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203d MI Battalion (Operations) (Corps)

By order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official:

SANDRA R. RILEY  
Administrative Assistant to the  
Secretary of the Army

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff
In the last issue of MIPB, BG Sumpter discussed the solid foundation of what makes the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps great. Continuing operations around the world as a part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) reinforce my assessment that our Corps is on the right track. Intelligence is critical and will be even more critical as the Army transforms. We must always keep that fact forefront in our minds. For this issue, I want to focus on the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) lessons learned effort, the importance of our MI skills to the warfighter, the emerging growth of our branch, and how the Intelligence Center is dealing with that growth.

In order to have an aggressive and synchronized means of focusing and adjusting the many functions we perform here at Fort Huachuca, we have created an aggressive lessons learned program. The program objectives include—

- Creating an effective mechanism to assign responsibilities for collection, analysis, and dissemination of observations and other critical lessons learned information.
- Providing lessons learned to commanders to help units train and prepare for operations.
- Identifying lessons learned issues and solution strategies to the Intelligence Center leadership for approval and implementation of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) actions.

To assist in this effort we have developed requirements to better focus the collection of observations from you. It is your observations that help us train the MI force, develop our doctrine, organize ourselves on the battlefield, and shape our future. I hope all of you will take a moment to reflect on the importance of your participation and make the extra effort to provide our lessons learned team your observations as appropriate.

While we are finding many issues to aggressively tackle with our lessons learned effort, all of our observations reinforce the fact that intelligence is absolutely crucial to the fight.

The skills we as MI professionals carry to the battlefield across full spectrum operations are critical. Often we overlook how much we actually know and how skilled we actually are. Warriors need us at their sides ready to understand their requirements, to work with the J3/G3/S3 and the rest of the staff to fight for intelligence, to conduct intelligence operations, and to provide the intelligence needed to successfully accomplish the mission.

One of the most fundamental truths coming from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is that intelligence warriors must deploy ready to operate in the environment, make the intelligence cycle work (by overcoming obstacles to effective intelligence operations), and provide what the commander needs when and how the commander needs it. Legal, ethical, and disciplined intelligence operations are synonymous with effective intelligence operations ... our fundamental doctrine works. Many of the tools are there, we just have to figure out how to adapt those tools to the many variable missions, threats, situations, and environments. The real challenge is in applying techniques to each complex and unique situation we encounter.

As a result of these operations, the Army has recognized the requirement for more and better intelligence capabilities in the form of technologies, systems, personnel, and organizations. This recognition is initially manifested in the tremendous growth in three MI Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs): 96B (Intelligence Analyst), 97B (Counterintelligence [CI] Agent), 97E (Human Intelligence [HUMINT] Collector). At Fort Huachuca, we are “ramping up” to handle a significant increase in throughput for these MOSs. There are many details we are quickly handling in order to effectively put the train-
NCOES: The Way Ahead

“The whole object of education is...to develop the mind. The mind should be a thing that works.”

—Sherwood Anderson

The whole focus of the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) is to produce competent tactically and technically proficient warfighters for our Nation’s defense. Our current operational tempo is as high as it has ever been for our Army and we will sustain that tempo into the foreseeable future. Because we are an Army at war, concentrated on a fast-paced contemporary operating environment, the ways that we train soldiers will continually evolve, producing tougher and smarter noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to fight and win our country’s wars.

NCOES will potentially have a different “look” by fiscal year 2007 (FY07). The current NCOES is a four-tier system:
- Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC).
- Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNCOC).
- Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC).
- U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA).

A three-tier NCOES may replace it. Although a three-tier NCOES has not been approved for implementation, it has approval for further study and a three-tier pilot is still on line for FY06. There are two primary reasons for the hard look at the current four-tier NCOES. First is the total amount of time soldiers spend away from their units (high operational tempo brigade combat teams [BCTs] in particular), and second is the theory that a three-tier system “syncs” better with the BCT life cycle.

As proposed, Tier 1 will train all senior Specialists (SPCs) with promotion potential on how to be a Sergeant (SGT) in a team, crew, and squad. Tier 2 will teach Staff Sergeants (SSGs) with promotion potential how to become effective Sergeants First Class (SFCs) in a platoon and company environment. Tier 3 will prepare Army Master Sergeants (MSGs) and sister Service equivalents to operate as Sergeants Major (SGMs) and Command Sergeants Major (CSMs) in battalions and above.

What we as the Proponent propose is advanced leader training (ALT), which will train all MI Tier 1 graduates and all reclassified NCOs technical military occupational specialty (MOS)-related functions to prepare them to be competent MI team chiefs, crew chiefs, and squad leaders. The training will be MOS-focused and we will train a somewhat younger soldier than our current BNCOC does. Course lengths will vary by MOS—those details have yet to be determined, but the ranges you could expect will likely be along the lines of current BNCOC courses. Look for a few more skill level 20 tasks and a few less skill level 30 tasks, because we will be teaching younger soldiers. Senior leader training (SLT) will be the last time we will formally train our MI NCOs at the Intelligence Center. We will train all MI Tier 2 graduates in a four- to six-week resident course focused on MI senior NCO leadership roles.

Thus, our ALT soldiers will develop and refine their 20- and 30-level skill sets in a resident, proponent-driven technical training course.

(Continued on page 7)
Change is the only constant in our Army. For the first time in our Nation’s history, our Army is fighting on three fronts (Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Global War on Terrorism) while maintaining a legacy force and reorganizing into the Objective Force of the future. This is not only unprecedented but is a daunting task. Military Intelligence (MI) warrant officers (WOs) have an integral role to play in this change and a role that is likely to increase in the future.

For many years, the Army has relied on WOs as its technically expert officer cohort. The Objective Force, with its projected reliance upon modern systems and technology, will bring an expanded role requirement for WOs. The current method used to maintain and educate WOs is not adequate to train the expertise required in transformation. Today, the Army recruits, accesses, pays, manages, educates, and retains WOs separately from line officers. This is changing. The Army is making fundamental changes in the WO cohort to support full-spectrum operations. At the heart of this change is a complete integration of WOs into the larger Officer Corps. The road map to these changes is the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Warrant Officer Study.

The ATLDP WO Study set forth initiatives to improve WO training, resourcing, and leader development now and throughout the Army Transformation to the Objective Force. This past August, I attended a meeting of the Warrant Officer Leadership Council that discussed the status of implementing the ATLDP WO Study recommendations. I will be the first to admit that the implementation process has been slow but, on the positive side, it is moving forward. The most notable change, of course, was the integration of the Warrant Officer Corps into the Officer branches on 9 July 2004. More fundamental changes will occur in fiscal year 2006 (FY06, October 2005) when the Officer Education System (OES) absorbs the Warrant Officer Education System (WOES).

It is important that all MI warrant officers be aware of emerging changes within our Corps. If you have not read the complete report, I urge you to do so. (It is available online at http://www.usawoa.org/ProfAndMilReading.htm.) Read it as often as necessary so that you fully understand its intent and can educate superiors and subordinates alike about it. At the heart of the ATLDP recommended changes is a complete integration of WOs into the larger Officer Corps while ensuring that WOs retain their heritage as technical experts. The ATLDP WO Study also specified the need to clarify the roles of WOs, then make changes to their professional development, training and education, and personnel resourcing. In essence, WOs must remain relevant throughout Army Transformation. In doing so, we must discard any bias that threatens our relevancy now and in the future. We must take on the responsibility to ensure that others understand WO culture as well as our professional development, training, and personnel needs. The Army leadership can institute a multitude of changes, methods, and business processes, but people are at the core of everything accomplished in the Army.

Let us remember that until 1959 the U.S. Air Force (USAF) also employed WOs as technicians and mid-level managers. However, after a comprehensive review of its warrant officer program, the USAF concluded the following:
“Warrant Officers are not sufficiently flexible for utilization outside of their technical specialty…. Furthermore, officers provide the flexibility for use in a broad span of managerial and career broadening assignments, which are necessary to meet requirements.”

As a result, the USAF determined that structure, training, and retention requirements were best served by “eliminating its warrant officer program.”

As the Army transforms to a lighter and more lethal force, capable of effectively operating on future battlefields, a new mindset has to be established. The Warrant Officer Corps must evolve and its members must be recognized as full-fledged members of the Army Officer Corps. WOs must abandon an education system that is neither fully resourced nor uses the latest technology to deliver specialty-specific training. We must shed our current system of accessions and the unfavorable perceptions that accompany it. The negative effects of pay compression, promotion risks, and discouragement mar today’s WO recruitment efforts. We must counter with an aggressive recruitment program, with involvement by the entire chain of command so that enlisted soldiers view warrant officer service as the attractive Army career that it truly is, and embrace a mindset of “One Officer Corps.”

We must discard a culture where we are separate segments of an officer corps. Instead, we must move forward toward the Objective Force as one officer corps bonded with a common goal and an understanding of one another’s roles. Conversely, WOs must discontinue any notions of inflexibility to perform outside their specialties in order to operate effectively in the full spectrum of Army operations.

The ATLDP definition of a Future Force “warrant officer” is the following:

“The Warrant Officer of the Objective Force is a self aware and adaptive technical expert, combat leader, trainer, and advisor. Through progressive levels of expertise in assignments, training, and education, the Warrant Officer administers, manages, maintains, operates, and integrates Army systems and equipment across the full range of Army operations. Warrant Officers are innovative integrators of emerging technologies, dynamic teachers, confident war-fighters, and developers of specialized teams of soldiers. They support a wide range of Army missions throughout their career[s].”

Key points in this ATLDP definition dispel the notion of WOs serving as single-tracked technicians. Of note is the “adaptive technical experts” who must be able to adapt to an ever-changing environment within and outside their technical specialties. The ATLDP definition goes on to state that WOs “support a wide range of Army missions throughout their career[s].” This comment again reverses the notion that future WOs will serve as “single-tracked” technicians. Moreover, the ATLDP definition characterizes WOs as “innovative integrators…dynamic teachers, confident war-fighters, and developers of specialized teams of soldiers.” That defines the future technical officers. The Objective Force WO will remain the Army’s technical expert, in addition to encompassing broader warfighting and leadership roles.

On the other hand, some will argue that redefining WOs as multifunctional officers is another attempt to mold them into line officers. It is important to remember this prediction from the ATLDP report that again dispels that notion: “…with the Army’s reliance upon modern systems and technology, this will likely bring an expanded role for warrant officers.” In addition, a comprehensive report on WOs by the Congressional Budget Office noted an expanded role for Army WOs in the future. The summation is that the technical officer of the future must be a multifunctional and “multidimensional officer capable of operating in a full-spectrum environment.”

The Army is well on the path to redefining the roles of WOs so that we are full and relevant participants in its future force structure. Our charter is not to confine ourselves to a particular specialty, unable or unwilling to perform effectively “outside the box.” We must remain adaptive technicians, competent warfighters, and confident leaders ready to take on expanded roles in the Objective Force.

Each warrant officer must view the Army’s changing environment not from an individual “foxhole” or particular specialty, but in its totality. The Warrant Officer Corps cannot stand by while change occurs all around us. We must be part of the transformation process so that warrant officers remain relevant in the Objective Force.

“Remember the past but look to the future”
Military Intelligence

...ing in place: scheduling training, cadre issues, budgeting and other resources, furniture, automation, other training equipment, classrooms, dining facilities, other facilities, and a myriad of training support to name a few. Rest assured, we will put the necessary enablers in place to meet the Army's needs.

However, our training contributions do not end there. Some of the other critical training initiatives we have either finished or undertaken include—

- Many diverse MTTs.
- A number of expanded NETs and DTTs.
- The creation of the G2X Course.
- An Expanded Source Operations Course.
- Cultural Awareness Training.
- Ethical Decision Making Training.
- Fighting ISR and Analytical Fundamentals Training.
- Stability Operations Specific Training.

These actions, in conjunction with other developments here at the Intelligence Center, at DA G2, at INSCOM, and across the Army, will position the MI Corps to smoothly transition to modularity and the future force. The intelligence component of the future force will realize tremendous intelligence capabilities composed of the right organizations, technologies, and equipment from the BCT level up to UEy. However, our most important enabler for the future force remains the best trained intelligence professional in the world.

We are making great progress every day and are on the right track for the future. However, we still have some challenges we must tackle. We still have much to learn on some of the critical issues (like how to provide the critical intelligence overwatch to forward-deployed tactical forces and the necessary sensor technology mixes to operate against an adaptive enemy). This is the future we promise to embark on with you to find the right answers and support our Army at war.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

Collecting Intelligence Observations

Some of our general collection requirements include—

- Observations developed in the course of conducting tactical intelligence collection. How are you integrating and synchronizing the intelligence disciplines, combat patrols (Every Soldier is a Sensor), and the various technology insertions to meet the commander's intelligence requirements? How can you better focus and cue collection in the current environment? How well are you or what gaps are you experiencing in sharing situational awareness across echelons?

- Observations related to the dissemination and sharing of intelligence. What means do you use to disseminate intelligence (both the type of product and communications means)? What battle rhythm do you support with this intelligence? How did you handle the different categories of intelligence (for example, time sensitive vice routine)? What workarounds did you use to overcome shortfalls?

- Observations and best practices related to analysis.

- Observations on the adequacy or shortfalls for the education, training, and experience necessary for G2s, S2s, and other key intelligence staff positions (for example, the collection manager).

- Observations on how to leverage Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) systems. How do you leverage ongoing national agency collection, analysis, and databases? Identify policies, databases, and training that either helped or did not help during operations.

- Observations on how to acquire and analyze the data and information collected within the various coalition, national, and joint agencies and organizations not traditionally thought of as sources of information.

- Observations on the organization, task organization, and ad hoc use of units and assets during operations (especially changes made to adapt to Phase IV operations).

- Observations on which new concepts and techniques (for example, Every Soldier is a Sensor, Tactical Questioning, and J/G/S2X) have the most merit and/or can be improved.

- Observations related to the adequacy or gaps in cultural awareness training.

Please pass your observations to our team by using the lessons learned website which is located on the Fort Huachuca Intelligence Center Online Network (ICON) website. The site contains observations, after-action reviews (AARs), and an online observation submission form. Eventually in the future you will be able to search all observations and their status from this location. The site is located at https://iconportal.hua.army.mil/.

You can access the site by using your existing AKO login and password. To get to the lessons learned site after logging in, click on the OIL (Lessons Learned) tab.

A subsequent article in this issue of MIPB will describe some of our other Lessons Learned web initiatives such as posting techniques on the ICON website and what we have posted to AKO.
Always out front!

Our SLT soldiers will have a 40-level career management field (CMF) focus with senior NCO peers and will have opportunities to interact with the senior NCO and officer leadership here at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH).

Remember, these are proposals right now; none of this is definite. If we do not implement these proposed changes, we may retain the four-tier system. We simply cannot accomplish some of our training objectives through distance learning or unit training. We owe it to our soldiers, our Army, and our Nation to give our soldiers every tool we can provide them to continue to fight and win battles from the Hindu Kush Mountains in Afghanistan to Iraq’s Sunni Triangle.

Let’s take care of each other, our soldiers, and our families. You train hard, you die hard; you train easy, you die easy. Peace needs protection.

(Continued from page 3)

The Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) Transforms Toward the Future

To better serve you, we are changing the way MIPB is produced and distributed. We are in the process of migrating from the “hard copy” issue you receive four times a year to an electronic web format. This format will be—

- User-friendly and interactive. Appropriate levels of interactivity in articles will provide value added information and enhance the reading experience.
- Secure. Material and information can be disseminated that is current, relevant, and at a higher sensitivity level than is currently permissible.

Projected date of the MIPB website activation is January 2006. We will update you with more details of our progress throughout the rest of the year.

Sterilla A. Smith
Managing Editor
Military Intelligence

The Situation

At 0800, three individuals approach the gate with information about a known terrorist cell. The unit detained four of their relatives at a traffic control point three days prior and they want to trade the information for the release of their relatives. Since there is no counterintelligence (CI) team at battalion level, the battalion intelligence officer (S2) has to gather information. The S2 will take information from all three separately to get their information.

The S2 must determine the legitimacy of their stories by comparing their accounts with those of the four detainees, using pattern analysis and past human intelligence (HUMINT) reporting. The detainees are key because they can validate the information given by the three walk-ins. The detainees do confirm the accounts of the three walk-ups after 4 hours of questioning. The information is validated by the S2.

The S2 will now have to pinpoint the location of the objective area. He can use the source to take him there or the source can pinpoint it on a map, imagery, or pictures. Once the location is pinpointed, the S2 will begin to plan the operations. He plans and develops products in conjunction with the S3 who will issue a warning order (WARNO) to the maneuver element conducting the raid. Once the order is given, the S2 will accompany the element to assist with questioning detainees on the objective, identifying critical information and evidence about the objective, and advising the command element the on ground. Once the detainees and contraband are secure, they move back to the forward operating base (FOB).

It is 0300, there are now six people with valuable information. At 0800 there will be somebody else at the gate to give information. The cycle will continue.

Military Intelligence (MI) assets—organized, equipped, and trained to win a conventional linear war—are failing to provide maneuver battalions with the analyzed intelligence and information needed to conduct effective stability operations and support operations in Iraq. The following article will discuss the shortcomings of tactical intelligence that one battalion task force (TF) experienced during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and provide some recommendations on future organizations, equipment, and training of MI at the tactical level.

Background

Task Force 1-68 Armor operated north of Baghdad as part of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. When the TF first moved south from Tuz, Iraq, into the current area of responsibility (AOR) on 25 June 2003, it consisted of two armor companies, one infantry company, a headquarters company (scout and mortar platoons), a separate infantry platoon, a howitzer battery, an engineer platoon, and a civil affairs (CA) team. The TF later lost the howitzer battery, separate infantry platoon and engineer platoon; and the infantry company was detached from December through February 2004.
The TF’s AOR was spread over 800 square kilometers and was split by Highway 1, the primary north-south main supply route in Iraq. The main population center is the Tarmiyah district, an outlying agrarian suburb of the Baghdad Governate with an estimated population of 150,000. The AOR also included an area south of the Balad Airfield (Corps logistics support area) that belongs to the Salah Din Governate. With the exception of Highway 1 and a few paved roads, the area is dominated by irrigation canals and dirt roads. The area is host to the homes and farms of a large number of high-ranking Ba’athists, including “Chemical Ali” and others directly related to the former dictator. The population is highly tribal and generally unwilling to work with the coalition, unless coerced (money, force, shame). During the deployment no local leader came forward with relevant information about enemy attackers.

The enemy conducted over 250 attacks in the AOR from 26 June 2003 through March 2004. These included mortar and rocket attacks on FOBs; rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and small arms ambushes, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In addition to attacks on coalition forces, the attackers have targeted contractors, police, local leaders, and soldiers of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). The primary tactical missions of TF 1-68 include raids, cordon and searches, area security, route security, area and route reconnaissance, and mounted and dismounted ambushes.

The TF detained over 700 Iraqis and killed or wounded an unknown number. Additionally, the TF spent nearly 2 million dollars rebuilding 16 schools and irrigation projects in the area, reforming the local government (firing a number of city councilmen, mayors, ministry workers, and police), and recruiting and training both local police and more than 180 ICDC soldiers.

**The Battalion S2 Section**

The standard table of organization and equipment (TOE) for an armor battalion intelligence section is an S2 (35D captain), one Battalion Intelligence Center Coordinator (BICC) (35D second lieutenant), one Senior Intelligence Analyst (96B30), one Intelligence Analyst (96B10), and one S2 NCOIC (19Z50). Only five personnel are authorized to analyze intelligence and produce threat information on a continuous basis.

The battalion S2 section was required to be more detailed and responsive than the brigade S2 and division G2 because of the dynamics and enemy situation in Iraq and the fact that battalion (and below) conducted offensive operations almost daily. It was rare for a brigade or larger size unit to conduct offensive operations. As opposed to conventional top-down intelligence development, the majority of intelligence for the TF operations was originated, developed, and refined at the battalion level.

Typically a request for information (RFI) can be sent higher to be answered. This was not the case in Iraq. Information requests were constantly tasked down. The battalion submitted numerous RFIs but the brigade and division intelligence structures were not equipped, capable, or were too overtaxed and could not answer detailed information requirements. For example, we could not expect division to tell us if the mayor of our region was facilitating enemy operations. Occasionally, division would be able to provide information pertaining to enemy activities originating from our sector, but the majority of the time it did not have the resolution or assets to dedicate to developing the intelligence. It fell to the battalion S2 to develop intelligence in order to assure successful operations. It was quickly determined that the battalion S2 section was not manned to provide a continuous and maximized intelligence capability.

The 1-68’s S2 section was at full TOE strength at all times. It had one organic All Source Analysis System (ASAS) computer. ASAS utilization was limited because there was no connectivity between battalion and brigade until seven months into operations. Even when a link was established, the computer did not perform to its full capability as an ASAS platform because of restricted bandwidth; the S2 was unable to effectively access and leverage division and national assets.

With limited guidance and support from the brigade, the TF managed to develop effective, although resource-intensive, methods to collect information and develop exploitable intelligence. We started with relatively little information. The information that was available was on a macro level and not very helpful. The S2 section generated databases that helped us determine enemy disposition, composition, and strength in the AOR. In stability operations and support operations it is very difficult to define the criteria that will lead you to the enemy, so everything seems to be important. Field Manual 2-0, Intelligence, lists the critical variables of a contemporary operational environment (COE) but they were too broad and only provided a baseline from which to start.
The Battalion S2 needs to focus on information that is going to allow him to capture the enemy; a manual cannot define this information because the situation is different for each AOR. Initially, we tried to define indicators of enemy activity; the S2 section tracked everything including traffic patterns, electrical blackouts, flares, light usage, weapons movement, and other standard information such as spheres of influence and HUMINT reporting. The amount of information was overwhelming and unmanageable. Eventually, the requirements were narrowed down to 29 tasks. The seven most important ones are listed in Figure 1 along with the TF action officers who performed the tasks compared to the Army specialty that is most appropriate to perform the task. These tasks consumed the majority of the S2 section’s time and were performed on a daily basis. Tasks were assigned by duty position, but with limited manpower every soldier was required to be proficient in each task.

The S2 section spent less than half of its time doing analysis because the specified and implied tasks required in the current threat environment went far beyond its capabilities and resources. The analysis the S2 section did pro-

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TASK</th>
<th>ACTION OFFICER</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
<th>Required MOS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participate in raids as the subject matter expert to advise commanders and expedite combat decisions on the ground.</td>
<td>S2 35D Tactical Intelligence Officer</td>
<td>Only one DIV directed mission and three BDE missions were executed during stability operations; nearly all actionable intelligence was produced at the BN level.</td>
<td>S2 35D Tactical Intelligence Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Produce a packet for each detainee to be sent higher that had multiple sworn statements, pictures, evidence, a Coalition Provisional Authority worksheet, inventories of all personal items, and any targeting (linkage) that should accompany each detainee—roughly a 2-hour process for each detainee at a minimum.</td>
<td>S2 35D Tactical Intelligence Officer</td>
<td>DIV and BDE’s G2/S2 sections do not process detainees. All written work is done at BN, and the detainees are handed over to DIV MPs.</td>
<td>97E HUMINT Collector &amp; 95B Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactically question all detainees and civilians on the battlefields who may have been involved with an attack or have information of value.</td>
<td>S2 35D Tactical Intelligence Officer</td>
<td>DIV and BDE G2/S2 sections are not in the middle of the battle and have HUMINT collection teams assigned to deal with these issues.</td>
<td>97E HUMINT Collector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain and update a Detain/Suspect/Protect list and supporting database.</td>
<td>BICC 35D Tactical Intelligence Officer</td>
<td>Detain/Suspect/Protect lists are developed from bottom up; 99% of the names tracked at BN will be derived from HUMINT at BN level and below. BDE and DIV lists will be derived from the bottom and the top; 99% of the BN targets will come from a BN Detain list.</td>
<td>97B Counterintelligence (CI) Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain an area to accommodate detainees 24 hrs a day 7 days a week with food, water, shelter, and medical care if necessary.</td>
<td>19Z50 NCOIC</td>
<td>BDE and DIV S2 sections do not have to worry about detaining anyone. All of these specified and implied tasks are handled at the BN level.</td>
<td>95B Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure all seized propaganda, paperwork, and any other relevant written information was translated and analyzed in a timely manner.</td>
<td>96B30 Senior Intelligence Analyst</td>
<td>BDE and DIV S2 sections do not understand the value of seized propaganda or documents nor are they involved in the processing. Valuable information is being thrown away or bypassed because of lack of assets at lower levels. Only someone with an intimate understanding of their AO could identify what is important.</td>
<td>97E HUMINT Collector &amp; 37F PSYOP Specialist</td>
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Figure 1. Task Breakout for TF 1-68 S2 Section
vide was done without the benefit of traditionally available products like doctrinal templates and “off-the-shelf” enemy courses of action (COAs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The threat situation was so dynamic that there were no tactical pauses for battalions in Iraq and no chance for the S2 section to get ahead in its tasks. Compounding this problem was the fact that most of the actionable intelligence used to plan operations originated within the battalion AOR. Useable enemy situation templates or detailed intelligence about targets from higher regarding the battalion AOR were nonexistent. Battalion AORs were too diverse and the brigade AOR was too large to expect this type of detail from higher headquarters. Occasionally national level assets provided some actionable intelligence, but this information was wrong as often as it was correct. Cooperation between battalion S2 sections sharing boundaries was unusual and limited product support came from brigade or higher.

In addition to the traditional role of analyzing information and creating or refining products in support of operations, the battalion S2 section became the primary collector for the battalion. This is a change from conventional intelligence gathering, which takes place above the battalion level and is filtered down. While every soldier and leader who comes in contact with Iraqis is a potential collector of information, the battalion S2 section collects, sorts, analyzes, links, and packages this information into useable intelligence. On any given day it was not unusual for local civilians, police, ICDC soldiers, contractors, and representatives of other government agencies to show up for scheduled and unscheduled appointments, interviews, and briefings. These people all had different priorities and agendas and all wanted to talk to the S2, CA representative, S3, or commander. The challenges of managing interpreters, separating competing ethnic and religious factions, and deconflicting information were daunting.

As the de facto proponent for information collection in theater, the battalion S2 section was also the principal manager of the intelligence assets employed at the tactical level. These assets included attached or battalion operational control (OPCON) Tactical HUMINT collection teams (THTs), tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAVs), mobile interrogation teams (MITs), CI teams, Prophet, psychological operations (PSYOP), and ground surveillance radar (GSR). Each of these collection assets must be integrated into the battalion collection plan; the S2 section bears the responsibility for being the subject matter experts for the battalion in terms of synchronizing and emplacing these assets to ensure they are utilized to the fullest extent. Doctrinally, the S3 is in charge of tasking these assets but the S2 advises the S3 on where these assets should go and what to look for to answer the commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Because of these management tasks, the traditional role of battalion S2 in analyzing information and creating or refining products in support of operations became secondary.

**Detainee Handling**

One of the most time-consuming tasks of our S2 section was the processing of detainees. Doctrinally, the S1 section has many of the responsibilities in processing enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), but in Iraq all the processing quickly became a requirement of the S2 section because it was intimately involved in detainee operations. We found that many PIRs and information gaps can be answered through detainees.

Processing detainees in a short period of time (the standard is 24 hours) is a daunting task under any circumstance. But in Iraq (where all information and sources are suspect, familial and tribal ties and loyalties seem ubiquitous, and exact locations of targets and identification papers are rarely available), simply determining the accuracy of names is a challenge. The challenges of detainee processing are illustrated in the following scenarios taken from actual experiences during TF 1-68’s deployment:

- An informant provides information about an alleged attack cell. The informant gives names and locations of the personnel. A raid is conducted. All of the named individuals (four) are present on the objective and are detained along with two additional personnel (adult males), but no weapons or contraband equipment are found.
- Several independent sources identify a leader or supporter of anti-coalition forces. A raid is conducted and the target is detained along with three of the target’s sons, two brothers, and several local sheiks who were meeting at his house at the time of the raid. No weapons or contraband were found.
- Three Iraqis are engaged while attempting to set up an RPG ambush, one is wounded. They abandon their weapons and attempt to leave the area. The blood trail is followed to a house where the wounded Iraqi and five other individuals are found. One is an old man. It is unclear who the two companions of the wounded Iraqi are, and it...
is unclear if the others found in the house are accomplices or simply “in the wrong place at the wrong time.” No weapons or contraband are found. The wounded individual claims to have been shot mistakenly by coalition forces while he was working in his fields.

Two men are stopped during a mounted patrol. They are carrying diagrams of an improvised rocket launcher. One is clearly more involved, refuses to speak and is belligerent. The second seems weak and confused and more likely to talk.

Under current standing operating procedures (SOPs), all of these individuals must be sent to higher within 24 hours. But do the circumstances surrounding each case warrant these individuals being imprisoned? As important, do some of them have information that could be used by the detaining unit to build link diagrams and develop the intelligence picture in the AOR? Clearly each case is different, but none of the individuals in the scenarios above have much potential to provide significant intelligence. This situation, coupled with the fact that battalions do not receive intelligence about detainees that are sent higher, argues for a more robust interrogation or investigation capability at the battalion level. Not only would this alleviate the large number of “innocent” Iraqis being sent to coalition prison but also it would allow maneuver battalions with a vested interest in reducing attacks and defeating the enemy in their AORs to develop the necessary intelligence. It would also increase the power of the battalion commander in relation to local sheiks and civic leaders because the decision to detain and to set free would lie with the commander most connected to the area.

The battalion detainee screening process highlights the necessity and importance of the S2 section’s ability to make recommendations to the battalion commander about who is detained and who is released. The commander should be able to look a detainee’s family in the face and feel comfortable with the explanation for why their son or daughter was detained. The reason should not be, “We didn’t have time to figure it out so we sent him on.” The only way to accomplish this is through interrogating, screening, or tactically questioning the detainees at the battalion.

The screening process (tactically questioning) requires at least two hours for each detainee. This is just to get basic screening data and information. If the detainee is found to be of higher intelligence value or involved in terrorist activity, a detainee packet is filled out on the individual. This can take up to three hours depending on available evidence. An incomplete packet often means a detainee is refused for processing by higher headquarters. If the intelligence is immediate and actionable, the detainee is of more value to the battalion in its AOR. The detainee can be used to positively identify (PID) terrorists, show safe houses and weapons caches, or identify other activities that are of military value to the battalion.

All of this takes time, and all of these things are impossible when a detainee goes higher. The lack of understanding about battalion intelligence concerns and overburdened interrogation teams at brigade and division levels guarantees information cannot be exploited in a timely manner at higher levels. Unfortunately, battalions are not equipped to hold detainees for extended periods of time and recent events suggest that the centralized detention system in place during the past twelve months was flawed. Empowered battalions with a more robust and experienced Military Police (MP) and HUMINT capability could certainly help alleviate the overcrowded and overburdened detention system; conducting interrogation as soon after detention and as close to the alleged incident as possible has been proven more effective.

Doctrinal Note: The issues arising from personnel detention and evacuation in the current complex operational environment are being addressed by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) in FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, and by the U.S. Military Police (MP) School in FM 3-19.40, Internment and Resettlement Operations. An MI and MP Internment, Resettlement and Interrogation (IRI) Coordination Checklist is pending. Joint Publication 3-63, Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations, is also under development. These documents will refine the doctrine and procedures for detaining and evacuating detainees.

Tactical HUMINT Collection Team (THT)

As currently configured, THTs canvass the countryside in Iraq to answer PIRs and gather information for brigade and higher headquarters. They are supposed to make coordination with the unit in whose AOR they plan to operate; but this only occurs with varying degrees of success. In the case of TF 1-68, on more than one occasion, a THT operating in the TF AOR came under direct fire attack without the TF tactical operation center (TOC) knowing that the team was even operating in the area. On other occasions, the THT spent hours questioning sources and gathering information that was either already known to the TF S2, was irrelevant, or was beyond its useful significance. Typically THTs operating in the TF area spent three to four hours a day (which included travel time), two to three days a week,
developing information. For the final four months of the deployment, the THT did not come to the TF area because of maintenance and security concerns. This experience may not be typical, but the capabilities embedded in a THT are too valuable not to be used more efficiently. Despite attempts to have the THT attached to the TF or to focus its reconnaissance priorities, it continued to operate on its own timeline and with its own agenda.

Since tactical information and intelligence collection occurred almost exclusively at the TF level, it makes sense that the THT work for the TF commander. In some cases it may even be appropriate to attach the THT down to the main-effort company. In this way, the THT is available to develop intelligence whenever the opportunity arises from walk-ins, after enemy engagements, or during actions on the objective. If the team is embedded in the TF, its security is inherent and it will have the opportunity to circulate throughout the battle during normal TF operations as well as to participate in planned operations and questioning of detainees.

The bottom line is that every battalion TF needs the capabilities that a THT brings to the battlefield. The amount of combat information and HUMINT reporting that was received at battalion and below level was overwhelming when compared to the small number of THTs operating in theater. All of this information is being lost on a daily basis because of lack of training and assets at battalion level. To fully exploit all combat information and HUMINT reports, a 97B must be at battalion level.

Doctrinal Note: Tactical HUMINT team employment will be phased out in favor of HUMINT collection teams (HCTs). A THT is a task-organized element drawing from mainly HUMINT and CI personnel. THTs developed out of the need for trained personnel with language skills to conduct operations. The shortage of trained HUMINT personnel led to the augmentation of HUMINT teams with CI personnel. As the concept and employment evolved, various occupational specialties were added to and taken from the THTs. HCTs will be organized with three HUMINT personnel. The HCT capability at the brigade level is three THTs and an operational management team (OMT). The HCT capability at the Unit of Employment X (UEx) echelon is more robust than the current division. The result is greater numbers of HCTs operating in a brigade area of operation (AO) and a greater opportunity for HCTs to be task organized to the battalion level.

Mobile Interrogation Team (MIT)

The MIT is a useful asset that brought a much needed capability to deployed battalions. Unfortunately, there are too few in theater and because of their scarcity, they are rarely found below the brigade level. When they are “pushed down” to battalions, their usefulness is limited by the general lack of knowledge about the specific AOR. This is not their fault; battalion AORs are too diverse for one team to be “read in” on the many cells and personalities involved.

In the experience of TF 1-68 Armor, much of the collected information and intelligence was based on personal relationships built over time, coupled with a reputation of fairness and the demonstrated ability and willingness to go after targets regardless of social status. An interrogation team, with an experienced interrogator incorporated into the existing S2 section, is a necessity if the intelligence picture in Iraq is to improve and relieve some of the inefficiency due to the existing interrogation process.

Doctrinal Note: The MIT is a task-organized element formed and utilized at the direction of the commander. Unless a unit is equipped with excess personnel, the formation of an MIT draws organic personnel from assigned duties. The benefits of an MIT must be weighed against the degradation to tasks normally conducted by the team members.

Other Collection Assets

TUAV. TF 1-68 used the TUAV extensively during OIF. Unfortunately, for all the times it was used, it provided no actionable information or intelligence. During the one event that it was actually positioned to “see” (the burning of a police station), the grid it transmitted was over 1,000 meters away from the actual target it was observing; 1,000 meters is a significant distance in an urban environment. The operators had a difficult time identifying what they were looking at and because of a lack of confidence in the picture being sent, no forces were sent to counter the threat. In fact, the event was over by the time the situation became clear. A large part of the problem is that the operators were not familiar with the terrain they were viewing or the operational significance of what they were observing. Having unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with a trained teams at the battalion level would increase this effectiveness.

GSR. The terrain, coupled with the reality of a battlefield busy with civilian traffic, made GSRs less than effective. Often these teams were simply used as static observation posts. One such team operating in the TF 1-68 area, not task organized to the TF, performed this job well until it made contact with the enemy. Once in contact with the enemy,
the team reacted, received a casualty, and evacuated the area, leaving the reaction force and arriving aircraft to identify and eventually kill the attacker.

Again, the ad hoc relationship and (apparently) insufficient training of an MI asset resulted in the ineffective employment of this asset. If troop strength tradeoffs must be made, the addition of more HUMINT capability at the expense of GSR teams would certainly pay immediate dividends. The actual GSR could be given to scout platoons to use when appropriate.

**Doctrinal Note:** GSRs will be absent from the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) and the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT).

**PSYOP.** TF 1-68 had a PSYOP team attached for the duration of the deployment. From the TF perspective this is one asset that was used to its fullest capacity. The three-man PSYOP team regularly performed human and signals collection, product translation, and information operations (IO) production and broadcast. The team was represented at all of the scheduled targeting meetings and was attached to the battalion main effort company for the majority of the deployment. The PSYOP team was the most responsive external asset the TF employed.

**Restructuring the Battalion S2 Section**

To fully maximize the exploitation of intelligence and to make the troop-to-tasks ratio more manageable, the battalion S2 section needs to have intelligence capabilities similar to those of brigade and division. In the previous chart, five of six critical tasks were conducted by soldiers without the proper military occupational specialty (MOS) or training. The majority of our time was spent dealing with humans; and most battalion S2 sections have no organic assets to deal with these types of operations. Additionally, the S2 section is not properly resourced to operate continuous operations in a hostile environment. Figure 2 outlines a recommended TOE change to properly staff a battalion S2 section for success, not just in Iraq but anywhere in the COE.

**Conclusion**

Now in Iraq and in the future anywhere in the COE, tactical-level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty Title</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>Duty Description</th>
<th># Personnel Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>35D</td>
<td>Primary intelligence officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOIC</td>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>19Z50</td>
<td>NCOIC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2X 1LT</td>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>35D</td>
<td>Manages HUMINT database</td>
<td>2 (day and night shifts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BICC 2LT</td>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>35D</td>
<td>Assistant S2</td>
<td>2 (day and night shifts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT Collector Enlisted</td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>97E</td>
<td>BN HUMINT collector</td>
<td>2 (day and night shifts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translator</td>
<td>Enlisted/Civilian</td>
<td>09L/Civ</td>
<td>Translator aide</td>
<td>2 (day and night shifts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI Team</td>
<td>SSG/SFC</td>
<td>97B30/40</td>
<td>Conduct CI operations</td>
<td>2 (day and night shifts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Analyst</td>
<td>SSG/SFC</td>
<td>96B30/40</td>
<td>Senior enlisted analyst</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyst</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>96B10</td>
<td>Assistant to senior analyst</td>
<td>2 (day and night shifts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyst</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>96B10</td>
<td>Database manager</td>
<td>2 (day and night shifts)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2. Recommended TOE Changes to a Battalion S2 Section**
intelligence will have strategic relevance, and tactical level engagements with strategic importance will continue to be won or lost at the TF level and below. In order to better support the maneuver TF commanders, MI assets must be reorganized, retrained and, in some instances, re-equipped. (The increase in manpower within the battalion S2 section under the current HBCT TOE is a step in the right direction but the correct skill identifiers, rank, and experience need to accompany it as well.) The Army must recognize that in the current environment with the proliferation of technology to lower and lower levels, actionable information and intelligence with strategic relevance comes from the bottom up and is not generated by centralized and stovepiped assets. The intelligence community will continue to be limited and severely challenged until the focus is placed where it needs to be—battalion level. The MI community’s challenge is to transform itself quickly or risk a slide towards irrelevance at the tactical level.

Doctrinal Note: The S2 sections of the combined arms battalions (CABs) of the HBCT and IBCT with an authorization of ten positions will be more robust than those of current maneuver battalions. See Figure 3 for a breakout of those positions.

CI representation begins at the BCT level in the brigade S2X, a sub-element of the S2 section. The increased presence of task-organized HCTs at the battalion level and the prioritization of assets facilitated by the S2X will support greater HUMINT and CI capabilities and levels of support. Additionally, the S2X will facilitate integration and coordination of HUMINT or CI assets to maximize efficiency and economy of force.

The S2 will remain the subject matter expert on intelligence capabilities, synchronization, and employment; but, ultimately, the commander drives intelligence. It is at the commander’s discretion to sacrifice the analytical process of long-term analysis in order to attain short-term goals. It is also the commander’s prerogative to allocate limited staff specialties to guard prisoners in the pursuit of combat information rather than devote the staff’s time to pattern and link analysis in support of threat model development. The additional personnel in the CAB will now allow the commander to better manage the risks involved in shifting from long-term collection and analysis to short-term combat information collection.

In the near-term, USAIC&FH has dispatched Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to assist deployed and deploying units by training their personnel in the conduct of information collection and intelligence analysis based on the intensity and unique challenges of the current operational environment. (See the article on page 52 by Mr. Masterson and Major McDeed entitled “USAIC&FH Task Force Modularity MTT Mission.”)

In the mid-term, the Department of the Army formed TF Actionable Intelligence to determine the Army’s future intelligence needs and to identify a way ahead to fulfill these requirements. As the Army reforms and employs its new BCTs, the concepts developed by TF Actionable Intelligence will foster an integrated intelligence capability allowing commanders at lower echelons to collect and process information into intelligence that they can exploit faster than ever before. (See the article on page 43 by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Iwicki entitled “CSA’s Focus Area 16: Actionable Intelligence: One Year Later.”)

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CPT Sean C. Nowlan and MAJ Bill Benson both served with TF 1-68 AR BN, 3 BCT, 4ID (M), during OIF 1. CPT Nowlan has served as the 1-68BN S2 for 2-1/2 years and prior to that was branch-detailed Infantry and assigned to 1-508 (ABCT) in Vicenza, Italy. His military education includes IOBC, MIOBC, and the MICCC. CPT Nowlan has a Bachelor of Arts degree in Criminology from Auburn University.
Measuring Anti-U.S. Sentiment and Conducting Media Analysis In The Republic of Korea (ROK)

by Major Daniel S. Burgess

“Tools and techniques that gear the analyst’s mind to apply higher levels of critical thinking can substantially improve analysis on complex issues on which information is incomplete, ambiguous, and often deliberately distorted. Key examples of such intellectual devices include techniques for structuring information, challenging assumptions, and exploring alternative interpretations.”

- Richards J. Heuer, Jr.

The purpose of this article is to highlight successful analytical techniques used in measuring anti-US sentiment in the Republic of Korea (ROK) from November 2002 to June 2004. Although the alliance between the ROK and the United States is strong, there have been some difficulties over the past few years. It is important for both sides of the alliance to understand these problems. Because of this need, the Eighth United States Army (EUSA) G3, Information Operations (IO) Branch formulated an analytical methodology to effectively measure anti-U.S. sentiment in the ROK media.

This is not to say that other staff elements did not contribute; collectively all of the products contributed to the command’s situational understanding. The analytical process developed by the IO Branch represents a technical and analytical approach to advance situational understanding at different levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) of the ill-feelings directed toward U.S. forces. The output of this process helped Eighth Army mitigate some of its causes.

Our approach could apply to almost any theater of operations and prove invaluable as a tool for mitigating other forms of anti-U.S. sentiment. The process involved designing a database to structure our analysis and provide a more objective methodology to a subjective process. This methodology helped G3-IO gain significant perspective and insight into Korean politics, news agencies, dissident groups, and the Korean culture overall.

Methodology

When I arrived in the ROK, I became only the second functional area (FA)-34 to work IO issues and the first to formulate ideas for analyzing the Information environment. My supervisor, the G3-IO Chief of Current IO Operations wanted a product to measure the information environment. He charged me with developing “a methodology … a barometer of some kind that measures sentiment within that environment.” With that guidance, I sat down and began to formulate my plan.

I decided that I must develop a roadmap or line of attack for developing the “barometer.” This “road map” must—

- Define exactly the purpose of the product.
- Decide on inputs.
- Develop a database that would enhance our analysis.
- Determine the outputs.

Based on the above roadmap, I quickly determined that the purpose of the product must be to determine the South Korean sentiment towards the US and more specifically United States Forces Korea (USFK), as measured in the information environment. This purpose fit well with the concept of a barometer or measuring device and it focused on US forces. With that goal in mind, I then determined the inputs required for analysis.

Inputs

Newspaper Articles. The ROK is not unlike many developed countries in that their newspapers, television, and radio stations all have political slants or agendas. In Korea, the G3-IO Branch needed to incorporate a multitude of sources, thereby achieving a balance so we could measure sentiment across the political spectrum represented in the media. For example, just looking at the Choson Ilbo would provide only a conservative view of South Korean issues whereas Hangyore normally offers only a left-wing or “progressive” view. After talking with some of the
Korean experts on post, we determined that the focus would include the Choson Ilbo, the Dong A-Ilbo, the JoongAng Ilbo, and the Hangyore. Included in the analytical input were news releases from the Yonhap news agency. Yonhap is the semiofficial news agency of the ROK, a kind of Associated Press (AP) for the ROK.

**Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).** During this time the Branch Chief and I went to the U.S. Embassy to talk with the analysts at FBIS. This contact became one of the most fruitful and invaluable we ever made. FBIS uses an unclassified web site with a huge database of translated articles from the Korean newspapers, as well as some television and radio coverage. After talking with their analysts, we were put on their “urgent” tag distribution list. FBIS generates e-mails containing important news stories and sends them directly to the list members. While at FBIS, we also asked about any products they developed that defined and explained Korean news agencies and how Koreans got their news. Additionally, FBIS had identified how dissident groups spread their propaganda and rally many young students to protest against the United States. This information would be used to develop and enhance our analysis.

**Public Affairs Office (PAO).** Another source of newspaper article inputs came from the USFK PAO. The PAO employs linguists who review articles impacting the command and publishes a daily summary of local news media that was used to help populate the database.

**Newspaper Article Headlines.** Still another source of input developed was headline analysis. The purpose of the headline analysis was to balance out our newspaper analysis, as often times only selected articles germane to US policy or which would potentially impact USFK were selected for review. We simply could not read and analyze every article in every newspaper. The headline analysis counter-balanced this inherent flaw and gave us a broader view of what ROK newspapers felt were the top stories. For example, if one only reads Korean newspaper articles that deal with the US, one begins to think that is all they discuss. The headline analysis certainly demonstrated that this was not the case and that Koreans almost always wrote more about domestic issues than any other. Though it proved useful on its own, headline analysis became much more useful when used as an input to our broader analytical effort.

**Dissident Web Sites.** We decided to monitor these sites because they—

- Provided insight to messages and themes of the dissident groups.
- Posted scheduled demonstrations; it became a way to verify all registered and unregistered protests.
- Enabled IO to counter misinformation if needed.

One instance where our analysis was helpful happened in the fall of 2002, during the courts-martial of two U.S. soldiers involved in the Route 56 incident. The Route 56 incident occurred when a U.S. Army armored vehicle accidentally killed two Korean girls during a training exercise. The soldiers were later acquitted of negligent homicide in a military court. Their acquittal and anger over the girls’ deaths caused widespread protests and represented the apex of anti-U.S. sentiment during my time in the ROK. Because of the number of protests that occurred after the acquittals, we were able to establish that there was a close linkage between the dissident web sites and demonstration activities, validating that the dissidents used the Internet to rally and coordinate demonstration support.

**Demonstrations.** The decision to add demonstration reports as an input occurred because it helped to measure dissatisfaction and, in turn, anti-U.S. sentiment. At the time, there was no other comprehensive technical analysis of the demonstrations occurring in the command and we felt we could provide an effective overall assessment of planned demonstrations. For example, we were able to conduct a pattern analysis of demonstration activity and published a comprehensive document we called the “Farmer’s Almanac of Demonstrations.” This document provided the command the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of dissident protests. We were also able to construct a by-month calendar that, based on historically important events (such as the Kwangju Uprising), enabled the command to take predictive, proactive measures to counter anti-U.S. demonstrations. The database enabled us to graph and display hundreds of demonstrations based on locations, purpose, dissident groups, and date and time.

**Additional Input.** Another input for the overall assessment came from the Special Reports that “zeroed” in on an important issue for the month and the
impact that issue had on the command. *Specials Reports*’ topics included—

- Polling information on National Assembly elections and attitudes towards the U.S.
- Hwang Chang Yop’s recent activities.\(^7\)
- South Korea’s dispatch of troops to Iraq.
- Regional themes pertaining to the six-way talks.
- Regional reactions to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea DPRK’s nuclear announcement.

I might also add that key information did appear in other forms of media, such as television news, and FBIS often provided excellent summaries of these occurrences. These summaries were then incorporated into the assessment. In hindsight, it would have been very useful to have native linguists who could have analyzed the broadcast news and other significant events. However, we only had two Defense Language Institute (DLI) linguists (rated 2/2) and their ability to follow the news was challenged. Various methods were used to overcome the language barrier, but were not very successful so we made a conscious decision to depend on FBIS for important television input.

**Structuring the Information for the Assessment**

The third part of putting the assessment together was to develop a database to provide analysts a tool to structure their analysis. This stage of the process consumed the majority of the setup time. I decided to use *Microsoft* Access to build our databases because I was familiar with the software and it was on our office computers.

**Newspaper Article Database**

I developed the following data fields for the newspaper analysis:

- Date of publication.
- Title.
- Media source.
- Intensity.
- Author.
- Macro category.
- Micro category.
- Editorial (a “yes” or “no” field).
- Media hyperlink.

Most of the data fields are self-explanatory; however, explanation is required on a few. **Intensity** was the data field that most represented our subjective analysis. It was our method for determining whether we deemed an article favorable or unfavorable towards the United States. We decided that intensity would measure the degree of how positive or negative articles were, as opposed to the “black, white, or neutral” concept espoused by the EUSA PAO office. I wrote a supporting document, “*Rationale for Intensity For or Against the United States,*” which outlined the data field entries and described the differences between the nine possible entries (using samples representative of these ratings found in several newspapers), which seemed to be a very natural means of delineation (see Figure 1).
The analysts could then use this paper as a point of reference to assess the articles. My senior analyst would often spot check articles by exchanging assessed articles among the junior analysts to validate individual ratings. We were always very close in our assessments and are confident that the intensity rating is a consistent measuring tool even though it is, by its very nature, a subjective assessment.

The **macro category field** was important because it showed when U.S. policy- or USFK-related articles increased from one month to the next and helped us depict whether articles addressed domestic, regional, international, U.S. policy-related, or USFK-related topics. Although designed specifically for our newspaper analysis, this field was found to have other analytical uses. It helped when assessing individual media outlets and their propensity to write about particular macro categories.

The other data field that needs some explanation is the **micro category**. This category defined the subjects within the macro categories. For example, the National Assembly election results are a micro category that is part of the domestic issues macro category. By refining the issues into subsets, one can track dominant issues, recognize emphasis in reporting, and identify trends (see Figure 2).

**Newspaper Article Headlines Database**

The data fields for input were as follows:

- Newspaper name.
- Day.
- Macro category (domestic, regional, international, U.S. policy, and relating specifically to USFK).

The next level of analysis broke down these broad categories into more delineated topics. For example, the domestic macro category could be further refined into political, economic, or scandal subcategories. From that construct we could then rapidly graph the results (see Figure 3). The headlines were distilled from a web site maintained by Yonhap news agency.

**Dissident Web Site Database**

Structuring the database to analyze information from dissident web sites was one of the most difficult obstacles. After several variations it was concluded that the focus should be on four critical aspects of each web site. These aspects were—

- Overall sentiment (using the standard rating scheme, Figure 1).
- The site’s headline article.
- The site’s second leading article.
- Demonstrations planned or addressed.

The overall sentiment and the lead articles were tracked by issue and rating. If any demonstrations were mentioned, we captured the date-time group, location, likelihood of violence, number of demonstrations that were planned, and the purpose or reason for the protests (see Figure 4).

We then coordinated with other agencies to ensure the command was aware of these activities. The dissident Internet homepages we focused on were the Korean Federation of University Student Councils (Hanch’ongnyon), the National Alliance for Democracy and Reunification of Korea (Chonguk Yonhap), and the Pan-Korean Alliance for Reunification (Pom-millyon). These three sites represented the “most vocal and visible dissident groups in South Korea” and form the core of an extensive ring of websites devoted to the dissemination of anti-U.S. propaganda. We also examined the maze of interconnected sites of which these three formed the hub.

**Demonstration Database**

The structuring of our demonstration database closely followed the evolution of the database design for the dissident web sites. We ended up tracking—

- The name of the group.
- Its primary affiliation (e.g., Anti-US, pro-labor, pro-north Korean, etc.).

![Figure 3. Example of Headline Analysis](image-url)
The End of Month Assessments (EOMs)

The EOM was really the heart and soul of all our work. It was the method used for communicating our monthly analysis. This standard format was broken down into different media categories and each section of the EOM contained a similar format. The first section was Periodicals,\(^\text{11}\) then Dissident Web Sites and Demonstrations.

**Periodicals.** This section included the Previous Month’s Assessment, Current Assessment, Issues Relating to U.S. Policy, Issues Relating Directly to USFK, and a Findings paragraph, which ultimately became the Previous Month’s Assessment for the next EOM. We used this format for all other sections of the assessment.

The first paragraph was used to remind readers of the previous month’s conclusions, upcoming significant issues, and how these issues may affect the command during the next month. The Current Assessment paragraph discussed the issues for the month and how the issues impacted the command; it included trends as well as any changes in each newspaper’s overall rating. Issues Relating to U.S. Policy addressed issues that pertained to U.S. foreign policy affecting USFK or the ROKG. The Issues Relating Directly to USFK paragraph was used to summarize the issues that related specifically to USFK (e.g., Eighth Army relocation). Also covered were any trends in a periodical’s overall rating and included a discussion on how the

![Figure 4. Actual Database Input Form for Dissident Web sites](image)

- Location.
- Date and time (to include start and end times).
- Number of demonstrators (both planned and actual).
- Whether the demonstration was U.S. related or at a U.S. facility.
- If the demonstrators breached the facility.

These data points enabled us to query the database information in an effective manner. For example, the number of demonstrators planned and actual told us that usually the protest planners were overly optimistic vis-à-vis participation. Other data points enabled us to scan for patterns in times and locations. Other possible data points that could be added are days of the week with demonstrations planned but not executed.

**Outputs**

The results of the analysis fell into four categories:

- End of Month Assessments (EOMs).
- Special Reports.
- Watch Reports.
- Information Papers.

![Figure 5. A Graphic from January 2003 Depicting Demonstration Trends](image)
issues may develop in the coming weeks or months. Sometimes we included Other Important Stories. This paragraph was used to cover important news stories that did not fall neatly into other paragraphs.

The last paragraph within this category was Findings. This final category was used to summarize the Periodicals portion of the assessment in a holistic manner. In other words, how all the newspaper reporting impacted the command in a collective manner. The thought process was to describe what happened and why as well as what will happen and why. This same thought process is repeated in the Findings paragraph for other categories as well.

**Dissident Web Sites.** The next portion of our assessment dealt with Dissident Web Sites. The focus on the dissident web sites was different. Because of their inherent nature (they all dislike the U.S. and its policies) we were looking for tip-offs that something within the dissident community had changed. In other words, when certain events occurred that were not beneficial to the U.S. in the media (e.g., acquittal of the two soldiers involved in the Highway 56 incident), the dissidents usually took advantage of this and began to increase their anti-U.S. rhetoric. When the rhetoric stepped up on the web sites, so too did their activities.

The ability to analyze this form of media was beneficial to understanding a variety of activities and issues. We identified the trends, planned demonstrations, and propaganda that we may need to counter. Our work in this area helped our understanding of how dissident groups actually planned their activities and the issues used to rally the Korean youth. We could predict whether scheduled demonstrations were important or not by studying these patterns of “negativeness” and increased changes on their web sites. It became a great measuring device that we took advantage of often.

The manner in which we subdivided the paragraphs was identical to other categories of the assessment.

**Demonstrations.** This section of the assessment looked at all demonstrations at or near US facilities. Following the same format of other sections, we began by reviewing the previous month’s assessment. The next paragraph, Current Month’s Anti-US Demonstration Assessment, detailed any patterns of demonstration behavior we identified. This could mean an increase in frequency, violence, or belligerence or changes in demonstration themes. We often used graphical analysis to capture trends spanning across weeks or quarters depending on what points we were trying to highlight.

The next paragraph detailed issues that related to U.S. policy. Two of the principal issues we tracked under this paragraph were the war in Iraq and President Bush’s perceived hard-line policy towards the DPRK.

The next paragraph spoke to issues relating to USFK. This paragraph received the bulk of our attention as we tracked a multitude of issues, demonstration groups, and themes. The most common themes we tracked
were those relating to the Highway 56 incident, inequities in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), USFK withdrawal from Korea, U.S. base movements and their expenditures, and construction of the Yongsan overpass. We concluded this section with a findings paragraph that summarized what happened and why, and what we assessed would happen the next month and why. We included any particular location or theme that may be stressed by dissident groups. This portion of the assessment was tied closely with our efforts on dissident web sites, as the groups that were protesting often exploited the speed and span of the Internet here in Korea to recruit members and incite passion in protestors, especially the younger generations (under 40 years old).

**Special Reports.** We developed this product due to a need to expound upon certain issues concerning the command that did not fit neatly in other areas of the assessment. The special report was normally developed in conjunction with the EOM, but was a stand-alone product and therefore a separate output. The Special Report development was possible because I had such a great group of enthusiastic analysts. They had taken on the great majority of the assessment, which allowed me time to look at other key issues more critically. We also used this venue to expand some of our analysis from the databases. We profiled newspaper authors, summarizing their usual sentiments into three key areas: overall sentiment, U.S. Policy, and USFK issues. We also profiled newspapers in a nine-month rollup to their sentiment over time in relation to key events (see Figure 6).

We produced a variety of Specials Reports on political maneuvering conducted in the press as well as reports to help other staff sections such as PAO, G5, and CJ5.

Oftentimes we used this forum to discuss the media’s responses to world and regional events. For example, we published Special Reports on the ROK media’s response to the Operation Iraqi Freedom, President Bush’s State of the Union Address, and the ROK troop dispatch. The Special Report simply allowed us to deviate from our base product, the EOM, and discuss timely issues in a less structured manner.

**Watch Reports.** Watch Reports were developed whenever we identified a time-sensitive issue. During June 2003, for example, several reports in both the daily newspapers and dissident web sites foretold of a massive demonstration near Gwanghwamun (in the vicinity of the U.S. Embassy) to recognize the first anniversary of the Highway 56 accident. The anticipated turnout was between 100,000 to one million protestors. Our work on the Internet and trends for the last year’s demonstrations allowed us to determine that the turnout would be substantially less (20,000 to 35,000). The actual turnout was within the range we predicted and the demonstration passed without much incident.

Some of the Watch Reports addressed recent polls in the Korean Press. Although not considered “time sensitive,” we felt that waiting until the EOM would not allow prompt situational understanding by the command. The Watch Reports were a vital informational tool we used to alert the command of potential dangers and changing trends. In the Intelligence community, one could compare our Watch Report to an Intelligence Report (INTREP) and the EOM as an IO Intelligence summary (INTSUM).

**Information Reports.** This type of report was used to educate the command on numerous issues. We found that through our new-found knowledge of ROK media, we were also increasing our understanding of Korean people. One of the first information reports I wrote was on Korean history and culture. This two-part paper provided background information into the unique historical struggle the Koreans experienced and detailed much of how that history helped mold their diverse culture. Accompanying the information papers were two PowerPoint™ presentations that depicted the material in a more user-friendly format.

We also produced Information Reports (IRs) on many of the political and military processes. They included—
- A background paper on a particular person, entitled “What Makes Him Tick?”
- New ROK military leadership profiling their careers.
- A Congressional Court composition.
- The processes to remove or reinstate the impeached president.

IR enabled the command to better understand a variety of issues. Based on feedback from our subordinate commands, the IRs proved a valuable tool.

**Conclusion**

Media Analysis and the corresponding products we developed provided expanded insight into numerous aspects of the Korean information environment. We
learned that structuring our analysis was the key to our success and the databases we created became the foundation of almost everything we did. The output complemented other products and augmented the command’s situational understanding of the ill-feelings directed toward U.S. forces, and helped Eighth Army mitigate some of its causes. Because of this increased understanding, the leaders were able to make better decisions which ultimately helped keep the ROK-U.S. alliance strong. This technical analytical approach could be applied to almost any theater of operations and could be used to inform, educate, and mitigate other forms of anti-U.S. sentiment.

ENDNOTES


2. One dissident group, perhaps the most infamous, is the Hanchongry’un (also known as Korean National Federation of General Student Assemblies) which is a student activist group. It was formed on 1993 from the Chon Dae Hyop (National University Student Executive Council). The National Security Law outlawed Hanchongry’un in 1997 because of their pro-north Korean ideology and violent methods. In late 1997, most colleges severed their ties with the Hanchongry’un and by 1998 it had lost its influence as the leading student movement dissident group. However, it still exists today as an outlawed organization and organizes demonstrations, often under false names.


5. IO eventually discarded this aspect of the overall assessment of demonstrations in November 2003 for several reasons:
   • Demonstration activity significantly decreased.
   • We no longer had the personnel to continue the process.
   • The 8th Military Police Brigade had, to a large extent, assumed responsibility for the process.
   • Demonstrations did not have a direct linkage with the information environment.
   6. The Kwangju rebellion in Kwangju and surrounding towns was a mass uprising of the people fighting for their rights and democracy in May 1980. Although the ruling clique succeeded in putting down the people’s uprising, the resulting May movement finally brought about the 1998 transition of power. Chung Kun Sik, professor at Chun Nam University, Korea, presented “The Kwangju Popular Uprising and the May Movement,” at the Second East Asia Peace and Human Rights Academic Conference, found at http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/43kwang.htm.

7. Hwang Chang Yop is the highest ranking North Korean to defect from the DPRK.

8. Analysis focused specifically on headlines appears elsewhere in this article in more detail.

9. Political corruption and scandal is ubiquitous in the ROK. It is such a problem that President Roh has stated that one of his top priorities is to cure what some have called the “Korean Disease.”

10. FBIS, South Korea: ROK Dissident Web Network Described, 30 July 2002.

11. For the most part, we covered the leading newspapers; however, we sometimes included weekly magazines and monthly publications when applicable.

12. There were periods when the websites changed very little; these low-level changes often addressed more homegrown issues, like labor disputes, which did not impact the command.

13. We felt that consistency in the product throughout the categories enabled a certain amount of thoroughness as we looked at the issues as well as reader comfort in absorbing the assessment.

14. Although we databased all the demonstrations, we focused on those in and around U.S. facilities. For example, we were not concerned with a union demonstration in Taejon that was not focused on the U.S. or our forces.

15. We differentiated between violent and belligerent by defining violent demonstrations as physical acts that purposely occur to cause injury or damage (to either individuals or property) where the injury or damage is foreseeable. Belligerence is defined as acts where protestors exhibit non-violent behavior but where behavior is considered provoking or demeaning (e.g., protestors swearing at the guards or using non-verbal offensive gestures).

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Army’s MI School Faces TRADOC Accreditation

by John J. Craig

During 2d quarter, FY 06, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) will undergo its first accreditation as a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) “Army Center and School.” The FY 06 accreditation visit is part of TRADOC’s ongoing initiative to evaluate and improve Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) initial military training (IMT) and professional military education (PME) across the Army.

The genesis of this initiative was the 2001 Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP), which recognized the need for accrediting TRADOC’s training institutions, both at the AC Proponent Schools and at their affiliated RC The Army School System (TASS) battalions. In October 2001, General John N. Abrams, then Commanding General (CG) of TRADOC, ordered the creation of a TRADOC Quality Assurance Office (QAO) to oversee the new mission.

TRADOC built the accreditation process around 24 standards that focus on conduct of training, training support, and proponent functions.

- The **conduct of training** standards assess ten elements including actual training, instructor-to-student ratios, visitors’ folders, student files, instructor certification, course materials, etc.
- The **training support** category includes six elements that focus on areas such as personnel management, staffing, facilities, instructor development, and test control.
- The eight **Proponent functions** standards are for AC training institutions only, not RC TASS battalions; their focus includes resource forecasting, quality assurance, AC and RC course development, integration of lessons learned, and compliance with command training guidance.

The 111th Military Intelligence Brigade, its subordinate battalions, and the school’s staff sections are currently working on a self-assessment for these 24 standards that will identify shortfalls and guide the accreditation visit.

The TRADOC accreditation team will include members not only from TRADOC headquarters but also from the U.S. Army Accessions Command (AAC), U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (SMA), and other TRADOC schools. In addition to traditional training areas and issues, the team will review safety, infrastructure, facilities, personnel, and logistics across the installation that can affect training in the MI schoolhouse.

During the accreditation visit, the team members will spread out across the school visiting training sessions, conducting student and instructor focus groups, interviewing leaders, and reviewing documents. During the document review, it will be critical to our success that knowledgeable staff and cadre are present and on-site to assist the accreditors as they check student files, instructor folders, and test control items.

Before departing, the TRADOC accreditation team will outbrief the USAIC&FH senior leadership on its initial impressions and findings. Subsequently, they will send a comprehensive draft report to USAIC&FH for review. TRADOC will then prepare a final report and assign the appropriate level of accreditation.

There are four possible levels of accreditation:

- Level 1, Candidate for Accreditation, means that the school has failed to achieve even 60 percent of the standards.
- Level 2, Conditional Candidate for Accreditation, means the school meets 60 to 79 percent of the standards.
- Level 3, Full Accreditation, means the school achieved 80 to 99 percent of the standards.
- Level 4, Institute of Excellence, means the Proponent School achieved 100 percent of the standards. No TRADOC school has yet achieved Level 4.

John Craig (Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired) is currently a Department of the Army civilian assigned as a Training Specialist-Evaluator to the USAIC&FH Quality Assurance Office. Prior to his retirement in May 2001, Mr. Craig was USAIC&FH’s Assistant Chief of Staff and the senior Army Reserve officer at the MI School. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at john.craig@hua.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 538-7461 or DSN 879-7461.
USAIC&FH Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned (OIL) Process

Background
During the summer of 2003, an organized process for developing Military Intelligence (MI) specific lessons learned was created in order to effect change in, as well as enhance, the MI Corps’ current and future warfighting and operational capabilities. Support to the Global War On Terrorism provided an additional emphasis on immediate changes that most improve intelligence operations.

The Lessons Learned Process
The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) Lessons Learned Process is a regimented series of actions occurring three times a year (see Figure 1). Although the identification of issues and development of solution strategies is a real time, ongoing effort between doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) agencies, a formalized process remains in place to brief the USAIC&FH command and attain approval and guidance on strategies and solutions.

The process begins with the collection of observations from soldiers. Several methods are used in the gathering of observations and insights. They include—

- Unit AfterAction Reviews (AARs).
- Pre-Course Surveys.
- ICON online surveys.
- Soldier interviews.

These observations are reviewed for completeness and then analyzed to determine if the observation is unit specific or Armywide. Unit specific or unit-unique issues are noted for future reference. Armywide issues are further analyzed to determine trends that require potential action.

New observations may support an existing issue: either confirming the issue still exists or indicating the issue has evolved or disappeared entirely. Observations may also indicate evolving issues that are concurrent with an existing issue, or a completely new issue.

The OIL team then conducts an internal “murder board” to ensure all of these issues have been identified and posted to the OIL site.

The next step in the process is to conduct a thorough liaison with all of the DOTMLPF representatives to ensure their strategies are up to date. This preparation is considered a quality control measure prior to the Strategy Validation and Synchronization (V&S) Working Group.

The Strategy Validation and Synchronization Working Group is the opportunity for DOTMLPF representatives to—

- Meet face to face in a final effort to identify lead and supporting efforts in solving identified issues.
- Validate evolving and new issues.

Figure 1. USAIC&FH Lessons Learned Process
Conduct final coordination and synchronization concerning new issues and strategies to be briefed to the USAIC&FH command for approval.

Following the working group is a USAIC&FH Senior Officer Steering Committee (SOSC). The SOSC is chaired by the CG or her representative. This SOSC convenes to approve new issues and strategies as well as receive updates on existing strategy status.

The intent of the entire process is to provide information and knowledge to improve intelligence operations through doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) actions. To facilitate this, the USAIC&FH OIL team has developed a web-based repository.

In a successful collaboration between the USAIC OIL Team and the Digital Training Office in February 2005 the OIL webpage was launched. This website, residing on the Intelligence Center Online Network (ICON), is the home of the OIL team’s efforts to track the observations received as solution strategies are developed and updated. Everyone with an ICON account has access to the site (see Figure 2).

Within ICON, newly developed issues are posted to the OIL web page by the team. Coordination among likely DOTMLPF leads takes place and possible solution strategies are identified. For instance, the issue may address, among other things, a need to revise or create new doctrine. The Chief of the Doctrine Division will receive the e-mail notification and assign an action officer to begin working the strategy and solutions required to meet his portion of solving the issue.

The action officer or Chief of Doctrine replies to the OIL Team and the action officer is given limited permissions within the system so that he can then access the administrative portions of the website and update or develop the solution strategy and its status.

After the issues and strategies are approved in committee, the OIL page permissions will be restricted to the administrators on the OIL Team. Updates can only be made to the status or additional strategies can be added.

Currently there are plans to improve the OIL page. One improvement will enable the generation of paper reports in the PowerPoint™ Quad format or in a text format. Additional improvements include automated notices to action officers concerning suspense status, activation of a hyperlink to a techniques page, and an ability to archive past observations supporting current issues.

The USAIC&FH Lessons Learned Process has evolved to a more user-friendly, intuitive, and interactive solution to record, track, and share with the Army community the status of issues the Intelligence Center is working on. This enables the Army community to see what lies ahead to make our Intelligence Community stronger, more effective, and more responsive to the Warfighter.

Mr. Dee K. Barnett, Command Sergeant Major (Retired), is a member of the Intelligence Center Lessons Learned Team.
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Intelligence Operations

by Michael A. Brake

At the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), the Army is transforming. The changes provide significantly more robust intelligence collection and analysis capabilities at the brigade level. This article will discuss these changes as projected in early November 2004.

The CSA's guidance was to create a modular, brigade-based army that—

- Is more responsive to regional combatant commanders.
- Better employs joint capabilities.
- Facilitates force packaging and rapid deployment.
- Fights as a self-contained unit capable of full-spectrum operations.

Modular Brigades

For the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (BOS), this means that many of the military intelligence (MI) collection assets that formerly supported maneuver brigades in either a direct support role or attached during operations are now organic. There will also be an increase in intelligence synchronization and analysis personnel within the brigade.

There will be four types of modular brigades:

- Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs).
- Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs).
- Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs).
- Future Combat System Brigade Combat Teams (FCSBCTs).

This article does not address the SBCTs as their structure and doctrine are set; it does not discuss the FCSBCT as its development is ongoing. From an MI perspective, the primary difference in the intelligence capabilities of the HBCT and IBCT is that the IBCTs are projected to have an organic Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS) capability within the MI company.

Brigade and Battalion S2s

The brigade S2 section will increase to 17 personnel, including the brigade S2 (an O4), 3 O3s, and a 5-person S2X section. During operations, the analysis and integration (A&I) platoon from the MI company will collocate and work with the brigade S2. This enhanced brigade S2 section supports intelligence synchronization and analysis capabilities in the brigade. The S2X section gives the brigade the ability to orchestrate organic and attached human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) activities as well as to interface with non-Army HUMINT assets within the BCT area of operations (AO).

The combined arms battalions and reconnaissance squadron S2 sections are projected to have ten personnel (nine would be MI). This will increase their processing capability to create actionable intelligence from multiple sensors, provide resources for planning to ensure a proactive vice reactive capability, and enhance the sections' abilities to conduct current operations and future planning for a sustained period.

The fires battalion S2 section is projected to consist of eight personnel (four will be MI). This section will provide an organic, 24/7, situational awareness capability, integrate collection requirements to ensure coverage of targeted areas of interest, and conduct targeting analysis and battle damage assessment.

The S2 portion of the brigade support battalion S2/S3 section is projected to consist of six personnel (four will be MI). This increases its capacity to provide continuous situational awareness support.

The brigade troops battalion is a new organization designed for the HBCTs and IBCTs. It consists of the otherwise separate units within the brigade such as the MI company and the signal company. The S2 section will have five personnel (three would be MI) who will provide a continuous organic situational awareness capability and will be able to surge for analytical support of Level I force protection and tailored missions.

MI Company

Although assigned to the brigade troops battalion (BTB), the assets of the MI Company will be task-organized across the brigade during operations.

The MI Company commander—

- Responds to the tasking of the brigade commander as directed by the brigade S2 and S3.
- Organizes for combat based on the mission, scheme of support, task organization, and specified and implied task contained in the brigade's operation orders (OPORDs).
- Uses the brigade's order to plan, prepare, execute, and assess the MI Company's operations.
- Advises the brigade S2/S3 on the use of the Ground Collection platoon assets and any MI assets attached to the MI Company.
During the brigade’s planning, the MI Company commander assists the brigade S2 with the development of the intelligence estimate and all intelligence products and deliverables needed to support the brigade orders process. These include but are not limited to the mission analysis briefing, base OPORD input, and Annex B. The commander also advises the brigade S3 on the employment of the HUMINT section and what echelons above brigade (EAB) intelligence collection platforms or agencies are available in the brigade areas of responsibility (AOR) that can be incorporated into brigade planning. As soon as the brigade commander approves the plan, the MI Company commander completes his planning, produces the company OPORD, and prepares to support the brigade’s ISR plan. In addition to the task organization considerations in FM 5-0, the MI Company commander attempts to—

- Provide seamless analytical support to the brigade S2.
- Employ SIGINT assets as directed in the brigade’s AOR.
- Assist with the synchronization of intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) assets in the brigade’s AOR.
- Employ HUMINT assets as directed in the brigade order.
- Retain the flexibility to reallocate and reposition company assets in response to changes in the brigade’s mission, concept of operations, scheme of support, and threat.
- Establish logistics and security relationships with the brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) to sustain and protect the MI Company personnel and equipment.

The MI company will consist of the following:

- Headquarters Section. The headquarters section will include a ten-person IEW maintenance section giving the brigade an organic IEW maintenance support capability.
- Analysis and Integration Platoon. The A&I platoon will support with the brigade S2 section during operations. The platoon will assist the brigade S2 with—
  - Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) support.
  - Database management.
  - Request for information (RFI) tracking.
  - Target development and other planning support.
  - ISR synchronization within the BCT.
  - Situation development.
  - Threat disposition development.
  - Combat assessment support.
  - Imagery analysis.
  - Requirements management.

Additionally, the A&I platoon will provide asset management support by translating the commander’s requirements into technical parameters. This platoon has two additional assets: a Common Ground Station (CGS) that will provide the brigade with access to the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) data feeds, and a TROJAN Special Purpose Intelligence Remote Integrated Terminal (TROJAN SPIRIT), which provides access to national databases.

- TUAV Platoon. The TUAV platoon is projected to consist of 35 personnel with 7 TUAVs and 3 Ground Control Stations (GCSs). The GCSs will be positioned on the battlefield based on mission requirements. The structure of this platoon allows for continuous tactical UAV imagery coverage with two UAVs flying at any one time (weather permitting) and one spare.
- Ground Collection Platoon. The ground collection platoon consists of two sections: Prophet and HUMINT. The Prophet section comprises a Prophet control section and two three-person Prophet teams. This will allow for continuous signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection, but the teams will require external security support. The HUMINT section consists of a four-person operational management team (OMT) and three four-person HUMINT collection teams (HCTs). This section provides the brigade with an organic HUMINT collection and management capability. The OMT will coordinate the HCTs’ collection and reporting. The HCTs will deploy across the BCT AOR as the mission requires, as directed by the brigade, and in conjunction with guidance by the S2X. In the IBCT, the ground collection platoon will consist of a four-person measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) section and the REMBASS systems.
- Staff Weather Officer (SWO) Section. During operations, the U.S. Air Force will provide a SWO section. This SWO section will work within the brigade S2 section.

Final Comments

The additional collection and analytical assets in the HBCT and IBCT greatly increase the brigade’s intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. However, they will also necessitate a considerably greater ISR synchronization effort across the brigade. Due to current limitations in equipment and trained personnel, brigades will receive their full authorizations incrementally throughout the transformation.

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“Ever since the Korean Conflict ended in a cease-fire in 1953, the clouds of war have never really been cleared because of the never-ending military provocations by the north.”

—Park Chung Hee, President, Republic of Korea, 1961-1979

In September 1996, North Korean Special Operations Forces (SOF) infiltrated the South Korean eastern coast near the town of Kangnung. The North Koreans, numbering 26, abandoned their stranded submarine and rushed from the beach into the surrounding hills. What followed was a two-month bloody manhunt for the infiltrators that left all but two of the North Koreans dead. During the manhunt, 16 South Korean soldiers and civilians died and 27 were wounded.

I was assigned to the J2, United States Forces, Korea (USFK) at the time and offer this account of the Communist North’s submarine infiltration that went terribly wrong. The infiltration mission was one of collecting intelligence on the Republic of Korea (ROK). U.S. senior leaders have identified the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, also North Korea) as part of the “axis of evil” and a potential threat to national security. In fact, North Korea has been an ongoing threat to peace and stability in Northeast Asia for the past 50 years. The failed infiltration mission provides some insight into how the North Koreans might conduct wartime infiltrations and gives us a glimpse into the training and capabilities of their SOF.

**Background**

North Korea has the largest special operations force in the world. Currently, the North Korean SOF numbers more than 100,000 soldiers, approximately 10 percent of their active duty military. Their mission includes the seizure, destruction, or both of—

- Command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) nodes.
- Aerial ports of debarkation and seaports of debarkation.
- Logistics sites.
- Lines of communication.
- Key terrain.
Additional SOF missions include—

- Raids.
- Targeting.
- Assassination.
- Reconnaissance.
- Intelligence gathering.

The North Korean SOF comprises 25 brigades and 5 reconnaissance battalions. These Special Forces fall under the DPRK General Staff Department and more specifically under the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau, Reconnaissance Bureau, Army Corps and Divisions, or Korean People’s Navy.

The North Korean soldiers who infiltrated Kangnung belonged to the Reconnaissance Bureau (REBU). The REBU is the most elite of all the North Korean SOF units. The REBU consists of 5 reconnaissance battalions numbering approximately 2,500 personnel and 3 sniper brigades numbering approximately 10,500 personnel.1 (The term “sniper” is more of an honorific title rather than a mission statement of the unit.)

The North Korean SOF soldiers are the best-trained personnel in the North Korean People’s Army. They conduct tough and realistic training and on numerous occasions have conducted real-world missions for the North Korean regime. As an example, three SOF soldiers went to Burma in 1983 with the mission of assassinating then South Korean President Chun Do Won. Although the assassination attempt on President Chun failed, the SOF soldiers did kill 17 ROK government officials traveling with Chun.

The SOF soldier is a dedicated guard of the Fatherland and servant of “the Great” General Kim Jong Il. Figure 1 lists some characteristics of the individual North Korean SOF soldier.

**Figure 1. Characteristics of the North Korean SOF Soldier**

- Highly motivated, well-trained, and disciplined fanatical fighter.
- Educated and from an urban and politically reliable background.
- Politically indoctrinated and ideologically loyal to the North Korean regime.
- Prior military service from four to seven years in a combat arms branch.
- Tough and physically fit with a consistent program of physical training, road marches, and martial arts.
- Trained not to surrender, but to fight to the death.
- Will choose suicide first, rather than surrender. Methods of suicide include SOF soldiers shooting each other or using a grenade to inflict their own death.²

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**Chronology of Events**

This was not the first time the DPRK had conducted a seaborne infiltration near Kangnung. The only captured North Korean of the 1996 infiltration stated that an infiltration near Kangnung had occurred a year earlier on 15 September 1995. The following will describe the chronology of events in the failed 1996 attempt.

**Preparation.** On 13 September 1996, Captain Chong Yong Ku, Commander of Number 1 Reconnaissance Submarine, Second Team, 22d Squadron, Maritime Department of the REBU, his crew, and REBU SOF soldiers conducted a final mission meeting. Before this final meeting, the submarine crew and SOF soldiers had conducted five training exercises, two of which were dress rehearsals “under operational conditions.”³ All the REBU soldiers took and signed an oath of allegiance pledging to return only “after fulfilling the order of General Kim Chong Il.”⁴ Lieutenant General Kim Tae Shik, Director of the REBU, ordered the infiltration team members to “perform their mission with courage.”⁵

**Mission.** Of the 26 North Koreans, 21 were crewmembers, 2 of whom were trained reconnaissance team escorts. The Director of the Maritime Department, Colonel Kim Dong Won, and the Vice Director were also on the submarine. The remaining North Koreans were a three-man SOF reconnaissance team.⁶ The SOF reconnaissance team’s mission was to collect intelligence on military facilities near Kangnung, while the submarine crew was to photograph the beach and nearby facilities.⁷

This was not a new endeavor by the North Koreans. The late Kim Il Sung, previous DPRK dictator, stated in the 1970s that his military reconnaissance teams kept U.S. military maneuvers in South Korea under surveillance.⁸

**H-Hour.** At 0500 on 14 September, the Number 1 Reconnaissance Sango submarine departed its base at Toejo-Dong, located on the North Korean east coast above Hamhung. The DPRK had specially modified the 325-ton Sango (Shark) class coastal submarine for infiltration missions. The submarine was 32.5 meters long and 3.7 meters wide and can cruise at a maximum submerged speed of 12 knots. At 1930 on 15 September, the submarine arrived approximately 8 kilometers off the South Korean coast near Kangnung. Kangnung is 140 kilometers east of Seoul (the capital of South Korea) and 150 kilometers south of the Demilitarized Military Zone (DMZ). The submarine approached the coast and stopped approximately 300 to 400 meters from the shoreline.
Infiltration. A SOF reconnaissance team and the two escorts departed the submarine in scuba gear and swam toward the shore. At approximately 2100, they reached the shore; the SOF team hid their scuba gear, while the two escorts returned to the submarine. The submarine then returned to international waters. On 16 September, the submarine returned to ROK waters to recover the SOF reconnaissance team. Since the recovery was not successful, the submarine again returned to international waters (see Figure 2 for a map depicting the route of the 1996 infiltration operation).

On 17 September, the submarine reentered ROK waters to make a second attempt to recover the team. At approximately 2100, the submarine ran aground and eventually settled approximately 20 meters off An-in Beach (5 kilometers south of Kangnung). The submarine crew tried unsuccessfully to move, but the grounding damaged the submarine and it was now stuck. Captain Chong ordered the crew to abandon the submarine. They started a fire on the submarine in an attempt to destroy the equipment aboard. At 2350, the 26 North Koreans reached the shoreline with the weapons and equipment they could carry.

Abort Infiltration Mission. At approximately 0100 on 18 September, Lee Jin Gyu, a South Korean taxi driver, spotted a group of men huddled near the Kangnung-Tonghae coastal highway. Lee also saw a large object in the water near the beach. He was suspicious and noti-

Figure 2. Route of the 1996 Infiltration Operation
fied ROK authorities. Soon afterward, both ROK Army units and police were alerted, rushed to the area, and began blocking and searching operations for the North Korean infiltrators. The North Koreans quickly separated into several groups and headed inland toward the mountains.

At 0500, General Kim Dong Jin, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Headquarters, ROK Defense Ministry, ordered a Chindogae One (alert order) across Kangwon Province and surrounding areas. The ROK Army would eventually mobilize approximately 40,000 soldiers, along with helicopter and “sniffer dog” support in the hunt for the infiltrators. The anti-infiltration operation encompassed an area with a 50-kilometer radius surrounded by ROK soldiers and police. The ROK Army also imposed a night curfew for the area. At daybreak, a special unit of the ROK Navy boarded the submarine and found a Czech-made machine gun, an AK-47 rifle, approximately 250 rounds of ammunition, and other items.

Escape and Evasion. On 18 September at approximately 1110, ROK soldiers spotted two armed North Koreans fleeing. The North Koreans had previously come upon two farmers, and after beating them, fled. The farmers then notified the police, and ROK soldiers were soon in pursuit.

Capture and Interrogation of Lee Kwang Soo. At approximately 1630 on 18 September, the submarine helmsman, Lee Kwang Soo, was spotted near a farm approximately 1630 on 18 September, the submarine lost engine power shortly after departing from the port of Wonsan and then drifted into South Korean waters. He said there were 20 personnel on the submarine, and later stated there were 26. He subsequently told his interrogators that the mission of the submarine was to collect information on South Korean naval and air bases near Kangnung.

Later, the ROK presented Lee, a lieutenant in the REBU, to the public at a press conference in Seoul. At the press conference, he stated:

“We were not on a training but a reconnaissance mission. The mission was to be prepared for a big war, considering the fact that [the] chief of the Maritime Unit of the Reconnaissance Bureau, a full colonel, was with us in the submarine.”

Lee also declared he had heard from his comrades that 11 of the infiltrators had been shot “by their colleagues because they were not as strong and might have been captured.” He said, “we were told to commit suicide to avoid arrest” and that he tried to head to the DMZ but was caught while trying to get food from a farmhouse.

Murder or Murder-Suicide. Eleven North Koreans had moved to a 330-meter-high mountain clearing approximately 8 kilometers southwest of where the submarine had run aground. At approximately 1700 on 18 September, ROK soldiers arrived at this hilltop clearing and found the bodies of the 11 North Koreans. Ten of the bodies were side by side, lined up in a row, while one body (that of a colonel) was off to the side a short distance away; the colonel’s pistol was still in his holster. All of the bodies were dressed in civilian clothing and white tennis shoes. The ROK Army reported that all of these North Koreans died from a gunshot in the head at close range. Probably one or more of the SOF soldiers had shot the 11 North Koreans and then fled, or it is possible that one of the 11 infiltrators shot his comrades and then shot himself. The dead North Koreans were the subma-

Head North. At this point, the remaining North Korean infiltrators had no intention of surrendering, which left only one option: fight their way back north to the DMZ and the Fatherland. From 19 through 30 September, 11 more North Koreans died in firefights with the ROK Army. Every week or so, Korean television stations would broadcast the results of the latest firefight and show ROK soldiers carrying bloodied white sheets and several makeshift wooden coffins containing the bodies of the infiltrators out of the woods.

On 19 September, ROK soldiers killed seven North Koreans in three separate firefights. Three North Koreans dressed in jeans, T-shirts, civilian jackets, and tennis shoes died at approximately 1000 on a mountain south of Kangnung. At 1400, the South Koreans spotted three more infiltrators and a firefight ensued; one infiltrator died during the firefight and two others later died of their wounds. Then at 1600, another firefight resulted in the death of another infiltrator and the wounding of one ROK soldier.
On 21 and 22 September, two more North Korean infiltrators were killed in a firefight. Between 23 and 30 September, two more infiltrators died in another firefight.

On 22 September, the ROK Navy towed the Sango submarine to the port of Tonghae. They conducted a thorough examination for intelligence purposes.

Political Actions and Rhetoric. On 20 September 1996, then President of the ROK Kim Young Sam said, “this is an armed provocation, not a simple repeat of infiltration of agents of the past.” He declared that any further provocation against South Korea would bring a “real possibility of war.”

The DPRK responded:

“As far as a competent organ of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces knows, the submarine encountered engine trouble and drifted south, leaving its crew with no other choice but to get to the enemy’s land, which might cause armed conflict.”

On 1 October 1996, Choi Duk Keun, a South Korean diplomat, was assassinated in Vladivostok, Russia. His death came shortly after North Korea threatened to retaliate for the killings of the evading infiltrators in South Korea; poison found in his body was the same type as that carried by the North Korean infiltrators.

According to the South Korean newspaper Joong-ang Daily News in mid-October, the ROK Government had selected strategic targets for possible attack if North Korea conducted further provocations.

Continuing Pursuit of Infiltrators. From October through 5 November, the ROK Army pursued three remaining infiltrators who were moving north toward the DMZ. More than likely, there was a two-man team and another infiltrator traveling alone. Lee Kwang Soo, the only captured infiltrator, stated he believed the remaining three infiltrators were “specially trained and fit” and had already crossed the DMZ into North Korea.

On 5 November, the two infiltrators died in a firefight. A South Korean motorist had spotted them as they crossed the highway. The motorist immediately called the police and the chase was on. The ROK Army picked up the infiltrators’ trail near Inje, in Kangwon Province, approximately 20 kilometers south of the DMZ and 100 kilometers north of Kangnung. At approximately 2230, the North Koreans spotted the ROK soldiers approaching on Mount Hyangro and opened fire. There were three separate exchanges of gunfire before the ROK soldiers finally killed the North Koreans. Before their deaths, the North Koreans managed to kill 3 ROK soldiers and wound another 14 with grenades and gunfire. These two infiltrators were killed almost 50 days after their submarine had run aground.

These North Koreans wore ROK uniforms and their weapons included M16 rifles, handguns, and grenades. ROK soldiers also found three pocket notebooks on the infiltrators, one of which contained a crude map of their 49-day escape. One of the notebooks was a diary that described the infiltration mission and how the submarine went aground. This diary also had these descriptions of the infiltrators’ escape and evasion (see Figure 3).

According to Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., author and expert on the North Korean military, the last infiltrator, Li Chul Jin, escaped to North Korea.

In mid-November, a New York Times reporter in Seoul wired back to his paper that—

“a surge of tension; fears of further military provocations or even war; stalling of the engagement process; a growing number of hungry North Korean peasants who can count on little international help; and a reminder that it is hard to find a place more dangerous and unpredictable than the Korean peninsula.”

Aftermath. Of the 26 North Korean infiltrators, 1 was captured, 11 were murdered or died from a murder-suicide, 13 were killed in firefights with the ROK Army, and 1 reportedly escaped back to North Korea. The infiltration led to a 49-day manhunt from

Figure 3. Diary Entries Describing the Infiltrators’ Escape and Evasion
18 September through 5 November when ROK soldiers killed the last two infiltrators.

On 29 December, a North Korean official issued an official apology:

“The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK is authorized to express deep regret for the submarine incident in the coastal waters of Kangnung, South Korea, in September 1996 that caused the tragic loss of human life. The DPRK will make efforts to ensure that such an incident will not recur and will work with others for durable peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.” 20

On 30 December, the ROK Government returned the cremated remains of the infiltrators to North Korea at Panmunjon.

The ROK military conducted an investigation on how the North Koreans were able to infiltrate the coastline so easily. A ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff report resulted in punishment of 20 ROK officers and soldiers for “negligence of duty.” 21 The report cited the failures of the Army and Navy in detecting the submarine infiltration and the lack of speed of the military response to the infiltration. The investigation also resulted in a ROK lieutenant general and major general being relieved of their positions.

Lee Kwang Soo, the only captured infiltrator, remained in South Korea. He became an instructor for the ROK Navy.

Conclusion

The North Korean submarine infiltration was a “normal” spying mission that on this occasion turned into disaster. The incident should make it clear to all observers of the DPRK’s continuing preparations for war and their longstanding goal to reunite the two Koreas someday either by political trickery or force, if necessary.

The 1996 infiltration incident demonstrates that North Korean SOF units and soldiers are tough, well trained, and loyal, and they will be fanatical fighters on the battlefield. The North Korean SOF conducts realistic, hands-on training. These Communist SOF soldiers will not surrender in battle, but will try to take as many South Korean and U.S. soldiers with them to death.

General Leon J. LaPorte, USFK Commanding General, stated in an interview that North Korea’s SOF is the largest in the world and is the key element in the Communist state’s “asymmetric” warfare strategy. 22 In a wartime scenario, the North Korean high command will probably attempt to infiltrate thousands of SOF soldiers into South Korea to cause as much death and havoc as possible. ROK and U.S. forces, regardless of whether they are combat arms or support troops, should be aware of this threat and be ready.

Endnotes

2. Ibid., pages 3, 215.
3. Ibid., page 163.
4. Ibid., page 161.
5. Ibid., page 162.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
9. Ibid., page 387.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., page 389.
12. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
21. Ibid.

Major Harry P. Dies, Jr., served as Operations Officer, Combined Intelligence and Operations Center, C/J2, Combined Forces Command/USFK, during the 1996 submarine incident. He has served in South Korea and Germany, and deployed to Kuwait in 1998 during Operation DESERT FOX. He is currently the Chief, Intelligence Division, G2, First U.S. Army, Fort Gillem, Georgia. MAJ Dies earned a Bachelor of Science degree from Austin Peay State University in Tennessee and has a Master of Arts degree from Webster University in Missouri. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at harry.dies@us.army.mil and telephonically at (404) 469-4386 or DSN 797-4386.
“From these characterizations, the authors posed the hypothesis of fourth generation warfare. This style of warfare was based on the trends identified in the earlier generational shifts. They believe that future war would be characterized by: very small independent action forces (SIAF) or cells acting on mission-type orders; a decreased dependence on logistics support; more emphasis on maneuver; and psychological goals rather than physical ones. This latter objective of psychological warfare meant that the enemy’s will to fight had to collapse from within.”

Also, fourth generation warfare (4GW) includes three basic constructs:

- The loss of the nation-states’ monopoly on war.
- A return to a world of cultures and states in conflict.
- Internal segmentation or division along ethnic, religious, and special interest lines within our own society.

Deconstruction

We have defined what 4GW is according to its proponents. This article will now critically examine these claims.

First, to start the generational construct of warfare in the Napoleonic era implies that all that preceded Napoleon Bonaparte is so irrelevant as to not even merit discussion. No true student of history, let alone military history, would advocate ignoring the advances in the conduct of war and theory of war established by Sun Tzu, Joshua of Israel, Alexander the Great, Gaius Julius Caesar, Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, George Washington, etc. As a minimum, one should, at least, reconsider the start-point.

Second, proponents of 4GW admit two key issues. First, although generational advances may occur, they are not uniformly dispersed nor adopted. Second, ideas can be sufficient, of themselves, to warrant a generational paradigm shift. This article discusses more on
that later; let us first examine the three basic constructs of 4GW.

**The loss of the nation-states' monopoly on war.** Of itself, this is a misleading construct. Tribes, peoples, clans, and nations (without states) have never relinquished their ability to wage war. The mere advent of the nation-state did not uniformly negate the existence of other conflict and forms. The fact that this nation fought the French and Indian wars, allying with some tribes while engaging others in battle, while simultaneously allying with our mother state (England) while fighting the French, is of itself proof that nations, tribes, clans, and peoples have never relinquished their willingness, nor their ability, to wage non-state war. The existence of mercenaries is another point—these are non-state actors. The existence of pirates, such as the Islamic Barbary Coast pirates fought during the era of Jefferson, is yet another instance of non-state actors engaging organized states.\(^3\) Nation-states never held such a monopoly on war, and therefore could never lose the alleged monopoly.

**A return to a world of cultures and states in conflict.** This statement implies that there once was a world without cultures and states in conflict. Even using the argument promulgated by the 4GW theorists and starting only with the Napoleonic era, there is no time for a supposed “golden era” where cultures and states were not in conflict. Since the proponents of 4GW are American, yet use European examples, we will consider the relatively recent history of Europe and the United States from the time of Napoleon Bonaparte to the present (see Figure 1). So there was never a time when cultures and states were not in conflict.

**Internal segmentation or division along ethnic, religious, and special interest lines within our society.** There was never a time when these schisms did not exist. Native Americans were subjugated, placed on reservations, and abide there to this day. Similarly, no student of history seriously holds that the mere freeing of slaves at the end of the U.S. Civil War automatically led to full and equal treatment; a lack of fair treatment persisted. There were additional major political schisms when the Vietnamese refugees first came here at the end of the war in Vietnam. There was no mythic “golden era” when ethnicity did not matter in the United States. Religion has likewise been a factor—when John F. Kennedy was running for office and then elected, his religion (Roman Catholic) was a serious political issue. Now, however, instead of Christians quarreling among themselves, there is again concern regarding Islam and its practitioners—especially within our borders, not only after the events of 11 September 2001 but also failure of mainstream (vice fanatic) spokespersons for the self-proclaimed “religion of peace” to decry these and other atrocities. Simply because the focus has shifted does not mean there was no previous conflict.

**Counter-Definition**

As Robert M. Pirsig wrote in *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry Into Values*, there are several ways to consider a thing, even something as basic as motorcycle maintenance.\(^4\) One can reasonably view history as a cycle, instead of a linear progression; or a spiral; and dispense with the notion of generational warfare altogether. Refraining from those possibilities, however, let us retain the 4GW model, and consider instead the following alternate historical definitions and interpretations.

**First generation warfare.** Intellectual honesty demands that we view the first generation of warfare as comprised of individuals conducting individual actions, more or less organized into groups or armed mobs, with a more or less understood common goal of the forcible implementation of one’s political and military will. Ironically, at this “primitive” stage, warfare was often not merely along ideological or religious lines, but also along the lines of race, ethnicity, etc. In addition, the concept of utter destruction and annihilation of the foe was well understood—total war was the objective; there was no other form of war. (The idea of total war was rediscovered when Germany declared Britain’s popula-

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<td>• Global War on Terrorism</td>
<td>• Bosnian civil war</td>
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<td>• Countless other interventions, noncombatant evacuation operations, etc.</td>
<td>• World War II</td>
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Figure 1. Examples of Conflicts In and Between Cultures and States
tion and will to fight as a strategic objective, and began the Battle of Britain.) Also from the beginning, the idea of a defense was understood, and the use of walls to defend towns was an intuitive counter to the threat of marauders. Along with this defense of places came the idea of defense of the person, and the introduction of defensive armor. The Egyptians, and others, used heavy metal armor at least 1,500 years B.C.

The next phase of the first generation war was the organization of armed mobs into an “army” to function as a team, the introduction of a battle hierarchy for purposes of command, and related matters. It is at this time that the idea of conquering a people and subjugating them became a viable model, rather than total extermination. This also marks the introduction of siege warfare and the deliberate efforts to counter static defenses. It is also immediately followed by the introduction of maneuvers other than frontal assault. The square was then modified so that an element could be detached, marched to be adjacent to the enemy, and the enemy flanked. This is, arguably, the very beginning of “maneuver” warfare.\(^5\)

The third phase of first generation war is the introduction of auxiliary elements, such as formations of archers, cavalry, etc., and the deliberate and synchronized use of assets in a combined manner for increased effects. Joshua of Israel (circa 1250 B.C.), Sun Tzu (5th century B.C.), Alexander the Great (4th century B.C.), and many other famous leaders mastered this use of combined arms. It is noteworthy that the same great leaders, who understood combined arms, also recognized the need for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance of the enemy. For example, Joshua’s requirements of the scouts he sent to spy out the land of Canaan and to prepare for the attack on Jericho reads like a modern scout report as far as the topics of concern and focus. The ideas of the tactical ruse, deception, feint, display, etc., were already understood and practiced well over 3,500 years ago, as was the use of human intelligence (HUMINT) as demonstrated by the recruitment of Rahab the harlot.

Second generation warfare as a seismic paradigm shift can be seen as the successful use of gunpowder in war; this technological shift begins during the Hundred Years War at Crecy, France, in 1346.\(^6\) The introduction of artillery was the beginning of the end of the utility of fortresses, though other technological improvements and refinements had to occur before that statement was fulfilled.

The mere introduction of gunpowder, however, did not immediately mean that all armies dispensed with their pikes and crossbows. Command and control (C2) through the use of fires, flags, trumpets, carrier pigeons, etc., continued to be a part of warfare for centuries. HUMINT, counterintelligence (CI), reconnaissance, surveillance, improvements to transportation and logistics, and other related combat multipliers were refined and enhanced. The gains achieved in all the phases of first generation warfare remained, and warriors applied them with varying degrees of success.

Third generation warfare is arguably the introduction of air power as a combat multiplier, rather than a mere observational platform (as used during the U.S. Civil War, etc.); so this set point should be World War I. The goal of out-maneuvering the adversary was already well established and well understood, but not well executed. This failure to perform does not equate to a lack of understanding the requirements, as implied. Nearly simultaneous to the introduction of air power were the introduction of chemical warfare, toxins, and a refinement of biological warfare capabilities.

World War I as a set point is also useful for seismic paradigm shifts, as this marks the introduction of armor at the 1916 battle of the Somme in France. New technologies—including the telegraph, telephone, etc.—enhanced C2. The railroad as a force multiplier was already a proven factor as early as the U.S. Civil War; and General Alfred von Schlieffen had already written the German continuity plan for a two-front war literally decades before WWI began. Although all of the above-cited technologies came together at this time, the true seismic paradigm shift was the use of air power in an effective combat role.

A more proper set point for fourth generation warfare is 1945, and the advent of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. This is a technological capability that absolutely must be part of any serious discussion of war and the capabilities to wage war. [It is interesting that while some nations for some time adopted a belief that only armies should fight one another, thus sparing the civilian populace, by World War II there was a certain “rediscovery” of the concept of total war—a principle that was already well understood and practiced as a first generation principle.]

Final Thoughts

From 1945 to the present, no seismic paradigm shifts regarding war occurred that warriors had not already discovered or practiced at some previous time in human history. As regards the current Global War on Terrorism, this is not the first—
Campaign ever fought in a desert.
Insurrection or counterinsurrection ever fought.
Occupation ever conducted.
Guerrilla or counterguerrilla campaign.
Attempt at reconstruction and nation building (as though the Marshall Plan never existed).

We cannot logically justify what we are seeing today as a seismic paradigm shift concerning how war is fought in theory or practice, nor for how we as a nation conduct war, in either theory or practice. Indeed, we find ourselves at the beginning, facing an armed mob, who have a political will that they wish to impose upon us, despite the advances in technology, political thought, intellectual development, philosophical developments, and even spiritual enlightenment over the millennia.

“…there is no new thing under the sun.”

—Ecclesiastes 1:9, King James Version, The Bible

Endnotes

Del Stewart (Chief Warrant Officer Three, U.S. Army, Retired) is a contractor and a retired CI Technician. Readers may contact him via E-mail at del.stewart@us.army.mil.

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READ ANY GOOD BOOKS LATELY?

We welcome reviews of books related to intelligence professional development or military history. Please E-mail or mail your book reviews with your phone number, address, the title, author, publisher, price, number of pages, and the publisher’s address (listed on the book’s copyright page). Please send your reviews to mipb@hua.army.mil or mail them to ATTN: ATZS-FDT-M USAIC&Fort Huachuca, 550 Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017.
The Army and Military Intelligence (MI) continue to move at a very fast pace to keep up with transformation. Much is happening throughout the Army and we have tried to capture the key points and how it all affects you, the intelligence professional, in this article. Thanks for all your dedication and patience as we work together to smooth out the wrinkles of change. Congratulations to those selected on recent boards, and thanks to those of you who make a difference while deployed away from home each day.

Officer Professional Development

MI Transformation and Branch Qualification. With the many changes coming to MI as a result of the Army’s transformation efforts, we will need to keep a close watch on the current branch qualification requirements. We are beginning to see more emphasis on core intelligence jobs. If this becomes a trend as we expect, then adjustments to branch qualification may have to occur to accommodate the new reality. Some experts have stated that they are already seeing some of this new emphasis in the recently released Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Selection Board results. We will let you know how this evolves. The bottom line is that we are seeing a greater appreciation for MI technical skills in promotion decisions.

FY04 MI LTC Selection Board Results. The results of the last promotion board for fiscal year 2004 (FY04) show MI coming in slightly below the Army average. The selection average for MI was 70.7 percent versus the Army average of 77 percent. Selection results still show that Command and Staff College (CSC) attendance is a must. While overall performance remains the single most important factor, high quality performance in branch qualification positions (analysis and control element [ACE] chief, brigade S2, S3, and executive officer [XO]) is the key to selection. In fact, performance was a greater factor than resident versus nonresident attendance at CSC or even School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) participation. Those who served as S2s only (versus S3 or XO) at the brigade level and performed well were selected for promotion. While not a trend yet, this does show that the Board regarded brigade S2 positions equally with XO or S3 assignments.

FY04 Functional Area (FA) 34 LTC Selection Board Results. The primary zone (PZ) selection rate for FA 34 (Strategic Intelligence) was 73.7 percent and for the entire Information Operations (IO) Career Field (CF) it was 70.6 percent. Most would argue that it is more important for officers in the smaller career fields (those outside the Operations CF) to compare selection rates within their own career fields rather than to the Army average. With such small populations, a difference in one officer can skew the percentages. To show this in hard numbers, the Operations CF had 965 officers eligible in the PZ as opposed to the IO CF where there were only 102. FA 34 has the second largest eligible population within the IO CF with the IO CF having a maximum selection target of 91. The Board met the maximum goal by selecting 91 officers. FA 34 got 14 of those selectees. Completion of CSC continues to be a must for selection for promotion; however, the Board results again do not indicate a difference between resident and nonresident CSC. Performance continues to be the primary driver for selection. Files containing exclusively center of mass reports appear to place IO CF officers at risk for promotion. Officers selected for promotion had at least one report in their files that was above center of mass (ACOM).

Warrant Officer Professional Development Opportunities

Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) Redesign. In April 2003, the Army Chief of Staff (CSA) approved implementation of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel-Warrant Officer Study (ATLDP-WO) final report. Based on an April 2004 ATLDP update briefing, the
CSA confirmed his support of the ATLDP initiatives, recommendations, and the implementation “way-ahead.”

Among the many study recommendations was one to integrate branch WOs into their respective officer corps. Central to this effort is the consolidation of the Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) and Officer Education System into a single Officer Education System (OES) that takes advantage of shared training opportunities.

The Center for Army Leadership (CAL) is leading the effort to develop a consolidated OES that includes elements unique to warrant officers, elements unique to branch-commissioned officers, and elements common to both cohorts. It is anticipated that the Combined Arms Center (CAC), CAL, and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training), in conjunction with the Warrant Officer Career Center (WOCC), branch proponents, and schools will shortly determine the specific requirements for expanded officer education and training.

This consolidation of education systems into a single OES will occur in four phases.

- **Phase I (Near-term)** begins with the inclusion of lessons learned from Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM (OIF and OEF, respectively) into the existing WOES. Completion date is anticipated to be no later than (NLT) the second quarter (2Q) FY05.

- **Phase II (Military Education Level [MEL] analysis)** begins after Commanding General (CG), CAC approval to conduct the needs analysis and critical task analysis required to redesign WOES and develop the consolidated OES. Completion date is anticipated NLT 4Q FY05.

- **Phase III (Course design, development, and implementation of pilot courses)** begins after completion of the needs analysis and critical task analysis and CG, CAC approval. This approval will allow the completion and approval of the course design and development at each MEL and conduct of pilot courses. Completion date is anticipated NLT 4Q FY06.

- **Phase IV (Implementation of redesigned WOES as a consolidated part of OES)** begins after successful conduct of pilot courses. CG, TRADOC approval will allow the complete implementation of the redesigned WOES. Completion date is anticipated NLT 1Q FY07.

The development of a consolidated OES will allow appropriate shared training to occur at all education levels. One of the major objectives of the shared training is to permit branch officers and branch warrant officers to learn skills pertinent to both cohorts in a shared environment, facilitating a better understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each cohort. Training of the consolidated OES will be accomplished using the following methods:

- Integrated training where both the environment (classroom) and the terminal learning objectives (TLO) are the same.
- Shared training where the environment is shared, but the TLOs are different.
- Shared curriculum training where the environment is not shared, but the TLOs are the same.
- Warrant Officer specific training where the environment and the TLOs are completely different and separated.

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) has anticipated the way ahead and has already begun consolidation of WOES into OES. The 304th MI Battalion, responsible for all MI officer training, will start a pilot course in February 2005, wherein branch officers and branch warrant officers will attend common courses together. As usual, MI is “Always Out Front.”

**Enlisted Professional Development Opportunities**

**MI Enlisted Career Maps.** Our Army and the Military Intelligence Corps continue to experience change and turmoil as we work through Army transformation initiatives. With all of the changes, anticipated and unanticipated, it is sometimes difficult for enlisted soldiers to keep track of the things needed to get ahead in their military occupational specialties (MOSs). Additionally, for leaders it is often an equal challenge to stay informed in order to counsel soldiers on what they need to do to progress in their MOSs. There are, of course, several websites, handbooks, Field Manuals, and other tools available. One of these tools is the MOS Career Map.

The Career Map serves as a guide and timeline to the various “gates” soldiers should attempt to pass as they progress through their military careers. We understand that while not every soldier will meet every gate, all should meet some of the gates. The maps also list the correct duty title for each grade and MOS. To find the map for your MOS, visit the Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI) website listed below.

**OCMI Points of Contact**

The point of contact (POC) for officer actions is Ms. Borghardt; readers may contact her via E-mail at charlotte.borghardt@hua.army.mil. The POC for
warrant officer actions is Chief Warrant Officer Five (CW5) Prewitt-Diaz; readers may contact him via E-mail at james.prewitt-diaz@hua.army.mil. The POC for enlisted actions is Sergeant Major (SGM) Mitchell; readers may contact him via E-mail at maurice.mitchell@hua.army.mil.

OCMI Website
Interested readers can reach the OCMI website at https://cms.portal.hua.army.mil/channels/OCMI/Web page/index.htm. You will be able to find information on issues ranging from enlisted career field overviews to officer, warrant officer, and civilian updates.

Lieutenant Colonel Harvey L. Crockett is the Director, Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (MI). Readers may contact him via E-mail at harvey.crockett@hua.army.mil. Robert C. White, Jr., is the Deputy OCMI; you can reach him via E-mail at bob.whitejr@us.army.mil.

The Government Printing Office (GPO) has authorized MIPB to sell back issues for $2.50 each. If you wish to purchase issues, email your request to MIPB@hua.army.mil. Tell us which issue(s) you want; e.g., January-March 2002 and how many.

MIPB ONLINE
The Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) is now online at three different sites.

To view past issues of MIPB up to and including the October-December 2003 issue, log on to:

Army Knowledge Online (AKO). You must have an established AKO account to access this site. Click on the files tab at the top of the page. At the left side of the page under U.S. Army Organizations click on Intelligence, then click on MI Professional Bulletin.

Intelligence Center Online Network (ICON) at https://iconportal.hua.army.mil. You must have an established ICON account to access this site. After logging on click on the MIPB tab.

University of Military Intelligence (UMI) at http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us. Currently you do not need a password to view MIPB. After logging on, click on the MI Training tab, then on Training Resources.
The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is a dynamic organization that has, like all other organizations, undergone many transformations since the events of 11 September 2001. However, we have not transformed for transformation’s sake. CALL—which was founded 20 years ago—has expanded its purpose from simply capturing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) at the National Training Centers to serving as the Army’s agent for change by connecting the Army’s senior leadership and soldiers with the realities of conducting “Army business” on the battlefield.

Since our inception, CALL has become many things to many echelons. To squad leaders and company commanders we are a source of information and education by offering direct insight from a peer in another division on what TTPs worked in Iraq or Afghanistan and what TTP did not. To the Army’s senior leaders we help identify and prioritize the challenges and issues facing our soldiers in combat so they can work to fix them. We are rapidly extending this zone of influence further into the Joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) communities by expanding our coverage of operational and strategic issues.

We do these things by capturing what is going well and what needs improvement within our units and forward-deployed headquarters by deploying collection and analysis teams (CAATs) into theater, by embedding personnel in select headquarters, and by receiving and reviewing the after-action reports (AARs) of deployed units. This data is referred to as “OIL”, or observations, insights, and lessons. NOTE: The term is “lessons” not “lessons learned.” A lesson does not become a lesson learned until the issue surrounding the OIL is resolved (e.g., the problem gets fixed or the behavior in the field changes).

For this reason, CALL has worked to enhance its dissemination tools (the CALL website is one example) and has increased our direct interaction with the branch proponents (in the case of military intelligence, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca). In special cases requiring immediate actions we can also assist by elevating a critical issue through the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command headquarters to the Department of the Army Staff for resolution.

CALL has also improved the user-friendliness of its website by removing many of the administrative control measures (e.g., extra passwords) that frustrated users in the past. By integrating our security measures with “Army Knowledge Online,” one can now log onto the Department of Defense user’s portion of the CALL website using your AKO userid and password. In addition, we have increased the number of personnel that support our Request for Information (RFI) Program. These personnel, most of whom are retired military officers who hold advanced degrees in computer technologies, will conduct searches on your behalf and forward you the results via the Nonclassified or Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET or SIPRNET, respectively). To request RFI support, all one must do is click on the link that says “Request for Information” and fill out the RFI form. As a “green-suiter” with first-hand knowledge, I can testify that these civilians give the same professional attention to RFIs no matter who submits them.

Last, CALL has enhanced its SIPRNET presence immensely in the last couple of years. This increase in capability has greatly improved our ability to interact with forward-deployed units and disseminate information unsuitable for the NIPRNET as well as reduced the amount of time required to get information we gathered to our customers.

To get started, please visit our websites via the links provided below.

- NIPRNET Site: https://call.army.mil.

For additional information, please contact Major David R. King, Intelligence Representative, CALL DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities) Team, via E-mail at david.king4@us.army.mil or telephonically at (913) 684-7380 or DSN 552-7380.
The end of October 2004 marked one year since the start of our Army Focus Areas, including Focus Area 16, Actionable Intelligence. Over the last 12 months, our Army made significant progress in building more modular units, improving capabilities through the spiral insertion of new technologies, and most importantly changing the way we conduct all forms of intelligence operations to provide the best possible support to ongoing combat operations. I will use this quarter’s column to discuss where we started, what we have accomplished in the last 12 months, and what we still have ahead of us.

The centerpiece concept of “the fight for knowledge” has taken hold in the Army, as well as the Joint and national communities. This is a tremendous step forward with many second- and third-order effects for Army Transformation. As we look across Army Transformation, the changes to our military intelligence (MI) branch primarily fall into four categories:

- Modular unit transformation.
- Network-centric enterprise approach to the fight for knowledge.
- Concept that “Every Soldier is a Sensor.”
- Changes to the professional development of our MI branch.

Many of our fellow soldiers are sitting back and looking at Army Transformation changes strictly as changes to our unit organization and technical capabilities. Transformation is about much more and really focuses on how we “fight intelligence” as an enterprise. This includes maneuver of the sensor grid (collection capabilities) but more importantly, it means understanding what we already know. The most important part of intelligence transformation is synchronizing advanced collaborative analysis and operations in real time against an asymmetric threat environment.

Modular Unit Force Structure

Last fall, Focus Area Modularity stood up to begin the conceptual redesign of our Army force structure. A large group of individuals from all our branches came together from across the Army to form Task Force Modularity (TF MOD). Their primary charter was to transform the Army from a division-centric force to a brigade-centric force. The ground rules were clear in several areas.

- Create four new brigade combat teams (BCTs) called “Units of Action” (UAs) from the existing three-brigade division force structure. The new BCTs had to be at least as or more capable than the current force.
- Embed all additional capabilities that we routinely task-organized with the brigade for operations, such as the direct support (DS) MI company, as organic elements of the new brigade design. Because of this guidance, the Army broke up and inactivated the divisional MI battalion as we know it in the Force XXI design. Each of the three DS MI companies moved to a new UA BCT. The general support (GS) MI company converted to a DS company assigned to the 4th UA of each division.
- The division analysis and control element (ACE) moved from the MI battalion headquarters to become part of the G2 staff.
- TF MOD inactivated the MI battalion headquarters. This was an emotional event for many members of the MI Corps.

The changes to and growth of the MI force structure resulted primarily from warfighter requirements. Warfighters from across the Army—most of them with recent combat experience—stated requirements for more MI capabilities across the force in terms of both collection and analytical capabilities. All the work that TF MOD did resulted in a new unit force-structure design, the objective table of organization (OTOE). It represented a new and interdependent force structure that was validated as the requirement. As with any validated requirement, it underwent feasibility review for affordability and to determine if the Army could fully resource it for both personnel and equipment. The OTOE design calls for an increase of al-
most 9,000 more MI soldiers and more collection systems. Army MI could not suddenly grow 9,000 intelligence professionals overnight, particularly noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and warrant officers. This presented us with a significant challenge associated with achieving a design requirement and the actual resourcing of the force. Figure 1 shows the impact of the Modular Force concept on Army military intelligence.

As a result, the Army initially applied a reduced resourcing strategy called “Vanguard.” The Vanguard strategy reduced authorizations on transforming units’ modified tables of organization (MTOEs). Consequently, the divisions undergoing transformation to the new Modular Force structure in fiscal years 2004 (FY04) and 2005 (FY05) did not receive all the personnel and capabilities built in the OTOE design. Additionally, the personnel at these units were at fair-share levels, based on the available inventory for each MI military occupational specialty (MOS) across the Army. We are working to ensure all units are fully resourced (100 percent MTOE; i.e., above fair share) when they deploy, and we are growing the overall MI force as fast as possible in order to resource transforming units at the OTOE design capabilities.

The new modular design added capabilities to both the BCT and the division headquarters. As I discussed in the last issue, the battalion and brigade S2 staffs increased and include an S2X capability as well. The MI company of the BCTs gained a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) communications capability, an organic Shadow 2000 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platoon, two Prophet collection systems and a Prophet control section, and an increase of human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities with more HUMINT collection teams (HCTs).

The division headquarters also transformed to a new force structure called the “Unit of Employment X” (UEx). The UEx represents the Army’s operational warfighting headquarters and is joint task force (JTF)-capable with additional augmentation from the other Services. There are several things different about the UEx G2 staff under the Modular Force concept. The UEx G2 staff absorbed the divisional ACE. Additionally, there is a new G2X staff and a language coordination cell to provide the necessary capabilities for the HUMINT-intensive environment that we face in the modern stability operations and support operations environment.

Another critical supporting element of the UEx is the MI battalion in the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) brigade. The RSTA brigade provides additional collection capabilities that represent the GS collectors for the UEx commander and a force pool of collectors to reinforce and augment BCT collection capabilities. While the RSTA brigades are a key element of the Modular Force, the Army is still determining the required number of these brigades; thus, none have activated to date. The requirement for the MI battalion within the RSTA brigade is clear and critical to meeting our HUMINT collection requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan. We envision there will eventually be ten MI battalions at the UEx echelon, independent of whether there is a RSTA brigade. We are activating the first MI battalion (UEx) at Fort Hood, Texas, in July 2005. We are working a strategy to have ten MI battalions (UEx) by the end of FY07. This is a significant challenge, but a capability our Army needs now.

The “Unit of Employment Y” (UEy)—the blending of corps and army capabilities—is still undergoing design review. We expect to have a decision on the UEy structure by December 2004. What we believe is that there will be five UEy commands similar to the five theater army commands that exist today. The current designs have one theater intelligence brigade (TIB) aligned to each UEy and a slightly larger G2 staff than exists today. Additionally, all of our Army aerial exploitation battalions (AEBs) will migrate to the UEy echelon and become theater assets.

The important point to remember is that the Army developed the modular designs based on lessons learned from current operations and the desires of warfighting
commanders for more intelligence capabilities. The designs remain under review and may alter as they undergo further testing and doctrine updates.

**Fight for Knowledge**

The concept of the “fight for knowledge” is really what the Army intelligence Transformation concerns. Intelligence is operations and the Joint Community is leading an effort to “operationalize” intelligence. The heart of the intelligence challenge we face today is not collection: it is to leverage fully the intelligence we are already collecting to see and understand that information: “Know what we know.” Analysts spend too much time searching and assembling accessible data that is only a fraction of what we actually collect. We need unfettered, universal data access. We do not have the time to shop around all the classified web sites looking for posted products that may help answer our needs. If credit card companies can simultaneously monitor millions of records and detect anomalies in people’s accounts in four minutes, why can we not do the same for our commanders on the ground (opportunities→targets→threats) at usable classification levels?

The Army G2 recently sponsored a Land Warfare Panel on Actionable Intelligence at this year’s annual Association of the United States Army (AUSA) meeting. Speakers at this panel included Lieutenant General (LTG) Jerry Boykin (Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence), Major General John Kimmons (Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command [INSCOM]), MG Barbara Fast (former Director of Intelligence [C2] for Multinational Forces-Iraq), and Mr. Edward Bair (Program Executive Officer for Intelligence Electronic Warfare and Sensors). The overarching theme of each speaker focused on “operationalizing” intelligence and better analytical capabilities.

Each speaker commented on the fight for knowledge as the crucial thing we must get right. LTG Boykin emphasized that we spend much more time doing intelligence than combat operations and that intelligence is in fact a warfighting command. The Department of Defense (DOD) is creating Joint Intelligence Operational Commands (JIOCs) in each of the regional component commands (COCOMs), in the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and a DOD-level JIOC (see Figure 2). The JIOCs will be true COCOMs lead by a senior general officer just like the land, air, and maritime components of each COCOM. The JIOC will serve as the supported commander during Phase 1 (peacetime), Phase 2 (crisis development), and Phase 4 (stability operations).

MG Kimmons highlighted the complex nature of generating actionable intelligence on individual terrorists or terrorist cells. “The warfighters are not impressed by the complexity of the intelligence cycle, they just want the right answers.” We need to obtain access to all data with the proper tools to search rapidly and visualize it, and then present the essence of our analysis to the warfighter at the collateral or unclassified level.

MG Fast highlighted that collaboration is a true combat multiplier. The members of the intelligence team can be a continent away, and still provide critical contributions to the mission. Additionally, she highlighted that we need to “fight” a network of collectors driven by analysis as the starting point of the intelligence cycle. We must educate our commanders how to “fight intelligence” and to understand that they may have to conduct maneuver operations for the sole purpose of gaining intelligence.

Mr. Bair’s main theme addressed the true challenge (see Figure 3) with an enterprise approach to intelligence—distributed operations are the essential component. The Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) is the centerpiece of the Army’s future analytical system. DCGS-A is “being built joint” as part of a joint family of systems, the DOD Distributed Common Ground/Surface Systems. While it is part of a joint family of systems, one system or one size of tools does not fit all needs. The key concept behind DCGS-A is to provide an architectural solution that enables us to collect single-discipline intelligence one time and provide it to multinode consumers without requiring a dedicated direct downlink. This interdependent relationship breaks down the barrier of data “ownership” and builds an integrated common ca-
pability that bridges the gap from the dismounted soldier to the national Intelligence Community.

DCGS-A is a system originally scheduled for initial fielding in FY08. Today, we have already fielded an interim, fixed DCGS-A capability to the INSCOM TIBs. We have also completed bench testing an interim, mobile DCGS-A capability that will deploy with the 3d Infantry Division back into Iraq in the coming months. Is it as good as the objective DCGS-A? No, but it is better than what we have today. The Army also recently shifted the focus of DCGS-A development to center on DCGS-A capabilities for our brigades and battalions as the main priority, again putting the most emphasis on supporting our soldiers on point for our nation.

Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2)

The heart of the ES2 concept is that soldiers are our most brilliant collectors with boots on the ground, hearing, seeing, and sensing things that technical collectors cannot. We must integrate all of our soldiers into the fight for knowledge (see Figure 4). We are doing that today under a variety of initiatives that train our soldiers and connect them to the network. First, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command has embraced the ES2 concept and is finalizing programs of instruction for every TRADOC schoolhouse from basic training to the Army War College.

Second, the Army is training our soldiers to observe details actively and to report their experience, perceptions, and judgments in a concise, accurate manner. We began this effort early on with mobile training teams (MTTs) teaching our soldiers refresher training on tactical questioning. This effort grew and TRADOC formalized it into a larger training program. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca is working with the Infantry Center and the Combined Arms Center to finalize common training standards for implementation across TRADOC in the coming months.

Editor’s Note: Mr. Masterson and Major McDeed discuss the TF MOD MTT at length on page 52 in the “Training the Corps” section.

For our leaders, it is important to understand two things. First, leaders must understand how to maximize the collection capability of the soldiers in their units. Second, leaders need to understand how to communicate their requirements in terminology soldiers can easily understand in terms of specific requirements and broad overarching information needs.
To achieve this capability, we must succeed in connecting the soldier to the network. We are moving forward with the initial fielding of a hand-held Commander’s Digital Assistant (CDA) that will deploy with some of our HCTs in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 3 (OIF 3). This device (depicted in Figure 4) has a two-way communications capability that allows the soldier on the ground to receive a common operational picture (COP) of Blue and Red forces, and allows the soldier to report observed information by digitizing it at the point of origin. This will overcome the current manual and often filtered-out process of reporting over radio networks all the way up to brigade where a very small percentage of information may get into a digital report and sent out laterally and vertically through the chain of command. We do not expect soldiers to stop in the heat of battle and write reports, but reporting a few minutes later is much better than hours later when they return to their patrol bases.

Imagine if a police officer in New York City did not have the requirement to report. He observes something on the street, knows there is a problem, but has no way of communicating his immediate needs. The same could be true for two ground patrols in Baghdad operating on a parallel course a few streets apart. The first patrol takes sniper fire from a building and immediately enters an enemy icon and activity report into the COP; the second patrol is now aware of a danger in the area before it may cross into the sniper’s field of view.

The CDA is not a perfect solution, but it is better than what we have today. Fusion of this information will be a challenge. What if in the situation above, the second patrol mentioned also took sniper fire and generated an icon at a similar but slightly different location (different building). Now we have two reports of the same sniper that do not completely correlate. We are aware of this challenge and are working on solutions, but the bottom line is that the soldiers on the ground are aware of the threat and have time to react. As one of our senior leaders recently stated, “bad breath is better than no breath.”

Professional Development of MI Branch

Our MI branch is also going through some cultural changes as we move forward with Transformation. Branch qualification emphasis is changing to put more emphasis on the G2/S2 and ACE chief positions. The Army just completed its first central selection board for division G2s. This changes the selection process for our G2s and puts the division G2 job on equal status with that of the battalion commander. In the future, an Army board will centrally select both. Both will be
two-year assignments and will receive Central Section List (CSL) credit.

For our warrant officers, there is an increased number of technical positions under the Modular Force concept and, in some cases, increased levels of responsibility. The chief of all-source fusion in the UEx ACE is a senior warrant officer (WO). Our challenge remains accessing individuals into the MI WO specialties needed. We are working for statutory relief of some of the obstacles our NCOs face when applying for the WO Corps. We are looking to lift the P2 permanent physical profile restriction, the maximum years of service before accession as a WO, and eliminating the Phase 1 portion of the basic WO Course at Fort Rucker, Alabama, for staff sergeant and above applying to become a WO.

Our NCOs and enlisted soldiers represent the area of greatest growth within the MI branch. We are literally accessing thousands more into the MI Corps, particularly in MOSs 96B (Intelligence Analyst), 97E (HUMINT Collector), and 98G (Cryptologic Linguist). These particular MOSs will likely have the fastest growth and the earliest promotions. We have increased authorizations for NCOs in almost every MI MOS. Our challenge is to strike a balance between additional WO accessions and to maintain a quality senior NCO force. We believe we can achieve that. NCO promotion points will likely drop to meet our needs in some MOSs; however, lower promotion points do not mean lower standards. Our MI soldiers have gained much more operational experience over the last few years and are better prepared to assume leadership roles earlier. This is a different mindset than most of our current leaders “grew up” with during the last few decades.

It is important for the unit first sergeants and command sergeants major to recognize this. If you have a specialist serving in an NCO position for a period and that soldier is doing a good job, then it is the unit leadership’s responsibility to ensure that soldier receives consideration by the board and the deserved promotion. We have too many board-eligible soldiers who are not having the opportunity for promotion to the NCO ranks. We recognize that some are not ready. If the soldier is not ready, then mentor and develop him or her for further advancement. We need every experienced MI soldier in the Army. The risk in this approach is minimal—soldiers almost always exceed our expectations.

Conclusion

I hope the reader understands the message that Army Intelligence Transformation is about far more than just new capabilities in our tactical forces. Transformation is part of a larger culture and mindset change that is “op-
erationalizing” intelligence and focusing on the fight for knowledge. It is truly about leveraging all the intelligence capabilities of our nation (collection and analysis) to “fight intelligence” in an enterprise approach. It is enabling the tactical force with network connectivity so that smartest people can collaboratively attack any problem from any location in the world. Do we still need MI assets and analysts forward? Absolutely! Does the analyst need to be standing in your tactical operations center in order to provide critical input as part of your collaborative team? Absolutely not!

We are working to apply a new standard of Intelligence Community support to our soldiers on the ground. We believe that if our military pilots get real-time reporting of air defense threats they are about to encounter, so should our soldiers on the ground. The challenge is much more complex than that in supporting our pilots, but we believe it is feasible and obtainable in the near term. Connecting the soldier to the network with a CDA-like device and linking the locational data provided by Blue force tracking to events and assessments in the Intelligence Community is the key to a solution.

In closing, transformation has received much criticism from the tactical “point of the spear” in the field. Much of the criticism is due to the resourcing challenges associated with the Vanguard resourcing strategy for FY04 and FY05. We are working to correct this situation as fast as possible, but we cannot magically “grow” 9,000 new MI soldiers to resource the OTOE design overnight. We are already accepting reduced readiness in some units in order to resource deploying units fully. The MI team members working transformation have spent the majority of their careers in tactical units. We know where the “rubber meets the road” and enabling tactical forces is the heart of what we are doing. If you have issues related to transformation, then exercise your right to “vote” in the process by communicating your issue to us. Many have complained, very few have offered alternative solutions. We are dramatically changing the way MI does business to meet the asymmetric threat of the coming decades. We are embracing Information Age processes and distributed network-centric operations. This is not the MI Corps some of us joined as recently as ten years ago. We must break some of our own cultural mindsets in order to achieve this goal.

Lieutenant Colonel Steve Iwicki is currently the Deputy Director of Task Force Actionable Intelligence (TF-AI) assigned to the Army G2. Readers may contact him via E-mail at steve.iwicki@hqda.army.mil and telephonically at (703) 695-1861.
For many years, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), as well as the rest of the U.S. Army, has been pursuing creating a “schoolhouse without walls,” a truly integrated learning environment that would provide training and resources for the soldier anytime, anywhere. While there have been many attempts to achieve this goal, the technology for creating this virtual learning environment did not exist. That is, until now.

The University of Military Intelligence (UMI), at http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us, is an Intelligence Center effort to create an environment where you, as an intelligence professional, can go to receive training in your specialty area(s) regardless of where you are. The Intelligence Center has attempted to combine all the features of a “brick and mortar” schoolhouse into the UMI so that a student will have all the distributed resources and links he or she needs in one place. The UMI has been operational since February 2004 and continues to expand both the training available through the site and links to resources that are useful to all intelligence professionals.

**UMI Contents**

The UMI home page contains links to self-paced training, intelligence reach training, the Military Intelligence Foreign Language Training Center (MIFLTC), cultural awareness, and the Military Intelligence (MI) library. Links to self-paced training and reach training require separate user accounts to access the materials.
The Resources page provides a wide Internet-based assortment of information resources useful to intelligence professionals. These resources range from lessons learned to doctrinal publications to professional journals.

Self-paced training currently consists of refresher and reinforcement training and reach training. The Army Learning Management System (LMS) tracks refresher and reinforcement training. Reach training makes resident classroom information available to the student for use in homework, refresher training, or individual study. Also available is assignment-specific training such as installation force protection and collection management at division, corps, and Joint levels. The LMS does not track student progress in reach training. The goal for the self-paced training is to provide a place to go for training that will enhance your MI professional development. If you do not currently have a self-paced learning account, UMI has a link that allows you to request an account.

The MIFLTC web page provides news and information regarding language sustainment and refresher. You will find Language Survival Kits in a variety of languages available for download as well as the Somali and Liberian Language Trainers (SALLT) Media Library.

The Cultural Awareness web page currently contains cultural awareness information for Iraq and Afghanistan. Look there for more cultural awareness material in the near future.

The MI Library web page is a good example of “one-stop shopping” that is one of the goals for the UMI. It has all the resources one would expect from a quality university library to include periodicals, reference publications, and current documents pertaining to intelligence, many of them available online. This is a great resource for those who wish to research current intelligence topics or for students taking courses on the UMI and wanting a deeper understanding of the subject matter.
Conclusion

This article has provided a quick snapshot highlighting just a small fraction of the learning environment that is the University of Military Intelligence. Be sure to explore the UMI website at http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us to find out more.

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New Training Opportunities for Joint STARS CGS Operators (96H)

by Major Patrick L. Daniel

A new software upgrade designed to allow Common Ground Station (CGS) and Joint Service Workstation (JSWS) systems to network with other systems over the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) is providing valuable training opportunities for Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) CGS Operators. Based on lessons learned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), a contract firm developed the software upgrade known as “Enhanced Multi-Common Ground Station.”

After successfully testing the software, the members of the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) Development, Training, and Test Detachment (DTTD) in Melbourne, Florida, quickly realized the training applications of the newly developed networking capability. With the capability to network CGS and JSWS systems, any CGS and JSWS on the network can receive moving target indicator (MTI), synthetic aperture radar (SAR), unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and other data from any other CGS and JSWS system on the network. In other words, a CGS receiving data from a live Joint STARS flight in Iraq can share the data in near-real time with any number of CGS or JSWS systems simultaneously over the SIPRNET. This capability will revolutionize CGS and JSWS training as well as operations.

Currently, the DTTD supports training events every week, providing recorded data and live feeds to users in the field. Many of the customers to date have been Reserve Component (RC) units mobilized for OIF or Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) duty. Many of these RC units do not have adequate equipment at their home stations, lack adequate training when mobilized, or both. Many of the 96H (Common Ground Station Operator) soldiers in these units would never see a live data feed prior to deployment if not for the capability of sending data through the network to their CGS and/or JSWS at their home stations or mobilization training sites.
In addition to providing support to 96H training in the field, the DTTD also provides a ten-day live-environment training (LET) opportunity at the Joint STARS Joint Test Facility (JTF) in Melbourne, Florida. The LET focuses on CGS and JSWS configuration, operation, maintenance, and repair. System configuration topics cover the most current software installs and Service Pack loading. Operations training consists of a combination of live and simulated datalinks to Joint STARS (Surveillance and Control Datalink [SCDL] and satellite communications [SATCOM]), Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) nodes of TRAP (Tactical Related Applications Program) Data Dissemination System (TDDS), Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS), and Tactical Reconnaissance Intelligence Exchange System (TRIXS) using the Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT) or Commanders Tactical Terminal (CTT) radios. Classified local area network (LAN) connectivity and data distribution via Multi-CGS and Enhanced Multi-CGS modes are reinforced through operations and training.

In the day and age of Army Transformation and stability operations and support operations in the field, units face a challenge in providing realistic and relevant training opportunities for their 96H soldiers. The advent of Enhanced Multi-CGS now provides the vehicle for turning those training challenges into great training opportunities. For more information on the LET, contact your local readiness training (REDTRAIN) manager and ask about LET 1235. For more information concerning network training opportunities, contact Staff Sergeant William Strouse via E-mail at william.strouse@js-jtf.af.mil and by telephone at (321) 726-7078 or Sergeant First Class Kevin Rinehart at kevin.rinehart@js-jtf.af.mil and (321) 726-7097.

Major Patrick Daniel is currently the Commander of the Joint STARS Development, Training, and Test Detachment (DTTD) at Melbourne, Florida. Before his assignment in Melbourne, he served in OIF as Deputy G2 for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and a former member of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center faculty. He holds undergraduate Bachelor of Arts degrees in Speech Communication and Psychology from the University of Arkansas, Little Rock. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at patrick-daniel@us.army.mil and telephonically at (321) 726-7203.

USAIC&FH Task Force Modularity

MTT Mission

by Burke A. Masterson and Major (P) Scott L. McDeed

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) and the 111th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade are increasing the Intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS) mobile training team (MTT) capability to bring trainers to units undergoing transformation.

The mission of the Task Force Modular Force (TF MOD) MTT is to provide specifically tailored intelligence training to members of the force in order to increase the abilities of the brigade combat team (BCT) intelligence officers and battalion S2s to perform effectively as an intelligence section. The TF MOD MTT provides an overview to a BCT or battalion staff on recommended usage of their intelligence assets. The unit leadership will receive recommendations on the “how and why” to employ their intelligence assets to gain maximum effectiveness and efficiency. Based on intelligence mission requirements and asset availability, the MTT will develop and train scenario-based recommendations on equipment use to achieve the greatest intelligence value from organic assets. The TF MOD organization is a subset of a larger organization positioned under the cloak of the Special Purpose Training Organization (SPTO).
Under a federated effort, the SPTO works closely with internal 111th MI Brigade trainers and other Intelligence BOS MTT elements external to USAIC&FH. This collaborative effort produces an increased Intelligence BOS training capability to the field enabling the training of more units in a shorter amount of time.

Intelligence BOS MTTs that fall under the SPTO include the specialized integration of intelligence equipment and sensors (e.g., Prophet, ground surveillance radar [GSR], All-Source Analysis System [ASAS (ASAS Master Analyst Course or AMAC)], etc.). They also include administrative training on current foreign disclosure policies and other guidance to U.S. Army agencies such as the Functional Disclosure Certification Course (FDCC), Information Systems Security Monitoring (ISSM), and contemporary operating environment (COE) training.

The TF MOD MTT exports to the unit the following instructional capabilities:

- Internal and external subject matter experts (SMEs) from other Intelligence BOS MTTs.
- Tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) trains both counterintelligence (CI) and HUMINT MI personnel in the skills and knowledge required to plan, prepare, and execute tactical HUMINT missions during combat, stability operations, and support operations in both rural and urban environments.
- Tactical questioning (TQ) trains non-MI personnel in the skills and knowledge required to perform basic questioning techniques and reporting procedures in order to enhance the commander’s ongoing HUMINT collection mission at the tactical level, putting “feet” to the concept of “Every Soldier is a Sensor” (ES2).
- Intelligence support to counter terrorism (ISCT) trains analyst (96B) and interrogator (97E) personnel in both advanced analytic and interrogation skills necessary for combating the threat associated with the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
- HUMINT management train selected MI personnel (battalion through BCT S2s) and operational management team (OMT) personnel in tactical HUMINT operations that provides the skills and knowledge required for an OMT, and the employment and management of information collected by HUMINT collection teams (HCTs) during combat as well as stability operations and support operations.

This training is critical in order to enhance ongoing HUMINT collection efforts at the battalion and BCT levels. Finally, the 111th MI Brigade deploys the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) MTT elements to designated transforming units. SBCT MTT training focuses on the SBCT intelligence organization, equipment, architecture, and operational concepts in order to establish a baseline competency among SBCT leaders and soldiers enabling them to execute SBCT intelligence operations in support of the brigade.

The USAIC&FH and 111th MI Brigade MTT vision is to build a team consisting of permanent contractors and MI soldiers returning from Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). USAIC&FH is collaborating with the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to identify MI soldiers with critical skills for temporary assignment to the 111th MI Brigade for a period of four to six months as part of the TF MOD MTT team.

The TF MOD MTT works in conjunction with the New Systems Training Integration Office (NSTIO), U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Managers (TSMs), and Program Managers when fielding systems or any Intelligence BOS. The MTT will also work closely with any new equipment training team (NETT) or other MTT to conduct military occupational specialty (MOS) training, system fielding training, or any other training that units may require when deploying in support of the GWOT.

One of the crucial elements of mobile training is to maintain close and continuous coordination with warfighting units to ensure emerging operational intelligence support requirements are met. As such, we are charged with the development and coordination of all mobile training aspects and actions, which include reviewing and assisting transforming Units of Action (UAs) and Units of Employment (UEs), conducting after-action reviews (AARs), and implementing lessons learned of those deployed units.

TF MOD MTT works in conjunction with TSMs, NSTIO, U.S. Army Communications-Electronic Command (CECOM), and the appropriate system Program Managers to coordinate and synchronize training concepts, requirements, and system architectures. We can then provide tailored intelligence training in exportable packages to individuals or units of the Intelligence BOS, enhancing their capabilities by increasing their abilities to perform effectively as BCT and battalion S2s.
In addition, the TF MOD MTT offers training to U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) units. Priority will be for those units who will deploy to OEF and OIF within the next 18 months. All units interested in receiving training need to contact the USAIC&FH Special Purpose Operations Officer and ask to speak to the USAIC&FH MTT USAR and ARNG liaison officer.

Our end state focuses on the fact that we will not win the GWOT using conventional training methods, but rather by the soldiers on the ground that had quality, relevant, accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence training. This clearly is not a war for which the Army is structured, since our previous training methods are not meeting the requirement to prepare soldiers on the ground for the current threat. It is an asymmetric training endeavor where out-of-the-box thinking must be standard in order to meet the needs of the soldier on today’s battlefield. It is the singular key to winning the GWOT, and this type of mobile training will provide Army leaders the facts, assessments, and insight to successfully guide and win this campaign.

The goal of the TF MOD MTT is to build a cohesive team of highly trained, dedicated, permanent contractors coupled with selected MI soldiers from FORSCOM units with recent OIF or OEF experience. (See Figure 1 for MTT points of contact; contact the author or Mr. Hargis for more information.) This teaming effort will provide the MTT with stability and first-hand knowledge of the current mission and real-world application. The ability to continually shift the training focus and train outside the conventional training box is a training multiplier that will provide quality intelligence soldiers skilled in the operation of their equipment and current mission requirements.

Burke Masterson (Sergeant First Class, U.S. Army, Retired) is currently a contract Operations Officer with the Task Force Modular Force (TF MOD) Mobile Training Team (MTT). Readers may contact him via E-mail at burke.masterson@hua.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-1704 or DSN 821-1704.

Major Scott McDeed is currently the USAIC&FH MTT Officer in Charge. Readers can contact him via E-mail at mcdeeds@hua.army.mil and by telephone at (520) 533-3165 or DSN 821-3165.

Figure 1. USAIC&FH MTT Staff Coordination Cell Points of Contact
The 111th Military Intelligence Brigade Command Philosophy

by the Office of the Dean of Training, 111th MI Brigade

On 31 July 2004, Colonel (COL) Thomas M. Kelley assumed command of the 111th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade. His command philosophy is based on the following realities and challenges: the nation is at war and the Army is in a period of adaptation and transition. With these facts in mind, his primary focus is on the brigade mission to train technically and tactically competent, disciplined, and physically fit MI warriors instilled with the Army values and fully prepared to join the Army Joint team, and national agencies.

Soldiers and civilians assigned to the 111th MI Brigade are keenly aware that COL Kelley is a totally dedicated member of the Army team. His message is straightforward: he believes that the U.S. Army is the best institution in the nation and that it has the confidence and trust of the American people. He emphasizes the Army’s “values based” orientation, and focuses on the “profession of arms.” He is convinced that the Army’s team-oriented approach to national defense makes it the best, most professional Army in the history of the world.

Expectations

COL Kelley is uncompromising in his expectations. All members of the brigade must—

- Conduct themselves responsibly.
- Exhibit a strong sense of urgency as they accomplish their assignments.
- Exemplify a life-long commitment to learning.
- Maintain a willingness to sacrifice for the good of others.

Additionally, he expects a consistent commitment to living the Army values, doing what is right, showing respect for the law and Army regulations and policies, staying physically fit, and demonstrating a willingness to communicate openly. He also stresses the importance of safety in all actions and activities. Moreover, COL Kelley expects all soldiers to live the “warrior ethos” by placing mission first, never accepting defeat, and never giving up. He also expects all civil-
ian employees to consistently perform as true professionals dedicated to excellence in the execution of their duties, committed to victory in the war against terrorism, and willing to sacrifice for the well-being of the soldiers and civilians they train.

**Vision and Goals**

COL Kelley’s vision and goals for the brigade are to—

- Remain the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s center of excellence and be the academic showplace of the Army.
- Continue to be a learning organization that embraces and welcomes change.
- Be unmatched in the ability to foster innovation and to integrate new concepts and procedures.
- Continue as the most relevant and relied upon pool of talent in the Army and Joint team.
- Build and sustain a climate that makes the 111th MI Brigade the most desired unit of assignment in the MI Corps.

**Implementation**

To achieve this vision and these goals, COL Kelley has directed each battalion to establish a process for analyzing every course with special attention to improving teaching effectiveness. He expects all instructors and subject matter experts to maintain a high level of currency in their disciplines through direct experience, refresher training, or both. He has also directed the training battalions to quickly integrate the valid “lessons learned” from operations in the field into their lesson plans and programs of instruction. Likewise, he stresses that all training must be seamlessly linked to the contemporary operating environment (COE). He will accept nothing less than relevance in training.

In keeping with his commitment to realistic experiential training that develops the “critical thinking and problem-solving skills” of students, COL Kelley emphasizes the use of practical field and situational training exercises. He is committed to the continued development of the brigade’s Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center into a state-of-the-art facility that will significantly enhance the integration of lessons learned into training, and provide students with an opportunity for realistic, dynamic, and challenging “experiential learning.”

**Opportunities for Personal Growth**

COL Kelley supports and encourages cooperative educational programs between the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) Intelligence School and various institutions of higher learning. Currently, many students undergoing training at USAIC&FH can earn an Associate degree from Cochise College upon successful completion of their military occupational specialty training. The brigade staff is now working to make it possible for other students to also earn Associate degrees. Furthermore, COL Kelley has directed all supervisors to make certain that every soldier and civilian in the brigade creates and implements an approved, professional development plan.

**The Bottom Line**

Change and adaptation are constants for members of the 111th MI Brigade. All new commanders make modifications in the way their units do things, in priorities and, to some extent, in the culture of the brigade. COL Kelley is not an exception. Nevertheless, he has initiated changes only when they have been necessary to effectively address the rapidly evolving needs of the Army and to achieve his vision and goals for the brigade. He will spare no effort to provide MI students with the realistic training they require to defend the nation and win the war against global terrorism.

*Readers may contact the 111th MI Brigade Dean, George A. VanOtten, Ph.D., via E-mail at george.vanoten@us.army.mil. The Associate Deans are Richard B. Loomis (richard.b.loomis@us.army.mil), Francis W. Smith (francis.smith@us.army.mil), and Ken L. Welsh (ken.welsh@us.army.mil).*
Joint C4I Staff and Operations Course

What is in your future? Are you or will you soon be serving at a corps- or theater-level G2 or G6 staff in support of a joint task force (JTF) or working with a JTF Joint Communications Control Center (JCCC) executing requirements associated with an information management plan? Or are you looking at an assignment to one of the theater signal commands or to an Army Service Component Command headquarters as an active duty or Reserve Component officer or senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) and finding yourself involved in exercise planning conferences or exercises such as Lucky Sentinel, Ulchi Focus Lens, Combined Endeavor, or Grecian Firebolt?

If you are concerned with your present situation, consider the following: Maybe you are now an action officer or senior NCO supporting signals intelligence, space operations, or theater missile defense command and control initiatives. Or are you a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Systems Manager (TSM) or Project Manager action officer or a Department of Defense (DOD) civilian who deals with a myriad of interoperability issues or key performance parameters in the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) transformation arena?

If any of these situations describe you, then the Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Staff and Operations Course (JC4ISOC) stands ready to support your joint C4I educational needs. Sponsored by the Joint Staff/J6, the JC4ISOC is four weeks long and taught six times during the fiscal year (FY). First established in January 1978 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense as a joint C3 systems course at the Armed Forces Staff College, it is now one of the resident courses under the Joint Command, Control, and Information Warfare School (JCIWS), Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC), in Norfolk, Virginia. The mission of JCIWS is to educate and train intermediate- and company-level military staff officers, senior NCOs, and DOD civilian equivalents in the concepts, applications, and procedures associated with C4I and information operations (IO) in a joint and multinational environment.

To support the warfighter’s needs in a network-centric, capabilities-based force, the JC4ISOC curriculum takes a generalist approach. The program meets the school’s objectives and supports the college’s mission by emphasizing a broad understanding of the joint C4I environment, C2 process, and operation, planning, and management of current joint C4I systems. It provides quality C4I instruction for the joint community on topics such as Joint Vision 2020, joint interoperability, battlespace systems, the Global Information Grid, information assurance, and JTF C4I planning.

Reviews from former students indicate the course’s value to their past, current, and upcoming assignments. An Air Force colonel said, “I would have been 300 percent more effective in the job [I had] if I had attended that JC4ISOC course....the information was that beneficial, especially that part about the C4I contacts and points of contact!”

Annually, JC4ISOC issues messages to major Army commands (MACOMs) and joint agencies of all services announcing FY course dates and prerequisites. We disseminate a separate message a few weeks before the start of each class. The course accommodates a maximum of 25 students. The next six iterations of the course will be:

- Class 05-4: 18 April-13 May 2005
- Class 05-5: 6 June-1 July 2005
- Class 05-6: 1-26 August 2005
- Class 06-1: 17 October-10 November 2005
- Class 06-2: 9 January-3 February 2006
- Class 06-3: 27 February-24 March 2006

Students must possess a Top Secret clearance with sensitive compartmented information (SCI) access and be cleared for SCI indoctrination before arrival. Students’ commands must fund their travel, per diem, and billeting, which includes a five-day field trip to the Washington, D.C., area for “up close and personal” experiences with joint agencies and organizations. Administrative information is available through the “Welcome Aboard” and “General Information” sections of the JFSC website at https://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools-programs/jciws/c4i/default.asp.

The JC4ISOC quota control point of contact is Lieutenant Commander Katherine Mayer; you may contact her via E-mail at mayerk@jfsc.ndu.edu or jciws@jfsc.ndu.edu and telephonically at (757) 443-6320 or DSN 646-6320; the Army faculty representative is Lieutenant Colonel (P) Reynold Palaganas at palaganasr@jfsc.ndu.edu and by telephone at (757) 443-6328/6331 or DSN 646-6331.
The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) and the Defense Language Institute (DLI) have collaborated with Colonel Shawn Mateer, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Kirk, and First Lieutenant (1LT) Carol Stahl of the 4th Training Brigade at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, to implement the 09L training. We have personally attended all of the 09L graduations, talked with the soldiers and cadre during their field training exercises, and met with the 4th Brigade’s leadership. We are satisfied their training is superior, which has resulted in the best translators and interpreters to meet contemporary operating environment (COE) requirements. In the following paragraphs, 1LT Stahl discusses the Translator Aide mission and real world activities of 09L soldiers.

**True Patriots—09L Soldiers Fighting the GWOT**

**by First Lieutenant Carol A. Stahl**

In order to successfully fight and win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), we must be able to communicate effectively with the local population. The Army currently has a severe shortage of linguists and cannot adequately support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with its current supply of linguists. An initiative by the Deputy Secretary of Defense created a new military occupational specialty (MOS) 09L (Translator Aide) to help fill the vital requirement for translators and interpreters.

The 09L program recruits native and heritage speakers of Middle Eastern descent. All the soldiers are U.S. residents and approximately one-third are U.S. citizens. These soldiers enlist directly into the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and upon graduation from advanced individual training (AIT) are mobilized, and shortly thereafter deploy in support of either Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) or Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). To date, 63 soldiers are 09L program graduates. These soldiers speak a range of languages to include: Arabic, Kurdish, Farsi, Dari, Urdu, and Turkish. The 09L soldiers have deployed in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa.

Reports from the commanders in the field and the 09L soldiers themselves, support the conclusion that these soldiers are vital assets for our fighting force. One commander stated that his unit’s productivity increased 150 percent since the arrival of his 09L soldier. These soldiers perform a variety of missions throughout the theaters. Some soldiers are interpreters for senior officers, while others support interrogators and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection teams. The 09L soldiers are also serving in Civil Affairs positions, not only building schools, bridges, and houses, but most importantly, building a trust between U.S. soldiers and the local populations. Many 09L soldiers are picked to accompany special missions, and even travel with the Special Forces. One soldier in particular described his job as interpreting daily between U.S. Forces and a local trucking company. In addition, this soldier went out on several missions that led to the capture of local insurgents along with a cache of important documents that required immediate translation. This same soldier teaches Arabic classes to the soldiers in his unit, and has volunteered to teach English to some of the local Iraqis. The potential of 09L soldiers is limitless.

The 09L soldiers are natives of numerous countries throughout the Middle East. Their backgrounds are diverse and their stories are fascinating. Some soldiers have fought in civil wars, been wounded in combat, fled persecution, lived in refugee camps, or were members of the Republican Guard. One soldier was gassed by Saddam Hussein when he attacked the Kurds. These soldiers hate Saddam Hussein and terrorism every bit as much if not more than all other Americans. They have lost their family members to the cruelty of tyrants, and have a love and appreciation beyond compare of the freedoms of the United States of America.

The main reason soldiers join this program is so they can give back to the country that has done so much for them: they want nothing more than to serve as U.S. soldiers. Many 09Ls still have loved ones in war-torn countries. Many within their native countries consider them traitors. These soldiers put much more than their own lives on the line when they joined the U.S. Army, and that is why, beyond any doubt, they are True Patriots.
First Lieutenant Carol Stahl has commanded the 09L Translator Aide Program since its inception in fall 2003 and helped develop it. The course, taught at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, has graduated four classes with 63 09L graduates directly supporting OIF and OEF. LT Stahl enlisted in the Army and attended the 63-week Basic Arabic Course at the Defense Language Institute after completion of basic training. After her advanced individual training, she was assigned to Fort Gordon, Georgia, in 1999. In October 2001, she entered Officer Candidate School; she graduated as an Air Defense Artillery Officer and served at Osan Air Force Base, Korea, as a Tactical Control Officer and Support Platoon Leader. 1LT Stahl earned Bachelor and Master of Arts degrees in History from the State University of New York at Buffalo and a Secondary Social Studies Education Teaching Certificate.

New Cavalry Leaders Course Is For MI Personnel Too

The challenges of the U.S. Army’s modular force redesign are upon us, and we are addressing the necessary changes with the grim, professional determination of an Army at war. Our Army’s efforts to make Units of Action (UAs) a reality have demanded some fundamental shifts in our thinking about how we organize brigade combat teams (BCTs) and how we expect them to fight. This Army reexamination has not spared the role of the Cavalry. One of the latest efforts to ensure the Officer Education System at Fort Knox, Kentucky, remains current and relevant is the U.S. Army Armor Center and School’s recent redesign of the Cavalry Leaders Course (CLC).

As we change our force structure, so must we also reconfigure our assumptions about who should attend the Cavalry Leaders Course. The combined arms philosophy that underpins the logic behind creating these UAs demands that all officers, regardless of branch, who are assigned to the BCT (UA) planning staffs or assigned to the reconnaissance squadrons within these brigades, should understand Reconnaissance and Security Operations. Leaders who attend CLC will gain in-depth knowledge of reconnaissance and security as applied to the new reconnaissance squadrons found in the Heavy BCTs (HBCTs), Infantry BCTs (IBCTs), and Stryker BCTs (SBCTs). The CLC accomplishes its learning objectives through challenging practical exercises that test and hone the students’ understanding of the latest doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); organizations; missions; and capabilities and limitations of reconnaissance squadrons and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA).

The Armor School encourages CLC enrollment for all Armor officers as well as those leaders serving in the Infantry, Field Artillery, Engineers, Aviation, Military Intelligence, and Signal Corps branches assigned as planners or commanders of RSTA or Cavalry organizations within these new UAs. All those in the above branches should seriously consider attending CLC to prepare for their assignments to or in support of RSTA and Cavalry organizations. Attendance at CLC is currently open to graduates of any officer career course in the grades of First Lieutenant (Promotable) through Major in both the Active and Reserve Components with the assignments mentioned above. MI noncommissioned officers in the ranks of E-8 and above who may find themselves either assigned to positions inside RSTA or Cavalry units or assigned to work on planning staffs inside the new UA BCTs may also attend the CLC.

The updated CLC is 15 academic days in length with 36 students per class. Upcoming course dates for fiscal year 2005 are:

- Class 05-03: 4 through 22 April 2005.
- Class 05-04: 31 May through 17 June 2005.
- Class 05-05: 1 through 19 August 2005.
- Class 05-06: 29 August through 16 September 2005.

Enrollment is available through the Army Training Requirements and Resource System (ATRRS); the ATRRS website is at https://www.atrrs.army.mil/. Information on specific blocks of instruction, read-ahead materials, reporting and inprocessing, clearance requirements, etc., is available at http://www.knox.army.mil/school/16cav/studentinfo.asp (click on “Cav Leader (CLC”).

For more information, readers may contact Major Matthew Dooley via E-mail at matthew.dooley@knox.army.mil or telephonically at (502) 624-7617 or DSN 464-7617.
Robinson Moore’s The Hunt for Bin Laden, covers the operations of Task Force (TF) Dagger in Afghanistan during the six months following 11 September 2001. Special forces (SF) teams from the 5th Special Forces Group deployed to conduct unconventional warfare in support of Northern Alliance (NA) warlords. The ill-equipped and outnumbered NA faced Taliban and al-Qaeda opponents fueled by religious zealotry and quantities of Soviet-era weapons and stiffened with levies of foreign fighters. A month after 11 September 2001, SF teams began infiltrating into Afghanistan, providing the NA with close air support (CAS) and serving as a conduit for airdrops of critical supplies. Often, calling in CAS required SF teams to operate in front of the forward line of own troops (FLOT), exposed to hostile fire and running battles. With unrelenting CAS and strengthened NA forces, Taliban and al-Qaeda positions soon cracked. Northern Afghan cities—Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Baghlan—became scenes of victory, with the liberation of Kabul following a month later. With their rout, the coalition pursued the Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants into the mountains bordering Pakistan. The battles in these far mountains, fought by SF teams, U.S. Army conventional forces, and NA troops reached a climax with Operation ANACONDA in March 2002. To execute all of TF Dagger’s operations, no more than 400 SF soldiers deployed to Afghanistan.

The book’s strength is the chapters on operations with the NA, based on interviews with SF soldiers. Reading like an after-action report, some chapters are more fully developed and better written than others, but taken together there emerges a coherent story of the U.S. military effort marked by many acts of heroism. The author of a classic book on the SF in Vietnam, The Green Berets, Mr. Moore knows his subject intimately and his access to the troops is impressive. However, his analysis is unquestionably subjective, so those readers interested in objective analysis of the Afghanistan campaign should look elsewhere. This book is strictly a heroic portrayal of a military victory and the difficult search for Osama bin Laden.

The Hunt for Bin Laden was an early effort to capture the SF experience in Afghanistan. Being first has its pitfalls, as the writing style is uneven and the author repeats anecdotes. While the recollections of participants are a lode of information, without corroborating sources, many interviews turn into self-serving pieces. For example, sections covering operations after December 2001 relied on an apparent special operator nicknamed “Jack.” While his stories were colorful, “Jack” (aka Jonathan Idema), was a source proved dubious, as evidenced by his September 2004 conviction in Afghanistan for rogue activities as an independent bounty hunter. Jack Idema’s fraudulent past casts doubt on parts of the book.

For intelligence professionals, reading The Hunt for Bin Laden is useful. Operations in Afghanistan are a blueprint of future conflicts, reflecting the difficulty of fighting terrorism, breaking terrorists’ infrastructure, and capturing key personnel. Despite the criticisms by some SF teams regarding intelligence, accurate and timely intelligence enhanced targeting. Human intelligence (HUMINT) became increasingly available as the results of prisoner interrogations were disseminated. Over time, more detailed works will supersede this book, but this first history on TF Dagger gives the reader an appreciation of this extraordinary conflict.

Master Sergeant Peter Clemens
U.S. Army Reserve
Stafford, Virginia
The 1942 campaign for Burma was a disaster for the Allies—British, American, and Chinese. Then Lieutenant General (LTG) Joseph W. Stilwell remarked shortly after the Japanese Army conquest, “We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating as hell. I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back and retake it.”

Nathan Prefer’s book, *Vinegar Joe’s War: Stilwell’s Campaigns for Burma*, details how LTG Stilwell led the Allies back in early 1944, and over the course of the next year General (GEN) Stilwell defeated the Japanese Army in northern Burma. Fought with a coalition of forces, U.S. and British long-range infiltration units, U.S. airpower, and Chinese Army conventional infantry divisions, this diverse coalition in the Burma campaign overcame fierce Japanese resistance, dense jungles and steep mountains, brutal tropical weather governed by the monsoon rains, and political differences to drive the Japanese out and open a land supply route to China.

The northern Burma campaign is a complex tale of tough fighting, determined opponents, and improvisation. Mr. Prefer’s book is not a comprehensive history of this campaign. Instead, he writes about the U.S. Army ground forces that served as the core of the U.S. long-range penetration groups. Never in the Burma battles did U.S. infantry soldiers number more than four thousand, but they proved hard fighters and were critical to the campaign’s success.

Drawing heavily on personal accounts and interviews, Mr. Prefer writes on the operations of the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional)—more famously known as “Merrill’s Marauders”—from January 1944 until its demise as an effective unit following the siege of Myitkyina in August 1944. Soon thereafter another U.S. long-range penetration group formed. Drawn from the 124th Cavalry and 475th Infantry Regiments, the author recounts its story as the Mars Task Force that finished the campaign to forge a linkage with allied China. With detail, he explains the formation, training, engagements, and effectiveness of the Marauders and Mars soldier. Infiltrating miles behind Japanese positions to establish blocks and ambushes on jungle trials, the U.S. units disrupted Japanese attempts to supply and reinforce the battlefield. Usually fighting as battalions, the U.S. incursions often met with savage Japanese counterattacks.

The difficult battles of this campaign—Walabum, Shaduzup, Nhpum Ga, Tonkwa, and Myitkyina—are largely forgotten. Nonetheless, the outnumbered American forces relied on ingenuity to succeed. Forbidding terrain made conventional land supply impossible, requiring the United States to develop capabilities to air-drop supplies. The long distances the U.S. infantry operated from friendly lines meant aerial evacuation of wounded and ill soldiers was imperative. To fight and survive in this hellish environment, soldiers were well-trained and conditioned before deployment. Despite these measures, disease and the jungle decimated U.S. ranks, leaving units understrength and forcing the hurried introduction of replacements not acclimatized to the fighting or weather.

While this book is not the definitive history on this campaign, it provides a good overview of the U.S. ground operations. Sometimes reading like an after-action report, the author liberally uses personal anecdotes to enliven the text. Importantly for the reader, Mr. Prefer does provide battlefield maps. For a comprehensive history of the north Burma campaign, readers should refer to the two official U.S. Army histories, *U.S. Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater—Stillwell’s Command Problems* and *U.S. Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater—Time Runs Out in the CBI* by Charles Romanus and R. Sunderland, while an excellent personal account is *The Marauders* by Charlton Ogburn, Jr.

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Master Sergeant Peter Clemens
U.S. Army Reserve
Stafford, Virginia
January-March, Applied Intelligence Lessons Learned

Features

- Intelligence Battlefield Operating System Lessons Learned: Stability Operations and Support Operations During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM by LTC DJ Reyes
- Digital Battle Command: Baptism by Fire by LTC John W. Charlton
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