MIPB

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

Intelligence Support

Tactical through Strategic

FROM THE EDITOR

Included in this quarter's issue are five lessons learned oriented articles:

- Major Remso Martinez offers advice for those stepping into the role of a sustainment brigade S2.
- Captain Tim Bagley gives his perspective on conducting intelligence operations as an infantry officer who served as a maneuver battalion S2.
- Based on his experience is Iraq, Captain Todd Harkrader outlines a methodology to successfully execute Time Sensitive Targeting.
- Captain Joan Hollein discusses the challenges of training MICO platoon leaders in a BSTB to perform in both leadership and operational roles during deployment.
- Lieutenant Colonel Lee Lacy presents his observations on the training and development of his unit's G2 and ACE to perform predictive analysis and information operations during peace keeping operations in Kosovo; lessons applicable in today's operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

TCM Ground Sensors at Fort Huachuca discusses updates on two ongoing efforts in counter RCIED training and the Sequoyah Foreign Language Translation Program. Points of contact are included for those interested in these efforts.

In the strategic arena, Major Brian Dunmire discusses the need for MI/FA 34 Strategic Intelligence officers, the relationship between MI/FA 34 and MI/Branch 35 Intelligence, and suggestions on what should be done to create a healthy FA 34 structure to get the right analytical skill sets in the right organizations.

From INSCOM, Christopher Anderson and Matthew Herbert explain the 66th MI Brigade's innovative academic outreach program with Mercyhurst College to teach intelligence analysis. Major Ronald Beadenkopf discusses the many missions and challenges of the 513th, a Theater MI Brigade, located at Fort Gordon.

Nick Padlo discusses the need for advanced pattern analysis for successful intelligence operations at the tactical level. Captain Paulo Shakarian suggests the need for a greater investment in cultural modeling to aid in the counterinsurgency fight at the tactical level.

Michelle Gray, of the TRADOC Culture Center, Fort Huachuca, updates the Intelligence School's ongoing cultural training efforts as she discusses another innovative training experience, the African Film Festival.

Be sure to review the summary of contents of the new FMI 2-01 ISR release.

Watch for our new MIPB website on the Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN) coming in mid-March 2009. The site will have several new features to include a complete MIPB archive from 1974 to present; a complete author/title index from 1974 to present; an area to submit your articles; a shout box, and the new security release format. In the near future we hope to include a "blog" function with each article for reader feedback and discussion. The Professional Reader program will continue as well.

Readers must have an AKO account to be able to access the website within the IKN portal at https://icon.army.mil. Those within DOD who are eligible for a Defense Knowledge Online (DKO) account can go to www.us.army.mil to request an account in order to access IKN and the MIPB website. Readers not eligible for an AKO/DKO account can view the most current issue on the public IKN.

We have resumed printing. If your unit or agency would like to receive MIPB at no cost, please email sterilla.smith@conus.army.mil and include a physical address and quantity desired or call me at 520.538.0956/DSN 879.0956. We are no longer accepting personal subscriptions. We mail to APOs.

Sterilla A. Smith
Editor

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

PB 34-08-4 Volume 34 Number 4 October - December 2008

FEATURES

DEPARTMENTS

Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin** (**MIPB**) quarterly under the provisions of **AR 25-30**. **MIPB** presents information designed to keep intelligence professionals informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; problems and solutions, etc., can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of professional development.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are those of the authors and not those of the Department of Defense or its elements. The contents do not necessarily reflect official U.S. Army positions and do not change or supersede information in any other U.S. Army publications.

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ALWAYS OUT FRONT

by Major General John M. Custer III
Commanding General
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In the previous issue of MIPB I discussed the tenet that MI assets are always engaged and described how the Intelligence Center is diligently working to draw from your experiences in ongoing operations. Carrying that thought forward, I will discuss some of the newer conceptual and doctrinal paradigms we are now crafting into the full-spectrum doctrine that will underpin precise intelligence operations for the future. One of my key tests for developing the right doctrinal constructs is the ability of the emerging doctrine to facilitate intelligence operations that can find high value individuals, the proverbial needle in a stack of needles, during stability operations while still addressing the many nuanced requirements associated with securing and meeting the needs of the local populace.

We carefully struggle with the friction of maintaining fundamental full-spectrum doctrine from which you can vary while also addressing the requirement to develop specific relevant doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for the current fight. Our fundamental doctrinal constructs must remain as relevant during the conduct of offensive, defensive, and the many newly forming challenges of civil support operations as they are for current operations. We have taken big strides forward in adapting to asymmetric threats and complex operations but there are still many improvements we will implement. You will have a gigantic role to play in crafting this fundamental doctrine and more specific TTP through your reviews of our doctrine in the near future; most notably the review of our capstone doctrine FM 2-0, Intelligence this year. Our strategy in most cases is to develop an 85 percent solution and then quickly revise those manuals as necessary in order to break out of the old doctrinal revision cycle…which has not been effective.

Some of the newer doctrinal concepts and issues we are tackling within MI doctrine and also addressing within other branch and Joint intelligence doctrine include:

- **Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition/Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (RSTA/ISR).** In September 2008, we drafted and received official Army authentication on a Change 1 to FM 2-0, Intelligence focused almost exclusively on Chapter 1. The revision of FM 2-0 implemented the Vice Chief of the Staff of the Army guidance to introduce RSTA/ISR into Army doctrine. RSTA/ISR reflects the unique application of ISR and targeting within current tactical operations and provides a useful context from which to view future operations. The definition is provided within the context of the unique nature of land operations and the execution of intensive ISR operations required to conduct successful tactical operations. The points of emphasis that make RSTA/ISR unique from broader ISR and targeting include: recognition that operations must be dynamic, timely and accurate in its nature; the inclusion of combat information and actionable intelligence in its very essence; and the specific emphasis on effects and decisions in direct support of the ground tactical commander. We will continue to explore the implications of this conceptual change on the body of MI doctrine.
  - Change 1 to FM 2-0 states, "RSTA/ISR is the means the Army uses to implement the Joint doctrinal concept of persistent surveillance in support of tactical operations. Dependable technology and responsive intelligence lessen the effects of uncertainty, chance, friction, and complexity. Complex and dynamic Army tactical operations require extensive ISR capabilities to satisfy the commander's information requirements to detect, locate, characterize, identify, track, and target HPTs, and to provide combat assessment in near real time within a very fluid operational environment."

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CSM FORUM

by Command Sergeant Major Gerardus Wykoff
Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca

In October 2008, during the opening ceremony of the annual Association of the U.S. Army Meeting and Exposition, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren announced 2009 as the "Year of the Noncommissioned Officer (NCO.)" He mentioned that, "At the front of every Army mission in the U.S. or overseas, you'll find an NCO. They know their mission, they know their equipment, but most importantly, they know their Soldiers." Throughout history, the NCO has been at the forefront of every training exercise, tactical and operational mission, and every major battle. NCOs are the Army's primary military leaders. They are responsible for executing an organization's mission—and for training Soldiers in an organization. U.S. Army NCOs are the finest in the world. Their training and education is rigorous and includes leadership and management as well as Service-specific and combat training. Another critical role our NCOs assume is providing advice and guidance to the Officer Corps at all levels. This role is particularly important for junior officers, who begin their careers in a position of authority but lack practical experience. Senior NCOs are a wealth of knowledge which earns them the esteem title of being the "backbone of the Army". Their leadership, expertise and experience are the primary link which forms the bond between enlisted Soldiers and the officers in our military organizations. Our NCOs are empowered and trusted like no other NCO in the world; even the most advanced armies in the world today are mirroring the U.S. Army's Model of the NCO. In his speech, Secretary of the Army Geren pledged that the intent for 2009 is for the Army to accelerate NCO development of strategic initiatives and develop new initiatives that enhance training education, capability, and utilization of the NCO Corps. This year's theme will help showcase the NCO story to the Army and the American people, honor the sacrifices, and celebrate contributions of the NCO Corps, past and present.

In 1989, when the first "Year of the NCO" was announced, the Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh, along with the Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan and Sergeant Major of the Army, Julius Gates, used the opportunity to bulk up the responsibilities and the status of the NCO Corps with programs that underscored four principal roles of NCOs—leader, trainer, role model, and standard-bearer. It was a banner year for increased NCO promotions, changes to the NCO education system, and programs to ensure NCO mentoring happened on par with commissioned officers. Due to these initiatives and proven performance from our NCOs over the past decade, the U.S. Army's NCO Corps is stronger than ever before.

On 6 January 2009, the Army's highest ranking leadership gathered for the official kick off of the Year of the NCO at Fort Bliss, Texas. Secretary of the Army Geren said "With our effort–the year of the NCO–we have many things we want to accomplish. One is to just recognize the contributions that our NCOs make–past and present–and recognize them for internal and external audiences. We want to inform the country, inform the Congress, and also inform young people about what NCOs do for our Army and help them better understand what an exciting opportunity and a career the choice of being an NCO in the U.S. Army, is."

The Army's intent for 2009 is to enhance the overall mental and physical health of all NCOs, improve the educational opportunities in both military and civilian programs available to NCOs, enhance leadership skills through various programs such as The NCO Congressional Fellowship Program, and last but not least, increase the public awareness of the NCO Corps by showcasing the history of the Corps and the Army. The NCO Corps has been and will always be the backbone supporting the greatest fighting power in

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> *"RSTA/ISR is a full spectrum combined arms mission that integrates ground and air capabilities to provide effective, dynamic, accurate, and assured combat information and multidiscipline actionable intelligence for lethal and non-lethal effects and decisions in direct support of the ground tactical commander."* ***Change 1, FM 2-0, Intelligence, 11 September 2008***

- **Assessing targeting doctrine**. Associated with the underpinnings of RSTA/ISR we believe is an immediate need to better express areas of emphasis and the nature of execution within our tactical targeting doctrine relative to current operations. However, this will have to involve a careful process and broad consensus in order to implement a change to the current doctrinal constructs and TTPs. A conceptual basis will first have to be developed to reach a viable solution. The Intelligence Center is not the proponent for targeting although obviously intelligence plays a pivotal role across all targeting operations. We will frame the basic analysis of a future construct in terms of many of the same RSTA/ISR characteristics previously mentioned: dynamic, timely and accurate; the effective integration of combat information and actionable intelligence; and an emphasis on effects for the ground tactical commander unique to current operations against an asymmetric threat.
- **Tactical Persistent Surveillance (TPS)**. The Intelligence Center prepared a White Paper for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Department of the Army (DA) staff in September 2007, to further explore the conceptual basis for a new view of articulating the elements of truly effective intelligence and ISR at the tactical level. There was widespread agreement that the Joint definition for persistent surveillance did not mark any new characteristics of ISR and intelligence, lacked specificity, and did not adequately apply to the nature of tactical operations. By design, our change 1 to FM 2-0, first discusses the Joint view of TPS then flows to a more relevant discussion of the nature of land operations culminating in a discussion of RSTA/ISR. FMI 2-01, ISR Synchronization, discusses the idea of TPS as a related concept to the Joint definition of persistent surveillance:

"In its most simple form, the goal of the Army conceptual discussion of Joint persistent surveillance is to provide the right intelligence to the right person at the right time and in the right format focused to their requirements...these concepts focus on balancing future requirements for providing or accessing combat information and intelligence in a networked environment to support ongoing operations while also supporting long-term intelligence analysis and planning and other staff functions. Most of the concepts (and the Tactical Persistent Surveillance White Paper) focus on:

- *Embedded ISR synchronization capabilities.*
- *Improved ISR sensor capabilities and effective evaluation of ISR resources.*
- *Assured network communications capability.*
- *An enterprise approach to analysis, processing, and data or information access across units or organizations and echelons.*
- *Enhanced automated analytical tools to include planning and control, and analytical change detection capabilities.*

As a result of implementing these tactical ISR concepts, we can expect gradual incremental improvements in:

- *The number of ISR resources available.*
- *Phasing, cueing, and overlapping of ISR capabilities.*
- *Integrating and networking ISR assets and collection efforts.*
- *Executing the intelligence handover.*

Within the latest Army intelligence concepts there is recognition that while vast improvements in ISR capabilities are possible, these new characteristics are not likely to fully develop in the near future. ISR will:

- *Not provide guaranteed and uninterrupted collection on all requirements for all operations.*
- *Not change from inherently using a combined arms operational construct.*
- *Not eliminate all operational risk and uncertainty.*

- *Not obviate the need for operational planning.*
- *Not exclusively focus on sensor capability issues."*

> *"The synchronization and integration of available networked sensors and analysts across warfighting functions and operational environments, to provide commanders with combat information, actionable intelligence and situational understanding. In response to the tactical commander's requirements (CCIR), TPS missions detect, characterize, locate, track, target, and assess specific objects or areas, in real or near real time despite target countermeasures or natural obstacles."* ***White Paper, Tactical Persistent Surveillance, 25 September 2007***

- **Critical thinking.** The Army's manual on Leadership, FM 6-22, espouses critical thinking as one of the skills demonstrated by effective leaders and decision makers. The importance of improving the quality of our analysis and more effectively executing our other intelligence processes can not be overemphasized. The Intelligence Center has long recognized that critical thinking is one of the major traits required in intelligence analysts and staff officers, and is at the forefront of integrating critical thinking principles into doctrine and training. Recent initiatives include: adding blocks of instruction on critical thinking to the school's academic courses; creating critical thinking vignettes for the Joint Intelligence Training Center's capstone exercise–Exercise Eagle II; and the incorporation of critical thinking into FM 2-33.4, Intelligence Analysis (which we will submit for approval soon) and addition of TC 2-33.401, Critical Thinking within Intelligence (which is in the early stages of development). We are dedicated to forging ahead so that critical thinking is thoroughly, but realistically, embedded in the right places across all of our fundamental intelligence tasks. A synopsis of our approach to critical thinking relative to analysis with the latest draft of FM 2-33.4 states:

"Critical thinking is an essential element of the analytical thought process …lessons learned in recent military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforce the importance of critical thinking skills training…These lessons show that the intelligence analyst must be able to clearly articulate to the commander: what he knows and why he knows it; what he thinks and why he thinks it, what he does not know and what he is doing about it. When assessing any situation, the analyst strives to be fair-minded, honest, reasonable, systematic, precise, persistent, focused, questioning, and open-minded when formulating and presenting conclusions."

I understand the challenges of keeping current with changing concepts and doctrine given the tremendous OPTEMPO the Army is grappling with now. However, I still encourage you to read, comment on, and consider our doctrine and concepts as you execute your mission. Recent DA authenticated intelligence manuals (in December 2008) include: FM 2-19.4, BCT Intelligence Operations, and FMI 2-01, ISR Synchronization. We anticipate DA authentication or at least TRADOC approval of FM 2-01.3, IPB; FMI 2-01.301, Specific IPB TTP; FM 2-22.2, Counterintelligence; FM 2-22.4, Technical Intelligence; and FM 2-33.4, Analysis, in the next few months.

Those portions of the Change 1 to FM 2-0 (focused almost exclusively on chapter 1) have rolled into the ongoing complete revision of FM 2-0 and many other changes are promulgating the breadth of our MI doctrine–over 30 products are under development. Another critical effort is the recent approval of our ISR Synchronization FMI (FMI 2-01) and then immediate start of the revision of the FMI into a full-up and more comprehensive FM. To serve you, our doctrine (both approved and draft) is available for download on several sites. Additionally, we are happy to send you a CD or CDs with many of the latest approved and draft MI doctrinal publications and a few of the more relevant Combined Arms FMs. (Contact information page 6.)

As we move forward with experimental, conceptual, force structure, doctrinal, and training developments we will need your help in getting the issues right, finding viable solutions, and carefully articulating a conceptual and doctrinal path forward for the future. These are changing and challenging times but our constant is the quality of intelligence we provide as the critical warfighting function of the preeminent land force in world history.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT

To request a CD(s):
Email: atzs-fdc-d@conus.army.mil
Phone: (520) 533-7835 (DSN 821-7835)

For draft and approved MI doctrine:
IKN: https://icon.army.mil/
"IKN Websites" tab (gray bar below IKN Logo)
Capabilities, Development, and Integration (CDI)
Doctrine

For all approved Army doctrine:
APD: http://www.apd.army.mil/usapa_home.asp_
Under "Doctrine and Training" click on "FM–Field Manuals"

ATIA: http://www.train.army.mil
Click on the "RDL Service" tab at top
Click on the "Official Department Publications" radial at top left
Set "Type" to "Field Manuals" and Set "School" to "Military Intelligence" then click "submit."

Always Out Front!

CSM FORUM

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the world. I have witnessed first hand other nations, allies and even our enemies, seek out the expertise of our highly skilled, expertly trained and proficient NCOs. They are truly amazed with our organization, skill set, initiative, and professionalism. Most importantly, they are impressed with the level of respect given to our NCO Corps. Our NCOs understand the Army's mission. They are mentors, leaders, true professionals. Above all, they take care of our Soldiers and ensure their safety.

Many of you can easily remember by name or perhaps even the voice of an NCO who stood in a crossroad for you and pointed the right way; their professionalism, their quick response, their unwavering leadership, their dedication to duty. How did they get to become such a strong leader? Although it may seem to have come naturally, don't be misled. The art of Soldiering is a learned skill, especially in today's unpredictable, unconventional scenario. The ability to improvise solutions in uncertain and changing missions is something our NCOs, warrant, and commissioned officers do every day. In a 1997 Military Review article, General Sullivan once compared the art of leadership to jazz improvisation. He wrote "Everything, especially the creation of great art (whether operational or musical), takes study and work. People come into this world with varying degrees of talent, but few achieve much without a great deal of diligent effort. It is an old truism that you cannot get something for nothing. This is especially true in trying to develop a versatile intellect. It does not 'just happen'."

The concept of a "versatile intellect" is what we demand of Military Intelligence (MI) NCOs daily. Some call it critical thinking, some call it magic—the ability to "find, know and never lose the enemy" as the MI creed states—has gotten exponentially more complicated and difficult. Yet, MI NCOs excel at it every day. I can think of no more fitting theme for this issue of MIPB dedicated to Intelligence Warfighting Capabilities—2009 The Year of the MI NCO.

NCOs Lead from the Front!

The 35 Things You Should Know before Deploying to Iraq as a Sustainment Brigade S2

"Intelligence Drives Logistics!"

by Major Remso J. Martinez

Introduction

In today's non-contiguous asymmetric environment the concept of the secure rear area does not exist. Now, more than ever, all types of non-combat units are operating within the same operational environment (OE) encountering the same types of threats as regular maneuver forces. This is especially true for sustainment units at the brigade and battalion level. This became very evident to me during my last deployment to Iraq, from August 2006 to October 2007 while serving as the S2 of the 15th Sustainment Brigade. The mission of the 15th Sustainment Brigade was to provide direct support combat sustainment support to all units within the Multinational Division-Baghdad (MND-B) OE, which entailed traveling along the same dangerous main and alternate support routes (MSR/ASRs) that the maneuver units and regular Iraqi population would use on a daily basis. Since our Brigade was also a Corps level unit, we also supported movement of units and commodities throughout the Iraqi theater of operations as far as Mosul, Fallujah, Baqubah, and Basrah. To say the least, this was a very complex and challenging experience, especially since my S2 section had only six analysts. Nevertheless, we engaged, overcame, and adapted to our environment and mission requirements, and we provided accurate and timely intelligence support to all of our six subordinate battalions.

After my unit submitted our formal OIF after action report to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) I realized that my perspective could be useful to those responsible for training Military Intelligence (MI) officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and Soldiers. I submitted several products containing the lessons we had learned by using the *"Submit a Lessons Learned"* link on the U.S. Army Intelligence Center's (USAIC) Intelligence Knowledge Network homepage at (https://icon.army.mil/).

The Lessons Learned (LL) Team leadership contacted me right away seeking to use my observations in order to share my LLs with the broader intelligence community and to showcase the fact that non-combat brigades and battalions encounter the same types of issues and challenges as maneuver units. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) are the center of gravity for U.S. force employment and are often the focus of institutional training tasks, especially at the MI Basic Officer Leadership Course and the



Area outside of assigned AOR in which Sustainment Brigades operate.

MI Captains Career Course. The terms brigade and battalion S2 are normally synonymous with maneuver BCT S2 in its various forms of Infantry, Stryker, or Heavy BCT. The truth is that non-combat units at the brigade and battalion level are fighting the same enemy, and are in the same OEs as the maneuver units. I hope that this article will generate questions and discussion, especially at the intelligence training centers, regarding the training that intelligence soldiers should have to support non-maneuver units.

The 35 Things . . .

There are 35 things I felt were important for someone deploying as a sustainment brigade S2 to know. The list that follows is pretty much how I initially submitted it. They are derived from LLs through trial and error during my deployment, from suggestions and recommendations from my fellow sustainment brigade and maneuver BCT S2s, and from reading the sections on support to logistics operations from Army **FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)**, **FM 3-06 Urban Operations**, and **FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency**.

1. Conduct deliberate IPB prior to deployment. The process is still relevant and needs to be done if only to ensure that you and your commander's subordinate commanders and primary staff understand the threat environment. The unit you will replace has much of the information that you will need to ensure your IPB is current and accurate. You and your personnel must know at a minimum:

a. Basic terrain and cultural geography on the area.

- Names of cities, towns, neighborhoods, provinces, etc.
- Political and religious demographics in the area of responsibility (AOR).
- Key political and religious holidays.

b. Names and orientation of all MSR/ASRs on which you will be traveling.

c. The existing and planned road infrastructure.

- Number of lanes per road, composition of roads (asphalt, dirt, etc), and current condition of roads (pot holes, blast craters, garbage, etc.) This can help focus your intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and support counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) techniques and analysis.
- Location of all bridges that are key terrain to mobility.
- Overpasses.
- All check points (CPs) along the MSR/ASR.

d. Theater specific acronyms.

e. Current composition and disposition of the threat in your area of interest (AI).

f. Current tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by the enemy in your AI.

2. Personnel Security

a. Ensure you identify all of the Soldiers in your unit who will need a clearance to do their job during the deployment. This is critical to do prior to deployment! Also identify alternates and start the paperwork for their clearances as a contingency for unexpected return to CONUS (compassionate, casualty, etc.).

b. Personnel whose clearances cannot be finalized before deploying can be granted a Contingency

Access Clearance to perform their job. Conduct briefings and read-ons for Contingency Access Clearances prior to deploying. The first O-5 in the chain of command can grant these clearances. Of particular note is that these clearances are neither accepted by the Combined Forces Land Component Command in Kuwait, nor are they granted to non-U.S. citizen soldiers.

c. Prior to deployment issue TOC/CIC badges.

3. The brigade S2 needs to participate in the Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS). The main benefit to an S2 of traveling to the area of operation (AO) before the unit deployment is that he or she will be able to identify the specific training requirements that the brigade S2 section (and supporting unit intelligence sections) will need to address prior to deployment. Going on the PDSS is critical in order for the S2 to fully understand the intelligence architecture and environment in which he or she will operate; the types of products currently produced and used by the unit; the S2 battle rhythm, and intelligence or security standards specific to the AO.

4. The biggest challenge to the S2 section is efficiently and effectively managing intelligence information. You may routinely receive hundreds of reports a day via the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). I averaged over 300 reports a day. The key to managing such a large flow of information is determining which reports to focus on for a particular period based on the current mission, enemy, terrain, time and troops available, and civil considerations.

You will receive Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and spot reports as well as various other assessments that may apply to the hundreds of upcoming operations about to take place in your AI. Your challenge will be to extract the information that is pertinent to your unit's needs in a timely manner and identify how the information may affect your unit.

5. The main staff officers you need to interact with on a daily basis in a sustainment brigade are:

- The Brigade S3.
- The Brigade Support Plans Officer (SPO). The SPO is a position not usually known to MI officers who have never supported logistics units. The SPO is basically the main logistics planner for the sustainment brigade. He interacts with all logisticians in the AO, and comes up with the concept of support to meet all logistics needs for the units within the AOR.
- The Deputy SPO, SPO Planner. Interacting with the Deputy and SPO Planner allows you to be aware of, and develop intelligence support products for all upcoming future missions.
- The Brigade SPO Transportation Officer. This officer coordinates the movement of all classes of supply to all customer locations. Ensure you coordinate with and receive the updates from the convoy tracker to ensure you understand where the battalions are operating and all of the locations and routes to be used by the combat logistical patrols (CLPs). *This is how you stay ahead of the game and identify who is going where, when, and what routes they intend to use.*

6. *The Brigade S2 does not pick routes for missions!* The S2 recommends routes that are safer to travel along based on current threat trends, patterns, and intelligence information and validates routes based on the current and predicted threats. A key point to keep in mind is that in reality the S2 will become the subject matter expert for the brigade on all routes. The various SPO officers and other staff will carefully consider the routes you recommend.

7. Don't assume that operations are conducted the same way in every AO. Ensure you understand when (night versus day) and how (only follow the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), accompanied by maneuver, etc.) logistics units normally operate in differing AOs.

8. *Networking is key terrain!* Ensure the S2 you replace gives you a list of all key intelligence points of contact (POCs), organizations, S2s, websites, and telephone numbers (or means of contact) with whom you will need to exchange information.

a. The POC list should have as a minimum those within your AI:

- The Expeditionary Sustainment (Command)/ Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) (ES(C)/ SC(E)), Corps and Division G2 and Deputy G2,

Analysis Control Element or Fusion Element Chief, battle captains, and the Collection Manager/ISR Synchronization Officer for the preceding.

- ✦ All BCT S2s contact information, as well as their respective BCT's battle captain, Collection Manager/ISR Synchronization Officer, and C-IED fusion cell lead analyst.
- ✦ Functional Task Force (such as TF Troy) contact information.

b. Ensure you request that all of the POCs above send any time sensitive threat reporting from IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT sources directly to you. Also, have these POCs add you to their distribution of routine or recurring intelligence products.

c. Ensure you participate in the ES(C)/SC(E), and division G2 netcalls. These are very informative and help one to understand what is happening in the AO as a whole, in each BCT AO, and to present issues to the respective G2/S2.

9. S2 Automation. The main intelligence automation systems used by the S2 section during our deployment were the Command Post of the Future (CPOF) and the Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A). DCGS-A is often referred to in-theater as the Joint Intelligence Operations Center-Iraq (JIOC-I). JIOC-I was the name for the legacy equipment purposely built for OIF. Additionally, the software application Google Earth is available on the SIPRNET and is used extensively.

a. CPOF is the main battle tracking and command and control (C2) system we used in Iraq. It is not a database so you cannot query for data like one is able to do in the All Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS-L). We mainly used CPOF to track significant enemy events. CPOF does have some basic IPB/intelligence production capabilities.

b. JIOC-I (the predecessor to DCGS-A at our location) is the system that we used in our section to create all of our intelligence products. We were able to provide two JIOC-I systems to the S2 sections of the battalions that conducted daily CLP operations. DCGS-A greatly enhanced their ability to create timely and relevant products in support to their CLPs.

c. DCGS-A has a suite of tools like ArcView that is very user friendly to create focused intelligence products. ArcView is full-featured geographic information system software for visualizing, managing, creating, and analyzing geographic data. It allows one to understand the geographic context of your data, enabling you to see relationships and identify patterns in new ways.

The DCGS-A software extracts current significant events data from databases like the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) on SIPRNET, providing us with the database query capability CPOF lacks. CIDNE contains an engagement tool for tracking three types of entities: people, facilities, and organizations. The data pulled from CIDNE can be plotted on maps to create current threat estimates, and a myriad of other intelligence products.

d. During our deployment the MND-B did not use ASAS-L as a situational awareness or database query tool. The Division G2 section did not add significant activities on a daily basis, so this system was useless. Thus, we wound up not using ASAS-L to its full capability. We 'base-lined' our ASAS-L and used it as an extra SIPRNET laptop. Other units only used the Analyst Notebook program that came with the ASAS-L laptop for pattern and link analysis type products.

e. Google Earth on SIPRNET is a great program to use as an additional capability to visualize events in the AO, conduct route analysis, get and create imagery, and track enemy attacks. You can download the program from the Google Earth site on SIPRNET, which then allows you to connect to their local server. The program has a utility called a Ruler which can be used to calculate distances. Also, Google Earth allows you the ability to post

and share data and overlays you have created with your subordinates, or with other units, on the main Google Earth website on SIPRNET. It is very easy to post current products like locations of enemy attacks, named areas of interest (NAIs), names of neighborhoods, etc.

10. Read all of the intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) of the BCTs that operate within your AOR in order to clearly understand the threat environment. If you don't do this you will never understand what is currently happening with the threat, how it is changing/adapting, or where the possible flashpoints will be. It takes up to 3 months to be able to do accurate intelligence analysis on the enemy threat. Plagiarism is not always a bad thing. Identify what unit(s) in the AO produce good intelligence assessments. Use and tailor their products until you feel comfortable enough to start creating your own.

11. The Seven Day Rule. This is something the Brigade S2 came up with that helped us maintain oversight on possible enemy attacks. This may not be the case currently in Iraq as the threat and OE are continually changing. We never received a single threat warning that occurred the way or at the time the warning said it would occur. There were times when a similar threat event would happen at or near a predicted location or time. But never did the event occur at the specified time or place. A pattern we determined was that a similar event would happen anywhere between 7 days prior to, or after, the specified date of the projected attack contained in the warning.

12. When conducting operations in areas or along routes you normally don't travel or support, ensure you check not only the BCT INTSUMs, but also the INTSUM for the maneuver battalion that owns that piece of the AO. Sometimes the battalion level INTSUM will have information that is not reflected in the BCT INTSUM. You may also have to directly contact the battalion S2 as some don't have the time to post their current INTSUMs to a portal. Ensure you also ask for any information that would normally not be included in their intelligence products on the AO or specific area that they think would be beneficial for you to know in support of your mission.

13. You need to have two sets of priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Although not specified in doctrinally correct terms, I found using this technique helpful.

a. Ongoing PIRs. These PIRs are focused on accomplishing your main mission. They should be used to identify any type of enemy event that could lead to your unit's inability to accomplish your mission. They are tied to a commander's decision point. This is the current doctrinal use of PIR.

b. Temporary PIRs. These are developed with the same focus as the on-going PIRs, but they are developed in support of temporary missions or situations, for example, if you have a mission to help establish a new forward operating base (FOB) in an area that you normally don't support. The PIRs help develop your collection and analytical focus during that time period against possible threats that could affect your unit's ability to accomplish the mission.

14. Develop and maintain a list of intelligence requirements (IRs). This is a great way to focus your analyst's analytical effort, and to help overcome intelligence gaps.

a. Each of your PIRs may have a number of IRs that need to be answered in order properly answer the PIR. However, in addition to these supporting IRs, you can also develop additional IRs to assist in situation development, enhancing the analytical effort, developing additional intelligence problems, or identifying gaps that may require an answer for Force Protection or Operations Security reasons. An example may be, "What vehicles in the convoy are insurgents mainly targeting?"

b. A lot of times these IRs developed into specialty products that were disseminated to our subordinate units, as well as with the other intelligence sections within MND-B.

15. Identify key websites on the SIPRNET that can provide your section good information. There are many websites from many different organizations, but only a few provide very good intelligence information. The S2 you will replace may alert you to the sites he used, but make sure you look around for others that can also help you.

16. Intelligence products need to be relevant to your brigade, brigade staff, and subordinate battalions' needs as well as focused on your AO and tied to

answering PIRs or other IRs to include addressing intelligence gaps (analysis documents). Your brigade commander should give you guidance on what type of information he wants you to brief, update, the amount of detail required, and the type of product or format that best suits his needs. If the commander or deputy commander does not provide this guidance to you, ask for it.

17. Periodically review and ensure the quality of the intelligence products your section produces to ensure the products are relevant, necessary, and address requirements your commander, subordinate battalions, and other customers have specified. This is one of the most important things you must personally perform to ensure quality. Over time, after creating the same product over and over again some tend to get sloppy. This often results in products that are not up to standard. Having your assistant S2 or S2 NCOIC perform quality control prior to product dissemination can help make sure your section's work quality remains high.

18. Post all of your intelligence products on your specific unit SIPRNET website. This is a great way to disseminate products not only to your units, but also to others who can benefit from your intelligence production.

19. Counterintelligence (CI) and HUMINT issues. What do you do if your unit captures someone? What do you do if you think an employee(s) on the FOB, or directly working for you, may be a threat (Iraqi, other foreign national, or U.S. citizen)? Though these are uncommon events for a sustainment brigade they do happen. Here are some actions we found helpful.

a. Immediately identify both the CI and HUMINT teams on your FOB. They can not only help advise you with the best course of action, they may be able to take the most appropriate action themselves.

b. Create a standard operating procedure and battle drill with at least the specific procedures to follow when detaining personnel on the FOB and while on a CLP.

c. Turn in the suspect(s) to the FOB Military Police (MP) or Brigade Detainee Operations Center. If not already done, alert the FOB CI detachment of the apprehension and disposition of the detainee. Ensure all of the soldiers involved in the apprehension write *very detailed sworn statements* on the events that led to the apprehension.

d. Review the HUMINT and Draft Intelligence Information Reports for your AI to help identify personnel within the FOB who are under investigation for being possible insurgents. Ensure you gauge the reliability of the source by reviewing the source reliability code. Source reliability codes are available from any S2X/G2X section in the AO and are listed in several MI field manuals.

20. Obtaining additional ISR assets in support of sustainment operations is difficult but not impossible. Leveraging existing or established Corps, Division, and BCT collection plans is an effective way to get at least some ISR support.

a. Have your collection manager get a copy of the collection plans and event templates for all of the units in the area in which you'll be conducting operations. Identify which NAIs on which they are currently focusing collection. Identity the specific description (road, intersection, building, bridge, etc.) and the collection task associated with the NAI. Also identify when the NAI is active; that is when the ISR collection is occurring or planned to occur.

b. Read the PIR that drives the collection effort and see if it may also cover one of your own PIR or IR requirements. Do this for the NAIs as well.

c. After you identify the NAIs that may also support your own unit's collection requirements, have your collection manager contact the respective unit performing the collection and coordinate for support to your unit. Explain to the collecting unit's collection manager your unit's mission. Stress the fact that you (sustainment brigades) have no organic ISR and very limited convoy security within your CLPs.

d. Have subordinate battalions that may benefit from the leveraged collection contact the unit performing the ISR collection. Ensure they provide the collecting unit with the following contact information:

- The Mobile Telephone System and Blue Force Tracker addresses for the vehicles in your CLP. This will enable these vehicles to receive up the up-to-date intelligence.

- FM/HF frequencies and call signs for the gun trucks and convoy commander's vehicles.
- Unit POC email and Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP)/Secure phone numbers.

21. The Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) is your main threat analyst on anything dealing with remote controlled IEDs. The EWOs are very good at overall IED analysis. Ensure you keep the EWO informed of any new IED TTPs you or your unit may identify.

22. Weather conditions are always changing. Expect weather to turn to Red for MEDEVAC whenever you see the current weather slide predicting Amber impacts on convoy or MEDEVAC operations. During my deployment, it was SC(E) policy that no CLPs moved if MEDEVAC was coded Red due to weather. This became my commander's PIR.

23. Bridges are key terrain. Bridges that are damaged or targeted by the enemy can dramatically limit your ability to maneuver and conduct your sustainment and distribution missions within your AO.

a. Identify which bridges are critical for your units to conduct their missions. I recommend you create a focused bridge analysis product that explains the structural composition and current threat status of these, if not all, bridges within your AOR.

- Keep a running tally on the number of threat reports you receive on each bridge to maintain situational awareness on which bridges are being targeted by the enemy. You could put these on a spreadsheet in Excel and automatically add the reports to a PowerPoint slide with an image of each bridge.
- Obtain and maintain an engineer assessment of the current structural status of all bridges. You can get this assessment from Corps, Division, or Brigade Engineers. If the assessment is from other than the BCT in which AO the bridge is located, confirm the information with the BCT engineers. They tend to have a more current status of the bridges in their AO than higher echelons. As a minimum the assessment should include the following:
  - Type of bridge.
  - Weight class and types of vehicles it can *actually* (not theoretically) handle. Can it handle Heavy Equipment Transporters (HET) or just up-armored HMMWVs (M1114)? Can it handle HETs or Palletized Load Systems with equipment, etc.?
  - Who is responsible for each bridge's security?

b. Understand how the loss of any of the identified bridges will affect your unit's ability to conduct its mission. Perform detailed IPB for the alternate routes available to overcome the loss of each bridge.

24. Ensure you continuously identify current route mobility status. The Route Operations Center at Division maintains this status for each approved route on its website. Although the S3 maintains visibility on route conditions, the Brigade S2 needs to understand the current route conditions to a greater degree of detail.

a. Ensure you understand the color categories and what each means (Green, Amber, Red, and Black).

b. Identify why the respective route has that color code. (For example: damage to route, enemy threat is too high, no route clearance committed on route, friendly operation will be conducted, etc.)

c. Identify when the route will be open.

d. A key point is to ask each BCT for its internal route status. There were times when a route was coded Amber by Division but coded Black by the BCT.

25. Expect to conduct missions out of your routine AO. As soon as you identify that this may happen,

even before receipt of a warning order, immediately do the following:

- Contact the Sustainment Brigade, BCT, or coalition partner that operates in that area and tell them:
  1. What your mission entails.
  2. The equipment and supplies you are delivering.
  3. Delivery location(s).
  4. The time and duration of the mission.
  5. The quantity of vehicles involved.
- Send the appropriate S2 a Request for Information asking for a route analysis for the areas that you normally don't cover. Specify exactly what type of intelligence product you need and in what format. Sending a copy of a product that your unit currently uses may help them understand how to create a product that best suits your needs. Identify what ISR assets the respective S2s have available in their area that could also provide support to the unit conducting the mission.

26. The Combat Sustainment Support Battalion/ Brigade Support Battalion S2 sections will probably be junior in rank and experience and may need a lot of coaching, teaching, and mentoring.

a. Active duty S2 sections in sustainment units tend to have 3 to 4 personnel assigned holding military occupational specialty (MOS) 35F Intelligence Analyst. It is not uncommon for the battalion S2 to be a sergeant or corporal, but most S2 sections do have lieutenants or captains.

b. National Guard (NG) and Reserve sustainment units may have as many as 5 to 6 personnel, but expect them to have only half to be in MOS 35F. The rest are logistics soldiers from within the battalion to augment the S2 section's capability.

c. The priority of the Sustainment S2 in garrison is mainly related to personnel and physical security issues. Expect both Active Duty and Reserve/ NG personnel to need some refresher training on the intelligence cycle, IPB process and how it supports the Military Decisionmaking Process (MDMP), Collection Management, and ISR capabilities or responsibilities.

d. Areas of emphasis for proficiency training:

- Current terrain and threat assessment of the AO.
- The intelligence cycle, the IPB process, collection management, PIR development, and ISR assets available in the AO.
- Reviewing Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) and sustainment brigade standards.
- The Intelligence battle rhythm.
- Navigating on the SIPRNET: how to and where they need to go to get information.
- Theater specific security issues.

27. Visit your subordinate battalion S2s within the first month of assuming responsibility to meet them, understand how they operate, and identify what they need. I recommend you ask them what products the last Brigade S2 produced that they found useful and which products they never used. This will help you better assess what their needs are and what types of products you can provide.

a. Ask them if they are getting the support they need and in the product format they need it.

b. Ask for a brief on how they support their unit's operations.

c. Identify their manning.

d. Identify their current challenges, and those which you will be able to support.

28. Don't assume your subordinate battalion S2s understand the products/reports you send them. Whenever you send them any type of product or report (either from your unit or a product/report obtained from another unit) ensure you look at it first to see if you need to summarize or identify the key points from that product/report. As stated earlier, your subordinate battalion S2 personnel will come with a varied range of experiences, so do not assume they understand all of the information you send them. Examples of this may be INTSUMs, ISR plans, specialty products developed from other intelligence organizations, etc. Bottom line, review the products you're providing and determine if you need to clarify the product by adding an explanation of the 'So What?' meaning of the product.

29. Ensure battalion S2s make their CLPs conduct de-briefs and report the results to you at the end of *each leg of their mission*. This is necessary in order to gain current information and situational awareness about the routes as well as enabling you to

pass appropriate information to your subordinates and higher.

For example, if a CLP has a 5 day on-going mission during which it will travel to five different FOBs, ensure the CLP leaders send their de-briefs to the battalion S2 after each leg of the mission is completed. The information can be sent via VOIP/ secure phone, secure/encrypted cell phones, or secure email. A lot of logistic units need to train often in order to do this very well, but, it is an achievable and necessary goal. Ensure the brigade commander emphasizes this responsibility and directs both the training and reporting be done.

30. Insurgents are good weather fighters. When it is cold, snowy, or rainy the activity level often decreases significantly. But, don't assume that the enemy will always avoid bad weather.

31. Assume enemy reprisal attacks along the MSRs/ASRs after friendly, Iraqi, or coalition operations. For example, if an infantry company conducts a cordon and search operation, finds weapons caches, or apprehends insurgents/terrorists in the raid you can expect reprisal attacks in the surrounding area and against units traveling on the MSRs/ASRs/internal routes.

32. Keep track of any previously known or recently discovered caches in the AO and the cache contents (IED making material, small arms, rockets, etc.) By keeping track of these you will have an idea of the areas along the route where you can expect activity levels to possibly decrease.

33. Explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) are the main armor defeating device used by the insurgents in Iraq.

a. Ensure you continuously track their patterns and trends of activity.

b. Ensure you identify any changes of modifications on how they are using EFPs.

c. It is *key* that if Soldiers in one of the vehicles on a CLP think that they might have been hit by an EFP, that they evacuate the vehicle to your motor pool and don't let anyone other than EOD touch the vehicle, fix it, etc. Take lots of pictures, fill out a 9-line unexploded ordnance report and contact your FOB local EOD team to determine if an EFP caused the damage. There are other measures to be followed; and, it's best if you identify, know, and follow them according to the AO in which you serve. There are also specific intelligence reporting procedures to follow, know these as well. This is very important to ensure that all of the theater's databases have this information.

34. All of the CPs on approved routes are manned by either Iraqi Army or Police units. Keep track of attacks and other events that occur near them to identify whether the Iraqi unit manning that specific CP was complacent, allowed it to happen, etc. Once you see a pattern, pass this information on to the brigade S3 so he can address your concerns with the BCT that owns that sector or with the Division G3.

35. Serious Incident Reports (SIRs). This report is produced by both the S3 and S2 and provides a summary of all serious incidents. The S3 summarizes the event, and the S2 provides the threat analysis on the incident. When composing a SIR make sure that:

a. Appropriate and theater approved terminology is used. This is very important because SIRs are seen at the highest levels that may not be familiar with local or tactical jargon.

b. Ensure the "who, what, when, where, why, and how" are properly addressed.

c. Ensure that if an imagery product is used, it shows the event at the correct location. There were many times that the grid location provided in a narrative did not match the location shown on the accompanying SIR imagery.

d. Ensure the S2 portion of the SIR is an analysis of the event, not simply a repeat of the S3's portion. Try to include as much pertinent information as possible.

e. Go to the CALL website and look for the *News From the Front (NFTF): Sustainment Brigade S2 LLs* for a list of questions an analyst should think through when writing the S2 portion of the SIR.

Conclusion

In conclusion, intelligence support to logistics operations is probably one of the most challenging positions any intelligence personnel will encounter in their careers. I hope those of you currently serving or about to assume the position of a sustainment brigade S2, or serving as a battalion or brigade S2 in a non-maneuver unit, found my observations, insights, and LLs helpful and beneficial for your up-

coming deployment. Intelligence support to logistics is not an area that normally gets a lot of attention, so please add to the body of knowledge your own individual unit's LLs and recommendations for doctrinal, training, and manning changes.

Major Remso J. Martinez is currently a student at the National Defense Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency. His last assignment was as the S2, 15th Sustainment Brigade, which deployed in support of MND-B during the surge from August 2006 to October 2007. Major Martinez has served in tactical intelligence assignments in the 2nd ID, 4th ID, and the 3rd ACR, as well as operational assignments in the 501st MI Brigade in Korea. He was an exchange officer to the Australian Defense Intelligence Training Center where he taught both tactical and intelligence specific blocks of instruction to Australian intelligence personnel. Major Martinez is a TRADOC master instructor, and the 2002 Distinguished Instructor of the year for his work in the MICCC and the Imagery Officers Course (35C). He is a 1992 graduate of the Citadel and a 2003 graduate of Touro University International, where he received an MBA in International Business. He is a graduate of the Airborne School, MIOBC, MIOAC, CAS3, Imagery Intelligence Officer Course, the CI Officer Course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Defense Strategy Course. Major Martinez can be reached at remso.martinez@us.army.mil.

MI LEGACY

The CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) originally formed in WWI as the Corps of Intelligence Police, was renamed in 1942. CIC was used for security for secret scientific work as well as capturing and interrogating enemy prisoners.



by Captain Timothy A. Bagley

Introduction

Ten years of Army experience, private through captain, led me to believe that no task was too demanding or challenging. As my time as an Infantry officer came to a close, I imagined a future in Military Intelligence (MI) that would be less stressful, more technical, and somewhat less relevant than the eight years of "ground pounding" that was now ending. I was dead wrong. My time as an Infantry Battalion S2 in combat would prove to be the most demanding, relevant, and satisfying assignment that I have yet to hold. My belief is that I will never again experience an assignment that can compete with my time as a combat "2."

I spent the last five years of my commissioned career at Fort Lewis, Washington, a member of the Army's first Stryker Brigade. Leading my rifle platoon through the streets of Mosul, Iraq, serving as a rifle company executive officer, and even harkening back to my time as a combat engineer shaped my ability to confidently advise the commander and recommend sound options for defeating a committed enemy. Battalion S2s must use all of their experiences along with tapping into the experiences of others to be successful. The purpose of this article is to provide focus for the new S2. It is not an all encompassing view of the S2 world, but instead will provide insight to the most critical tasks that will ensure the success of combat operations. There is much written on the subject, but lacks input from company grade officers with recent experience. My intent is to allow new or existing 2s to apply time and resources to the most important facets of the mission that they are required to provide to the battalion. I served as the S2 for the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 3-2 SBCT for 2 years without attending the MI Captains Career Course. I have experienced tactical intelligence work as a land owning unit in Mosul (SASO/COIN), as the Multi-National Division-Baghdad "strike force" (attacking key nodes), and my battalion spear-headed the mission to liberate and secure the capital of the Islamic State of Iraq in Baqubah. Operations in Baqubah were as close to high intensity conflict that you can get in the current operational environment.

All of these experiences are quite different from the intelligence perspective and have taught me a broad range of tactics, techniques, and procedures that I feel are necessary to share with the current cadre of intelligence professionals. This is not meant to be an over generalization, but my observation is that most intelligence officers just don't grasp the concepts necessary for success. Intelligence officers need to work together to move beyond the MI oxymoron, and create a new level of confidence for commanders and credibility to our profession. We are the means to the end of our nation's War on Terrorism, and the sculptors of the future operations that will ensure our freedom. I don't want to sound cliché, but there is no job more important. Every day as an intelligence officer allows for the saving or the sacrifice of human life. That responsibility is ours to uphold.

The maneuver battalion is the tip of the spear and the ultimate end user of the intelligence community (IC). As such, a maneuver S2 must be a competent tactician and an expert at managing information. Above all, a battalion S2 must be a leader. There are several misconceptions that linger in the IC. The first is that analysts must be treated differently than other Soldiers because they have a requirement to think freely and analyze without the constraints that other Soldiers have. This is absolutely false. Analysts need structure, discipline, and firm limits on what they can and cannot do. They need confident and competent leaders to focus their efforts and extract the very best analysis that supports the mission. If you waiver or your expectations are not clearly defined and enforced, you will have already lost half of your analytical capability. Do not coddle your Soldiers; instead, strive to empower and inspire them with leadership. Do not accept mediocrity from your analysts and do not accept excuses from your subordinate leaders. Be a leader on your staff! The S2 is the most important part of the combat staff. Embrace and own the position; do not allow yourself to be an afterthought at any part of the planning process. Do not be intimidated or subordinated to fellow staff members. Make sure your assessments are heard. Due to the critical nature of the job, always do your own work. Never rely on anyone else's assessments and analysis to keep your unit's Soldiers safe and to keep your operations ahead of the enemy. Use other products as tools and background information to formulate your own take on the enemy situation. Never assume that someone is as interested as you are in your area of operations (AO).

Expectations

There are some baseline skills that commanders, staff, and Soldiers will expect of you as the S2. You may not start out as an expert in any of these, but you should constantly try to improve upon them. Tactical expertise is the most important skill that an S2 must possess and an attribute that others will expect you to apply to your profession. The combat S2 must understand how the unit fights down to the team and individual level. This is generally the hardest skill for MI officers to acquire. You must know how the U.S. Army fights in the current environment and you must understand the operational capabilities of your unit and its Soldiers. Conversely, you must understand the same about the enemy. In the current environment, you should focus on small unit tactics (SMUT) that terrorists and insurgents employ on the battlefield. If you are unfamiliar with these tactics, become friends with H. John Poole, who has written a series of books on enemy SMUT. These books explore fundamentals and specific tactics preferred by threat groups, and are arguably the best tools to educate the MI officer on enemy SMUT. You will also be expected to understand the overall goals of your adversary and create broad assessments that analyze and portray the overall intent of the enemy.

You will also be expected to articulate complex thoughts in a simplified way. This is an art that you may have to massage to get right. You work for Soldiers; be able to talk to them. You must be a confident briefer, prepared to brief at all levels. You will brief Soldiers, general officers, and everyone in between; be prepared to modify your style and verbiage. Confidence comes with a firm grasp of the enemy situation and your assessments. You must know your products inside and out. Remember that 80 percent of your work will never be presented; be prepared to back up your assessments with reinforcing data and products. The final expectation is your ability to manage the battalion's information requirements. There is always a plethora of questions that require an answer. It is your responsibility to prioritize and focus collection to answer the information requirements that will most directly impact the mission.

Personal Relationships

The art of developing and maintaining personal relationships within the IC cannot be over emphasized. Its execution can define the success or failure of the tactical level intelligence officer. Just as there is a vast amount of data and information prevalent on the battlefield, so too are the number of people competing for resources and tools to exploit this information. It is a well known that the IC is plagued by a crisis of isolationism. This is not because of the lack of individual desire to share information and assets, but is a byproduct of a compartmentalized system in which assets and information are constrained to certain individuals and lines of communication. Since 9/11, great progress has been made to streamline the dissemination of information, and with major hostilities on multiple fronts the prolif-

eration of intelligence assets has had a substantial impact on Army operations, yet the value of creating personal relationships has not diminished in the least.

As a battalion S2, organic intelligence collection is restricted to the use of ground troops. Information requirements on the contemporary battlefield dictate the need to depend on higher and outside agencies to stay ahead of the enemy. Every person you meet in the IC could become an asset or ally at some point during your fight. The S2 who works in isolation or cannot cooperate with others is destined to fight over the scraps of what is left after everyone else has taken their share. The S2 must never perpetuate the attitude that "you work for my unit and you will do what I tell you and how I tell you", rather the savvy S2 makes others want to work for his unit by making outside agencies feel integrated, relevant, and informed. Other units require feedback and often feel isolated from the mission, even though their assets or information are absolutely critical to the mission. Keep them informed of what your unit is doing and praise their Soldiers for the support they offer. It is your job to request, manage, and incorporate their assistance. If you isolate yourself or act in an obnoxious and abrasive way, your unit will pay the price. In many cases, you are asking for help from persons or agencies that do not have a requirement to support you. Every piece of information garnered and every asset added to the fight saves lives and provides more means to neutralize the enemy. The IC is small, and reputations tend to dictate how much or how little support you may receive. Work hard to build and maintain your reputation and credibility in the IC.

Train for the Fight

I cannot emphasize enough the importance of providing realistic training prior to deployment. Creating realistic intelligence training requires creativity and a sound knowledge of the current threat environment. I would encourage you to create two training models. The first is a "reach forward" model using whatever SIPR access you can get. Choose a unit that is forward and start to pull all of its data and build products. Use actual events and activities to train and exercise both you and your analysts. Present the products to your commander and S3 so you can iron out formatting issues prior to deployment. This provides you the ability to do short term analysis and evaluate the results based on actual events. This is the most productive way to spend your time in garrison.

The second training model is to incorporate intelligence into every company training event that occurs. Create an intelligence scenario that supports the training exercise. Build props that will facilitate exercising the intelligence cycle down to the fire team level. Use documents, role play, weapons, photos, and low-level intelligence problems to stimulate your primary collectors. Use this to exercise your reporting and dissemination systems both to higher and lower. Create a deliberate intelligence dissemination system that includes intelligence summaries, battle update briefs, SPOT reports, patrol debriefs, and feedback products that portray intelligence success that originated with your units. Feedback should never be overlooked; it will exponentially increase the amount of cooperation and information your collectors provide. Enforce the debrief and use your analysts to process and analyze the information; then disseminate relevant intelligence to the force. Always incorporate your HUMINT Collection Teams (HCTs) into unit training, they can use this time to develop rapport with your units and educate tactical leaders on how to support their intelligence collection mission. Incorporation of HCTs will also allow you to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of your HUMINT Soldiers.

If you have Soldiers who are struggling, attempt to re-train them on key tasks, but if that does not work send them back to your MI company. Attached Soldiers that are ineffective are a distraction to operations and should be removed if they do not add capability to your section. Integrating into maneuver training will set your section up for success. It creates knowledge and confidence in the intelligence apparatus for the maneuver Soldiers, and it exercises the critical task of disseminating intelligence for your section. If you are able to successfully incorporate these training models you will eliminate the frustration that normally comes with slogging through your first few months of deployment trying to rectify insignificant details of products.

Individual Soldier training in garrison should be focused on systems and programs. In general, if you learn the program, the data will take care of itself. There are some programs that are mission essential and your analysts must be able to employ them

at an expert level. The baseline skills reside with MS Office. Analysts must be proficient at MS Excel and PowerPoint. ArcGIS is an application that will provide you with battle-tracking, mission planning, and printable map capabilities. This program is the best on the market and rivals FalconView in its capabilities. However, it is extremely complex and requires a high level of training. It is well worth the time to train your analysts on ArcGIS. The Distributed Common Ground Station-Army is a great web-based tool that is evolving to be the baseline system supporting Army operations at all levels.

Training is time consuming but will pay great dividends in time management and analytical support. Learn how to set up, manipulate, and load frequencies on the remote video terminal, one system remote video terminal, and ROVER. These interface with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and your section must understand how to employ and operate them in static (tactical operations center (TOC)) and mobile (vehicle mounted) modes. U.S. Air Force TACPs are subject matter experts on this equipment and are a good source for training. The Biometrics Automated Toolset and the Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment are great tools for databasing personalities and can be incorporated in a myriad of ways to support operations. HCTs should be experts with this system, your section must have a working knowledge of base station operations and file transfers, and Soldiers in your units must be experts at the use of the handheld devices. Take ownership of this training and work with your S3 to get it on the calendar. These programs and systems are not an all inclusive list, but a good place to start for someone new to the business.

Analytical training must start with the basics and slowly evolve into an environment which facilitates understanding of complex intelligence problems and the analysis of second and third order effects. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is the most crucial skill set to train and exercise. There are two basic types to be familiar with. Macro IPB is the analysis of large areas and intelligence problems; it is the basis for which all planning is conducted on a given area. A situation template (SITEMP) is the most common product associated with macro IPB. It describes in detail the environment, effects, enemy, and their likely courses of action (COAs) based on the environment.

Micro IPB is the detailed planning and assessment of a single enemy entity in a specified location. Micro IPB is the baseline of all targeting or execution of specialized operations. It incorporates all the factors of the macro, but is extremely detailed in nature. An example is a completed target packet that considers all of the possible circumstances that will affect the executing unit (e.g., which way the door is hinged, wall height). Analysts must be trained to create products at this level of detail and to answer the questions that will supplement these products.

In all cases, your analysts need to be able to think like the Soldiers on the ground and identify with their information needs. IPB should be understood in depth by your analysts at every level, your subordinate leaders should be solid practitioners of it, and you have to be an expert. Testing IPB skills is an easy and practical way to evaluate the proficiency of your section. Choose any small area of the world (city or less), create a short operational scenario, set a deadline, and allow them to proceed with no guidance. If they understand the key concepts, they will produce a coherent and organized product in a short time. If they need some work, coach them through the process using realistic examples that mimic the current threat environment. Every attempt should be made to ingrain the IPB process into your analysts. Create a poster that outlines the process and post it in your work area. Have Soldiers outline their upcoming weekend using the steps of IPB, and exercise routinely at the micro and macro levels. Knowledge of the IPB process is the key to success.

Cultural knowledge and awareness is a fundamental area that intelligence personnel should emphasize in any training program. Understanding the history and principles of the Islamic faith is a great tool to spur thought outside the confines of conventional operations. Few members of our community have a firm working knowledge of the pillars of Islam, the schism between Sunni and Shia, Islamic writings and who uses them, and how Islam is applied throughout the world.

Additionally, analysts should be able to ascertain the difference between terrorists, insurgents, criminals, fundamentalists, and guerrillas. These terms

are often used interchangeably but should be used specifically by intelligence analysts. Never limit your training objectives to the current threat environment. Train on various religions, ideologies, and political groups.

Geography is another critical area often overlooked where knowledge enables comparative analysis of geographic areas associated or relative to the one you are studying. Have your analysts fill in a blank map of the Middle East and Southwest Asia to evaluate geographic skills. Cover ethnic issues and ensure analysts are able to differentiate between ethnic, racial, political, and religious differences in populations. Although these concepts are simplistic in nature, they augment the analytical capabilities of the individual and will filter through your section.

Threat group classification and awareness should be at the forefront of analytical training. Understanding ideology, tactics, and strategic and operational goals of individual threat groups is the foundation of a suitable enemy COA. Threat groups will differ in their application of resources, funding, and treatment of the local population. Focus your training on the current threat environment, but be sure to emphasize the global nature of many threat groups. Groups like Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Irish Republican Army have global relationships and agendas that shape the form of tactical operations. Understanding these aspects of each group allows the analyst to compare relationships, contrast agendas, and sometimes identify anomalies that may be the cornerstone of solving intelligence problems in your area of concern. The evolving nature of these groups forces the analyst to conduct regular research to stay on top of the latest paradigm and innovative methodologies. Institute a personal goal to discern and understand the 10 major global threat groups and their ties to major state actors. Comprehension of threat groups will supplement enemy COAs, provide meat to SITEMPs, and allow you to effectively communicate the threat to your commander.

Organize Your Section

With the advent of technology and the proliferation of intelligence systems, the resulting preponderance of information is overwhelming. Few changes have been made to the authorized manning levels of intelligence sections throughout the Army. You will process and analyze more information than your predecessors. You have the obligation to mitigate this. Request Soldiers from the line to augment your section, train them on basic analytical skills and functions. Request analysts from your MI company and train them to operate within a battalion setting. These are major issues that you will have to fight to acquire the needed resourcing. You are required to persuade your commander to support and increase manning in the intelligence section on the basis that a shortfall in manning will result in a mission failure. Always task organize for the fight at hand, be flexible and prepared to launch a competent forward intelligence package to support your battalion's operations. Plan and rehearse the utilization of this package before you are in contact.

When operating independently from your brigade, demand multi-INT support to facilitate operations. You will require direct support teams from your brigade and higher to effectively operate when you are detached from your brigade. When receiving Soldiers with specialized skills, put them to work using their INTs to solve the intelligence problems your battalion is facing. Supervise these Soldiers and evaluate their contributions to your mission. Organically assess the strengths and weaknesses of every member of your team. Always cross train on systems, but focus individuals in areas of strength.

Have an intelligence apparatus at the company level. Much has been written on this subject and it appears that the concept has support from all levels to increase future intelligence manning for battalions. In the interim, find a solution at the company level and ensure that your commander and S3 firmly back the plan. This will prevent push-back or misuse of the apparatus. Whatever your company apparatus is, ensure you train and exercise reporting procedures and requirements. Most importantly, place yourself at the point on the battlefield where you can best leverage assets and provide intelligence support to the commander and his subordinate commanders. Most often, an S2 is better served by staging at the TOC where the systems are in place to provide real-time analysis and recommendations to any situation that arises. There is not much an S2 can do sitting in the belly of a vehicle with little situational awareness and understanding. There will also be times when you need

to be at the front to advise and plan on the fly. Incorporate the assistant S2 into planning and discussion. Where can he benefit the battalion most? Discussion with your commander on this topic is imperative. Explain the benefits and limitations of both possibilities, this will allow you to be flexible and ensure that you can provide the best possible support to any tactical situation.

Lead Your Section

Effectively managing the intelligence section takes a particular combination of finesse, gumption, and intractability. If you were to study the effectiveness of S2 sections in combat, I believe you would discover that the most successful S2s are the ones who delegate and manage tasks within their sections. S2s who isolate themselves and do a majority of the work on their own tend to be less effective. Managing your section to maximize efficiency will be your biggest challenge. First and foremost, your analysts are specialized Soldiers who must accomplish tasks that require more extensive training and mental preparedness than their peers. Because of this, you must minimize the additional duties and random tasks that will sidetrack training and affect accomplishment of mission. It is imperative to keep your analysts in the fight, a guard tower is not the place for a trained and experienced intelligence analyst. You will win this battle easily if your shop is running efficiently and all of your analysts are diligently executing their duties. If the contrary is the norm for your section, you will not be able to justify exceptions for your Soldiers.

The model of task, purpose, method, and end state (TPME) is one with which your section should be intimately familiar. Most commonly it is used when developing enemy COAs; however, not all analysts are accustomed to the concept. One method I have utilized is to issue all tasks within the section using this format. It ensures that tasks are understood and creates a reasonable end state and deadline to drive the analytical process. Create and update a tasking board for your section. Tasks and deadlines should be emphasized on the display. The most important part of the display is the priority of tasks.

Prioritization is vital to the success of the S2. On any given day, there are hundreds of intelligence problems to solve, scores of products to create and update, and a vast amount of information filtering into your shop that requires processing and analysis. Without prioritization, essential and relevant tasks will be overlooked and precious time will be spent on tasks that do not meet the needs of the present situation. In combat, your tasking priority will likely change 3 to 5 times daily due to the dynamic nature of the enemy and the speed in which targets are acquired and executed. Always be prepared to shift priority of effort, or abandon a project completely.

When tasking an analyst to create a specific product, always draw an intent sketch that outlines the layout and information that you desire on the graphic. Five minutes of discussion can save you five hours of work that does not meet your intent. Empower your subordinate leaders and Soldiers by allowing them to brief products and present their analysis to the commander and staff. This fosters creativity, gives a feeling of ownership, and serves as an excellent professional development opportunity. This can begin at lower levels until they become comfortable. Teach doctrinal terms and ensure your analysts understand them so they can effectively communicate with the commander and staff. Never underestimate the hidden talents and strengths of your Soldiers; however, if they are never given the chance to display them, you will likely never discover these talents.

In combat and while engaged at a combat training center, it will be necessary to work in shifts. Always analyze the most productive way to split the work load so that work is maximized and no part of the situation is lost through shift change. The "intel huddle" should incorporate your entire section at shift changes and follow a format that does not allow information to slip through the cracks. The night shift is an excellent opportunity to research topics for longer term projects. Band width is generally better, and distractions are more manageable in the evening. If you are in a situation where intelligence supervision is not possible around the clock, your most dependable analyst should take the reins on this shift. Provide your prioritized task list and check their work before they go off shift. During major operations, always ensure a key leader (S2, AS2, or NCOIC) is available in the TOC to answer questions, provide immediate assessments, and to recommend immediate operations or troop movements based on ISR collection. Never sell short on having someone responsible available at all times. Crucial

events can and will occur at all times. Establish and post wake-up criteria for your analysts so they can send someone to find you when critical events occur. Your efforts in managing your shop for success will not be in vain; accordingly your analysts will be able to meet your expectations in a timely manner and the end result is credibility for your section.

Create and Manage Information Requirements

Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) are a frequently under-utilized tool for intelligence professionals. More often than not, these information requirements (IRs) are created solely to fill a placeholder on a slide. When used properly, they combine the commander's guidance, major intelligence gaps, and operational requirements to generate an appropriate collection plan. Your collection plan will then answer the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) allowing an operation to be executed, changed, or cancelled respectively. PIRs are the mechanisms which allow the S2 to fill intelligence gaps. Once the commander approves the PIRs, the S3 can then task and prioritize assets to answer these questions. This passage is not meant to gloss over the CCIR process; the assumption is that the reader has a working knowledge of these concepts.

There should be two types of PIR that are utilized in the field. The first is standing PIR, these remain the same throughout and should be based on the campaign plan. Examples are: *Where are explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) being manufactured in the AO?* Operational PIR, the second type, have a specific relevance to an upcoming or ongoing specific operation. Operational PIR should be as specific as possible and associated with a decision point for the commander. An example is: *Does Muhhamad Ibn Ali manufacture EFPs VIC NAI 1324?* This example would be relevant if your battalion was conducting an operation to neutralize EFP manufacturer's in a specific geographic area.

Much like tasking your section, collection on PIRs is done most efficiently when it is prioritized. Your commander will prioritize your PIRs, but you should assist by providing background and relevant information regarding the threat. It is acceptable to have a large number of PIRs that need to be answered, but focus on 2 or 3 at a time to maximize collection assets. PIRs must be answerable. If they cannot be answered with the assets available, restructure it as a request for information (RFI) and send it higher. If it is too vague to be answered; don't use it.

PIRs are made up of more refined questions called specific information requirements (SIRs). The SIR contains the indicators (events on the ground) that will answer the question. Structure your SIRs so that 2 or 3 coordinate to answer a PIR. If you need more SIRs then your PIR is not specific enough. If you are confused on SIR, ask yourself: *What would this asset need to see to answer the question?*

The concepts of simplicity and common sense will go far in relation to your PIR and SIR. Always structure your questions at the user level. The more complicated a question is, the less likely it is to be answered in a timely manner. In your quest for information, you will have the need to collect information unrelated to PIRs. These questions are simply IRs. IRs are usually required to refine the IPB process, or to facilitate knowledge of the battlefield for future operations. An example of an IR generally looks like this: *Who is the Muhktar of neighborhood X?* You will have a large number of IRs, feed them to your ground units in small amounts rather than a massive list that can be overwhelming for Soldiers patrolling the streets.

ISR

The following is a brief summary of ISR and targeting operations along with key points and lessons learned. As an S2, 60 percent of your time in combat is spent on both ISR and targeting. Few training programs are in place to assist with collection management and targeting at the battalion level. Incorporate ISR planning and execution into pre-deployment training as much as possible. Target development and planning is easier to recreate in garrison, and can be exercised at unit training events and live fire exercises. Realistic scenarios coupled with updated threat information will assist in effective training on these tasks.

ISR is simply how you are going to answer your battalion's IRs. The collection plan is what IR you have that need answered and who can answer it. Your collection plan also needs to address critical times in which the question needs answering. Once you have developed your collection plan, determine what assets are available to you in the next 72 to 96 hours and determine what IR they

will collect on and the times for collection. Create an ISR synchronization matrix to graphically portray your collection activities. This will assist you in identifying gaps in coverage or when cueing, mixing, or redundancy is available and applicable. Designating one person in your shop is the best way to tackle this task. The assistant S2 or NCOIC are great candidates as it requires a lot of time and constant monitoring to ensure that IR are being answered and disseminated. Most units will require a collection plan 72 hours out to ensure assets can be provided to execute your collection.

There are two types of assets that can collect on your IR for you. The first are organic assets which consist mainly of all of your ground forces (scout and maneuver platoons), your HCTs that may be attached from higher, and any attached units that are operating within your battlespace. This limits your collection capability considerably. You may also be in a unit equipped with long range surveillance capabilities, always consider these as an asset that can collect on some IR. As a planning factor for collection, assume that higher level aviation and collection assets will not be available to collect on your IR. The second type of assets are brigade (tactical), echelons above brigade (operational), or echelons above division (strategic). You can have any number or variant of assets available given the time and location. The important take-away is to know all assets available. Make a list and post them in your TOC. Train all Soldiers in your section on the capabilities and limitations of all assets. Many times an asset will suddenly appear on station for you, if your Soldiers do not understand what it can do, the likelihood is that it will be misused or not used at all.

The most important aspect of ISR is knowing how to interface with every asset on the battlefield. Many assets will supply a direct feed that you can monitor, and most have a human interface system so that you can communicate with the asset or asset operator. Build a cheat sheet that contains the details of interfacing with every asset available and post it in your operations area. Always remember attack and reconnaissance helicopters have many capabilities that can extend your intelligence footprint and answer IR. Many commanders focus on the direct action role of rotary wing aviation and overlook their stellar reconnaissance capabilities. Several staff members should be able and willing to assist you in planning ISR for the battalion. The U.S. Air Force TACPs can request and execute fixed wing aviation reconnaissance from multiple platforms. Your Electronic Warfare (EW) Officer can assist with support as well as provide technical expertise on all things relating to signals and electronics. The Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officer can assist with many HUMINT related IRs. Your Fire Support Officer will answer questions about the enemy's indirect fire capabilities.

These staff members will not likely reside in your back pocket as they have other duties and responsibilities so approach them often to discuss your collection plan and solicit their advice. Whether you are handling collection management, or it is a subordinate, maintain daily contact with your brigade Collection Manager. He is your gateway to all the assets that the Army has to offer. Always ask for everything and ensure your collection plan has every INT accounted for. Chances are, you won't get it all but you certainly won't get it if you don't ask. Many times your requests will cause your brigade Collection Manager to learn new methods and points of contact for different assets. As always, be proactive and never take no for an answer.

There are many additional tools and assets available to enhance your battalion's ability to collect on IRs. These force multipliers require significant planning and careful execution to have the maximum impact on your operations. Some examples of force multipliers are unattended ground sensors (UGS), camera systems (overt and covert), and special access programs (SAPs). UGS can be used to determine and characterize mobility and mobility patterns in areas that have limited ground presence. They can be especially fruitful when mixed with other Measurement and Signals Intelligence (MASINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) platforms. Training is generally the greatest constraint as employment can be tedious and affect the capabilities of the systems. Camera systems can be employed in active or passive surveillance roles to monitor areas of increased enemy activity or as a deterrent. There are many SAPs that will enhance ISR and targeting capability that are available once you are in theater.

Targeting

Targeting is the ability to effect something or someone and leave it in the condition that you choose. That is, of course, my definition. Like many other intelligence functions, doctrine complicates matters that are simple to plan and execute. We will not delve into targeting methodologies or specifics, instead focusing on the S2 role and lessons learned. Intelligence officers are mainly focused on lethal targeting, but play a strong advisory role in the non-lethal realm. If the target is a human being, the S2 should have the lead. Targeting for intelligence professionals at the tactical level can be broken down into five easy steps:

1. Identify the threat or intelligence problem and develop a threat model.
2. Create a SITEMP of the threat or intelligence problem and identify the most likely time/place to see the threat or activity. Analyze the possible 2nd and 3rd order effects of engaging the target.
3. Create an IR regarding the threat/activity and task a collection asset(s) to locate or report on the threat.
4. Engage the target either through kinetic or non-kinetic means.
5. Assess if engaging the target had the effect you wanted, or if you need to engage it again through the same or some other means.

Many would argue that this is over-simplified, but it works well in an environment where time is always a limiting factor.

One of the most difficult intelligence tasks to accomplish is developing a target. You know something or someone is out there, you just don't know where or when. You must decide what you want to target first which usually requires a nomination to your commander where he will bless off on assets and resources to be used to detect the target. To do this, you must create a target packet that contains all of the information or evidence that you have to prosecute the target. The next part is the one that requires a lot of imagination on the part of the S2. You have to employ assets to find, pattern, gain further information, or determine the operational status of your proposed target. At a minimum your packet should contain:

- Imagery of the target or target location at the best possible resolution.
- All intelligence reports pertaining to the target or targets activities.
- A listing of known associates or affiliated entities.
- A SITEMP of how the threat will react to the operation with two COAs.
- Special instructions to the actioning unit that includes specific items to be collected from the objective.
- A set of target criteria to determine target readiness.

When you create this packet intelligence gaps will become apparent. These intelligence gaps transform into IR about the target, and possibly PIR. Use the newly discovered IR to collect against the target until it is actionable. When the target is actionable, determine a delivery method to effect the target. These methods can range from setting up a meeting with your commander to dropping a 500 pound bomb on the target. This is the point at which evaluating 2nd and 3rd order effects is critical.

Analysis of effects and consequences is essential to effective targeting. With each target and delivery method, you have to analyze the following: What will the effect on the population be for friendly and enemy forces? What effect will this have on government and policy? What effect will this have on host nation security forces? What effect will this have on our current and future operations in this area and others? Will this decision affect the local economy? What is the likely public opinion or enemy information operation that will result from this action? All of these questions are weighed with a cost-benefit analysis that should result in the best possible delivery method for the desired effect.

As the S2, encourage the best possible method that benefits the enemy the least. Never allow targeting that empowers the enemy, this type of targeting is counter-productive and is not focused on the endstate of the operation. Finally, after a delivery method is chosen and executed, the S2 must assess the target: Did the method achieve the desired effect? Did it have unintended or unconsidered consequences? If unintended consequences arose, they must be mitigated as soon as possible to lessen the enemy's ability to exploit the event. Targeting is

the final step and the end result of the intelligence cycle. Assessments and impacts are then factored back into the process and it begins again. The ability to develop targets effectively will increase credibility and are the building blocks of accomplishing the goals laid out in your unit's campaign plan.

Characterize the Enemy

You and your section will be responsible for producing many products during your tenure as an S2, and arguably the SITEMP is the most important. This is the means by which you portray how the enemy is arrayed and how it is operating. There are multiple ways to display your SITEMP. I recommend that you find a style that facilitates your perspective of the enemy and is understood by both your commander and S3. There are some salient points that come to mind when considering the SITEMP in the counterinsurgecy environment:

1. Use a common operating picture. Ensure that the operations graphics and the enemy graphics share the same background. This facilitates the commander's ability to visualize the battlefield.

2. Create and maintain a macro level SITEMP of your AO. Depict all threat groups and their current disposition. Use tactical intent symbols to portray their current operations or goals. Assess the members' (quantify) strength and their main source of funding. Clearly depict support, disruption, and battle zones and identify any key nodes that facilitate your enemy's operations.

3. Create micro SITEMPS for subordinate units' AOs. Get daily input from company and troop commanders about enemy forces in their AOs and use input to update your macro SITEMP.

4. Major operations require COA statements and SITEMPS of the AO that your unit will operate in. This is when you apply the full-blown IPB and develop COA statements to facilitate the operations plan. Focus your efforts on enemy centers of gravity, key terrain, and their decisive operation when time constrained.

5. Target packets require SITEMPs down to the individual enemy level. Focus efforts on engagement areas, likely early warning sites, infiltration and exfiltration routes, and details of the target when time constrained.

Threat models characterize how the enemy conducts operations without regard to terrain and weather. To utilize threat models, break down your top three enemy threats and begin to analyze the specifics of how they conduct these operations. Assess the time the enemy needs to conduct the operation and break it into phases. Determine what type of logistical support is needed and where it comes from. How does the enemy communicate during the operation? Does the enemy require special transportation or technology? How does the enemy choose targets, and how does it conduct reconnaissance? Are there any ceremonial or religious aspects for the attackers? How does it handle the civilian population?

When you have answered these questions about the enemy you can reasonably determine the pattern of life for the activity examined. Find creative methods to graphically depict your study keeping in mind simplicity and common sense. Programs like Analyst Notebook have built in features that allow you to do time-based analysis. List all of the indicators that are visible during the operation. Identify any point in the enemy's operation that he has to expose himself and will be vulnerable to collection. If you take your threat model and apply it to a specific threat group in your AO and the area that it has historically conducted this type of operation, you have just created a target.

"Intelligence Drives Operations"

This is possibly the most used U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command catch-phrase meant to inculcate the importance of MI on the battlefield. Its significance is often down-played by operations personnel who truly believe that their plans are comprehensive and the measure of battles won and lost. As an intelligence professional, no phrase should empower you more. The simplicity and relevance of the statement could not be more significant. There are a few instances in which intelligence does not drive operations and they are all negative.

The first and most common is a lack of confidence or loss of credibility of the intelligence apparatus. This is caused by individuals or groups (units) of individuals that have missed the boat in their understanding and application of intelligence doctrine. Most prevalent is the lack of leadership and professionalism that are required to handle the responsibilities of the post. Good MI officers are a commodity in high demand, and the market

is straining to supply them to the field. Often, commanders are required to "settle" with a level of professionalism that is below what is necessary. The MI Corps as a whole has to work together to transform our Corps and restore credibility to the MI apparatus. It is the duty of every MI officer to help in this struggle.

Another example of intelligence not driving operations is when commanders decide to distrust intelligence methods and conclusions and foster an environment of apathy towards intelligence within their command. These commanders put their faith in the planning process without the application of intelligence. Rarely will these commanders change their course based on relevant intelligence. The positive aspect of this notion is that there are very few senior commanders who have adopted this methodology. Often it is company and troop level commanders who will perpetuate this notion and become an obstacle to intelligence rather than a contributor. The underlying cause is arrogance and can often be overcome by presenting timely and actionable intelligence that indisputably leads to mission success. In general, commanders who support, equip, and prioritize their intelligence effort, see the best returns on their investment. Concurrently, company and troop level commanders who cooperate, provide information and feedback, and participate in their intelligence effort will see the tremendous benefit to their mission set.

The final scenario that causes conflicts is when a mission is assigned or dictated from a higher headquarters that lacks situational awareness or understanding of your AO. Many times it will be a supporting effort to a larger operation that leaves Soldiers feeling as though they are wasting their time or quite often "driving around waiting to be blown up." This is where the industrious S2 springs into action. Make every mission an intelligence mission. Generate relevant IRs, search for targets, and transform a throw away mission into something that generates success. In the current environment (Iraq and Afghanistan), there is no shortage of intelligence to be gathered, bad guys to be handled, or enemy infrastructure to be influenced. Making the best of this situation is often the most challenging aspect of the job, but arguably the most important. Strive to be creative in your use of assets and your approach to collection, work with your maneuver forces, and expend energy convincing your higher headquarters to support your efforts.

Conclusion

I have often suggested the theory that intelligence analysis is 80 percent art and 20 percent science. I ardently support this notion. As intelligence officers, we are overwhelmed by data. It comes in all forms: letters, numbers, pictures, spoken word, and in video. Success is still rooted in the understanding of how human beings behave, and more importantly, how they fight. The intelligence officer uses intuition, savvy, and "gut feeling", then examines corresponding data to confirm or deny theories and circumstances. Science and data certainly have their place in the process, but it is all insignificant without the human mind to analyze, interpret, and exploit the results. The successful intelligence officer is a student of all things military, political, and economic, and an expert in acquiring information of all types.

It is the goal of the U.S. Army to establish information dominance over our nation's adversaries. While the struggle for information dominance is the keystone of the IC, learning to interpret and exploit this information should be the preeminent focus of the MI officer. Experience is one of the best traits that an intelligence officer can bring to the table, but a lack of experience can be mitigated by a firm grasp of intelligence doctrine and a baseline knowledge about the enemy. Knowledge and experience can be gained by interacting with others, and no institution is structured better than the Army for this type of interaction. Credibility is the key to success. Gain and maintain credibility at all costs. Work daily to present with confidence and defend with vigilance. No intelligence officer is expected to know all the answers, seamlessly predict the enemy's movements, or expertly manipulate assets to answer all of a given commander's questions.

An intelligence officer is expected to be able to create sound and logical enemy COAs that expose friendly vulnerabilities, gather and prioritize information from a variety of sources, and effectively use systems and methods to apply both critical thinking and decision making to tactical problems. The maneuver battalion intelligence officer is the principal executor and the authority of this methodology. It is my assertion that there is

no profession of arms more exigent or germane. The eventual triumph in the War on Terrorism is at stake and the positive resolution of conflicts yet to come depends on the continued development of proficient tactical level intelligence officers. The current corps of MI professionals will analyze the complexities of the most significant threats to democracy that have been experienced to date, and this cadre of officers will advise the policy and decision makers that will determine the survival of our American way of life.

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MI LEGACY

A thermos bottle that actually held coffee was used to conceal items in its false bottom.

Racing Against the Clock: A Practical Guide to Time-Sensitive Targeting in a COIN Environment

by Captain Todd J. Harkrader

Introduction

Imagine that you are brand new Battalion S2 or Assistant S2 with very little time in your position. You have been to the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course and have had the benefit of one rotation through the National Training Center, but have yet to deploy in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF). That changed recently, and you are now in only the first of a twelve month deployment to Iraq in support of the War on Terrorism. You completed a relief in place a few weeks prior and your Battalion has been relatively successful continuing the work of the previous unit. Developments with targeting have been slow though and although enemy contact has been light, there has been a steady increase in reports indicating that Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is preparing to increase operations to exploit your unit's inexperience and regain control of the populace. Along with your S3 and Fire Support Officer, you have held several targeting meetings but have yet to develop the actionable intelligence that you need to target the developing AQI threat in your area of operations (AO).

Late one evening, you get a phone call from a special operations unit that has time sensitive intelligence on a major AQI leader in your AO. They tell you that their intelligence indicates the insurgent leader will be in a meeting for no more than the next two hours. The special operations unit would hit the meeting, but cannot go after the target due to other operations that are consuming all of their manpower. They are able to provide you with a brief target packet on the leader via email and a 10 digit grid coordinate to the target location. You hang up the phone and turn around to see your senior analyst and NCOIC waiting for orders. What do you do?

Although "steady-state" targeting will always have a place in military operations, Battalion S2s and their sections must understand and be proficient in the execution of time-sensitive targeting (TST) in order to be successful in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. During my two deployments to Iraq, first as an Assistant S2 in Balad, Iraq and again during a 15 month tour in Ramadi, Iraq as a Battalion S2, I found that proficiency in TST was absolutely

vital to our maneuver operations and was an integral part of the daily operations of the S2 section. Our Battalion became extremely adept at receiving time-sensitive intelligence from an outside entity, creating accurate and timely targeting packets, and passing it to our maneuver elements who actioned targets with overwhelming success. However, this proficiency did not develop overnight and many lessons were learned along the way. In hindsight, there were many things I would have done differently or focused on even before deploying that would have facilitated our TST efforts the minute that our boots hit the ground.

In the next several pages, I am going to briefly overview targeting and various targeting methodologies prescribed by both Army and Joint doctrine. More importantly, I am going to talk about my experiences in trying to adapt this doctrine to a COIN environment and how I viewed their applicability in both lethal and non-lethal operations. Finally, I intend to provide the reader with a step by step guide based on my own experiences that I believe will greatly improve the probability of a new Battalion S2 to conduct successful TST operations.

What is Targeting?

According to **JP 3-0, Joint Operations** targeting is defined as "the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities".[1] A "target is an entity or object considered for possible engagement or action," such as an area, a person, a vehicle, a capability, a war fighting function, a behavior, or a certain portion of the populace.[2] The doctrinal targeting process that has been adopted by the Army is denoted by the acronym ***D3A***, which stands for *Decide, Deliver, Detect*, and *Assess* and is covered in-depth in **FM 6-20-10 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for The Targeting Process**.[3]

The ***decide*** function of D3A is by far the most important of the four steps because it requires synchronization amongst the staff, between the staff and the commander, as well as a clear understanding of both the mission and the commander's intent. Examples of products that are produced during this step include priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), an intelligence collection plan, high-payoff target list (HPTL), and an attack guidance matrix. The next step of D3A, ***detect***, involves utilizing the collection plan developed in Step One to target the commander's PIR as well as any targets identified by the staff. In a conventional environment, if you identified an enemy BMP-1ksh as an HPT, you could use your scout platoon or an unmanned aircraft system to detect its presence on the battlefield. The same is true of a COIN environment, where an insurgent leader could be detected via a Signals Intelligence platform, an Iraqi police officer, or a Human Intelligence (HUMINT) source. Once detected, the commander and the staff reach the third step of D3A, ***deliver***. This step involves effects on a designated target. The delivery could be lethal in nature or it could be non-lethal depending on the effects that the commander hopes to achieve by taking action against the target. The concept of lethal and non-lethal targets will be discussed in greater detail later in this article. The final step of this process is the ***assess*** phase, where the commander and staff review the results of the mission. If the desired end state has not been achieved (i.e., the target has not been destroyed, the populace is not responding to a new city council initiative, etc.), then the entire process begins again.[4]

But what does D3A really mean or do for you when applying it practically to a real-life situation, especially when time is critical as is often the case in Iraq and Afghanistan? I believe that D3A provides staff officers and particularly S2s with a relatively useful list of products that should be produced and the order in which they should be produced to facilitate the targeting process. However, I believe that the D3A methodology and types of products it prescribes are much more conducive to a conventional "steady-state" fight than they are to the austere and ever-evolving environment you will encounter in COIN. This is a point that I will address when discussing the practical application of TST as it relates to my experiences as a Battalion S2.

What is TST?

Having covered the basics of targeting and the Army's doctrinal targeting process of D3A, it is time to address what I believe is one of the most important roles an intelligence section plays in providing support to operations in OIF and OEF TST. As opposed to a standard targeting cycle which is a repetitive, normally weekly process that builds upon itself from one week to the next and requires con-

tinuous analysis by the S2 section and the staff as a whole, TST requires you as a Battalion S2 to react quickly and proficiently to intelligence of a time-sensitive nature that must be actioned immediately. More importantly, it requires you to provide the warfighter with a hasty, yet accurate and complete targeting packet or slide so he can quickly and efficiently deliver effects on the TST. Intelligence that triggers TST can come from a wide variety of sources to include adjacent units, special operations forces, national level agencies or assets, local law enforcement or a member of the populace. Although a TST can catch you off guard, there are a wide variety of steps you can take to prepare for them.

Much like the Army targeting doctrine of D3A, Joint doctrine addresses and has a method for prosecuting time-sensitive targets. This process is known as F2T2EA, which stands for find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess.[5] According to JP 3-60, "a TST is a JFC designated target or target type of such high importance to the accomplishment of the JFC's mission and objectives or one that presents such a significant strategic or operational threat to friendly forces or allies, that the JFC dedicates intelligence collection and attack assets or is willing to divert assets away from other targets in order to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess it/them . . . In most cases, TSTs require immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a direct danger to friendly forces, or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity".[6] In essence, the definition of a TST at the battalion level is the same as that of a TST at the brigade, corps or Joint level, but what constitutes TST at the battalion level may not be deemed of as great an importance at higher levels.

But much like D3A, how does F2T2EA help you prosecute a TST or plan for it in advance? So you decide or find a target; you fix/track/target and detect the target; you engage or deliver on the target, and then you assess the success you have against the target. While it sounds and looks good on paper, how does that help you, a new Battalion S2 with no combat experience, train and prepare for that one phone call that triggers you going after your top Battalion high value target in the middle of the night?

Practical Application of TST in a COIN Environment

This final section is a list of steps/lessons learned that I feel will greatly improve your ability to conduct TST from the day you arrive in your area of responsibility (AOR). While a lot of this information ties into doctrine, a great deal of it is simply what looks like in hindsight, commonsense. But it is a methodology that many experienced S2s have likely applied yet have never taken the time to write down or articulate to their intelligence sections. It is important to remember that many of these steps can occur before you deploy, concurrently, or in a different order than is prescribed below. It is also important to note that this is based predominately on my experiences during OIF 06-08 and is what worked in my particular AO. It is a very flexible methodology, but is one that I believe will provide any new Battalion S2 with a solid framework from which to build TST standard operating procedures (SOP) that are most effective for their individual AOR.

- **Develop rapport with your Battalion and Company-level leadership.**

Developing rapport with your senior leadership is quite possibly the most important step for setting yourself up for success with regards to TST and is also a step you can and should begin well before you deploy. This step begins as soon as you get to your unit when you first sit down with your Battalion Commander to discuss the role that he or she expects you to play within the organization. During this meeting you can almost guarantee that the Commander will ask you who the best S2 in the Battalion is and your answer better be that it is the Commander, not the S2. You must remember that your Commander has likely been in the military for ten or more years than you and that he or she has an extensive understanding of both friendly and enemy tactics. This type of experience cannot be taught in a school house and is a direct result of participation in numerous military operations over a long period of time. Knowing this going in will set you up for success and will help you to focus on how you and your section can best support the Commander. From time to time, do not be afraid to ask your Commander if you are providing the intelligence support that he needs and if the products your section is producing are meeting the intelli-

gence gaps. I found these types of azimuth checks to be critical, as they both furthered my maturation as a Battalion S2, enabled me to develop a very personable relationship with my Commander, and more importantly, provided me with the insights I needed to tailor intelligence products to the meet the Commander's needs. The end result of this is the Commander trusting you, your assessments of the threat, and your section's ability to provide intelligence support to him or her when you are in sector or at a meeting. Cultivation of this relationship early on will greatly facilitate your TST efforts down the road when lives are on the line and the Commander asks you for your assessment regarding the target.

An equally important relationship to develop is the one between you and your S3 and executive officer (XO). While you ultimately answer to and are rated by your XO, my experience has been that you will work much more closely with your S3 and S3A downrange. There are many schools of thought or opinions as to whether or not the Battalion S2 works for or with the Battalion S3. Regardless, you have to make sure that you and the S3 are in sync with one another when it comes to "intelligence driving maneuver" and that you remain abreast of all planned and future operations. When you begin to look at friendly versus enemy courses of action (COAs), there is a strong possibility that you and the S3 will disagree; however, I encourage these disagreements, as it forces both parties to relook their COAs and facilitates a more thorough analysis of the task at hand. Even though you primarily tailor your products to meet the needs of the Battalion Commander, be prepared to also make products that meet the specifications of the S3. As the S3 begins to develop plans for operations, make sure you provide tailored intelligence products for that operation, be it pattern analysis, threat templates, or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. As you cultivate this relationship in garrison and during training exercises, you will begin to figure out the personality, tactical mindset, and methodology of your S3, all of which will serve you well as you work together in combat. Again, the end state is a mutual trust between the two of you. Just as with your Battalion Commander, it is extremely important that your S3 has confidence in your assessments and knowledge of the enemy. Finally, during both training exercises and deployments, work closely with your S3 and S3A to maintain situational awareness of all operations, patrol cycles, and air assets available from day to day. This knowledge is critical when you receive a TST because in the absence of the S3, it is imperative that you know at any given time what assets may be available to deliver effects on a target.

The relationship you maintain with your Battalion XO will be very similar to the one you have with your S3. Even though your interaction with the XO during a deployment will pertain more to intelligence manning, equipment, and administrative issues, at some point during the deployment, the XO will serve as the Commander when he or she is on leave. At any given time, the Commander and S3 can also be out in sector simultaneously, so it is important that you have excellent rapport with the XO because the intelligence you provide him or her could be the difference between executing an operation against a TST or not. In most cases your XO was likely the Battalion S3 before taking over as the XO, which means there is a good chance that you will have already developed an S2/S3 relationship in the past. This will greatly facilitate working together when the opportunity arises to action a TST.

The final and most important relationship you need to develop as an S2 is between the Company Commanders/First Sergeants and you. Always remember that no matter what is happening at the Battalion level, you are ultimately supporting the companies and that your intelligence products have to meet their needs and facilitate their operations. I learned the hard way in garrison how important this relationship is and I did not make the same mistake during our deployment. Prior to deploying you must work closely with the companies to develop rapport and understand how each functions. This is especially true when you are task organized and will likely be working with infantry, armor, field artillery and engineer companies, all of which have a different mindset, capability, and approach to operations. It is remarkable how the relationship you develop in garrison with companies, processing clearances and conducting arms rooms inspections, can transfer to your operations downrange. The best time to gain a more clear understanding as to how your companies will operate in combat

is during your mission readiness exercise (MRX) prior to deploying. Use this time to tailor your products to the individual companies and to train your section on intelligence operations. Be prepared for some growing pains, as this will likely be the first time that your section is operating under a simulated combat environment. Develop templates for the various products you will produce downrange to figure out what works for the companies and what does not. Finally, use TST simulations to cross-train your section so that they know what to do in your absence as well as to figure out how each company responds to those types of operations.

- **Develop a standard for TST and Targeting prior to and during training rotations.**

As mentioned previously, garrison and MRXs are the ideal time to figure out as an S2 section and as a staff how you are going to conduct targeting and TST downrange. We spent an exorbitant amount of time during our gunnery and MRX developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for targeting. A majority of this time was spent on producing, managing, and understanding how to employ a Targeting Synchronization Matrix (TSM), an outstanding tool that helps you to apply D3A to targeting so you can see your targets and the effects you want to achieve in time and space. Although I arrived at the opinion during our deployment that a TSM is more useful to non-lethal as opposed to lethal targeting, it is an excellent starting point for the targeting team and will be used regardless during operations. Learning how to utilize a TSM will ultimately give you a more clear understanding of targeting methodology and will give you a foundation for your targeting operations. I strongly recommend that you review FM 6-20-10 to gain a better appreciation of the TSM and its application.

You must also use this time to develop an SOP for TST. This will likely be a learning experience that will afford you the opportunity to test different TTPs and employ your personnel in different ways. The beauty of an MRX is that is forces you, upon receipt of intelligence that triggers TST, to immediately think about the assets you have that can support action against that target, whether they are maneuver or ISR assets, as well as how and what you need to get to the chain of command and the companies. It also tests your daily analysis and targeting to that point. You should already be tracking the TST to some extent or be able to look at your databases and find additional information on that target to facilitate decisions regarding effects you want to deliver on that target. I cannot emphasize enough how important it is to delegate to your subordinates and ensure they are proficient in what to do when a TST emerges, when they should come get you if you are off shift or, in your absence, when to have the initiative to go directly to the battle captain or the Battalion leadership. Instilling confidence in your subordinates at this stage and making sure your strongest personnel are on shift when you are not will greatly enhance the effectiveness of your shop and will ensure that a potential target will never fall through the cracks.

EXAMPLE TSM (Format)

DECIDE			DETECT		DELIVER		ASSESS	
P	Category	HPTs	Agency	Asset	Agency	Asset	Agency	Asset

EXAMPLE TSM (Completed)

DECIDE			DETECT		DELIVER		ASSESS	
P	Category	HPTs	Agency	Asset	Agency	Asset	Agency	Asset
1	Fire Support	M46 Astros/ BM-21/ FROG 2S5 --- D-20,D-30 --- Atk Hel	Div arty --- G2 --- 313 MI --- Div arty --- 3-4 ADA	Q-36, Q-37 --- EAD assets --- Quickfix TO-32 --- Q-36, Q-37 --- Organic National	1-Div arty 2-Avn --- Div arty --- 3-4 ADA Div arty	1-Arty, MLRS --- Arty, MLRS --- Organic Arty, MLRS	Avn --- G2 --- 313 MI --- 3-4 ADA	INFLTREP --- Analysis --- Quickfix --- Organic
2	ADA	MR II SA-6, -8, -13 ZSU-23, S16	G2	Tencap, EAD ELINT	Div arty --- G3/EWO	SEAD Arty, MLRS --- EF-111, F4G	G2	Tencap, EAD ELINT
3	RISTA	ARK-1 --- Patrols, OPs	Air Force --- G2 --- Bde	--- EAD ELINT --- Organic	Div arty --- Bdes	Arty, MLRS --- Organic	Air Force --- G2 --- Bde	INFLTREP --- EAD ELINT --- Organic
4	MANEUVER	3-47 AR, 15th Mech Bde,14th Mech Bde, 3d Recon Bn 2d Mtze Bn	1-17th Cav --- G2 --- 2d Bde --- 313 MI	Organic --- LRS,J-STARS SLAR --- Organic --- Quickfix O-32	G3/EWO (313) --- Div arty --- Avn	Quickfix TLQ-17 --- Arty, MLRS --- AH-64	313MI --- G2 --- Avn	Jamming Eff Reps --- LRS,1-17th Cav,2d Bde Spot reps --- Pireps

LEGEND: **atk hel** = attack helicopter; **EAD** = echelons above division; **eff reps** = effective reports; **INFLTREP=** in flight reports; **mech** = mechanized; **mtze** = motorized; **pireps** = pilot reports; **spot reps** = spot reports

Sample Target Synchronization Matrix.

✦ **Fight to be on the Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS) Team.**

Upon receipt of deployment orders your unit, while still at home station or in Kuwait, will have the opportunity to send key leaders on a PDSS reconnaissance of your AO. You must be on the PDSS and should fight to ensure that this happens! This experience was extremely valuable to me and greatly facilitated transitioning my section into the driver's seat upon transfer of authority with the outgoing unit. By participating in the PDSS, you will have the opportunity to meet with your counterpart and start picking his or her brain about the enemy threat in your AO. The amount of information you will receive will be overwhelming, but it helps to make a place that had only been a location on a map a few weeks earlier to you a reality. Go on orientation patrols, if you can, to gain a ground-truth perspective of the AO. This type of understanding is critical to communicating with the companies and understanding what is realistic tactically when it comes to targeting.

I also had the opportunity to stay at Camp Ramadi when the rest of the PDSS returned to Kuwait. If you get this opportunity, take it! It will not only provide the Battalion chain of command with an additional set of eyes and ears that can answer requests for information, but it will also afford you the opportunity to meet with intelligence enablers on the base, continue working with your counterpart, and most importantly, monitor enemy activity throughout the AO. The more time you can spend immersing yourself in the AO and in the TTPs of the enemy, the better.

✦ **Spend as much time as possible with the outgoing Battalion S2.**

It goes without saying that you should spend a lot of time with your counterpart, but many incoming S2s do not and they pay the price once they take over and the resident expert is gone. Aside from the obvious (learning about the enemy, political and tribal groups, TTPs, etc.), the key things to discuss with the outgoing S2 are the intelligence enablers that will be at your disposal. Talk to the S2 about how he or she employed those assets, the relationship with those entities, problems that occurred, and lessons learned. Do not be discouraged if the outgoing S2 had a bad experience with certain units or agencies; just because that was the case for him or her, doesn't mean it will be the same for you. The same is true if the outgoing S2 had an outstanding working relationship with an agency or unit. You will have to develop your own relationships, but learn from the outgoing S2 and remember the lessons learned when you take the lead. Also talk to the outgoing S2 about TST operations. Talk about previous operations and see what was successful and what was not. There is a very strong possibility that you will witness the outgoing unit respond to a TST as well. When that happens, shadow the more experienced, outgoing S2 and watch how he or she and the section operate. Practice this TTP as well when your soldiers arrive so they can gain practical experience and see what TST looks like in real-life.

✦ **Meet every intelligence enabler you can and develop a working relationship with them.**

Meeting intelligence enablers operating in your AO begins during the PDSS and continues for the duration of your deployment. The best advice I can give a new Battalion S2 is to meet every enabler that you can as quickly as possible and begin developing a working relationship with each respective enabler. I found that just by meeting routinely with other enablers that I was able to prepare the battalion leadership and my section for potential TSTs well in advance of execution. This also allowed me to anticipate what ISR assets to request and prepare the companies for potential operations. Fortunately, the outgoing S2 made a point to take me around to every intelligence enabler he worked with and it is imperative that you demand the same of your counterpart. After having very limited assets during my first deployment, I was completely shocked and quite honestly overwhelmed by the number of intelligence enablers that were at my disposal. From National level agencies, to special operation forces, to sister Service branches, the number of resources from which to draw both intelligence and maneuver support were incredible.

I made a point to continue the successful relationships the outgoing S2 had developed, but I also reached out to entities his unit had difficulties with and ended up establishing outstanding dialogues with those organizations. I cannot emphasize enough how important these relationships will be to your success or failure downrange. When looking at our targeting over the first 90 days we were in country, at least 65 to 75 percent of our targeting suc-

cess and detainees were the result of TSTs we were receiving from these enablers. Almost every day a new target emerged that required collaboration between our unit and special operations forces. This 90 day period resulted in AQI nearly being crippled in the main population center of our AO and was also the beginning of an outstanding partnership between us and the Special Forces community that lasted the duration of our 15 month deployment. Meet your enablers, share intelligence with them, and I guarantee you will be successful.

- **Conduct weekly lethal/non-lethal targeting meetings.**

While your unit will have likely developed an SOP for targeting meetings during your MRX, there is a strong possibility that you will modify your approach to targeting depending on your AO. This will definitely happen when you consider the fact that you will adopt the outgoing unit's battle rhythm for the initial part of your deployment. Our unit conducted separate targeting meetings every week for lethal and non-lethal targeting, to include at least one working group meeting for each type of targeting prior to the actual targeting meeting. The primary document we utilized was the TSM, which in turn helped drive our ISR collection plan as well as our weekly patrol schedule. After our initial success targeting insurgent groups in our AO, I found that I was only updating the targeting team on changes to targets from weeks prior and more often than not, ended up saying "no change." This was not necessarily a result of not receiving new or accurate intelligence on a daily basis. It had more to do with the fact that the targets in question were in the upper echelons of the insurgency and took months to develop due to a lack of actionable intelligence. When we apprehended these targets, it was a result of time-sensitive intelligence, and all of the additional intelligence we had developed through weeks or months of targeting went into the detainee's packet upon capture.

I also found that unless I was putting out information about a new cache location or a target that had a location tied to it which could be targeted, the targeting staff really did not need to hear updates on targets of which they were already aware. It was important for the S2 section to track these targets and I could always answer questions about targets if someone wanted an update. However it really wasted everyone's time to review targets and follow the D3A/TSM model. With the success we were having with TST, it became abundantly clear that our targeting cycle was going too slow to keep up with the decision cycle of the enemy. By the time I had added or developed TSM input for a target, we would detain the individual and move on to new targets that emerged. The TSM also began to outlive its usefulness for lethal targeting as we moved from kinetic to non-kinetic targeting in our AO. As a result of this experience, I recommend the use of a TSM as a method by which to track lethal targets when you first get into sector but be open to the possibility that it may became a hindrance rather than an enabler to your targeting efforts as your progress through your deployment. Again, every unit and AO is different, but more often than not I was continuously receiving intelligence that I believed to be actionable. This resulted in me immediately going to the S3, recommending action against the target, and passing the intelligence to the companies for execution.

One caveat to the above is the usefulness of a TSM to non-lethal targeting. I say this because many non-lethal targets and the effects you hope to achieve will take weeks and months to reach an end state. The concept of D3A and the TSM work perfectly for this and will really keep you honest when it comes to where you are and where you need to go with your non-kinetic operations.

- **Conduct weekly intelligence synchronization meetings with all intelligence enablers.**

As discussed previously, coordination with other intelligence enablers is paramount and will greatly facilitate your S2 section's TST efforts. I had the benefit of falling in on a weekly intelligence synchronization meeting that had been established by the Brigade S2 that brought all intelligence enablers together once a week. Every week, S2 representatives from the battalions, brigade, special operation forces, sister Service branches and National level agencies met and the results were outstanding. From target de-confliction to gaining situational awareness on the operations and targeting focus of other organizations, this meeting never failed to provide me with something that I could take back to my chain of command. The face time you get with the other enablers is invaluable and makes for a smoother operation when you do get the call indi-

cating that a trigger has been established for a TST in your AO.

The beauty of this meeting is that it prepares you for TSTs in advance, because you almost always have at least one enabler that has a potential target in your AO. Knowing this allows you to go back and prepare your commander, the S3, your section, and the companies for a potential raid 24 to 48 hours in advance. This extra time is critical and enables both the battalion and company to develop a quick concept of operations that can be utilized when a trigger is established. This weekly meeting was vital to our success and greatly enhanced the ability of our S2 section to provide intelligence that drove operations. If you are at the brigade or battalion level, ensure that a meeting like this occurs and if it is not, recommend it to your leadership.

- **Cross train S2 section on TST.**

Even though cross training your S2 section should have occurred prior to your deployment, there is a great deal of modification that will occur to your TST SOP once you are doing the real thing. The worst mistake you can make, and it is a mistake that I made from time to time, is to go to a synchronization meeting where you receive intelligence and then fail to pass it down to your subordinates. The last place you want everything to be is in your head which will frustrate your 2A and NCOIC, especially if you are on leave or get injured. A priority after going to an intelligence synchronization meeting should be to brief your entire section, as well as your commander and S3.

The other key is that your entire section needs to be familiar with and understand the enablers that are available. I would often take one of my Soldiers to a synchronization meeting just so he could see the type of intelligence that was being discussed and so he could match names/organizations with faces. Whenever an enabler came to see me, I always made a point to introduce him or her to my entire section so the section would know who the person was and what he or she could bring to the fight. This is invaluable when you are not around. I guarantee you enablers will call with time-sensitive intelligence when you are in sector or at chow. When this occurs your personnel have to be able to take action without you. By ensuring that everyone knows what to do when a TST emerges, you greatly improve the efficiency of the section. You also protect your section against falling into the trap of not knowing what to do when you are not present and of your section depending on your presence to make a decision regarding a TST.

- **Routinely meet with indigenous intelligence officers.**

Another important part of your week should be to meet with indigenous intelligence officers. Be it an Iraqi Army or Iraqi Police S2 or some other indigenous intelligence personnel, it is vital that you work closely with them. I say this because they are almost always going to get certain types of intelligence, particularly HUMINT, before any Coalition asset. While you personally may not be able to meet with these intelligence officers weekly, you have other assets at your disposal that can meet weekly if not daily with these individuals and I recommend you do so. To this end, we tried to hold a weekly meeting where I would meet with all of the indigenous S2s either in sector or at our base. Although we sometimes received useful intelligence during these meetings, I quickly learned from my enablers that they had already received the intelligence that had been presented to me. While this meeting format was good in that it brought everyone together, it never developed into the intelligence sharing forum that I intended. I believe this is a valuable enterprise to undertake and could have a very positive outcome in the right AO. But you can achieve the same result by utilizing intelligence enablers to conduct the day to day intelligence collection meetings while you conduct more formal meetings with these personnel via battlefield circulation.

- **You got the time-sensitive intelligence, now take action!**

So, you have followed the above steps and now it is time to take action against a TST. Going back to the scenario presented earlier, it should be very clear what you should do. I would personally take the following action:

- Immediately brief your section on the intelligence you just received and have them pull up whatever is known about the target in the databases.
- Plot the target on mapping software and make a quick slide with the target's name, a brief description of what you know about the target and a ten-digit grid coordinate.

- Find the Battalion S3 and/or XO and brief them on the target, provide your assessment of the importance of the target and the validity of the intelligence, and notify them of ISR assets or other enablers that are available to facilitate targeting the TST.
- After receiving approval, inform the TOC and battle captain of pending action against a TST.
- Contact the company that has been tasked with the TST and provide them with as much intelligence on the target as needed; remember less is sometimes more. A location and a name will often suffice. Also, facilitate link-up between the company and intelligence enablers if necessary.
- Immediately divert any ISR assets to support the action against the TST and request additional support from your higher echelon if needed.
- Continue to provide ISR support and intelligence updates to both the maneuver forces and the battalion leadership throughout the duration of the operation.
- Upon capture, begin detainee operations and send the detainee to a holding area for interrogation to develop additional TSTs.

This is just one example of how exploitation of a TST can transpire. Remember to be flexible and think outside of the box. You will have a wide-variety of enablers that can be employed and always be prepared for new and challenging target sets that are unique. The more you can prepare for a TST via your own analysis or contacts with other enablers, the better. Figure out what SOP works best for your unit and your section, modify it, perfect it, and pass what you have learned on to the next S2 who replaces you.

Conclusion

When I first became a Battalion S2, I had a lot of experience being a 2A, but knew very little about all the enablers that are out there to support the warfighter. It is a constant learning process and it is your duty as an S2 to know as much as you can about the external assets that can be utilized downrange. The same can be said of TST. Throughout your deployment, you will think you have seen it all and then a new enabler or a new target will emerge that is like nothing you have seen before. The important thing is to learn from your experiences and train your soldiers so they can react quickly, professionally, and effectively to these situations.

It is my hope that the aforementioned methodology provides you with a framework or foundation upon which to build. The above is by no means a how to for TST, only an example or model of what I saw worked very well during my deployment to Ramadi. I recommend that you take the time to read the doctrine on targeting to better familiarize yourself with many of the time-tested tools that are available to you and your section. It has been my experience though that doctrine often times can make an easy or simple concept more difficult than it needs to be and does not evolve as quickly as our enemy does on the battlefield.

At the end of the day, TST comes down to experience and commonsense. If you understand the intelligence assets at your disposal, your AO, your unit, and the enemy that you face, all while keeping your wits about you and thinking logically and practically about the TST you are facing, you are guaranteed to succeed. 

Endnotes

1. **Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations**, 17 September 2006 (with Change 1, dated 13 February 2008), III-18.

2. **Joint Publication 3-60 Joint Targeting,** 13 April 2007, I-1.

3. U.S. Marine Corps, **FM 6-20-10 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Targeting Process,** 8 May 1996, 1-2.

4. FM 6-20-10, 1-6.

5. JP 3-60, I-4.

6. Ibid., I-5.

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Developing Officers in a Deployed Tactical MICO: The Tri-Role Approach

by Captain Joan Hollein

Introduction

During the 2007 deployment of the 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), 3rd Infantry Division, the Military Intelligence Company (MICO) provided continuous intelligence analysis and collection capabilities in support of intelligence driven operations. Under the BCT modularity concept, the MICO is the single intelligence unit in the brigade that is task organized as Alpha Company in the Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB). This structure is both a training and leadership challenge, as the MICO is tasked by brigade, but maintains organizational integrity under the BSTB battalion commander. As a brigade asset, the MICO operationally augments the brigade S2 and maneuver battalion S2 sections, while still under the leadership of the company and BSTB.

The role of the MI Platoon Leader (PL) within the MICO needed definition in order to provide useful, relevant, and necessary development of the lieutenants. The tri-role approach was created to outline a multi-faceted approach to utilizing the MI PLs during combat. In formulating this tri-role method for the officers of the company, the lieutenants were required to fulfill three roles and functions:

1. MICO PL.
2. S2 Operations Officer.
3. Brigade Intelligence Staff Officer.

Upon initial systems setup, the MICO Soldiers and equipment are attached and detailed throughout the brigade not only to staff sections at brigade, but also down at the battalion S2 levels. Subsequently, most MICO Soldiers comfortably integrate into established staff sections, function in a daily shift work battle rhythm, and work under the direction of officers other than their organic PLs.

After a mid-deployment assessment, a shortfall was revealed in the organization of a deployed tactical MICO: the role of the PLs.

Unlike an infantry platoon that is directly led and managed by the PL in combat, the MI PL role is somewhat diminished while deployed. Since the company Soldiers operate more autonomously while deployed, the day-to-day role of the MI PL during deployment can become somewhat obsolete. With the exception of checking in on their Soldiers and potentially passing administrative information, the lieutenants needed a greater mission. According to **FM 3-90.61 The Brigade Special Troops Battalion**, the MI Company Commander is to develop tentative plans for his/her subordinate PLs. The assumption is that the PLs will fall into some role within the brigade S2, however there is no doctrinal or specified position for these officers. The goal is to integrate them into solid positions, best suited for brigade mission accomplishment.

The Tri-Role Approach

By mid deployment, the lieutenants were desperate to be part of the operations, but lacked any specified guidance or direction to do so. In many cases, their Soldiers had been stripped away from the organic leadership, worked for other leaders, and did not require the constant direction of their PL. Predeployment plans had carefully outlined the organization and detachment of the MICO Soldiers, but overlooked additional responsibilities for the PLs. The MICO obviously had to support the Brigade S2 shop with Soldiers, but what about the additional intelligence officers?

The tri-role approach was developed in order to introduce MICO officers to all aspects of intelligence and absorb the maximum amount of knowledge during a deployment. In this model, the lieutenants were utilized not only as PLs, but also treated as operations officers, and augmented the Brigade in relevant intelligence staff functions. This decision was beneficial to the Company, Battalion, and Brigade: it allowed for additional support to the Brigade S2 and also integrated young officers into MI functions and systems. In other words, junior officers were forced to find out, and subsequently learn what they didn't know. This tri-role approach also mandated that the lieutenants develop organizational skill sets to manage their time across different job and section boundaries.

The intent of such an approach was to find a balance between integrating Intelligence officers both in a leadership role as well as familiarity in current operations. In the MI branch, junior officers are often differentiated between their experiences either as a PL or as a staff officer. Very rarely will young MI officers gain knowledge or exposure to both sides. The fear is that officers will only know one side of the house and thereby lack innate knowledge in the other. Potentially, this division may hinder their ability to command effectively if they have only experienced staff work. There is no greater opportunity for intelligence Soldiers to expand their understanding of the enemy situation and characteristics of a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment than during a deployment.

Initially, requiring junior officers to stretch themselves over three separate mission sets seemed arduous and unrealistic. However, by exposing them to all of these aspects and involving them in operations functions of the fight, the officers were able to integrate fully into the "big picture." In an initial counseling, the roles of each of these positions were outlined to clearly articulate expectations. As required by the Commander, the lieutenant's number one job and most vital role was that as a PL. Company business and Soldier management in support of the current operational missions is most important and always the highest priority. However, their responsibilities to situational awareness and to the Brigade staff are tantamount to the PL role.

Additionally, in this model, two warrant officers (WOs) in the Company also added depth in the staff officer functions. As maintenance and operations warrants, their additional time and knowledge can be utilized in additional areas once the systems are initialized and maintained. The unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations WO also assisted in the Linguist Management program and the equipment maintenance WO learned the functions and processes of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) Collection Management. Therefore, every officer of the MICO also covered down in an additional area within the Brigade staff.

Three Roles of Officers in a MICO

MICO PL. As a PL in the MICO, the lieutenants were required to first and foremost lead Soldiers as their PL. The responsibilities included standard health, morale, and welfare of all Soldiers as well as maintenance, property, and training responsibilities. The PLs were not the primary operational decision makers of their detached Soldiers. However, they needed to be included in any operational decisions that affect those Soldiers' missions. The main place of duty and the majority of time each day were spent with their Soldiers in order to learn and understand the Soldiers' duties and responsibilities. Other focused areas for the MICO PL include:

Maintenance. The loss or degradation of specialized MI equipment is a commander's critical information requirement to both Battalion and Brigade. Therefore equipment maintenance and status reports were a critical area of emphasis for the PL. Due to the importance of MI assets to tactical operations, constant maintenance status was reportable to the Company Executive Officer (XO) and Commander.

Property. The most arduous and time consuming function as a PL is property accountability. Monthly, all sub-hand receipts are signed from the organizational property book and also from the Theater Provided Equipment book. In an environment of non-standard equipment, constant upgrades, and new equipment fielding amongst combat operations, property requires constant attention and monitoring by the lieutenants.

Training. MI Platoon training needed planning and resourcing, even while deployed. Training requirements include standard Soldier skills such as the APFT and combat lifesaver re-certification, but also MI Theater specific training such as interrogator refresher training. Although in a deployed environment, the PL has the responsibility to ensure that the Soldiers are current on all basic and MOS-specific Soldier training. Company meetings conducted three times a week forced the PLs to track training updates.

Intelligence Operations Officer. As all officers have a responsibility to operations in combat, the second role of the MICO PLs was that of intelligence operations officers. In an effort to streamline intelligence development and awareness for the PLs, a role as a general intelligence operations officer was required. This task allowed the lieutenants to continue to remain vigilant in the current fight and not to bury themselves in administrative functions. Losing touch with reality outside the wire would not only be a disservice to their growth as intelligence officers, but also removes them from involvement in intelligence driven operations. It is essential for the PLs to have current enemy situation knowledge in order to clarify guidance and provide direction to their Soldiers, even those Soldiers not under their direct control. A conscious effort must be made by the PLs to understand the current enemy situation, particularly because within the MICO they are not required to produce products or briefs at Brigade level. The lieutenants track and participate in pertinent intelligence meetings at all echelons, including online collaborative meeting sessions, targeting meetings and Brigade concepts of operation. The lieutenants must be prepared to brief and update the following areas at all times:

- Current/future planned Brigade missions.
- Brigade high value targets (HVTs).
- Detainees of interest.
- Enemy area of operations (AO) assessment.

To ensure compliance, the PLs briefed current operations updates during Company meetings. This effectively ensured they understood what was taking place in the AO and initiated discussion and cross talk between Platoons and sections.

Intelligence Staff Officer. The third and final role of the MICO PLs of 3-3 HBCT was a specific staff area of focus. Somewhat like an additional duty, the lieutenants were also responsible for products, briefings, and decision making in each of their

respective sections. The benefit was two-fold. First, they augmented the Brigade S2 section, an already undermanned section and freed it from additional tasks. Secondly, junior officers were integrated leaders deeper into intelligence operations. In each respective role, the lieutenants answered to another supervisor, not their rater, in order to assist and accomplish those associated missions.

Other MICO PL Positions

During this deployment, the three MICO PLs also wore the hats of the Brigade Linguist Manager, the Brigade ISR Collection Manager, and the Debriefing and Evidence Processing Office (DEPO) OIC.

- **Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) PL Brigade Linguist Manager**

The SIGINT Platoon conducts SIGINT collection and exploitation in support of 3-3 HBCT HVT development, pattern analysis, historical data and trends, confirming/denying enemy activity in the area of responsibility, identifying leadership and cell structure, and confirming/denying presence of foreign fighters in order to provide time sensitive intelligence to 3-3 HBCT maneuver Soldiers.

–SIGINT Platoon Mission Statement

In line with the communications mission of the SIGINT Platoon, this PL doubled as the Brigade Linguist Manager. As the BCT linguist manager, he was responsible for tracking and maintaining constant status reports of the nearly two hundred Brigade linguists. These reports were briefed within the Brigade, at Division, and through the civilian linguist contractor company, L3. The Brigade Linguist manager held weekly meetings with all the Battalion Linguist manager representatives and resourced changing linguist needs based on the Commander's requests and everchanging operations on the battlefield. While working closely with the Brigade operations leadership, and side by side with the L3 manager, everyone worked to anticipate changing linguist requirements based on future mission sets. As the Linguist manager, the PL answered to the Brigade S2 and in many cases the Brigade XO for questions regarding this subject area. The UAS Operations WO1 also augmented this role. This WO was able to add another level of depth and knowledge to coordinate linguist issues when needed. As the Brigade Linguist manager, the lieutenant was able to appreciate the complexities of allocating and distributing a valuable battlefield resource: linguists. The PL was able to grasp an extensive knowledge of the Brigade priorities and remain cognizant of the linguist mission sets and needs within the Brigade's AO.

- **UAS–ISR Collection Manager**

The UAS Platoon conducts 24 hour operations, providing ISR collection and analysis in support of 3-3 HBCT in order to provide situational and tactical awareness, counter-improvised explosive devices missions, counter rocket/mortar missions, troops in contact, downed aircraft recovery, vehicle recovery, confirm/deny battle damage assessment, target development, route reconnaissance, terrain denial, and other ad hoc missions as required in order to provide near real-time direct Imagery Intelligence support to 3-3 HBCT maneuver Soldiers.

–UAS Platoon Mission Statement

While the Platoon executed overhead imagery collection, the UAS PL doubled as the Brigade ISR collection manager responsible for planning, resourcing, and requesting organic and echelons above division ISR assets in concert with BCT missions. He attended the Brigade S3's daily sync huddle and was involved in mission planning and resourcing at the BCT level. Also, by building a firm knowledge base, he was able to anticipate future ISR collection requirements. These ISR requests were filtered from competing Battalion mission sets, formatted, and requested to Division based on priority and allocation. In this role, he worked with the S2 section, but primarily answered to the Brigade S3. This directly involved the PL in tying together the planning and utilization of the UAS mission. Again, in this job, a CW3 back filled in this role by learning the requirements management system and interfacing between the Brigade and Division Collection elements. As the Brigade ISR Manager, this PL was immersed in the operations arena and could directly understand and relay to his Soldiers the task and purpose of every UAS mission.

- **HUMINT PL–DEPO OIC**

The Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Platoon conducts continuous HUMINT collection to 3-3 HBCT through military source operations and interrogation operations in order to support the Commander's decision making process and force protection efforts, provide intelligence to support 3-3 HBCT HVT development,

answer the Commander's priority intelligence requirements, and provide time sensitive intelligence to 3-3 HBCT maneuver Soldiers.

–HUMINT Platoon Mission Statement

The HUMINT PL doubled as the DEPO OIC in support of detainee and interrogation operations. On Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, the DEPO is co-located with the Division Holding Area Annex. The primary mission of the DEPO is to in-process new detainees. However, additional functions of the DEPO include data mining for detainee information, updating detainee folders, providing interrogator support, updating detainee trackers sent to Brigade and Division, and preparing Detainee Review Board packets. This lieutenant oversaw the in-processing of all detainees to include precise documentation such as Coalition apprehension forms, sworn statements, evidence forms, pictures, and sketches. Also, data mining through databases such as The Combined Information Data Network Exchange provides additional information to assist in prosecuting detainees and can assist interrogation operations. This critical mission requires extreme attention to detail, as any mistakes in the detainee packet can seriously hinder proceedings in the Iraqi court process. As the DEPO OIC, the PL was linked directly into detainee operations and assisted in passing detainee information to her own Soldiers, the interrogators. The PL had institutional knowledge of all detainees and operated in conjunction with the interrogation processes.

Conclusion

In order to assist with operational requirements, and also for professional development purposes, the lieutenants of the 3-3 HBCT MICO operated in a tri-role approach during the most recent deployment. In this approach, they were utilized not only as PLs, but also treated as operations officers, and augmented the Brigade in relevant, intelligence staff functions. Although these roles spread them out to multiple arenas and the staff functions maintained a high level visibility at Brigade, the primary mission was the leadership and guidance to a Platoon of Soldiers during combat operations.

By working and interacting in another section, for someone other than their Company Commander, these junior officers were able to gain alternative perspectives. While maintaining loyalty to the MICO, they were forced to maintain constant professionalism with their other bosses and sections they augmented. Working within the Brigade S2 shop also provided connectivity to operations and propagated new ideas while also positively assisting in information flow between two separate, yet intertwined, entities.

In order to maximize the information learned in these additional Staff duties, each officer was required to develop a standard operating procedures (SOP) book for their position and also present a brief to the Company leadership during a Company officer professional development (OPD) session. In some cases, due to the demands of their own specific roles, the lieutenants were unaware of the duties of their fellow PLs. Both the SOP concept and OPD briefs encouraged discussion and the flow of ideas among all officers of the Company.

Finally, by involving the officers more in the fight, they were also able to gain respect and legitimacy in the eyes of their Soldiers. Once they became directly involved in the planning and systems of the Platoon, the Lieutenants were positioned back among their Soldiers. As informed, involved leaders, they gained credibility and ultimately respect, among their subordinates.

In a constantly changing COIN environment, the necessity for well-rounded, versatile, and seasoned Intelligence Officers is evident. The method used by the MICO of 3-3 HBCT is one technique of exposing junior officers to multiple aspects of both direct leadership and staff intelligence knowledge. The endstate was the creation of experienced, innovative, and assertive junior leaders with the capability to conduct enhanced future intelligence driven operations.

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Intelligence Led Operations in Post-Independence Kosovo:

Observations and Lessons Learned



by Lieutenant Colonel Lee Lacy

"One of the lessons learned . . . today's peacekeeping operations are as complex as unconventional combat operations and are best conducted by well-informed and well-prepared forces who are familiar with each other's operations and concepts before they enter the operation area."[1]

Introduction

The last 18 years of history in the nations that formed the former Yugoslavia were tumultuous times, fueled by nationalism, clan wars and simmering medieval era blood feuds between various warring parties. In 2008, the newly independent nation of Kosovo lived up to that reputation and provided a challenging set of problems for Intelligence Section personnel assigned to 35th Infantry Division (Forward), Multi-national Task Force East (MNTF-E), Kosovo Force (KFOR) 9.[2] The U.S. led MNTF-E assumed command of the NATO peacekeeping operation less than two weeks prior to Kosovo wide parliamentary elections and less than 90 days before Kosovo declared itself independent of Serbia.

As the guidon passed between the incoming and outgoing commanders, it is certain many leaders pondered the numerous intelligence gaps that would haunt the G2 over the next nine months. The question that weighed heavily on everyone's mind: Would there be a repeat of the 2004 Kosovo wide riots that caught both the KFOR and the international community by surprise? Additionally, MNTF-E wanted to pinpoint when Kosovo would declare itself independent and how the ethnic Serb population inside and outside Kosovo would react. By late 2007, Kosovo's independence was certain as the Quint[3] became stalemated in negotiations with Serbia and Russia. Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik summed up the European perspective on Kosovo during the Declaration of Independence in February 2008, "The Balkans have already lost too much time. It was necessary to draw a clear bottom line. Now the path is free for the region to free itself from stagnation and start dynamic development anew. The long-term stabilization of the Balkans and its integration in the European Union remains our uppermost goal."[4]

Is U.S. military involvement in Kosovo an anachronism given the current direction of the U.S. Army? Are lessons learned in Kosovo relevant in the current War on Terror? Kosovo is significant for many reasons, the least of which is its potential as a breeding ground for Islamic extremism. According to a U.S. State Department report, ". . . (Kosovo) Provisional Institutions and (the United Nations) monitored non-governmental agencies (NGOs) suspected of funding Islamic extremist and Albanian extremist movements. Officials believed only several of the more than 400 NGOs operating in Kosovo were involved in suspicious activities . . ." Additionally, the report stated, ". . . While NATO has roving teams patrolling the green border right up to the border and administrative boundary lines, terrorists could exploit numerous passable roads leading into Kosovo . . ."[5] Moreover, best practices in a tactical intelligence environment in Kosovo remain important as conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan eventually evolve into some variation of peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Before this transition occurs, intelligence officers should learn from

the KFOR 9 experience and apply the LLs from nearly 13 years of active U.S. involvement in the Balkans. Army leaders should consider dusting off after action reports and opening the LL archives as it relates to intelligence support to peacekeeping/enforcement operations. G2s and J2s in all aspects of the War on Terrorism should reflect on the lessons learned in the Balkans.

Looking back, the overall success of KFOR 9 in accomplishing its mission of keeping a safe and secure environment while ensuring freedom of movement;[6] had its roots in the tough standards established in pre-mission training at Camp Atterbury, Indiana. Aptly put: "Peacekeeping is a team effort and the best teams are those that practiced together before they enter the operations area. That applies as much to intelligence as it does to any other aspect of military operations."[7]

The principles put in place by TF leadership and First Army trainers paved the way for the formidable challenges that lay ahead for TF Falcon in the autumn of 2007 and winter/spring of 2008.

Pre-Mission Training

Mobilization is one of the most arduous tasks for an Army National Guard unit, especially one as diverse as the 35th Infantry Division (Forward). The final tally of troop contributing states and territories was 27, along with a sizable addition of troops from the U.S. Army Reserve and a small contingent from the U.S. Air Force. Within the G2 section there was a cohesive team, many of whom served together during Stabilization Force 13 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite the promising team assembled, little could prepare the G2 section for the challenge of delivering predictive and actionable intelligence to the Commanding General (CG). The Kosovo mission was as complex as an intelligence mission could be, taking into account the many dimensions of economics, politics, religion, history, and geography. On top of this was over 600 years of conflict between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs.

The training started with a decision making exercise (DME) to refresh Military Decision Making Process skills and build unity between the Command Group and the coordinating staff. Unfortunately, it was realized too late into the DME that not enough G2 section personnel were present to make the DME a success. Unfortunately, skilled members among the G2 staff such as the G2 Plans Officer, Analysis Control Element (ACE) Chief, the ACE Collection Manager, and various intelligence analysts were mobilized late and could not attend the DME. The first LL was to assemble the right team for the job. As a result, the G2, ACE Chief and Deputy G2 were relegated to intelligence analyst jobs instead of assuming their traditional roles in managing the intelligence cycle and maintaining quality. The DME, while an overall successful training exercise, would have been a resounding success with other critical team members.

A few weeks following the DME, Command Post Exercise (CPX) 1 took place with the complete G2 team. In the days prior to CPX 1, trainers from First Army taught refresher classes on a variety of tactical intelligence topics. Some of the classes such as those related to databases and other practical knowledge base tools were of value, while other topics had nothing to do with the Balkans environment we were about to encounter. While well-intentioned, some of the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) from Iraq and Afghanistan were of little use. The G2 and ACE Chief specifically requested mentors from First Army Division East G2 to assist in the learning process. A dose of humility went a long way in overcoming our steep learning curve. The First Army mentors assisted the G2 and ACE Chief in working through the challenges presented to the intelligence section by an analysis and intelligence driven CG. For example, the ACE struggled in CPX 1 when it provided a good intelligence summary of events that took place during the training scenarios. The information missed the mark in enabling the CG to understand what the ACE would predict for future events. There was a sense the ACE lacked confidence in making bold, decisive and predictive statements regarding fused intelligence. This was attributed to lack of experience, but certainly not for lack of talent. First Army trainers were especially helpful in offering proven techniques for collating fused intelligence and drawing logical conclusions. First Army provided a patient guiding hand, but it was the determination and exceptional leadership of the ACE Chief who implemented the necessary changes. The ACE Chief was the standard bearer for integrity and hard work. He was respected by his subordinates and had their loyalty.

Another challenge during pre-mission training was overcoming hesitancy to provide predictive analysis. TTPs developed by the end of CPX 3 were validated at Camp Atterbury and sustained throughout the nine-month mission. The process for fusing intelligence into a tool for decision making was one of the great achievements of the G2 section. The process came about because the detail of intelligence analysis was not delivered during the daily ACE Brief to the CG. Clearly the G2 section was afraid of predicting future events for fear of being wrong. This fear showed in the lackluster intelligence analysis that merely recounted events rather predicting competitor's future courses of action. The ability of the G2 Section to see its flaws and self-correct was phenomenal in the progression from "untrained" to "trained" by the end of CPX 3. With encouragement from the Deputy Commander for Maneuver (DCM), the Chief of Staff (COS) and the G3; the G2 section conquered this fear and overhauled the ACE Brief and the methods by which intelligence was fused.

The first obstacle in the ACE Brief makeover was to assemble a team with the most knowledge of events in the area of operations (AO). With assistance from the DCM, battalion TF S2 officers were required to meet, daily, with the ACE Fusion section. In addition, either the ACE Chief or ACE Battle Captain visited the S2s in their Command Posts to gain situational awareness and exchange intelligence. Often, the ACE Chief, Fusion OIC or G2 Chief of Operations accompanied S2s in their AOs to gain first hand situational understanding. The COS and G3 assisted in gathering various coordinating staff officers such as the G7 and G9 to participate in a weekly fusion meeting, the G2/S2 Synchronization Meeting. It immediately became a battle rhythm meeting that was maintained throughout the mission. The meeting was facilitated by the ACE Chief and assisted by the Fusion Section OIC. The rules of the meeting were informal. Everyone had an equal voice regardless of rank, although the ACE Chief and G2 had the final approval on intelligence analysis presented to the CG or KFOR J2. The format of the meeting was characterized by unrestrained and open discussion that led to conclusions that were presented during the ACE Brief the following day. Often the discussions were time-lined and tracked in a flow chart in order to understand the complicated operational landscape of Kosovo and major regional players such as Serbia, Russia and Macedonia.[8] Often there were major disagreements among those present which benefited the G2 as it served to refine the final product presented to the CG. Disagreements were not destructive as they were tempered by teamwork and professional interaction among the General Staff.

In both the training environment and during the actual mission, the G2/S2 Synchronization Meeting was immediately successful and often resulted in actionable intelligence. It was easier for the ACE to get past its initial inclination to be shy about predicting future events when preliminary predictive analysis was validated by group concerns. The success of the fusion meeting presented another problem, this time for the G3. Shortly after assuming the mission, the ACE began turning out actionable intelligence that required an operational response. For example, the ACE analyzed archived historical data regarding weapons caches that were prevalent during the 1999 conflict. The historical data was examined in the context of predicting likely areas for present weapons caches. The resulting analysis prompted the G3 to plan and execute operations to find and eradicate the weapons caches. As a result, the G3 was able to properly allocate operational resources. *The role of intelligence in this operation cannot be understated. Intelligence was the pathfinder that led operational decision makers to the objective.*

Intelligence Led, IO Driven Operations

Not all intelligence analysis resulted in kinetic operations. The most pressing issue facing MNTF-E was how to maintain calm during the mid-November 2007 Kosovo-wide parliamentary elections. The ACE accurately laid out a near term analysis for the elections with most likely and most dangerous courses of actions. Based on ACE analysis, very powerful tools orchestrated by the G7 Information Operations (IO) were leveraged against the set of problems presented for the election. The measured use of IO became a common theme throughout the mission and was instrumental in the overall success of accomplishing the mission. The G7 was a willing partner with the G2 and used ACE analytical products extensively to enhance proposed targets presented to the CG. Information was obtained actively and passively through various channels. Active gathering was through traditional collectors such as Human Intelligence, Imagery

Intelligence, and patrol reports. Passive information was obtained through various staff elements such as the G7, G9 and Regional Liaison Monitoring Teams (RLMTs).[9] The G9 had an outstanding relationship with NGOs such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and summarized information from bi-lateral meetings from such sources. In addition, both the G7 and G9 gathered and analyzed information from diverse groups as municipal leaders, politicians, and the police. Moreover, the G9 was a conduit to information from LMTs, which were off limits to overt intelligence taskings.

In a supporting effort, the MNTF-E Joint Implementation Commission (JIC)[10] was the best source of information on the Serbian Armed Forces. The G7, G9, and JIC were enthusiastic supporters of using intelligence analysis to lead the IO campaign. Overall, intelligence led, IO driven operations were effectively used to counter the challenges presented by Kosovo elections, the Serbian Presidential election, the Kosovo Declaration of Independence and finally the official implementation of the Kosovo Constitution. The G7 carefully considered current intelligence when considering any changes in the IO campaign and used intelligence to shape targeting meetings, which produced IO themes and messages for the CG to approve. Once the IO themes and messages were approved presence patrols, key TF leaders, LMT and G9/S9 personnel carried the messages to the local population. This interaction with ordinary citizens and their leaders built confidence in the local population in regard to the role of KFOR. This open communication allowed the G9 and S9 to return with information that fed into the G2's overall assessment.

The positive results of this interaction were only realized when the violence that took hold in the French sector did not materialize in the Serbian enclaves of MNTF-E. The calculated use of intelligence led, IO driven operations resulted in a calm and stable environment in MNTF-E AO. The MNTF-E sector remained tense, but the lack of significant violence was a by-product of carefully planned and executed IO campaigns. This was in stark contrast to the harsh violence encountered by the French led peacekeeping force in the Serbian dominant enclaves in northern Kosovo.

Foundations of Success

The relationship between the G2 and G3 was critical to mission success. Early on, a dilemma presented itself. Actionable intelligence demanded an operational response. Very quickly the G3 and G2 found a way to bridge the gap that divided the two sections. The stop gap measure was the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Decision Matrix (Figure 1) that showed ACE identified targets, overlaid with operations to service those targets.

Operation Wagon Wheel ISR Decision Matrix

Priority	Problem Set	Target Description	Target Number	Asset 1	Asset 2	Asset 3	Task	Purpose	Coverage	PIR	NAI	End State
1	Weapons smuggling along ABL and MK border near ZEGRA and DEBELDE	NCGs	ACE29	KPS	Patrols	AVN	Co-opt / Isolate	Deny Smuggling	1 OCT-3 OCT	1, 4	S1,2, 3,4, 5,6	Deny Weapons
2	"Human Chain" protesters impede freedom of movement in and out of CBS during the Commander's Reception	NCGs	ACE30	KPS	MPs	AVN	Influence / Control	Freedom of Movement	2 OCT	1, 2		Freedom of Movement
3	Weapon shipments along MSR from VITINA/VITI to KAMENICA/KAMENICE and GNJILANE/GJLAN	NCGs	ACE24	KPS	Patrols	AVN	Isolate / Deny	Deny Smuggling	1 OCT-2 OCT	1, 4	S1,2, 3,4, 5,6	Deny Movement of Weapons
4	Continuing infrastructure deficiencies throughout the AO	NCGs	ACE31	CA	LMT	Patrols	Area Assessment	Provide Basic Services	2 OCT	1, 3		Gov in providing services

Figure 1. ISR Decision Matrix

The operations could be either kinetic or non-kinetic in nature. The ISR Decision Matrix was the embodiment of intelligence fusion in a matrix format, depicting predictive analysis merged with operations. The end result was the decision making tool for the CG to set intelligence collection priorities and establish operational guidance. The ISR Decision Matrix emerged out of necessity to show the CG how actionable intelligence was being responded to. This was the beginning of the evolution of the ACE Brief into

an Operations and Intelligence Brief. The ISR Decision Matrix caused the ACE to evolve from giving uninformative briefings such as recounting the events of the day. With a focus mechanism, the ACE began to effectively provide the CG with intelligence from which he could make sound operational decisions. Additionally, this alerted the G7 and G9 sections to be acutely aware as to their roles as passive collectors. The G3, G7, and G9 maintained a keen understanding that the success or failure of the G2 rested on the quality of intelligence they fed the ACE. The cohesion among the G3, G7, and G9 was one of the great success stories that began in pre-mission training and was sustained throughout the deployment.

For example, the G2 and G9 found creative ways to satisfy the CG's requirement for accurate and timely information during presidential elections in Serbia in February 2008. The G2 predicted the election would serve as an indicator to indicate when the Kosovo provisional government would declare its independence. Knowledge of this event would give the MNTF-E CG a decisive edge in responding to threats to a safe and secure environment mandated to KFOR by UN Security Resolution 1244. The G2 and G9 developed an election reporting system consisting of simple communication, using two mobile telephones and electronic mail. The G9, Deputy G9, and an interpreter monitored Serbian broadcast television from a restaurant in a Serbian community not far from Camp Bondsteel. Proper security measures were coordinated beforehand to insure the safety of the G9 team. As soon as Serbian television broadcasted election updates, the G9 called the G2 on her mobile telephone with simultaneous translations. The G2 transmitted the data and analysis as it was received into electronic mail messages.

In a parallel effort, the G2 Open Source Intelligence Cell translated and disseminated news from Serbian Internet media outlets and western news agencies. Electronic mail was sent through routine distribution channels in the TF Headquarters, but included the KFOR J2, the U.S. mission in Pristina, U.S. Embassy Macedonia and the EUCOM U.S. National Intelligence Cell-Pristina. The MNTF-E CG kept up by electronic mail and periodic calls or visits to the G2. By 2200, election results were declared and the CG ended his day with timely information of this pivotal event. The next morning the G2 and G9 re-capped the election for the CG and key staff in a special topic briefing. This set into motion a series of MNTF-E operational events and responses leading to the February 17th Declaration of Independence. The timeliness of the intelligence and the decisive operational response made a difference in the approach to this event. It was part of the overall plan to stay one step ahead of potential troublemakers. The election TTP was repeated during the May Serbian parliamentary elections with similar successful results. The Kosovo environment and lack of intelligence collection resources necessitated creativity at all levels in order to meet the CGs intent.

The relationships between the G2 and S2s enhanced intelligence sharing and timely cross talk. In one instance the Aviation TF S2 researched an ethnic Albanian extremist linked to a terrorist group, which spun off into several operations to counter extremism. This operation involved many intelligence organizations and developed a lasting partnership with the KFOR Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) and a UN counter-terrorism unit. The Aviation S2 was welcomed as part of the G2 team and given the opportunity to fuse intelligence with the ACE. The S2 eventually made the presentation to the CG and KFOR JIOC, which provided further encouragement to pursue other similar projects.

Observations

The training at Camp Atterbury, Indiana built the intelligence team. First Army played a major part of this success. The pressure exerted by the worst case scenarios tested our resolve to work under pressure and exceed the expectations of the CG. Many lessons carried over from training made the overall mission a success. Some observations were:

- **Use Staff Resources**. Listen to your best non-intelligence collectors who are often among the staff. The G9 and DCM had outgoing personalities and knew international community leaders on a first name basis. Early in the mission the G2 made a decision to de-brief the CG, G9, DCM and others because of the intelligence value of their bilateral meetings. Value was found in having the G2X teach tactical questioning TTPs to non-traditional intelligence collectors. The G2 leveraged its Strategic Debriefer to quickly get information of intelligence value into the system. Reports of the bilateral meetings of key

staff members with key local leaders made a big difference in understanding complicated and divisive politics of the local area of operations. Although the G2 was careful never to task some resources such as the Chaplain, members of the ACE were, nevertheless, voracious readers of his reports.

- **Pick the Right Team.** Develop a productive and professional relationship with the G3. The G2 should maintain daily contact with the G3 and respect the G3's position. The key to this relationship is placing the right intelligence officer as the G2 Chief of Operations. The KFOR 9 field grade officer selected for this position was a former armor officer who understood intelligence as it related to maneuver operations.
- **Collection Planning.** Press the CG to be specific about his collection priorities. The development of the G2 Collection Focus Chart made sure priorities were in check and precious resources were not wasted. Demonstrate initiative rather than be reactive. The G2 must personally own priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and present them to the CG. The KFOR mission operational tempo dictated the G2 update the PIRs at least every 90 days. Use predictive analysis and trends to anticipate changes to PIR. The G2 accurately predicted the Kosovo Declaration of Independence to within 48 hours, which allowed the G2 to draft new PIRs ahead of the violence that followed almost immediately.
- **Develop Professional Relationships.** Relationship building is key to multiplying intelligence resources in your area of operations. Key relationships included G2 officers in adjacent multinational task forces and specialized units such as the Great Britain led ISR TF and the Italian led Multinational Specialized Unit. Always share appropriate intelligence and never expect anything in return. Keep your promises. In addition, develop relationships with the U.S. Embassy, especially the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) and the Political/Economics Chief. The DAO at Embassy Skopje facilitated a monthly meeting of the Macedonian Ministry of Defense for the purpose of sharing intelligence of mutual interest. NGOs such as OSCE played a large part in meeting collection objectives, but be careful about overwhelming them with collectors.

NATO Italian peacekeepers arrive to reinforce French troops in Northern Kosovo. *Photo courtesy NATO KFOR.*

Conclusion

The period of history KFOR 9 witnessed in Kosovo was unlike any other. The 35th Infantry Division (Forward) was present during the birth of Europe's newest nation and was on hand for the intense fallout among ethnic Serbs. The nine months in the U.S. sector were relatively calm even though the AO was home to the largest ethnic Serbian population outside the bitterly disputed north Kosovo ethnic Serbian communities. MNTF-E was successful because it sustained an intelligence and operations formula it developed while preparing for the mission. The pressure to "be right" or to "hit another home run" all of the time was intense. Not all of the G2s predictive analysis was right, but it was mostly timely and accurate during critical events such as the Kosovo Elections and the Declaration of Independence. It was absolutely critical for the G2 to make predictions ranging from one week to 90 days in length.

The G2 section's worth as intelligence professionals was only as good as the ability to make predictions. Operational decisions were never made in a vacuum. The fusion of actionable intelligence with sound operational decisions kept MNTF-E one step in front of various competitors, trouble makers and even enemies, all who had various agendas. The pragmatic approach to intelligence analysis assisted operational decision makers from never having to react too late to a crisis. This is the lesson learned for the evolution of future operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Endnotes

1.Captain Carl Otis Schuster, USN (Retired), "Intelligence Support to Peacekeeping Operations" at www.carleton.ca/csds/pki/doc/Schuster.doc.

2. MNTF-E KFOR 9 was a brigade size TF with a General Staff. The headquarters was provided by the 35th ID which underwent transformation in 2006. The G7 was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Operations and the G9 was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil-Military Operations, created under transformation.

3. The Quint is an informal organization consisting of the diplomatic representatives of U.S., Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy who collaborate on issues related to Kosovo.

4. "Letter on Kosovo's Recognition Signed," *Austrian Foreign Ministry,* 28 February 2008 at http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/news/presseaussendungen/2008/plassnik-schreiben-ueber-anerkennung-des-kosovo-unterzeichnet.html.

5. "Country Reports on Terrorism," *U.S. State Department,* 30 April 30 2007 at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82732.htm.

6. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) directed the KFOR mission to maintain a safe and secure environment while maintaining the freedom of movement among the population.

7. Schuster, "Intelligence Support to Peacekeeping Operations."

8. The Republic of Macedonia is also known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

9. Following Kosovo wide riots in 2004, KFOR established the RLMT. The LMT members spent their days among the local population building relationships with community members, specifically political, religious, and business leaders. Additionally, LMT members attended governmental meetings and liaise with local police, schools, NGOs and members of the IC. The LMT purpose was to gain an understanding of the socio-economic and political situation in an assigned geographical community in order to assist commanders and staffs in assessing social tensions and points of friction that may cause an outbreak in violence. In MNTF-E, the LMT was a company sized element.

10. The JIC was an entity set up under UNSCR 1244 to monitor the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) that separated Kosovo from Serbia. It served as a liaison between the VF and MNTF-E. In addition to information exchanges and bi-lateral meetings, they conducted joint patrols of the ABL.

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by Major (P) Brian Dunmire

Introduction

The need for strategic intelligence analysis in the Army is pressing, vital, and necessary for our ability to defend and advance the interests of the U.S. The Army's experience during the Long War makes clear the importance of accurately discerning the emerging threats and opportunities for our nation, placing them in context, and turning this knowledge into actionable intelligence for the policy makers. This article examines Army strategic intelligence and how the Army has attempted within the commissioned officer ranks to address the critical need for skilled strategic intelligence leaders and analysts.

The belief held after the Cold War ended was that the onward march of history was determined, a march to a world that was peaceful and democratic. We now know this is not the case. A senior Army intelligence officer recently stated that "during the Cold War, we already had the context, and we just needed the data. Now, we need to continue to define the context so we can create knowledge for decision makers." Threats to the U.S. and its interests continue to evolve, from the rise of complex transnational, religiously inspired terrorists groups and ideologies to the resurgence of Russia in invading its neighbors. This complex and changing environment requires insightful analysis buttressed by outstanding critical thinking. The accurate assessment of the strategic environment is the core competency of strategic intelligence.

The need for strategic analysis is a continuing challenge for an Army consumed by current operations in the high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) wartime environment. The Army continues to suffer significant shortages of intelligence officers, leading to many units focusing their field grade intelligence officers in operations and placing more junior officers in the analytical positions. In a recent 2008 monograph from the School for Advanced Military Studies; Daniel Allen wrote that "the focus on analysis in today's Army is absent."[1] Congress has criticized the Intelligence Community (IC) for a lack of imagination in the wake of 9/11 and the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) reports, largely due to poor analysis. Intelligence failures of this magnitude cannot happen again. The response to these intelligence failures has led to the development of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise concept, a unifying document that gives broad strategic guidance to the intelligence agencies within the Department of Defense (DOD), and Army intelligence is a crucial part of that. This article will explore how Army Intelligence is attempting to solve the strategic intelligence analysis problem.

Strategic Intelligence

What is the purpose for intelligence at the strategic level? Mark Lowenthal states clearly that intelligence is to support policy makers. He argues that intelligence at the strategic level exists for four major reasons:

1. Avoiding strategic surprise.
2. Providing long-term expertise.
3. Supporting the policy process.
4. Maintaining the secrecy of information, needs and methods.[2]

Renowned intelligence analyst Cynthia Grabo goes further, explaining strategic intelligence is vital in order to provide strategic warning to senior leaders. She writes that "Strategic warning is not the same as current intelligence, not just a compilation of facts."[3] Dr. Thomas Fingar, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, observed in

September 2008 that a flood of reporting creates challenges for turning this data into analysis.[4] Grabo notes that the simple act of collection does not equal analysis, it is the critical thinking of the analyst that makes meaning out of the reporting and turns it into a judgment. Strategic warning depends on a dedicated and exhaustive research effort by the analyst that leads to an assessment of probabilities of threat action and reaches a judgment for the policy maker. If intelligence has been effective, intelligence judgments create conviction in the mind of the policy maker that results in action. This is what must be done to be considered effective.

Strategic intelligence is in support of senior policy makers, such as the senior leadership of the Army, combatant commanders, the DOD as a whole, the U.S. government, and our Allies and Coalition partners. The focus of this effort comes directly from **JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**. JP 1-02 delineates four levels of operations: national strategic, theater strategic, operational, and tactical.[5] Army strategic intelligence, *by definition*, directly supports the decision makers at the national and theater strategic levels and enables operations at the operational and tactical level. The national and theater strategic headquarters and analytic centers are special purpose organizations, and are not prone to assignment to different geographic areas of responsibility. This is in contrast to Army-specific units at the operational and tactical level, which are general purpose formations that can be used in all potential theaters of operation.

The education, skills, and experience of an analyst are crucial to provide tailored decision making support to senior decision makers. It is impossible for our combined analytical knowledge to be fully comprehensive, and the limits to our knowledge must be acknowledged. Strategic analytical work focuses on identifying both opportunities and threats to U.S. national policies within an environment of uncertainty and the determining the intentions and capabilities of our enemies. In order to provide analytical insights and judgments, strategic analysts examine how countries and other organizations employ all the elements of national power in the effort to achieve their national objectives.

Importantly, analysts must understand the role of leadership–actions flow from decisions, not decisions from actions. The decision to use force by a power then leads to changes in diplomatic behavior, changes to foreign policy, and the use of public diplomacy. Propaganda and disinformation can and will be used to advance or mask the strategic and tactical preparations for enemy use of force against our interests. This flow of information, both actual and disinformation exposes the target intelligence agencies and the policymakers they serve to denial and deception operations. This is a crucial issue because the goal of a deception effort is to make the target, our policy makers, make the wrong choice. History is replete with nations that are deceived by their foes in order to gain an advantage, and the attacks of 9/11 or WMD analysis of Iraq in 2003 are just a small sample of effective denial and deception. By influencing policy makers to be very sure of their wrong decision, deception must be guarded against at all times. Strategic analysts help defeat deception by helping create quality knowledge for decision makers.

Strategic intelligence enables the Army to fulfill its part in developing a coherent outlook at the policy level. One of the key roles of strategic intelligence is assisting the Army in procuring and building the Army necessary to support U.S. national objectives, both now and in the future. The DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system requires that funds are programmed for major weapons programs in a seven year financial plan followed by the budgeters' two year input for Congress. The combined informed input of the combatant commands, the services, and the senior civilian leadership is vital to ensure we are procuring the Army necessary to achieve our national objectives. Force structure follows doctrinal development, so strategic intelligence is necessary to ensure that the land power force is fully integrated into the Joint vision of the use of military power.

Successful examples of strategic planning include the implementation of the first peacetime draft in September 1940 which enabled the Army to build the 90 division force that carried the U.S. to victory in 1944-45 and the building of the Airland Battle Army, first conceptualized in the 1970s and which is the basis of the Army today. It remains to be seen if the Army's Future Combat System, which was conceived

in the aftermath of the Kosovo campaign of 1999, will be flexible enough to address the threats to, and opportunities for, the national interest for the next twenty to thirty years. To be successful, Army strategic intelligence needs to be fully fluent in Army requirements and policies in order to effectively represent Army interests in the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Allied, and Coalition environments. Short-term, single assignment exposure is not enough.

Analysis is the product that makes all the intelligence collection operations worthwhile. The former Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms (1966 to 1973) noted that despite all the attention focused on the operational (collection) side of intelligence, analysis is the core of the process to inform decision makers.[6] Intelligence is just one element in a stream of information available to policy makers. The IC can make the argument that it is uniquely distinctive from all others due to the unique nature of its product. Intelligence products are only valuable if they are outstanding based on merits and quality, not simply because they are exotic.[7] Intelligence can be exceptionally value added to the consumer because of its timeliness, its objectivity, quality, and its tailored output *specific* to the decision maker's needs. As such, the products produced by strategic intelligence officers are different in scope, scale, and focus than for the tactical or operational commander.

Current intelligence is vital to the operational commander, designated for this discussion (JP 1-02) as the Joint task force level and below conducting a campaign. This type of intelligence is the product most in demand by tactical and operational commanders, and as such, often gets the majority of the available intelligence resources. However, the focus on the current often serves senior policy makers poorly. The reason for this is that adequate warning must be given to policy makers for them to both decide upon and then implement strategic plans and policies.[8] Lowenthal argues that *"crisis-driven requirements represent the ultimate victory of the current over long-range intelligence needs."*[9] It is long-range planning that gives us victory in the long run. At the end of the day, this is the value added by strategic intelligence.

Strategic Intelligence in the Army

So, now that the requirement for strategic intelligence has been clearly explained, the examination of strategic intelligence in the Army can be explained. How has Army Intelligence addressed this problem? The problem of strategic intelligence in the Army focuses on two main points. First, the challenge of creating a cadre of strategic intelligence professionals that will be experts in their field and will represent the Army's interests in the Joint, Interagency, and intergovernmental environments. Second, to address the long-term Army intelligence manning problem that continues to leave Military Intelligence (MI) short hundreds of intelligence officers at the senior ranks and cripples its ability to focus on analytical products.

The enduring issue of how the Army creates strategic intelligence analysts has plagued the MI Corps for the past twenty years. The need for skilled strategic intelligence analysts has been constant. The problem has been how to acquire strategic intelligence officers and then how to professionally develop them. The first attempt in the modern era to create a corps of strategic analysts was the Area of Concentration (AOC) 35B Strategic Intelligence Officer from the 1970s. These were MI basic branch officers (hereafter addressed as Branch 35 officers) who were designated to be strategic analysts, but still had to fill all the basic branch required positions like an AOC 35D All-Source Intelligence Officer. This method failed for two reasons: if 35Bs were serving as battalion executive officers (XOs), S3s, or commanders, they were not sharpening their strategic intelligence analysis for those four years. Worse, if they did the assignments as strategic intelligence officers, they were passed over for promotion for not being XOs, S3s, or battalion commanders because only these positions were designated as branch-qualifying positions.

MI/Branch 35 Intelligence (MI/Br 35) officer training and assignments are optimized for service in Army general purpose organizations. Historically, the focus of assignments for MI/Br 35 field grade officers reflects a distinct command-centric focus. Language training was not incorporated into most MI/Br 35 officer training because of both the operational focus of MI and the need to be able to easily assign intelligence officers to commands in different theaters. Key positions for MI/Br 35 officers are all in general purpose Army forces (Corps and below) with Centrally Selected List (CSL) positions for colonels (COLs)

as brigade commanders and lieutenant colonels (LTCs) as battalion commanders. Recently, senior intelligence staff officer billets, such as division G2s, were also added to the CSL roster, largely in response to the deactivation of the divisional intelligence battalions and the desire to maintain a robust pool of CSL-select officers.

For majors, XO and S3 are primarily key and developmental positions, with the relatively recent additions of brigade S2 and ACE Chief. It is only in the past three years that being the senior intelligence officer in an Army unit has been explicitly considered key and developmental. The 2007 version of **DA Pam 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management**, was the first time strategic intelligence positions at Theater Army and above were considered key and developmental for basic branch officers. The relatively recent recognition of analytical positions being developmental for MI/Br 35 officers is indicative of the previous collection and command focus of the basic branch.

The rotational system associated with the professional development model militates against basic branch intelligence officers becoming dedicated analysts. Strongly performing intelligence field grade officers will only spend at most four years out of thirteen in any type of analytical position if they desire to become competitive for brigadier general (BG). The remainder of the time is consumed by CSL positions at the LTC and COL level (4 years), key and developmental time as a major (2 to 3 years), and professional development such as Army's Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Program and Senior Service College (2 years). Injected into this timeline the MI leadership wants to expose as many CSL-select MI/Br 35 officers to the Joint environment to expand their professional expertise and to qualify as many as possible for the one or two BG promotions available each year. This has significant impacts for the manning of the force at the senior levels.

Basic branch intelligence career progression and rotational assignments were and are made more challenging due to the problem of the basic branch being structurally undermanned. MI/Br 35 accessions are based on the number of company-grade officer billets only, not based on the demand for field grade officers. As far back as 1997, MI was short over 300 field grade officers to fill its upper level billets. There were and are mathematically more field grade billets than the company grade base can create. The branch detail program is designed to bring captains into MI because there are not enough lieutenant positions to grow the captains. We will see the functional area program is designed to have the same effect for field grade officers. The structural inability for MI/Br 35 to grow enough field grade officers continues to this day, creating significant shortages that have to be managed by the Human Resources Command (HRC) and commanders in the field. The Army manning guidance (greatly simplified) directs that deployable units are filled first, then Joint units, then all remaining units. The remaining units are usually units such as U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and the theater Army headquarters. This is the reason why INSCOM and the theater Army headquarters remain habitually understaffed, as well as non-essential Joint positions. The shortage of MI/Br 35 field grade officers is, at the end of the day, mostly a structural issue.

What Was the Fix to the Strategic Intelligence Problem?

The Army Intelligence leadership recognized the structural problem ten years ago. LTG Kennedy, Deputy Chief of Staff, G2; LTG Ohle, Deputy Chief of Staff, G1; MG Maude, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G1; MG Thomas, Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, and MG Noonan, Commander, INSCOM agreed to create the Functional Area (FA) 34 (hereafter addressed as MI/FA 34) in early 1997. MG Thomas was clear that FA 34s were MI Officers and would be full members of the MI Corps.[10] The goals were to enable MI/Br 35 to fill the tactical and operational intelligence positions, allow enough MI/Br 35 officers to gain Joint qualification, and solve the strategic intelligence officer professional development problem. The accession rules for functional area field grade officers are based on field grade billets, not on company grade billets like a basic branch. The more billets that are coded for the functional area, the more field grade officers are accessed into Army Intelligence.

To take advantage of this process MG Thomas, with LTC (now MG) Custer as the action officer and the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI), hosted a conference in 1997 that was attended by

all major intelligence agencies, Joint and theater Army commands, and the major Army commands to implement the decision. Over 1,400 MI field grade billets were reviewed, and as a result of this conference, 297 theater and strategic intelligence billets were directed by MG Thomas to be recoded from 35B to 34A. This recoding:

- Matched the necessary skill set to the duty position.
- Provided an accession base to bring in new field grade officers.
- Relieved MI/Br 35 of having to dedicate such a large portion of its field grade population to Joint assignments.
- Enabled the basic branch to utilize MI field grade officers in key and developmental assignments at INSCOM and the theater Army level while enabling high performing MI/Br 35 to get Joint qualification.

The theater-strategic level was designated as the mixing point between MI/Br 35 and MI/FA 34. In addition to these, another fifty strategic intelligence officer billets that were split coded 35/48 in the Directorate of Analysis inside the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) were coded FA 48, Foreign Area Officer, to allow the field to build its base of accessions and to take advantage of many FAOs being former MI/Br 35 officers.

OCMI developed a comprehensive professional and educational development program for the newly created Strategic Intelligence Officer Functional Area to ensure its officers were well prepared to be the Army Intelligence's representatives at the strategic level. At Fort Huachuca, Arizona, the new MI/FA 34 attends the Strategic Intelligence Officer Course, a seven-week course on Army-specific intelligence activities and doctrine from brigade through Theater level. MI/FA 34s then attended CGSC (now ILE-Common Core) for their basic Army field grade training and education. They also attend the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC) to achieve a Master's Degree in Strategic Intelligence,[11] which provides strategic level analytical education. and then most attend the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JPME II) to get fully trained and educated to be a Joint field grade officer. The officers that go through this comprehensive program are exceptionally well prepared to serve in the nominative strategic-level assignments that are the norm for MI/FA 34.

The MI/FA 34 program was also designed to solve the chronic, long-standing problem in Army Intelligence by bringing officers from other branches into Intelligence. A new MI/FA 34 is designated at the seven-year mark in their career, only three years after branch-detail officer moves from their basic branch to MI/Br 35. The major career experiential difference between MI/FA 34 and branch-detail MI/Br 35 officers is that MI/FA 34 will have commanded companies in a different branch and not served as a battalion or brigade S2 by the time they are promoted to major. A key point of the functional area program is that MI/FA 34s do not compete for MI/Br 35 CSL positions, such as battalion command or Division G2. As is, competition and manning remains a problem in MI/Br 35, and it directly impacts analysis. Historically, there are too many MI/Br 35 officers competing for too few CSL billets. For most branches, about 15 percent of a year group is offered CSL opportunities. In MI/Br 35, there is about a 7 percent selection rate due to the relatively small number of CSL billets. In order to be competitive, MI/Br 35 officers tend to focus on intelligence operations assignments, such as XO, S3, or other positions so they are well positioned for command positions. This structural orientation forces MI/Br 35 officers away from analytical positions. MI/FA 34 is designed to resolve that issue by eliminating competing for command CSL positions.

The foresight of the Army Intelligence leadership created FA 34 as it is today. There are now more field grade MI/FA 34 officers in the force than there are field grade officers authorized in INSCOM. MI/FA 34 officers serve in positions from the Theater Army level up to the White House. FA 34's ability to access new field grades into the intelligence force cannot be underestimated. MI/FA 34 has the highest rate of fill of any functional area. Nearly 250 officers per year group compete for selection into MI/FA 34 every year. Over 150 officers from other branches, the equivalent fill of ten combat divisions of intelligence officers, have become MI/FA 34s. If this had not been done, Army Intelligence would have been very hard pressed to sustain itself under the strain of seven years of war.



Figure 1. Strategic Intelligence vs. MI/Branch 35 Career Progression

The promotion and formal professional development problem for strategic intelligence officers appears to be solved (See Figure 1). Officers that were chosen to become FA 34s as junior majors are now being selected for Senior Service College and promotion to colonel. From a quality perspective, MI/FA 34s have to perform at a high level of proficiency over their entire career because the vast majority of their assignments are nominative assignments. MI/FA 34s, in conjunction with the FA 59 Strategists and FA 48 FAOs, help form the "strategic triumvirate" of strategic intelligence analysis, plans and policy, and "global scouts" forward to provide long-term plans and policy support to decision makers. The program works, and is greatly value added to the Army in specific and the IC in general.

However, the implementation of MG Thomas' plan was not fully followed through. Shortly after the recoding of the 297 billets in 1997, follow-on leadership allowed the uncoordinated recoding of over 150 MI/FA 34 billets back to MI/Br 35. This recoding was the equivalent of adding ten combat division equivalents of field grade requirements back to the MI/Br 35 structure without the accessions to support it during a time of war. The recoding of most of the billets in INSCOM and the Theater Armies increased the demand on MI/Br 35 beyond what the branch can support. This failure of followership undid half of the program. The primary reason for this recoding was the desire of leaders at the O-6 level to bring officers they were personally comfortable with to the Theater level without realizing the cost to the force as a whole. OCMI at Fort Huachuca was not able to track the changes because the positions, flipped at the Joint level, were often changed within the Army G1 without its input, and the theater Army headquarters unit's proponent is Fort Leavenworth, not Fort Huachuca. OCMI could only track the changes after they went through, which put Fort Huachuca at a 2 to 6 year lag behind changes being made in the field. The MI/FA 34 and MI/Br 35 assignment officers at HRC were split up into two different divisions (Functional Area and Combat Support Divisions), so neither knew the impact of the gradual recoding of the billets in the field.



Figure 2. Army Intelligence Recoding Impact (As of June 2007)

The cost of this uncoordinated recoding has been high to Army Intelligence. First, the recoding reduced the intake of new MI/FA 34 officers from the desired 30 per year to 10 per year. The original 297 billets would have been completely filled by 2006, which would have meant that Army Intelligence as a whole would have been at 100 percent for all billets and made it much easier to address the taskings of the War on Terrorism. The turning away of the equivalent of ten combat divisions of intelligence field grade officers has had a tremendous negative impact on the Army Intelligence force as a whole, especially in its ability to respond rapidly to the growth of both the tactical army and the need to regenerate the Human Intelligence capabilities. The basic branch remains short, on average 150 field grade intelligence officers on an annual basis.

Second, the increased demand of wartime requirements and unanticipated inflation of MI/Br 35 billets affected retention. MI/Br 35 officers that wanted to remain in the Army by moving into a functional area, such as MI/FA 34, were now given the choice of either remaining MI/Br 35 or leaving the Army. The last year group that significant numbers of MI/Br 35 officers were made MI/FA 34 officers by the functional area designation board was Year Group 1992. All others were kept as MI/Br 35 or were given the option to leave. Only by exception have MI/Br 35 officers been allowed to leave the basic branch with approval by the MI Branch Chief. Limiting MI/Br 35 officers from moving into functional areas was not due to explicit policy by the MI general officer leadership, but was a direct outcome of the uncoordinated increase in demand by flipping so many MI/FA 34 billets to MI/Br 35 billets.

Last, since roughly over 80 percent of all MI/FA 34 billets are now in Joint billets, this has two major impacts on the Army Intelligence force. First, most MI/FA 34s are not taskable for Army-specific War on Terrorism taskings. The structural imbalance means that most individual taskings for Iraq and Afghanistan now fall on MI/Br 35 officers only, even if the MI/FA 34 wants to deploy. This concentration of taskings affects INSCOM and the Theater Armies most profoundly, increasing the personnel OPTEMPO at units which are already undermanned due to their lower manning priorities and their failure to maintain MI/FA 34s in their organizations. Secondly, eliminating most of the MI/FA 34 billets in Army forma-

tions deprives new MI/FA 34 officers to become "green" Army MI officers. By not being able to get new MI/FA 34 officers into Army organizations for their first intelligence assignment, most gain their experience in the "purple" Joint community. For many MI/FA 34s most if not all of their assignments will be in the Joint environment. This leads to a disconnect between the culture of MI/FA 34s and MI/Br 35 officers.

Level	Units	MI/Br 35	MI/FA	Total Army Intel
Tactical/Operational	Corps and Below	241	4*	245
Theater Strategic	Theater Army/INSCOM	424	17	441
National Strategic	Unified Command/DoD	237	136	373
Generating Force	TRADOC/Other	243	9	252
Total		1145	166	1311**

* Corps FA 34s are leaving the force structure in FY09.

** Does not include future growth of 35F or new tactical organizations.

Figure 3. Army Intelligence Field Grade (COL/LTC/MAJ) Billet Structure (As of June 2007.)

The recoding also created a skill mismatch in a number of our strategic and strategic intelligence organizations. All-Source officers needed at the operational and tactical level now have to be assigned to strategic organizations because of the uncoordinated recoding. INSCOM, the Army's theater and above intelligence organization, recoded its billets to MI/Br 35 billets, eliminating its designated theater strategic intelligence officers. This reduced INSCOM's percentage of strategic intelligence billets from 30 percent of the Army's total strategic intelligence billets in 1987[12] to less than 1 percent today. INSCOM is now authorized 250 MI/Br 35 and 2 MI/FA 34 field grade officers, and these numbers include the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). The penalty for this improper recoding is that INSCOM now competes to fill its billets with officers that can be assigned to deploying corps and below units. INSCOM, by DA G1 policy, invariably loses and suffers chronic shortages of field grade officers. The problem of INSCOM's manning is primarily structure based. The problem is no better at the joint level. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the penultimate strategic alliance of the U.S., is now virtually entirely populated by MI/Br 35 officers (34 MI/Br 35, 2 MI/FA 34). The National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Organization, and elements of the Central Intelligence Agency will soon have no assigned MI/FA 34 officers, which create significant fill and skill issues.

Not only does MI/Br 35 have too many billets at the Theater Army level that are going unfilled, but MI/Br 35 also has too many Joint billets, which translates into an unnecessary tax of personnel over and above what is necessary to get all CSL-select MI/Br 35 officers Joint qualification in order to qualify for promotion to BG. The requirement to donate nearly a hundred MI/Br 35 field grade officers to DOD while INSCOM and the theater Armies are undermanned and the tactical structure is growing must be relooked. This is what MI/FA 34 was designed to overcome for the Army Intelligence force.

Lastly, the fifty strategic intelligence analytical billets given to the FAOs in 1997 have proven to be problematic. These billets form the core of the ground-force analytical billets at DIA and NGIC, yet they are last in priority for fill by FA 48 and are now populated by primarily former combat arms officers who do not have intelligence training, if they are filled at all. This change in conditions, both in the background of FAOs and the reorienting of their mission indicates that these billets should be returned to Army Intelligence because that is what the mission demands of these billets.

Looking ahead, the Long War has changed the intelligence environment for the next generation. The civilian agencies are all rapidly expanding and are hiring trained intelligence officers, creating greater choices for MI/Br 35 captains deciding whether to stay in the Army or go into the civilian workforce. Additionally, the retirement of the baby-boomers from senior civilian intelligence positions is creating increased oppor-

tunity for LTCs to also move vertically from O-5 to GG-15 positions in the civilian intelligence agencies. This is a demand that will not be reduced for some time. Lastly, private contractors are also hiring intelligence officers in large numbers. Against this increase in competition the Army Intelligence leadership has not, at this point, taken advantage of using MI/FA 34 as a means of retaining high quality MI/Br 35 officers in the Army. MI/FA 34 is a very effective program to retain high quality officers in the Army who do not want to compete for MI/Br 35 CSL positions.

Revitalization and the Future

What is being done to fix the problem and get Army Intelligence healthy again? First, in 2005, the MI/FA 34 career manager position returned to MI Branch at HRC, enabling the MI Branch Chief to now have oversight of the entirety of Army Intelligence officer manning. Shortly thereafter, HRC and OCMI began a review of manning documents and policies to determine where the systemic problems were in both the increase in demand on MI/Br 35 and the cutting in half of MI/FA 34. After extensive research and consultation with HRC, OCMI sent out a request in 2006 to all commands to review their manning documents and to see where MI/FA 34 officers could best serve in their organizations so Army Intelligence could get the accession machine moving again. The field responded with an initial 124 billets to be recoded, and MG Custer approved 87 for recoding after a total structure review. However, opposition to the recoding by the FAO proponent and mid-grade elements of the Army Staff halted the recoding in Washington, DC. This halt cost Army intelligence over 100 new field grade intelligence officers due to missing a series of closely clustered year group accessions and hurt the force by doing nothing to alleviate the manning shortages or to resolve the skill issues identified. In 2008, personnel changes on the Army Staff have allowed the project to begin to move forward again, effecting the recoding 37 billets to MI/FA 34 and relieving some of the strain upon MI/Br 35. Strategic intelligence positions will continue to be reviewed and more recoded to MI/FA 34 to get the accession process working again and to get the right skills in the right position.

Conclusion

The future of strategic intelligence and the Army is a vital and important one. The need is clear for skilled strategic intelligence officers to help determine the context in which the Army will be both advancing and defending our national interest over the next generation. MI/FA 34 is here to represent the Army in the Joint, Interagency, intergovernmental, Coalition, and Allied environments. The recoding and accession effort continues to alleviate stresses on the Army Intelligence force. OCMI continues to work with the commands to examine manning documents for places where FA 34s can serve, and helping the various commands submit the change requests through the necessary channels. The Army Intelligence senior leadership, especially MG Custer, is fully supportive of this program to ensure that Army intelligence as a whole is a fully manned and trained operational support function to the Army. The MI/FA 34 senior leaders have begun to constructively engage with both the Army Intelligence senior leadership and DOD intelligence leadership to assist both sets of leaders in finding ways to promote outstanding strategic intelligence analysis and to get the force structure fixed. One example of this effort is that now MI/FA 34 senior leaders are invited to MI Commander's Conferences and Senior Intelligence Officer Conferences. These conferences are the habitual coordination centerpieces for the Army Intelligence senior leadership. Unfortunately, MI/FA 34 officers were structurally excluded from these conferences due to being neither brigade commanders nor Division and Corps G2s. The result was that the MI/FA 34 senior leaders missed out on both hearing the guidance from the Army Intelligence senior leadership as well as the concerns of the field, and the MI/Br 35 officers missed out on what the strategic level both needed and could provide for them. Resolving issues such as these help Army Intelligence as a whole perform its mission more effectively.

MI/FA 34s do need additional skills, training, and experience to become more effective as strategic analysts. Serious consideration should be given to providing language training to MI/FA 34s, because they serve only in special-purpose units, not general purpose units such as divisions and corps. A senior intelligence officer recently and clearly stated that for the special purpose forces, language and cultural knowledge are crucial for the intelligence enterprise's success. The senior leadership of the Army continues to call for greater regional knowledge from the IC, and MI/FA 34s are the logical choice in order to develop long term regional expertise

in intelligence. This is not to be in competition with the FAO officers, but to provide complementary regional intelligence analysis to the FAOs regional operational experience. Another skill necessary in the Joint environment is targeting. The Army is the only service that does not train its intelligence officers to be professional targeteers, and this places Army Intelligence at a disadvantage at the joint level. Sufficient training for this skill is available at schools such as the Joint Targeting School at Joint Forces Command. Lastly, the intelligence failures of 2001 and 2003 made clear to all the need for greater skill in counter-denial and deception analysis in the IC. The jihadists use their own version of this, *taqiyya* and *kitman*. MI/FA 34s can become fully certified at NDIC in the ODNI-sponsored Denial and Deception Advanced Studies Program, building a cadre of strategic intelligence officers that are skilled in ensuring that our strategic analytical products have been tested and vetted for denial and deception influences. All three of these skills can greatly enhance the success of the Army Intelligence enterprise as part of the defense of the U.S. and its interests.

The complementary relationship between MI/Br 35 and MI/FA 34 is a strong and enduring relationship, but in order to have MI/FA 34 effectively perform its function at least 100 national strategic and 50 to 75 theater strategic billets must be recoded to get the accessions for MI/FA 34s back up to the required level and to get the right analytical skills in the right organizations. The fifty regional analysis billets should also come back from the FA 48 and back under the Army Intelligence umbrella so the correctly skilled officers are doing the regional intelligence analysis demanded by the force as a whole. MI/FA 34s should be reintroduced to Army Theater strategic organizations to provide analytical support to units that are vital for operational success, but are undermanned and undercapitalized. The failure to do so continues to keep the OPTEMPO for MI/Br 35 field grade officers high and the manning of units much lower than necessary. The future for Army Strategic Intelligence as a component of Army Intelligence is clear. The combined and complementary efforts of both elements of Army Intelligence are the key to the Army's future success.

Endnotes

1. Daniel Allen, *Building a Better Strategic Analyst: A Critical Review of the U.S. Army's All Source Analyst Training Program,* School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort. Leavenworth, Kansas, 2008.

2. Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence, 3rd Edition,* CQ Press: Washington, DC, 2005.

3. Cynthia Grabo, *Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning,* Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, Washington, DC, 2004, 1-4.

4. Thomas Fingar, *Remarks and Q&A by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis & Chairman, National Intelligence Council,* 2008 INSA Analytic Transformation Conference, Orlando, Florida, 4 September 2008.

5. *JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,* 2008 accessed 11 November 2008 at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

6. Lowenthal, 109.

7. Lowenthal, 109.

8. The best example of this process is Colonel John Boyd's "OODA" loop of "Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act."

9. Lowenthal, 113.

10. Notably, with the addition of the Strategic Intelligence Officer Functional Area to the MI Corps, the leadership did not rename the Army Intelligence enterprise as the Army Intelligence Corps. This linguistic *faux pas* built in an unintended segregation between Army Strategic Intelligence (FA 34) officers and Army Military Intelligence (Branch 35). The consequences of the unintended division of Army Intelligence cost the branch and the functional area about 150 field-grade officers in a time of war.

11. Formerly, this was known as the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program (PGIP), where the officer could earn a non-degree certificate. The term PGIP is now obsolete, with the non-degree program no longer being offered by NDIC.

12. DA PAM 600-3-35, *Military Intelligence,* Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1 August 1987, 4.

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The Directorate of Doctrine, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), would like to announce the publication of **Interim Field Manual (FMI) 2-01 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Synchronization (ISR)**. FMI 2-01 replaces FM 34-2 published in March 1994 and FM 34-2-1 published in June 1991.

FMI 2-01 is the Army's keystone manual describing the Military Intelligence (MI) role in ISR planning and operations. It describes ISR Synchronization, a six-step non-sequential, continuous planning activity which supports the Army's planning and operations processes:

- ✦ Develop Requirements
- ✦ Develop ISR Synchronization Plan
- ✦ Support ISR Integration (led by the operations officer)
- ✦ Disseminate
- ✦ Assess ISR Operations
- ✦ Update ISR Operations

The doctrinal term ISR Synchronization was adopted several years ago in a change to **FM 7-15, Army Universal Task List (AUTL)**. However, the term "collection management" still lingers in some references such as duty position descriptions on tables of organization elements. With the publication of FMI 2-01, the term "ISR synchronization" will be fully absorbed into the Army MI doctrinal lexicon and USAIC&FH curricula.

FMI 2-01 is aligned with all currently published doctrine including FM 3-0 published in February 2008. However, **FM 2-0 Intelligence**; **FM 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production**; **FM 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces**, and **FM 7-15** are all being revised, warranting changes to ISR synchronization doctrine to reflect those changes. Therefore, FMI 2-01 will be superseded in approximately 18 to 24 months by field manual FM 2-01.

In order to provide the field with the best possible version of FM 2-01, your comments on the FMI 2-01 are essential. To add your comments log onto MI Net https://minet.bcks.army.mil and navigate to the FMI 2-01 Comments discussion under the new ISR Synch Topic, or you can also use this direct link to access the discussion: https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=706425&lang=en-US

MI Net is provided by the Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) https://bcks.army.mil and is part of the Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN) https://ikn.army.mil formally known as the Intelligence Center Online Network (ICON). You can also comment on the FMI in the intelligence forum on Army Knowledge Online (AKO). Just search for ISR synchronization as a topic and add your comments. FMI 2-01 is available for download from the Army Publishing Directorate website.

FM 2-01 will be a complete revision of ISR synchronization doctrine. Greater emphasis will be placed on how intelligence personnel support ISR operations through direct involvement in the operations planning and military decision making processes. FM 2-01 will change the approach from describing ISR synchronization doctrine by the six continuous activities (as portrayed in FMI 2-01) to describing those activities in terms of deliberate planning prior to operations and hasty planning during the execution of operations. Plans for appendices in FM 2-01 include developing requirements; ISR operations in offensive and defensive; stability and support operations; Joint considerations, and ISR in the DCGS-A environment.

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TRADOC CAPABILITY MANAGER
ENABLING THE WARFIGHTER
GROUND SENSORS

Counter-RCIED Training

by Mr. Kent Gibson

One of JIEDDO's greatest priorities is to provide the best possible C-IED training support program to Warfighters through investments designed to ensure training on current enemy TTPs and our associated countermeasures.

—LTG Thomas F. Metz, "JIEDDO Training Support Strategy," Cover memorandum dated 20 March 2008

Introduction

The main problem with an improvised explosive device (IED), from the insurgent's point of view, is that it often fails to harm the intended target. If the timing is off just a little the blast occurs too early or too late. To facilitate higher accuracy, insurgents employ triggers that effectively turn an IED into a poor man's precision weapon. Of the several types of IEDs known to exist, including the victim operated IED, suicide vehicle borne IED, and command wire IED, it was the radio controlled IED (RCIED) that caused about half of all U.S. casualties in Iraq between 2003 and 2005.[1]

The need to rapidly develop countermeasures to neutralize the RCIED threat led the Army in 2005 to charter the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capability Manager–Ground Sensors (TCM-GS) to integrate Counter RCIED–Electronic Warfare (CREW) across the Army's DOTMLPF domains (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership/education, personnel, and facilities.) Statements of Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUONs) from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) guided early CREW requirements and steered counter-RCIED (C-RCIED) capability management for TCM-GS as the Combat Developer. Alongside Program Director CREW as the Materiel Developer, New Systems Training and Integration Office (NSTIO, Fort Huachuca) as the Training Developer and a host of other interconnected stakeholders from Army, Joint, Interagency, and multinational organizations, TCM-GS contributed to a collective effort that reduced the RCIED threat by late 2007 to a fraction of the rate seen previously.

However, the success of CREW over the last three years won't generate a "mission accomplished" banner anytime soon. IED-related activity still accounted for around 78 percent of individual detentions by coalition forces in Iraq in 2008.[2] The continuing challenge is to capitalize on CREW investments with adaptive, flexible, and enduring CREW training solutions. A key component of this strategy is to instill C-RCIED capabilities throughout all stages of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle and across the institutional and self-development training domains. The latest CREW training strategy front loads CREW training opportunities further left of boom[3] to develop competent leaders and well-trained, disciplined, and adaptive Soldiers. Current and future efforts follow the TRADOC Campaign Plan and expand CREW training into complex multi dimensional urban environments to achieve the Army's goal to train anywhere, anytime.

The purpose of this article is to describe the CREW strategy and some of the training initiatives that form the cornerstone of effective C-RCIED capability management.

Background on RCIED/CREW

RCIEDs first appeared in Iraq in July 2003.[4] They used "cell phones, garage door openers, remote telephones, and even kids' toys"[5] to initiate IED detonation. Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups quickly recognized the economy, stealth, and strategic advantage of the IED as a terrorist weapon. IEDs ignite sectarian conflict, ruin popular support for war, wreck faith in local government, and cause withdrawal of coalition and multinational partners.[6] To counter the escalating employment of RCIEDs against ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American military funded the development of countermeasures to neutralize the threat. This effort initially suffered from a lack of preparation. The Army Staff vetted urgent requests for quick solutions to the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) for funding. Materiel developers adopted rapid equipping procedures which compressed procurement schedules, forced a cold

start for industry, and led to short product life spans for most early CREW devices. The first CREW jammer was actually a modified Shortstop Electronic Protection System (SEPS) originally designed to spoof variable time artillery fuses.

It didn't take long for insurgents to adapt to these early countermeasures. A "whack-a-mole" dynamic ensued between insurgents and CENTCOM where both sides assessed existing adversary advantages and cycled in new and short-lived advantages of their own. The cycle continued for years, from the modification of SEPS in 2003 to follow-on iterations of the Warlock family of CREW 1 devices in 2004 and 2005. It wasn't until DOD Directive 2000.19D established the Joint IED Task Force in 2005 and the Army developed the high-powered Duke CREW 2 jammer in 2006 that coalition forces pulled decisively ahead of insurgents in the CREW/RCIED arms race. At the time of this writing, there is cautious optimism that American jammers can sustain a technological advantage over RCIEDs for some time to come. The advent of upgraded operational capabilities for versatile modulation may signal a future of "cognitive jammers" with autonomic technology to interpret and transmit signals without affecting the operation of friendly radios.

CREW Training Strategy

The CREW training strategy grew along with CREW materiel solutions as shown in Figure 1. In 2004 CREW training consisted mainly of New Equipment Training (NET) in Theater. By 2006, the proliferation of CREW devices required a new approach. This led the Combined Arms Center (CAC) under the leadership of then Lieutenant General David Petraeus to approve a layered concept for



Figure 1. The Evolution of C-RCIED Training (Source: CREW STRAP, NSTIO[7])

CREW training that prescribed mobile training team (MTT) support to the operational Army, CREW operator training and staff training in the institutional training base, and distance learning to support individual self-development. As CREW continued to mature from 2006 to 2008 training metamorphosed around a wider array of training resources. At the center of this effort stateside was the transformation of the National Training Center (NTC) into a world-class CREW training facility under the leadership of the Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) and the Army Center of Excellence (ACOE).

The wealth of knowledge gained over a two-year evolution of coaching, teaching, and training company commanders and battalion staffs influenced the latest CREW System Training Plan (STRAP). From 2008 onward, CREW training will extend to more units at more locations than ever before for early and continuous exposure to C-RCIED capabilities. The goal is to increase dwell time on equipment and eventually make C-RCIED tasks universal events, on par with weapons qualification or first aid. To accomplish this, CREW training will expand in the institutional domain, add resources to the self-development domain, and coexist with the various battle rhythms in the operational domain. The latest CREW STRAP documents a holistic approach to C-RCIED training with a strategy that:

- Provides flexible opportunities at all locations worldwide.
- Updates instruction to reflect the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
- Aligns with the Army's Title X responsibilities.
- Expands financial support.

The new STRAP remedies a major limitation in current CREW training, which until recently focused predominantly on CREW support to regional combatant commanders. The new strategy widens this focus to a worldwide look across Army institutions and throughout the ARFORGEN cycle. Today JIEDDO funds, develops, and procures CREW to satisfy CENTCOM JUONs through the Joint IED Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process. The advantage of JIEDDO acquisition is that the Services don't have to pay acquisition costs or pick up the training and sustainment costs of Counter-IED solutions for two fiscal years after introduction. CREW is therefore theater provided equipment (TPE) without an Army procurement ob-

jective. This no-cost approach shields the Army's top line from CREW sustainment and training expenses, but also rules out CREW authorizations on Tables of Organization and Equipment. The disadvantage to JIEDDO acquisition is that CREW has no Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP), no formal training requirement, and no defined process to easily integrate CREW into a cradle to grave Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS). The new STRAP goes beyond NET for Quick Reaction Capability and stipulates CREW training opportunities across all domains.

Additionally, the STRAP provides the template to align CREW training with the Army's traditional Title X responsibilities to train, equip, and organize. The new approach joins the cooperative effort of the joint acquisition community in the self-development domain and puts more CREW training in the institutional domain. In the operational domain, CREW training moves beyond pre-deployment readiness and extends to all ARFORGEN units as part of a Total Force concept for both the Active and Reserve Components. This change gives commanders the freedom to determine which tasks should be trained and at what level the training should begin based on their unit's training status. With the additional resources discussed in this article, CREW training can enter unit training plans along with collective tasks derived from CATS. Commanders won't have to depend on MTT/ACOE and Joint CREW Composite Squadron–One (JCCS-1) to reinforce deployment preparations but can develop and execute short- and long-term crawl-walk-run CREW training events on their own. The potential for units to determine for themselves when to revisit C-RCIED capabilities and to adjust repetition intervals for optimum retention increases the probability of greater CREW proficiency.

The STRAP also envisions dynamic updates to CREW training based on Lessons Learned and best-of-breed adaptations whenever the threat changes TTPs. Much of the heavy lifting for CREW training initially fell to Program Manager (PM) CREW to provide trainers, instructional material and equipment to Warfighter units and other organizations. The PM CREW MTT trained other MTTs, Field Support Representatives, combat training center (CTC) advisors, and JCCS-1 Electronic Warfare Operations (EWO) trainers. ACOE, NSTIO MTT, and JCCS-1 in CENTCOM soon took over the bulk of training responsibilities. These organizations maintain currency of CREW training materials with updated friendly TTPs and up-to-date threat emulation from the JIEDDO Counter-IED Operational Integration Center (COIC). All these organizations leveraged linkages to supported operating forces, which provided constant feedback to inform updates to training materials. The STRAP implements a similar adaptive process across all domains to refine training and sustain relevance and realism in CREW training.

Finally, the CREW training strategy actually has teeth in the form of expanded financial support from JIEDDO. The apportionment of funds for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 shown in Figure 2 devoted a larger slice to training than previous years. The amount of money available for IED training went from 9 percent of the budget in FY 2007 to 15 percent of the budget in FY 2008. This 73 percent increase from $410 million to $710 million dollars surpassed increases in all other sections of the JIEDDO budget in both nominal and percentage terms. The benefit of this expansion of resources will be improved proficiency in technical and procedural CREW training solutions that support cornerstone C-RCIED capabilities.

Line Of Operation	*FY 2007*		*FY 2008*	
	$Billion	Percent	$Billion	Percent
Attack the Network	$1.39	32%	$1.38	29%
Defeat the Device	$2.53	58%	$2.57	54%
Train the Force	$0.41	9%	$0.71	15%
Staff & Infrastructure	$0.06	1%	$0.11	2%
Total	**$4.39**	**100%**	**$4.77**	**100%**

Figure 2. Expanded Funding For C-RCIED Training Initiatives (Source: JIEDDO Execution Plan, FYs 2007 and 2008[8])

Operational Training Domain

CREW training in the operational training domain emphasizes home station training (HST) resources, battle staff training, and Joint exercises focused on full-spectrum operations during CTC rotations and mission rehearsal exercises (MREs).[9] The intent of the operational training domain is to develop and sustain individual competencies, such as operator and leader proficiency and train collective tasks up to platoon level, supplemented with battle staff tasks up to brigade level in support of the unit's Mission Essential Task List. Some of the major initiatives here are: NTC transformation; development of HST; exportable training capability (ETC); CREW MTT, and fielding of CREW training devices.

The transformation and expansion of NTC since 2004 as part of the CTC Modernization Program created the premier desert facility for CREW training. New NTC facilities support C-RCIED training in a realistic live environment and provide the best way to maximize the proactive edge and technical superiority of our CREW devices. NTC investments meet Modular Force training and ARFORGEN readiness requirements with a greater emphasis on foreign role-players, the construction of twelve urban combat facilities, and a shift from high-intensity desert combat to an emphasis on counterinsurgency operations. Coupled with advanced feedback systems for enhanced after action review (AAR) capabilities, NTC exercises quickly correct deficiencies and improve unit capabilities. Joint investments in the COIC also contribute to NTC success. The COIC develops realistic storylines, intelligence, and the Master Scenario Events List for MREs. The TRADOC G2 Army COIC links to the JIEDDO COIC and provides similar expertise and training to Army units deploying to theater. The payback from these investments is greater situational understanding of the principles and characteristics of RCIED attacks and better situational awareness based on better CREW vulnerability assessments.

Another major initiative began in 2008 to establish IED-Defeat Training Lanes in support of HST II for U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) units deploying to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. This is a multi-faceted initiative to develop and sustain basic C-RCIED capabilities and collective (unit) training at the camp, post, and station level. This effort began in 2007 when the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office validated the requirement for training lanes at 18 FORSCOM installations (Forts Dix, Drum, Benning, Bragg, Campbell, Know, Stewart, Jackson, Bliss, Carson, Hood, Lewis, McCoy, Polk, Riley, Sill, and Camps Atterbury and Shelby.)[10] These lanes combine road-trail improvements, facade villages, mock traffic circle-overpass, Jersey barriers, signage, and non-permanent storage buildings. Local units request access to the facilities through normal range operations. The Phase II HST concept provides additional resources to create a microcosm of NTC at up to 36 locations. This impressive plan runs into the hundreds of millions of dollars but the payback far outweighs the cost. The full concept calls for subject matter experts at each location to include red team members, Counter-IED Exploitation Cell (CEXC) advisors, CREW trainer/advisors, Route Clearance Team (RCT) trainers, explosive ordnance device (EOD) advisors, intelligence analysts, and civilians-on-the-battlefield role players. Phase II HST also adds more equipment in the form of range instrumentation, surrogate Buffalos, surrogate Joint Explosive Ordnance Rapid Response Vehicles (JERRV), surrogate RG-31s or RG-33s, surrogate Huskys, visually modified surrogate Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), HMMWV remote controls, and surrogate jamming effectiveness boxes.[11] Each HST build-out diffuses the locus of CREW training beyond NTC with support to Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units. HST fundamentally alters C-RCIED training and affords commanders unprecedented opportunities to train and sustain proficiency on C-RCIED TTPs at local ranges before cycling into the Available Force pool.

To leverage HST resources with world-class exercise support, NTC will stand up an ETC in October 2009 to export CTC training capability to installations outside Fort Irwin. Today approximately one-third of all units miss a CTC rotation as part of pre-deployment preparations due to scheduling conflicts or low priority. ETC will bridge this gap with mobile Observer/Controller support and scaled back training packages to meet ARFORGEN requirements at home station. The idea is to move the CTCs to the unit rather than move the unit to the CTCs. The ETC will not change normal CTC support, (for example, the number and scale of MREs conducted at the CTCs will remain the same even after the ETC is fully operational.)[12] Due to weight/cube restrictions on ETC transportation assets, early ETC rotations probably won't export CREW/RCIED equipment. Instead, ETC will attempt to leverage COIC input and HST resources at large FORSCOM installations to enable full spectrum training. To staff this initiative, TRADOC will realign 278 active component military authorizations from the CTCs to the ETC Table of Distribution and Allowances.

CREW MTTs from Fort Huachuca provide another resource in the operational domain to train the trainer and give operator and leader CREW familiarization training. Since 2005 the ARFORGEN model set MTT priorities to deploying units so that through 2007 CREW MTTs trained more than 34,000 Joint Service

members. A CREW MTT consists of two 18-person teams dedicated to training brigade combat teams and one 14-person team dedicated to Joint forces training and training development and EW training. Most classes are 2 to 4 hours long with 2 instructors and up to 35 students per class. CREW MTTs forge a close working relationship and complement the training resources of JIEDDO, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center, U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, and the U.S. Army Signal Center.

Device	Description	Target Audience
XM1 	The XM1 Training Device is simply a physical representation of CREW capabilities. It has very limited functionality. Has basic switches and indicator lights and an audible alarm initiated by observer/controller.	CREW Familiarization during Initial Entry Training (IET)
Operator Training Devices and Leader Training Devices 	Fully functional CREW representation. Actual physical components with mesh network interoperability to IED simulators. Creates operationally realistic cause and effects of employing CREW capabilities.	• Combat Training Centers (NTC, JRTC, JMRC) • Home Station Training, Pre-mobilization, and Pre-Deployment • Operator Training, Collective Training
Live Devices 	Actual CREW systems. Operating live systems in CONUS requires coordination approval from FCC and local spectrum management offices.	Mobile Training Teams

Figure 3. CREW Training Device Requirements by Type/Quantity (Source: CREW STRAP, NSTIO[13])

CREW training devices provide another resource in the operational domain that won't compete with CENTCOM for CREW equipment and won't interfere with civilian communications networks or run afoul of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) restrictions.[14] The first spiral of this capability was an outdated CREW 1 Warlock jammer retrograded from CENTCOM and then modified with an embedded training capability. The loadset of this device worked within an authorized frequency band and provided CREW familiarization without decrementing theater stocks. Warlock jammers provided a quick bridge solution but they suffered from a disconnect between the training base and actual TPE. Low density and high sustainment cost projections for modified Warlocks also raised concerns about long-term supportability of expensive circuit boards and other components.

The design, development and fielding of the next spiral of CREW 2 and CREW 2.1 training devices in 2007 and 2008 overcame these deficiencies. The new CREW training devices provided a relevant, flexible and affordable platform for live CREW training through the following innovations:

- ✦ Dual-purpose faceplates that simulate a range of devices.
- ✦ Special training frequency ranges and power transmission within FCC regulations on an approved mesh network.
- ✦ Worldwide distribution across active and reserve components.
- ✦ Support for full-spectrum operations at CTCs without extracting CREW devices from Theater.
- ✦ Interoperability with IED effects simulators.
- ✦ Affordable sustainment projections due to simple circuitry.
- ✦ Permitted commanders to integrate CREW into HST lanes and other home station training events without FCC consent.

JIEDDO funded 6,153 of the total CREW STRAP requirement of 8,529 training devices for operator and leader training as shown in Figure 3.

With the exception of an urgent local purchase of 60 devices by Fort Drum, installations pay nothing for the devices. All the live devices for MTT support similarly have funding. Fort Jackson received funding to produce 525 XM-1 devices and distribute to all Initial Military Training installations in FY 2009. Also, Training Support Centers, scheduled to receive many devices, receive extra storage facilities funded by JIEDDO. The prioritized distribution plan pre-positions devices at CTCs and synchronizes with HST locations. Other slices provide worldwide distribution based on range capacities and supported unit types, with additional devices dedicated to the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division also employs over 100 training devices to train Security Force Assistance Transition Teams with particular emphasis on CREW status training for the Transition Team Communications NCOIC.[15]

Institutional Training Domain

In the institutional training domain, training takes place at Service schools, CTCs, the civilian education system, and professional military education programs. This domain provides standards-based training and education from individual through collective training for Soldiers, civilians, and leaders.[16] Institutional CREW training augments programs of instruction (POIs) at Initial Entry Training, and

in the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) and Officer Education System (OES). Training in this domain breaks down into three functional areas: operators and leaders, maintainers, and planners.

Operator training begins with IED familiarization training. Of the five common IEDD tasks built into the IEDD framework established in **FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations**, the relevant operator common task is combat survival techniques 052-192-1271, "Identify visual Indicators of an IED."[17] Warrior Task 27, "Prepare a Vehicle in a Convoy," incorporates CREW. The equivalent leader task from the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Courses, Warrant Officer Basic Courses, and Basic Officer Leader Course Phase III is 052-192-3262, "Prepare for an IED threat prior to movement." The level of training fidelity depends on resources available. At the lowest crawl stage of CREW/RCIED training, piles of rocks painted red may represent IED locations and an ammunition can with a flashlight bulb may represent CREW. The XM-1 familiarization device destined for each Basic Combat Training platoon shown in Figure 3 will increase realism, but most other representations can also achieve the required training effect. CTCs offer the next level of operator training through JCOE/ACOE introductory classes. These courses provide instruction on current CREW capabilities in theater and incorporate realistic devices to teach functional characteristics and proper employment techniques. NCOES and OES schools also provide some leader training and CREW overview.

The biggest shortfall in the institutional training domain is the lack of courses to train military personnel as CREW maintainers. This gap doesn't affect operational availability since Field Support Representatives in CENTCOM, funded by multi-year contractor logistics support contracts, update firmware and provide field/sustainment maintenance for CREW. The emerging maintenance concept for CREW will reduce sustainment costs and limit the number of contractors on the battlefield perhaps starting as early as FY 2012. One potential solution proposes field maintenance performed by Soldiers in Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 25U, Signal Support Systems Specialist and sustainment level repair in MOS 94E, Radio and Communications Security Repairer. Though without a BOIP to drive a formal requirement Army units lack organic maintenance support for CREW. For now the institutional domain only teaches Army maintainers to manage CREW configuration files and load sets. To support this requirement Fort Huachuca's Tactical EWO Course (course number 3B-SI/ASI1K/230-ASI1K(CT) at https://www.atrrs.army.mil/atrrscc/) provides selected individuals with detailed knowledge of CREW configuration procedures and basic troubleshooting skills. Students learn to upload load sets to CREW devices and download load sets to laptop computers from the Army Reprogramming Analysis Team website. CTCs offer similar training through JCOE/ACOE classes and CREW MTTs also offer the Crew Company Specialist Course at home station. ACOE proposed a new CREW Master Gunner Course to combine this training into a single course.

CREW planners have a number of resources available in the institutional domain managed by the Combined Arms Center EW Proponent.[18] The proliferation of CREW added complexity to an already oversaturated electromagnetic environment, which complicated the job of spectrum management. Expedient measures adopted to meet the requirement for immediate EWO support included an Operational EWO Course at Fort Sill, continued instruction for the Battlefield Spectrum Management Course at Fort Gordon, and temporary assignments of Air Force and Navy EWOs to Army brigade combat teams. These measures worked but didn't fit a long-term solution that could sustain robust Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) capabilities. One problem spectrum managers faced was a lack of leadership assignments for those awarded the Additional Skill Identifier D9, which meant they seldom worked as spectrum managers in consecutive assignments. The Signal Center addressed this gap in 2007 with an EMSO Concept Capability Plan and the designation of EMSO as a core competency. In 2008 Fort Gordon began instruction for MOS 25E Electromagnetic Spectrum Managers. The design of this MOS creates competitive promotion opportunities and cultivates career professional development with an electromagnetic spectrum manager course, a phase 1 and phase 2 Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, and finally a Joint spectrum manager class.

Within OES, Fort Sill prepares EWOs for Functional Area (FA) 29. The pilot for the proposed six-week qual-

ification course included a comprehensive assessment to drive updates and adjustments to the POI before the initiative ramps up to the maximum class load of 56 students. The impetus behind this effort is a desire to diminish or eliminate the Army's Request for Forces from the other Services to resource EWO billets. Official designation of FA 29 should come out in the next few months with the release of results for Total Army Analysis 10-15. FA 29 complements education and training conducted by other centers and schools and supports the application of Army-wide warfighting functions in cyberspace. While electronic attack is just a part of the work of spectrum managers and EWOs, MOS 25E/FA 29 training represents a major milestone toward launching proficient CREW planners and establishing ground EWO as an enduring capability and Army core competency.

Self Development Training Domain

In the self-development training domain, training takes place beyond the schoolhouse and training site to extend the skills, capabilities and fundamental knowledge through practice and performance of routine duties, self-directed learning activities, and reflection after exercises and operational experiences.[19] In addition to general web-based resources for Lessons Learned, Reimer Library, and Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals, the three major CREW-specific initiatives that enhance self-directed learning are: JIEDDO JCOE Knowledge and Information Exchange (KnIFE); DARWARS Ambush!, and the Convoy Planning Tool.

The KnIFE information portal disseminates common POIs, best practices, and threat TTPs specific to an area of operation. This is the best resource for individuals who want to pursue self-directed CREW training. KnIFE provides opportunities to train at home station and gain knowledge that prepares warfighters to quickly capitalize on C-RCIED capabilities encountered in other venues. Commanders derive a huge benefit from this kind of self-study. As individuals achieve greater proficiency through self-development, it frees up more time to prepare for more complex tasks related to full spectrum operations and CTC/MRE events. Another benefit is the currency of information on KnIFE. Hard linkages to Theater shrink the knowledge gap to a negligible amount between the training base and actual operational capabilities. The Army's IED-Defeat training website links to KnIFE and provides close coordination with the Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Battle Command Knowledge System.[20] Users may access KnIFE resources over the Secure Internet Protocol Router network, https://knife.jfcom.smil.mil.

The PC-based DARWARS Ambush! convoy team trainer is another self-development resource developed by BBN Technologies that provides an excellent virtual environment for CREW training. JIEDDO funded the integration of CREW/RCIED representations into this virtual training environment in 2008 to support either single player or multi-player modes. Synthetic opposing forces act/react according to a sophisticated artificial intelligence engine. The best thing about DARWARS Ambush! is that individuals or teams can practice platoon-level mounted infantry tactics anywhere. The environment allows quick reset from mistakes and AAR tools. Following CREW/RCIED practice in a virtual environment, the unit performs better and adapts quicker during live training than would be possible without individual preparation. The DARWARS Ambush! site, https://ambush.darwars.net, contains a Request Authorization link where users request permission to join the community and access the software.

Finally, the CREW Convoy Planning Tool provides an unclassified introduction to a classified planning solution for optimal CREW employment. The Naval Sea Systems Command Explosive Ordnance Disposal Division (EODTECHDIV) distributes this computer based training (CBT) program to authorized U.S. military organizations and other authorized persons. The training version of this program uses the same interface as the classified version to teach convoy planners. The program lets users check CREW effectiveness against prevailing threats and warns of compatibility conflicts prior to CREW employment in company and battalion operations. Users drag vehicles from the library, add/remove CREW, toggle on/off CREW, and set vehicle spacing. The software provides a quick aid to help determine the most effective placement of CREW systems within the convoy to maximize CREW capabilities and minimize CREW vulnerabilities. To receive a copy of the program, users email a CBT software request form to EODTECHDIV, EODTSC@navy.mil (unclassified) or TSC@jeodnet.smil.mil (classified).

Conclusion

In the hands of the enemy, RCIEDs threaten the safety and long-term strategic interests of the U.S.

and our allies. Our initial flat-footed response to this threat with retrofitted SEPS jammers in 2003 morphed into today's potent CREW capabilities that provide the power our forces need to fight back and seize the initiative wherever and whenever RCIEDs appear.

With no end in sight to the CREW/RCIED arms race, CREW training must evolve along with CREW materiel solutions to look further into the future than ever before. The short term goal is to effectively leverage existing CREW investments with flexible, agile, and effective C-RCIED training across the operational, institutional, and self-development training domains. Over the long-term, CREW training must constantly readjust to stay relevant alongside the other pillars of C-RCIED capability management. The convergence of an integrated training strategy with the C-RCIED initiatives mentioned in this article maximizes the promise of CREW systems and ultimately determines their value to the force. The desired spin out from these efforts is a culture of agile C-RCIED adaptation in Army combat formations and institutions that facilitates proficient leaders and soldiers with relevant skills who can sustain enduring success against our enemies.

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Kent Gibson is a senior System Engineer for TCM-GS. During his Army service, Mr. Gibson was a Field Artillery officer in Panama where he commanded D-320th FA during combat and served as Fire Support Officer for the 1-508th Infantry Battalion (Airborne). He then transitioned to MI and served as a Brigade S2 in Korea. Mr. Gibson later served at the National Security Agency as a Cryptologic Systems Management Officer and deployed as Balkans Watch Chief for Operation Joint Endeavor. In his final position as an active duty officer he served as Deputy Director of the Brigade Combat Support Directorate for the TRADOC Analysis Center–White Sands Missile Range. He most recently worked as a Senior Intelligence Analyst for the Army Intelligence Master Plan. Mr. Gibson is a Microsoft Certified Systems Engineer and Sun Certified Java Programmer. He holds an MS in Computer Science and Industrial Engineering from New Mexico State University and an MA in Economics from the University of Oklahoma.

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TRADOC CAPABILITY MANAGER
ENABLING THE WARFIGHTER
GROUND SENSORS



When You Have No Human Linguist—

Sequoyah Foreign Language Translation

by Mr. Tracy Blocker

Introduction

SSG Dedication is supervising checkpoint operations, outside a rural town west of Baghdad. Vehicle and pedestrian traffic passes through the checkpoint. Most of this is routine. However, on this one morning, a distraught man approaches the checkpoint on foot. He speaks no English, only Iraqi Arabic. He is clearly upset and very animated, desperately wanting to convey information to the Americans. The assigned translator, usually at the checkpoint, isn't there this day.

One of SSG Dedication's subordinate noncommissioned officers, SGT Mission, pulls out his 2-way speech-to-speech handheld device to communicate with the upset man. Over the course of several minutes, the man tells him that insurgents have been gathering in the desert 50 kilometers southeast of town and have been threatening families nearby to include his family. SGT Mission then brings the man to SSG Dedication who further interviews the Iraqi man in his vehicle using a 2-way speech-to-speech laptop system with more robust translation capabilities (see Figure 1). SSG Dedication gains information on the coordinates of the insurgency site, materials being stockpiled, and descriptions of the insurgents and their vehicles. He promptly reports the information to his headquarters. Though SSG Dedication's human translator was absent, his machine foreign language translation (MFLT) capability enabled him to communicate with a non-English speaking person and conduct an interview at the checkpoint gaining valuable information on his area of operation (AO), maintaining situational awareness and aiding force protection.

Figure 1. Current QRC 2-way speech-to-speech system used in Iraq.

The Sequoyah Foreign Language Translation Program

The above vignette is a compilation of many after action reports collected from current quick reaction capabilities (QRCs) for MFLT supporting current operations. A pending program, the Sequoyah Foreign Language Translation Program or simply Sequoyah (named for the American Cherokee Indian who invented the Cherokee written language) manages the deployment and training of these QRCs while simultaneously developing a capability to address the myriad of enduring foreign language translation requirements where MFLT would be appropriate. The Army has realized that it will never have enough linguists with the right language at the right time and place to meet Army requirements. The solution: Provide the Soldier with translation capability through automation to fill the gap caused by too few human linguists with the necessary language at the right time and place.

Though language translation, aided by automation, has progressed to the point of being a viable tool for Soldiers today, the capability manager for MFLT, Colonel Lee Stewart, TRADOC Capability Manager-Ground Sensors (TCM-GS) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, admits that the capability still needs more maturity. However, as the user representative for MFLT capability, he acknowledges that basic lower level communication requirements of Soldiers can now be met in the speech-to-speech area through 1-way and 2-way devices.

The Army envisions an enduring MFLT capability beyond stand alone 1-way and 2-way speech. The Army approved Sequoyah Capabilities Development Document (CDD), articulates a much more robust MFLT capability that provides multiple applications (speech-to-speech, text-to-text, and foreign media monitoring translation) over three primary configurations (web-enabled, mobile, and portable platforms) through software operating on other platforms and networks. When a Soldier needs translation and a human linguist isn't available, he will access MFLT capability, whether at a checkpoint or in a tactical operations center. If his mission changes from an AO where Arabic was the predominant language to an AO where Pashto is now the predominate language, the Soldier simply downloads a new language module. The capability will be software based supported by the necessary peripherals such as a microphone, speaker, and/or document scanner.

As stated above, Sequoyah MFLT capability is envisioned as a software based capability hosted on other platforms/systems that have a MFLT requirement. Therefore, other than necessary peripher, the Soldier has no other equipment to carry. Other programs that Sequoyah is currently coordinating integration of MFLT capability include Ground Soldier System (GSS) under Soldier as a System (SaaS), Future Combat System (FCS), Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A), Prophet, Battle Command, and Intelligence Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer (IEWTPT).

Because of the broad requirement and developing technology capability, Sequoyah will initially focus on GSS. Under GSS, the program requires translation of languages for all languages used in an assigned AO. The Sequoyah Program is developing languages in accordance with an Army prioritized list of languages, in part based on the Department of Defense Strategic Language List. The capability must translate from English to the foreign language of interest and vice versa. This capability also

Soldier using a QRC handheld translation device.

Soldier using a QRC handheld translation device with a loudspeaker.

includes translation of both paper and electronic documents. Sequoyah, using current QRCs, provided capability to a Land Warrior prototype unit in 2007 upon deployment for assessment and feedback. Land Warrior efforts are being managed and subsumed under GSS. Though the provided equipment was stand alone 1-way phrase-based systems, Soldiers managed effective communication to non-English speaking personnel for simple directions and coordination when their human linguist was unavailable.

For integration with future GSS prototypes, Sequoyah will provide software for the man wearable micro-processor. Returning to the checkpoint scenario with SSG Dedication now equipped with GSS, he could speak English through his organic microphone and the foreign language speech would be emitted through a peripheral speaker. The non-English speaker then could respond in his/her language and SSG Dedication would hear English. Additionally, SSG Dedication in his GSS can use his peripheral document scanner to view a discovered foreign language document in English on his heads up display and even save the document in English to send to headquarters.. Though this may seem very futuristic, the Army is attempting to realize increments of this kind of capability over the next five years.

Conclusion

The Sequoyah Program will begin as an Army program of record in fiscal year (FY) 2009 managed under the Army Space Program Office, again with TRADOC proponency at Fort Huachuca under TCM-GS. Based on current timelines, the first Sequoyah developed software capabilities for speech and text language translation capabilities will be delivered by late FY 2011 with a plan of developing software modules for two languages per year thereafter. Currently, language priorities are in support of Army near term requirements and will be reprioritized based on Warfighter needs.

As Soldiers prepare for future deployments and require translation support, they will look no further than their own equipment knowing that basic translation support is as close as their terminal or the microprocessor on their back.

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MI LEGACY

A working felt tip pen doubled as a surreptitious paint and metal sample gathering device.

Challenges of a Theater MI Brigade

by Major Ronald Beadenkopf

Introduction

Just as much has been said regarding the challenges in prosecuting the current war in Iraq and Afghanistan without breaking an all-volunteer Army and the dangers of losing our focus in other parts of the world, so too could volumes be written about maintaining the health of one of the large engines that drives the success of many of our warfighting endeavors–the Theater Military Intelligence Brigade (MIB). The key similarity is that there is no blueprint for success, no model or owner's manual to compare when making significant and long term decisions about things as fundamental as personnel structure, infrastructure, training, and strategic focus. As current and future requirements are not like those we've faced in the past, so too are the current and future challenges. In an era where we face too many missions with too few resources, prioritizing efforts is the critical role of the commander–and the Brigade S3 is the chief architect and enforcer of the commander. This article will discuss some of the recent challenges facing the 513th MIB "Vigilant Knights" from the S3 perspective, and some recommendations and concerns for the future.

The "Vigilant Knights"

The 513th MIB is a dynamic, fully engaged intelligence provider and enabler in the intelligence community (IC), serving a critical role as a key node in the intelligence enterprise. Headquartered at Fort Gordon, Georgia, with a presence in half-a-dozen countries throughout the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), the Brigade provides critical intelligence collection, production, and analysis to include All Source Intelligence, Counterintelligence (CI) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Measurement and Signals Intelligence (MASINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and other special access programs. The Brigade is also a test bed for the Army's Distributed Common Ground System–Army, a key intelligence enabler providing the U.S. Army fully integrated and timely intelligence on the battlefield. The Brigade is leading the way in new technologies and new capabilities in GEOINT, to include MASINT and Advanced Geospatial Intelligence, where its cutting edge efforts are setting the example for others to follow across the Department of Defense. The Brigade is also partnering with the National Security Agency–Georgia at Fort Gordon, to provide critical SIGINT support to U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) and the CENTCOM AOR while providing leadership and learning opportunities with other Army and sister-service MI organizations.

The mission of the 513th MIB is to provide tailored, multi-disciplined intelligence and intelligence capabilities to support ARCENT full spectrum operations and other commands as directed. The Brigade's subordinate battalions include the 224th Aerial Exploitation Battalion stationed at Hunter Army Airfield (HAAF) in Savannah, Georgia, responsible for conducting SIGINT and unmanned aircraft systems operations. The 202nd MI Battalion (Forward Collection) is stationed at Fort Gordon and provides CI, HUMINT, and tactical SIGINT in support of ARCENT requirements, while providing deployed, enduring CI and HUMINT capabilities in the CENTCOM AOR. The 297th MI Battalion (Theater Operations), also stationed at Fort Gordon, provides full-time intelligence overwatch from the 513th's Theater Ground Intelligence Center in Luketina Hall at Fort Gordon to deployed forces while serving as the ARCENT Analysis and Control Element, providing timely, relevant, intelligence support to ARCENT and deployed forces. Lastly, the 345th MI Battalion is the Brigade's Army Reserve (Theater Support) Battalion also stationed at Fort Gordon, which provides mobilized reservists in support of real-world requirements, both at home and deployed in the CENTCOM AOR.

224th MI Battalion conducting aerial exploitation operations in Iraq.

The 202nd MI Battalion conducting HUMINT operations in Afghanistan.

297th MI Battalion Soldiers erect DRASH tents in preparation for an FTX.

513th MIB TGIC.

A 345th MI Battalion Soldier qualifies on his weapon during unit Annual Training.

The role of the Theater MIB is to provide multi-discipline intelligence and intelligence capabilities in support of deployed forces, while simultaneously supporting the command which holds administrative control (ADCON) over it; providing people, equipment, funding, and training, and the command exercising operational control (OPCON). As the title suggests, each Theater MIB supports a different military Theater of the world. While all of the Theater MIBs are under ADCON of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), each Theater MIB has a different OPCON command, which draws upon its intelligence gathering and production capabilities.



202nd MI Battalion (TF Deuce) Soldiers on patrol in Afghanistan.

Challenges Facing the 513th MIB

The 3rd U.S. Army served as ARCENT in Operation Desert Storm–the ground command for all forces attacking into Iraq. Since then, ARCENT has played a role in every significant operation in the CENTCOM AOR, and could be called on to do that again.

The first of many challenges facing the S3 is how to assist the commander in balancing requirements between the ADCON and OPCON higher headquarters. The ADCON headquarters (INSCOM) has the responsibility of providing intelligence and intelligence capabilities to virtually the entire spectrum of the War on Terror. It faces the ultimate challenge of fighting the intelligence battle with too many missions and too few resources and calls upon that great intelligence engine of the 513th often, looking for all of the things that make the Brigade tick, primarily people and equipment, to fulfill the many critical missions

it's called upon to support. Every request for support comes at a price to the Brigade, and the S3 must balance those requests with ongoing and future missions. For the past several years, the challenge for the 513th has been training battalion task forces to deploy, deploying those forces, then providing intelligence support via reach to those units while continuing to support the rest of the IC.

To make it more challenging, ARCENT is also ramping up for the next big challenge as it continues to support CENTCOM in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the other 25 countries for which it has responsibility. As the MI organization supporting ARCENT, the 513th MIB also has the responsibility to plan and prepare for ARCENT's next contingency, ranging in size from a few dozen people to the entire organization potentially deploying. As a Brigade S3, having plans in place is critical to the success of all of our endeavors; however the blueprint is not as clear cut. ARCENT has not deployed as a headquarters in some time, and faces significant planning challenges, not least of which is how to leverage its MIB.

The second great challenge facing the S3 is the fact that the way we fight has changed so drastically that the Army is sprinting every day to keep up with the technology, training, and employment challenges–unthinkable a few years ago. In Cold War times, a unit deployed with organic equipment that was intended to match or beat its opponent's capabilities. The intelligence capabilities required for Iraq and Afghanistan look nothing like that which has traditionally resided in the Army's inventories, and this has second and third order effects that provide daily challenges for MI leaders. When a unit's manning structure, skill sets, and funding are based off of equipment that is obsolete and no longer used, the challenges in providing the warfighter an intelligence capability manned, trained, and equipped to meet the current challenges on the battlefield becomes much more complex.

202nd MI Battalion Low Level Voice Intercept Team conducting operations in Afghanistan.

Our traditional training model has been based on training soldiers and leaders at the schoolhouse to an initial standard, then improving their ability through individual and collective training at the unit using organic equipment. The traditional end state is that a unit should emerge from this process ready to go to war with the equipment they have, comfortable in the knowledge that they have the best training and equipment that money can buy. The new reality is much different, and has stood the old paradigm on its head.

Now, MI soldiers receive some training at the schoolhouse, but will require much more when they arrive at their duty station, and the unit will likely not have the equipment they need to train on that they will use on the battlefield; it is not organic to them and must be borrowed. To use the example of a rifle range, every unit has the M16 rifle or other assigned weapon in its arms room. First line supervisors can conduct individual training and develop collective training based on the easy availability of the actual weapon that Soldier will take into combat. The unit can plan and execute a rifle range to standard at a time of its choosing because the equipment is readily available. This would be significantly more difficult if the Army had chosen a new rifle and all these new rifles were out on the battlefield and not available at the unit arms room. Imagine the challenges of conducting realistic and effective training then.

This challenge is not insurmountable, and the 513th MIB relies heavily on its ADCON headquarters for the funding, equipping, and training that bridges the gap between the old model just discussed, and new model where soldiers training to deploy must

train on systems they don't own, and practice collective training not found in any doctrine. To leverage training opportunities for systems, methods and capabilities not resident at Fort Gordon, or for stay-behind-equipment in Iraq or Afghanistan, the Brigade also leans heavily on INSCOM's Project Foundry Program for funding and support of unique and short-notice training requirements. The Foundry Program provides advanced skills training, special certifications, and real-world training opportunities. It also provides a critical bridge between our Soldiers and the training required to deploy and conduct intelligence in a hostile environment on those low-density and high-demand purpose-built systems that are often only found in the Iraq and Afghanistan AORs.

Another significant challenge is that some of the language requirements for the current conflict require specialized dialect training that must be identified and programmed when Soldiers arrive at home station following their initial entry and basic language training. Advanced language training opportunities at Fort Gordon provide us with the ability to prepare our Soldiers to conduct their reach and overwatch missions as well as deployed missions, but immersion and other language classes require time. Additionally, the Brigade has identified Basic Analyst Certification that addresses a baseline of analytical applications and capabilities that Soldiers need at the junior analyst level to execute their assigned missions.

TF Deuce Soldier (202nd MI Battalion) working on a SATCOM system at FOB Sharona in Afghanistan.

This brings us to our third challenge, which is that in fighting an extended unconventional war our doctrine, traditionally the framework by which we operate, has not kept pace with the way we are fighting. This ties into the previous discussion, because our doctrinal strategy is supposed to drive the type of equipment we need, the type of training we need to employ the equipment, and the type of organization we need to take all of this equipment to war. The knowledge we have of how we need to fight today is primarily *tacit knowledge,* or the information that people carry around in their heads. This works well for individual and collective training at small unit levels when there are a sufficient number of combat veterans who have the requisite knowledge, but does not work well for a Theater MIB trying to develop the strategy to support an Army Service Component Command on the brink of a potential deployment. The disconnect that arises is that the people (knowledge holders) at the lowest level end up having to develop the plan that allows the upper echelons to direct them. The Brigade has made enormous progress working with ARCENT via recent exercises, such as *Lucky Warrior 2009*, to develop the long term strategies that will ensure that our higher headquarters has the ability and knowledge to leverage the full extent of the Brigade's capabilities, while ensuring our continued support to the IC, and our ADCON headquarters, both deployed and via over watch and reach from Fort Gordon.

Conclusion

Despite the many challenges, the 513th is making enormous progress due to talented soldiers, leaders, and civilians. The leadership realizes it they must take the tacit knowledge from the heads of the experienced veterans and transform that into the doctrine of the future. It must identify the equipment and resources needed to successfully fight the current war and develop the tools, training, and opportunities to succeed at it. They must also never forget that leader and Soldier development is a constant process, especially in a unique organization such as a Theater Military Intelligence Brigade.

Major Ronald Beadenkopf is currently the Brigade S3 of the 513th MIB and served as the Deputy Brigade S3 in 2007. He is a graduate of Command and General Staff Officers College and holds a BA in Broadcast Communications from Western Michigan University and an MA in Management from Webster University. He has had intelligence related assignments in Operation Iraqi Freedom I and III, Korea, and Fort Gordon, Georgia. Major Beadenkopf may be contacted via email at Ronald.beadenkopf@mi.army.mil

Teaching Intelligence Analysis and Helping the IC:

The 66th MI Brigade's Academic Outreach Program Does Both

by Christopher Anderson and Matthew Herbert

Introduction

When Mr. Jim Schoenhaar, a senior analyst with the 66th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade in Darmstadt, Germany, approached Mercyhurst College two years ago about an academic partnership, he wasn't quite sure what to expect. "We wanted to establish an outreach program with an academic institution," said Schoenhaar, "but we didn't know what the students could do with the real-world problems we wanted to give them." Two years and two successful large-scale strategic projects later, the questions have been answered. "The students do outstanding work," says Mr. Matt Herbert, 66th MI analyst and current manager of the outreach program, "We get their unique, independent insights on some tough problems and they get feedback and mentoring from professional analysts and decisionmakers."

Approaching Mercyhurst College made sense. The college, located in Erie, Pennsylvania, is the home of the Institute for Intelligence Studies (MCIIS), which prepares students for potential careers as intelligence analysts in national security, law enforcement, and business intelligence. Founded by former Deputy Director of Counterterrorism for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert Heibel, the program is more than 16 years old (the oldest in the country) and with more than 400 undergraduate, graduate and graduate certificate students in its resident and online courses, it is also the largest. According to James Breckenridge, retired Army Lieutenant Colonel and director of the Department of Intelligence Studies, "Our program focuses on learning to actually do intelligence analysis, so the partnership with 66th MI seemed like a natural fit."

Details of the Partnership

The first group of students to work with the 66th MI Brigade in 2006, completed an analytical report gauging the prospects for regional ethnic conflict that would arise from the independence of Kosovo. Following this success, the 66th MI Brigade pursued its most recent project in the fall of 2007 with Professor Kristan J. Wheaton's strategic intelligence class. Herbert, on behalf of the 66th MI Brigade Commander, Colonel Todd Megill, tasked four MCIIS student analysts (Robert Williams, Chris Anderson, Kathryn Connelly and Matthew Gurto) to produce an estimative report to fulfill a simulated intelligence requirement—the potential growth of an Islamic insurgency in Russia's North Caucasus region. The report had to highlight what was likely to happen in advance of the 2008 Russian elections and was to include estimates of the quantitative and geographic growth of the violence. Additionally, Herbert sought an assessment of the capabilities of the Russian military and security forces to combat the insurgency. With Wheaton's oversight, the student analysts gained critical insights by actively communicating with a real-world decisionmaker as they developed their "terms of reference", or formal statement of the intelligence requirement. The simulated intelligence requirement, the terms of reference, and the final product were based exclusively on open source information.

Mercyhurst professors designed the strategic intelligence course to act as "bridge" between the rarefied world of the classroom and the real world of intelligence analysis. As a result, with the terms of reference complete, the analysts had to manage most aspects of the project themselves including creating deadlines and accounting for the work they needed to complete. By delegating work within the team, the analysts developed both group and individual skills that will apply to any area of analysis they will encounter in the future. Other skills developed during the ten

week course included the basics of strategy and strategic intelligence, communicating with decisionmakers and learning to contribute to a team of analysts.

A unique aspect of the North Caucasus project was its final format. The students chose to use a "wiki", or online collaborative tool, to collect raw information, analyze it and present their analysis. Using a wiki allowed the analysts to collaborate without having to plan meeting times, while allowing Wheaton to track the group's day-to-day progress. Anderson was particularly enthusiastic about using a wiki to produce the analysis. "I know that wikis are becoming increasingly important inside the Intelligence community," he said, "and I can see why now. With a wiki we could link internal and external data and reports, which eliminated the need for much of the duplication of effort found in traditional processes." Each analyst was accountable for his own collection of research and writing of reports, while collectively the analysts could oversee the progress of one another's work and uniformly put together the web-based estimative product.

The final interactive product (available for viewing at www.caucasus.wikispaces.com) incorporates the student's estimative reports, a link-analysis chart of the command structure of the North Caucasus insurgency, as well as individual assessments for Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. Based on a quantitative and geographic analysis of insurgent attacks during the previous year, the students estimated that the insurgency in the North Caucasus would remain active and would maintain its current level of operations in Chechnya and Dagestan while continuing to shift and increase operations westward over the next twelve months towards Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. The students also concluded that government officials and Russian security forces within each republic would remain largely ineffective in combating the known insurgency strategies and alleviating the socio-economic problems of the region.

In the final report, the analysts provided the 66th MI Brigade with, not only key findings, but also detailed narrative assessments of each republic, interactive violence database maps, and shorter reports on Russian effectiveness, political, military and demographic conditions in each republic. "The analytical findings were very interesting and extremely well-written and researched," said Herbert. "Although we don't incorporate the Mercyhurst students' thinking directly into our own analysis, we do exploit it as a valuable form of competitive analysis. Since they do their work entirely independently, we know we are getting a fresh look at the issues."

"Perhaps even more valuable than the students' substantive analysis is their ability to explore and model agile new business practices," Herbert said. "Using the wiki is an ingenious way to wrap up all the elements of the intelligence production process into one package. Instead of the raw reports, background notes and analytic hypotheses disappearing into the individual analysts' files when the final product is published, they all remain modular parts of the finished intelligence, which the consumer can view on demand. The consumer can, if he wishes, just read the final assessments, or he can look deeper into the working details of the production process. It's a system that lets decision makers see clear distinctions between facts, hypotheses and intelligence gaps."

"Furthermore, these kinds of projects ensure that MCIIS students enter the intelligence profession already attuned to our borderless business culture. We routinely work in partnerships that span the globe; we share production responsibilities across organizational boundaries and might never meet our colleagues face-to-face. A lot of seasoned analysts have had to adjust to this virtual mode of collaboration in mid-career, but Mercyhurst's students will have already lived it before they even enter the workforce."

Conclusion

With the success of the second team of MCIIS intelligence analysts, the 66th MI Brigade and Mercyhurst intend to continue the cooperative educational partnership. "The partnership of the 66th MI Brigade and Mercyhurst College is one of lasting value," said Megill. "It exposes academicians and their students to thorny intelligence issues and at the same time provides us with a fresh look at enduring issues using the latest analytical techniques. This partnership is a win-win for all involved and one that we hope will endure for many years to come."

Christopher Anderson is a 2008 graduate of the Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies in Erie, Pennsylvania. He now works for a defense contractor as an intelligence analyst. Matthew Herbert is a Department of the Army Civilian serving as the Open Source Intelligence Program Manager, 66th MI Brigade in Darmstadt Germany.



Increasing the Complexity of Pattern Analysis: Exploring the Need for Advanced Mathematical Modeling

by Nick Padlo

Introduction

Successful pattern analysis depends on the ability of the Military Intelligence (MI) officer/analyst to apply rhythm to a seemingly chaotic situation–human behavior. It is made even more difficult by the fact that the enemy is intentionally *trying* to remain unpredictable. Nonetheless, it is human nature to repeat behaviors; either in time, place, or other more complex relationships. In my mind, the greatest development in pattern analysis over the last five years is the focus on improvised explosive devices (IED) Hot Spots to conduct our analysis. By narrowing our analysis to specific, high intensity locations, we eliminate the majority of outliers which can mask the subtleties of human behavior. By conducting analysis separately on individual Hot Spots, the intelligence analyst can more accurately depict the behavior of a single group or network; this is the key to establishing patterns. Once the data from separate groups/networks enters the analysis, the trends become more cultural and less specific. It is the equivalent of the overarching hand sweep over the map that commanders so specifically loathe. If IED Hot Spots was the biggest step in the advancement of our pattern analysis in the last five years, what is the next step? In order to discuss the future of intelligence pattern analysis, we need to investigate other professions that utilize similar tools.

Wall Street traders use pattern analysis to detect trends in the seemingly chaotic movement of stocks, bonds, and commodities much in the same way that MI officers apply pattern analysis to detect trends in seemingly random human behavior. About ten years ago, traders began to use less instinct and more complex mathematical modeling to assign probability to each of the likely outcomes. Now, the trading community is full of intellectuals and Ivy League graduates who have created complex mathematical models to better define probabilities and increase their edge against the market. These tools measure automatically received data and measure that data against every possible trend. In turn, these models alert the user when data reaches a critical point in any area. The trader simply looks at the data, and analyzes what it means. In this regard, the MI community can apply some of the same tools in our analysis. As we are now entering our seventh year in Afghanistan and our fifth year in Iraq, MI officers could significantly increase the quality of their analysis by creating systems to match with activities and increasing the complexity of their models.

Detecting Rates of Change

Sure, most intelligence analysts create scatter plots or time wheels to detect patterns in activity. This is a valid start, but why shouldn't we experiment with applying derivatives to detect rates of change in both time and place? This would enable us to not only give the commander our predictions, but also assign a probability to our predictions. By multiplying the probability of each time probability with each location probability, we could then determine a relatively precise probability for each time/location combination. Rather than saying, I think the enemy will hit here, we can actually say *the probability distribution of time/place is as follows.* While this would only be applicable in locations with a large amount of activity (read: many data points), it would be very helpful in those locations. Similar to the weather forecasting of hurricane movement, one of the briefing tools could look

much like a non-linear hurricane chart. In order to maximize our effectiveness against all time/space probability combinations, we could recommend that operations array forces in a manner to maximize the probability while minimizing the use of forces.

On an even higher note, we could then look at second derivatives to ascertain the rate of change of the rate of change. Over time, this statistic, could lend insight into the complexity of the enemy at a specific location. It would tell us how difficult our future predictions would be over time.

Tactical Level Pattern Analysis

The first, and most obvious, opposition to using this type of analysis is that intelligence analysts simply do not have the time or manpower to conduct this in-depth, intellectual analysis. Having served in the S2 section at both battalion and brigade levels, I agree. But why? Simply put, the reason that intelligence officers do not have the time to deepen their analysis is because they are spending so much of their time putting out fires. They are too busy creating briefings, preparing for briefings, etc. to conduct thoughtful analysis and create systems. Then, because they do not have systems in place, they remain too busy. It is a vicious cycle, but one that has lasted five years. When significant activities occur, the data should automatically populate a database with all pertinent, known data. This should happen at the operations RTO level. Rather than the RTO writing the data down, the S2 copying the data and inputting into the Excel worksheet, etc., it should all be centralized, and the work should be done *one time*. While we are moving toward this system at the brigade level, the battalions are often still operating on an antiquated system.

The raw data, in turn, should automatically populate all of the briefing products, thereby further decreasing the workload and increasing efficiency. Intelligence officers should have two main jobs: conduct thoughtful analysis deciding what the data/briefing products mean and creating more newer systems. Even in intelligence sections where the analysts and assistant intelligence officers actually create the lion's share of products and the S2 does the thinking, there is still lost efficiency. If the majority of the products were automatically created, then more time would be free for the section to conduct analysis.

If this sounds complex or futuristic, it is because it is indeed more complex and systematic than our ideas in the past. However, it is simply the application of ideas that are pervasive in other random measure professions, such as financial markets or weather analysis. It involves a slight bit of calculus, but any officer should be able to understand the basic math. Add a little computer savvy and you can create a model that will self populate all of the feasible charts, given a set database of information.

Taking this to the next level, the models could set off an alarm when any of the charts depict a standard deviation from the mean (under a certain level of variance), indicating a discernible trend in the data. If the U.S. Army wanted to standardize this analysis and increase the complexity significantly, it should hire a contractor to create the base systems, instantly creating hundreds of different charts and analyzing hundreds of different measurements.[1]

Conclusion

The intelligence officer, however, cannot wait for the Army to create these systems for him. He should be proactive and take full advantage of his garrison time to create systems. Synchronizing with the currently deployed unit, intelligence sections can get a head start on the creation of systems that the deployed unit realizes the need for but simply does not have the time to create.

Next time you feel weighed down in the rear proofreading security clearances, preparing for arms room inspections, or creating a class on an unknown topic, think about where your focus should be–the next deployment. Create just one system that will make your life easier when you are deployed, and you will improve your analysis for the next year.

Endnote

1. For example, the program could chart attacks by hour, attacks by day of week, IED by hour, IED by day of week, IED by date of month, IED by hour on Tuesdays, direct fire attacks by month, rate of change (derivative) of IEDs by hour and so on. It could measure hundreds of comparisons instantly, and the user could select the measures that he wanted to investigate. In addition, it could indicate trends automatically and bring them to the user's attention.

Nick Padlo graduated with honors from the U.S. Military Academy in 2003. He served as the Assistant S2 for 2-27 Infantry Battalion in Afghanistan and as the MiTT Intelligence Advisor for 2nd Brigade, 4th Iraqi Army Division in Kirkuk, Iraq. He is currently working toward his MBA at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.



The Future of Analytical Tools: Prediction in a Counterinsurgency Fight

By Captain Paulo Shakarian

Introduction

The analytical software tools of the future will radically change intelligence analysis. Currently, the research community is utilizing the expertise of both social and computer scientists to produce these tools. Computer software utilizing artificial intelligence and geospatial information techniques will leverage research in the social sciences to conduct predictive analysis that is not widely performed on today's battlefield. Software that takes into account the behavior of various non-U.S. actors with respect to terrain will specifically aid in the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight–particularly at the tactical level.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the bulk of defense research focused on the conventional fight. Weapons such as precision-guided munitions, direct-fire systems with extended standoff, and intelligence systems to complement these revolutionary weapons were the focus of research and development in the Department of Defense (DOD). However, in the present conflict, COIN operations are the norm. As a result the Army has placed equal emphasis on conventional operations and operations dealing with local populations.[1] To this end, the Army is now looking to invest more in technologies relating to COIN operations. Throughout my time in Iraq and related field problems, I observed some areas in which intelligence could leverage such technologies in this fight.

In April of 2005, I worked as an observer-controller at the Joint Maneuver Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany.[2] The unit in training was participating in an Iraq-style COIN exercise. I asked the senior operations observer/controller, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Boden, about the performance of the intelligence officers while in an exercise. He responded that the intelligence officers, although usually very knowledgeable about the situation, repeatedly failed in assessing enemy courses of action (COAs).

One year later, I found myself as the intelligence officer on a transition team–working with an Iraqi battalion. Daily I produced a summary of intelligence from various U.S. units in Iraq. Our Iraqi unit often traveled throughout the country.[3] The intelligence summaries I created allowed me to view intelligence products from throughout the entire theater of operations. After reviewing several of these summaries, my team chief identified a missing element. He asked me if there were any intelligence products that clearly delineated the areas controlled by the different militias, tribes, insurgents, clans, etc. Most units did not have such a product, despite control-

ling large areas with a presence of the aforementioned groups. Several other units had products that were either incomplete, not up-to-date, or that would overly generalize the situation. Only a small minority of the units had the products we were looking for–a clear, updated, detailed delineation of the areas in which different groups operated.

The two challenges presented above are by no means meant to belittle the performance of the intelligence officers in the exercises at Hohenfels or on the battlefield in Iraq. Most intelligence officers prove themselves to be very resourceful in the current COIN fight. The issues presented above, providing a detailed COA for the enemy in a COIN operation and identifying areas controlled by different groups, are difficult, time-consuming tasks to properly complete. Intelligence officers with minimal manning, limited resources, and competing demands would probably be negligent of other priorities if they concentrated too much on these efforts. However, these issues are important for a long-term campaign. The analytical tools of the future will address this problem set.

The Conventional Model for IPB

Intelligence professionals root their analysis in the process known as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).[4] IPB is traditionally used with the conventional fight, but has been modified in order to apply it to COIN operations as well. With the conventional fight, the intelligence officer analyzes the terrain and the capabilities of the enemy formations in order to determine the enemy COAs. By following the process, the intelligence officer will produce logical results. For example, the amount of terrain an armor unit can operate on is limited. The areas that would provide such a unit maneuverability, cover, access to indirect fire, and mutual support of other units will limit the number of "correct" locations for that unit when IPB is used.

According to doctrine, IPB calls for the intelligence officer to determine non-U.S. COAs in the COIN fight.[5] The intelligence officer is now faced with a greater set of factors. Which non-U.S. groups are relevant to the operation? What factors motivate these groups?[6] In what areas does a given group operate? What areas does a given group use for support? Unlike the conventional scenario, determining the COAs in a COIN environment can be daunting. Examining the multitude of possibilities in such an environment, especially compared with the conventional fight, would confirm LTC Boden's observations.

Investment in Cultural Modeling

The solution to determining non-U.S. COAs is to have the proper tools for analysis. In the early days of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, many Army intelligence officers found the current set of tools, such as All Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS-L),[7] inadequate for dealing with COIN operations. Over time, the Army, aided by the DOD, adopted new tools such as the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE)[8] and the Tactical Ground Reporting (TIGR) software.[9] These tools provide a great wealth of information that is accessible to intelligence officers at all levels of command. However, any analysis beyond rudimentary density plots and other pattern-based products is still left largely on the shoulders of the analyst. This is not to say that pattern-based products are useless, they are very useful. The issue is rather that if we have all this data on the computer system, why can't the computer perform initial analysis beyond pattern analysis?

Academia may have part of the answer. The U.S. Air Force previously funded projects to model human behavior. The purpose of these efforts was to optimize the performance of Airmen. One example was the Air Force's efforts to model Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System operators while conducting command and control (C2) missions.[10] In developing new C2 systems, the Air Force used computer models to simulate system performance. As researchers found simple probability models of human behavior inadequate, behavior modeling filled a necessary gap.[11]

As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan wore on, many universities expanded these efforts to perform cultural modeling attempting to model the behavior of different cultural groups, particularly groups engaged in terrorist activities.[12] These efforts have spawned academic collaboration between very disparate disciplines–namely computer science and social science. Universities such as the University of Maryland, Northwestern, and Carnegie Mellon are investing a great deal of research in these areas. The Defense Advanced Research Projects

Agency (DARPA)[13] program, Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS)[14] which will attempt to model the behavior of nation states in the area under U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), is funding many of these efforts.[15] The Army has taken notice of these efforts and has developed a strategy for what they term "network sciences." A sub-category of this discipline, "adversary understanding,"[16] will deal directly with modeling the behavior of cultural groups. The U.S. Military Academy has established the Network Science Center[17] and similar research efforts in the Army Research Labs are expected to be established as well.

The DARPA ICEWS program will use multiple algorithms and consider multiple factors to predict the behavior of a nation-state. If successful, this will no doubt be a great benefit to PACOM's mission. But how can this technology be leveraged to help warfighters in a COIN operation at the tactical level?

Tactical Cultural Modeling

One piece of software that holds promise for the tactical mission is an effort under development at the University of Maryland known as Stochastic Opponent Modeling Agents (SOMA).[18] In its current form, SOMA uses data from open-source news media on the Internet to find commonalities in the behavior of various terrorist and insurgent groups world-wide. The user can query the system with a given scenario and determine with a percentage probability how a group will react to a given situation (See Figures 1 and 2).

SOMA, given the proper data sources, is a good candidate for aiding an intelligence professional in determining non-U.S. COAs. The results from SOMA are objective, based on facts, and include probability.[19] This provides an ideal starting point for additional subjective analysis and allows the intelligence professional to take a large step away from overly-generalized COA predictions which do little to benefit the command.



Figure 1. SOMA allows a user to select a given organization and a set of actions. Then, the user enters in various conditions. SOMA now computes the probability of the action based on the conditions and presents additional conditions.

Action	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4	Probability
	separate state		against org		
Armed attacks	No economic grievances	Standing military wing	State use of violence against org		0.93333334
Armed attacks	One of several organizations with support from group	Standing military wing	State use of violence against org		0.93333334
Armed attacks	Militant	Standing military wing	State use of violence against org		0.93333334
Armed attacks	No cultural grievances	Standing military wing	State use of violence against org		0.93333334
Armed attacks	Strong ruling council	Standing military wing	State use of violence against org		0.93333334
Armed attacks	Focused on creating a separate state	Not legal	State use of violence against org		0.93333334
Armed attacks	No economic grievances	Not legal	State use of violence against org		0.93333334
Armed attacks	Focused on creating a separate state	Illegal and repressed periodically	State use of violence against org		0.93333334
Armed attacks	Not legal	Standing military wing	State use of violence against org		0.93333334
Armed attacks	No economic grievances	Illegal and repressed periodically	State use of violence against org		0.93333334
Armed attacks	One of several organizations with support from group	Illegal and repressed periodically	State use of violence against org		0.93333334

Figure 2. SOMA results for the query on Hamas. The results show a set of rules. Given the condition that the state will use violence against Hamas, SOMA has discovered other conditions that would lead to armed attacks by Hamas. Note the probabilities on the far right.

While the SOMA analysis will eventually provide a great starting point for intelligence professionals to provide non-U.S. COAs, it could be greatly enhanced if it were also to account for terrain. Adding terrain analysis would address the concern outlined earlier: In what areas are the non-U.S. groups operating?

GIS and Landowner-Red

The discipline that is best suited for terrain analysis is geographic information systems (GIS) development. This is because GIS leverages both advanced computer mapping software and robust database systems. One key characteristic of a GIS is the creation of new information rather than just the retrieval of previously encoded information.[20] This characteristic of a GIS lends itself to behavior prediction. GISs currently have the ability to perform detailed analysis previously thought unimaginable.

Because GIS can make thousands or millions of distance calculations in minutes, analysts can now uncover and exploit patterns that might otherwise remain hidden.[21]

A GIS known as "Threat Mapper" has recently been employed to predict mortar attacks by analyzing spatial features.[22] Perhaps the power of the GIS can be leveraged to forecast group behavior as well, enhancing analysis from other software such as SOMA by providing predictions relating to geography.

A new initiative at the University of Maryland known as LandOwner-Red (LOR) intends to address this issue. LOR would take a given geographic area and make predictions based on the analysis of predefined sub-regions. LOR would consider multiple overlays of the area in its analysis. These overlays would consist of sub-region statistics or plots of entities in the area. The overlays would be combined using various artificial intelligence techniques. The system should ultimately produce a new "overlay" for the GIS map that would illustrate the predicted behavior.

Outlining LOR Requirements–Two Examples

LOR may meet the need for prediction of non-U.S. COAs and identification of group influence on given areas. Figure 3 illustrates potential military applications for COIN and other related operations (many of which will be discussed later in this article).

Landowner-Red Military Applications	
Discipline	**Capabilities**
1. COIN Operations	a. Identify group areas of operations.
	b. Identify groups support areas.
	c. Predict group behavior.
2. Peace-Keeping/Nation-Building	a. Identify group areas of operations.
	b. Identify groups support areas.
	c. Predict group behavior.
3. Advisor teams to foreign militaries	a. Predict effects of a unit on a given group's area.
4. Military simulations	a. Scenario generation for non-kinetic simulations.

Figure 3. Military Applications for LOR.

Landowner-Red Requirements	
1. Baseline	a. Analyze sub-regions based on statistics.
	b. Analyze sub-regions based on physical characteristics.
	c. Analyze relationships between different sub- regions.
	d. Combine different sub-region analysis in a meaningful way (taking into account 1a-c) in order to predict behavior.
2. Association	a. Associate events (i.e. attacks) with a given group for sub-region analysis.
	b. Associate physical locations with a given group for sub-region analysis.
	c. Conduct all baseline requirements (1a-d) on data derived from association (2a-b).
3. Advanced Capabilities	a. Fault line identification / shift prediction.
	b. Cueing imagery-based algorithms for pinpoint targeting.
	c. Cueing social-network-based algorithms for pinpoint targeting.

Figure 4. Requirements for LOR.

In addition to the military applications for LOR, the software may have potential for non-military use as well. LOR has the potential to introduce a more general academic problem with wide-ranging application. Prediction of commercial marketing campaigns or areas of gang violence are only some possibilities. This article will introduce two such problems: election prediction and forest fire spread.

These two examples are introduced as simplistic cases in order to give an understanding for the more complex problems of COIN prediction. Figure 4 outlines requirements for LOR. Baseline requirements (1a-d) are illustrated by the following examples. The remaining requirements are covered later in the article.

A local election scenario is a simple example to illustrate how LOR will meet some of these baseline requirements. Suppose the area in Figure 5 is a small town divided into neighborhoods. The town is holding mayoral elections, and the two individuals who are running are from different tribes. Candidate 1 is regarded as the voice of the industrial workers while Candidate 2 is regarded as the representative of the agricultural community. Consequently, the system would take the data in a completed version



Figure 5. Map of a fictitious small town divided into neighborhoods.

of the chart in Figure 6 to potentially predict the winner. This is why LOR must meet requirement 1a (in Figure 4).

In order for LOR to determine the winner of the election, it would use each piece of data given as an indicator of one of the probable futures. The tribal affiliation may indicate voting along tribal lines. The farmers and factory workers in each zone also show a propensity of a different type. When combined, these pieces of data should provide a more solid prediction of the outcome (meeting requirement 1d in Figure 4). Essentially, each column in Figure 3 would become an overlay fed into LOR. The software would then produce a prediction overlay for the election.

The example of fire-prediction may help outline other baseline requirements.[23] Fire spread prediction is based on numerous factors. These factors take into account the fuel properties of the vegetation in an area.[24] The analysis includes examinations of different species shrubs, grasses, trees, etc. Additionally, it also looks at the physical characteristics.[25] These can represent different overlays in LOR (requirement 1b in figure 4). Further, LOR would have to look not only at each sub-region, but at the relationships between sub-regions (requirement 1c in figure 4). Perhaps a sub-region that is less flammable would catch fire when a neighboring one does.

Like a fire, an insurgency has the potential to spread between sub-regions. Unlike a fire non-adjacent sub-regions can also have relationships as well. Like the fire example, terrain will play a part in COIN prediction (location of caves, forests, etc.) However, in addition to that, fixed man-made structures with additional, non-physical characteristics play a role in prediction (places of worship, businesses, etc.) Simplistic problems such as the election and forest fire examples would aid researchers in the initial development of LOR. Nevertheless, COIN applications would add another degree of complexity to the system, causing us to examine requirements 2a-c.

Requirement for COIN–Association

The principle prediction most users of LOR will be concerned with is violence. Given one group operating in an area divided into sub-regions, the system should predict the future using a record of previous attacks just as the example earlier predicted forest fires. However, with more than one group operating in an area, which is common on today's COIN battlegrounds, the issue becomes more complicated. The key is to associate an attack with a group. Given cer-

	Tribe		Work		Prediction of Votes	
Neighborhood	Candidate 1's tribe	Candidate 2's tribe	Farmers	Factory Workers	Candidate 1	Candidate 2
A						
B						
C						
D						
E						
F						
G						

Figure 6. Data LOR would use to predict the outcome of the election of the fictitious town.

tain characteristics of an attack–tactics, munitions, timing, etc. it is possible to associate an attack with a given group. The system should associate attacks with a given group to a degree of confidence, and that degree of confidence should be factored into the final prediction. This is why LOR must meet requirement 2a (see Figure 4).

In addition to understanding where a given group will attack, commanders are also concerned about the location of the support base. In this manner, absent targetable intelligence, the commander can focus on non-kinetic operations or re-focus the intelligence effort to a new geographic location. Locations of structures, such as places of worship, can be associated with a given group to a degree of confidence just as discussed with attacks (requirement 2b). Further, analysis of related sub-regions, whether adjacent geographically or related in other ways, (as in the forest fire example) can also lead to possible areas of support.

Advanced Capabilities

The requirements outlined in Figure 4 also include "Advanced Capabilities." These requirements are not essential to the basic functionality of LOR. However, these extensions of the system have the potential to greatly enhance LOR's predictive ability.

Conflict among groups in a given piece of terrain often leads to a presence of a faultline. While the "front line" described in a conventional fight is not present in the traditional sense, there is often an area of high activity between areas controlled by two competing groups. A recent example of this in Baghdad were the neighborhoods of Adhamiyah (Sunni) and Khadamiyah (Shi'ite). These two neighborhoods are located on opposite sides of the Tigris River. In many ways, the river itself became the faultline as indirect fire attacks were launched from one side to another.[26] The psychological attack against crowded Shi'ite pilgrims on a bridge between the two neighborhoods resulting in hundreds of deaths in 2005 further illustrates how the river was a social boundary as well as a geographical one.[27]

Not all social boundaries are fixed to a piece of terrain such as the Tigris River. If such a terrain characteristic is absent, the boundary can actually shift as one group makes gains over another. The system for determining non-U.S. COAs would be able to predict these shifts by comparing the attack and support areas of different groups, just as it compared bases of support for the electoral candidates in the earlier example.

The shifting faultlines may cause a change to the actual locations of the sub-regions. Everything from military operations, genocide, refugee camps, and forceful displacement can totally alter the characteristics of an area and establish new boundaries. If the system can predict shifting faultlines, perhaps it could establish re-drawn sub-region boundaries. Faultline analysis would greatly enhance LOR's ability, which is why requirement 3a was included in Figure 4.

The system should also be combined with other algorithms to predict more precise details of the future. LOR could be implemented to cue other systems for a finer detail (requirements 3b-c). If we have an area where we predict that a group will launch more sniper operations, for example, we could then compare the locations of the previous events with the terrain in the new location to identify likely attack sites. LOR could feed data to a system such as ThreatMapper (discussed earlier) or PITS (Potential IED Threat System, developed for the DARPA RAID program). PITS or ThreatMapper can then take a sub-region of interest and analyze the terrain within that region.[28] With such a cueing strategy, the processing power and computational time for such algorithms could be greatly reduced. Likewise, the analysis from such system is combined with geo-registered link analysis. Suppose the system predicts support in a geographic area. Now assume that no actual target has been identified there. The algorithm could conjecture the presence of a new node in that area, aiding in the intelligence effort to learn more about the environment.

Applications Beyond COIN Operations

As discussed, LOR may provide a significant benefit to prediction outside the COIN fight. Military Applications 2-4 in Figure 3 were included for this reason. Rear Admiral James M. Hart, Commander of Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJSOTF-HOA), recently commented on how cultural considerations differed considerably in his

area of operations in a non-kinetic operation (Military Application 2, Figure 3).

> ***"And that is, looking at the different relationships we have with the different areas. You can operate one way in Djibouti and you have to operate a completely different way in Eastern Kenya."***[29]

CJSOTF-HOA's operations may resemble the future for the newest Combatant Command–U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). AFRICOM will function significantly different from the other American Combatant Commands, as it "will necessarily require a major break with conventional doctrinal mentalities both within the armed services themselves and between government agencies."[30] As AFRICOM prepares for contingencies, prediction of non-U.S. behavior will become a commodity as it will rely on data collected from a variety of agencies.

One AFRICOM focus is military to military contact. For AFRICOM, this type of operation is designed to "build capacity and capabilities among our African partners so that they are able to tackle Africa's security challenges."[31] In the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters, the U.S. Army utilizes transition teams for this mission. One issue that arises as U.S. units work with host-nation militaries is the interaction between indigenous forces and local populations during deployment. Differing clan, tribal, or ethnic groups of the indigenous force versus the local population cause a variety of second and third order effects.[32] Perhaps the modeling of these interactions is another area where LOR may contribute to the mission (Military Application 3).

LOR would have great utility for predicting COAs for different groups on the battlefield, as well as make geographic predictions. However, this predictive utility may go beyond the battlefield, it may benefit military simulations as well.

Current military simulation software, designed to exercise division and brigade staffs at "warfighter" exercises, focuses exclusively on the conventional fight. In such exercises, the decisions made by commanders and staffs are then carried out by virtual armies in the simulation world fighting against other virtual armies. What kind of training effect would these commanders and staffs receive if instead their chosen military operations, as well as political meetings and economic projects, were reflected in a COIN environment? The utility of such a simulation, provided it were detailed and realistic, would be very helpful as these units prepare for war. LOR's terrain-based prediction would greatly enhance such a simulation, especially if coupled with other prediction systems such as SOMA (Military Application 4). Additionally, there would be the added effect of conducting training on a non-mature theater. Currently, Joint Forces Command is conducting research into this area.[33]

The Future of Analytical Tools

Research in the area of cultural modeling has the potential to produce great results. The U.S. Army and DARPA supported research will lead the way into this new future. Predictions of non-U.S. actions with respect to terrain will greatly benefit the COIN fight. A system such as LOR would have the ability to predict a variety of behaviors. These include prediction relating to politics, violence, marketing, and disaster spread. The system would utilize all sorts of data available, whether statistical, or location of event or places. The system would also discover faultlines and predict shifting boundaries. The system may also combine other techniques in order to pinpoint activities or predict locations desirable for further study. If successful, the ultimate effect of such a system would not only affect ground operations but also training. The future of analytical tools will provide tremendous opportunities to change our view of the complex COIN battlefield.

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2. I worked as an observer-controller augmentee for intelligence. The JMRC was formerly known as the Combat Maneuver Training Center.

3. Our unit had a national "Quick Reaction Force" (QRF) mission. Refer to "Stand and Fight: Lessons for the Transition Mission in Iraq," Armor, Nov-Dec 2007, pages 10-14, for further details on the mission of the Iraqis I worked with.

4. FM 2-0, Intelligence, May 2004, 1-4.

5. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, 3-2.

6. Ibid., 3-13.

7. ASAS-L is a set of software programs to conduct intelligence analysis primarily for traditional, conventional warfare. The software was not originally intended for COIN operations. Throughout

the early rotations of Operation Iraqi Freedom, our unit faced a series of upgrades to help adapt ASAS-L to the situation. Often, these updates would force units to erase entire databases before upgrading. Issues such as this led to the Army's current fielding of Distributed Common Ground System–Army.

8. CIDNE is currently the standard portal for storing data in the all units under U.S. Central Command. The system is currently employed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

9. TIGR is a software program designed for patrol reporting. It was developed by DARPA and is currently in use by many Army maneuver brigades in Iraq. Refer to http://www.darpa.mil/ipto/programs/assist/assist_tigr.asp for further information.

10. Douglas R. Flournov, "Leveraging Human Behavior Modeling Technologies to Strengthen Simulation-Based C2 System Acquisition," McLean, Virginia, The MITRE Corporation, April 2002 accessed on 29 May 2008 at http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_02/.

11. Ibid., 2.

12. V.S. Subrahmanian, "Cultural Modeling in Real-time," Science, Vol. 317, No. 5844, September 14, 2007, 1509-1510.

13. DARPA. Refer to http://www.darpa.mil for further information.

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18. V.S. Subrahmanian, M. Albanese, V. Martinez, D.Nau, D. Reforgiato, G. Simari, A. Sliva and J. Wilkenfeld, "CARA: A Cultural Adversarial Reasoning Architecture," IEEE Intelligent Systems, Vol. 22, No. 2, March/April 2007, 12-16, accessed at http://www.computer.org/portal/cms_docs_intelligent/intelligent/content/Promo/x2012_07.pdf.

19. The University of Maryland's SOMA also leverages a newer program, CONVEX, for forecasting group behavior as well. See V.Martinez, G. Simari, A. Sliva, and V.S. Subrahmanian, "CONVEX: Similarity-based Algorithms for Forecasting Group Behavior," IEEE Intelligent Systems, Vol. 23, 4, July/August 2008, 51-57.

20. David J. Cowen, "GIS versus CAD versus DBMS: What are the Differences?" Geographic Information Systems, Ed. D.J. Peuquet, and D.F. Marble (New York, NY: CRC, 1990), 57.

21. Stephen R. Reise, "Templating an Adaptive Threat, Spatial Forecasting in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom," Engineer, January-March 2006, 42-43.

22. Ibid., 42-43.

23. In addition to illustrating the inner working of LOR, the Army and DOD actually do play a limited role in response to severe forest fires. For further information, refer to CALL Catastrophic Disaster Response Staff Officers Handbook No. 06-8, Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 2006, 51.

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25. Joe H. Scott and Robert E. Burgan, Standard Fire Behavior Fuel Models: A Comprehensive Set for Use with Rotehrmel's Surface Fire Spread Model (Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-153-2005) (Fort Collins, Colorado: USDA Forest Service, June, 2005).

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TRADOC Culture Center Hosts African Film Festival

by Michelle Gray

Introduction

In conjunction with the Fort Huachuca Equal Opportunity Office, the University of Arizona South, and the Cochise College Center for Lifelong Learning, the TRADOC Culture Center (TCC) hosted the African Film Festival on four consecutive days, from Wednesday, February 4, 2009 through Saturday, February 7, 2009. The festival is a creative answer to the military's new emphasis on culture training. The military recently identified culture as a mission essential tool to help Soldiers efficiently and safely accomplish their missions abroad. The TCC provides culture training to all units and Soldiers that prepare to deploy, focused on developing skills in military cross-cultural competence. The training provided by the TCC gives Soldiers insight into foreign cultures, allows Soldiers to practice their newly gained cultural knowledge through interactive exercises before deployment and skills to continue cultural analysis while deployed.

Innovative Culture Training

The African Film Festival is the latest effort by the TCC to provide innovative culture training. This state of art, national level film series will provide the Fort Huachuca/Sierra Vista, Arizona community with first-hand knowledge of African culture, without the travel time! The African Film Festival was free to the public and serves as a passport to understanding contemporary issues affecting African society, using cinema as an educational tool for cross cultural communication. The verbal and visual aspects of film allow us to experience new situations and cultures in a simulated environment.

The festival offered many viewing times to include short one hour, brown bag and lunch time lectures, evening showings, and a grand finale on Saturday that showcased a live cultural event performed by the African Student Association from the University of Arizona in Tucson. Each film was followed by a discussion led by an African subject matter expert to facilitate the audience's understanding of key themes and the central issues presented by the movie. The films transported the audience through an emotional journey to various locales in Africa, including Mauritania, Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, and the bush of Ethiopia. The films also address the poignant struggles of members of the African Diaspora and the African heritage community in the United Kingdom. Along the journey, endearing characters share the trials and tribulations of life as they struggle to provide for their families, positively contribute to their community, and achieve personal success and happiness.

The use of traditional religious practices, alongside devotion to Islam, causes conflict in *Clouds over Conakry*.

Filmed by African directors, the films address such issues as women's roles in the community, the clash between traditional and modern values, family bonds, post-colonial relations and offer insight into the role of religion and politics in contemporary African society. The films provide a visual narrative of both the diversity and the complexity of modern day Africa. By capturing the local folklore, sense of humor, and indigenous perspective on magic and fantasy, the films address the elusive elements that form the undercurrent of today's contemporary African culture delivered through an intellectually compelling media for discovery and insight.

U.S. Military in Africa

The African Film Festival is a timely event to highlight important socio-cultural issues in Africa and the Diaspora. Africa, due to its lack of socio-economic development and political instability, emerged as a focal point in the War on Terrorism as an area especially susceptible to extremism. The War on Terrorism mission expanded in 2004 to include two new operations in Africa: Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara and Operation Enduring Freedom Chad. In order to consolidate command and control over U.S. initiatives in Africa, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) became the Department of Defense's sixth regional command in October 2008.

USAFRICOM is a unique organization that has earned the title, Combatant Command +, due to its mission with special emphasis on interagency cooperation and cultural awareness. The mission is to work as a Joint command with U.S. government agencies and international partners to conduct sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy. Given this mission, it is critical to gain a deep understanding of cultural factors affecting stability and development in Africa.

Service members from the U.S. Navy and Army deliver backpacks and school supplies to students at Salaladin Mosque in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on March 18, 2008. The mosque was being used as a temporary school while U.S. military members helped refurbish the Abadir Primary School's ceilings, bathrooms, classrooms, and administration building during a Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa community service project. (Photo by Technical Sergeant Jeremy T. Lock, U.S. Air Force.)

Conclusion

The effort in Africa focuses on conflict prevention and counter terrorism measures accomplished through collaboration with regional partners to improve local capabilities. Based on a peace keeping and support and stability framework, missions in Africa require U.S. military personnel to work directly with local partners, the success of which depends on successful cross cultural competence. The African Film Festival, through its chronicle of relationships and daily activities of the population, is a gateway to understanding the socio-cultural dynamics of Africa.

Michelle Gray is a training developer and instructor at the TCC. The TCC prepares and presents culture training to Department of Defense personnel. Many Culture Center products are available at http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/main.asp.

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

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

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

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