# MIPB

## Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin

# National Agency Support To Intelligence Operations

# From the Editor

This issue focuses on support to intelligence operations from National Agencies with contributions from the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

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## FEATURES

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# Always Out Front

by Major General Barbara G. Fast
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## MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (MI) CORPS PROFESSIONAL UPDATE

### Ongoing changes to the OPMS

As the Army continues to refine the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), we can expect to see ongoing adjustments put in place over the next several years. Some major areas impacting the MI Corps are:

❑ Career Field (CF) Redesign. The current CF model, with four groupings (Operations, Operational Support, Information Operations, and Institutional Support), was replaced by three new Functional Categories (Maneuver Fires and Effects, Operational Support, and Force Sustainment). Both MI and FA (Functional Area) 34 (Strategic Intelligence) will be in the Operational Support category and no longer compete within the Operation CF. MI Branch and Human Resources Command (HRC) have already reorganized to support this functionally aligned design. Promotion categories will be aligned with the functional groupings beginning with the fiscal year (FY) 2007 Lieutenant Colonel Board.

❑ Central Select List (CSL). CSL categories will also be revised starting with the FY 2008 Command Board. The new categories are Operations, Operational Support, Recruiting and Training, and Installation. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager category was deleted. Another important change is that officers competing for CSL, if selected, do not have a 30 day grace period as in the recent past. If you decline after selection it is with prejudice.

### MI Field Grade Position Review

FA 34 has now been in existence for almost 10 years. The initial justification and impetus for this functional area was an effort by the Army leadership to help MI fill its field grade requirements, especially the brigade S2 positions in the tactical force, by freeing up MI officers from the Joint account. The idea was that FA 34 officers would be able to fill many of the Joint billets that were being filled by area of concentration (AOC) 35 officers. Those officers, in turn, would be returned to the tactical force for Army specific assignments. However, over time the mix of MI FA 34 and AOC 35 officers has undergone some changes. Initially there was a conscious effort in some quarters to convert FA 34 positions back to AOC 35. This resulted in a reduced number of FA 34 requirements and fewer FA 34 officer accessions. Subsequently, with Operations Iraqi Freedom/Enduring Freedom, the priority of the intelligence effort shifted to the tactical force and the Joint account holders found themselves short MI AOC 35 officers without being able to fall back on FA 34 positions. Therefore, before we undergo another round of position recoding the Intelligence Center, in cooperation with HRC and Department of the Army (DA) G1, is working with all Joint and Army account holders to review their Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE), Modified TOE, and Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) for MI field grade requirements. We are analyzing the input we received from the field in preparation for making recommendations to the DA G1 and G3 on position recoding that may need to be accomplished.

### DA Pam 600-3 Update

We recently updated the MI chapter in Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, in accordance with Army Chief of Staff's

# CSM Forum

**by Command Sergeant Major Franklin A. Saunders**
**Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Intelligence**
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While I will be updating a number of personnel policy issues in this column, I would like to draw your attention to one area of particular concern–the challenge our Corps is facing in terms of Star MOS (military occupational speciality). A Star MOS is one in which the Army is historically short of Soldiers at certain ranks but, in fact, have significant numbers of Soldiers available for promotion had they only been so recommended by a promotion board. MI Star MOSs at sergeant (E-5) include 96D (Imagery Analyst), 97E (Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collector), 98Y (Signals Collector/Analyst), and 98G (Cryptologic Communications Interceptor/Locator–Hebrew and Tagalog). At the staff sergeant (E-6) rank, the list includes MOSs 96B (Intelligence Analyst), 96D, 97B (Counterintelligence (CI) Agent), 97E, 98C (Signals Intelligence Analyst), and numerous 98G languages. In most cases we have sufficient numbers of board eligible Soldiers in the primary zone which would more than meet our documented shortfall.

While there are often good reasons for a given Soldier not to go before a promotion board, we have to recognize that as the Army transforms it is even more important for leaders to "train, mentor, and coach" Soldiers so they are ready and we can send fully qualified noncommissioned officers to the field as quickly as possible.

## MOS 09L

In June of 2006 MOS 09L (Interpreter/Translator) was established as an accessions MOS for Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard. The MOS prerequisites are published in **DA Pam 611-21, Military Occupational Classification and Structure**, and recruiting of non-prior service into the Active Army began October 2006. A Critical Task Site Selection Board (CTSSB) was held in November 2006 at Fort Huahcuca, Arizona and the results should be posted on Army Knowledge Online shortly. Of importance to you is that LTG Kimmons has approved guidance for granting MOS 09L Soldiers limited access authorization (LAA) which should go far toward solving some of the clearance access issues that have arisen. The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command and DA G2 are working out the final details of the implementation plan which should be announced later this spring.

## ASI 1F (Intelligence Master Analyst Course)

There are several proposed changes being considered for additional skill identifier (ASI) 1F course. High on the list is a plan to move away from training the legacy systems such as the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) and to start to include the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS). This will most likely require a name change to the ASI during the coming year and revalidation of which MOSs are to attend training.

## MOSs 96D and 96H

The Intelligence Center is conducting a Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) "Cradle to Grave" (C2G) Study. One significant finding is that MOSs 96D and 96H (Common Ground Station Analyst) are operationally requiring very similar skill sets. Based on this, we have decided to recode MOS 96H positions and personnel to MOS 96D. **If approved by DA** this merger and conversion will occur over the next several years and be fully implemented by FY 2011.

## MOS 97E

These highly skilled Soldiers are in great demand, resulting in a huge requirement increase from today's authorization of 2,421 to 3,325 or more required in the Modular Force. Of additional note is that on 1 October 2006 all MOS 97B10 positions were formally con-

*(Continued on page 4)*

guidance and expect publication early 2007. While there are several changes, some items will be of special interest to MI officers:

❑ Key Developmental Assignments (KDA). KDA are defined as a series of assignments that collectively prepare an officer for promotion to the next higher grade. With contributions from DA G2 and HRC we have developed MI officer KDA for each rank. Officers should seek out these positions as their skills and interests dictate.

❑ Junior Officer Retention. Last May, the Secretary of the Army approved the use of graduate school as an incentive to increase retention of high potential junior officers. Selected officers will attend graduate school in the U.S. for up to 18 months. The majority of expanded graduate school opportunities under this program will be distributed to local commanders to use as a developmental and retention tool. This program is currently in place but is limited to selected year groups. Check with your Adjutant General to determine whether you or any of your officers are eligible. An active duty service obligation (ADSO) of three days for every day spent in school is incurred by these officers.

❑ Open System HUMINT Officer. On 8 September 2006 Lieutenant General Kimmons, Major Generals Fast and DeFreitas and Brigadier General Schumacher, Commander, Military Intelligence Readiness Command (RC) agreed to create the Open System HUMINT Officer (OSHO). Although the purpose of the OSHO is to provide HUMINT oversight within the Army, this will not directly impact what many of you understand to be the Great Skills program. Those officers would retain their current AOC with the addition of a skill identifier for their specialized training and utilization. There are about 158 positions within the Active Army and another 126 in the Army Reserve. The training path is still being developed but a track course of approximately 18 weeks for officers coming out of the MI Captains Career Course is the most likely option.

## FY 2006 MI Warrant Officer Accessions Board Results

FY 2006 was the second year in a row that the MI Corps achieved its warrant officer accession mission in the aggregate. Although recruiting for warrant officer AOCs 351L (CI) and 351M (HUMINT) remains challenging, the fact that the number of new warrant officers needed by MI are being accessed is certainly good news. Nevertheless, much work remains to be done if we are to maintain this level of recruiting success. Please continue to work your hardest to fill our ranks with the best MI warrant officers possible. There will be three more warrant officer accession boards held during 2007 (March, July, and September). Soldiers interested in applying for the warrant officer program should visit the USAREC Warrant Officer Recruiting website at http://www.usarec.army.mil/warrant or contact the recruiting team via phone at DSN 536-0271 or Commercial (502) 626-0271 in order to obtain the latest information.

# Always Out Front!

verted to MOS 97E10 positions in line with our current HUMINT/CI enlisted training strategy. Once these positions have been recoded to 97E10, all current 97B10 Soldiers will have until 2009 to either be promoted to SGT within CI or to transition to another MOS. During the transition period the current 97B10 Soldiers will remain 97B and are authorized to remain in those 97E10 CI positions they previously held until 1 October 2009. Only if, or when, these Soldiers are sent to a HUMINT position will they need additional training. On the other hand, 97E10 CI/HUMINT trained Soldiers graduating from the new 97E10 Initial Military Training (IMT) course will possess the minimum skills necessary to serve at the initial entry level in either a CI or HUMINT position.

# Soldiers Are Our Credentials!

# NRO's Outreach Program for Tactical Units

**by Donald Smith**

We've all been there. Every so often, a Mobile Training Team (MTT) appears at your headquarters. You and an assortment of your colleagues are herded into a classroom. There, you're met by a crew of clean-cut, well-rested, too well-fed briefers in suits from somewhere within the D.C. "Beltway". They bombard you with Death-By-Powerpoint on the latest technique/system/capability/grand idea which the Army and/or the Department of Defense Intelligence Communities have dreamed up. Their goal: *To "Empower" You!*

As the slides fly by, and the colors and the words on them become one unending blur, you find it hard to concentrate. There's too much information coming at you, and it's coming too fast to absorb. And, in the back of your mind, you *know* the First Sergeant is cruising around the motorpool, looking to see whose section hasn't finished their checklist of items on the "Things To Get Done Or Else" list.

The "Pros from inside the Beltway" promise to leave all their briefing materials behind, along with their business cards. And, all you have to do is go through all this material after they leave, come up with any questions you have, and give them a call. No sweat, right? Just do it the next time you have some spare time on your schedule. Problem is, in today's Army, there really isn't such a thing as "spare time." Especially if you're in a pre-deployment cycle.

The sad but well-known truth is that much of the well intentioned *and worthwhile* pre-deployment training fails to really sink in with the training audience. The folks who really understand the material (the aforementioned "Pros") can't stick around to go over it in detail so that you have time to study it and really learn it. And, your unit's noncommissioned officers are so busy with. . . well, *life* in today's Army! They don't have the time to study the material and *really* learn it to the level where they can properly train their troops. As a result, much good information never gets past the briefing platform. It never is fully grasped by the soldiers who can use it.

One way to fix that problem: Allow the unit to practice what it's just learned. With that in mind, we hereby introduce the Deputy Directorate for Mission Support (DDMS) Distance Learning Program. The DDMS is the primary outreach organization for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The NRO operates our government's primary Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) reconnaissance satellites. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the images and SIGINT intercepts collected by NRO satellites are used extensively by Army commands, at both the operational and tactical levels. With the new communications systems available to the modernized Brigade Combat Team (BCT), such as the Global Broadcast System (GBS) and TROJAN SPIRIT II, brigade and battalion S2 staffs will have exponentially greater access to the many types of data–both raw information and finished intelligence products–routinely derived from NRO collection.

However, it's hard to efficiently and thoroughly use an asset that you really don't understand. DDMS's after-action reviews from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom continue to show that many S2s and all-source analysts don't understand how NRO systems can support them in tactical operations. The S2s and their Collection Managers (CMs) who write the Specific Orders and Requests (SORs) that are eventually transformed into IMINT, SIGINT and Measurement and Signals Intelligence (MASINT) taskings will better perform this task if they fully understand what the NRO can (*and can't*) routinely do to support the warfighter. If a BCT S2 section really grasps how "spy satellites" can (*and can't*) answer typical PIR/IR, it can then:

- ❑ Write SORs that contain indicators which NRO satellites can really collect. This will in turn reduce the volume of future calls from Division/Corps CM's to S2s, in which the CM asks if the S2 really thought he/she could see that with a satellite.

- ❑ Better anticipate the intelligence questions that National systems *can't* answer. Those "gaps" in our understanding of the enemy which the NRO cannot close will then have to be covered by another system (e.g., unmanned aerial system, Long Range Surveillance Detachment), or go unfilled altogether.

- ❑ More efficiently use organic IMINT and SIGINT collection systems (UAS, PROPHET) in conjunction with the National platforms.

## Training Support Options

To help S2 sections "grasp" what NRO systems can do in support of tactical operations, DDMS offers two basic kinds of training support:

1. Platform briefings that describe NRO's capabilities and limitations when supplying data to the typical Army warfighting headquarters.

2. A practical exercise (PE), that simulates the kinds of questions a BCT S2 faces when using NRO Systems data. In the PE, students are presented with a brigade mission scenario. They also receive a series of SORs from their "division" headquarters which the BCT S2 has been tasked to answer. Students then determine the extent to which NRO IMINT Systems can or cannot answer the division SORs.[1]

DDMS conducts MTTs to all units scheduled to deploy (and as funds permit, it will visit other units). The training teams can conduct the briefings and the PE during the same visit if the unit has the time and can corral its S2 sections for training. (**Note**: The PE is designed for S2s and all-source intelligence personnel. Your MOS 96D Imagery Analysts already know the material covered in the PE).

But as we all know, most units can't devote several days to a series of briefings and PEs. Hence, this PE is set up so that DDMS can conduct it *remotely* for the unit. All you need is a computer accredited for SECRET level information, a STU-III speakerphone, and a projector. Here's how it works:

❑ The unit contacts DDMS and schedules a mentor to administer the PE.
❑ The mentor emails the first part of the PE via SIPRNET. It contains the scenario background and the PE requirements.
❑ The unit collects all the soldiers to be trained in one place with access to a STU-III speakerphone.
❑ The DDMS mentor calls in and briefs the PE to the students. Preferably, the unit has displayed the PE on a screen for all to see, or has given the students copies, so they can follow along as the mentor briefs the PE.
❑ The unit hangs up and completes the PE. For each of the SORs tasked from "division", they:
  ❑ Determine which of the SORs can be answered by NRO systems data, and which ones cannot. For the ones that satellites can answer, determine which systems they would ask for and why.
  ❑ Write two to three SORs to be sent to the "Division G2", requesting NRO support.
❑ The unit emails via SIPRNET the answers to the mentor, who reviews/critiques them and sends them back.
❑ At a time that's good for the unit and the mentor (on the same day or on a different day) the unit calls back on the STU-III.
❑ The mentor goes over the PE results, critiques their SORs, gives the "school solution", and answers any questions.

Admittedly, this is not the same as having the mentor in the same room with your students. But, this method is a lot easier to accomplish. It takes less manpower *and costs less* than an MTT. And, a unit can schedule the PE at a time that suits its busy schedule. The PE can be repeated as many times as necessary, as long as the DDMS mentor is available (and mentor availability has never been a problem in the past.) IMINT subject matter experts at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center have vetted the PE and determined that it addressed the kinds of questions that brigade S2s currently face in the Global War on Terrorism.

Students who attempt the PE should have had some NRO Support to Military Operations (SMO) training beforehand. Ideally, the unit will have first completed a DDMS/National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) Imagery and the 3rd MI Center MTT, and will use the distance learning PE for sustainment training. However, if necessary, DDMS can send the MTT briefings via Fed Ex® to the unit and present them remotely, if the unit can't support an onsite MTT. To schedule a PE, or to get more information, contact the DDMS Army Services Team, at (703) 808-6181/0212, DSN 898.

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**Endnotes**

1. Currently, the outreach activities of NRO/DDMS, in conjunction with NGIC's 3rd MI Center, emphasize IMINT. The Army Technical Control and Analysis Element (TCAE) has the lead for most pre-deployment SIGINT training as part of the National Security Agency National To Tactical (NTT) training program.

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# National Reconnaissance Office and the Army—Partners for the Future

**by Gary Starkweather**

As the U.S. Army continues its transformation so does the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Army maneuver units will now have greater access to national reconnaissance capabilities and intelligence information. The NRO seeks to complement the Army's transformation in delivering value-added information with an improved ground access capability, and more responsive support.

## NRO's Strategic Framework

The NRO mission is to develop and operate unique and innovative space reconnaissance systems and conduct intelligence related activities essential for U.S. national security. Today's military users require information, not data. That information must be fused, multi-disciplined information that is tailored to their needs. Doctor Donald Kerr, Director of the NRO, has set two strategic goals:

❑ Be the foundation for global situational awareness.

❑ Provide intelligence information (or data) on timelines responsive to user needs.

Global situational awareness is a shared mission but one in which the NRO is a key contributor and partner. NRO systems provide world-wide access to targets of interest and cue other collectors. Additionally, the NRO can provide on-demand surveillance capability to focus on particular targets or areas of interest for sustained periods.

The NRO has on-going efforts with its mission partners to provide value-added information to tactical and analytical users to meet the military commander's needs. The goal is to minimize the time between identifying an intelligence problem and fielding a responsive capability. To accomplish this, the NRO with its mission partners, will optimize existing capabilities for current user needs and create a process to rapidly develop and deploy new and adaptive solutions to evolving user needs.

## Deputy Director for Mission Support (DDMS)

Within the NRO, it is the responsibility of the DDMS to ensure NRO capabilities provide improved support to combatant commanders, military services, and the National community. Under this umbrella of responsibility, the DDMS has established programs to empower warfighters with National systems access by brokering information through the following means:

❑ Institutionalizing National systems solutions to warfighter challenges.

❑ Coordinating NRO support to the combatant commands (COCOMs).

❑ Creating innovative hardware and software solutions to improve operational effectiveness in the dissemination and exploitation of national systems data.

❑ Ensuring National systems are accurately modeled during exercises and advanced warfighter experiments.

❑ Conducting Service and Joint National systems education based on Service and COCOM requirements and priorities.

## Army Coordination Team (ACT)

The ACT was re-established (July 2006) by the Chief of Staff of the Army to be the voice of the Army at the NRO and serve as the conduit for communications, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration between the Army and the NRO. This team will also serve as a link to the Army Space Council. The ACT operates under the sponsorship of the Department of the Army G2 and is resourced by key stakeholders on the Army staff and space-related commands.

## New Priorities For Units Preparing for Combat Deployment

We decided that the best way to embed National systems into the tactical headquarters was to start with units preparing for combat deployment. Dialogue to integrate and synchronize training among National and Army mission partners was then initiated to maximize a unit's pre-deployment training time and eliminate duplication of effort. Out of those discussions, a four-phased approach to improve unit personnel awareness of National and

Army intelligence capabilities was developed:

1. Conduct an initial site survey.
2. Provide training support.
3. Provide major readiness exercise-brigade (MRE)/major readiness exercise-division and above (MRX) support.
4. Conduct follow-up training as required.

Site surveys usually include representatives from National and Army intelligence organizations such as the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)–for Imagery Intelligence (IMINT); the 513th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade–for Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT); the 704th MI Brigade–for Signals Intelligence (SIGINT); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency–for IMINT; and the Global Broadcasting System (GBS) Program Office–for Communications. The goal of the site survey is to ensure that leaders have an increased awareness of National and Army intelligence capabilities and access; understand the types of National intelligence information available to their command, and identify personnel training requirements.

Ideally, training identified during the site survey should be performed prior to the unit's MRE/MRX. During or after the MRE/MRX, G2/S2s may identify additional training requirements. If additional training is required, then the G2/S2 will coordinate with the appropriate agency for support.

## Examples of Partnering Towards Success

Early on it was clear that the NRO needed to partner with all the elements of National level intelligence to bring a multi-intelligence training package to the tactical intelligence units. Since 2003, the NRO has partnered with the 704th MI Brigade to more effectively integrate National SIGINT into Army operations. For example, the NRO attached a Tactical Exploitation System (TES) subject matter expert to a 743rd MI Battalion Mobile Training Team (MTT) to assist with Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) training at Fort Hood, Texas. Additionally, representatives from both the NRO and the 742nd MI Battalion provided training to 4/25th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to increase awareness of National capabilities as well as facilitate training opportunities to improve proficiency and equipment integration prior to the unit's deployment.

Started in 2004, the partnership between the NRO and the NGIC continues to grow. Representatives from NGIC's 3rd MI Center routinely travel with the NRO Army service representatives to train Army units preparing for operational deployments. During these training sessions, the NRO describes overhead system capabilities with NGIC providing complementary training that focuses on how to request, acquire, and exploit national IMINT products and services.

The results of a 2004 "Last Tactical Mile" fact finding mission commissioned by the Under Secretary of the Air Force identified an insufficient communication capacity for many Army units to receive moderate or larger data files (primarily imagery) over existing Army communications systems, primarily TROJAN-type systems. As a result, the NRO in collaboration with the Warfighter Integration Network Tactical (WIN-T) GBS fielding office developed the means to download large files, such as imagery or topographic products, through GBS. This procedure gave the Army tactical intelligence and topographic elements a preferred means to acquire timely imagery and topographic products.

## The National Training Center

As the National Training Center (NTC) rotation is the culmination of BCT pre-deployment training, the most logical step was to advance the exposure of National Systems intelligence capability at the NTC. NRO and NGIC's 3rd MI Center collaborated to inject imagery and imagery-related products into these training operations. Representatives from these two organizations and NTC developed an IMINT architecture that maximizes the use of TROJAN and GBS communications to produce a realistic IMINT environment. They also support the NTC Operations Group and S2 personnel during a unit's pre-deployment BCT rotation in that they:

❑ Search the Web-based Access and Retrieval Portal (WARP) for new imagery that the division would routinely provide to brigades.
❑ Coordinate with NGIC for imagery support.
❑ Ensure the BCT and NTC operations section can access the WARP Training Server.
❑ Play the role of either the Division Collection Manager or IMINT Warrant Officer.
❑ Script Initial Photographic Interpretation Reports (IPIRs) when required.
❑ Provide quality control of the BCT's IMINT Request For Information.
❑ Engage in discussions with the S2 concerning the potential of national capabilities within the unit's intelligence/operational cycle.

## Schoolhouse and Leadership Training

To better educate today's MI Soldier, NRO has taken the lead to familiarize our professionals with space based

# The Intelligence Campaign Plan Initiative

by Lieutenant Colonel Rachel McCaffrey and Markus V. Garlauskas

## Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, our national Intelligence Community (NIC) has provided direct intelligence support to military operations on numerous occasions. In general, this support has been valuable to warfighters, but such efforts have frequently not lived up to their full potential. Support efforts were often organized in the midst of a crisis by shifting resources from other ongoing tasks and deploying ad hoc organizations such as a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). This led to many mistakes and missed opportunities as both the supporting agencies and supported warfighters struggled to find the best way to leverage NIC capabilities to help achieve military objectives—with a number of S2, G2 and J2 staffs sometimes caught uncomfortably in the middle.

It did not help that many warfighters and Military Intelligence (MI) personnel came into these situations with unreasonably high expectations for the NIC. Some thought that the NIC's advanced technology and immense resources would give it the ability to immediately answer their intelligence requirements and provide commanders with total information dominance. These unrealistic expectations sometimes led to flawed plans and decisions, followed by recriminations when the NIC did not deliver as expected.

Although the U.S. spends billions of dollars a year organizing, training and sustaining the NIC agencies, the NIC has limited resources for direct support to military operations, and can only focus part of its attention on planning for or conducting such support. The NIC has complex, global issues it must address in order to support a wide range of intelligence consumers every day–regardless of ongoing or contemplated military operations. The fact that we are at war in Iraq and Afghanistan does not negate the NIC's requirement to monitor and evaluate other potential crises such as India-Pakistan, China-Taiwan and, Korea.

So how can we then ensure that the NIC focuses on more effectively using its limited resources to provide support for warfighters taking the fight to the enemy? After all, NIC members understandably respond primarily to priorities set by senior leaders who control their budgets, not distant commanders in the field. How can warfighters leverage the enormous investment in the NIC and use it to more quickly and efficiently achieve tactical and operational objectives? How can the NIC agencies, which historically have not shared the "planning culture" of military commands, better plan and prepare to rapidly provide support to military operations throughout an entire campaign: *shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize* and *enable civil authority*? How can our large investment in National intelligence capabilities reach its full potential to support military operations?

## The Intelligence Campaign Planning Initiative

The Joint Staff J2 and other NIC organizations posed these questions as part of a project to rethink defense intelligence prompted by the creation of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD/I) in 2003. With the support of the new USD/I, a solution was developed in early 2004: the Intelligence Campaign Plan (ICP) initiative.

USD/I and the Joint Staff J2 designed ICP around the concept of committing the NIC to develop detailed, executable plans to provide intelligence support to meet the operations plan (OPLAN) requirements of combatant commanders (COCOMs). The goal of ICP is to ensure that the NIC provides products that allow commanders to make better decisions about how to employ forces, giving those commanders an edge that will allow them to more quickly and efficiently achieve their operational objectives. In sum, ICP moves National intelligence support for future military operations from a "hand wave" of generalized promises to a "handshake" of specified commitments.

USD/I and Joint Staff J2 personnel, working with NIC and COCOM intelligence members, developed the ICP process for supporting an OPLAN. The process begins with a working group that clearly identifies requirements (called tasks and sub-tasks in ICP) for NIC support to the COCOM's OPLAN execution. Then the NIC and the COCOM collaborate to develop an executable plan for the NIC to satisfy those requirements. As this plan is developed, the capability of the NIC to collect intelligence and conduct analysis for each task is determined. Once complete, the plan is continually evaluated and adjusted as required, both prior to and during OPLAN execution.

## Establishing Tasks

The first challenge each ICP effort faces is accurately and precisely defining, capturing, prioritizing, and relaying the warfighters' requirements to the NIC. A failure to define clear, concise requirements has led to many disconnects between the NIC and the operational and tactical warfighters in the past; ICP seeks to solve this problem. At first it sounds simple to do this because you could start with the priority intelligence/information requirements (PIRs) identified within the plan's intelligence annex.

However, it quickly became apparent during the development of the ICP process that existing OPLAN requirements, as written, would not be sufficient, and that simply supporting a command's PIRs is not nearly enough. Most higher-echelon commands write very broad PIRs to cover a wide range of issues in their areas of responsibility. Using this type of PIR as the basis for ICP tasks would allow intelligence agencies to provide ambiguous answers and to justify products virtually irrelevant to warfighting as falling within the scope of the requirement. Also COCOM PIRs are typically focused on the overall priorities of high level decision makers, and thus would not provide the information necessary for subordinate commanders to actually execute the plan. In addition, mirroring the command's PIRs can also potentially lead to wasted effort—the national agencies should not be spending valuable resources building products to answer questions upon which the COCOM's intelligence resources are already focused. The NIC must focus on those questions that the COCOM cannot answer with its organic intelligence capabilities.

The ICP process meets this challenge by using the same planning process used by joint campaign planners. Intelligence professionals work with operational planners to identify tasks for the NIC that support achievement of the operational objectives of the campaign. ICP planners then structure these tasks so that they will result in specific information for commanders that will allow them to make decisions and take actions which will shape the course of the campaign toward achieving these objectives. The resulting tasks are then prioritized based on the operational priorities of warfighters, using the OPLAN as a guide.

ICP planners design the tasks to minimize additional coordination or tailoring that might be required from the already overburdened COCOM intelligence personnel in the middle of a crisis or war. The tasks focus on providing relevant, actionable intelligence to complex problem sets that COCOM intelligence cannot solve alone. To satisfy a task, multiple agencies must collaborate to provide fused, all-source intelligence that commanders can immediately put to use.

## Matching Tasks With Agencies

This leads directly to the second challenge in ICP: determining which members of the NIC can respond to tasks in the most effective manner possible. After ICP tasks are defined, individual NIC agencies self-identify as the lead agency for a task, the *Responsible Analytic Center* (RAC). The RACs commit to producing fused, timely, relevant, actionable intelligence in support of the task. Planners then break down the overall task into a series of smaller requirements, called sub-tasks. The RAC may answer a sub-task, or another member of the NIC may answer it while working collaboratively with the RAC. These *Collaborative Analytic Centers* (CACs) bring specific expertise to sub-tasks to ensure that that the RAC can address all aspects of a requirement in the intelligence product provided to the COCOM.

For example, an OPLAN might require intelligence about a potential enemy's artillery capability. "How will country X employ their artillery in support of offensive operations?" As you can see, this task does not simply say "Describe country X artillery" nor does it say, "How much artillery does country X have?" Instead, the question focuses on providing analysis to commanders which will allow them to make better decisions about force employment.

Since the broad subject area is artillery, the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) would self-identify as the RAC for this task. Sub-tasks underneath this task might include topics such as "How will country X move their artillery?" or "How will country X command and control their artillery?" For these two sub-tasks, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) organizations would identify themselves as CACs, since they are the DOD lead for foreign infrastructure and leadership issues. NGIC would determine precisely what it needs from the DIA agencies and would fuse all intelligence related to the overarching task into one clear, concise answer for COCOM leadership. All of the sub-task intelligence would also be available to interested warfighters, but the NIC focuses on answering the operationally relevant task itself.

## Coordination and Dissemination

Once the ICP process identifies RACs, CACs and NIC agencies that can collect intelligence in support of a task, planners need to define how members of the NIC will coordinate with each other and how they will disseminate intelligence to operational and tactical users. These issues pose two of the biggest challenges for ICP. First, members of the NIC who work for different leaders and frequently compete for funding must clearly define their areas of expertise and must agree to share valuable intelligence with other members of the NIC. Agencies accept the risk that they will provide intelligence to another agency which may ultimately get "credit," and perhaps additional resources, for outstanding intelligence support. This can lead to tension when trying to build executable processes for collaboration and information sharing. Second, members of the NIC must determine how the relevant, actionable intelligence products will flow to the warfighters executing operations thousands of miles away with limited access to information technology.

To address the first issue, members of the NIC meet throughout the ICP process to define requirements and identify who will support those requirements. Experts from the different agencies meet in a working group with COCOM representatives to define the tasks necessary to support an OPLAN, chaired by a planner from the Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center as an honest broker. As they work through the tasks, naturally the agencies consider their own capabilities and limitations in supporting those tasks and sub-tasks.

After the NIC/COCOM team defines the tasks, linked to specific operational objectives, experts begin to identify themselves as RACs, CACs and/or agencies with a collection role. The RAC then takes the lead in developing the process to share collection and analysis among all NIC participants supporting a particular task. All NIC participants recognize and agree to support the RAC's authority to develop processes in support of a task because they also recognize that the RAC is responsible for ensuring that the task is answered throughout the phases of OPLAN execution. Since all members of the NIC will identify themselves as RACs for certain tasks, they understand that they need to support processes which will allow them to meet their responsibilities.

ICP planners must then determine the actual mechanisms for sharing information, analysis and intelligence throughout the NIC to support task execution. The RACs, CACs and collectors must identify tools that will allow them to rapidly and efficiently coordinate and collaborate while building background material for an OPLAN and then, in an even bigger challenge, while providing critical intelligence during execution of an OPLAN. RACs, CACs and collectors find this difficult because of the large number of systems and software applications throughout the NIC.

One of the biggest benefits of the ICP process is that it drives members of the NIC to work through these coordination issues *prior* to a conflict–which should make intelligence support to a COCOM during execution of an OPLAN run much more smoothly than the *ad hoc* approach used before ICP. ICP limits the confusion and complexity usually experienced at the onset of a contingency by ensuring specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are already in place to allow members of the NIC to rapidly collaborate with each other to provide fused, all-source, relevant intelligence to the supported COCOM.

But a second challenging issue remains: *How* will the NIC disseminate that fused, all-source, relevant intelligence to the supported warfighter? It is even more difficult to build processes that facilitate coordination (as well as dissemination) between the NIC and the supported COCOM than to build processes that support coordination within the NIC. The impracticality of moving large portions of NIC analytic capabilities into the theater makes reach-back to U.S based NIC facilities not only a doctrinal imperative but a practical necessity.

In order for reach-back to work effectively, participants must develop detailed TTPs that allow members of the NIC to disseminate fused, all-source intelligence to warfighters in a timely manner at a useable level of classification. For large products with pictures or imagery, it is critical that the communications infrastructure, to include communications pipes, bandwidth and computers at all echelons are available to transmit and receive intelligence. National agencies must also produce and disseminate intelligence at a classification level that allows it to reach the warfighter who needs it. This is a particularly important issue for ICPs that support multinational campaigns or commands with limited network capabilities.

Equally important, the NIC must know *where* to send the intelligence and warfighters must know *where* it will be located. If the NIC comes up with the most sublime piece of analysis and it never leaves the Beltway, the ICP has failed. If the NIC sends a sublime piece of intelligence to a website that no one in theater knows of or accesses, the ICP has failed.

## Matching Expectations With Capabilities

Another key aspect of the ICP process is determining the capability of the NIC to collect intelligence and conduct analysis to answer each operationally relevant task. Despite the billions of dollars spent on national intelligence, the NIC does not enjoy omniscience about our enemies. ICP planners work to ensure that COCOMs understand NIC capabilities to avoid unrealistic expectations. The NIC, through the ICP process, educates COCOMs about capabilities and limitations in order to eliminate expectation problems that have plagued previous NIC efforts to provide support to military operations.

The ICP process includes procedures and tools to collaboratively provide an honest, comprehensive assessment of the NIC's ability to collect and analyze information in support of a COCOM's operational objectives. This informs the commander and his staff about the amount of risk they must accept in pursuit of certain operational objectives as they work through their planning process. If the NIC states that they cannot provide the intelligence necessary to allow a commander to make a well-informed decision at a certain point in the campaign, then the commander can either decide to accept the risk or he can adapt his plan based on the capabilities of the NIC. Either way, the commander is better prepared to execute his campaign plan because he has a realistic understanding of the capabilities and limitations of national intelligence support.

This process provides a standardized methodology for identifying national intelligence support shortfalls across OPLANs and thus provides USD/I and other key senior leaders with information that can help them make difficult resource prioritization decisions at the national level. In addition, if a commander is informed by this process that the NIC cannot provide key operationally relevant intelligence, the commander can engage NIC leadership to find ways to improve intelligence support. Since the DOD leadership is encouraging the COCOMs to get more involved in determining funding and acquisition priorities, COCOMs can gain leverage in this process through the clear assessment of intelligence shortfalls provided by ICP. For example, two successive commanders of U.S. Forces Korea cited the results of the Korea ICP assessment in Senate testimony to justify their arguments about correcting shortfalls in required national intelligence support.[1]

## The Way Ahead for ICP

We are still in the initial stages of developing ICP processes but we have made substantial progress over the past two years. ICP efforts in U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea have led to a much greater degree of cooperation within the NIC and between the NIC and the supported COCOM. The NIC has a much greater understanding of the intelligence required to support their OPLANs and the COCOM leadership has a much more realistic understand-

ing of the capabilities and limitations of the NIC to support their campaign plans. Members of the NIC have worked through some difficult coordination problems and all ICP participants have tackled the difficult problem of how to get fused, relevant, actionable intelligence to operational and tactical commanders in a timely manner. However, we still have a long way to go.

As the ICP matures, it will increasingly become a central element of how we produce MI. We encourage all readers to become familiar with the ICP process to understand how it affects them, and to help improve it. Though the NIC does the majority of the "heavy lifting" in an ICP effort and the warfighting commanders are ultimately the consumers of the ICP's products, MI personnel of the supported commands provide the critical expertise and credibility necessary to bridge the gap between these two very different groups. For a command's ICP to be fully effective, its MI personnel must fully understand and participate in the ICP process. They must skillfully and aggressively advocate for their commander's requirements, while also collaboratively engaging their NIC partners as teammates.

## Conclusion

ICP has the potential to radically transform intelligence support to combat operations. When executed properly, it forces all members of the NIC to truly understand operational objectives and to build an executable plan to support those objectives. It forces the NIC to collaborate with other agencies and develop TTPs for providing timely, relevant intelligence to warfighters. It forces the NIC to honestly and comprehensively evaluate its ability to collect and conduct analysis in support of an OPLAN and, most importantly, it helps a commander to understand the level of risk associated with certain actions within a campaign plan. ICP acts as a forcing function which will help U.S. forces achieve their operational objectives more rapidly and effectively and will thus save U.S. and allied lives. It is up to all of us in the intelligence community, from tactical to national level, to work together to see that ICP achieves its full potential to support the warfighter.

**Endnote**

1. General B. B. Bell, Statement Before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 7 March 2006. *See also* General Leon J. LaPorte, Statement Before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 8 March 2005.

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# A New Image for Geospatial Intelligence

by Jared L. Ware

*"The requirement for electro-optical, radar, and infrared imagery remains crucial. IMINT converted into geospatial data and integrated with other source material is critical to the commanders in the field and provides much-needed context to decision makers . . . . Effective TPED of geospatial intelligence is crucial to providing the Combatant Commander, operational, and tactical forces with an incontrovertible view of the battlespace."*

**—Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, speaking before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 31 March 2004**

## Introduction

Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is rapidly moving to the forefront of intelligence analysis as commanders at all levels understand its effectiveness in the context of current and future operations. GEOINT provides the commander with more options, and allows the staff to provide an optimal solution to the tactical problem. Previously, a land component commander's flexibility and versatility was limited to force capabilities within the unit. If an operation required a gap crossing, then the commander could use organic armored vehicular-launched bridges to cross a site, ford the site with its vehicles, or request a multi-role bridge company if the gap exceeded the organic capabilities to cross the gap. With GEOINT, the commander can now conduct detailed intelligence preparation of the battlespace using commercial multi-spectral imagery (MSI), vector data sets from National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) stocks, or even reachback capabilities for hydrographic and bridge engineering via satellite communications with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer's (USACE) technical laboratories within the unit. This analysis can be conducted by the intelligence, engineer, and space activities staffs within the division staff or brigade combat team (BCT) staff using organic hardware and software capabilities. GEOINT improves both the art and science of battlefield operations, and empowers a maneuver commander with the ability to wargame a range of options that in the past had been limited to operational echelon-above-corps staffs. The article will examine the paradigm shift in GEOINT and showcase GEOINT's usefulness in visualizing the operational battlespace.

## The GEOINT Paradigm Shift

Born of the Information Age, GEOINT was not just an amalgamation of intelligence disciplines created to support Cold War doctrine. During the Cold War, Imagery Interpreters provided the bulk of Imagery Analysis, specifically order-of-battle numeration and special equipment identification of enemy capabilities. Defense cartographers and surveyors provided mapping, charting, and geodesy services in support of Department of Defense requirements. Most of the intelligence products from imagery sources remained classified, while most of the cartographic products and the data used to create them, were normally disseminated at the unclassified level. When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the proliferation of the Internet and the expansion of the Global Positioning System (GPS) began to change the face of intelligence analysis. Hardware equipment and software formats once highly classified or too expensive for normal usage became commonplace throughout defense and academic institutions. Softcopy digital products began to replace hardcopy paper and film in the late 1990s, ushering the beginning of what is now termed GEOINT. Softcopy Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) products in a raster format could be embedded or encoded with improving accurate geographic metadata and shared with multiple users across an electronic medium. Moreover, digital products that had traditionally resided in other intelligence disciplines became layers of information contributing to a higher-order intelligence product. By 2002, GEOINT became a full-fledged but little understood intelligence discipline, a discipline that truly as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts. **Note:** In Febuary 2006, Major General Fast, Commander, USAIC&FH, designated GEOINT as an Army Intelligence Discipline.

Early attempts at GEOINT centered on what could be characterized as *Interpret and Archive*, where GEOINT resided in separate disciplines, separate analysis, and

**Figure 1. Evolutionary path of geospatial intelligence**

separate archives. Current processes have advanced to an *Integrate and Populate* phase, where separate disciplines combine for integrated analysis, and products eventually enter sharable archives based upon the nature of the product. In the future, the prevailing school of thought is to attain a *Fuse and Synergize* methodology, where true multidiscipline, fused analysis is the standard and all products enter a common archive or sharable set of archives. The overarching goal is to develop a fusion of GEOINT data sources to produce timely, relevant, and actionable intelligence for full-spectrum operations. The products range from basic pattern analysis of battlefield vehicles to advanced material analysis of those same vehicles to determine camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D) methodologies of an adversary. Thus, proliferation of GEOINT remains a function of mission, education, training, and technology. Actionable GEOINT requires skilled, multi-faceted analysis with scientifically repeatable procedures to speed up the "product-to-market" cycle for the end-user. Once *Fuse and Synergize* GEOINT reaches the operational Task, Process, Exploit, and Disseminate (TPED) cycle, commanders will have a full-spectrum visualization of the battlespace with unparalleled actionable intelligence.

## GEOINT Source Selection

Actionable GEOINT can come from a number of sources, many of which are listed in Figure 1. However, getting the right information and deriving the correct product to assist the commander's visualization starts with three fundamental questions:

1. Does it satisfy an existing intelligence requirement?
2. Does it support the decisive or shaping operation?
3. Does it measurably improve the commander's visualization of the battlespace?

Answering these questions will serve as a starting point for developing timely and actionable GEOINT. First, if the GEOINT requirement is related to an existing requirement, then chances are that a host of data sources exist to either satisfy the requirement, or the requisite data (imagery, metadata, etc.) can be used to create the product. Second, the priority of GEOINT resources must be devoted to the decisive operation. Answering the question will allow the staff to allocate the proper resources (band width, imagery collects, Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS), etc.) to the task, and not waste precious GEOINT resources that may be better utilized in support of the entire decision and shaping operation. Finally, the

GEOINT must measurably improve the commander's visualization, thus metrics must be associated with the process of data mining and product creation, as well as the overall analysis, exploitation, and production of the GEOINT product.

Given the number of GEOINT products readily available to most intelligence staffs, it is imperative that the senior intelligence officer on the staff understand various types of GEOINT data and products required to satisfy the intelligence requirement. For example, a notional BCT is operating in the vicinity of Tbilisi, Georgia. The brigade commander states "The unit will be operating within the city's central sector during the next 72 hours. I need GEOINT products to help me visualize operations in the urban environment." Four GEOINT products that may assist in the task are travel maps, topographic maps, tourist maps, and commercial imagery. The products may exist with or without geospatial metadata such as scale, resolution, accuracy, datum, projection, and coordinate system. However, understanding the intricacies of GEOINT data sources will prove beneficial and lead to better overall products. Figure 2 shows a variety of unclassified GEOINT sources that, once fused and synchronized, will improve the commander's visualization of the city's center.

In View 1, the digital area map, like most found on open source Internet sites, provides an area overview of the city and its surrounding features, to include major roads and rivers. View 2 is a detailed Soviet-era 1:100,000 topographic line map of the city, which provides more



**Figure 2. Examples of GEOINT sources**

intricate and robust information on most geographic features in the area. Moreover, the digital map is properly referenced and can be imported into the engineer cell's DTSS with minor manipulation. View 3 is a tourist map of the downtown area. It provides useful information in terms of streets, parks, and the river. However, this map lacks absolute accuracy and may not possess thematic specifications or have timely updates. View 4 is a commercial satellite image of the city area. This provides a wealth of information when analyzed by both imagery and geospatial analysts. Its main advantages are the geospatial coordinate data associated with the imagery and the MSI bands available for both feature and material analysis. All of these products, used in concert within a common operational picture software package such as DTSS, can "complete-the-picture" for the maneuver commander's operational march into the center of the urban environment.

## GEOINT Visualization Approaches

Visualization products depend upon a number of factors, such as data sources, data availability, hardware/software capabilities, analyst training, and end-user requirements. GEOINT visualization approaches can be as simple as a digital map overlay for area familiarization, or as complex as a multifaceted 3D flythrough for detailed mission rehearsals. In any case, the GEOINT visualization product must satisfy GEOINT Source Selection Question 3 by measurably improving the commander's visualization of the battlespace. Figure 3, an MSI map, provides analysts the ability to interpret not only features in the area of operation (AO) using various bands of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, but allows for detailed geospatial referencing of object's within the area. The final product can be easily produced and disseminated to a variety of users in both hardcopy and softcopy formats. Figure 4 is a 3D visualization using high resolution MSI draped over high resolution interferometric synthetic aperture radar (IFSAR) elevation data. The product can be produced with the DTSS, disseminated as a movie file and viewed with any common movie software package. Figure 5 is a cross-country analysis product integrating the NGA's vector map (VMAP) data and Controlled Image Base (CIB®) imagery. This information provides the user with a basic understanding of the environment, and allows for more detailed planning of movement within an AO. Figure 6 is a line-of-sight analysis of an urban environment. This type of GEOINT visualization product is useful to all personnel operating mounted and dismounted within an urban AO. All of these visualization products

provide the commander with critical intelligence and will measurably improve a commander's visualization of the overall battlespace.

## New Frontiers for GEOINT

Geospatial Intelligence will continue to provide timely, relevant, and accurate information to commanders at all levels for a variety of missions. As more analysts become accustomed to the usefulness of the entire



**Figure 3. MSI map**



**Figure 4. 3D MSI terrain visualization**



**Figure 5. Cross-country terrain analysis**



**Figure 6. Line-of-sight analysis within an urban area**

EM spectrum, GEOINT will evolve from imagery interpretation to material analysis, and all data will possess geospatial metadata for quick referencing within a common operating picture. As the Army embarks on more stability missions, GEOINT will provide commanders with the ability to plan and execute infrastructure projects, monitor progress, and plan for future development across multiple lines of operations. GEOINT will provide Army units involved in disaster relief operations with up-to-date image maps that reflect the actual realities of a disaster area in a geospatial format compatible with Army geospatial systems and GPS. Army intelligence analysts will continue to be a crucial component of future GEOINT operations, and will continue to improve their tradecraft to provide commanders with GEOINT products that contribute to mission accomplishment.

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## National Reconnaissance Office and The Army—Partners for the Future

operations starting at Advanced Individual Training, Officer Basic Courses, and other military career courses. Presentations of NRO systems, architecture, and capabilities have been integrated into numerous Army intelligence and leadership curriculums with the goal of increasing awareness of the NRO support to the warfighter. In January 2004, the NRO assigned a Technical Support Representative (TSR) to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAIC). The Fort Huachuca TSR provides NRO presentations to approximately 14 intelligence courses, such as the Pre-Command Course and the Military Intelligence Captains Career Course, as a means to increase familiarization.

Additionally, the Fort Huachuca TSR is responsible for integrating the current National intelligence architecture and procedures that exist at the NTC. He provides material and presentations for professional development to the NTC cadre as well as support to MREs. He identifies requirements that can be supported by the NRO or its mission partners. Due to the success of integration of National capabilities into the NTC, coordination for similar National intelligence capability feeds into Joint Readiness Training Command rotations has been initiated.

As part of a commitment to grow into education forums at all levels the NRO established the position for a Midwest TSR to be assigned to the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in June 2005. The duties of this TSR are primarily oriented towards increased awareness of NRO and National intelligence capabilities available to commanders and their staffs. With the Battle Command Training Program, he presents an NRO overview during Battle Command Seminars and Counterinsurgency seminars. The TSR also conducts platform instruction in support of the Staff College and School of Advanced Military Studies.

In addition, NRO presentations are provided to students attending the Army's War College, National Intelligence Familiarization Course, and Space Operations Officer Qualification Course. Army personnel have opportunities to either attend an NRO education event or take a course via the Collaborative Learning Environment On Network (CLEON) available on JWICS or SIPRNET.

## Conclusion

The Army continues to undergo its largest transformational changes since World War II to further develop its future force capabilities. Part of the plan's improvements and modernization programs result in greater access to National reconnaissance and intelligence information. In complementary efforts, the NRO and its mission partners continue to collaborate to improve the information flow and increase personnel awareness of National intelligence capabilities to provide commanders the information they need.

*Gary Starkweather, (Lieutenant Colonel, USA, Retired) is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy graduate and a career MI officer. His career included tours with the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment; 25th Infantry Division; USFK HQ, and the NRO liaison element (JCS staff). He is a SETA contractor with the NRO's Army Services Team. Mr. Starkweather is one of NRO's leads for pre-deployment support to Army units. He can be reached at (703) 808-6181/4269; DSN 898-6181/4269 or via email at gary.starkweather@us.army.mil.*

# Army G2
# Information Technology
# Note to the Field

Lynn Schnurr, Army G2 IC CIO

## September 2006

## Introduction

*Since fighting the Global War on Terror, the Army Intelligence Community has been neck deep in new information technology. Our G2s are faced with decisions on a daily basis with regard to commercial technology, program upgrades, or "nearly there" S&T solutions to operational challenges. Many of us have IT lessons learned, both horror stories and best business practices to share with each other. The perspectives from the Pentagon, IC agencies, and G2s who have been in the foxhole might be useful to us all as we make some hard IT decisions to accept new COTS products or undergo system upgrades. With that in mind, I'd like to welcome you to the Army G2 IT Note to the Field. It is an informal way to let you know what is happening with regard to Intel IT.*

*This month's topics include Link Analysis, Joint Intelligence Operations Capability-Iraq (JIOC-I), and a note from LTC Steve North, 1CD G2. Future topics range from state-of-the-art equipment in the various intelligence disciplines to a modern interpretation of T-SCIF policy and the role of mentors for new equipment fielding. We'll also solicit a note from unit G2s throughout the coming months to hear your perspectives on various IT issues.*

*Please let me know if you have a topic you'd like to author and share via this medium.*

***Sincerest regards—Lynn Schnurr, Army G2 IC CIO***

## Link Analysis–A Critical Capability in Today's Warfighting Environment

**by Ed Tower, AG2, DAMI-IM**

Link analysis tools were a "*blip on the radar*" for conventional Army G2s prior to 9/11. We have since discovered the criticality of this type of analysis in engagements where CCIRs and PIRs drill down to individuals, organizations, and events. In recent years, Army analysts have identified and located insurgents and cells, first through hand written link analysis charts and later, through automated tools. Early in the "link analysis tool wars," Analyst Notebook (ANB) beat Crimelink and JIVA's VisuaLinks through "informal" user satisfaction and word of mouth. The Army made a concerted effort to provide these licenses to units at their request. While most users love ANB, one of their repeated complaints is the need to eliminate the need to "cut and paste" data and instead, operate the application over a database. This is not a minor fix.

For those who have ever had to buy licenses in large quantities, and at one time 10,000 licenses was thought to be the Army requirement, you might understand why the Army G2 and Program Managers for ASAS-L, CHIMS, BAT, and JIOC-I/DCGS-A are looking for a sustainable link analysis tool that also includes the database fix noted above.

So, where are we today and what is the way ahead? ANB is the "de facto" baseline tool today. We have purchased large quantities of licenses for use in Iraq, Afghanistan, and predeploying units and offered the remaining licenses to other units. Some of these are 2-year dongle-free licenses that do not expire until the end of FY07 and others are 1-year dongle licenses. Both will work indefinitely, meaning they will not "turn off" when the license expires but if they break, they will not be replaced. While AG2 will not ask units or PMs to remove ANB from existing baselines, neither will we continue to resource them.

If you have ANB, you may continue to use it in its present form. In parallel, PM IF asked a vendor called Over-

watch to develop an affordable, scaleable, link analysis tool that operates over the ASAS-L database. The resulting product is called AXIS Pro. It provides the flexibility to create its own database or link to another structured database, eliminating the "cut and paste" and enabling the sharing of analyzed data for use in further analysis. III Corps and 1st CD were the first to use this application as part of a pre-deployment exercise in June, 2006. They asked Army G2, PM IF, and PM DCGS-A to support their request for AXIS Pro in the OIF 06-08 rotation. At the request of these users, AG2 bought licenses and initiated a process to insert AXIS Pro into the JIOC-I/DCGS-A baseline. Midway through their rotation, we expect III Corps and 1st CD to provide feedback to TCM Sensor Processing and PM DCGS-A with regard to this application. This will assist the PM and TCM in determining the best of breed link analysis tool.

## Transitioning JIOC-I into an Army Program–Where We Are and Where We Are Going
### by Patty Guitard, AG2, DAMI-IM

The JIOC-I is comprised of an architecture approach as well as specific analysis equipment. This novel architecture approach involves the ingestion of multiple data sources into a single repository that analysts access, query, and map in layers. The layers allow an analyst to do a "show me" drill, that is, show me the IED attacks, show me the Mosques, etc. The information is plotted in layers to visualize as much or as little information as desired to work a given problem set. Specific analysis tools are included as part of the JIOC-I software baseline to include CJMTK mapping, link analysis, Querytree, and others.

Systems are currently fielded in Iraq and Afghanistan to the G2 elements for Force CIOC, Fusion Centers, CJSOTF, JIDC, Corps ACE, Divisions, and Maneuver BCT/RCTs. The fielded BCTs selected subordinate bns for JIOC-I fielding based on sector responsibilities. The Bn S2 then had the option to accept JIOC-I on the SIPR domain or to receive JIOC-I on both the SIPR and JWICS domains. So far, 18 Bns have chosen both domains.

*"We continue to push units to make the move to SCI level. Virtually all who have done so are converts, the security and technical issues have not proven overly difficult. We will continue to work to expand capability to more units."*– COL Marcus Kuiper, MNC-I (V) Corps G2

Effective June 2006, the JIOC-I Quick Reaction Capability was officially transitioned into the Army's Program of Record, Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A). The DCGS-A Program Manager distinguishes JIOC-I as version 2.0. The next version, 3.0, is intended to add Battle Command interoperability to the current JIOC-I baseline. The AG2 intent is to see the OIF/OEF 07-09 rotation upgraded to v3.0 in theater, as well as all of the training sets currently installed in garrison (I Corps, III Corps, 25 ID, 1 CD), and those being installed over the next several months (XVIII ABC, 82 Abn Div, 3 ID, 101 AA Div, 4ID, 10 Mnt Div). With regard to these training sets, Corps and Division G2s have the option to invite BCT S2 and Bn S2 personnel to train alongside the Division or Corps. Version 4.0 is intended for BCTs in a mobile configuration but production and fielding of version 4.0 is still in the out years.

With regard to training, the schoolhouse at Ft. Huachuca, is also establishing the first Intelligence Master Analyst Course in October 2006 to train JIOC-I/DCGS-A instead of legacy ASAS systems. We look forward to feedback on this course, and future IT notes to the field will cover the "Mentor program" and its transition to Soldier-based Intelligence Master Analysts as well as progress toward DCGS-A v3.0 and 4.0.

## Training Intel Soldiers to Think–More Than Automation
### by LTC Steve North, 1CD G2

During the past twenty months (March 2005 thru September 2006), the 1st Cavalry Division has been immersed in transitioning from a Force Twenty One Division to modularity, while regenerating combat power in support of "future deployments." The cross leveling of personnel (in and out of the division), while resetting equipment, places a strain on the types, quantity, and quality of training that our Intelligence Soldiers receive. The numerous requirements of a division-level or BCT-level staff also reduces the frequency and duration of dedicated intelligence training. These challenges are multiplied in cases where the period allotted to the division is decreased to as few as twelve to fourteen months. The following two training programs, developed by CW3 Dave Bassili and CW2 Jim Corrigan provided the 1CD Intelligence Soldiers (Division and BCT) with tough realistic training, on a budget, while facilitating the minimal deployment of soldiers to training sites away from Fort Hood.

## Training the ACE for deployment to the Iraqi Theater of Operations
### by CW3 David J. Bassili, 1st Cavalry Division G2 ACE

The Iraqi theater offered the most challenging analytical environment I've encountered in 17 years of intelligence

work. I quickly learned in the first 30 days of OIF 2 that we as a division failed to properly train our analysts to perform in this HUMINT intensive fight.

In general, the ACE was used to working with automated systems (ASAS and ASAS-L) to tell them what the enemy was doing, so our focus was teaching them how to properly input data into the database. We trained them on IPB of the Baghdad AO, the various threat and political groups, the TTPs being encountered, what IED stood for, and even had a senior DIA analyst present a briefing on the tribes of Iraq; all very good things for intelligence professionals to know. Where we failed was not teaching them how to find intelligence, evaluate sources, and how to THINK! Understanding the culture of Iraq can not be underestimated in its importance, teaching analysts how to think was our priority in the months leading up to our next deployment.

Enter ACE Daily Mission Operations; daily briefings by new intelligence soldiers to the most feared creatures in the ACE–the All Source Intelligence Technician! Prior to OIF, the 1st Cavalry Division IBOS (now Intelligence Warfighting Function) had a proven and trusted training regimen to ensure the entire ACE and All Source Analysis System could fully perform its war time mission: fire up the Trojan Spirit and let the sensors feed the beast.

The means had changed, analysts now have to go look for intelligence to analyze and this time it was from "*a middle aged Iraqi male without an established reporting history, credibility can not be established.*" We changed the training to incorporate using M3, NCTC, CIASource, CIDNE, Pathfinder and reviewing (not cutting and pasting) products produced in country. We made the analysts produce original products to brief at the end of the day. We provided minimal oversight in the production with the exception of what "right" looked like by way of process. By forcing them to do the work themselves, collaborate with fellow analysts, and corroborating HUMINT/SIGINT reporting through SIGACTS, we taught them to think through the process and learn to be analysts, not historians.

Only the coming months will validate the training program. The process was sound; force the soldiers to find the intelligence, evaluate it for credibility through corroborating information and be able to tell someone what it all means and how it relates to the Commander's PIR. I will say this, the last Daily Mission Operations briefing I took prior to deployment; I didn't "HAVE" to ask one question of a single soldier. I did it to keep them striving to do it better.

## The Intelligence University Method for Training New Systems
**by CW2 Jim Corrigan, 1st Cavalry Division ACE**

Intelligence processing systems are only useful if they can help shift the balance of an analyst's time from data gathering to information analysis, from crunching numbers to thinking through the problem, evaluating sources and creating analytical intelligence products.

Approaching OIF 06-08, we found ourselves inundated with new systems, new technology, all touted as the latest and greatest fix to the intelligence problem. It isn't about the tools themselves but the way we train to use those software tools. No system can ever think for the analyst. A valuable system gives the analyst more time to think.

The 1st Cavalry Division's Analytical Control Element (ACE) developed the Intelligence University (Intel U) to provide intelligence soldiers at all echelons exposure to the new tools in an environment that replicated being in theater. Intel U training material was based on current or near-current reporting from Iraq. After the system overview, analysts tackled problem sets specified by the battalion and brigade S2s. Three days of research, analysis and product development resulted in a final briefing to their S2s on the methods used, their analysis and the resulting products.

We used this method to demonstrate the capabilities of JIOC-I tools and how they can assist MI soldiers with their daily production requirements including hands-on time on NG Querytree, ARCGIS and Analyst Notebook. We also used the week-long Intel U to demonstrate the functionality of AXIS-Pro software, its ability to import report data using the text extractor, create analytical link diagrams and how it interacts with the ASAS-L database.

With modularity in full effect, intelligence soldiers even within the same brigade rarely get to train together. By capturing analysts down to the battalion level for a one-week Intel U, we built an instant alumni association they can rely on during deployment. Better yet, by focusing on how the systems will be used in theater versus which buttons to push, the Soldiers grasped the software's application instead of the intangible capability.

JIOC-I and AXIS-Pro, when used as part of the intelligence production process, can greatly enhance the analyst's efficiency and free up more time to think.

## Introduction

*Hello G2s–Last month's inaugural G2 IT note to the field was well received and I thank those who took time out of busy schedules to read and distribute to your staffs and to those who offered to write a note for upcoming releases. For those still considering submitting a note to share with your fellow G2s, the November issue will concentrate on language translation and the SIGINT discipline, the December issue on cross domain security and information sharing, and the January issue on MI/IT training. For the December issue, we are particularly interested in soliciting a note from a Bn S2 who can share personal challenges and successes in establishing a T-SCIF. Notes on these or other topics you deem of value to the Army Intel Community are welcome.*

*This month's G2 IT note covers technology in support of the Human Domain, such as Biometrics, HIIDE, HDWS, and Battlefield Forensics. I hope it is useful as you prepare your Soldiers for intelligence operations.*

*Sincerest regards—Lynn Schnurr, Army G2 IC CIO*

## Biometrics–The tool and the "So What"

**by Jim Fenton, AG2, DAMI-IM**

You just collected some sort of biometric and contextual data on person of interest (POI) using the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT), or a similar device, so what? You are tired, hot, hungry, and in need of a shower. Why is this information important to you and the War on Terrorism? What are the people in the "real world" doing with the information you have painstakingly collected?

The "So What" to these questions is by collecting and using biometrics to identify the "bad guys", we reduce the potential threat to all Warfighters worldwide by developing a biometric enabled POI watchlist. What the Warfighter does not see is the enormous architecture and personnel supporting many different agencies that depend on the collection of that one fingerprint, iris scan, facial picture, or piece of contextual data that can quickly lead to developing an identity of a POI, relationships to other POIs and POIs to events. Using BAT or any biometric collection device (BCD) to collect the biometrics of a POI or a detainee is essential in the fight against terrorism.

There are processes and equipment in place to determine rapidly whether that person at the checkpoint, the local hire, or third world national is a friend or foe. Many sources gather and provide biometric information back to local and national databases while other sources collect latent prints and evidence from IED events, captured weapons, crime scenes, etc. Local and national databases receive this information for exploitation by different government agencies which feedback the information, the "So What", from the analyst to the proper unit or person. A match in a database of a POI does not have much meaning unless it is accompanied by the "So What".

One such "So What" product is the Biometric Intelligence Analysis Report (BIAR) produced by NGIC. These reports are available from the Automated IDENT Management Support System (AIMS) on SIPRNet at http://www.ngic.army.smil.mil/biometrics



Key Points of the AIMS portal:
- ❑ Exploitation across all domains.
- ❑ Establish a knowledge base on matched IDs.
- ❑ Manage DOD biometric-based watchlist development.
- ❑ Support operationalizing by analyzing & distributing "So-What."

The most prolific tool to collect biometrics in the CENTCOM AOR is BAT. BAT is a multimodal, Electronic Biometrics and Fingerprint Transmission Specification (EBTS/EFTS) compliant biometric system that collects and compares fingerprints, iris images and facial photos both internally and externally through the BAT Server System. BAT has the capability to enroll, identify and track POIs. The BAT user can build digital dossiers on POIs that include interrogation reports, biographic information, relationship, etc. BAT is the only system currently fielded that has an internal biometric signature searching and matching capability with sharable, cross-domain data.

BAT started as an Advanced Concept Technology Demostration (ACTD) in the late 90s and was adapted for use in OIF and OEF. BAT has undergone many

changes since its first inception and is operating currently at version 4.0. There are over 800 systems fielded and more than 1,200 software thin clients installed on non-enrollment computers. BAT version 5.0 is in development with an anticipated fielding date of February 2006.



### Badging Operations

This tool has many different configurations to fit the mission. BAT can operate independently of a network connection and can receive updates from any of the servers in the CENTCOM AOR after establishing a SIPRNET connection. Using the information from BAT, along with assets like PATHFINDER and the JIOC-I, analysts can bind together many different databases to identify a POI at a particular place and time of an event.

The future of biometric collection and matching technology is growing quicker than the ability to design systems to accommodate the changes. The PM Biometrics' Way Ahead is to produce a family of systems that share data and meet specific needs of the mission within the next year using BAT as the foundation stone. Eventually, systems will be smaller, lighter, share data across domains, have the capability to collect at a distance, one-step collection for iris and facial, and the capability to quickly collect quality fingerprints.

### Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE)–Collection and Matching at the Point of Encounter

**by Jerry Jackson, AG2, DAMI-IM**

A scenario—It's June 2007 and an Army element has gathered information that indicates a key insurgent cell leader is scheduled to meet his lieutenants at a nearby location within two hours. An assault force is assembled that

includes cordon security and objective assault elements. Prior to their departure from the Forward Operating Base, the assault team members download the biometrically enabled Watchlist from the DOD biometric enterprise to their new Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE™) devices. During the assault, all individuals seized on the objective or attempting to flee through the cordon are biometrically scanned with the HIIDE™ devices and their fingerprints, facial photos and iris scans are compared to the biometric portfolio data contained in the downloaded biometric enabled Watchlist. Utilizing a reach back wireless capability, the scanned biometric information is also vetted against the entire collected DoD biometric authoritative repository to aid the assault force in establishing the true identities of the individuals they encounter.

As a result of the rapid biometric vetting, the assault force identifies and detains the cell leader despite his having undergone significant cosmetic surgery to alter his appearance. Also seized by the cordon forces are two wanted insurgents and a bomb maker whose biometrics are linked via the HIIDE™ to multiple attacks on coalition forces through latent fingerprints lifted at previous incidents. The use of the HIIDE™ as a tactical biometric capability speeds the analysis and vetting of each of the individuals encountered; thereby minimizing the time the assault force must stay exposed in hostile territory. Also, rather than creating animosity with the local population by collecting all personnel in a broad sweep and taking them back to the FOB for enrollment and screening, all personnel not of specific interest to the coalition are biometrically enrolled with the HIIDE™ at the point of encounter and released by the assault force. This minimizes the impact on the local population and expands the available biometric database.



HIIDE V 4.0

What is it? The HIIDE™ device is a powerful tool developed for biometric identification. Users can enroll, match, or verify with the three primary biometrics: iris, finger and face. The intuitive user interface also allows the entry of

biographic data to create a comprehensive database on the enrolled subjects. The HIIDE™ has an onboard processor and data storage capacity and is the only device that allows complete functionality while connected to a host PC or when operating in the field untethered. Small, rugged and lightweight, the HIIDE™ is a critical component in the DoD worldwide need for faster, more accurate identity solutions.

The HIIDE™ is a Microsoft XP embedded device that includes state of the art lens technology for both iris and facial image capture and an FBI standards compliant 500 DPI capacitive fingerprint sensor. Enrollment on the HIIDE™ is accomplished through an easy to use step by step wizard process starting off with capturing a subject's left and right iris images. The HIIDE™ then can capture all ten fingerprints and finally a facial image is acquired. The user can choose to skip any or all of the biometric captures for maximum flexibility. Once the biometric capture is completed, the user can input a fully customizable biographic information file and save the enrollment. Recognition of a subject can be performed using either the iris or fingerprint biometric for 1:N searches or a 1:1 verification using facial recognition.

The HIIDE™ can store up to 10,000 full biometric portfolios (2 iris templates, 10 flat fingerprints, a facial image and selected contextual data) and identify a subject in stand-alone mode (i.e., untethered to a host PC). The biometric and contextual data is fully compliant with the FBI's Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Standard (EFTS) which is focused on fingerprints, and the newer DOD Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification (EBTS), which accounts for multiple modes of biometrics. The device can be expanded to include USB enabled peripheral devices such as passport or card readers, and an external keyboard and mouse. Current development efforts include completion of full compatibility with the Tactical Computer (TactiComp) fielded by the Army Space Program Office (ASPO). Through this interoperability, the HIIDE™ will gain the wireless reach back to the biometric enterprise "inside the wire" via the TactiComp's self healing "Mesh Net" capability. Efforts are also underway to develop wide band communications on the move as a means for accessing larger stores of intelligence data related to the identified individuals.

Designed from the ground up as a cooperative interagency effort, the HIIDE™ is fully compatible with the Army's Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) currently fielded throughout the CENTCOM AOR. Through this interoperability, the HIIDE device provides connectivity to the DOD Biometric Enterprise but frees the Soldiers/Marines who use it from wired connectivity to the biometric data source. Utilizing the internal storage and matching capabilities of the device, the user gains truly tactical biometrics or "biometrics outside the wire."

The ability to not only identify personnel wanted by coalition forces but to identify persons of interest while conducting normal patrols has already proven of value to U.S. forces. U.S. forces utilize biometric identification to confirm that individuals they encounter are authorized to be in the area. By screening all individuals in a town as part of counterinsurgency efforts, it is possible to later identify individuals that don't belong to the previously enrolled local population (such as mobile insurgents). Such a policy has proven so successful at limiting insurgent freedom of movement that some local leaders have approached U.S. forces to have their towns biometrically enrolled. They realize that biometric enrollment will help to identify those that don't belong in the area (such as foreign insurgents) without the local leaders risking reprisal by reporting insurgents to the coalition.

The world of biometrics has moved from solutions involving single biometric modalities to ones of increasing complexity such as national identification projects. These projects often involve two or three biometric modalities. Layering biometric technology allows users to maximize the benefits of each of the biometrics while effectively minimizing the limitations. The HIIDE™ device utilizes the speed and accuracy of iris identification, the ability to access large fingerprint databases, and the social acceptance that comes with facial recognition. Combined in a single device, this offers a powerful and flexible tool that can be customized to fit almost any identification scenario.

The way ahead–Army G2 will seek to move this QRC into an Army Program of Record should the system prove to be as user friendly and productive as anticipated. The Army G2 is sponsoring the fielding of roughly 1,500 devices as a Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) to deploying units as soon as November 2006. Planned future enhancements will include reduced size, one-step iris/facial capture, and increased internal storage. These enhancements will greatly aid the Warfighter with the capability to quickly enroll and identify persons of interest at the target site or control point.

## Human Domain Workstation (HDWS)
### by Victor Robles, Army G2, DAMI-IM

On 1 October 2006, the Distributed Common Ground System–Army (DCGS-A) Human Intelligence Virtual En-

vironment (HIVE) became operational within the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) MNC-I intelligence architecture. This countrywide, web based, distributed architecture provides Army, USMC, and coalition forces easy access to advanced DCGS-A human domain query and analysis capabilities. To provide this service to U.S. and Coalition Human Intelligence activities and to network the system, nine DCGS-A Human Domain Workstation (HDWS) servers were installed throughout Iraq. An on-going training and installation program established over 1,500 user accounts and has allowed for the construction of a human domain/human intelligence database of over 430,000 records to date. Both the number of users and the database continue to grow rapidly as users access the system and realize its ease of use and the depth of human domain data that is available for direct support of warfighting operations. System support is provided through a Forward Support Engineer (FSE), a manned help desk in Baghdad operated 24/7, and two rapid-response FSEs operating from Balad. An in-country DCGS-A HDWS development "Tiger Team" is working on enhancements and additional functions to address MNF-I goals to streamline the method of targeting, engagement and battle damage assessment. Additionally, they have ensured interoperability with Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Block II and are working the requirements for other key systems within the intelligence network such as the Joint Intelligence Operations Capability–Iraq (JIOC-I) and the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE). The way ahead–The HDWS stand-up is one of the first instances of an initial distributed architecture within DCGS-A for HUMINT services. The Program Manager DCGS-A plans to integrate the HDWS software and hardware platform into the net-centric DCGS-A Enterprise solution (Version 4) in Fiscal Year 08.

## Battlefield Forensics Training

**by COL Samuel Dudkiewicz Chief, Biometrics Intelligence Project, National Ground Intelligence Center**

In early 2006, LTC Duke, 25th ID(L) G2, suggested that U.S. and Coalition combat units were unprepared to thoroughly exploit evidence and material of intelligence value for a given objective. His concerns centered on the fact that units had not adequately demonstrated a capability to prepare detention packets that reliably resulted in a sustained detention, a subsequent prosecution, and an adequate jail sentence for charges levied against a detainee. The 25th ID G2 opined that there was significant importance in capturing evidence from objectives in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the relative importance to de-

tainee operations and prosecution could not be understated.

Moreover, he offered that the credibility of the unit with the local populace is negatively impacted when known terrorists are released from custody because of an inability to put a case together. According to Duke, "Those Iraqis that would otherwise work with us, cease doing so because they are putting their lives in jeopardy to no purpose." As a result of these concerns and a desire to change the status quo, LTC Duke requested that NGIC provide training that centered on non-IED Battlefield Forensic Collection. Upon approval from the Army G2, NGIC put together a 40-hour Battlefield Forensic Course which was modeled on the training being provided to the Weapons Intelligence Teams deploying in support of OIF. Although this training centered on IED exploitation, the basic subsets of the training would be the same for non-IED forensic exploitation.

The core of the Battlefield Forensic Training deals with the proper handling, collection, and processing of combat related forensics. This training provides an organic capability to provide competent evidentiary exploitation in a variety of situations. Overall skill sets developed during the training include: quartering and controlling a scene; quickly assessing the scene; identifying and evaluating material of evidentiary and intelligence value; use of photographs in scene documentation; processing of the scene utilizing standard latent lift techniques, preparing evidence documentation and maintaining chain of custody; preserving evidence during collection and transportation, and preparation of diagrams and sketches.

A variety of teaching modalities are utilized to ensure the development of required skill sets including classroom, round robin exercises and live environment scenarios. The training culminates with a series of capstone team exercises. The scenarios and exercise are developed in a manner to replicate situations confronted in the theater of operations as much as the training environment allows.

To date, this training has been provided to over 150 Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division, 25th ID(L) and most recently the 1st Cavalry Division. Soldier evaluations of the training continuously reflect the high quality and value of the training as well as the professionalism of the training cadre.

(**Note:** In some instances, NGIC has provided Forensics Tech Kits that contain supplies and materials used to collect forensic evidence and related materials. However, as NGIC is not a logistical conduit for supplying equip-

ment, it routinely advises units participating in the training to purchase kits if they plan on doing this sort of mission. NGIC provides information on what type of equipment is best suited along with an appropriate source of supply.)

*If you have a comment or suggestion for a note, or you'd like to volunteer to write an article for an upcoming note to the field, contact:*

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
# Training the Corps

## Test Development—If It Was Easy, Everyone Would Be Doing It
### by Joann Kiyabu

At most U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) installations, instructors and training developers are expected to produce tests with little or no training in test development. This can lead to poorly constructed tests that do not adequately and reliably test what was trained and therefore, have little to no validity or reliability.

Fortunately, at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), Fort Huachuca, Arizona we are a step ahead of most TRADOC schools as within the Staff and Faculty Development Division (SFDD) a Test Development Workshop has been taught for about 20 years. It is one of the few test development training courses in all of TRADOC and was designed and developed right here at Fort Huachuca.

The Test Development Workshop provides instructors and training developers with basic training in the theory, methods, and techniques of developing tests. Included in the course are blocks of instruction and practical exercises in Critical Thinking, Bloom's Taxonomy, Developing Learning Objectives, Test Development Blueprint, Test Writing (both hands-on and written performance-based), Test Validation, Item Analysis, and Test Control.

## Test Development Basics

Tests should be designed and developed prior to the lesson plan. This ensures the right focus for your lesson plan to cover only the material that is important enough to be tested. There is no time or place in an Army course to train or test trivia. To develop a good test you must first determine what you want the students to be able to do as a result of your training. Then you need to establish your training objectives and further break them down into learning activities and performance measures. In the Test Development Workshop, you will learn how to use the Test Development Blueprint, a tool that will help you plan the design and development of your test items based on your training objectives.

Training in the workshop includes positive and negative aspects of various test types and writing guidelines for test item types such as true-false, matching, multiple-choice, short answer, and essay type questions. This is reinforced with a practical exercise in which the students actually create a test from the Test Development Blueprint following the guidelines of writing a good test item. They are also encouraged to write test items at the application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation levels using Bloom's Taxonomy to test critical and creative thinking skills and abilities.

The ideal scenario is to write a test that is so mechanically sound that the students who have mastered the objective will pass the test and those who have not mastered the objective will not pass the test. You want a well designed test where the test-wise student will not be able to pick out the correct answer because of mistakes you have inadvertently made while constructing the test. Some of the guidelines covered in the Test Development Workshop include the following:

❑ Keep the wording simple, concise, and direct leading the students to interpret the test item the way you intended.

❑ Avoid writing tricky or misleading test items. Your job is to accurately assess their knowledge and performance and *not* to trick students.

❑ Keep items independent of other items so that you do not give away the answer to one test item within another item. Also, being able to answer any item should not depend on getting the right answer on another item.

❑ Highlight any words that are crucial to understanding the test item such as underlining, bolding, italicizing, or capitalizing.

❑ Include pictures, sketches, diagrams, or schematics if they more clearly represent the problem than would words.

## Outreach Activities

Over the last several years, in addition to increasing the number of classes at USAIC, SFDD leads the way again by delivering on-request training of our version of the Test Development Workshop at other TRADOC installations such as Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Benning, Georgia, as well as the Lavern E. Weber National Guard Bureau Professional Education Center at Camp Robinson, North Little Rock, Arkansas.

The requesting organizations fund the trips so there are no travel costs for the Intelligence Center and trips are arranged around the SFDD's training schedule. During Fiscal Year 2006, SFDD will train 198 students in test development. This is an increase from a few years ago when 48 students per year were trained.



Photo by Marschall Brooks, PEC-ARNG

**A Test Development Workshop graduating class at the Lavern E. Weber National Guard Bureau Professional Education Center, Camp Robinson, Arkansas.**

*Readers may contact the Test Development Workshop Course Manager and Instructor, Joann Kiyabu via email at joann.kiyabu@us.army.mil.*

# Language Action

## TRADOC Cultural Training Summit

*by Peter Shaver*

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Cultural Training Summit will convene in early 2007 under the direction of the Commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Major General Barbara Fast. The purpose of the summit is to bring together government, academia, and non-governmental organizations to discuss topics ranging from critical tasks required for cultural awareness training to linkage of operational training with the institutional structure that will best serve the soldier in the field.

The theme, *Cultural Awareness: Seeking Congruence–Needs and Challenges* illustrates the critical importance of cultural awareness at the tactical and strategic level. Lieutenant General David Petraeus, Commander of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) stated, "We have spent the last fifty years remembering and forgetting the importance of cultural awareness and stability ops. Now it's coming to us full force."

Challenges of curriculum development and training; relevant and effective instruction; implementation; Joint service issues on convergence and divergence; standardization of cultural awareness training, and metrics/evaluation of cultural awareness training will be addressed during the summit. Additional focus issues will be transforming academic knowledge into operational acumen; incorporating lessons learned and "boots-on-the-ground" experiences; and implementing tactical application of knowledge, as well as combating the "kinetic solution" mindset to mission accomplishment.

We expect representatives to attend from all of the uniformed services; several universities; the Hoover, Goldwater, and Carnegie Institutes; non-governmental organizations such as Amideast, the Rand Corporporation, the Center for Strategy and Technology, and non-Department of Defense governmental organizations such as the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Well-known keynote speakers from military, government, and academic agencies will highlight the theme of the conference. Break-out discussion group topics include:

❑ *Curriculum development and standardization:* Incorporating lessons learned, boots on the ground experience, and best practices.
❑ *Instruction:* Relevance, efficiency and applicability; establishing metrics and evaluation criteria; leveraging academic knowledge.
❑ *Implementation:* Tactical application of cultural information; Joint service issues.

The conference will convene at The Palms Convention Center in Sierra Vista, Arizona from 27 through 29 March 2007. For further information please go to the MIPB homepage and view the conference flyer at our Latest News section.

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*Peter Shaver is the Chief, Culture and Foreign Language Integration Center (CFLIC) and the 09L Translator/Interpreter Course Manager. Readers may reach him via email at peter.shaver@hua.army.mil and by telephone at (520) 538-1042 or DSN 879-1042.*

# Intelligence Philatelic Vignettes
## Proper Use Of Government Mail

### By Mark Sommer

An official War Department cover (philatelic term for an envelope) from the Military Intelligence Service used during World War II.



Privately used by a Major General Converse to his wife, but properly sent using his own 6 cent postage. Obscured by the stamp is the printed "PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE" in the upper right corner. Postmarked 8 September 1943.

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# Unit Profiles

Tell us about your unit. Please send us a write-up with the following items and information:

- ✦ High resolution color photographs or high resolution soft copy (preferred) of the unit crest.
- ✦ History of the unit to include campaigns and decorations.
- ✦ Current unit subordination, status and mission (unclassified).
- ✦ Operations your unit has supported in the last 15 to 20 years.
- ✦ Recent special accomplishments or activities that make your unit unique.
- ✦ Images of specialized equipment (unclassified).
- ✦ POC name, email address and phone numbers for this project.
- ✦ Full unit mailing address.
- ✦ Other information you would like included not listed above.

In order to allow our graphics designer time to create your unit crest, please send the any photographs at the earliest possible time to:

ATTN ATZS-CDI-DM
USAIC&Ft. Huachuca
550 Cibeque St.
Bldg 61730, Room 124
Ft. Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017

Please send the soft copy crest and the unit write-up to
mipb@hua.army.mil

# Contact and Article
## Submission Information

*This is your magazine. We need your support by writing and submitting articles for publication.*

**When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the Military Intelligence or Intelligence Communities (IC).**

Articles about current operations and exercises; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and equipment and training are always welcome as are lessons learned; historical perspectives; problems and solutions; and short "quick tips" on better employment or equipment and personnel. Our goals are to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps and the IC at large. Propose changes, describe a new theory, or dispute an existing one. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how new technology will change the way we operate.

**When submitting articles to *MIPB*, please take the following into consideration:**

❏ Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3,000 words, double-spaced with normal margins without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words.

❏ Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible.

❏ We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles.

❏ Although *MIPB* targets themes, you do not need to "write" to a theme.

❏ Please note that submissions become property of *MIPB* and may be released to other government agencies or nonprofit organizations for re-publication upon request.

**What we need from you:**

❏ A release signed by your local security officer or SSO stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and pictures are unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain **OR** that the accompanying graphics and pictures are unclassified/FOUO. Once we receive your article, we will send you a sample form to be completed by your security personnel.

❏ A cover letter (either hard copy or electronic) with your work or home email addresses, telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published.

❏ Your article in MS Word. Do not use special document templates.

❏ A Public Affairs release if your installation or unit/agency requires it. Please include that release with your submission.

❏ Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic. We need complete captions (the who, what, where, when, why, and how), photographer credits, and the author's name on photos. Please do not embed graphics or photos within the article's text, attach them as separate files such as .tif or .jpg and note where they should appear in the article. Also the resolution of your graphic and/or photos should be 300 dpi or better.

❏ The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author's current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information, email address, and phone numbers with the biography.

We will edit the articles and put them in a style and format appropriate for *MIPB*. From time to time, we will contact you during the editing process to ensure a quality product. Please inform us of any changes in contact information.

Send articles and graphics to MIPB@hua.army.mil or by mail on disk to:

MIPB
Box 2001
Bldg. 51005
Fort Huachuca, AZ  85613-7002

If you have any questions, please email us at MIPB@hua.army.mil or call 520.538.0956/DSN 879.0956. Our fax is 520.533.9971.

### Upcoming Themes and Deadlines

| Issue | Theme | Deadline |
|---|---|---|
| Jan-Mar 07 | COIN | 31 Jan 06 |
| Apr-Jun 07 | Transformation | 30 Apr 07 |
| Jul-Sep 07 | GEOINT | 31 Jul 07 |
| Oct-Dec 07 | Biometrics | 30 Oct 07 |

**Air Intelligence Agency**
http://www.aia.af.mil

**Central Intelligence Agency**
https://www.cia.gov

**Department of Homeland Security**
http://www.dhs.gov

**Defense Intelligence Agency**
http://www.dia.mil

**Defense Threat Reduction Agency**
http://www.dtra.mil

**Intelligence and Security Command**
http://www.inscom.army.mil

**Joint Warfare Analysis Center**
http://www.jwac.mil

**National Counterterrorism Center**
http://www.nctc.gov

**National Ground Intelligence Center**
http://avenue.org/ngic

**National Geospatial Intelligence Agency**
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