlikely to report IEDs to Afghan authorities.
- There is no strong correlation between age and willingness to report IEDs.
- The higher the level of secular education, the higher the chance of reporting IEDs.
- The higher the level of formal religious education, the more likely to report IEDs.
- The higher the reported quality of life, the higher the possibility of reporting IEDs.
- The higher the reported perception of Afghan police being helpful in the local community, the better the odds of reporting IEDs to authorities.

The selection of comparative categories in the listing above provides insight as to why the decision to report IEDs is a local decision. Decisions made in villages or groups of adjacent villages and/or villages linked by social ties have a cumulative effect is, in this case, at the Afghan district (county) level.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, using geo-statistical forecasting is not a panacea for good common sense information gathering and analysis on the ground. Nevertheless, it can lend a helping hand in examining the "big picture." Geo-statistical forecasting is a tool to search for insights that might otherwise escape us. Moreover, other forms of information communications and analysis may not be as efficient as analytical thematic mapping.

**Endnotes**

1. I would like to thank the following individuals: Dr. Mike Weltsch, PhD, RRC Theater Research Manager, HTS RRC; Mr. Matthew Shands-Pickett, RRC Social Scientist; Ms. Floridna Lucero, RRC Research Manager, and Mr. David Poplack, RRC Social Scientist, for their supporting contributions to this paper.

2. The HTS RRC was created in 2006 to provide on-demand sociocultural dynamics research support to forward deployed HTS Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan and to U.S. Combatant Commands. The RRC elements are located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and Newport News, Virginia. The RRC has produced a wide variety of operationally relevant sociocultural dynamics reports each year since its inception. RRC products are accessible via the HTS Knowledge Center on the SIPRnet. More information describing HTS can be found at: http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil.

3. Brent Hecht and Emily Moxley, "Terabytes of Tobler: Evaluating the First Law in a Massive, Domain-Neutral Representation of World Knowledge," in *Spatial Information Theory*, edited by K. S. Hornsby, C. Claramunt, M. Denis, and G. Ligozat, 9th International Conference, COSIT 2009, L'Aber W'rach, France, September 21-25, 2009, Proceedings. Volume 5756 of Lecture Notes in *Computer Science,* Spring (2009) 88-105, 1. Accessed at http://www.brenthecht.com/papers/bhecht_cosit2009_tolberslaw.pdf.

4. Kevin Johnston, Jay M. Ver Hoef, Konstantin Krivoruchko, and Neil Lucas; "ArcGIS® 9 Using ArcGIS® Geostatistical Analyst," Environmental Systems Research Institute, Redlands, California; 2003; 236.

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# Bilingual Data Collection and Research Protocols: Some Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

**by Joko Sengova, PhD**

***The views expressed are those of the author and not those of U.S. Army, TRADOC, HTS, or NTM-A/CSTC-A Command Group."***[1]

## Introduction

This article discusses lessons learned collecting field data in English and Dari with the aid of Afghan interpreters having prerequisite proficiency in both languages to help mediate bilingual communication. Interpreting from English to Dari may seem like a simple inter-language communication activity between researcher, interpreter, and target audience. However, this engagement can be more complex than that, because it requires linguistic competence and ability in those languages, including some knowledge of cultural idioms and their appropriate use.

Generally, interpreting from one language to another, (e.g., English to Dari), must involve a culturally and linguistically savvy English-Dari bilingual capable of listening to an interview, simultaneously figuring out its substantive message, communicating it to the target receiver(s) in Dari, receiving their response, processing it, and finally, delivering it back to its source in English, hopefully still intact.[2]

This article discusses lessons learned gained from the challenges and successes of engaging in this three-way communication to design research protocols for use as tools to collect primary field data. The same principle applies in open and secondary source data gathering that are documented in Dari and/or Pashto to complement primary source data. Our aim is to share some language and communication strategies resulting from challenges we met in designing appropriate tools for collecting operationally relevant field data to help our supported unit and decision makers accomplish its mission.

Self-interrogation, reflection, and retrospection about how we were conducting research from planning design to implementation led to conceptualization of this article. I especially led our team in looking closer at problems we had experienced doing our job as a team, and as individuals to share some instructive lessons learned designing protocols and collecting data. Questions raised in my mind included our translation and interpreting standards and routines including degree of accuracy, interpreter/translator bilingual proficiency, and other difficulties found in the second language communication of non-native English speakers with which I am very familiar.[3]

At the time of writing, there were five members of Human Terrain Team (HTT) AF13: Team Leader, Research Manager, Social Scientist and two Human Terrain Analysts (HTAs). A number of Afghan local nationals (LNs) served as research interpreters.[4] During our mission we spoke to hundreds of men and women. Some of our data was collected from other interpreters and translators to help validate or invalidate our primary field data.

## Interpreting and Translating

Interpretation and translation are generally considered two separate or different communicative activities, each dynamic in its own way. Their commonality seems to lie in communication transmission, changing one system or medium such as one language to another, supposedly with form and content usually intact. What then is it that precisely distinguishes the two? And what are the similarities, if any? In a typical oral research interpretation activity, the speaker or researcher initiating the activity transmits his/her message to an in-

terpreter/listener via one language (L1), which the listener acting as communicative mediator then simultaneously processes, transforms and transmits through another language (L2) to the target message recipients (potential respondents to the question elicitation).

Those respondents in turn articulate their informed message responses to the elicited research question presumably context and all, through their 'native' language (which for them is the L1) through the interpreter/mediator, who again processes and transmits via the researcher's L1 (L2 for the respondents). This verbal and vocal communicative exchange back and forth with reversed speaker-listener roles mediated through the so-called interpreter describes the real praxis of 'interpretation,' a three-way communicative event.

**Interpretation** therefore involves verbal communication through a channeling process of communicative activity from a source to the target language recipient and vice versa, mostly conducted in 'real time.'[5] Most of our field data collection basically involves interpreting spoken and/or written English protocols into Dari with respondents' reverse transmission from Dari to English mediated through an interpreter.

**Translation,** on the other hand, requires qualitative precision in transforming larger bodies of written text or discourse from one language such as Dari into another distinct language, English; or scripting one linguistic genre, say a Shakespearean poem into its modern contemporary equivalent using the same genre. A translation exercise therefore, requires more time and painstaking work beyond the simultaneity of most interpretation work, because it involves systematic transformation and consecutive rendition of an original written text, word by word, sentence by sentence, from an L1 to its formal and semantic equivalent in an L2, with time and scope to consult diverse written sources, references such as dictionaries, glossaries etc.

The two may actually merge in theater research, where two or more interlocutors speaking different languages may participate in a 'communicative event' consecutive in its transitional stages, yet equally marked by a series of interrelated, simultaneous cohesive 'acts' that result in a carefully crafted usable research instrument appropriate for data collection.[6] We worked as a team in ensuring that our field collection tools and protocols were designed in language that best captured our mission intent, goals and objectives, and capturing approximated meanings in the target language.[7]

## Bilingual Interpreter

A competent bilingual interpreter must be equipped with a variety of linguistic, social, and cultural skill sets to perform the job to the satisfaction of the customer. In addition to the ability to navigate two language systems very well, the interpreter is expected to include in the interview record any salient sociocultural insights that relate directly or indirectly to information communicated on the surface. These could be deeper meanings embedded in words and expressions familiar mainly to native speakers in whose society and culture the language is spoken. Simultaneous interpretation can be taught or learned from experience and can be partly from natural linguistic aptitude.

In this case, an interpreter must also have a reasonable knowledge of English and Dari grammar in terms of sentence pattern and arrangement. Closely related to that ability is the understanding that interpreting English to Dari or other languages is not simply about matching words, phrases, and expressions across the languages. It is an attempt to bridge sociocultural barriers across two distinct linguistic systems no matter their formal structure. As an example, two English and Dari sentences having a similar translated meaning have a different word order arrangement. English has a Subject–Verb–Object pattern, whereas Dari uses a Subject–Object–Verb word order:

**(English)**–We eat only chicken and rice.

**(Dari)**–*Mah tanha morgh wa berenj may-khorem.*
(Literally) We only chicken and rice [we] eat.

## Lessons Learned in Research Planning, Design, and Data Collection

Most of our lessons learned while conducting research to support our unit requests for information and HTS requirements related to collaboration; team work; sharing and exchanging ideas, knowledge, and information; and recognizing strengths and weaknesses via conversation and dialogue to satisfy our customers. Overall, these efforts also helped facilitate interaction with diverse individuals and groups within the Afghan terrain.

Those lessons discussed here include:

- Positive outcomes of team planning and design collaboration.
- Bilingual field data collection with team input and support.
- Literacy challenges.
- Understanding host country sensitivities.
- Orthography challenges.
- Linguistic strategies of successful intergroup communication.

In Afghanistan, several factors may challenge or enhance successful data collection ranging from verbal/nonverbal language communication and comprehension issues to sociocultural constraints, taboos, fear and concerns about personal safety and well-being. There is lingering fear, for instance, that when NATO and Coalition Forces do pull out, all hell might simply break loose and the less powerful, ordinary citizens would suffer the brunt.

## Positive Collaborative Team Planning and Design Outcomes

Experience teaches that whenever people with diverse backgrounds (differences in education, ethnicity, race, provenance, nationality, language, religion, gender, etc.) gather together, there is bound to be discord, friction, disagreement, contention, or even fighting. Objectivity, excellent communication skills, a cooperative spirit, a sense of humor, and respect for self and others, topped by the professionalism required by one's position must supersede all personality traits that feed and drive conflict. How do HTT team members from diverse educational, professional, and disciplinary backgrounds work together to conduct research?

In planning and designing research protocols, everyone comes to the table to participate as fully as possible in the entire process. We found this an effective antidote to failed collection experiences, which we had a few times early in our mission. We learned to use all our English and Dari sociocultural and linguistic resources to create more effective tools everyone was conversant and familiar with, rather than just the sole property of 'the team social scientist.' This deviates from conventional scholarly academic research practice in which sole responsibility for research project planning, design, and implementation belongs to the 'principal (research) investigator' and/or 'co-investigators' (depending on the type of research.) Theater research experience has taught us differently.

Teamwork has been one of the principle cornerstones of HTS operations as a theater support element providing sociocultural understanding to fill knowledge gaps that help commanders and battlefield brigades plan and execute missions with non-kinetic options. This is in sharp contrast with cultural advisory roles where chances often exist for one person or individual to sway information and decision making based on a sole subjective perspective mistaken for a much larger sociocultural worldview.

When questions were designed for focus group elicitation and discussion, they were done so simultaneously in English and Dari. Using the question below, its equivalent or the closest Dari approximation is constructed, reviewed, and critiqued until final agreement is reached on its appropriate correspondence. Failing this, we might tweak the question a bit without changing its intended eliciting theme and focus. The literal construction below in Dari is a word-by-word example of how the language pieces together its own ideas to roughly match its English counterpart, an integral part of the interpreter's or translator's analytic process in doing his job.

"As a citizen, what would you do to end endemic corruption in the country?"

**(Dari)** *Baheye- say yak Afghan az-een momlakhat, khodit chi mekooni keh fisaaat –edaari az bane bohbarree?*

**(Literally)** As one Afghan from country, you what would do like corruption end this?

Tailoring a question to elicit native language and cultural insights helps generate positive thinking and socioculturally rich responses that provide operationally relevant information. Some role playing also helps learning from each other's disciplines, professional experiences, strengths and weaknesses. We also found team collaboration most suited to our respective professional and sociocultural backgrounds, allowing us to think, reflect, and critique our own work, in order to help us gain even better insights into individual and collective experiences.

## Bilingual Field Data Collection with Team Input and Support

The team collaboration framework is also applied in our bilingual data collection approach. It similarly entails team participation, while using our two Afghan American HTAs as moderators/facilitators to conduct some of our interviews, focus group discussions, and other information gathering activities. Both are formally educated, very proficient and competent in Dari and English with capabilities such as those discussed above.[8] In another distinctive bilingual role, they both also serve as team 'Gate Keepers,' monitoring and checking propriety, veracity, and accuracy of language, sociocultural and other related information found in the data.

These moderators/facilitators as principal collectors in our Afghan theater experience essentially bring to the team the kind of chemistry required to sync with this population of which they are an intrinsic part socioculturally and linguistically. They seem to ignite a spirit of bonding that helps generate special interest and eagerness within the target research population to connect culturally, socially, and linguistically with them. As with our collaboration in research planning-design, our entire team also participates in bilingual collection with each person assigned individual roles to help drive collection. Physical considerations are important as well. Seating is specially arranged in close proximity to encourage more group interaction, rapport, and frank and open discussion.

By rotating moderator roles, we get a sense of what and how to improve on our collection methods. There are subtleties of language embedded in a speech community's worldview that an outsider is not necessarily privy to, unless learned or taught. For instance, we had designed a question on demographics, especially 'ethnicity,' asking participants in Dari what their *Qawm* was, having learned from some open and secondary sources that the word refers to 'ethnicity' rather than 'tribe.'

We found out, however, from the participants that *Milliyat* is a more accurate term used to identify someone as *Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, or Pashtun.* We then rephrased the question as: 'Of what ethnicity are you?' or *Milliyat-eton chi ist?* (literally, "Ethnicity which one is it for you.") rather than our original question "*Qwam-eton chi ist?*" with multiple referential meanings.

Our English-Dari moderator is positioned to sanction the interpreter's bilingual proficiency and correct any errors of interpretation or meaning in the message content of the question-response. Meanwhile, the rest of the team would be engaged in observing, taking detailed notes and 'eyewitness' accounts of events, and participating when necessary.

Two fairly simple rules and procedures helped guide our collection:

1. The rest of the team would be 'Observer-Participants' listening and following the conversations interpreted from Dari and writing extensive field notes.
2. Some limited interruption would be allowed to help guide the group moderation, such as prompting on follow-up questions or probes as needed.

At the end of 45 to 60 minute session, the rest of the team was allowed to ask one question before the moderator revealed his/her true Afghan identity by speaking to the group in Dari and having an Afghan 'rap session' so to speak; with a final 'thank you' (*Tashakur*) and 'goodbye' (*Khuda Hafiz*) to end the session.

## The Literacy Factor and Development

Relative native literacy is one factor of critical importance in nearly every aspect of development within a country. Literacy is the level or ability to which a population can read and write in addition to speaking one or any number of languages. Afghanistan's total population literacy rate is still estimated at only about 28 percent, not only in English or other languages, but especially the two

major official national languages, Dari and Pashto.[9] Higher levels of literacy would obviously be a tremendous strength and asset in further accelerating the multiple efforts and resources being invested to build and reinstate the country's long term security, stability, economic growth, and sovereignty.[10] The country's critical mass of young people, estimated to be close to 70 percent of the population, represent the next generation of Afghan leadership that needs strong solid, educational foundations, knowledge and enlightenment in democratic governance, security reform and rule of law.

## Understanding Host Culture Sensitivities

A veteran translator/interpreter gave us an eye-opener relating to illiteracy interfering in data collection in the Afghan human terrain (similar revelations were experienced in similar conditions in other parts of the world.) We were informed that interviews not only scripted but facilitated in English, usually with the researcher using documents and writing tool to conduct interviews, can be very intimidating to the average citizen, in whose perception or imagination the researcher is simply a government or foreign agent who knows the answers to the very questions being asked, simply to get someone in trouble. This sensitivity might be a result of fear once lived and/or experienced, especially during the country's protracted history of factional conflict and violence.

It is also likely people may simply feel embarrassed that some stranger, knowing full well how low educational achievement standards and literacy skills are, is just trying to be cynical or laugh at them. On the other hand, if the script were in Dari, it might probably be accommodated in most parts of the country. This is partly because Dari brings everything closer to home, that preferred comfort zone of cultural familiarity, safety and easy communicative interaction for both native speakers and their larger speech community. Such cultural challenges also bring to light the 'insider-outsider' dynamics of interaction, in which the 'foreigner' and foreign language are often held suspect by locals till proven right or wrong.

In addition, the public perception seems to be that anyone, internationals or LNs alike, self identified or associated with Coalition Forces, is simply not to be trusted, at least not as much as non governmental agencies and world organizations (such as the United Nations, the United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, United Nations Development Program, World Health Organization, etc.) whose declared agenda is 'helping and working with the Afghan people.' Coalition partners are believed to be GIRoA's strongest allies and are, by default, lumped in with everything negative associated with the Karzai regime. Therefore, the argument goes that all Coalition Forces, their allies, agents, employees (interpreters/translators/linguists/cultural analysts) and surrogates are generally not to be trusted or confided in.[11]

## Some Linguistic Strategies of Successful Communication

Linguistic barriers posed by diction or word choice in English (making it difficult to provide satisfactory meaning in the host language (Dari or Pashto)), to roughly match that in English and vice versa) can also be a formidable challenge. These difficulties occur when translating Standard English, specifically sociocultural concepts, and metaphorical and idiomatic usage framed in unfamiliar sociocultural and linguistic contexts. Some of those difficulties were identified in responses to our short informal interview which was designed in English.

Short Informal Interview on Interpreting/Translating

[Interviewee Title ONLY:_____]
[Date: / /2011]
[Location:_____]

1. What difficulties do you encounter {experience}/have you encountered {experienced} interpreting and or translating texts/discourse/conversation {treated as redundancy in Dari Syntax} from English to Dari/Pashto and vice versa?

2. How were you able to overcome {deal with} those difficulties, and why do you believe your strategy worked?

Some of the difficulties were the use of:

- Technical terminology ('core competencies,' 'capabilities,' 'milestones,' etc.)
- Abbreviations/Acronyms (AWOL, CLB, IMET, etc.)
- Use of lengthy paragraphs, sentences and 'phrase wordings.'

Another difficulty was described as 'nonsense Dari texts,' meaning English words, phraseology, idioms, and proverbs (like 'the squeaking wheel gets the grease') which makes absolutely no sense if translated in Dari other than giving us a literal nonsensical Dari meaning, as shown in the example: *Az-tyrey ke sadah kuna charb kunin*–(literally, "From wheel that squeaks oil do it.")

A respondent tried to explain further:"…And it goes vice versa, for example in Dari there is expression we say *Choobey* (Stick) *Khuda* (God) *Sadah* (Voice) *Nadara* (doesn't have) which means with translation that: "God's beating with a stick has no voice," which means when God wants to punish someone it will not be heard but will be seen."

This next example from the short two-question interview we administered was designed to test interpretability and or translatability of an L1 word or expression to an equivalent in L2, in this case, English to Dari in a typical spoken and or written text interpretation/translation scenario. Respondents had difficulty interpreting the underlined words partly due to incomprehension, but also because they were not familiar with them in their limited vocabulary and knowledge of English. As a result, changes had to be made by substituting 'simpler' English words for those underlined to accommodate communication without however, losing the thematic sense of the English question itself. The words in 'brace notation' convention were some suggestions made to replace the underlined words based on respondents' approximation of their Dari or Pashto interpretation or translation.

Referring to them as "these complicated words; hard to understand," suggestions were made to replace or substitute for them simpler words, such as 'experience/experienced' for encounter/encountered, and 'likewise/similarly/the same' for vice versa. A likely substitution for the *text/discourse/conversation* might be: Een jamla roh (literally 'this saying/expression/sentence, etc.) as provided by our analysts:

As demonstrated, paraphrasing, a common bilingual strategy, can be used in inter-language communication to break down words in order to show basic/literal meaning through the use of other word collocations with the final meaning roughly matching the original source language word. And though a safety net needs to be in place to apply accuracy and veracity checks, the native speakers of a second language are often the very ones who will bring to their interlocutor's attention disparities of meaning that they believe they see or hear from a piece of text or discourse translated into their language.[12]

Some interpreters and translators told us they got around their different challenges in a variety of ways: 'getting many more details and information about the system; asking the source where the translations came from; attending a great number of meetings; asking for clarification of technical terminologies and abbreviations,' and so forth.

## A Note on Orthography

Afghanistan's official orthography is in the Arabic script. This practice is not very common among most non-Muslims and westerners whose languages are mostly scripted in Roman alphabet letters, Greek, International Phonetic Alphabet symbols, etc.[13] Therefore, an English text or written communication interpreted and/or written in Dari or Pashto would still need the services of literate speakers of those languages to guide them through literal meaning(s), word-by-word or phrase-by-phrase. That could be quite a challenge.

This is not meant to diminish the importance of a well established orthography, but sociocultural research protocol might find it useful adopting Roman orthographic conventions to gain a better understanding of Dari, Pashto, and other Afghan languages. To get around this barrier, we sometimes encouraged our English proficient language facilitators to attempt writing the sentence or utterance and word components as they might look in Roman script ('American English'.) Using language transcription experience, we work with facilitators and interpreters to pronounce the words while they or I attempt spelling them out to at least help figure out some rough phonetic approximation of the sounds. Some interpreters however, did not, at first seem thrilled about helping figure out literal meanings in order to get some sense of the English original until they practiced doing so a few times realizing it gave them some linguistic insights into their own language!

## Conclusion

In this article, we discussed group collective experiences and lessons learned designing English-Dari

bilingual research protocols and applications in field data collection, along with the challenges and ways to circumvent them successfully. First, self-interrogation and dialogue led to further thinking and action on how best we would be able to provide as much operationally relevant information on beliefs and values of Afghan society as possible, especially deeply embedded sociocultural meanings that are primarily learned from detailed exploration of language use and communicative behavior.

Second, probably the best interpreter or translator is someone who has excellent to outstanding bilingual communication skills in both source and target languages, preferably backed by at least some basic knowledge, competencies, and understanding of the sociocultural contexts of the specific country in which each language is used. The job market for these occupations appears to tailor its ads to some of those qualifications.[14]

Third, it might sometimes be deceptive to think that an interpreted piece of work represents clear understanding and knowledge of both the interpreter's language and ours, to be able to mediate communication accurately back and forth from source to target language. It might useful to write what we hear using conventions modeled after the Roman alphabet and IPA, especially to make communication easier, more effective and accessible to a much larger audience of partners and consumers.

Finally, probably one of our most significant and interesting cultural findings was discovering that early rapport established between interviewers/moderators and individuals or groups, and surprisingly irrespective of gender or nationality, could be a strategic move in collecting rich, operationally relevant data in multilingual societies.[15]

**Endnotes**

1. I would like to acknowledge and thank HTT AF13 teammates, Research Manager Mr. Tommie Hollins Sr., HTAs, Ms. Lailoma Nayabkhil and Mr. Mohammad Yousafi, and recently redeployed Team Leader Dr. Fred Van Dusen, for their team spirit, support, and willingness to share their individual and group experiences conducting socio-cultural research in the Afghan human terrain that made this article possible. Without their input, I would not have been able to boldly formulate and craft these thoughts and ideas; however, they are not responsible for any shortcomings. Special thanks to K2 Dr. Jackie D. Kem NTM-A/CSTC-A for unit support and intellectual encouragement to make this a worthwhile DAC venture, and to CJ2, FDO, and PAO directorates for additional support.

2. The communicative process is dynamic rather than static and, therefore, involves verbal and nonverbal cues, kinetics, culture specific rules of proxemics, tone, and so forth–all part of the entire package that conveys meaning from one agency to another.

3. Formal linguistics training and years of teaching and research helped generate interest in how people of different linguistic and cultural backgrounds communicate effectively, since I faced similar challenges translating and/or interpreting English into many African languages. The question is to what degree of satisfaction can one interpret or translate from one language to another if a language uses certain concepts the other does not even know? Put another way, can we evenly match a structured document written in English, for instance, using a certain genre, repertoire or register, with that of another language, say Dari? The article describes some firsthand experiences facing and dealing with some of these problems.

4. Those referred to as 'Local Nationals' are Afghan citizens, residents living in their country, working as interpreters and/or translators for Coalition Forces and International Community. This is as opposed to Afghan American citizens with U.S passports, two of whom are our HTAs.

5. *Comparison to Translation* at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/interpreting, Accessed 6 July 2011.

6. Dell Hymes (1964), Muriel Saville-Troike (2008, 3e), and others, postulate the theory of an ethnography of communication involved in this complex sociocultural linguistic communicative process that features as many 'events' of verbal and non verbal communication as possible each with individual speech and non speech 'acts' involved in their accomplishment from inception to conclusion.

7. Contrary to conventional belief, translating from one language to another rarely results in exact one-to-one correspondence or equivalence in meaning, if at all. Semantic equivalence between two very different languages, especially those with distinct cultures and societies, is likely improbable. What one often ends up with as translated text is roughly an 'approximation' of elicited meaning couched specifically in the interpreter's informed interpretation of native speakers' collective knowledge about the specific subject of translation. That is, what he/she thinks it might mean to co-native speakers and interlocutors. Our caveat is therefore: in trying to understand our theater host nation's socio-cultural characteristics through language and affiliated forms of communicative behavior, we must use inter-reliability checks of translation samples until one that best suits/matches the general sense of its English original can be found.

8. Ideally, where resources are available, a five member HTT operating in the Afghan theater where gender sensitivities appear to be high should include two Human Terrain Analysts, a male and female, in addition to a Team Leader, Research Manager and Social Scientist.

9. In the absence of more reliable, recent data since the country's last census was conducted in 2004, much of its demographics are built around various statistical surveys cast in rough estimates, such as its population at around 29-31 million, and literacy rate "supposedly at 28 percent..." (NTMA-/CSTC-A Constellation Working Group Updates, EXSUM for Patrick Walters: Interview with Dr. Kem, 11 Mar 2011; from Frederic Bobin, South Asia *Le Monde* Bureau Chief, interviewed Dr. Jack Kem, Deputy to the Commander of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, 17 June 2011. At https://cstca.oneteam.centcom.mil; Accessed Sunday, 7 August 2011.)

10. Literacy and education are pivotal to any serious discussion concerning developmental policy or aid geared toward accelerating economic growth, stability, and social well-being of peoples in post conflict nations like Afghanistan and Sierra Leone. Without significant numbers that can read and write, first in their own languages and then in subsequent others including English, which has steadily grown into a global lingua franca, it can be a serious challenge communicating about partnerships and supports that help build strong institutions of governance, security and leadership, accountability, sound and ethical financial management, capabilities to properly channel and develop human capital and natural resources toward the right goals and objectives serving the nation.

11. This mindset might help us all understand or explain why at any given time, significant parts of this population, irrespective of geographic provenance, continue to believe that Coalition Forces, especially U.S. troops, are simply here to occupy Afghanistan and take a part of its wealth and riches in natural assets and resources, thanks to the help of their infamously corrupt president.

12. This was the case especially with some of our draft questionnaires translated in Dari. For example, the case of a unit appointed translator who questioned me several times on his way to coming up with a translation of my original English protocol, expressing difficulty understanding certain words in the text of the questionnaire. Interestingly, his rendition when checked by another more experienced, long time translator/interpreter was simply dismissed as unacceptable Dari, calling it Farsi (the Iranian dialect of Persian, which by the way Dari also is.)

13. The English language, like several European and African languages I am familiar with, is written in Roman and Greek alphabet characters, therefore, some word spellings tend to be arbitrary and iconic in pronunciation rather than onomatopoeic. Some African languages, for example Mende, Lorma and Bandi, spoken in Sierra Leone and Liberia, have also tapped into the universal sound inventory of the IPA, supposed to contain characters representing every language's basic sounds combined to form words, to create their standard orthography.

14. For instance, while the first of these two job ads culled from open sources includes only 'Duties & Responsibilities' and 'Qualifications', the second, more detailed, professional and demanding job ad requires applicants' performance capabilities in three major 'Duties & Responsibilities' (oral interpretation, written translation (English to Dari or Pashtu and vice versa), and assisting staff on substantive issues; 'Competencies' (corporate, functional, development and operational effectiveness); 'Required Skills and Experience' (education & experience–K through12 grad, BA in English, Cert in Translation, etc.); 'language requirements' (English, Dari, Pashto fluency, etc.) Both ads are clear in differentiating interpreting and translation job responsibilities and assignments. At (http://www.arianajobs.com/afghanjobs/view-5509.html. Accessed 7 July 2011 from Interpreter (FOB Lindsey Project)–Jobs in Afghanistan, and UN Jobs at http://unjobs.org/vancancies/1270526025658, Accessed 7July 2011 from Vacancy: Interpreter/Translator UNDP, Afghanistan (Number of Vacant Post Multiple).

15. This might sound contradictory to the commonly held belief and practice that it is strictly taboo for males and females to mix, unless a male relative escorts a female, for instance leaving the family home or compound to go out in public. All the males that our female HTA interacted with seemed awed when she spoke in Dari after interviews and appeared to admire and evince pride that an Afghan and woman was doing this job, speaking fluent American English and looking like a typical American female. There seemed to be free flow of information with group members trying to attract our female moderator's undivided attention and perhaps, bond with her.

*Defining Moments in MI History*




Fort Huachuca became the "Home for Military Intelligence" when the Intelligence Center and School was officially created. The Intelligence School was formerly located at Fort Holabird, Maryland. The relocation made possible the long-range goal of consolidating all Army intelligence training at a single location.

# HTT Coverage of Afghan Women's Perceptions and Perspectives: The Commonly Forgotten Community

***The views expressed are those of the author and not those of the U.S. Army, TRADOC, HTS, or CJSOTF-A.***

**by Rheanna R. Rutledge, PhD**

## Introduction

This article reflects some of the sociocultural findings stemming from rich contextual dialogue with female members of the respective communities in which Coalition Forces (CF) operate. It demonstrates the enhancement capabilities of gaining comprehensive community-wide perspectives (to include females) and the development of a holistic look at the human terrain in order to better understand the battle space. The resulting high-level analysis connecting sociocultural snapshots assists in better informing battle space owners in order to achieve the most positive interactions on the ground as possible. These interactions are critical to mission success.

Military intention is not to attempt to liberate Afghan women from oppression; rather, it is to address women's concerns and listen to their perspectives as valued members of the communities the Commands support. The perceptions and perspectives of Afghan women are rarely adequately addressed by researchers and military Commands. One example of research that tapped into this area is a Human Terrain Team (HTT) study of women in Greater Zangabad, Panjwai District, Kandahar Province, conducted during Spring 2011. An HTT female Social Scientist was able to assess women's perspectives resulting in data that provided valuable, operationally relevant information with regard to women's (and entire community) perspectives and needs in the Zangabad area. The study informed the Military Decision Making Process, provided a valuable sociocultural foundation, and recommended a culturally sensitive, community-inclusive way forward.

Within in the population women influence the viewpoints of their family, especially throughout the process of raising their children, and have a significant impact on familial finances (economy.) They are an integral part of the social fabric that makes up the communities in which we operate. Further, when Commands treat Afghan women as respected, valued members of society that are worthy of being listened to, it models positive behavior which may be observed and hopefully later mimicked by the local population. Most Afghans respect their women, albeit they do not always have Western viewpoints. Respectful interactions, especially conducted by females, as was the case in the highlighted study, promote positive Afghan/Coalition Forces (CF) relations.

## Methodological Overview

One female HTT member spent approximately three focused weeks embedded with U.S. Forces, conducting an assessment of the Greater Zangabad Area. The end state of the overall effort was to collect operationally relevant information on "white situational awareness" to support the Command. The primary focus of the embed was to obtain sociocultural data, and circumstances allowed for field study and analysis of women's community issues.

The HTT member participated in patrols, key leader engagements, and women's *shuras* through-

out the area. Patrols focused on interacting with the local population, including business and agricultural leaders, maliks, mullahs, government officials, elders, teachers, a midwife, village housewives, and children. While interactions included both men and women in the area of operations (AO), this document primarily focuses on interactions with the women. Interviews were only conducted with consenting, adult members of the populace.

The methodology utilized for gathering female related perceptions and community issues was designed in support of the Command in order to assess female social influences, grievances, and needs. Command efforts addressing female related community issues will impact overall community perceptions/attitudes and may influence behavior toward CF and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), with the potential of hindering negative outside influencers' effectiveness.

While it is understood there is discourse throughout the academic and social communities surrounding the semantics of the word 'woman' versus 'female,' the terminology used here commonly uses 'female' in order to capture the age ranges that 'women' may eliminate. The focus here is not on debating semantics, but rather to capture the more essential dialogue surrounding these community-centric issues.

## Politics

There is little to no direct political involvement by women in the Greater Zangabad area. Males are the predominant political figureheads, although females may have an indirect role in the political system. Their potential for indirect involvement requires further exploration. Most issues on which the HTT spoke to the women were met with an extraordinarily open response. However, perceptions of leadership yielded very little female response other than neutrality at best. More commonly no opinion at all was expressed.

A few women did express concern that their voices were not being heard in the political system and that they were not being taken as seriously as their male counterparts. For example, an elderly woman, whose husband is deceased, expressed that she is completely destitute and can hardly survive. She claimed her land had been part of controlled detonations destroying much of her property. It will take years to replace the crop destroyed. She stated her claim was pushed off and she was continually told to come back at a later date. Frustrations such as this with CF/GIRoA may lead women to seek outside support by outside negative influencers, especially for vulnerable populations.

GIRoA led programs have been predominantly focused on the men in the population. There are assets out there to provide support to the female population, such as teacher and midwife training. However, women in the Greater Zangabad area are either not aware of such programs or the initiatives have not yet reached them. GIRoA programs which reach out to family units, including the women in the household, if done so in a culturally sensitive way, would likely increase community support of GIRoA.

## Military Impact

While on patrols and engaging the female population with the all-female Cultural Support Team (CST), it was clear that after almost every engagement the local women were more at ease with CF and began to develop a rapport with the female HTT member and the CST. The local females' demeanors most often changed from an initial nervous tension to having a light hearted interaction which yielded insight and information pertaining to their own issues (such as medical), security concerns, and other critical information.

The CST also held weekly women's shuras, commonly with additional female medics in attendance, which was of great assistance to the local women to answer health concerns. Topics and themes of the weekly shuras varied. Attendance gradually increased and women often brought their girls and infants to the meetings. Some women present discouraged others from conversing and remained somewhat skeptical of CF. The CST worked on developing positive interactions with those present and other women in the community. Women were invited to the weekly shura by the CST while out on patrols. Many local women expressed they couldn't attend because of the distance, they were not sure if their husband or male figure in the home would allow them, and especially because of security concerns. Husbands and/or the male figurehead of the homes were always asked for their permission for the women to attend the weekly shura. Males in this community make this type of decision in their

homes, thus asking for permission implies respect and increases likelihood of attendance.

Women commonly expressed an absolute fear of CF planes overhead. This was, in part, a fear of attack but also that the planes were able to see into their compounds, thus seeing them without modest dress. At one location, men from the community came to our compound for an impromptu shura at their own request to address the issue of a female that they claimed was inappropriately searched by Soldiers. This act is currently unsubstantiated; however, it is a reminder of the sensitivity of the population about searching and inappropriate interactions with females.

## Economic Impact of Women

Women reported that they mostly do household chores, care for their household animals, prepare food, and care for the children. Some women also attend to fields out of necessity. Local women were quick to share their talent for needlework and/or jewelry making, etc. They do these things for their own family and not as a business. There are no restrictions in the Qu'ran for women working outside the home. Some women have expressed they have no desire to do any form of work other than their primary role as a housewife.

Engagement and marriage practices have a large economic impact on families. Engaged females in the population are forbidden by custom to provide any source of income from work. This is seen as a disgrace to her fiancé, and a failure to provide for her family. Engaged females who work are viewed by the community as a complete dishonor. Girls marry at around age 15 into an arranged marriage. While male children are preferred, the dowry for females provides their families a large sum of money. Locals (who commonly overly exaggerate numbers) stated widely varying estimates of the associated costs.

HTT assesses the price paid by the fiancé for the bride (bride price) is $5,000 to $10,000. The actual costs appear to be associated with the status of the family. The female's family is responsible for making or obtaining new clothing for every member including children of the fiancé's family. This heavy price may lead a fiancée or female's family to seek CF funds or funds by negative influencers. One family admitted to having sold their 8 and 11 year old daughters for marriage in order to cover family debts.

Any initiative altering the economic state should be carefully and strongly considered before implementation. For example, initiatives such as the eradication of poppy fields could have second and third order effects impacting the entire community in ways that are inhumane by Western standards.

## Social/Hierarchical Structures

The social hierarchical structure of women in Greater Zangabad is influenced by several characteristics. These include, but are not limited to age, wealth, and childbearing ability.




**Hierarchical Structure of Women in Greater Zangabad. (Based on preliminary findings only. Further investigation required in order to yield more conclusive evidence.)**

Women beyond childbearing age generally have more freedom to leave the compound, more so than any other female family members. Further, the senior female in the home, as long as she has all of her faculties, makes internal decisions relating to female family members. For example, a mother-in-law has the authority to delegate particular labor tasks to female members and restrict or allow freedom in and out of the compound. The overall decisions related to freedom of movement in the community are up to the senior male family member, but the senior female member has great power to influence this in the internal female structure.

Family wealth does appear to impact social status of women in Greater Zangabad. Females who

can afford nicer clothing and who may even wear makeup and expensive jewelry tend to hold a higher status. Women, such as an elderly woman wearing her only piece of clothing which was torn to shreds, were talked about and perceived negatively. This was viewed firsthand at a weekly women's shura where other women were talking about the poor elderly woman as if she were not present. Wealth, family lineage, and social network appear to be interrelated. Marriage tends to take place within similar social strata, keeping wealth and status closely linked to certain family lineages.

**Female Interview in Kandahar City**

The ability for women to conceive a child, especially a male, influences status. Women who are incapable of conceiving were embarrassed and perceived by men and women as not being able to perform an obligatory duty. A large family is seen as a blessing. Women who do not provide children or who consistently provide female children may be pushed aside by the husband in order for him to seek another wife who is more capable in this duty. Divorce is highly uncommon (none reported in this area) and quality of treatment and respect/hierarchy of women is influenced by childbearing.

A woman's education appears to have some bearing on social hierarchy. Most women do not have any, or have very little, formal education. Women such as the certified midwife have what appears to be a higher social status within the general population, suggesting that, for some fields of education, there is a higher level of respect and hierarchy associated.

Women have informal roles that influence the men in the community. For example, wives have the right to accept or reject their husband taking another wife. They can also prevent marriages by claims (true or not) that the two proposed in marriage are milk-related (breastfed by the same woman). The extent to which women use this has not been examined in Greater Zangabad but it is a known custom. Local women did report a common form of exchange ritual. A daughter from one family is commonly married into a family where one of its daughters is married into the first family. This creates a balance that is meant to assure each wife is treated well due to a perceived reciprocity of treatment.

There are social norms not common to the Western world especially regarding surrounding engagement and wedding practices. For example, a girl may commonly disfigure herself before her wedding (scratching her face, pulling hair, crying for days on end, etc.) The more distraught she looks, the more it shows she does not want to get married, so she is a 'good girl.' If she appears happy it comes across as though she is ready for sexual encounters making her seem like a 'loose woman' within the community. One girl at a shura, around 15 years of age, came across as having very mixed feelings about getting married. She was somewhat shy to talk about marriage, as is customary. Marriages are arranged with little say from the female to be married.

## Medical Care

There are few accessible medical resources existing in Greater Zangabad. Women in the local population especially have difficulty obtaining health care. Several women reported having gone years without a proper medical exam, and many have had ailments for long periods of time. Women are the primary caregivers for the family and are among the most susceptible to disease (along with children and the elderly.) Most of these women are either not permitted to seek medical attention from a male medical professional or do not choose to seek it in cases other than emergencies. Commonly these women sought medical attention from the CST and/or CF medics for themselves and their children. While this creates a positive interaction and opportunity for dialogue, it is not sustainable once the CF leave and may reduce the perceived effectiveness of GIRoA efforts. Yet, medical care is seemingly the most efficient bond that unites local women to the

CF, providing an excellent opportunity for dialog. It is a positive rapport-building tool.

For treatment of serious incidents and, in some cases, for childbirth, locals make the trip to major medical centers of Kandahar City or seek CF assistance. There is one certified midwife HTT interviewed who is willing to train others in her craft and to assist with training the community in other basic health care needs. The CF have also consistently spread healthcare related messages with regard to the need for boiling water. Women state they now boil the water but it is common to see family members drinking and bathing directly out of the wadis (water systems similar to canals.) Fruits and vegetables are also washed with this water. This is of medical concern as the wadis are contaminated with sewage.

Lack of proper sanitary conditions in the AO cannot feasibly be changed in all circumstances. For example, diapers are not used so it is customary for women to let their infants urinate in their clothing. When the infant cries they take the pants off, let them dry and put them back on. The child essentially wanders around without pants until the clothing is dry. During this process the infant is not cleaned and may urinate again in the household area. Introduction of cloth diapers may appear to be an answer. However, cloth diapers would introduce other issues. Considering the cloth diapers would be washed in the wadi system (already contaminated with urine and fecal matter) this attempt at increasing sanitary conditions would likely backfire.

Women reported their family's medications are commonly purchased from Pakistan at roadside pharmacies. There is reportedly a complete lack of oversight for these pharmacies, thus making the medication potentially harmful to patients. Women have commonly said that the medical attention and pharmaceuticals they have received have been ineffective.

Dispensing birth control (condoms and pills) may have both positive and negative impacts to overall perceptions of CF/GIRoA. Both males and females in the community have asked for contraception. This is often largely due to already large family sizes, the economic strain to support large families, and the strain on a woman's body to continually have so many children. Some married couples report wanting the ability to be intimate without the repercussions of pregnancy.

## Education

While historically local Afghan girls received an education, years have now passed with little to no formal education for them in the population. The Taliban have expressed discontent for girls' education and few families with females are willing to risk the security issues related to sending their girls to school. As of this study, there was no formal school at all to which to send their children.

In one location, locals stated that males and females are educated (at an informal school) each by their own gender and are taught religion, including reading the Qu'ran, along with mathematics lessons taught in two sessions per day with over 20 children in attendance. In another location, male and female children were seen carrying the Qu'ran and, when asked if they could read, they replied "yes."

During one women's weekly shura, women present said they would like to have their children, both boys and girls, educated. Their concerns were the security risks and retaliation by the insurgents (INS). Some female children in attendance demonstrated they knew some Pashto letters and numbers. They are said to have had no schooling but it was clear some informal schooling is taking place. These children were eager to learn more and to show what they could do. The women too expressed an interest in education. One woman, a local midwife, stated she would be willing to educate other women in her craft.

There are also programs implemented by CF in the area where families are provided with learning materials and radios for lessons to be conducted in the privacy of their homes. This program eliminates the need for families to leave the compound, thus reducing security issues related to education. Even with the positive education efforts in the local villages, there is a short supply of formally trained educators. Most children do not attend any schooling at all and without this education run the risk of being vulnerable to manipulation, especially by INS when it comes to their religion. Along with security, education is viewed as a primary community need. One elderly woman stated it best when she said: *"It*

*is a miracle to see women such as you writing and educated. I want that for the future generation."*

## Conclusion

Perspectives and issues addressed in this field study demonstrate a few of the many sociocultural findings that branch from extended dialogue with female members of the communities in which CF operate. Acquiring a comprehensive community-wide perspective is not achieved by only interviewing and engaging with men in a population. While it is not always possible to engage in a culturally sensitive way with Afghan women if there are no female members on a patrol, this does not provide justification for not seeking out viable alternatives such as the CST, female HTTs to conduct assessments, and the like.

Truly holistic views of a community require analysis across segments of the population. HTTs throughout Afghanistan seek to understand the complex nature of the communities in which our forces operate. One of the strong points of the Human Terrain System (HTS) is in its capacity to gather sociocultural human terrain data derived directly from on-the-ground field research. Many HTTs across Afghanistan (as well as Human Terrain Analysis Teams and above) are composed of both female and male members. This allows a team access to a segment of the population that may be otherwise ignored. While it is not being suggested here that female HTT members should focus solely on women's issues in any community, it is part of an HTS capability set that has been used to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the environment.

Highlighted in this article are some of the dynamics of the hierarchical structure and examined aspects of women's roles and perspectives in the examined community. Women in this population, and throughout all of Afghanistan, are highly influenced by tribal and other cultural norms, as well other factors inherent to their environment. Examining these impacts as part of the analysis that is already being conducted creates a more accurate picture and increases CF community-wide understanding.

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Detail from "Brigade in the Attack", Marlo Acevedo, 1991, Watercolor, from the U.S. Army Art Collection.

**Defining Moments in MI History**

**1991**

The U.S. Army was going on 215 years of age in Februray 1991 when it overwhelmed the formations of Saddam Hussein south of the Euphrates River. MI had been around for the Army's entire lifetime often no more than an afterthought in its youth, but increasingly critical to its successes as it matured. It was in Vietnam that the discipline of intelligence learned its lessons and emerged in the U.S. Army as a well organized body of expertise designed to respond to the needs of the combat comander, a doctrinal awakening championed by Lt. Gen. Phillip Davidson and others. The MI Corps, established in 1987 was vetted in the operations in Grenada, Panama, and finally, the Persian Gulf.

# A Case Study of the Rural Human Terrain and Deep Engagements in Kandahar

by Gregory Cabrera

***The views expressed are those of the author and not those of U.S. Army, TRADOC, HTS, and CJSOTF-A.***

## Introduction

This article reflects upon stability operations in a rural district of Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, based on a year of ethnographic-inspired field research and anthropological analysis. The research and analysis supported both civilian and military efforts aimed at stabilizing a predominately rural district. Initially, relatively little was known about the district and it was not clear how district government functioned. This information is salient because of its size and that the district is considered by power brokers to be the heart of the rural insurgency. Physically, its mountainous terrain serves as a natural sanctuary for insurgent operations. Socially, its people have long maintained their ways of life with little to no support from the provincial government.

The result is that it is difficult to generalize about the region because it is comprised of numerous micro-regions that are themselves distinct. Understanding these challenges is essential because stability operations are an inherently complex process of incorporating various aspects of government, security, and development to unstable areas or insurgent-dominated regions. In this article, I will demonstrate that conditions affecting the district government came to shape the qualitative aspect of the work and courses of action on the ground. More importantly, I will highlight the role of interpretation at the tactical level and shed light on people who work at the most basic levels of rural district government.

## Background on Rural Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, the rural population is estimated at 75 percent of the country's 30 million people. Historically, centralized government has had little importance to people at the rural village level. According to Barfield and Nojumi, governments that have maintained a functioning state structure have relied on a minimalist approach that utilizes non-state mediators to address grievances at regional and local levels.[1] This kind of system favored the preservation of informal institutions and community autonomy all the while avoiding interference from centralized government. During the Musahiban period from 1929 to 1978, a period of peace and stability in Afghanistan, Barfield highlights:

> ***"Political stability in rural Afghanistan under the Musahibans rested on the tacit recognition of two distinct power structures: the provincial and subprovincial administrations, which were arms of the central government, and tribal or village structures indigenous to each region. While the central government had been effective in expanding its power into the countryside, its goals were limited to encapsulating local political structures in order to prevent them from causing trouble. It never attempted to displace or transform the deep-rooted social organizations in which most people lived out their lives."*** [2]

Further, analysis by Groh examines the nature of rural Pashtuns and the relationship to government and authority in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Groh argues that policy should reflect the social structure encompassed by Pashtunawali, a code of principles rooted in honor and reputation that has come to define the identity of Pashtuns.[3]

British (1849-1947), Pakistani (1947-present), and Russian (1979-1989) governments in Afghanistan failed to account for the social structure and tribal customs that are central to the lives of rural Pashtuns. In the end, each government had only marginal success in imposing control or authority over Pashtun tribes because their policies were either misguided or too suppressive. Regimes that insisted on greater state authority incited insurgencies against them.

Recent findings from the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit indicate the situation for local government policy at the district level is too complex and confused for district officials and is hampered by the dysfunctions of development planning, under-resourced administration, and pervasive corruption within the local government structures.[4]

Guistozzi highlights a key weakness of the new Taliban movement to establish a shadow government, and the inability to enforce their kind of governance once they have established their control. In one example, based on research in Uruzgan, the Taliban movement has perpetuated into a violent battle that is less ideological and more power driven as a result of tribal conflict when new Taliban leaders come into power.[5]

The greatest challenge for an International Security Assistance Forces backed Afghan government, if it seeks to be successful, is figuring out ways to establish control and gaining legitimacy in the eyes of its urban and rural populations. Incorporating people in rural areas has been a perpetual problem because there is little focus on securing outer lying areas and delivering government services to them. As a result, neglecting people in rural areas invites opportunistic insurgents who feed off of local grievances.

Likewise, people in rural areas reciprocate by participating in an ideological movement which seeks to funnel control into the hands of local area commanders. Whether a government can succeed without the support of a rural countryside remains to be seen, but in the history of Afghanistan, rural tribesmen have challenged the authority of the state in favor of village-level institutions based on custom and tradition.

## Rural Areas and Deep Engagements in Kandahar

In rural areas, the stability operations process can be particularly challenging if local institutions of governance exist where centralized government is weak. Tribal systems, tradition, and customs tend to dominate the formal institutional delivery system of provincial civil servants and foreign military officers. In this case, understanding the human terrain requires a more holistic, nuanced, time-dependent approach, one that requires deeper engagements with the population, long-term relationship building with local individuals, and greater attention to the specific constraints and opportunities that affect the lives of people.

Rural Kandahar is notable for its tribal loyalties and politics that come into play at various times during discussions about security, government, and development. Based on my time there, I saw two important dynamics, as gathered through interviews with district officials and from observations deep in the countryside. First, the district government was not reaching its rural constituents. Often, villages outside or on the fringes of government influence had little interest or understanding about what the district government did.

Second, people in rural villages faced constant threats to their livelihoods which were beyond their control. These included water shortages, crop diseases, and persistent conditions which perpetuated their impoverished lifestyles. Often, rural villagers referred to false promises of support from provincial administrators that occurred decades prior to the occupation of 2001. Based on these engagements, factors were not always measurable but could be conceptualized through in-depth conversations with villagers and government officials. Intellectual exploration of these factors allowed me, along with my military counterparts, to build strong relationships with local civil servants, the district police, and regional power brokers and influential elders.

The host nation counterparts, in my view, were highly appreciative of the opportunities to express their frustrations, participate in the building of their society, and incorporate customs and tradition into their government. On my part, searching for meaning and gaining an in-depth understanding had its pitfalls and frustrations along the way. At times, our unit would arrive at villages that were known to be troublesome for the local government, only to be told by villagers that security was good and people wanted to be left alone.

Mostly, people wanted security, but without a strong government presence. The fact that most villages and areas were scattered throughout the area of operations (AO) complicated military plans for a blanket of security and stability throughout the district. At times, I was unsure about how anyone could truly win

over the people of the countryside because each village, area, and micro-region, regardless of size, had its own specific needs for stabilization.

The overarching problem that I presented to my military and civilian counterparts was how to assist a rural, tribally diverse population that was in a state of constant flux between influential elders and insurgent commanders. More challenging was choosing where to work and determining which areas could be affected given a finite amount of time and resources. Ultimately, my unit decided to affect an AO where the government could not reach, where tribal loyalties were aligned with both sides of the fight, and where people were used to false promises dating back to the time of King Zahir Shah. Our plan was to show the rural people they had a district governor who was willing to address their village-specific problems and incorporate them into the district's progress.

## Exploring the Cultural Context for Security

The initial encounters with the rural human terrain almost exclusively focused on discussions about security–how it was defined by the local population and who was responsible for it. Even though the district maintained a proactive police force, government officials acknowledged their district was too large to fully secure without the help of the population. As a result, many areas went unsecured or fell under the influence of insurgents. In this context, working with the rural population was viewed as a linchpin to success for security and stability delivered through the district government. Accordingly, when locals were engaged in discussions about security, they usually pointed in the direction of power brokers and individual police commanders who held a high degree of power and influence over security efforts.

**This mountainous valley is too difficult to access or secure by police. As a result, the police commanders rely on their local, social relationships in order to maintain a pulse on insurgent activity.**

**The mouth of a valley in which little is known about its inhabitants. The government is unable to reach the people or motivate them to work to improve security in the area.**

In general, these individuals were highly regarded decision makers who held a strong tribal or family connection to the government or were descendants from a well known tribe or family. It was necessary in this environment to work with these individuals, rather than against them, in order to strengthen security in the district as a whole and avoid further fragmentation. However, in rural Afghanistan, security rests in the hands of whoever can provide it. Whether it is the Taliban or the district government means relatively little to the average villager whose day revolves around herding or farming. According to many district officials, it was difficult to distinguish insurgents from farmers since during the day farmers carried a shovel, and at night they carried a weapon. The local district representative, or *wuluswal*, expressed his view on the subject this way:

***"It's very easy to reach people in [rural area A], [rural area B], and [rural area C]. We need to make security checkpoints and show people we are here for them. The people get very bored and are tired of fighting. They***

***don't like bandits or fighting. In order to do this, we have to stabilize with more Afghan National Army Forces and Afghan National Police, and enforce rule of law, then we can recruit sons and brothers for this government. I've been here for [a number of] years, and I still haven't been to [rural area A], how are these people even suppose to know who I am? I am their district representative. If they see me, I know I can help them and solve their problems. This is my job."***

As the *wuluswal* mentioned, checkpoints and security posts do have a positive effect on creating security, but those are temporary solutions to a more enduring problem of insecurity throughout the district. In the past, the difficulty has been incorporating the rural areas into the government once security points have been established. The uniqueness of this district featured a road which linked two major population centers and served as an economic engine for security contracting. Predictably, this led to the empowerment of security forces along the road that fell outside of the district government's control, but intertwined into the activity of villages and social life. The road, both practically and symbolically, connected people throughout the district and to the government. The development of this infrastructure was a strategic opportunity to reach people governmentally and support their livelihoods through mobility.

## Understanding Government and Corruption

Generally, most people in the district do not participate in the government. This was due to the difficulty of government officials to reach remote areas or officials who were unable to serve village-specific needs. If a village participated in the government, it was usually through a village representative who was almost always an elder-type figure. While elders held a degree of influence at the district shura meetings, they did not have a high degree of control over the issues or the ability to effect change by themselves. Typically, the elders sat on the outside of decision making and conceded to the views expressed by the district representative.

The shura itself is a time tested way for solving problems based on principles of fairness and restitution. However, members of these district shuras are not elected representatives but rather members of the same tribe in nearby villages. Thus, it was no surprise why there was little disagreement on security and development concerns. This was governance based on a system of patronage and loyalty based on tribal and family affiliation. Non-affiliated tribal elders were marginalized and had little opportunity to participate in this system. Potentially, backing one tribe over another has a destabilizing effect because it provides insurgent commanders with opportunities to leverage grievances. However, in this counterinsurgency war, the goal is to legitimize the power and authority of government in the eyes of the people, regardless of tribe or ethnic identity.

**Elders and power brokers gather at key leader engagement focused on creating security in rural villages and pushing out insurgents. The shura addressed a historical grievance that people had with the govenment.**

The rural people I encountered usually could not identify their district representative and often labeled the government as "corrupt." Barfield has argued that people on the margins have historically viewed themselves as being purer than urban dwellers because the opportunities for corruption in the countryside are far fewer than those in the city.[6] It was the conversations about the dysfunctions and notions about corruption which led to greater understanding of the local indifference towards the government which allowed for critical reflection. As one elder explained to me during an interview,

***"If [coalition forces] wants to fix the government, then fix the shura. The shura representatives are not the right ones. The reason people are attending the shura is because people want projects. Give it a few months and you won't see anyone here."***

The shura itself was not highly representative and this information was incorporated into social outreach efforts to get more elders involved. When I talked to people about the shura, or government, they would often raise issues of corruption. In an interview with a district official, he explained corruption as a problem that needed to be addressed:

***"Corruption is a big problem in our government. Sometimes I feel like running away from the government and hiding. The people of my land complain to me that that money is being taken away from them and I as [a district official] cannot do anything about it. The corruption is not in the people, it is in us as leaders. We need oversight for the leaders of the district. But corruption has not happened in front of me, only allegations. People come crying to me and I know it is our government people who are involved."***

At times there were clear contradictions about what constituted corruption. Typically, corruption was raised when someone mentioned bribery, development projects, soliciting tolls on roads, or land use "fees." Since the district government did not have the authority to collect or raise taxes, it was not always clear where corruption existed or what constituted a legitimate claim to corruption. District officials often pointed their fingers at higher ups and never acknowledged a role in it. However one interviewee offered a different view and rare look into his practices. He explained:

***"Any new projects should go directly to villagers, anything, tell the villagers to do it and pay the villagers directly. Don't involve anybody from the government. If you involve me and it's a project for ten thousand dollars, I'm going to put two thousand dollars in my pocket based on instinct and only give eight thousand dollars to the village."***

In this case, it appeared that the district official believed in the people, but acknowledged his own role in creating the tension involved with development projects. When I raised this issue with my unit, we decided to keep projects small and simple, and work directly with village leaders through the district official to demonstrate that projects could be driven through the government. When I discussed corruption with a village elder who would go on to work for the local security forces, he described the problem in a systemic way, and said:

***"I've seen corruption for the past 40 years, if a cop doesn't take a bribe, then the judge will, if a judge doesn't take a bribe, then the jury will, if the jury doesn't take a bribe, then the warden of the police station will. Also, with corruption, the biggest thing, for police, is that the salary isn't enough to feed their families. So they are persuaded into doing these bad things they normally wouldn't do. For police in my village, it starts with having strong beliefs and values as a Muslim."***

Although the problem appears to be systemic, the discussion about corruption and what constituted it had its own meaning and context. When I asked a district official to imagine his district free of corruption, he expressed his vision in this manner:

***"In 3-4 years, [the district], imagining corruption is gone, I envision a clean and peaceful place, without mines, there will be roads, schools, hospitals and development projects. Everyone will come and see it and marvel at it. Everyone will look at [the district] and say, 'The foreigners brought all this to us.'"***

Corruption, in the eyes of district officials, was rampant in the government and outside of their control. However, the cultural context and meaning of corruption is crucial, especially among people who elevate honor and reputation above all else. Dishonesty or fraudulent behavior, is not a tenet of Pashtunwali, therefore, there was a tendency to associate corruption as a practice imported by foreigners and a tool associated with government. Bribery was known to occur at every level, but it was not always viewed as corruption, rather the grease that kept the government's wheels in motion.

My interpretation of conversations about corruption was that it tainted local government, and it was used as a proxy for complaints about resentment, inequality, and inertia that permeated down to the village level. My suggestion to my unit was to assist the local officials with a memo or decree against corruption, but it could only serve symbolic purposes since the problem was believed to be concentrated at the center of the system.

## Managing the Expectations of Development

In general, the locals viewed development in a negative light because they were far removed from it and had little influence on it. Rural farmers were used to periodic assessments and repetitive questions about what projects they needed in their village. Commonly, farmers would say, "I've seen this all before. You'll ask your questions now, fill out your reports today, and tomorrow you will forget about our village. We won't see anything and we'll still be here waiting for you to come back and ask the same questions in a few months." In other interactions, villagers would say, "Why are you asking me about projects? We need water, clinics, and schools. This is the elders' business, I agree with whatever the elders say we need. This is not for me to say."

Projects in their own right were a source of contention because they allowed for scrutiny and criticism over who won the project, the quality of the contractor's work, and who ultimately benefited from the project. After several conversations and interviews, it became clear that development had to be adapted to the rural conditions and focused on transformative projects rather than life improving ones. We defined transformative projects as those which could transform how people live their lives. For example, the creation of a road drastically transforms mobility for people who desperately need services, such as medical care or commerce.

**An unimproved road leads to a village in rural Kandahar. Such roads provide access to urban centers and ability to transport cash crops, goods and services.**

**An example of where a small irrigation efficiency project could benefit rural villagers. Installing a concrete structure would replace the present wood/stone structures installed for crossing of the channel. It is very difficult to maintain the interiors of the current structures.**

Life improvement projects were generally those that took an existing resource and improved it. As an example, wells and irrigation were helpful but had relatively little impact to the overall economy or beyond the village level. Transformative projects that reached the most people mattered in a district with approximately 300 scattered villages and hamlets. In one interaction, an elder explained he had family members in a neighboring village, but he could not visit because it was too dangerous to travel and influenced by insurgents. However, it proved to be an opportunity to make headway and re-link villages together strategically through a greater focus on road security.

In this rural area, road infrastructure was critical, but the more serious development need that faced the entire district was a crop disease affecting figs. Prior to harvest, figs turned black and fell to the ground, effectively damaging a farmer's output and profits. Agricultural experts believed the problem was based on number of factors (insects, bacteria, blight), but it did not carry the same importance when it was explained to farmers at the district center. The farmers viewed the problem in terms of their lack of access to fertilizers and nutrients which they believed the foreigners were keeping from them.

During a training session, the agricultural expert re-focused his presentation on utilizing natural resources, specifically the endless amounts of animal manure that could be processed into finely ground fertilizer without ever leaving the village. During a follow up training event, one farmer said, "We don't

**Figs provide the largest agricultural cash crop for most villages in rural Kandahar. There is a definite need for horticultural training, especially with integrated pest management, post harvest management and marketing. These programs are needed district-wide.**

need to buy fertilizers or rely on them. We have all the fertilizer we'll ever need in our villages and we are letting it go to waste." This was a positive moment where relatively impoverished farmers were able to take something they learned and put it to use. These kinds of training events bode well for working with rural farmers.

**Afghans sit and listen to training module on soil science from and agricultural expert. The training includes a hands-on activity to assess which soils are desirable for food production.**

**An agricultural expert teaches rural farmers about how to better care for their farms and be stewards of their environment. The farmers were surprised to learn they could create natural fertilizers from the manure of livestock.**

Along with others in my unit, we realized that the country was in greater poverty without education, and that future generations needed skills they could apply to improve their lives. This was further reiterated by the district representative who always vocalized the need and it was used to guide moving the district forward:

***"For the people of my district, the greatest need is education. Most people have no education, they do not know right from wrong, good or bad, and so we have to motivate them to want education. These people have been deprived for over 30 years without education. It is also in our culture, through education we can help these people, but we also need to keep in mind that it is important to respect their customs and traditions."***

This went along with a general change in perception in the district over the course of a year. For example, the initially held claim, "The government should give me a well," gave way to the more modest question "How can we as a village go through the government to obtain a well?" The latter implied a greater degree of initiative or self-sufficiency rather than a system based on dependency and high expectations. Yet it also presumed greater understanding of and willingness to work through government institutions.

**Children in a rural village without a school receive government literacy books during a humanitarian aid mission.**

## Conclusion

Stability operations in rural Kandahar proved to be a long, frustrating process characterized by dynamic and unexpected pitfalls. Operationally, it required a number of engagements with stakeholders and careful planning, but procedurally it needed time to develop and interpret conditions before one could decide on courses of action that were in short supply. In fact, stability operations needed to be flexible, adaptive, and infused with the conditions, context, and the needs of the rural human terrain. The implications are that greater exploration at the tactical level, a different approach to studying the local dynamics, and measures that are defined cooperatively at the government official's level may be valuable investments.

Afghanistan's central government has historically maintained loose relations with people in the countryside, therefore, a legitimate government in a rural area would have a different look and feel along with the stabilization approach. In the bigger picture, rural people have survived decades of international intervention, civil war, state collapse, and will continue to be a deciding factor in the future of a successful Afghan government.

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


**by Cynthia L. Hogle**

***The views expressed are those of the author and HTT AF-19 and not those of the U.S. Army, TRADOC, HTS, or Strike or Spartan BCTs.***

***Human Terrain Teams "are able to focus and put more analysis into the people than our units on the ground are, and this team is well suited to getting out on the ground alongside our Soldiers and developing the atmospherics of a given area. Soldiers can conduct patrol reports, can understand a few key personalities or overall atmospherics of a given area, but do not have the time nor the experience to conduct deep thinking, critical analysis."***

***–Major Dan DiNicola,***
***Brigade IO Officer (S7),***
***Strike Brigade (2/101)***

## Introduction

Military commanders and staff vary in their experience with, and impressions of, the Human Terrain System (HTS). The program was established in 2006 to fill the operational need for sociocultural support to military operations. The most effective Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) proactively seek to integrate with brigade staff to suggest and demonstrate how they can support the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Team members go out into the area of operations (AO) regularly to provide firsthand knowledge, in addition to conducting in-depth, open-source research regarding specific areas of interest to the brigade they are serving.

The six-member HTT AF-19 based in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, was established and has been led by Colonel Mark T. Stevens since September 2010.[1] AF-19 served Strike Brigade Combat Team (BCT) through the transition to Spartan BCT's assumption of authority for the AO. The team has developed a role complementary to the role of the Soldier and has developed in-depth research products and key tools to inform the brigade staff at every level. AF-19 has assisted each brigade to understand the culture and society within which they were planning engagements and operations.

## Complementary Roles

On a recent mission, two members of the HTT embedded with a platoon to meet with a village elder. The platoon sergeant had met with the elder twice before and had been frustrated by the elder's seeming lack of leadership initiative. The elder did not appear to take seriously his role as leader for his village. The Soldier expected a similar response this time–and indeed did seem to encounter resistance. However, during the engagement, the platoon sergeant simultaneously received information via his radio and his Soldiers regarding gunshots heard in the area and multiple other concerns demanded his attention. At any given time, a Soldier's attention may be divided among multiple concerns regarding security; building relationships with key leaders, such as the village elder; and tasks related to the brigade's development and governance projects.

The HTT members, on the other hand, were part of a team that had earlier dedicated three weeks to specifically researching the district and the village. They had attended the weekly shura (meeting of local village leaders) that morning. Hence, they had the time and the resources to develop a context for the meeting and to understand the challenges the elder faced. They were able to establish a rapport with the elder, who then shared sought-after information with both the platoon sergeant and the team members during the limited time of the engagement. This illustrates a primary focus of the HTT–to build and leverage relationships with local leadership and among community members to enhance mission success for the brigade.

## Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority

HTTs actively advise both the commander and staff, providing knowledge and insight regarding

the battlespace and its inhabitants. During the Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority process (RIP/TOA), during which a departing brigade transitions out of theater and the arriving brigade takes command, the HTT is an entity uniquely able to provide institutional knowledge and continuity. The cultural appreciation and sociological understanding of the province and districts is accrued over time; it is not possible for military personnel to possess this knowledge, particularly upon initial arrival into theater.

***"During the transition, AF-19 provided me with a tremendous amount of 'contextual' information and knowledge I might not otherwise have had," said Major Mark Crow, who is responsible for coordinating brigade non-lethal operations, "This knowledge continues to inform the way I plan initiatives."***

## Challenges of Integration

One of the challenges the HTT may face during RIP/TOA is establishing credibility. Its success depends on the prior exposure the brigade commander, his staff, and his battalion commanders have had to the HTS program. Although HTS falls under the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and its personnel are Department of Army civilians, the operational relevance of the team to the brigade is often not widely known. Since the program is relatively new and not broadly understood, the additional responsibility of civilians accompanying a platoon on patrol may be perceived as an added burden. Yet HTT members depend on this operational support to complete the field interviews from which the team builds its knowledge for the BCT.

The team may also face initial challenges in gaining access to key staff and other resources necessary to do an effective job and thus prove its value. While the team may quickly establish credibility at the brigade leadership level, this appreciation of the HTT's value may not reach all pertinent staff with whom the team must partner for optimum success. Therefore, the HTT must make a concerted and visible effort to ensure that its operational focus is aligned with that of the brigade.

***"I was not a believer," stated combined Task Force (CTF) Spartan Commander, Colonel Patrick D. Frank, "but HTT AF-19 has produced analysis, research, and products that exceeded my expectations. The fact is they are value added and have contributed enormously to the brigade's operations."***

## Establishing Operational Relevance

To establish operational relevance of its efforts, AF-19 conducted a mission analysis of Strike BCT's campaign plan before sitting down with the Commander and Plans Sergeant Major. Based on its analysis, the HTT crafted a research plan to integrate with BCT Lines of Effort (LOE) and priorities.

AF-19 nests its LOE in BCT LOE under Cultural Assessment Operations, including: Assessment of Security, Governance, Commerce and Development, Agriculture, Religion, and Education. Team members also focus on special areas of interest to the brigade, including the perspectives of women and Taliban propaganda, viewed from a sociological and cultural perspective. HTT in-depth mission reports also provide analysis, which is referenced by the brigade in shaping operations plans.

The HTT also supported brigade planning when the BCT operationalized AF-19's initial research proposal under Operation Village Assessment, and the team participated in the brigade's Counterinsurgency Clearance Patrols. On its first mission, AF-19 partnered with Coalition and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to conduct a detailed census and village assessments of the area. Team members went door to door and interviewed village inhabitants, enabling a detailed, deep knowledge of the area.

"The result was that the data collected literally filled information gaps between intelligence reports from higher-level intelligence sources and field reports from units regarding the local population," said Seargeant Major John White, Plans Sergeant, (2/101).

## In-Depth Research

In addition to field work collecting sociocultural information across the AO, AF-19 conducts in-depth research on topics of brigade operational interest. For instance, based on brigade briefings and planning meetings the HTT attended, AF-19 recognized that the brigade commander and his staff would benefit from exploratory research and recommendations that would inform the BCT on micro credit considerations within the Zharay district. The team conducted field interviews and open-source research that resulted in a detailed research report entitled *Micro Credit Analysis, Zharay District*.

The HTT research addressed the issue of access to low-cost credit; this is a countrywide problem and

is likely more severe in the rural Pashtun areas of Kandahar. Changing payment structures (hard asset, for example payment of one-fifth to one-half of the wheat or pomegranates harvested, vs. cash payments), coupled with insurgent intimidation and unscrupulous lenders, have pushed farmers and laborers toward an unbreakable cycle of debt. The combination of debt and lack of traditional social support networks limits a family's ability to achieve savings, reinvestment, and education for their children.

Since the early 1980s, war, population displacement, and the deliberate targeting of traditional landowning families have altered traditional economic and social structures and caused changes in residents' economic conditions. The structural changes in the economy created many new laborers. No longer able to rely on capital input from landowners, these laborers had to either finance the upfront costs of farming on small plots of land or enter into unfavorable relationships with landowners.

Lack of access to credit is only part of the problem. Lenders and insurgent influences who do offer credit have taken advantage of vulnerable borrowers by charging high fees or interest rates, often pushing farmers to grow poppy for its high profit margins. When farmers are vulnerable to coercion by insurgents, they are less receptive to new governance initiatives intended to supplant the insurgents' influence.

The HTT report demonstrated that a micro credit program could provide farmers with an alternative that would free them from the obligation to maintain relationships with the insurgents—and free them from a relentless cycle of debt.

HTT identified and described the following local debt cycle:

1. The farmer needs to borrow money during the winter to pay for family expenses and for the contribution he may be required to make toward the costs of seed, fertilizer, and farming equipment for the planting process. The amount depends on the relationship and the deal worked out between the laborer or sharecropper and the landowner or lender. The owner of the land worked by the farmer typically takes between one-third and two-thirds of the crop, depending on the percentage of the input supplied. (AF-19 interviews in Eastern and Western Zharay district.)

2. The sharecropper borrows the money, but because access to capital tends to be scarce, the lender cuts a deal with the borrower to buy the crop at a set price–which is always well below what the farmer would be able to sell the crop for in the marketplace at harvest time. This process is known as *salaam* and functions as a way for the lender to speculate on future prices.

3. The farmer is locked into a contract to sell the proceeds of his labor at a discounted price; therefore, the farmer is left looking for another loan at the end of the crop cycle to finance his family's expenses again for the winter season and to pay for the capital input of the next crop, thus perpetuating the cycle.

Based on its research, AF-19 deduced that a micro credit program could provide the cash needed for a farmer to choose a different crop or to allow a farmer to diversify into other types of work. Breaking the lending-debt cycle by expanding access to credit would allow farmers to sell their crops at fair market value, rather than forcing farmers to sell at a steep discount to the lender.

The team submitted an in-depth research report that concluded with this recommendation and included supporting examples of successful micro grant programs in Afghanistan and other areas of the world. In addition to the written paper, the team developed a farming cycle calendar, which assisted the BCT in understanding the most vulnerable times of the year for farmers.

The brigade intelligence officer (S2) integrated the HTT's analysis into its targeting cycle, with the intention of breaking the cycle of indebtedness and insurgent control over the local population. A diagram of the cycle informed the incoming BCT and provided focus for a new micro grant program for Zharay district farmers.

Thus, from the AF-19 research, the BCT was empowered with the knowledge necessary to implement micro credit in the optimum places at the optimum times to have the maximum effect in reducing insurgent influence on farmers in the AO.




## Creating Key Tools

In addition to research reports, AF-19 conceptualized and created two tools for easy reference of pertinent information: quick reference cards ("Culture Cards") for specific subjects and guides ("Smart Books") for each district. "These are key tools for leaders down to the platoon level," said Colonel Art Kandarian, Commander, CTF, Strike, (2/101)

The Culture Cards contain basic information and defined terminology or vocabulary related to subjects ranging from *mullahs* (religious and community leaders) and mosques to agriculture and village governance. Also included on each card are suggested questions useful for the population engagements that Soldiers conduct to gain specific regional information. Questions for a *mullah* might include: Are there *ziyarat* (shrines) in your area? How many people attend your mosque? Are they from the same tribe? Such questions inform the Soldier regarding atmospherics, since mosques can be difficult to identify visually, and mapping them provides perspective regarding the areas of influence of specific *mullahs*. The cards were published for distribution and are also included on a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency handheld device that is currently being tested and will soon be fielded to the entire CTF Spartan.

Initially, the Smart Book was an informal product that included lists of key leaders and basic information that had been compiled about one specific region in the AO during the research process for a report. The publication has evolved over time into a series of much sought after booklets that include an overview of each district, bazaar, or other area of focus within the AO. Profiles of key government and religious leaders and major landowners include biographical data, tribal affiliation, photos, and mapping of their inter-relationships. Notes regarding tribal dynamics and attitudes toward Coalition Forces and Taliban are also included to inform the Soldier planning an engagement. Sections of the booklet focus on education, health care, agriculture, and economics in the area.

One edition, focused on the Pasab Bazaar in Zharay, maps each shop and provides background information on each shop owner. The bazaar is the first place any visiting dignitary tours, and the booklet serves as a directory and point of reference for initial conversations. Also included in each edition is a glossary of terms, basic vocabulary, and cultural guidelines that should be observed.

The booklets are not intended to be comprehensive but are detailed enough for broad use throughout the brigade; they also serve as a reference point for deeper inquiries that are addressed in the formal written reports produced by the team. In essence, through these booklets and cards, the HTT is broadening the impact of its accumulated sociocultural knowledge across the entire brigade, as opposed to providing it only to brigade staff.

## Providing Cultural Expertise

Appointed team members actively participate in working groups related to their area of expertise, including the Governance and Development Working Group and the Information Operations Working Group. One of the meetings focused on the holy month of *Ramazan* during which observant Muslims fast daily from sunup until sundown and

then gather for an *Iftar* dinner to break the fast. The BCT needed to understand the impact *Ramazan* could have on operations.[2]

Recognizing the opportunity Ramazan offers to win more support from the local populace and to increase the legitimacy for the Afghan government by coordinating with political leaders to celebrate the holiday, the HTT helped CTF Spartan craft a strategy to take better advantage of this time period. Points of consideration included: specific date and time of holiday commencement and conclusion; significant dates within the holiday period; expected changes in daily patterns of the populace; considerations in working with observant Muslims serving with the brigade, as well as the Afghan Soldiers and police officers; and guidance for protocols regarding Iftar dinners.

The brigade developed a plan to host Iftar dinners at each base within the AO and to offer traditional gifts of food to those in need. In addition, AF-19 prepared two documents that were attached to the written directive that was disseminated to all battalions. The attachments included information regarding the significance of the holiday, cultural notes, and guidance for respectful behavior during the holy month. CTF Spartan's plan for Ramazan offered a unique opportunity for understanding and cooperation between the BCT, ANSF, and the local population.

## Summary

Since its arrival, AF-19 has supported both CTF Strike, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault,) and the CTF Spartan 3rd Infantry BCT, 10th Mountain Division. To ensure operational relevance of its efforts, the first priority for AF-19 team members was to meet with the commander and staff members of the brigade they were assigned to support. The initial meetings allowed them to suggest specific tasks they could do to assist with areas of concern to the brigade. AF-19 facilitated the MDMP by providing time-sensitive information that may not have been otherwise available. Every research task or field interview operation was planned to support BCT LOE and mission goals. Rather than becoming overly academic, research always remained practical.

During the RIP/TOA from CTF Strike to CTF Spartan, the brigade staff recognized the HTT as a critical component due to the history the team provided regarding the local population. CTF Strike was a surge brigade that benefited from the understanding regarding cultural dynamics tribal dynamics of the area and the analysis of village clusters, information that the HTT provided. CTF Spartan noted that AF-19 research and analysis products increased the knowledge base of local perceptions of Coalition Forces, ANSF, and safety and security concerns along the Security LOE within the AO.

From the initial meetings and until in-depth research reports were completed and submitted to brigade leadership, team members continued to liaise with and provide information to brigade staff. The HTT returned value to the entire brigade by disseminating as much information as possible.

Products such as the Smart Books and Culture Cards were designed to be accessible and easily digestible by any Soldier who needed quick access to pertinent information. This approach has made AF-19 operationally relevant, thus making the HTT that much more effective in performing its mission of supporting the BCT.

**Endnotes**

1. Colonel Mark T. Stevens, Team Leader; Andrew Kittleson, Research Manager, and John W. Pugh III, Analyst, contributed to this article. Team members also include Nathaniel Troy and Benjamin Bright-Fishbein. HTT AF-19 stands for Human Terrain Team, the 19th team established in Afghanistan.

2. "Ramadan" is spelled and pronounced "Ramazan" by Pashtuns in the Zharay district of Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.

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# Integrating Social Science Research into Miltary (Division) Staff Planning

by Melvin Hall


*"We are the conversation that we have."*
*–Hans-Georg Gadamer*

***The views expressed are those of the author and not those of the U.S. Army, TRADOC, HTS or 4ID.***

## Introduction

From December 2010 to May 2011, Human Terrain Analysis Team-North (HTAT-N), the 4th Infantry Division's (4ID) social science asset, conducted a cross sectional and qualitative study of the Combined Security Mechanism (CSM) within the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) of Diyala, Kirkuk, and Ninewa provinces.[1] The HTAT-N research team visited three provinces, twenty-two Combined Checkpoints (CCPs), two Combined Coordination Centers (CCCs), and interviewed over 400 participants, including Kurdish Regional Guard Brigades, the Iraqi Army, Gharmian (local police and security units in Diyala), Daughters of Iraq, and thirty local sheikhs and political leaders throughout the three provinces. HTAT-N research represents perhaps the most comprehensive study of the CSM to date. The research generated over 125 pages of field reports and approximately fifty PowerPoint slides used by the 4ID's Arab Kurd Working Group to understand the CSM environment, problem set, and to plan for its future as U.S. troops withdraw from CCPs and Iraq.

4ID made maximum use of its social science asset, integrating it into its Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). However, because HTS is a relatively new U.S. Army program, successful integration of an HTS team into any unit (Battalion, Brigade, or Division) can seem mystifying and challenging, especially to HTS civilians not familiar with the military or U.S. Army units not familiar with HTS. Difficulties integrating HTS teams into Army units arise because the HTS program brings together two professions (social science and military studies) that tend to operate within different problem-solving paradigms, speak different languages, consist of different personalities, and have misconceptions one about the other. Academia is stereotyped as theoretical, long winded, and perhaps of no practical use at the moment. Military studies are stereotyped as too practical, laconic, and operating under the slogan that a 70 percent solution is good enough right now in the battle space.

The purpose of this article is not to present a theoretical understanding of the two paradigms and how they can be successfully merged and used to advantage. Instead, it provides an example of how it was done; illustrating the steps taken to make HTAT-N a successful part of the 4ID's MDMP. In doing so, this example should demystify how HTS social science capability can be integrated into U.S. Army units and it provides a model for future HTS teams.

This article traces HTAT-N's integration into U.S. Army Division-North, 4ID's MDMP (staff officers' conversation) by following a social science research cycle, organized it into five main categories: introducing HTS and HTAT to the 4ID staff, developing a research question, writing a research design, data collection, and writing and presenting results and products. The article will end by providing insight into the unique capabilities of an HTS team and HTAT at Division level.

## Pre-Deployment Introduction and Integration of HTS/HTAT

Prior to the 4ID's relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) with the 3rd ID, an HTS senior social

scientist spent several days with 4ID staff members introducing the HTS concept and outlining the HTAT mission and capabilities. HTS is a population focused asset bringing rigorous research capabilities to the battle space. Its primary aim is to conduct social science research outside the wire, providing a real time description (and sometimes assessments) of how a unit's courses of action (COAs) and lines of effort (LOEs) shape local communities and how communities and their population's attitudes, politics, customs, history, religion, and traditions can shape COAs and LOEs for the most effective outcomes and end states. In the words of the 4ID's Arab Kurd Working Group Leader: "[HTS] should help the Army see itself."

With the help of HTS, it was up to 4ID commanders to determine how to make the best use of this asset in accordance with its mission plans and goals. The early introduction of HTAT to the 4ID was vital to its becoming part of the division staff and mission. Because 4ID began planning for its mission nearly a year before deployment, waiting to introduce HTS/HTAT to the division in country would have meant that HTS would have been left trying to find its place in an already fixed mission plan. Six months prior to deployment, 4ID staff began studying in detail their Iraq, USD-N mission set. HTS outreach enabled 4ID staff to integrate HTAT into their mission planning, with the division writing HTAT into its mission plan early enough to set the expectation that HTAT would be used during deployment.

The early introduction meant that HTS was helping to shape the way the 4ID's staff thought about their mission and was part of the planning conversations. For instance, the G2 developed a detailed set of priority information and commander's critical information requirements that included population centric questions specifically tailored for the HTAT to help answer. What is more, 4ID was able to clearly outline a chain of command for the HTAT that gave it a legitimate place within the commander's staff. HTAT was placed in the G9 shop under the direct supervision of the fire support coordinator who provided ultimate top cover.

Prior to deployment, therefore, HTAT's place at the MDMP table within 4ID's larger mission was understood. The early outreach could have been improved, however, by introducing the HTAT staff in theater to work with the 3ID and 4ID early in its planning and preparations for deployment. The HTAT in theater had access to many HTS products describing the human terrain and battle space that could have been useful during pre-deployment planning. As one officer stated, "I wish that I had known more about HTS products prior to arriving in country, it would have helped in our planning."

What is more, HTS units in country do not rotate out during RIP/TOA but remain in place to work with and provide a continuity piece for the new unit. So if HTAT staff in theater had been aware of the 4ID's planning, they could have built relationships with the 4ID staff and engaged in the planning dialogue and conversations, even if only on a limited scale from down range. Finally, because U.S. Army units prepare and plan for deployment far in advance, integrating HTS into a unit's pre-deployment planning is vital to building relationships and unit integration. Early introduction of HTS and HTAT is one key factor that led to the HTAT-N's success as a 4ID asset. As previously stated, two different problem solving paradigms are working together for a longer time for greater integration and learning prior to deployment the better.

## The LOE Dialogue

HTAT's research questions emerged from the conversations its personnel had with the G2 through G9 staff regarding the 4ID's LOEs and end states. This was especially true of the CSM research. If HTS units want to participate in their staff's dialogue, knowing the unit's LOEs and/or COAs is vital. And, perhaps more importantly, knowing the staff's priorities within each LOE will focus the social science research and make it meaningful to the unit on the ground. Nearly all of HTAT's staff discussions were about executing LOEs to reach a desired end state. If Army units want to make the most use of their HTS asset, the units must invite the HTS unit to be part of the LOE conversation.

HTAT found that at almost every meeting the staff officers' questions could be answered from an HTS social science paradigm. In other words, each question could be studied and researched from the local community and population standpoint or perspective by framing questions in terms of the appropriate social science theory. For instance, one of the staff meetings the HTAT attended was the Arab Kurd Working Group. From these meetings, questions emerged regarding the level of community and trust

between Regional Guard Brigade and Iraqi Army forces at CCPs throughout the CSM of USD-N. From simply listening to the staff's conversation, the CSM research question emerged. And this is an important point. Perhaps one of the most vital roles the HTAT played was listening to the staff's planning dialog and later engaging the staff officers in conversations about what was heard during meetings. Once the staff's problems and questions emerged from the meeting's conversations, the next step was for the HTAT social scientist to write a research design in keeping with 4ID's LOEs.

The HTAT social scientist included the G5 planning staff and Arab Kurd Working Group lead in the writing of the research design. This helped keep the research dialogic and inclusive. And, importantly, it was at this stage of the research where the relationship between the unit and HTAT became stronger. Because of the inclusive nature of writing the research design, expectations regarding the research were discussed and determined early, and a common vision for the research was created. Once the social scientist finished the first draft of the research design, he forwarded it to the G5 staff for their first review.

Receiving input on the research design kept the research focused on the planning staff's needs, mission and logistical constraints. It also allowed for the HTAT social scientist and analysts to learn more about the staff's paradigm for approaching the research question. The G5 staff officers learned more about how the social scientist's approach could help the Army "see itself" with regard to the CSM as well. Ultimately, including staff officers in the drafting of the research design makes them partners in the research and helps them advocate for its execution outside the wire. They can talk about and discuss the research just as well as the social scientist or HTAT analysts. Staff officers' familiarity with the research enabled them to easily write clear FRAGOs and gain the support of Battalions and Brigades in order to fully execute the research.

## Conducting Fieldwork and Data Collection

It is no secret that seats on security details going outside the wire are valuable and coveted, so in order to "win" these seats HTS teams' research designs must be logistically feasible and must have the support of the staff officers (gained when writing the research design as discussed above.) This section is about the logistic feasibility of doing research. The HTAT-N research team was a small group of civilian and military personnel totaling four (sometimes three) members. The team members included an Arabic linguist, an HTS Kurdish analyst, an HTS social scientist, and an NCO (E7) from the 4ID G5. The HTS social scientist was the team lead responsible for writing the research design and overseeing the execution of all social science research. The NCO from the 4ID's G5 shop acted as the HTAT-N NCO and was responsible for team security, logistics, and communication throughout the mission. He made sure the team had what it needed to make the field research successful. Perhaps most importantly, he acted as the interface between the HTAT-N research team and the U.S. Army units moving, housing, and feeding the team outside the wire. The HTS analyst and social scientist collected data through in-depth interviews with the help of an Arabic linguist as needed. The small size of the team gave it the necessary agility to move efficiently through the battle space without being a burden to host units.

There were four important lessons learned by HTAT-N when conducting extended missions outside the wire:

- It is vital that an NCO, E7 or higher, who has an interest in the outcome of the mission as well as combat experience, be a part of the research team. When working outside the wire and interacting with other units the NCO is an invaluable team member in accomplishing the mission and communicating with Army personnel. With regard to the HTAT CSM mission, when other units saw a fellow green-suiter who was invested in the mission, they were able to better identify with the HTAT-N research team. The NCO made all the movement, communication and logistics plans for the team and his presence attached a green-suiter identity to the mission–showing that the Soldiers' ultimately owned the mission. The NCO was also able to provide updated security information and maps for the mission. He also helped civilian personnel understand Army culture and avert misunderstandings between the research unit and Army units.
- It is important to keep the research team small and agile. A team of four is much easier to move through the battle space than an entire HTS

team of nine. A smaller team takes up fewer seats on convoys and flights, can work longer hours, stay out on mission longer, and can adapt more easily to the vicissitudes of the mission. What is more, keeping smaller teams allows for different research missions to be accomplished simultaneously. For example, a different HTAT research team conducted a study of Iraqi Army training while the CSM research team conducted its mission.

- Research teams must write standard operating procedures (SOPs) and rehearse the mission prior to execution. The HTAT-N social scientist wrote an SOP for the conduct of social science which set the guidelines for how the team would conduct itself and interact with local civilians and Regional Guard Brigade and Iraqi Army soldiers. One of the procedures was that all social science related questions would be referred to the social scientist while out on mission. The research team NCO wrote the security and logistics SOP for the team. Because the execution of each mission and research design is different, a new SOP for each mission should be written, borrowing from previously written SOPs.

  Having the SOPs allowed each member of the team to understand his role and how the team would make decisions, and helped the team interact with host units. For instance, when a host unit captain or lieutenant asked a question about our movement or our plans we knew to refer him to our assigned NCO to answer the question. If someone asked what the purpose of the research was or how it would be conducted the team knew to refer those questions to the social scientist. In this way, the team remained unified and on the same page. Finally, the team rehearsed the mission and the questions 48 hours prior to executing the mission. Practice gave the team confidence when describing the mission and an intricate understanding of the mission's goals and how to accomplish them.

- End of day team meetings kept the team focused and allowed the team to make adjustments to the research questions and schedule. After each day of research, team members met to record field notes, discuss observations, and make adjustments for the next day's set of interviews. It was the end of the day conversations that provided the richest amount of information for writing the briefs that were given to the Arab Kurd Working Group and field reports written for the 4ID staff and U.S. Army. These conversations were where that day's information was processed and compared to the previous day's information. After the team meetings, the HTAT-N social scientist wrote field notes and began a draft of the brief that would be presented to Army units once the mission was complete.

## Writing Briefs and Reports

HTS teams' briefs and reports must keep pace with their units' battle rhythm. The U.S. Army's problem sets in theater are very complex and, from a social science perspective, resist reduction or oversimplification. In fact, simply presenting information using the standard military PowerPoint format risks uncritically answering research questions or regurgitating back to units what they already know. At the same time, Army units need information right away with very little initial analysis to help shape current and future plans and decisions. HTAT-N and the 4ID found a good method for presenting key findings immediately after returning from the field and deeper analysis in longer field reports.

The phase of the CSM research that took us into Ninewa province provides a good example of how HTAT-N wrote and presented its research results meeting 4ID's needs with timely and in-depth social science analysis. The Ninewa phase of CSM research lasted 37 days. Each day, while out in the field, the team met and discussed findings as stated above. The social scientist kept detailed notes and created individual summary briefs for each CCP. Half way through the field research, the social scientist began composing the initial brief of key findings on a three slide PowerPoint presentation: one slide introducing the team and mission, one slide presenting the five key findings and one quad-slide presenting approximately twenty key talking points and findings. The day before returning to base, the initial brief was polished and prepared and the HTAT-N team was ready to report key findings on the Ninewa phase of research immediately upon its return. The team could present either an aggregate summary of key findings or present a detailed breakdown of each of Ninewa's eleven CCPs. The aggregate summary was enough to generate an hour- long conversation.

After the initial brief, the HTAT-N social scientist wrote a five page summary of the research findings delivered to the 4ID Arab Kurd Working Group two weeks after returning from the field. One month later, HTAT-N distributed a longer field report providing more in-depth analysis and greater detail that could be shared with other units.

The HTAT-N team learned that the 4ID staff liked the expanded reports just as much, as long as they first received a short, traditional U.S. Army initial brief of key findings with the Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF). The important take away is the following timeline for delivering reports:

- 48 hours after return from field–initial key findings brief (3 to 5 slides).
- 10 to 14 days after return from field–five page summary report of with in-depth analysis.
- 1 to 1.5 months after return–longer field report incorporating recent data and social science theory.

Analysis should be presented to units as it emerges from the team's conversations with the social scientist responsible for leading the team conversations and creating the format for the brief and report with the input of the staff officers. It is important to ask the staff officers for their input regarding the products because each staff has its own personality, pet peeves, and methods of information presentation.

## Conclusion

HTAT-N was fortunate to work with graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies who valued rigorous and in-depth research as well as just receiving the BLUF. The factor in making each phase of the research cycle work for both the HTAT and 4ID was a willingness of both to engage in conversation and dialogue about how to approach problem sets and answer questions. The 4ID staff officers were willing to work within a social science paradigm with HTAT-N team members shaping social science to fit within a military paradigm. All the while we maintained rigorous research standards, making the social science research cycle yield the most beneficial results for 4ID. In the end, the positive working relationship generated practical suggestions that other military staff and social scientists may find valuable when integrating HTS teams into a unit's staff and MDMP.

**Endnotes**

1. The term cross sectional means that the research focused on the CSM community at a fixed and particular time. The study did not measure in any change in community trust or individual attitudes over an extended period of time.

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# Building Credibility: Engaging Local Religious Leaders in the Central Helmand River Valley

**by Brian Gunn**

***The views expressed are those of the author and not of the U.S. Army, TRADOC, HTS, and RCT-1.***

## Introduction

To defeat a persistent insurgency, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) must combat pro-Taliban propaganda and build government credibility in the eyes of rural Afghans. This means accessing the key local influencers in communities.

Upon arrival in their area of operations (AO), which comprises the districts of Marjah, Nawa-i-Barakzayi, and Garmsir in the Central Helmand River Valley (CHRV), Regional Combat Team-1 (RCT-1) saw that commanders at the battalion, company, and platoon levels were successful in meeting with village elders and local civic leaders, but that local religious leaders had largely been ignored. Due to the centrality of religion in the lives of most Afghans, religious leaders are key influencers that have a dramatic impact on the community in which they serve. RCT-1 identified the need to engage with local religious leaders to positively influence Afghans. Their goal was to increase the legitimacy of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and GIRoA in the eyes of the populace by demonstrating that both share the same faith.

RCT-1 saw Afghan National Army (ANA) Religious and Cultural Affairs Officers (RCAOs) as a pathway to achieving this. RCAOs provide religious services and counseling to ANA soldiers, act as de facto ANA information officers, and conduct outreach in local communities with civilians and key leaders. To improve their effectiveness serving their soldiers and engaging with local religious leaders, RCAOs have been teamed with U.S. Navy chaplains. Although these efforts are in their infancy, there is already some evidence that they are having a positive effect on the population's perception of the ANA and GIRoA in the RCT-1 AO.

## The Need for Religious Engagement

From the time Islam began to take root in Afghanistan in the 7th century, the faith has functioned as a "total and all-encompassing way of life" for its practitioners.[1] Today, this aspect of the faith is shared among most of the people of Afghanistan, despite their ethnic background. However, notwithstanding the importance of Islam in Afghanistan, it is only in the last few years that GIRoA and NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have made a concerted and broad-based effort to engage local religious leaders. Previously, members of the insurgency were able to monopolize engagements with these locally influential leaders and use them to espouse their interpretation of Islam; and this interpretation, in turn, was used to justify their violent actions against GIRoA and ISAF.

Many of the previous efforts by ISAF to engage Afghan civilians and combat insurgent propaganda have had two fatal flaws; they have either ignored

religious leaders entirely or they have engaged religious leaders at the national or international level that lack credibility with local people.[2] The RCT-1 Commander observed that because Afghanistan is a largely oral society, word-of-mouth communication is most effective. Information resonates most successfully when it is relayed by an individual that is already known and respected by a community.[3] In order to effectively engage Afghans at the village level, we need to gain the support of those who "when they speak, others listen."[4] Local religious leaders are critical because, as trusted sources of information, they have the necessary credibility to influence the opinions and behaviors of civilians and civic leaders in their communities. As a society, we have often shied away from overt discussions of religion, viewing the topic as a personal endeavor and separating it from our public duties. In Afghan society, however, there is little or no such separation, and any discussion of development, security, or governance will inevitably need to consider a place for religion.

## Inception of RCT-1 Religious Engagement

The RCT-1 Effects Officer states that after RCT-1 spent some time in the CHRV, they recognized that the lack of engagement with local religious leaders represented a large gap in the operational design for the AO. This left unused an entire pathway to positively engage with the local population.[5] RCT-1 staff predicted that a program of engagement with local religious leaders could have a positive impact on the battle space and they developed a "multi-pronged approach" to engage local people. The approach was intended to counter negative INS messages and propaganda, increase the legitimacy of GIRoA in the eyes of local nationals, and also "spark the imagination of what is possible" for both Afghan leaders and civilians. It was at this time that the decision was made to leverage ANA RCAOs to engage with these key religious influencers.

## ANA Religious and Cultural Affairs Program

The ANA Religious and Cultural Affairs (RCA) program is a relatively new ANA initiative to create a professional corps of officers and NCOs trained to meet the spiritual and religious needs of ANA soldiers. Although the program began in 2009, the official ten-week RCA training course started in May 2010, with the first graduating class finishing on 24 July 2010. The RCA course is located at the Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC) where it is mentored by U.S. Army chaplains. The goal of the RCA training program is to make the ANA a "more capable and self-sufficient counter insurgency Army".[6] The training prepares the RCAOs to carry out their responsibilities in nine primary areas:

1. Religion.
2. Culture.
3. Education.
4. Family support.
5. Morale.
6. Casualties and martyrs.
7. Advising.
8. Outreach.
9. Literacy.

**Chaplain Sneath speaking with ANA Lt. Col. Sultan Mohammad at the July meeting between ANA RCAOs and U.S. Chaplains at Camp Dwyer, Helmand Province, Afghanistan.**

In their advising capacity RCAOs are expected to provide guidance and counseling based on Islamic values and advise their unit commanders on how to effectively interact with the local population.[7,8] In

the RCT-1 AO, RCAOs train ANA soldiers to work more effectively with local Afghans by teaching them to show greater respect to local leaders. This tutelage has helped ANA to counter insurgent information operations messages and enhance the reputation of the ANSF and GIRoA. An ANA that is well regarded by local Afghans will serve daily as a positive reminder of the link between the people and their government.

Additionally, U.S. Navy chaplains team directly with RCAOs to provide professional instruction and offer mentorship to help them accomplish their duties in more competent and effective ways. Although the scope of RCAO duties is quite broad, chaplains strictly limit their direct involvement with RCAOs to focus on building those skills that do not infringe on the non-combatant status of the Chaplain Corps.

The RCT-1 chaplain noted that he was initially quite surprised when he was briefed that one of his additional duties would be to engage with the RCAOs. He explained that his predecessor was very interested and intellectually curious about the "intersection of world religions" and had taken a key role in planning religious engagement programs during his seven month tour of duty. The chaplain stated that once he understood what his new duties entailed, it quickly became clear that religious engagement with the RCAOs was critically important.[9] Due to the centrality of Islam in Afghanistan, the chaplain felt that the perspectives and religious insight of the RCAOs could prove essential to ANA commanders as well as RCT-1.

## Gauging Success in the AO

Though there are some signs that the population of the CHRV is acting more favorably toward ANSF and Coalition Forces (CF), it is too early to tell if the efforts of RCAOs are causing a long-term improvement in local perceptions of GIRoA. The RCT-1 Effects Officer stated that the RCAOs are motivated partners and that there are some signs that the program is "starting to take off."[10] Each month since February 2011, RCAOs and their chaplain mentors, as well as key enablers from RCT-1 have met to report on outreach and engagement in their AOs. These meetings provide a forum for RCT-1 to track the progress of RCAOs engagement with local religious leaders, highlight successes and failures, and to synchronize efforts.

From the first RCAO meeting until the most recent meetings, RCAOs, chaplains, and other attendees have conveyed several distinctly positive trends in the AO. These include reports of increased mullah shura attendance and participation and enhanced rapport between local Afghans and ANA soldiers.[11]

## Countering Insurgent Propaganda

Whereas the majority of the population in the CHRV is ethnically Pashtun, ANA soldiers tend to come from northern Afghanistan and are often of the Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek ethnic groups.[12] Many ANA, therefore, speak Dari and very little Pashto. Because of this ANA soldiers serving in southern Afghanistan often face the same cultural and linguistic challenges experienced by CF soldiers, with soldiers from both groups often painted as outsiders and kafirs.[13] There is a certain amount of mistrust by locals for those that they consider to be outsiders, particularly non-Pashtuns. To the people of the CHRV, who have rarely ventured far beyond their villages or districts, ANA soldiers might as well be from an entirely different country.[14]

Due to the residents' wariness toward those they consider foreign, propaganda that paints ANA soldiers as either impious or non-Muslim infidels has been particularly successful in this AO. This is of great concern to the ANA, as the misconception that their soldiers are non-believers reduces the willingness of local residents to cooperate with the CF and ANSF. Claiming that the ANA are non-Muslims is also a way for the insurgency to justify acts of violence that they perpetrate against the ANA and is a way for the insurgency to claim legitimacy.[15]

However, there are some indications that the labors of RCAOs are causing this propaganda to lose its effectiveness.[16] At the initial meeting between RCAOs and U.S. chaplains it was suggested that a way to successfully counter the insurgent propaganda and "show" local Afghans that ANA soldiers are devout Muslims would be to install loudspeakers on ANA bases. The loudspeakers would allow RCAOs to call their fellow ANA soldiers to prayer and thus be a daily reminder to Afghans living near the bases that they are being protected by ANA soldiers who are fellow Muslims. RCAOs believed that greater trust would develop between the ANA and the local populace once they realized that ANA soldiers were of the same faith.[17]

At the bases where speakers were installed, RCAOs and chaplains noted an immediate effect on the local population. Reports began to reach RCT-1 of local Afghans being "stunned" that the ANA "pray the same way [they] do".[18] 1st Kandak RCAO in Nawa District reports that locals near his base anticipate the daily calls to prayer and have even begun attending the ANA mosque during Jumu'ah.[19]

The officer at the ANA Brigade RCAO who partners with chaplain suggests that most local people know that the ANA are Muslims, but question whether they are practicing Muslims, and whether they study and pray. Audible and visual reminders show locals that the ANA are practicing Muslims.[20] In rural Afghan communities, residents often have little exposure to the national government beyond what they see of ANSF in and around their village. ANA soldiers and RCAOs are on the ground, working in these communities on a daily basis, and by showing themselves to be pious they are gaining support with locals for both ANSF and GIRoA. Building this support is essential if the ANSF wants to draw the population away from the insurgency.

## Successful Shuras

RCAOs and chaplains are reporting that religious shuras are being conducted more successfully and with greater frequency throughout the AO. RCAOs have been able to meet successfully with elders and religious leaders in villages that previously had no interest in interacting with ANSF. This is an example of the positive benefit religious engagement is having on the battle space. A mullah and ANA soldier working in Marjah suggests that shuras are gradually becoming more successful. He states that "…before, when we would have shuras, it took a long time for them to know where we were coming from. But now, they listen better and know our purpose." [21] Another mullah from the ANA 6th Kandak notes a similar change, saying "we had many shuras this year. Last year, [local nationals] didn't want to attend our shuras. Now they come – both [local nationals] and mullahs." [22]

The Nawa District RCAO mullah is an ANA officer whose counterpart in the 1/9 is a chaplain. The chaplain claims that the most visible change has occurred in Shoshurak, a community west of the Helmand River in the northern part of the District. The village sits adjacent to a sparsely inhabited area known as Trek Nawa where individuals generally acted more favorably toward insurgent fighters. According to the Nawa District mullah, people in the area have transitioned from resisting any ANSF presence to attending a weekly shura sponsored by the ANA. He states that a recent shura was so successful that, upon completion, a village mullah gave his blessing for his own son to join the ANA.[23]

The 1/3 Marines chaplain in Garmsir District reports that in July alone, he and his ANA counterpart conducted five partnered shuras where residents asked about possible humanitarian assistance that ANSF and the CF could provide to the poor during the month of Ramadan. During another shura the chaplain partnered with a government judge, who spent the day listening to people's complaints. At the end of the day a man approached the chaplain and stated that he was, "so glad that we can come and argue. When the Taliban were here they said 'you will do this or you will die'."[24] These shuras are opportunities to show local residents that their needs are being considered, and they furthermore serve as visible signs of GIRoA presence in the AO.

## Building Credibility

RCAOs also mentioned several cases in which they were able to garner the support of the local population by displaying superior knowledge of the Qur'an. This suggests that RCAOs can build credibility as religious figures with local residents by demonstrating their understanding of Islam, and this in turn can improve pro-ANSF/GIRoA messaging from RCOAs when relayed to local leaders. Mullah Khabir states:

> ***"We recite Qur'an to [local nationals]. And then, they understand that we are Muslims. . . [I] translated it to them [and] told them about how it is wrong to kill people. They took more interest and said they would attend the next shura. People first thought that the ANA were not Muslims. . . So we have our loudspeakers and [call] people to prayer. Then we brought them in to show them our mosque, to pray, to see the Qur'an on the shelf. When we first went to Marjah, people didn't like the ANA. They didn't wave to us or anything. But now things are better, they wave to us. . . I've seen a big improvement."***

In RCT-1's AO, there are a number of examples in which ANA members were able to avert conflict or enhance relationships with communities by showing that soldiers are proficient in praying or reading

the Qur'an. The ANA mullah in the RCAO recalls an incident in his AO in which a child was killed after being hit by a speeding ANA vehicle. The unit at fault sought to offer their condolences by sending an ANA mullah to contact the family and attend the child's funeral. At the funeral a local mullah started to read some verses from the Qur'an from a sheet of paper. When he finished, the ANA mullah continued to recite, from memory, where the mullah had stopped.[25] The ANA mullah is a Hafiz and the ANA were able to repair and strengthen their relationship with the community by displaying their sympathies and their superior knowledge of the Qur'an.[26]

## Way Forward

Throughout the CHRV, RCAOs are conducting a greater number of successful shuras and in many places residents are reported to be more cooperative and motivated to assist friendly forces. When it is time for the RCT-1 to depart and hand over responsibilities to a new team, it will be up to the new unit to evaluate the effectiveness of RCT-1 religious engagement programs and to continue or improve upon the foundation that RCT-1 leaves behind. Success with the residents of the AO will mean fewer reports of anti-GIRoA and ANSF messaging coming from mullahs and other influential community leaders. Engagement should continue with local leaders with whom RCT-1 has already established good relations; however, they will also need to engage with those who remain elusive, particularly in the transitional and desert areas that are frequent bed-down locations for insurgents.

Also, mentoring of RCAOs should continue so that the ANA can transform into a fighting force that Afghans are proud to support. To encourage excellence among RCAOs the chaplain has taken steps to create a more formalized framework for RCAO/chaplain mentoring. Part of this includes the development of Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs) that are based on the core training RCAOs receive at KMTC. The inclusion of METLs in the mentoring program will give RCOAs specific goals to train to and will assist chaplains in identifying areas for further guidance. The chaplain is also working to encourage RCAOs to make humanitarian visits to ANA soldiers and Afghan civilians at the Combat Support Hospital at Camp Dwyer. This will provide an opportunity for RCAOs to show their compassion for and unity with the people that the ANA serves.

In order to transition from first to second order effects it will to be essential to understand what is being said in the AO and who is saying it. For many area residents, the local mullah is the only trusted source of information that they encounter during their average week, making the "religious terrain piece" crucial. This religious figure may be supportive of GIRoA, but until we know what his message to the people is it is difficult to accurately determine what community outreach is producing the greatest effect.

Enablers like Human Terrain Team (HTT) AF07 will be essential to RCT-5 as they work to determine the effectiveness of programs in the CHRV. The HTT works directly with local residents and leaders, through direct observation and interviews, to gain understanding on how they are responding to initiatives from the RCT. By understanding the population, the HTT will be able to make recommendations as to the effectiveness of engagement efforts. For RCT-5, HTT AF07 can also act as a continuity cell for current engagement programs. Members of the team have been in the CHRV since the inception of RCT-1 religious engagement programs and they can relay their institutional knowledge to RCT-5 staff so that programs can continue moving in a positive direction.

Also worth consideration by RCT-5 are innovative types of outreach programs such as Voices of Religious Tolerance, which sent 30 political, tribal, and religious leaders from Helmand Province to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The trip allowed these key leaders to observe how Islam is practiced in a modern, tolerant, stable, and largely Islamic country such as Jordan.[27] The trip was a success and has lead to "reunion" shuras where trip attendees share their experience with other key influencers in the AO.[28]

Another successful program was the outreach in the AO conducted by the U.S. Navy Imam Chaplain. During his time in the CHRV, he met with members of ANSF and explained how their conduct as Muslims directly impacted their relationships with local communities. He also met with local religious leaders and discussed the goal of a stronger relationship between the ANA and the local people based on their shared faith.[29] Lack of education and knowledge of the world outside of their village or district severely limits the imagination and under-

Group photo of participants in the July meeting between ANA RCAOs and U.S. Chaplains.

To progress beyond the first order effects observed by RCT-1 it will be important to obtain accurate reporting on the effectiveness of current outreach and continue providing the same level of mentorship to RCAOs. As efforts in the AO move forward, it is hoped that they will develop ANSF into a fighting force capable of attaining and keeping the trust of local people.

standing of many Helmand residents. These types of programs promote tolerance and counter the insurgent narrative by extending Afghans' knowledge and expanding their concept of what is possible in their own country. If outreach programs continue they will give local Afghans the opportunity to learn more about the world around them, their religion, and how it is practiced in other countries. Seeing the benefits of peace and education, people who have known nothing but war will finally have something to strive for.

## Conclusion

There are already signs that the RCT-1 religious engagement efforts are having a positive effect on the population's perception of ANA and GIRoA, but it is too early to tell whether maintaining the current momentum will lead to long-term gains and stability in the AO.

If RCAOs are able to build credibility for themselves, by continuing to work in local communities and demonstrating their faithfulness to Islam, they may prove to be the crucial link between ANSF (and thus GIRoA) and the key religious leaders that hold so much sway over the opinions and actions of local residents. Gaining the trust and respect of local religious leaders will doubtless increase the impact of CF and ANSF projects in the area and lead to the further marginalization of insurgents from the community.

***Acknowledgments: I would like to thank the members of HTS AF07 both past and present for their contributions. Particular thanks go to AF07 Team Leader Major Wilem Wong, Mr. Christopher Fulford, Mr. William Gregory, and Ms. Gretchen Severson. Additionally I am grateful for the invaluable guidance (and patience) of Dr. Marc Abramiuk who was kind enough to review my work through its many draft stages.***

**Endnotes**

1. Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, *Afghanistan: a Country Study, Foreign Area Studies* (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1986).

2. (U) HTT AF07, *An Analysis of the Factors Behind the Varying Success of Afghan Local Police in Marjah and Nawa-i-Barakzayi*, a report prepared by HTT AF-07 in support of RCT-1, Camp Dwyer, Afghanistan.

3. Personal interview with RCT-1 Commander, Colonel David Furness, conducted by Major Wilem Wong on 9 August 2011.

4. This was a common phrase used by local nationals when referring to key local leaders–HTT AF07 Field Research, June 2011.

5. Personal interview with RCT-1 Effects Officer, Lieutenant Colonel John Carson, conducted by Brian Gunn on 29 July 2011.

6. (U) ANA *Religious and Cultural Affairs Program Background, RRC-AF07-11-0002*, Human Terrain System–Research Reachback Center, 23 June 2011.

7. Slide deck *Religious and Cultural Affairs Responsibilities* provided by RCT-1 Chaplain Mike Sneath.

8. RCAOs currently serve as staff at the brigade and *kandak* (battalion) levels. At the tolai (company) and platoon levels other soldiers are designated to lead the daily prayers.

9. Personal interview with RCT-1 Chaplain, Commander Mike Sneath, conducted by Brian Gunn on 20 July 2011.

10. Personal interview with RCT-1 Effects Officer, Lieutenant Colonel John Carson, conducted by Brian Gunn on 29 July 2011.

11. These reports do not necessarily represent AO wide trends and in some cases may be isolated events or exaggeration by RCAOs. However, reports do reflect the enthusiasm of RCAOs and chaplains and correlate with reduced kinetic activity in RCT-1's AO compared to 2010. Additionally, per the RCT-1 S2 Officer, Major Robert Bechtold it is a matter of debate whether the insurgent's 2011 "spring offensive" took place.

12. Whereas Pashtuns comprise approximately 63 percent of the population of Afghanistan, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks make up 12, 9, and 6 percent respectively–CENTCOM Afghanistan Overview, 16 November 2005.

13. *Kuffar* is the plural form of the Arabic word *kafir* which is generally translated to mean "unbeliever." The literal translation of the root word is "to cover up".

14. (U) HTT AF07, *An Analysis of the Factors Behind the Varying Success of Afghan Local Police in Marjah and Nawa-i-Barakzayi*, a report prepared by HTT AF-07 in support of RCT-1, Camp Dwyer, Afghanistan.

15. (U) HTT AF07, *Engagement at ANA Mullah Shura*, 1 February 2011.

16. While conducting field research in Nawa District, members of HTT AF07 noted that several local nationals stated their previous belief that the ANA were not Muslims. Most respondents then stated that they understood now that the ANA are Muslims, having seen ANA soldiers pray and heard them give the call to prayer.

17. Ibid.

18. (U) HTT AF07, *Engaging ANA Religious and Cultural Affairs Soldiers at Religious Shura*, 9–10 May 2011.

19. *Jumu'ah* is the congregational prayer conducted at by Muslims every Friday.

20. (U) HTT AF07, (Draft) *Engaging ANA Religious and Cultural Affairs Soldiers at Religious Shura*, 24–25 Jul 2011.

21. (U) HTT AF07, *Engaging ANA Religious and Cultural Affairs Soldiers as Religious Shura*, 19–20 Jun 2011.

22. (U) HTT AF07, (Draft) *Engaging ANA Religious and Cultural Affairs Soldiers at Religious Shura*, 24–25 Jul 2011.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. (U) HTT AF07, *Engaging ANA Religious and Cultural Affairs Soldiers at Religious Shura*, 9–10 May 2011.

26. A *Hafiz* is a person who has completely memorized the Qur'an. This is different from a *Qari*, who can recite the Qur'an using proper rules of recitation, but has not necessarily memorized the entire text.

27. After Action Report (AAR) for Voices of Religious Tolerance (VORT) Program, 3 May 2011.

28. VORT was so successful that a second trip is presently being planned for leaders from across RC (SW).

29. Lieutenant Asif Balbale, one of three U.S. Navy Imam Chaplains, was sent TAD to II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF)–Forward for approximately six weeks, including the month of Ramadan. His status as a Muslim Imam and U.S. naval officer demonstrate the U.S. value of religious freedom; and, in so doing, reinforce the messages of the VORT trip.–Imam Chaplain Visit to RCT-1 AO AAR, 8 August 2011.

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# HTAT Arrives at Multinational Division Baghdad

**by Lawrence C. Katzenstein, Michael Albin, and Paul McDowell**

***The views expressed are those of the author and not those of U.S. Army, TRADOC, HTS, and MND-B.***

## Introduction

This article will detail how the first Human Terrain and Analysis Team (HTAT) at the Multinational Division Baghdad (MND-B) developed and evolved through successive unit attachments and how these embedded teams helped the units understand tribes, understand Arab diplomacy, and their linkages to the return of Iraqi refugees. As HTAT-C it helped to uncover causes of corruption in the security forces of the new Iraq. This article will also touch upon the work of a Human Terrain Team (HTT) in Anbar after the mission of the HTAT was extended into that province after the division's battle space was extended west beyond Baghdad. The focus is particularly upon that HTT's daily work with the Iraqi provincial council and with the police authorities in that province.

The broader goal here is to demonstrate how this first HTAT increasingly integrated with the military command and helped contribute to the stability of Iraq. However, before discussing this it would be wise to consider how the need for an embedded sociocultural capacity first came about in the context of these recent wars.

## Background

The 9/11 attacks on the American homeland led the U.S. to deploy troops to Afghanistan, and somewhat oddly, Iraq as well. The first of these operations was conventional by any standard since it involved a nation attacking the sanctuary of an enemy that had just killed 3,000 of its citizens. The second operation was less conventional and based on an argument of preemption of a potential nuclear, biological or chemical attack by a country with which we had had a recent war. The argument was extended to include the violation of the inspection regime established by the treaty that ended that war and was to prevent Iraq from having offensive weapons. It also specified human rights abuses by the Hussein regime.

Neither action was specified in advance as involving a large enough force to occupy either country on an ongoing basis. The end result was that our forces did not leave either country and subsequently remained for many years. By doing so, we and our Allies incurred obligations under international law and became responsible for the security of these states. As initial committed forces were relatively small, we either had to increase our forces to suppress any opposition or insurgency by force or find new ways to govern. Since our standing forces had been reduced at the conclusion of the Cold War, and our economy had been slowing since early 2001 it was in the interest of the U.S. to find solutions that could facilitate governance of Afghanistan and Iraq without expanding our personnel abroad. A variety of organizations, including the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), civil affairs (CA) units (G9), and HTS (Human Terrain System) were either expanded or set up to enable the Army in this broader governance role.

What HTS brings to the table is different from the other enablers but also sufficiently subtle that those of us who deployed as we did to a military command that never had a team were regularly asked "What is it that you do again?" In effect, HTS teams are in theater to understand the perspectives of the local population and bring this information to the command. At the HTT brigade level this usually involves going to markets, going to other public settings, going to key leader engagements (KLEs), or meeting with local leaders who may visit our offices as well as discovering perceptions, rumors, and grievances of the local population. Some of this may involve basic cultural awareness such as not eating in front of local people who are fasting for Ramadan, and some may involve understanding the perceptions of the Iraqi Army. Most Americans know little of Islam while the people of Arab countries see Islam, even if they're not religious, as a major part of their everyday world. This is clearly a gap that would need to be bridged if American soldiers are involved in day to day security and governance in an Arab country.

One could go on at length about the role of culture in people's lives, but it would be impossible to govern a people if we don't know how they interpret the world, know something about their family relations, and what they hold dear. For example, when a human terrain analyst in Baghdad was able to joke with local sheikhs drawing from his teenage years in Baghdad, delivered in Baghdadi Iraqi Arabic, he was able to connect on a much closer level than other Americans and was also able to gather important local information from his new friends far more readily. Local knowledge rooted in local culture is the very thing that allows Americans to establish a connection to people and take on a role rather be perceived as a foreigner or the "other". It provides a framework for real human interaction which also undermines prejudice and negative stereotypes.

Accessing the world of "the other" and letting them access ours basically provides both parties with human understanding. It is the same sort of empathy that's been achieved by police doing community policing. If it works correctly they're seen as members of the community wanting to help the community rather than as an "occupying force."[1] Such a transition allows people to come forward with information that could protect the community rather than keeping information to themselves for fear of reprisals. Not eating a ham sandwich in front of someone fasting on Ramadan; helping sponsor a feast on Eid al-Fitr; not frisking or being too familiar with female family members; learning about Islam, and showing genuine interests in the lives, interests, and aspirations of people and their families seems a small price to pay for information leading to enhanced stability.

If we understand the local culture, myths, and authority structures we can also build bridges and use the local culture to frame new policies and programs. This is nothing new to American politicians who have to pitch diverse ethnic and racial constituencies, but this can be lost on our security communities. While urban politicians in the U.S. may attend ethnic street fairs, learn ethnic phrases, and eat ethnic specialties in order to get people to buy their political positions, there is little of this in war zones. Democracy is presented as a good in its own right as is parliamentary government. We do little to show the value of democratic forms to other Islamic countries, nor do we carry messages from American Muslim politicians or provide copies of the Koran once owned by Thomas Jefferson.

Political and social change, if it occurs, will be most easily accepted if it's seen as also preserving local forms. This is why the Italian Communist Party was successful in the immediate post WW II period. The party held its celebrations on traditional Catholic festival days and celebrated as one would celebrate at these festivals. Employing local symbols, rituals and thinking to cause social change is less painful and more productive than trying to coerce it by force of arms. It's also a lot cheaper and more peaceful. It's just another part of accomplishing the mission.

## HTAT-In the Beginning...

One would think that this would be an easy sell, especially in a counterinsurgency and stability operations framework. The basic pitch is that if you respect the locals and show some interest in them and their thoughts you'll be able to get all sorts of information about the operational environment. It turned out that the sell wasn't so easy either with the military (attached units at Division) or the anthropologists. What's frightening however is that despite repeated explanations of our function, the first Human Terrain and Development team at Division in Iraq met with elements of a command that were

almost as hostile as the small band of vocal cultural anthropologists at the American Anthropological Association.[2] The real problem that the unit had was that they didn't understand what we could contribute. They already had people doing surveys, and additional troops and enablers were obtaining atmospherics across the local population. What they didn't have was a team that could get data and information from trained social scientists from brigade level teams across Baghdad.

Our first assignment was to effectively serve as appointment secretaries for the G7 (Training) working on KLEs. This involved some intellectual work since we would try to research and provide social network charts for the tribal leaders with whom the command met at these KLEs, but this was simply not enough work for a whole team. It was also frustrating since we were pigeonholed in the G7 while HTS teams were most often on special staff or some other element that allowed them to make themselves useful throughout the command.

However, while sniffing around the command we did find some allies who understood what we did. Since the Red Team was trained in the same Foreign Military Studies Office building we trained in at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, they afforded us their good offices. We got to go outside the wire with them and attend some meetings. We also went to meetings with them as plans for the 2009 provincial elections developed. Our colleagues at the Baghdad PRT invited us to the Green Zone to discuss our thoughts about both tribal issues and elections. One of the Iraqi contractors involved with the Iraqi Army took my junior social scientist to one of these meetings to help him network.

Finally, since we were organizationally housed in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G2 we were able to go to the Economic Political and Engagement Intelligence Cell (EPEIC) non-lethal cell of the command's G2. We helped them with whatever flow of information we got from the teams and they helped us in our understanding of the environment from their prior work in theater. There were almost daily meetings on the political, social and economic issues of the day run as a seminar by a warrant officer who headed the cell. This relationship went so well that the outgoing G2 during the Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) suggested that our team serve as the EPEIC for the new unit when it was first thought that this unit didn't have an EPEIC operation.

While our team worked closely with these helpful allies and kept to our assigned tasks related to the G7, we were still hindered in our efforts by misperceptions about our role. This was also hampered by the lack of direct information that we got within the command and from our own six brigade level teams. Since there had never been an HTAT in theater these teams may have been concerned that we would try to play a supervisory role. HTS doctrine was at odds with this since we lacked tasking authority. When the teams didn't choose to share the products they were providing to the brigade commanders, our team leader and the division command tried to task the HTTs by having the division commander task the brigade commanders with special instructions to turn over the work products of the HTTs.

These FRAGOs usually fell by the wayside since both the teams and the commanders saw this as an infringement on the brigade commanders' authority to task their teams. The result was that our team didn't get proper information flow from some of our most important assets. However, when we actually rode or flew to our teams, met with them, and established our support for their work there was a change of heart. Their work also benefited since they were able to call us for province-wide and other data and perspective we got from the Division.

Things improved markedly with a change of leadership. Our team leader, a long retired major recruited from a security contracting firm, left the program and was succeeded on an interim basis first by me and then by the recently retired colonel who ran both the Corps and Division teams until a permanent replacement could be found. The movement from a security and intelligence orientation by the former team leader back to a sociocultural orientation led to less conflict with the HTTs and even with the command itself. The RIP/TOA that occurred soon after allowed us to relate to a unit that was much more supportive. A G5 Operations Research/Systems Analyst came to us prior to the transition to introduce the work he planned in collecting data on local grievances using the U.S. Agency for International Development's Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework. He and the team worked together on these surveys, subsequent data

analysis and regular presentations to the chief of staff. Soon after the new unit arrived they also requested the Cultural Preparation of the Battlefield that HTS described as being part of our work in the HTS Commander's Handbook. We were able to produce what they requested within their six week timeframe.

Under the new unit the team was moved to the G9 and worked closely with the G5, G2 EPEIC and ultimately came under the direction of the Fire Support Coordinator. They not only helped map tribes and their boundaries within their area of operation (AO) based in part on the information we received previously, but were able to identify some imposter sheikhs inadvertently recognized by the previous unit. All this was facilitated by a new permanent team leader who was a reserve lieutenant colonel with a Master's degree in Public Administration, a law degree, and a senior civilian job at Homeland Security.

He integrated the team so well with the unit that he served as the G9 when the G9 went on leave. He also worked with us to set up a forecasting model drawn from events data in the AO. This was his idea which the social scientist helped him develop and implement. The G6 (Communications/IT) also helped the team create a web-based program which allowed our six HTTs to observe our findings and send additional data that they found appropriate. We also helped the unit predict the possible return of refugees so they could help secure housing and services if a large number returned to the AO. Under his leadership we also provided substitute personnel for HTTs that were in transition or needed additional staff. The leadership model and interaction with the unit served to show how helpful and useful an HTAT could be at Division under the proper conditions.

When the HTAT social scientist left theater after 11 months and the team leader and other team members left four or five months later there was a shuffle of social scientists, team leaders, and other individual replacements, but many of these eventually moved again to other teams. The team that took over ultimately had a new and highly motivated team leader who also integrated well with our old unit and again with a new unit after another RIP/TOA. Interestingly, under the new unit, the HTAT was housed with the G2 non-lethal EPEIC cell. Since non-lethal research on social, cultural, political and economic issues is the work of both a G2 EPEIC cell and an HTAT they experienced the same synergy with the G2 that we did. There was a good deal of overlap and common interests despite the differences in the training and information sources of the HTS social scientists and Military Intelligence analysts. The synergy between these two groups would seem to come from using different perspectives and methods to understand and address many of the same problems.

With less violence in Iraq, a priority was placed on consolidating the gains made by the Iraqi government. As Operation Iraqi Freedom gave way to Operation New Dawn there was more of an emphasis on training security forces. HTAT-C joined in this effort by interviewing Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units and U.S. Forces (USF) units involved in training them. Since two of the HTAT researchers were Iraqi-Americans with native language skills they were able to build trusting relationships with the ISF members they interviewed. They were particularly able to gather information on corruption that had not been forthcoming before. The interviews led the team to realize that those questioned had values quite at odds with corruption and that they resented any attempts by the political or influential to shape which prosecutions would be pursued. This was at odds with stereotypes held by Americans about local and organizational culture supporting corruption.

One of the social scientists from this HTAT designed an anti-corruption kit for the command to help them better understand the forces that drive corruption and suggesting ways that USF could help to reduce it. The team's research manager also worked with our country-wide polling unit (SSRA) on youth issues and fielded a set of interviews dealing with the development of youth and youth movements in Sadr City. The team was able to use its knowledge and rapport with the local population to develop studies that provided insights that were previously unavailable.

The HTAT and the Division command were able to integrate information from the new western part of the AO due to the work of HTT there. The entire team generally operated under the S7, but a two person element worked primarily for the team chief (a U.S. Colonel) at that location; for the bri-

gade commander at Camp Ramadi; and sometimes for the Division in Baghdad whose AO now included Anbar as well as Baghdad provinces. What was unique about the team in Anbar was that its location put them in daily contact with the province's governmental and police leaders. The team's reporting came from extended formal and social interactions with the executive and the legislature as well as with the police chief and his department heads.

Team members at Camp Ramadi were also able to frequently venture out to villages and police posts around Ramadi and east to the outskirts of Fallujah. They were also able to make trips to precincts around Habbaniyah. During a trip with a CA unit they were able to meet with the mayor of Ramadi who discussed U.S. assistance in repairing blast damage to city hall while also complaining about earlier U.S. assistance in repairing municipal facilities.

All members of the team answered requests for information on daily political developments, economic issues, security conditions and the personalities of key leaders. The access the team enjoyed at the seat of provincial government allowed them to provide detailed reports on governance issues. Besides policy and implementation, the team also provided biographical information about the leaders. While the team did little survey research they were able to field an instrument examining perceptions of the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police units stationed in the province. They found a "disjunction of perceptions" between the groups. The brigade leaders, trained themselves in survey methods, were very positive and receptive to the preliminary results of this survey.

While the team was kept busy by all the requests and projects that came to them they also initiated projects they thought necessary to help the staff around them fully understand the environment. Some of this involved cultural guidance (the role of the mukhtar (elder) at the neighborhood or village level; the meaning of the Shi'a Moslem holiday Ashura, and the general Moslem pilgrimage to Mecca known as the hajj.)

There were both religious and security aspects to these activities such as protecting worshipers who would appear in large groups, or sectarian groups that had sometimes chosen to disrupt holidays unobserved by their sect. There were also practical or policy questions such as the illegal drug trade, the condition of the medical facilities at the Habbaniyah military base, and the penetration of media into the social fabric of the province. This last piece involved a critical look at propaganda and programming on satellite TV. Since Iraq's 2005 constitution set up a federal system that was still highly centralized the team took it upon itself to help the Anbar political leadership manage their relations with the federal government in a more productive fashion. They also helped the provincial government understand some of the importance of apportionment and the related political and security implications of implementing a nationwide census. Since the team had travelled around the province they were in a unique position to share their insights with the provincial government about regionalism in Anbar. The team worked with the PRT and S9 to help in the preparation and execution of the province's budget.

The team became involved in a number of hot political and social issues as well. They held that the new Ba'ath Party was more imaginary than real despite staff at the brigade and division who believed it was a real emergent party. They reordered the political power of key figures in Anbar in accord with their actual power in the province. Thus, some sheikhs who were seen to have "star power" in Baghdad lacked any such power in Anbar Province. However the national Minister of Finance did enjoy a great deal of local power in the province. The team also reordered many civilian professionals as being higher up the provincial hierarchy than the staff believed them to be. Some tribal leaders were therefore minimized in their importance by the team while elected provincial council members, writers, professors and the imams from the Sunni Wakf (Endowment) were shown by the team to have risen in the Anbar hierarchy.

This team, despite its restrictions under New Dawn, was able to interact with and advise local authorities as well as both the brigade and the division based on governance conversations of which they had become a part.

## Enfin

Despite being affected by the sorts of growing pains attendant to any new effort the development of HTAT-B/C and IZ 13 that extended the reach of

HTAT-C shows a pattern of continuing integration with the command and the complexity and reach of the research they offered to their commands. This sort of organizational maturity can be expected of HTS as we go forward as academic researchers and learn more about the Army and the Army learns more about social scientists. This will not only allow HTS to continue to make more contributions to command decision makers but assure that the views of the population get to these decision makers as well. Put another way HTS has learned from the Army, the Army has learned from HTS. They've both learned from the local populations in critical war zones. In effect this has provided a democratic fix in achieving stability by having HTS act as a conduit for the local people and the elements of the command making critical decisions on governance. Having the population feel safe and cared about is exactly the lesson of democracy America tries to impart. HTS is just the latest vehicle for doing so.

**Endnotes**

1. Dominique Wisler and Ihekwoaba D. Onwudiwe, *Community Policing: International Patterns and Comparative Perspectives* (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2009).

2. The anthropologist opposition will be dealt with at some time in the future. The AAA refused to follow the path of the anthropologist Ruth Benedict who helped in the war effort against Japan or the numerous academics, such as the political scientist Harold Lasswell, who also helped in that effort. In fact many of us are just like them in many ways in that we're doing this to reduce violence and hasten the end of these wars.

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- Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3,000 words, double-spaced with normal margins without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words.
- Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible.
- We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles and it may take up to a year to publish some articles.
- Although ***MIPB*** targets themes, you do not need to "write" to a theme.
- Please note that submissions become property of ***MIPB*** and may be released to other government agencies or nonprofit organizations for re-publication upon request.

**What we need from you:**

- **A release signed by your unit or organization's information and operations security officer/ SSO stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain OR that the article and any accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified/ FOUO (IAW AR 380-5 DA Information Security Program).** A sample security release format can be accessed at our website at https://icon.army.mil.
- A cover letter (either hard copy or electronic) with your work or home email addresses, telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published.
- Your article in Word. Do not use special document templates.
- A Public Affairs or any other release your installation or unit/agency may require. Please include that release(s) with your submission.
- Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic. We need complete captions (the Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How), photographer credits, and the author's name on photos. **Do not embed graphics or photos within the article. Send them as separate files such as .tif or .jpg and note where they should appear in the article. PowerPoint (not in .tif or .jpg format) is acceptable for graphs, etc. Photos should be at 300 dpi.**
- The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author's current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information, email address, and phone numbers with the biography.

We will edit the articles and put them in a style and format appropriate for ***MIPB***. From time to time, we will contact you during the editing process to help us ensure a quality product. Please inform us of any changes in contact information.

Submit articles, graphics, or questions to the Editor at sterilla.a.smith.civ@mail.mil. Our fax number is 520.538.1005. Submit articles by mail on disk to:

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# TRADOC CULTURE CENTER
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**BG Gregg C. Potter**

**CG, USAICoE**
**Fort Huachuca**

## Why is Culture Important?

Cross-cultural competency (3C) is a critical combat multiplier for commanders at all levels that enables successful mission accomplishment. Possessing cultural understanding is one of the critical components for Soldiers who interface with the local population. At a minimum, soldiers must possess cultural awareness. Leaders must demonstrate cultural understanding and be proficient in applying cultural knowledge effectively to achieve mission objectives. The TCC can help Soldiers gain this mission essential proficiency. Lessons learned from 10 years of operational deployments clearly indicate that 3C is a huge and indispensible combat multiplier.

## OVER 160,000 SERVICE MEMBERS TRAINED

The TCC supports Soldiers and leaders throughout the Army and other services in numerous ways. It conducts ARFORGEN/predeployment training for any contingency; trains culture trainers; and produces professional military education (over 160,000 military personnel trained since 2004). The TCC will create or tailor any products deploying units require.




The TCC produces cargo pocket-sized training products to include smart books and smart cards, as well as digital downloads for smart devices. Areas covered include Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, and more. Let us know what we can produce for you. For a complete list of materials, see:

**https://ikn.army.mil/apps/tccv2/**.


The TCC has developed several distance learning products available for facilatated instruction or individual student use. As an example, two seasons of "Army 360" that the TCC produced contain 19 episodes of missions run in six countries. "Army 360" is an interactive media instruction (IMI) training product which meets the Army Learning Concept 2015 learner-centric requirements. The TCC is in the process of turning the "Army 360" IMI into digital apps which will be easily accessible for all Soldiers. The TCC produced an Initial Military Trainee (IMT) training product for the initial entry level Soldier called "IMT-BCT What is Culture?" We are also producing a BOLC IMI product. Both products are or will be available via the TCC website. The TCC is expanding other products into the apps arena as well as developing additional distance learning products to provide new 3C training and sustainment.


The TCC is your One-Stop-Shop to achieve individual and unit 3C. We will do whatever you require to help you accomplish your mission. Let us know what the TCC can do for you, your One-Stop-Shop for all things culture.

# ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| AASLT | Air Assault |
| ANA | Afghan National Army |
| ANP | Afghan National Police |
| ANSF | Afghan National Security Forces |
| AO | area of operations |
| BCT | brigade combat team |
| CA | Civil Affairs |
| CCC | Combined Coordination Center |
| CCP | combined checkpoint |
| CF | Coalition Forces |
| CJ2 | combined-joint intelligence officer |
| CMIP | Civilian-Military Integration Program |
| COCOM | combatant command (command authority) |
| COMIJC | Commander, ISAF Joint Command |
| COMISAF | Commander, International Security Assistance Force |
| COA | course of action |
| CSM | Combined Security Mechanism |
| CSOC | Consolidated Stability Operations Center |
| CST | Cultural Support Team |
| CTF | combined task force |
| DCOS COMM | Deputy Chief of Staff, Communications |
| DCOS OPS | Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations |
| DNA | district narrative assessments |
| FRAGO | fragmentary order |
| FRIC | Force Reintegration Cell |
| G1/S1 | Administration |
| G2/S2 | Intelligence |
| G3/S3 | Operations |
| G4/S4 | Logistics |
| G5/S5 | Planning |
| G6/S6 | Communications/IT |
| G7/S7 | Training |
| G9/S9 | Civil Affairs |
| GIS | Geospatial Information Science |
| HTAT | Human Terrain Analysis Team |
| HTAT-N | Human Terrain Analysis Team-North (Iraq) |
| HTS | Human Terrain System |
| HTT | Human Terrain Team |
| INS/TB | insurgents/Taliban |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force |
| JUONS | Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement |
| LOE | line of effort |
| MAP-HT | Mapping the Human Terrain Toolkit |
| MDMP | military decision making process |
| NCO | noncommissioned officer |
| OPT | operational planning teams |
| RC | Regional Commands |
| RFI | request for information |
| RIP/TOA | relief in place/transfer of authority |
| RRC | Reachback Research Center |
| SA | situational awareness |
| SME | subject matter expert |
| SOIC | Stability Operations Information Center |
| SSD | Social Science Directorate |
| SSMKT | Social Science Mobile Knowledge Team |
| SSRA | Social Sciences Research and Analysis |
| TCE | Theater Coordination Element |
| TSO | Theater Support Office |

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