




MTPB

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Analysis



From the Editor

This issue of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)* focuses on the intelligence analyst, the individual soldier who works tirelessly to make overwhelming amounts of often-conflicting data clear and concise and later provides predictable intelligence for commanders and soldiers throughout the Army. Through the experiences of several of these soldier-analysts serving in a wide variety of assignments throughout the world, we will examine the role of the intelligence analyst within the context of Military Intelligence doctrine and related tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

Today's intelligence analyst, whether a newly assigned Private or a veteran Colonel, must be prepared to support his commander and fellow soldiers by conducting analysis on a multitude of threats in a variety of environments and circumstances. The analyst must integrate significant facts while constantly searching for subtle and frequently contradictory details within ever-increasing amounts of information. Through the use of multiple collection and analysis resources, the intelligence analyst searches for these crucial "nuggets" of information, the proverbial "needle in a haystack," to produce the coherent intelligence product that enables the commanders and fellow soldiers not only to see but also to understand the environment, threat, and situation within their area of operation.

The intelligence analyst does not have an easy job. He or she must be a jack of all trades. Not only knowledgeable in the processes of analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the analyst should also exhibit an understanding of the environment, weather, military policy, governmental and threat infrastructures, and numerous cultural and religious aspects of the host nation and locale. Furthermore, the analyst must not only understand these subjects within the context of ground operations but also as they relate to air and amphibious operations.

Today's intelligence analysts increasingly find themselves challenged by situations for which there is little legacy experience, procedures, or doctrine. They often find themselves in positions where, given a lack of lessons learned or doctrine, they must rely on their own experiences while at the same time learn how best to employ the latest in highly technical battlefield processing systems. However, if the analysts have not received sufficient training, or lack experience, they may find themselves struggling to provide the required support their commanders need. Most should have received the requisite training and gained experience through exercises and in garrison training. Those few who fail, however, may do so with devastating results. Therefore, the intent of this issue is to help "share the wealth," so to speak, and to allow others to share their experiences and learn from them. With our insights and knowledge, we must ensure that we, the intelligence analysts, continue to provide the Army and our fellow soldiers with the best possible intelligence support.*

Included in this issue are a number of articles that address problems faced by today's intelligence analysts.

- ☐ Dr. Thomas Kane offers a frank discussion of the challenges facing today's strategic analysts.
- ☐ MAJ Chris Tatarka looks at common errors in analysis and decision-making.
- ☐ MAJ David Shin discusses development of the criteria necessary to commit U.S. military forces.
- ☐ CW3 Del Stewart focuses on the need to develop new methodologies or adapt existing ones and tactics, techniques, and procedures when analyzing the terrorist threat.
- ☐ MAJ Paul Shelton shares lessons learned from U.S. Marine Corps operations in Monrovia, Liberia.
- ☐ CW4 Thomas Quedensley focuses on the impact of the proliferation of space-based, commercial, multispectral imaging systems, their use by nations and organizations that previously lacked such access, and the increased imagery intelligence threat we face.
- ☐ CPT Fred Hoffman focuses on the intelligence implications of President Carter's decision to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea.
- ☐ CPT John Bento provides a discussion on maximizing the effectiveness of National Guard units through their incorporation with Active Component units during exercises.
- ☐ Mr. Michael Varhola addresses intelligence oversight and **AR 381-10**.

Taken together, these articles provide a rich overview of various aspects of the problems facing the U.S. Army's Intelligence analysts and their potential solutions.

*Additional information about the roles, TTP, and other aspects of the work of intelligence analysts is available through contact with the Doctrine Division, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), through its website at <http://usaic.hua.army.mil/DOCTRINE/dlbs.htm>.

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Always Out Front

By Brigadier General James A. Marks
Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca



Let me continue the dialogue from the previous MIPB with all of you in the field. In the last edition I mentioned that intelligence professionals “must stand ready to integrate intelligence within full-spectrum operations....” Now more than ever our war against terrorism makes this requirement a little more personal for all of us. Make no mistake, this war will be a long and complex campaign not simply in Afghanistan but across the globe and, most importantly, leveraging all of us in our Intelligence Corps. This is your fight; you will, if not already, be involved. Step up, raise your hand. Echo the words of those professionals before us, “Send Me.”

We all are analysts. It is core to what we are. In fact, all of our skill sets directly contribute to some form of analysis. I like to describe “analysis” akin to painting a picture. Depending on the subject (weather, enemy, terrain) and the audience (the warfighting commander...battalion, brigade, etc), the picture is either complex with many colors, hues, and shadows, or it is rather simple using black and white stick figures. You, the analyst, must know both the subject and the audience...know the enemy; know your boss.

Now, with that as a foundation, what are our (Military Intelligence) core competencies? Well, the answer is simple. Our core competencies must support our fundamental requirement to analyze. We have five core competencies:

- ☐ **ISR Integration**
- ☐ **Collection**
- ☐ **Analysis**
- ☐ **Presentation**
- ☐ **Protection**

This is what I call ICAP², the acronym for our core competencies.



Good analysis results from aggressive integration of the total ISR effort and directed, precise collection throughout all echelons of command and across all battlefield functional areas (BFAs). You must then present the results to include our counterintelligence efforts which help protect the force. Your analysis should “scratch your bosses itch...not scratch yours.” Remember, know your boss; answer his/her priority intelligence requirements (PIR). This is his/her read of the enemy, not yours. Intelligence is for the Commander!

Good analysis results from hard work. (I don't think I've ever experienced truly great analysis.

Good analysis is 1-½ hours of a

2-hour JRTC post mission AAR on how screwed up the S2 is; great analysis is a 1-hour critique of a 2 hour JRTC post mission AAR on how screwed up the S2 is. I never experienced such largess!) You must apply and modify doctrine and your tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). You must know how to collect...what is available to you in your formation and what is available from higher and adjacent units. You must know how “to reach” to other knowledge centers to flush out your analysis with theirs. You must know how to recognize and assess seams and gaps in your collection so you can cover down. You must train those around you; educate your battle staff on your core competencies and how to apply them. Be the acknowledged expert. Be the “go to” soldier. Step up; raise your hand. Tell all around you “Send me.”

In later issues I will get into the details of all of our core competencies, but I need your thoughts. Tell me what you think about what is “core to your corps.” We have never been more relevant. We need to share your thoughts to ensure continued relevance. Our nation, our leaders, our soldiers need you.

Step up; Send me!

CSM Forum

By Command Sergeant Major Lawrence J. Haubrich
U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps



With the attacks on our homeland on 11 September 2001 and the war on terrorism, these are busy times for our great nation. More than anything, communications with each other and our families are so important. Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) are the key to getting on with life and keeping the soldiers informed. **We make it happen!**

Our soldiers must know what they will be doing to support this on-going war against terrorism and our soldiers' families and loved ones need to know as well. We must ensure that our leaders are involved and have their fingers on not only the "pulse" of the soldiers but also the command information program, family resource groups, and quality of life for our Army and soldiers.

The mobilization of the 5th of the 104th Reserve MI Battalion at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; the 321st Reserve Corps Support Battalion-war traced to the 504th MI Brigade at Fort Hood, Texas; and the 325th Re-



serve Corps Support Battalion-war traced to the 525th MI Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, into the Active Army shows the world how strong our "Army of One" truly is. It also reinforces our determination to win this war against terrorism.

We must remember this is a war against terrorism, not a religion or an ethic group. Many U.S. citizens are understandably angry with the terrorist attacks on our nation, but we must not give in to hatred and stereotyping. I ask that you all remember our Pledge of Allegiance to our flag and to the United States of America.

We are one nation, a great nation where no attack on our homeland will create divisiveness among us, for we are "indivisible." I ask you all to stay focused and keep the faith. The road ahead will be long. We must ensure we take care of each other and our families. Our nation depends on us for we are her defenders. As always, you train hard, you die hard, you train easy, you die easy. Peace needs protection.

"I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

Strategic Analysis To Hear the Thunder

by Dr. Thomas M. Kane, Ph.D.

Those who study history know the importance of thorough military preparation and clear-sighted national policy. Nevertheless, even the most prudent observers of world politics often have trouble knowing how to prepare for what we may face. Both military technology and political alignments are changing rapidly, and it has become difficult to distinguish between truly significant developments in strategic affairs and momentary crises that merely happen to dominate the headlines.

The distinction is critical. Those who formulate defense policy and military strategy must learn to see beyond the immediate and the obvious. If we base future plans on recent events, or even ongoing trends, we risk finding out that we have prepared for the proverbial "last war." Furthermore, we must keep in mind that our most dangerous opponents may not be the most belligerent ones. Indeed, our most dangerous foes may not even appear particularly successful. If we are to identify our most significant potential opponents in this century, we must learn to see not only what other countries or groups are doing but also what they are putting themselves in a position to do.

The Crisis of Strategic Analysis

Even as the importance of sound analysis and preparation increases, the gap between strategic thought and the daily realities of international affairs has begun to

widen. In military journals, theoretical writings have become increasingly futuristic and increasingly devoid of political context. Even more practical studies such as the recent British and U.S. defense reviews offer frustrating generalities on the issues where strategists need specifics.

How can strategic analysts regain their focus? There is no certain formula for success. Ultimately, all assessments of future military challenges depend on informed judgment, and this means that even the most highly skilled analysts will occasionally be wrong. There are, however, things which discerning observers might seek. Some of the same principles that govern operational planning apply at the level of grand strategy as well, and one can use them to gain insight into the strategic significance of various trends and developments around the world.

The U.S. Army's official history of World War II notes that if the Allied High Command had been compelled to approach its campaigns without prior material preparation, the invasion of North Africa in November 1942 could not have taken place until 1944.¹ Although the Allied commanders were able to develop a strategy for this campaign in a matter of months, their logistical preparations consumed almost two years.

The Army historians went on to note an important fact:

The process of fashioning, mobilizing and distributing the tools

of warfare had to begin . . . long before the specific purposes for which the tools were to be used could be known.²

This observation applies as well to long-term state policy as it does to individual campaigns, and it is as valid in peace as it is in war. Countries that wish to develop modern armed forces in this century may require decades to acquire the necessary equipment and learn how to use it. States that wish to enjoy military power in the future will have to prepare now, whether their leaders have clear ideas about how to use that military power or not.

The principle that lead-time exceeds planning time is as useful for analyzing other people's actions as it is for carrying out one's own. Just as one must fashion military tools in advance, future allies and opponents must do the same. If one can acquire information about the types of political and military "tools" which other countries are developing, mobilizing, and distributing, one can gain insight into both their current intentions and their probable courses of action in unforeseen crises.

Taken singly, such insights are generally rather straightforward. The fact that the People's Republic of China (PRC) discusses the purchase or construction of aircraft carriers, for instance, provides one with some indication of the types of operations the Chinese Navy will be able to undertake in the future. One can proceed from that point to ask why Chinese leaders might be interested in developing force projection and other related capabilities, and how other countries might respond. Furthermore, as one collects numerous insights of this nature, one can assemble these findings into a pattern, which reveals more in its totality than any number of discoveries might reveal in isolation. The rest of this article consists of tips on how strategists can use these principles to extract the maximum amount of use-

ful knowledge from the information available to them.

Purpose and Potential

The fact that states must develop the tools of national power before they have decided how to use them means that one must interpret the actions of other countries not only in terms of their purpose but also in terms of their potential. In the last decade, for instance, the PRC was building up its armed forces. Some fear that the Chinese Government hopes to intimidate its neighbors, whereas others believe that leaders of China merely wish to protect their country and achieve recognition within the international community. For purposes of long-term planning, it may not matter which set of analysts is right.

By expanding their forces now, the Chinese leaders of the present are giving the Chinese leaders of the future new options and a collection of tools that they will be able to use in any way they desire. Other countries will have to consider the possibility that China might exercise these options and shape the course of world politics. The Chinese regime will have reaped the rewards of an aggressive policy even if its current regime is completely Pacific based.

One cannot, however, view all rising powers as identical. The possibility that North Korea may have deployed a few nuclear weapons disturbs U.S. policy-makers more than the certainty that Britain has deployed more powerful weapons in far greater numbers. They assume that North Korea is more of a threat to our interests than is the United Kingdom; not only are such assumptions normally valid they also are always necessary. Policy-makers must distinguish between relatively hostile states and comparatively friendly ones, if only because no nation could afford to prepare for simultaneous wars against all the countries that have the physical ability to harm it.

Although one should never assume that a nation's current political alignment will last forever, one should not ignore politics either. Therefore, when analysts assess another country's intentions, they must try to distinguish its momentary political and diplomatic posture from the enduring principles that will guide it through decades. This requires extensive knowledge of that country's history, geography, economy, and government. Material factors such as geography can shape a country's long-term interests; traditions and deeply held philosophical beliefs can do the same. The tangible fact that Britain is an island shapes both its past and future in undeniable ways, but intangibles such as the Serbian people's undying resentment of their defeat on the "Field of Blackbirds" in 1389 have equally profound effects.

Even when analysts have identified a nation as both a rising power and a potential threat, they must pay attention to the specific ways in which its military power is developing. The fact that China is expanding its fleet, for instance, raises different concerns than those that would arise if the Chinese regime was assembling land armies in Central Asia. By looking at the types of forces a particular country is developing, one can determine the opponents that country will best be suited to challenge. One can gain a sense of how long it will take that country to complete whatever programs it has underway, and thus an idea of how quickly its leaders hope to realize the benefits of their preparations.

Beyond Jane's

The acquisition and demobilization of military assets are only the most obvious signs of change in a nation's strength. The economic resources of a country or group can play as large a role in determining its capabilities as does the forces it deploys. For a classic example of this principle in action, one might recall the way in which the United

States expanded its tiny peacetime forces of the 1930s into a military organization that was able to play a decisive role in World War II. Whereas it would be unwise for us to assume that we will always be able to recover from military unreadiness so handily, it would be equally unwise for anyone to assume that other nations are incapable of turning their industrial capacity to military purposes on similarly short notice. Thus, developments that appear purely domestic and civilian can have profound effects on international relations and military affairs.

Those who wish to understand the strategic significance of economic developments must pay attention to subtleties. Not only is it hard to tell how readily a country will be able to use its resources to build capable military forces it also can be hard to ascertain what resources a government actually has at its disposal. States can use the complexities of finance and corporate ownership to acquire commodities they need, deny such commodities to others, avoid treaty restrictions on their activities, and conceal their activities from potential rivals.

Germany used such tactics adeptly following the First World War. In December 1917, even before the war had ended, Krupp began to open branch factories in Switzerland. These preparations later helped Germany avoid restrictions on German arms production. The Zeiss corporation used similar techniques of international diversification to produce regulated optical devices in the Netherlands, and the putatively Danish firm Daugs and Company also served as a front for German rearmament.³

Not only do economic resources and national infrastructure affect the quality and quantity of forces a nation can field, they also shape the ways in which they can use them. The leaders of 19th century Prussia demonstrated an awareness of this

fact when they designed their country's railway system to support their military preparations against France and Russia. Roads, airfields, harbors, and rail networks are among the things that determine a nation's military possibilities, and analysts should consider them in those terms. Transportation and communication are as integral to commerce as to warfare, and the patterns of one can become the patterns of the other.

Even the most lavishly equipped and technologically oriented armed forces still incorporate civilian resources into their logistical systems. In 1978, the International Institute for Strategic Studies observed that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces would have to rely on civilian facilities for 82 of the 100 airbases they would have at their disposal in the event of a major land war with the Soviet Union.⁴ In Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the U.S. military used both the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Ready Reserve Fleet of civilian cargo vessels to deploy forces into the war zone. One may assume that other countries will draw even more heavily upon supposed civilian assets for their military efforts. Commercial ships and aircraft can carry troops and heavy equipment, while fishing boats can serve as auxiliary patrol vessels. Therefore, one must consider such resources when analyzing their military potential.

The principle that the long-term potential of a national asset is more important than its initial purpose is doubly true when one analyzes the development of a country's transportation infrastructure. Few would claim that U.S. industrialists were thinking in military terms when they built this country's railway system, but their work still affected the course of the Civil War. Just as China's naval buildup is significant even if the Chinese Government has only the most peaceful intentions, the fact

that China is helping Burma to improve its roads and harbors is significant even if both sides hope only to trade and grow rich.⁵ Again, one discovers the possible meanings of such developments only when considering them in their full political and geographical context. Building a road is not an inherently aggressive act, but when one combines the fact that Burma is between China and India with the fact that there have been considerable tensions between the Chinese and Indian Governments, one may decide that road-building in this particular location is a cause for concern.

There are similarities between high-technology resources and more familiar types of infrastructure. Just as nations may press commercial shipping into military service, they may press commercial satellites into military service as well. To stretch the analogy further, one might compare information technology to roads and railways. One can redirect electronic data flow far more easily than one can lay tracks along new routes. However, a nation's access to space-based assets and telecommunications networks may dramatically affect its military options. In the Gulf War, for instance, one of the major reasons the Coalition armies were able to carry out their war-winning flanking maneuver was that the satellite-based Global Positioning System (GPS) allowed them to operate in parts of the desert where Iraqi forces could not.

Forage and Conquest

Analysts must also remember that economic resources may not remain with their original owners. When Warsaw Pact commanders planned for hypothetical invasions of Western Europe, for example, they took it for granted that they would be able to seize food and fuel along the way. Irregular forces can rely even more heavily upon captured supplies. When guerrilla forces grow

strong enough, they can force civilians to fund and equip them, thus turning part of the region's economy to their own purposes. If computer networks are to play as large a role in future warfare as some have suggested, hackers might accomplish an electronic version of the same gambit.

Just as forage continues to play a role in warfare, conquest continues to play a role in international relations. The fact that the Russian Navy still operates from port facilities which the U.S. armed forces built at Cam Ranh Bay during the Vietnam War serves as a reminder that countries can still win and lose strategically valuable territory in battle. Thus, when one analyzes the significance of economic development in a particular region, one must consider not only the ways in which its initial owners might use it but also the ways in which it might be vulnerable.

The Logistics of Ideas

Many of the principles that apply to material preparations for war, apply to political positioning as well. Indeed, for those who accept Clausewitz's statement that war is merely "the continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means," it is impossible to draw a clear line between the two.⁶ Just as one cannot carry out military operations without building up stockpiles of materiel, one cannot put political programs into effect without securing support from potential allies and undermining the arguments of potential opponents. These requirements are most obvious in the domestic politics of democracies, where politicians must win the consent of the people in order to keep their jobs, but they exist even in the most dictatorial regimes. Leaders of despotism may have to work with members of a select elite rather than the public, but they must still go through the same steps of building coalitions and preempting their opposition.

This form of "politicking" operates across national borders and shapes strategic affairs in much the same way that it shapes other public policy debates. During the Vietnam War, for instance, the North Vietnamese regime carried out an open campaign to "[win] the war on the streets of New York and the campuses of New England."⁷ Lobbying firms in Washington, D.C., routinely represent foreign governments to the U.S. Congress. In an age when Western countries typically attempt to justify their use of armed force by seeking approval from international organizations and going to war as part of large coalitions, transnational public opinion will play a crucial role in determining when and how these nations fight.

Just as countries can gain a wider range of military options by developing their armed forces, countries can gain a wider range of political options by advancing useful ideas. Political persuasion takes place largely in the realms of words and images. These are often ambiguous and difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, one can gain insight into a country's political intentions in the same way as one can gain insight into its military intentions, by looking at the actions it takes or advocates and asking what those actions could allow it to do.

Not only must one look at the types of issues other political actors raise, one must look at the way in which they portray those issues. The words people use often reveal a great deal about the political effect they hope to achieve. Not only can one use emotionally charged language to arouse people's feelings (or emotionally neutral language to achieve the opposite effect), one can use carefully chosen expressions to convey special messages to a select audience.

Soviet spokespersons, for instance, occasionally proclaimed their desire for "peaceful coexistence" with the West. To many, this

language undoubtedly sounded rather benign. Those who were familiar with the writings of Lenin and the speeches of Khrushchev, however, would have known that the concept of peaceful coexistence went hand in hand with the concept of "peaceful competition," in which the socialist countries would supposedly crush their rivals through superior industrial production and superior political appeal. Thus, the spokesperson could send different messages to different audiences. To some, their words were a reassuring promise; to others, their words were a call to action; and to others, perhaps, their words were a blatant threat.

When applying these principles, never forget that politics is a slippery business. Not only will nations, parties, leaders, and pressure groups attempt to affect the way people perceive issues, they will try to keep people from realizing how they are going about it. They may advance controversial ideas bit by bit, in order to avoid alerting their audience to their full intentions. Alternatively, they may demand far more than they actually want, so they appear to "compromise." In all cases, they will cover the more significant statements with a glaze of platitudes and rhetoric. One takes these things for granted in domestic politics, and one must remember them in the analysis of international affairs as well.

Conclusion: On Getting It Right

This method of analyzing international relations is based on the idea that, although foreign leaders may not always plan their future policies in much detail, they do attempt to put themselves in a position to secure various political and material objectives. They also attempt to take advantage of whatever opportunities they manage to create for themselves. In other words, this article assumes that foreign leaders practice at least a rudimentary level

of grand strategy. Those who apply this principle thoughtlessly can easily lapse into paranoia. The fact that something happens does not mean that anyone planned it, and the fact that a country is capable of aggression does not necessarily mean that it will commit it. In order to use the ideas in this article successfully, one must be careful not to take them too far.



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Overcoming Biases in Military Problem Analysis and Decision-Making

by Major Christopher J. Tatarka

I don't care what that report says, the enemy has to be traveling down avenue of approach #1...because that is what my IPB [intelligence preparation of the battlefield] says he'll do.

—Battalion Task Force S2 at the Joint Readiness Training Center, 1996.

Although we added the comment above for humor, many Military Intelligence (MI) professionals are continually in danger of making an error in analysis similar to that shown by this quote. This danger is not the result of a failure in attempting to interpret enemy activities correctly, but rather from analytical errors psychologically inherent to human decision-making and analysis. This article will discuss the two most serious errors in analysis and decision-making, as well as present methods to combat these potentially disastrous lapses.¹

Heuristics and Biases in Problem Solving

Intelligence analysis, by its nature, requires individuals to be decision-makers; despite recent advances in technology and decision-support systems (e.g., the All-Source Analysis System), the primary tool for intelligence analysis is still the human brain (see Figure 1). MI professionals often have difficulties making choices because the human brain has limits in its capacity to process information, and then make decisions based on that information using all aspects of the available data. Because of these inherent limitations, there is a natural tendency for people to attempt to take mental shortcuts in problem analysis and decision-making. Behavioral scientists have been studying these shortcuts, or heuristics, extensively for years.

Heuristics are not inherently bad as they often prove helpful in making decisions by simplifying the decision-making process. For example, if at your second Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation, you notice a trend in enemy activity similar to that at your previous rotation, then you are likely to rely on the previous solution to determine the enemy intentions. In this case, you would not have to make a completely new hypothesis about enemy intentions because this scenario is representative of a previous experience. This heuristic, referred to as “representativeness,” may have aided you in quickly making an analysis of the enemy situation.

Unfortunately, however, a wide body of research has shown that in many situations, these heuristics often lead to errors in decision-making, analytical thinking, and problem solving. That is, humans have a psychological tendency to make certain analytical errors or apply biases when analyzing situations. In intelligence analysis and military decision-

making, these biases can be extremely problematic since they frequently lead to incorrect assessments and poor analysis, which can lead to disastrous results.

Anchoring

One of the most dangerous biases for intelligence professionals results from limitations in human working memory. Due to the limitations in how much information humans can use at any given time, we tend to mentally limit, or screen, the amount of external information we employ to analyze a situation.² One of the problematic tendencies is for individuals to emphasize information based on **when** they received it, rather than on the strength or merit of the information.

Anchoring is the most common bias of this type. It occurs when an individual places too much importance on the first or early reports in a series of information collection (i.e., people become “anchored” on the initial information). For example, in the situation at the beginning of this

Do You Think You Are a Good Intelligence Analyst?

- ☐ Higher headquarters has various sources that strongly suggest a dismounted enemy unit's most likely course of action (COA) is to move along avenue of approach #1. You consider this information reasonable, given the situation. After you complete the IPB, you brief your commander that this is the likely enemy course of action (ECO).
- ☐ As the situation progresses, the first three incoming intelligence reports from solid, trustworthy sources strongly support your predicted ECO.
- ☐ If the next report, also from a trustworthy source, refutes your predicted (and publicly stated) ECO, what decision will you likely make?
- ☐ What if you receive a second “disconfirming” report? A third? At what point might you change your previous prediction and explain to your commander that you were wrong?

Figure 1. Are You a Good Intelligence Analyst?

article, there would be a strong tendency to place much greater importance on the early reports than on those that came later in the scenario (despite any indications that neither report was more valid than the other).

A large amount of anecdotal evidence from participants and observer/controllers (O/Cs) at the National Training Center (NTC) and JRTC suggest anchoring is a problem for many intelligence (and operations) sections when determining ECOAs. Likewise, historical instances of anchoring are equally common. For example, during the Civil War Battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863, General Oliver O. Howard, Commander of the Union Army's 11th Corps, likely became a victim of anchoring. General Howard received a number of initial reports early on 2 May, suggesting that the Confederate forces opposite his position were a covering force for a Confederate retreat.

These initial reports included a report from General Joseph Hooker, Howard's superior, who stated that the Confederate forces were clearly in retreat. As the day progressed, however, General Howard received a variety of eyewitness reports that indicated the Confederate forces were instead massing for an attack. Despite a large number of these reports, General Howard apparently anchored on the earliest reports. Although he was aware of eyewitness information, he apparently placed more emphasis on the earlier reports. At 5:15 p.m. on 2 May, Confederate troops stormed through the completely surprised 11th Corps, turned the Union flank, and eventually won this battle.³ Although it is difficult to completely recreate General Howard's thoughts, it does seem likely that anchoring played a vital role in this defeat.

Confirmation Bias

The second major bias that can hinder the intelligence analysis and

decision-making processes is the confirmation bias. After a person has developed a hypothesis about an event (e.g., an ECOA), confirmation bias leads the individual to—

- ❑ Seek out only evidence that confirms the hypothesis.
- ❑ Disregard evidence that does not confirm the hypothesis.
- ❑ Fail to use the **absences** of information about the hypothesis to develop alternate explanations.

For example, once an intelligence section develops an ECOA, the psychological tendency is to look for information or reports that only support that ECOA. Therefore, if they deploy reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) assets only along the most likely enemy axis of advance, this is likely to be a confirmation bias. Similarly, research suggests that humans will naturally tend to either forget or mentally ignore information that disconfirms the ECOA. In three JRTC rotations, I have been in intelligence sections that simply discounted reports because they did not fit the proposed ECOAs. Likewise, if there is not any substantial information about the most likely ECOA, we tend to assume it is valid, despite that lack of information. For example, when there are no significant negative R&S reports, individuals are prone to assume that the ECOA is accurate and do not consider that the enemy might possibly be coming from a location where there are no R&S assets.

Perhaps most significant about the confirmation bias is that the doctrinal military decision-making process (MDMP) lends itself to its occurrence. Doctrine requires intelligence personnel to generate hypotheses about enemy activities (e.g., the most likely and most dangerous ECOAs) and psychology suggests that we are likely to bias ourselves mentally to confirm

these COAs at the risk of more analytical thought. Although important in the MDMP, creating the most likely and the most dangerous ECOAs inherently adds to the odds of analysts injecting a confirmation bias into intelligence analysis and the intelligence cycle. That is, intelligence personnel spend a great deal of effort generating what they believe is the best possible hypothesis about enemy activities; once they complete these hypotheses, research suggests there will be a very strong psychological tendency for these individuals to seek out or note only information that supports their hypotheses. Even more troublesome is that this "cognitive tunnel vision" mentality is even more pronounced under conditions of high stress and mental overload,⁴ (which is the primary environment for Army operations).

Examples of confirmation bias in military history are widespread and similar to the evidence from JRTC mentioned above. An excellent example is General Ulysses S. Grant's actions in the Battle of Shiloh in 1862. Grant's assessment was that the Confederate forces under General Pierre Beauregard were preparing defenses and were "*heartily tired*".⁵ Despite information from frontline units, and one colonel who reported "*thousands of rebels out there in the woods*,"⁶ General Grant refused to alter his initial hypothesis about the enemy. When he continued to receive reports about enemy movements, his assessment was that it was, at most, a small attack against an isolated division, but clearly not a large-scale offensive. The next morning, as Grant was eating breakfast, thousands of Confederates began their attack. Although later able to obtain a costly victory at Shiloh, Grant's confirmation bias nearly led to a stunning defeat for Union forces.

Overcoming the Anchoring and Confirmation Biases

The tendency to commit these two biases in analysis and decision-making is inherent in human thought. These biases can lead to disastrous errors, making it imperative that intelligence analysts and decision-makers take steps to overcome them.

The literature in decision-making and human performance suggests implementation of three methods that can help prevent these biases. They are the use of decision-support tools, training, and employing a “devil’s advocate” to validate or invalidate hypotheses.

Decision-Support Tools. One of the best ways to overcome biases, most notably anchoring, is use of doctrinal and situational decision-support tools. For example, an organized, updated situation map or display—which graphically portrays unit reports—aids people in weighing incoming reports in a less sequential order. If accurate, organized, and updated in a timely manner, these graphic displays are likely to help analysts overcome anchoring on earlier reports. Since these reports show information graphically, not sequentially, they may alleviate the anchoring tendency. Although decision-support tools are common for intelligence professionals, it is imperative that analysts actually use them when analyzing threat activities.

Training. Although overcoming these biases can be difficult, another excellent method suggested by the research on decision-making is training individuals to overcome these biases. For example, training intelligence professionals and sections about these two biases is likely to make them more aware of their own thought processes, and therefore less likely to make these errors. Likewise, training individuals on the importance of considering all information that con-

firms or disconfirms an ECOA equally and impartially is also likely to prove beneficial. Research also suggests that training in these areas needs to be specific to the scenarios and environments in which these biases occur. That is, specific training on likely scenarios and procedures encountered by a particular intelligence analyst or section is more helpful in reduction of these biases than is less focused, broader scope training.

Devil’s Advocate. Assign a “devil’s advocate” to find errors in analysis or to generate alternate hypotheses concerning enemy activities. One possible technique is to assign an individual to evaluate each enemy COA critically, and then task that individual to “disconfirm” the stated most likely ECOA. One may also have this devil’s advocate create alternate ECOAs and graphically display (or list) all reported information that disproves the most probable ECOA. On occasion, they can also present their arguments against the most probable ECOA to the analysts in a section. Since time is critical in most intelligence settings, this process does not need to be exhaustive nor time consuming. Having one individual search for refuting evidence is a quick, efficient method, likely to lead to better analysis.

Conclusion

The three methods mentioned above provide a framework for overcoming two of the most prevalent and dangerous biases that exist in military problem analysis and decision-making. Although not “cure-alls” for every analytical and problem-solving bias in humans, these methods may help foster better, more accurate, and more relevant intelligence analysis. They may also help prevent the problems that exist when analysts and decision-makers anchor on early information or focus too much on confirming their own hypotheses.

Special thanks to Mike Matthews, (Ph.D., Department of Behavioral Sci-

ences and Leadership, United States Military Academy) for his input on this article.

Endnotes

1. The primary reference for this article was Wickens, Christopher D., Gordon, Sallie E., Yili, Liu, **An Introduction to Human Factors Engineering** (NYC, New York: Longman Books, 1998). More detailed information is available from this text, or other psychology texts, especially those involving cognition and problem solving.

2. “Working memory” is a psychological model to describe one of the “systems” that humans use in thought and memory. Simply put, this model states that working memory comprises primarily what a person is thinking of at any given moment. The following task illustrates the limitations of working memory.

Study the words below for 15 seconds.

orange cat paper house fish bucket
pear cup key pencil tape

Now cover up the words, and attempt to list them in order:

The fact that very few people can recall all eleven words evokes the limitations of working memory. Although a simplistic example, studies suggest that more complex cues that may be important to problem solving are “forgotten” in a manner similar to the words in this list.

3. McPherson, James, L., **Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era** (NYC, New York: Ballantine Books, 1988).

4. Wickens et. al., page 195.

5. McPherson, page 409.

6. McPherson, page 408.

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Use of Standing Criteria for Deciding to Commit U.S. Forces in Conflict Resolution

by Major David Shin

*"The lessons I absorbed from Panama confirmed all my convictions over the preceding twenty years, since the days of doubt over Vietnam. Have a clear political objective and stick to it. Use all the force necessary, and do not apologize for going in big if that is what it takes. Decisive force ends wars quickly and in the long run saves lives. Whatever threats we faced in the future, I intended to make these rules the bedrock of my military counsel."*¹

General Colin Powell

Some of our senior military leaders, as evidenced by General Powell's statement, are convinced that the United States' past conflicts have shown that general rules for military success exist. The nation must follow these rule to achieve the maximum results with minimum risk and exposure. Should we commit to a list of standing criteria for committing the military forces of the United States of America? After all, someone could argue, "wait a minute, you did not follow one of the rules." In fact, criteria that amount to rules could become policy and cause the nation to be too reluctant and averse to use her military forces. General Powell shared these concerns; however, he believed in the spirit of such rules rather than being ruled by them. He argued at his confirmation hearing as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), that the set of criteria Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger proposed for the use of U.S. military power was a useful guideline. However, General Powell never viewed these criteria to be a series of steps that circumstances must meet before the JCS would recommend the use of military force.

Criteria for Committing Forces

I share General Powell's view on this issue but think that we should

reevaluate these criteria as the nature of conflict continues to evolve. As we are aware, war is a serious business and its consequences may determine whether a state and its people will endure or perish. I believe this realization alone requires a more systematic approach to conflict resolution, rather than our reliance on what some would call ad hoc responses to crises. Furthermore, our religious values promote the *prima facie* obligation not to kill or injure others unjustly, and that value set acts as a constraint in determining the use of force. In brief, the very serious nature of war and our moral obligations demand the most weighty and significant reasons for going to war. The formulation of standing criteria for committing U.S. military forces would be very helpful in our attempts to wage just wars. The question is what our standing criteria should be and why? I will examine several views ranging from the just-war (moralist) argument to those promoted by Secretary Weinberger and synthesize them to posit my own views on the issue. I will begin by examining Secretary Weinberger's criteria, the Weinberger Doctrine, regarding the commitment of U.S. forces.

The genesis for the formulation of the Weinberger Doctrine was his realization that there was a growing sentiment in the United States advocating a return to the isolationism that was prevalent in this country between the World Wars. He firmly opposed this view because it would detach the United States from the world community and seem to be a renunciation of its responsibilities as a world leader. Simultaneously, he challenged the view that military force could be brought to bear on **any** crisis. He feared the indiscriminate use of force would bring about domestic

turmoil similar to that experienced during the Vietnam War, and would eventually threaten our ability to build a national consensus for a common purpose. In the end, he believed this would lead to low morale in the U.S. Armed Services and eventually reduce the effectiveness of our ability to wage war. Therefore, Secretary Weinberger was in search of a more flexible and effective response to deal with the use of military force. On 28 November 1984, he outlined six criteria for committing U.S. military forces to include—

- ☐ When its **vital** national interests were at stake.
- ☐ With the intent to win.
- ☐ When we have established clearly defined political and military objectives.
- ☐ Should have the support of both the citizenry and the Congress.
- ☐ Use of military force should be the last resort.
- ☐ We should continuously reassess and modify the decisions to conduct military operations when required.

Most of the above criteria are self-explanatory; however, some may need further clarification. For instance, what does Secretary Weinberger mean by **vital** and what are the **national interests** involved? In short, how do we know if the conflict is in our national interest? Next, what does it mean to have the **support** of the our Nation's people and the Congress? Finally, do we need to **modify** the Weinberger Doctrine since the international environment has changed so significantly since November 1984?

Evaluating National Interests

I will address the first issue by highlighting Donald E. Nuechterlein's work on U.S. policy national inter-

ests in a new security environment.² It helps us to better understand what our national interests are and to what degree of intensity they are at stake in a specific crisis. First, he argues that there are four enduring national interests:

- ❑ Defending the United States and its way of life.
- ❑ The economic well-being of the United States.
- ❑ Maintaining a favorable world order.
- ❑ Promoting our values (democracy and the free market system).

Second, and more importantly, he argues that our ability to assess the intensity of interest during crises will help us to correctly determine what our national interests are. In other words, it will be relatively easy to determine which of the four national interests are at stake. The critical element in the decision-making process is to what level of intensity we should assess them. He argues that in addition to the four enduring national interests, there are four different levels of intensity: survival, vital, major, and peripheral interests.

According to Nuechterlein, **survival interests** are at stake when one's homeland is threatened if an enemy state's demands are not dealt with quickly. For instance, Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939 and the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 are clear survival interests for both affected countries.

Vital interests are similar to survival interests but the main difference is the amount of time a nation has to respond to the threat. In short, the danger is not imminent and the nation has time to consult with allies, negotiate with the enemy, or to employ other instruments of national power. In the end, the nation is willing to use military force when the enemy refuses to compromise after reaching a certain point. For example, President Harry S. Truman's

decision to intervene in South Korea and President John F. Kennedy's decision not to allow Soviet missiles in Cuba are crises in which our vital interests were at stake.

Major interests are those not crucial to a nation's well being but are still considered important. Normally, it involves interests the country can negotiate with its adversary. Although they are of serious concern to our policy-makers, negotiation and compromise are the policy of choice rather than confrontation. For instance, the Arab oil embargo in 1973 caused significant damage to the U.S. economy but it was not a serious long-term threat to that economy. Likewise, the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan threatened our interests but we determined that we could still live with the unsatisfactory outcome without the commitment of our troops. In brief, the difference between vital and major interest is **what our policy-makers believe to be tolerable or intolerable**.

Finally, a **peripheral interest** is one that does not seriously affect the well-being of the United States as a whole, even though it may be detrimental to the private interests of U.S. citizens and companies conducting business abroad. We may need to monitor the situation but the concerns are at a lower order of magnitude. Examples are U.S. citizens imprisoned overseas on drug or other charges and violations of our business interests operating abroad. Again, the point is that correctly differentiating the levels of intensity ranging from peripheral to survival can provide policy-makers with a clear choice when deciding which national interest is at stake during crises.

Garnering Support

How do the President and his crucial advisors attempt to gain the support of the Congress and the citizenry? Must they have public support? Should Congress declare war

before committing our troops to combat? These questions are quite difficult to address since the end result, whether one has the people's support, can be very difficult to determine. However, the determination is more obvious with either mass public opposition (for example, the Vietnam anti-war protests) or overwhelming support (such as was observed during Operation DESERT STORM). A good example of how subjective this issue can be was in the debate over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) bombing of Serbia during the Kosovo crisis. A number of Senate Republicans accused President Bill Clinton of misleading the nation while others claimed that for him to go to war without a formal declaration of war from Congress was to abrogate his constitutional duty and violate his oath of office. Others argue that the Clinton Administration lacked an overarching national strategy and appeared to be responding to crises, as if it intentionally promoted incrementalism and "ad hoc-ism" in our national strategy. In the end, however, Congress voted to support the President's decision to bomb the Serbs.

It is also understood that the last time Congress declared war was during World War II. Since then, Congress has been unable to prevent our Presidents from committing U.S. forces to combat without a formal declaration of war to include Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and DESERT STORM. Furthermore, in the case of Kosovo, President Clinton appeared to have used all of his diplomatic options in order to gain the support of the people. Evidently, as a last resort, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright convinced him to send his Balkan envoy, Richard C. Holbrooke, to Belgrade one last time before committing our military forces. At the same time, President Clinton worked hard for several months to gain the support of our NATO allies for the bombings if and

when the Balkan peace attempt failed.

However, there are also indications that President Clinton wanted to use force as early as the previous winter, not as a last resort. Apparently, representatives from several NATO countries as well as those within his own administration who wanted one more political effort at settling the crisis forestalled this action.

Was President Clinton wrong when he wanted to use force? Does military force have to be used as a last resort? According to Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Leonhard, our last-resort tradition was an expression of our desire to avoid total war.³ In today's environment, policy-makers should consider the military instrument of power a full-time component to our strategy, possibly combined with the other elements to resolve all levels of crisis. I believe that in cases where our survival or vital interests are at stake (as defined by Neuchterlein), we may not have the time to exercise all of our instruments of power before the use of military force. Furthermore, the simultaneous application of all our instruments of power may be exactly what is necessary to deal with a crisis, where the danger is imminent and the enemy clearly does not want a peaceful resolution to the conflict (as in our post-September 11th actions). We must sometimes be willing to use military force when the enemy refuses to compromise, even if it is not the last resort.

I recognize the enduring qualities of Carl von Clausewitz's trinity of war consisting of the government, the military, and the people. The government provides the political aim; the military, the means to achieve the political aim; and the people provide the national will. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the support of the populace is sometimes very difficult to determine and in the end leaders must do what they believe is right. They must convince the citizenry

that military force is sometimes the correct instrument of policy. One should always attempt to garner the support of the public but leaders sometimes do not have the luxury of determining whether they will attain unambiguous public support before committing military forces. In this sense, I believe President Clinton's bombing of Serbia to have been quite bold simply because of its political risk. According to Max Boot, the recent crisis in Kosovo may be "*a new chapter in the history of American foreign policy*."⁴ He believes that our actions in Kosovo are a clear act of charity and highlight our altruism at its best. Arguably, we are willing to risk our national prestige and the lives of our soldiers even though our national interests are not seriously at threat. This begs the question of how morality influences our decision to commit military forces?

According to U.S. Catholic bishops, governments threatened by armed, unjust aggression must defend their people. In their eyes, proper defense would include military force if all attempts at peaceful resolution have failed, the cause is just, and use of military force is only as a last resort. Additionally, the situation must meet the following criteria:

- ❑ A competent authority must declare war.
- ❑ A nation should use only the minimal amount of force to achieve objectives.
- ❑ One's intent must be peace and reconciliation.
- ❑ There must be some probability of success.
- ❑ Damage caused by conflict must be proportionate to the good expected from waging war.

The United States Government, however, has not always been persuaded by the moralist argument to protect the innocent and the helpless with military force. For example, Washington chose not to commit U.S. military forces to Bangladesh in 1971 to prevent the genocide of

more than one million Bengalis. The same held true for the estimated 1.5 million Cambodians slaughtered in that country from 1975 to 1979. Finally, The United States troops did not respond to the extermination of some 800,000 Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. The Clinton Administration nevertheless appeared to use the moralist argument to wage war against the Serbs. Although we have not been consistent, our religious values do have some influence in our determination of what is and is not a **just war**. Finally, how valid is the Weinberger Doctrine today and what should be our standing criteria for a **just war**?

Validity of the Weinberger Doctrine

I believe all six of the criteria from the Weinberger Doctrine remain valid today, but there are other criteria, such as the moralist argument, that we should consider. Moreover, we cannot view them as a simple checklist in which all the steps must be met before the United States would consider the use of military force. In other words, the Weinberger Doctrine is a useful guide for determining the rightful use of U. S. military power, but dogmatic application of the rules may cause our foreign policy to be impotent. At every turn, someone could argue that policy-makers ignored a rule. As shown, leaders may not always have the time to determine whether unambiguous public support is attainable before committing our country's armed forces to a conflict. Moreover, situations may even require the use of force, not as a last resort, but early on in a crisis or as a complement to other instruments of power.

In the end, leaders must do what they believe is right and convince the people that military force is sometimes the correct instrument of policy. Furthermore, it is not enough to simply state that the United States should only commit forces when its vital interests are at stake; rather,

one must offer some methodology to determine what our national interests are and when they are at risk. As shown above, correctly differentiating the levels of intensity ranging from peripheral to survival can provide policy-makers with a clear choice when deciding what national interest is at stake during a crisis.

In addition, our religious values do have some influence in our determination of just war. We have no authoritative doctrine for a just war in the military and we have not **always** defended the innocent and the helpless. Nevertheless, we are still moved by the need to protect the innocent from unjust attack, to restore rights wrongfully denied, or to reestablish a just order. Arguably, our recent involvement in Kosovo is the ideal case for supplementing the Weinberger Doctrine with the moralist just-war criteria listed above. Therefore, the criteria outlined by the Catholic bishops and other moralists must be well understood by our decision-makers, and they should consider it before committing U.S. forces. Finally, we must also anticipate greater participation in future con-

flict from our allies as well as national and international nongovernmental organizations. This would require our cooperation with organizations such as NATO, the Red Cross, and Doctors Without Borders. As in the case of Kosovo, our leaders will have to work long and hard to win the hearts and minds of not only the populace but also of our allies and the rest of the international community. As a leader of the free world, we—unlike any other nation before—must extend Clausewitz's trinity of war and convince the rest of the world (not just ourselves) that just wars are morally and politically justified.

Conclusion

In summary, the serious nature of war and our moral obligation to wage just wars demands the most weighty and significant reasons for committing military forces. Therefore, the application of standing criteria (a hybrid of the Weinberger Doctrine and the moralist positions), with a methodology to differentiate the levels of intensity, will assist our decision-makers. Ranging from peripheral to survival interests, it will help them to correctly

apply our military instrument of power in times of crises.



Endnotes

1. Powell, Colin, with Joseph E. Perisico., **My American Journey** (NY: Random House, 1995), page 434.
2. Nuechterlein, Donald E., **America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Restructured World** (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1991), pages 17-18.
3. Leonhard, Robert R., **The Principles of War for the Information Age** (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998), pages 223-224.
4. Boot, Max, "When War is an Act of Charity," **The Wall Street Journal**, 25 March 1999, page A-22.

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Nato, U.N. Forces working together.

U.N. convoy with U.S. Forces.



Conventional Approaches to Unconventional Problems:

Analyzing Terrorism

by Chief Warrant Officer Three
Del Erin Stewart

Considering the implications of the 11 September 2001 attack on the United States, many changes must occur in how the U.S. Army conducts its counterterrorist operations. New methodologies and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) must emerge if the Army is to address this new threat. Based on experience, the following methodology is one possible interim fix.

The theory is simple: if you know your enemy's capabilities, vulnerabilities, methods, and thought processes, you are more likely to successfully predict when, where, and how he will attack and be able to plan countermeasures. While we used the following methodology experimentally at an analytical cell at a numbered Army level, the tools and techniques discussed below may be useful for other echelons.

When predicting traditional or conventional military threats, the U.S. Army employs analytical methodologies such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and related tools. The terrorist threat, however, is unique in that its nature and survival require it avoid direct engagements with main force units. Terrorists are exceedingly mobile, have mastered the art of blending into the surrounding population, and employ harsh measures to ensure security.

On the other hand, our national collection assets provide so much diverse information that making sense of it all is a daunting task. Reports on terrorist activity originate from all intelligence disciplines, to

include open source. The information that surfaces is usually of limited scope, fragmented, and can address anything from financial issues to those focused on training or operations. Currently approved doctrinal symbols do not reflect terrorist operations types of data, nor is there generally a doctrinal method for graphically portraying such activities. The question is, then, how can an analyst take the disparate, seemingly unrelated data points, and move forward toward accurate predictive analysis? One thing is certain: the effort will involve all intelligence disciplines.

We rethought and revisited these methodologies because the commander was very unhappy with detailed, multicolored charted and graphed after-the-fact analysis; he wanted reasonably accurate predictions to help in his decision-making

process for recommending countermeasures. First, it is useful to look at existing tools and methodologies for analysis, then additional areas of focus, and recommending countermeasures.

Existing Analytical Methodologies Applied Against Terrorist Operations

The following analytical tool descriptions and examples are from **FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, Section VI, Counter-Human Intelligence Analysis, to Appendix A, Counter-Human Intelligence Techniques and Procedures**. We modified the wording slightly for ease of use in this forum. This section discusses a chronological record and three analytical techniques.

Time-Event Charting. The time-event chart shown in Figure 1 is a chronological record of individual or




Figure 1. Sample Time Event Chart.




Figure 2. Sample Association Matrix.

group activities designed to store and display large amounts of information in as little space as possible. This tool is easy to prepare, understand, and use. Symbols used in time-event charting are very simple. Analysts use triangles to show the beginning and end of the chart and to show shifts in methods of operation or changes in ideology. Rectangles or diamonds indicate significant events or activities.

Analysts can highlight particularly noteworthy or important events by drawing an "X" through the event symbol (rectangle or diamond). Each of these symbols contains a chronological number (event number), date (day, month, and year of event), and may contain a file reference number. The incident description is a very brief explanation of the incident, and may include the team size, type of incident or activity, place and method of operation, and duration of incident. Arrows indicate time flow.

Analysts also use a variety of symbols, such as parallelograms, pentagons, and others, to depict different types of events and activities. Using these symbols and brief descriptions, an analyst can analyze the group's activities, transitions, trends, and operational patterns. Time-event charts are

excellent briefing aids as well as flexible analytical tools.

Association Matrix. The association matrix delineates the existence of relationships between individuals. The part of the problem deserving the most analytical effort is the group itself. Analysts examine the group's elements (members) and their relationships with other members, other

groups and associated entities, and related events. Analysts can show the connections between critical players in any event or activity in an association matrix (see Figure 2), which shows associations within a group or similar activity, and is based on the assumption that people involved in a collective activity know one another.

The construction of this type of matrix is in the form of a right triangle, and analysts list personalities in exactly the same order along both the rows and columns to ensure that all possible associations appear correctly. The purpose of the personality matrix is to show who knows whom. Analysts determine a known association by "direct contact" between individuals; a number of factors determine direct contact, including face-to-face meetings, confirmed telephonic conversation between known parties, and all the members of a particular organizational cell.

Analysts indicate a known association between individuals on the




Figure 3. Sample Activities Matrix.




Figure 4. Sample Link Diagram.

matrix by a dot or filled-in circle. They consider suspected or “weak” associations between persons of interest to be associations that are possible or even probable, but they cannot confirm it using the above criteria. When a person of interest dies, a diamond next to his or her name on the matrix relays that fact.

Activities Matrix. The activities matrix helps to determine connectivity between individuals and any organization, event, entity, address, activity, or anything other than persons. Unlike the association matrix, the construction of the activity matrix is in the form of a square or a rectangle (see Figure 3). The analyst can tailor rows or columns to fit the needs of the situation at hand or add them later as the situation develops. The analyst determines the number of rows and columns by the needs of the problem and by the amount of information available.

Analysts normally construct this matrix with personalities arranged in a vertical listing on the left side of the matrix and activities, organizations, events, addresses, or any other common denominators arranged along the bottom of the matrix. This matrix can store an incredible amount of information about a particular organization or group, and can expand on the information developed in the association matrix.

Link Diagram. The third analytical technique is link diagramming. Analysts use this technique to depict the more complex linkages between a large number of entities, and can include persons, organizations, or almost anything else. Analysts use link analysis in a variety of complex investigative efforts including criminal and terrorist investigations, analysis, and even medical research. Several regional law enforcement

training centers are currently teaching this method as a technique in combating organized crime. The particular method discussed here is an adaptation especially useful in counterintelligence (CI) investigative analysis in general and terrorism analysis in particular.

In link analysis, a number of different symbols identify various items. Analysts can easily and clearly display obstacles, indirect routes or connections, and suspected connections. In many cases, the viewer can work with and understand the picture more easily than the matrix. Link analysis can present information in a manner that ensures clarity.

As with construction of association matrices, analysts should follow certain rules of graphics, symbology, and construction. Standardization is critical to ensure that everyone constructing, using, or reading a link diagram understands exactly what the diagram depicts. The standard rules follow:

- Show persons as open circles with the name written inside the circle.
- Show person known by more than one name (alias, also known as [AKA]) as overlapping circles with names in each circle.
- Show deceased persons with a diamond next to the circle that represents that person.
- Show nonpersonal entities (organizations, governments, events, locations) by squares or rectangles.
- Show linkages or associations by lines: solid for confirmed and dotted for suspected.
- Show each person or other entity only once in a link diagram.

Complementary Methodology Developed

The approach used to meet the commander's intent for predictive

analysis was to use traditional IPB-style graphic overlays, but then modify this methodology to specifically monitor the actions of a terrorist group and its associated elements. The use of overlays on training, organizations, finances, and warnings can be effective.

Training. The first overlay (Training) may contain all the available information on training camps and locations, by country, which this organization and its associated elements reportedly use. This data will primarily come from imagery intelligence (IMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT). There is utility in knowing what topics specific camps train, and recognizing changes in what they are teaching or training. As an example, if a camp that traditionally worked on the use of RPGs (Soviet antitank grenade launchers) and small arms suddenly changes to one of hostage taking, analysts would note this radical change as a possible alteration in organizational objectives. Certainly it would be a key indicator.

Organizations. The second overlay (Organizations) may contain all of the available information on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and subordinate or related elements (e.g., branch offices of the same organization, but in a different country). That overlay depicts known and suspected relationships between NGOs (especially those that were essentially front organizations) and the terrorist groups. As appropriate, analysts can include other organizations. Information allowing completion of this overlay will mainly come from reports issued by HUMINT, CI, and SIGINT sources. Knowing what surrogates are available is essential to understanding the extent of the potential threat. For example, a legitimate mining operation may have second- or third-hand ties to a terrorist group, which could mean that industrial-grade explosives might be

available for the group to use in future attacks.

Note: A crucial consideration in evaluating this data is to ensure compliance with intelligence oversight requirements, and not store or depict any data that violates **AR 381-10, U.S. Army Intelligence Activities**, Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, and related regulatory requirements.

Finances. The third overlay (Finances) depicts information available on finances, business transactions, assets, and related issues. Nearly everything costs money and, as the maxim states, “follow the money.” The money trail leads through organizations to people and equipment, which in turn helps provide an understanding of the terrorist’s objectives and capabilities. Of particular importance are reports pertaining to the transfer of funds for training, either directly or via NGO surrogates. Again, this will come mostly from HUMINT and SIGINT sources as well as foreign and domestic law enforcement agencies and other interagency reporting.

Personalities. The fourth overlay (Personalities) depicts the current location of essential personnel within the terrorist organizations. These reports will at least include SIGINT, HUMINT, and some measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) and IMINT (e.g., a photograph or a sensor confirmed that a vehicle was at a particular site at a specific time). When looking at the movement of individuals, analysts should ask “Why?” All movement is risky; someone can blow a person’s cover and interdict vehicles, so why is he taking this risk? Such risktaking can be an indicator in itself, while answering the question of “why?” may lead to other issues and concerns.

Warnings. The fifth overlay (Warnings) shows where (by country) national agencies issued warnings and advisories, where previous attacks occurred (if the security posture al-

lowed one attack to occur, will others follow?) and where authorities thwarted attacks because the adversaries clearly intended something. These interdictions could include confiscation of arms shipments. The warning reports originate from all intelligence disciplines and may include law enforcement and other interagency information.

Convergence. Analysts may create additional overlays as needed. Because there are no doctrinal symbols for most of these overlays, analysts will have to create their own symbols, and post a legend to define them. Flexibility is paramount to success. Similar to chess masters, analysts look for convergent lines to indicate the possibility of attack. Despite the adversary’s ability to project into areas where they have not previously conducted an attack, normally there are indicators graphically depicted in two or more areas, (for example, to show movement of important personalities, supplies, and funds).

The current doctrinal analytical tools discussed above work well to explain how something happened. The critical point, however, is to go beyond the stage of describing history to the essential point of predicting when, where, and how the adversaries will strike next. Getting there requires personal skill, time, experience, and dedication. Additionally, it will require analysts possessing access to all levels of reporting and analysts from different disciplines who focus exclusively on this form of analysis.

Other Considerations

Open-Source Data. Regarding open-source reporting, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Cable News Network (CNN) provide some of the most readily accessible and timely reporting in the world. Terrorists have been using propaganda, media manipulation, and other similar aspects of information

operations for a long time, as the requirement to gain popular support is crucial to their success. Terrorist organizations need to “get the word out” to legitimize their operations, actions, and positions. The trained, experienced analyst can exploit this fact. For example, if a respected terrorist leader were to say something like, *“In the course of jihad, many innocents may have to be sacrificed for the greater good of the will of Allah.”* That could portend an attack where mass casualties might occur, and it might also mean that the attack might occur in an area where Islam is a dominant religion.

An experienced analyst will consider numerous aspects including—

- ☐ Timing of the pronouncement. (Is it a significant date, by either the solar or lunar calendars?)
- ☐ Location. (Is this a culturally or religiously significant site that issued the pronouncement?)
- ☐ Important personalities who were present (which may indicate support for the pronouncement, an end to differences between the groups, etc.).
- ☐ Other factors.

There may be other similar cues in other public pronouncements, some of them web-based instead of traditional newspaper and radio media. Just tracking the public pronouncements and postings, looking at them in detail, cross-referencing the announcements with other data, and so forth, is a full-time job—which means dedicating analysts to monitor these sites. There is a difference between the “normal” rhetoric and something that, in symbolic context, is genuinely a potential indicator. Again, deciphering these cues requires analysts who have the requisite experience and training, so that the terrorism analysis section does not begin to suffer from the “chicken little” syndrome in the eyes of the senior intelligence officer and the commander.

Visual Cues. Graphic aids are nothing more than visual cues to check the report details, develop requests for further information, and study the matter in greater detail. No system or software can begin to deal with these complex issues. The group synergy and crosstalk derived from experts in different disciplines looking at the same data is what makes or breaks this effort. Additionally, having “broken the code” on what the adversary might be planning is, in itself, insufficient; the analyst must pass data to the affected elements. Normally, at the commander and senior intelligence officer levels, this transmission will be via secure videoteleconference or similar methods. Behind the scenes, analysts often highlight a specific set of messages for one another in daily secure E-mail crosstalk. Because the amount of reporting is so great, each echelon has its own set of filters for sorting through the messages. When dealing with more than one thousand messages a day, it is easy for someone to leave out or overlook something inadvertently. Cooperation is fundamental to success.

Because the level of detail required involves individuals, and may include single individuals to squad-sized elements (as employed in the 11 September 2001 attacks), there is absolutely no utility in developing traditional decision-support templates or similar tools. However, depending on circumstances, location, echelon, and other considerations, there may be utility in devising specific activity-based templates for depicting possible courses of action, etc. Being in the loop for the daily data feed exceeding one thousand messages a day is an all-consuming business. In my experience, the graphics aid was an effective cue for conducting deeper analysis for converging lines.

When using the IPB-style graphics overlays, not only can this be a successful methodology, it also has

the additional advantage of serving as a briefing aid. Words alone, and reams of reports alone, can be confusing. Today’s senior intelligence officers are accustomed to acquiring data in visual icon form. The methodology described herein lent itself to transitioning instantly from conducting analysis to briefing that analysis in a manner in which the G2 was accustomed.

Countermeasures

The final step is recommending countermeasures. It is easy to develop a siege mentality, such as that which existed throughout U.S. Army elements stationed in the Middle East after the bombings of the Office of the Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard (Riyadh) in 1995, and the Khobar Towers (Dhahran in 1996) in Saudi Arabia. However, when everything is always on “high alert,” it defeats the purpose of the heightened alert status. Instead of temporarily raising defense levels, the defense level remained at threat condition (THREATCON) Delta (now called force protection condition or FPCON) for a prolonged period.

Such a prolonged state of high alert had at the minimum the following effects:

- ☐ Left open the potential for complacency.
- ☐ Created a state where a new (stable) pattern nullified the intent of thwarting hostile surveillance efforts.
- ☐ Negatively impacted the local economy.

Consider the fact that when U.S. forces no longer engage in or stimulate a local economy, the merchants (and their families, associates, etc.) have no further economic incentive to having U.S. forces present. What may then develop is a general attitude that is at best ambivalent towards U.S. forces; for if there is no perceived benefit for the presence of

U.S. forces, then it is a short move towards resentment of the U.S. presence. Once popular sentiment opposes the presence of U.S. forces, it is difficult to regain good will. From an intelligence perspective, it is useful to keep these economic considerations in mind when evaluating the threat, the enemy's ability to blend in with the local populace (will they be reported for suspicious activity), and related factors.

The fear that "something might happen" was so great in the Middle East after the 1996 Khobar Towers attack that Army intelligence and CI elements sometimes found it difficult to leave the compound and perform their missions. In fact, at least one G2 proposed taking all of his intelligence collectors and agents and in-

corporating them into the analysis cell! Analysts, however, will have nothing to analyze if the collectors do not collect. To be effective, intelligence and CI assets need to leave the compounds, and commanders must provide them with the necessary freedom of movement as prescribed in **AR 381-20, U.S. Army Counterintelligence**. Risk management must not become risk avoidance. Defensive postures and countermeasures must change appropriate to the threat.

Final Thoughts

The options and techniques detailed above are not radical. Our fundamental analytical methodologies are adequate to deal with this unconventional threat, with only minor adjustments; if we grant ourselves

some flexibility, current doctrine will suffice. The critical principle of translating intelligence into viable options and recommendations for the commander to evaluate and implement remains unchanged.



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— Osama Bin Laden.



Engagement area in Afghanistan.



— U.S. Special Forces boarding a C-130 to the engagement area.

Cities in Chaos: An Intelligence Challenge

by Major Paul A. Shelton, USMC

Beirut, Mogadishu, Sarajevo, Medellin, and Monrovia are cities that draw our attention by their names alone. The addition of a country name is unnecessary. At times, these cities in chaos have imploded, ceasing to function as the highly organized urban centers they once were, and descended into a bizarre world of factional violence and warlords. In the recent past, the United States has repeatedly called the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) into action in these highly uncertain environments, and the future certainly holds additional similar challenges as the world urbanizes. The USMC has recognized the growing requirements for operations in an urban environment and has undertaken considerable experimentation to prepare for the urbanized littoral of the near future. This article presents lessons learned regarding intelligence operations in Monrovia, Liberia, during my two-month assignment as the Assistant Intelligence Officer for the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Special Operations Capable).

Commencing Intelligence Operations

The starting point for intelligence operations in a city in chaos is that no one—neither the theater joint intelligence center (JIC) nor the desk officers at the various national intelligence agencies—can tell you what is going on in “your” city. The population density and number of fighters and factions in a contested major city are simply too high to permit accurate situational awareness from afar. Our nation’s highly developed technical collection capabilities fo-

cus on detecting observable activity and high-level communications. These indicator sets are completely absent in the typical city in chaos. The tactical intelligence officer (S2) on the scene is largely on his or her own to determine and “develop” the tactical situation in the city. While this task is daunting, both nontraditional and traditional resources offer great potential if properly exploited.

Initial coordination can provide valuable knowledge of the situation from a number of people in the city. If you are lucky enough to be working in a city with a functioning United States Embassy, start with the various experts there. They are the Defense Attaché Officer (DAO), the Chief of Station (COS), and the Regional Security Officer (RSO). Meet with

these individuals as soon as possible, and **listen** to them. Establish ground rules early to prevent turf battles and the subsequent souring of these critical relationships. I recommend informing these three officers that they will receive a copy of all products generated by the S2 and offering them the opportunity to review any crucial outbound message traffic before transmission. This allays their concerns regarding potentially erroneous reporting by the new arrival and allows the S2 to receive the benefit of their experience in the area.

Collection

Information collection in a city in chaos is a highly challenging situation. The S2 must aggressively pur-



Guinean T-55 of the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force passing in front of the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia. The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) cooperated with the ECOMOG first sent to Liberia as a peacekeeping force in 1990. (May 1996)

Photos courtesy of MAJ P. A. Shelton, USMC.



The author on the roof of the U.S. Embassy. From this position we fused listening to the sounds of the fighting with SIGINT in our initial effort to associate signals with specific parts of the city and factions. (April 1996)

sue all the numerous unconventional sources of intelligence as well as the more common ones.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT).

This is the best intelligence source in the city. Tactical units ashore will probably not have the time, resources, or freedom of movement to develop high-level sources. They should rely on the established in-country agencies to provide this reporting and should focus on the numerous targets of opportunity including evacuees, refugees, expatriates who were in business (most of whom have extensive contacts), journalists, relief workers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). All of these individuals have insight and move around the city in the course of their daily business.

Casual debriefing, generally pleasant with frequent conversation, is the best way to collect information from these sources. A smiling face, a liter of bottled water, and genuine interest will yield extensive information. Maps and photographs will help enable these sources to be specific in their reporting as they respond to questions

such as "Which intersection?" "What house?" and "What bridge?" As the intelligence personnel establish relationships with these people, the S2 will establish a net of observers located throughout the city. If the telephone system is still functional (and it frequently is), the S2 should develop an overlay showing the locations of these sources and their telephone numbers. A quick phone call to the trusted source that lives in a high-rise building in a conflictive neighborhood will yield more information than a hundred E-mail messages to Washington, D.C. Making and maintaining many friends is critical to this effort.

Everyone who leaves the compound should periodically undergo regular debriefing. Detecting changes in the city's rhythm through its traffic and pedestrian patterns, the mood of the populace, and the number of men in the marketplace should be the focus of these debriefings.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).

While SIGINT is a source of great potential, this is a fundamentally different environment from the classical

high-intensity combat scenario. The most rewarding signals in a city are typically from low-power handheld radios and cellular telephones in use by combatants and the functioning public services. Surprisingly, fire and ambulance services continue to operate in extreme conditions, and aid agencies frequently establish communications nets to coordinate their activities. Collection in an urban environment requires 24-hour access to these low-power signals, and SIGINT personnel are a critical element of the force ashore. The volume of traffic and the necessity of immediate tactical analysis make this a particularly intensive and tiring task. There must be immediate dissemination procedures in place to permit rapid warning to the force, a topic addressed in detail below.

Open-Source Information. Commercial or factional radio broadcasts are a highly important source of information, and the S2 must quickly identify which faction controls each radio station, and monitor them at all times. The factions and dissident groups use these stations to keep their supporters informed, and we can acquire a great deal of information from them. Of course, it is only prudent to exercise great caution in accepting radio reports. The intelligence officer should treat them as just another source of information, a source to fuse with data from others. The careful analyst will note how often he receives HUMINT reports that are nothing more than repetition of broadcast radio reports—classic circular reporting.

Be Aware. Hard work is necessary to detect critical indicators that establish normal levels of activity. An essential element of this program is regular personal reconnaissance by the S2. To the maximum extent consistent within the force protection posture, the S2 and essential analysts must move around the city daily to gain familiarity with the ground and the city's tempo. Once the S2 attains familiarity, he should escort the various

unit commanders around the city, highlighting the indicators of “normalcy,” and the various factional enclaves and friction points in the city.

Everyone Can Help. The greatest collector in the organization is the individual Marine standing his post. Encourage all personnel to establish the norms of activity in their vicinities and to report anything out of the ordinary. For example, the fact that the women did not make their usual dawn journey to the well across the street could be a critical indicator of impending combat operations. Our snipers and reconnaissance Marines excelled at this task, as one would expect of trained observers. By careful observation, one can identify individuals and specific vehicles of interest. The S2 can then consult the network of friends to develop a cross-index of names, faces, and associated vehicles. Fusing this information with SIGINT to identify specific leaders operating near the U.S. force is the next step. Indications of surveillance activity against U.S. forces constitute an immediate reporting requirement for all observers. Maintenance of detailed observation logs at all observation posts (OPs) will yield trend data for analysis and ensures high standards of vigilance.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). The most useful imagery product in an urban environment is a large format, hard-copy print of the entire city. The S2 shop and the subordinate commanders’ command posts are ill equipped without these prints—they should be on prominent display and form the basis of reference for operations in the city. One can overlay a grid system on the photos that match the projection of the maps in use, if gridded reference products are not available. A further refinement is to establish a standardized numbering system to label all structures in contested areas. This is a critical aspect of establishing effective reporting procedures from OPs. Each OP must have diagrams listing the

reference number for each building and overhead imagery to enable the observer to know what is on the other side of adjacent buildings out of his sight.

Analysis

I have described some of the sources of information available in the city. The volume of reporting generated by an active collection effort is immense. A successful effort will yield a mosaic-like portrayal of the city with significant gaps in the picture. Sifting through the reports and assembling a coherent understanding of the situation in the city is a daunting task requiring the focused effort of the best minds in the S2 element. The first place to start preparing for this challenge is the library. Analysts must fully absorb cultural information, an area in which the intelligence community rarely excels. Consult popular literature, periodicals, social histories, travelogues, and even fiction to develop at least a partial understanding of the culture within which the force is operating. The next step is a thorough study of the origin of the situation at hand and the historical precedents for operations in the city in question. One can be sure that the various factions operating in the area have done their homework and understand what has happened in the city in the past. Our analyst is playing catch-up and must turn to the task with great intensity.

The focus of our analytical effort must be to provide predictive intelligence to the supported force and its commander. The goal is to prevent surprise and promote situational awareness. Simply put, analytical duties are extremely important and we should not frequently rotate analysts in and out of the city. They should be completely immersed and remain committed to the operation until its conclusion or the end of their long-term rotations. Short-term rotation of analytical personnel will result in unacceptable situational awareness and an increased poten-

tial for missing essential indicators. Finally, do not forget the force multipliers available in the various offices of the embassy. Consult with the available experts and learn from their experiences in the city.

Dissemination: Dissemination must reach down to the individual level. The S2 should issue updates in written form twice daily, preferably on a schedule that will support regular updates by subordinate commanders as part of their daily routines. The force must establish procedures for the rapid dissemination of time-sensitive information. SIGINT indicators of impending threats will frequently occur within minutes of the event; the intelligence element must broadcast warnings immediately to all posts for appropriate action. Detailed information regarding the source of the report is unnecessary, and the S2 must aggressively employ report sanitization.

Conclusion

In conclusion, operating in cities in chaos presents unique challenges for the intelligence officer. Aggressive exploitation of nontraditional sources of information, cultural awareness, careful cultivation of friendships and relationships, full coordination with in-country experts, and extensive dissemination to the lowest levels are the formula for success. Do not expect anyone at the theater Joint Intelligence Center or in Washington, D.C., to tell you what is going on three blocks away. Getting that information is the S2’s job.



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The Commercial Satellite Multispectral Imagery (MSI) Threat

by Chief Warrant Officer Four
Thomas J. Quedensley,
NE ARNG

At one time, the primary imagery intelligence (IMINT) threat to the United States was from the former Soviet Union. Now, through the proliferation of space-based, multispectral imaging systems for profit, nations and organizations that previously lacked access to these imagery products can use them.

The most important thing to remember is that any nation, organization, or individual with the means to pay for the imagery may now acquire it.

The commercial space imagery market has developed high-resolution imaging technology that has both civilian and military applications. This technology has made it largely unnecessary for many potential adversaries to have their own imaging capabilities. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has published a list of operational and intelligence functions that commercial MSI systems can support. The Agency's involvement in military exercises has demonstrated the utility of MSI and helped define the requirements for multispectral data. DIA applications supported by MSI include broad-area search, contingency planning, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, current operations, disaster relief, environmental monitoring, hydrography, targeting, treaty monitoring, mapping, charting, and resource monitoring.

During the past decade, the U.S. military has acquired commercial satellite imagery to supplement national technical means. This

combination has helped place the most current, accurate, and comprehensive knowledge of terrain and infrastructure quickly into the hands of mission planners. The U.S. military successfully employed commercial imagery during the Gulf War, and support missions in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. MSI is generally timelier than other commercial systems, may be the only information available in the early stages of a crisis or emergency, and it is often the fastest way to assess post-conflict damage and plan for reconstruction.

The most important thing to remember is that any nation, organization, or individual with the means to pay for the imagery may now acquire it. For a relatively small investment, a somewhat unsophisticated organization can develop a workable and useful imagery analysis capability without establishing an expensive and complicated infrastructure. This capability will only improve as costs decrease and hardware and software improve. "*Space imagery is going to be part of the intelligence trade for the other 190 countries that haven't had access to it,*" says John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, D.C.¹

MSI System Review

MSI's analytical potential results from the sensor's ability to measure both the visible and non-visible wavelengths of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, and it frequently reveals more about an object than analyzing an image in only one wavelength band can. Remote-sensing satellites often carry one or more imaging sensors on-board, each providing data with unique characteristics and applications:

- ❑ Multispectral scanners (MSSs) sense energy in several narrow spectral bands simultaneously. These bands range from the ultraviolet to the infrared portion of the EM spectrum.
- ❑ The Thematic Mapper (TM) is an advanced MSS designed to achieve higher image resolution, sharper spectral separation, and greater radiometric accuracy in comparison to MSS. Thermal scanners sense only the thermal portion of the spectrum.
- ❑ Panchromatic or "PAN" imagery provides an image in the visible portion of the spectrum. This imagery essentially provides a high-resolution, black-and-white image of the targeted facility or area.
- ❑ Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) uses its own emitted energy to record characteristics of the terrain. Because atmosphere and weather have little effect on these radar systems, SAR imagery provides day-or-night and all-weather imaging capabilities.

Unlike traditional photographic cameras, MSSs record data in a digital format that we can store, manipulate, enhance, and print out on film. The resulting imagery products can support a variety of imaging applications:

- ❑ Image analysis is helpful for target area studies, broad-area search, or other applications requiring wide-area enhanced imagery. Different band configurations can enhance various terrain features. Users can "geo-reference" these images to a specific mapping projection to provide current mapping data where either no maps or outdated maps are available.
- ❑ Change detection is a spectral analysis technique that compares two reference images and

highlights the changes or lack of change between them.

- ❑ Perspective view imaging is a three-dimensional image simulating the view of a given point from a specified position, altitude, and direction.
- ❑ A mosaic image uses two or more adjacent MSI images, providing contiguous coverage of a specific area of interest.
- ❑ Terrain-categorized (TERCAT) imagery is a color-coded image in which the pixels represent various spectral groups such as forest, agriculture, water, and urban areas. The resulting image is useful in determining terrain categories and analyzing the area for trafficability.

Commercial MSI is available from a variety of space-based sensors. (See Figure 1.)

Capabilities

Most commercial imaging satellites share common orbital characteristics, including near-polar and sun-synchronous orbits. Sun-synchronous orbits take advantage of the early morning skies, which are generally clearer than those later in the day, and provide repeatable sun illumination. With each orbit, the

satellite progresses westward, tracking the sun's progress. Therefore, the satellite crosses the equator at approximately the same local time, with slightly later crossings in the northern latitudes and slightly earlier crossings in the southern latitudes. The French SPOT (System Probatoire d'Observation de La Terre) 2, for example, descends across the equator at 10:30 A.M. local time, while the U.S. Landsat 5 crosses the equator at 9:45 A.M. local time.

Landsat 7 orbits the earth every 98 minutes, and it requires 16 days for its orbital pattern to progress westward to repeat, or revisit, a point of coverage. This revisit capability is important in two respects—it increases the potential frequency of coverage of areas where cloud cover is a problem and provides an opportunity for viewing certain areas on successive days. The development of sensors that operators can point enables off-nadir viewing during the satellite passes. The French SPOT 2 has a 103-minute orbital pattern that revisits a given location every 26 days. The off-nadir revisit time, using its pointable scanner, is just 3 days.

Combinations of collection systems with different resolutions can produce a more useful product. For example, the current Landsat 7 TM system has 30-meter resolution and is suitable for an image map at a scale of 1:100,000. If one merged the same data with the French SPOT PAN image with 10-meter resolution, the resulting product could serve as a 1:25,000 image map. Today, commercial satellite imagery can accurately map more than 90 percent of the world, with a ground resolution of 10 meters or less.

The MSI Market

The commercial imagery market is likely to continue to grow as additional countries and private companies enter the arena. According to officials of the companies developing the next generation of MSI systems, the biggest near-term market will not be urban planners and scientists but defense ministries. Company officials view the defense market as one way of making their investments pay. The purchase of increasing amounts of commercial data by defense and intelligence groups "*is a given*," according to the Director of The North American Remote-Sensing Industries Association.²

Generally, imagery products are available for sale by arrangements between satellite imaging providers and companies which establish ground stations for the receipt of raw data. These companies (domestic and foreign) pay for the exclusive rights to process and sell the data in their respective regions. A client purchase of imaging services normally covers a specific number of images for an area. All other images obtained are then available for distribution by the company to any buyer.

Any state can negotiate a "sensed-state provision," giving them the right to request and receive the raw data of images at a reasonable fee to pre-

Satellite	Spatial Owner/Operator	Resolution
CBERS	Brazilian/Chinese Governments	20-160 meters
RADARSAT	Canadian Government	8-30 meters
ERS-1/2	European Space Agency (ESA)	30 meters
IKONOS	Space Imaging, U.S. Commercial	1-4 meters
IRS-1C	Indian Government	10 meters
EROS-1	Israeli Government	1.8 meters
JERS SAR	Japanese Government	18 meters
SPOT-1/2	French Commercial	10-20 meters
Almaz-2	Russian Government	5 meters
Resurs-02	Russian Government	27 meters
SPIN-2	Russian Government	2 meters
Landsat 5-TM	U.S. Government	30-120 meters
Landsat 7	U.S. Government	15-60 meters
OrbView-2	Orbital Image, U.S. Commercial	1 km

Figure 1. Some Government-Sponsored and Commerical Remote-Sensing Satellites.

clude others from buying them. As Gilbert Rye, President of Orbimage Sciences Corporation, explains, "... if a regional partner has areas it considers sensitive and prefers not to have imagery of those areas widely disseminated, we're willing to enter into that kind of arrangement."³

In 1994, the Clinton Administration, fearful of foreign economic competition, decided that private companies could build and launch satellites with high-resolution sensors previously available only to the intelligence community. These companies could then provide the resulting imagery on the global market. Several satellite imaging firms began developing satellites with 1-meter or better resolution. Recently, Space Imaging, Inc., has successfully launched its IKONOS satellite capable of 1-meter resolution PAN images.

Other countries are also entering the high-resolution marketplace. Russia is already selling 2-meter-resolution images from former military satellites, and France, Israel, and Japan plan to market high-resolution imagery. By 2003, 14 satellites capable of producing 1-meter resolution images should be operational (see Figure 2).

Assessment of IMINT Risks

Foreign intelligence agencies are among the largest buyers of high-resolution images. "*International security issues are serious*," according to Ray Williamson, a senior researcher at the George Washington University Space Policy Institute. "*Iraq would be interested in information about Saudi Arabia. Iran would like to see data about Israel. India and Pakistan would like to have information about each other.*"⁴ If a nation had concerns about troop buildup on its border, it could put in a standing order for the satellite to take pictures every time it passed over the border.

During future conflicts, this greater access could lessen the information

Operator	Number of Satellites Launched and Planned				
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Space Imaging (U.S.)		1			
EarthWatch (U.S.)		2			
OrbView (U.S.)			1	1	
West Indian Space (U.S.-Israel)		1	1	3	1
Russia			1		
India					1
South Korea					1

Figure 2. Potential Commerical Satellites with One-Meter Resolution by 2003.

advantage the United States now has over other countries. The U.S. military envisions a much smaller force on the ground in the future, and is counting on information dominance to gain the quick advantage and break an enemy's will to fight. Nations beyond the first tier of military powers will, for the first time, have access to viable satellite imaging capabilities resulting in a decrease in the potential for U.S. military forces to achieve strategic surprise and dominance. "*It will change operations. Tactical surprise will be more difficult to achieve*," states Martin Faga, former head of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).⁵ The new generation of high-resolution satellites can make it possible to identify the exact type of aircraft on an airfield or a specific type of missile site.

Operational Security

The international community, despite its best efforts, finds it increasingly more difficult to control and regulate the spread of advanced technologies that have military and terrorist uses. These attempts at regulation, or "shutter control," mean that the governments reserve the right to prohibit commercial satellite companies from distributing or gathering imagery of any area deemed important to national security. When asked to comment on proposed "shutter control" legislation, Cana-

dian Defense Minister Arthur Eggleton said—

*As modern remote-sensing satellites can produce imagery whose quality approaches that obtained from specialized intelligence satellites, we must ensure that the data produced by Canadian satellites cannot be used to the detriment of our national security and that of our allies.*⁶

U.S. commercial imagery providers collect MSI in accordance with an "open skies" principle. This means that other nations can have nondiscriminatory access to data collected anywhere in the world. The U.S. Government has drafted regulations containing a number of provisions that would enable it to restrict, even commandeer, private imagery sensing capabilities for purposes of national security, foreign policy, and international obligations. Other nations are also taking steps toward legislation that would give their governments "shutter control."

Conclusion

The current commercial satellite imagery industry can provide a potentially adversarial nation or group with the capabilities to acquire and analyze MSI and potentially erode U.S. battlefield information dominance. Mission planners and field

commanders must be aware that prospective adversaries now have imagery acquisition capabilities similar to their own and may have comparable analytical capabilities as well.

What can we do to counter this threat? First, we must remember that the commercial MSI risk is strategic rather than tactical. MSI allows us to detect activities, study target and terrain characteristics, and monitor equipment and facilities. MSI gives a potential adversary the means to conduct a more precise and detailed study of future areas of operations. Second, the imagery capabilities of commercial MSI alone cannot fulfill an adversary's intelligence requirements. Commercial MSI can support or trigger other information-gathering activity while high-resolution commercial imagery will give

other nations a better understanding of probable U.S. capabilities.

The introduction of newer, more sophisticated commercial MSI systems will increase the future IMINT threat. Groups or nations seeking to exploit this newfound information need only to invest in ground-based processing systems, high-order software, and analytical skills. We should always be mindful that the eyes of passing satellites will be watching most of our future operations.



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Satellite Imagery, photo of Serbia.

The Role of Intelligence in President Jimmy Carter's Troop Withdrawal Decisions

by Captain Fred Hoffman, USAR

In early 1975, candidate Jimmy Carter declared that, if elected president, he would order the withdrawal of all U.S. ground forces from the Korean peninsula. Less than a week after his inauguration, President Carter vigorously moved to keep his campaign pledge. For two and a half years thereafter, in the face of increasing opposition, President Carter remained steadfast in his determination to withdraw all U.S. ground forces from Korea by 1981. In July 1979, however, after only 3,600 U.S. troops had been withdrawn, President Carter grudgingly announced the suspension of further troop withdrawals. This article examines the role intelligence played in his support in 1975 for the complete withdrawal of U.S. ground forces, his 1977 policy decision as President to carry out this withdrawal, and his reluctant decision in 1979 to scuttle the plan.

President Carter's intention to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea was first publicly enunciated in January 1975, during the early days of his candidacy; one should consider it within the context of events and circumstances during the period between his candidacy and inauguration. In April 1975, communist forces captured Saigon. In addition to wrestling with morale, race, and substance abuse problems, the U.S. military at the time suffered from low public esteem and consequent recruiting difficulties. In the wake of the Vietnam conflict, the U.S. economy continued to reel from the long-term effects of our "guns and butter" policies, a situation exacerbated by the 1973 oil crisis. In the mid-1970s, given the sad experience of Vietnam and economic problems at home, most of Congress and the elector-

ate supported a U.S. retrenchment in Asia. A May 1976 poll conducted by the Foreign Policy Association revealed majority support for the gradual removal of U.S. Forces in Korea.¹ Six months later, the *Washington Post* broke the news that the U.S. Government was investigating an alleged influence-peddling campaign conducted by the South Korean Government against elected U.S. officials, further reducing popular support for the U.S. military presence in South Korea.² "Koreagate," as the press quickly labeled bribery scandal, only worsened the tarnished image of a South Korean Government already repeatedly lambasted for human rights abuses.³

Another significant factor contributing to support for reduction of the U.S. military presence was the changing balance of military and economic power on the Korean Peninsula. After peaking at 360,000 during the Korean War, U.S. troop levels hovered around 60,000 throughout the 1950s and 1960s. During those two decades, rapid growth in South Korean economic and military strength caused some U.S. officials to favor reducing U.S. forces there. In 1970, President Richard Nixon withdrew one of the two divisions then based in Korea, reducing U.S. military personnel from 60,000 to 40,000.⁴

Despite the initiation of an inter-Korean dialogue in 1972, military tensions remained high on the peninsula throughout the early- to mid-1970s. North Korea seized a U.S. naval ship, the *USS Pueblo*, in 1968. In late 1974, the first North Korean tunnel was discovered underneath the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the Koreas and a second tunnel a few months later. In April 1976, intelligence reports revealed that

Chinese officials had cautioned Kim Il Sung, then President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), against launching an attack on South Korea.⁵ In August 1976, North Korean troops attacked and killed members of a U.S. military work party in the DMZ.

As Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the outgoing Ford Administration, George Bush made several trips to Plains, Georgia, in 1976 to brief candidate (and then President-Elect) Carter on intelligence issues. Mr. Bush found President Carter to be attentive, but distrustful of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).⁶ Given the tenacity with which President Carter later clung to his troop withdrawal policy, one might have expected him to demonstrate a keen interest in any intelligence regarding Korea. Surprisingly, this was not the case. In fact, Don Oberdorfer writes that President-Elect Carter turned down a proposed CIA briefing on Korea, and during his administration rarely attended National Security Council (NSC) discussions regarding Korea.⁷ Not only did intelligence play little or no apparent role in President Carter's decision to withdraw U.S. ground forces from South Korea, neither former President Carter nor any of his advisors have ever identified an intelligence basis for the withdrawal decision.⁸

Troop Withdrawal Decision

On 26 January 1977, six days after his inauguration, President Carter issued *Presidential Review Memorandum 13 (PRM 13) Korea*. In response, Richard Holbrooke, President Carter's newly designated Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, formed the interagency East Asia Informal Group (EAIG) to conduct this review. Members of the EAIG were shocked

when Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance soon passed on guidance from the White House that the group should not study whether to withdraw ground forces, but merely how to do so. William Gleysteen, an EAIG member who later became Carter's ambassador to the Republic of Korea (ROK), writes:

Angered by this news, we ended the first meeting with a mutinous agreement about how to deal with this White House dictate. Some participants threatened to refuse to cooperate; others threatened to publicize the issue, perhaps by way of Congress. The angry, fractious session ended in bureaucratic chaos.⁹

The ripples from the shock first felt by the EAIG quickly extended not only to dismayed U.S. military and intelligence officials but also to U.S. allies Japan and the ROK. Neither country had been consulted by any U.S. officials before President Carter's decision.

As a candidate running in the first presidential election since Watergate, Jimmy Carter clearly benefited from his independence from the Washington establishment. As President, however, his lack of connections inside the Washington "Beltway," in particular among defense and intelligence professionals, turned his much-touted outsider status into a liability. Despite having graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Jimmy Carter did not have close ties to the military establishment. Sam Sarkesian observed during the latter part of the Carter presidency, "*National security remains the prime province of military experts and civilian specialists who tend to develop a legitimacy because of their expertise—an expertise, it might be added, upon which most Presidents depend.*"¹⁰ Throughout his presidency, he held both his DCI and the intelligence community at arm's length. National Security

Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski effectively neutralized President Carter's DCI, Stansfield Turner, by limiting his access to the President.¹¹ When the Carter Administration announced the withdrawal plan, Mr. Turner was to air his misgivings about the plan at a special NSC meeting. President Carter was unmoved by his DCI's pleas.¹²

Despite strong misgivings even among his closest advisors, Jimmy Carter doggedly pressed ahead with his troop withdrawal plan.

From the beginning of the Carter Administration in 1977 until mid-1979, the conduct of American policy toward Korea was encumbered by fundamental opposition within the bureaucracy (both civilian and military) and the Congress (both Republicans and Democrats) to the president's efforts to withdraw all U.S. ground forces from Korea.¹³

Examining President Carter's decision-making style, Vincent Davis in 1979 made three observations that partially explain this phenomenon:¹⁴

- ❑ He preferred written briefings, which reduced the ability of staffers to plead their cases before him.
- ❑ He tended to rush into decisions without any long-term plan or vision.
- ❑ He placed a premium on personal loyalty, and preferred working with just a handful of trusted advisors.

Carter's inner circle tightly controlled who, and what, the President saw. The critical players involved in formulating policy toward the ROK during the Carter years were Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the EAIG. Years later, Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, and

Advisor Brzezinski all professed to have personally opposed the withdrawal plan, but at the time they all loyally carried out the president's instructions with respect to it.¹⁵ By contrast, when Major General John Singlaub, the Chief of Staff of U.S. Forces in Korea, told a reporter in May 1977 that the withdrawal plan would lead to war, President Carter promptly fired him.¹⁶ This event galvanized congressional opposition to the plan, opposition which steadily grew during the next two years.

While his advisors agonized over how to dissuade the President without appearing disloyal, the intelligence community continued to exploit newly available satellite imagery capabilities to examine the North Korean ground force strength more closely. As early as May 1975, John Armstrong, a West Point graduate and Vietnam veteran working as a civilian imagery analyst at Fort Meade, Maryland, observed the existence of many more North Korean tanks than had previously been reported.

Within a few weeks, Armstrong identified an entirely new tank division (about 270 tanks and 100 armored personnel carriers) in a valley about fifty miles north of the DMZ. Before Armstrong's involvement, there had been little effort to compare the overall strength of North Korean units in the latest pictures with those of previous months or years. Armstrong's first intensive study, completed in December 1975, reported that the North Korean tank forces were about 80 percent larger than previously estimated. Armed with this alarming finding, he persuaded the Army to assign six more full-time analysts to his project. During the next two years, his team documented the development of North Korean special forces units—which were training on mock-ups of South Korean highways and terrain—and

a major increase in the number and forward deployment of North Korean artillery.¹⁷

By mid-1978, U.S. imagery analysts had not only concluded that North Korean tank forces were 80 percent larger than previously believed but also determined that North Korean maneuver battalions actually outnumbered South Korean forces by an alarming two-to-one (2:1) ratio. In January 1979, these classified findings were leaked to the media. Within ten days, Democratic Senators Robert C. Byrd, Gary Hart, and Samuel A. Nunn, Jr., of the Senate Armed Services Committee, joined with their Republican colleagues Senators William S. Cohen and John Tower to endorse suspension of further troop withdrawals.¹⁸ On 20 January 1979, President Carter issued *PRM 45 U.S. Policy Toward Korea*, calling for a new policy review of the withdrawal plan. On 20 July 1979, he grudgingly announced the suspension of all further troop withdrawals until the completion of a review of the military balance on the Korean Peninsula. Ronald Reagan's defeat of Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential election put the final nail in the coffin of President Carter's stubbornly defended troop withdrawal plan.

Conclusion

This case study demonstrates that even the most timely, accurate, and compelling intelligence information can be of limited value if policy-makers choose to ignore it. The study also underlines the critical importance of communications and trust between the President of the United States, his advisors, and Executive Branch intelligence agencies. If a president distrusts his intelligence advisors and their subordinate organizations, his receptivity toward the information they provide will be limited. An abundance of

intelligence information on Korea was available to Jimmy Carter when he was both President-Elect and President. However, due to the combination of his leadership style, personality traits, outsider status, and innate distrust of the intelligence community, intelligence information played a minor role in his decision-making on the troop withdrawal issue. The extent of President Carter's reluctance to abandon his withdrawal plan, and the depth of his distrust for the intelligence community, are revealed in a 1999 statement he made to long-time *Washington Post* correspondent Don Oberdorfer. Fully two decades after scrapping his plan, Carter voiced suspicion to Oberdorfer that the 1978 intelligence community findings on North Korean military strength had actually been manipulated by the Defense Intelligence Agency.¹⁹ Had the United States removed all ground troops from South Korea during Carter's presidency, especially so soon after the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, it is conceivable that North Korean leader Kim Il Sung could have interpreted this as a green light to reunify the Korean Peninsula by force of arms.



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Incorporating National Guard Divisions into Exercises

Have We Established an ARNG Trend?

by **Captain John C. Bento,**
CA ARNG AGR

Building on their successful "Warfighter '98 exercise" (WFX 98), the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG), 40th Infantry Division (ID) Mechanized (M), kicked it up a notch in June 1999 by fighting as the U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) Headquarters at "Roving Sands '99" (RS 99), conducted at Fort Bliss, Texas. This was the first time that a National Guard division participated in an operational level exercise as an ARFOR headquarters. With the U.S. Army at its lowest strength in recent years, we must incorporate National Guard divisions into exercises, in part because it provides the Guard units with access to the latest technologies. For this reason, it is more advantageous for a National Guard battle captain to work with the same intelligence indicators that their active duty counterparts use.

Exercise Participants

The 40th ID's Active Component (AC) teaming headquarters (III Corps) and teamed division (4th ID [M]) augmented the division's efforts with several Army Tactical Command and Control Systems (ATCCSs). The soldiers of the Sunburst Division's Analysis and Control Element (ACE) met the challenge head-on and achieved a high level of proficiency on the borrowed operating systems.

RS 99 was a Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command-sponsored, U.S. Army Forces Command-executed joint theater air and missile defense field training exercise employing U.S. joint and multinational forces. RS 99, executed 15 through 28 June 1999,

witnessed a successful integration of both AC and Reserve Component (RC) members of all the military services. Unfortunately, due to the crises in Kosovo, elements of the 8th Air Force abruptly pulled out of the exercise. The 8th Air Force and other higher headquarters units significantly adjusted their commitment to RS 99 by sending response cells. Only the 40th ID (M) and 32d Army Air Missile Defense Command (a modified table of organization and equipment [MTOE]-structured AC/RC unit) sent a full complement of division-level players.

Support Provided

III Corps augmented the ARFOR ACE with the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) Remote Workstation (RWS), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) operators. A team of five officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from the 104th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion, 4th ID (M), also supported the 40th ID (M) on the exercise. On four different occasions before and during the exercise, the team trained and guided the 40th ID (M) through the growing pains of standing up an ARFOR ACE. This teaming effort closely compares to the 1st Cavalry Division's efforts to prepare the 49th Armored Division, Texas ARNG, for their Bosnian ARFOR headquarters mission early in 1999.

Contractor support at RS 99 was extensive. During their last WFX, the 40th ID (M) relied exclusively on one contractor to help incorporate their Warlord Notebooks (WLNb) into the architecture of the G2 section and makeshift ACE

(seven of eight National Guard divisions are still missing an ACE in their current MTOEs). In contrast, during RS 99, the ACE received contractor support from seven companies. The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Operations Group D, from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, rounded out the expertise necessary to prepare for RS 99.

Added Collection and Processing Equipment Enhanced Operations

Just before the exercise, the Division received three ASAS RWS systems that III Corps dedicated to help the ARFOR ACE receive and parse the large volume of data it would have to process. The 40th ID (M) matched those three Sun Microsystems with three of their own, modified the architecture from an entirely WLNb configuration, and fielded a complete, RWS-configured ACE. WLNbs became a secondary means to process data, which we used as imagery intelligence (IMINT) sidebar workstations. The rest of the systems included a Joint STARS Workstation (JSWS), two HUNTER UAV baseline systems, COLISEUM (Community On-Line Intelligence System for End Users and Managers) software, and the Advance Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). These added systems were a revelation for most of the ARNG soldiers who had not seen them before.

The ASAS substitute system, WLNb, significantly challenges ACE battle captains that participate in a typical ARNG division WFX. They must rely solely on these single-source workstations



Captain Bento and colleague in the ACE.

to sift through the massive volume of text messages and push the pertinent intelligence to the all-source section. By then, hopefully, the battle captain, all-source analysts, and order of battle (OB) technicians would have developed an accurate graphical intelligence summary (INTSUM), updated their superiors, and adjusted the collection plan accordingly.

Today's intelligence community has better collection assets at its disposal. IMINT has readily become one of the customer's preferred choices for intelligence. In addition to human intelligence (HUMINT), time-sensitive IMINT is a necessity for decision-maker's use to adjust their plans or approve targets for engagement. The old proverb, "A picture is worth a thousand words," is alive and well at any level ACE. ACE personnel should be able to step back and visually monitor the moving target indicators (MTIs) on the JSWS, dynamically retask collection assets if necessary, keep analysts focused on the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR), and constantly feed the targeting cell. They should be aware,

however, that in a heavy-text message environment, the battle captain could easily fall into the trap of focusing on the monitor and lose sight of the big picture, crippling his ability to orchestrate the ACE.

Conclusion

The current Army multicomponent concept can only work in the military intelligence (MI) community if ARNG division personnel have opportunities to work with the AC in a modern architectural environment like RS 99.



Lieutenant Colonel Cushing receiving brief during Roving Sands '99.

The upcoming deployment of the 49th Armored Division to Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrates a need for such training. Another purpose for expanding on this trend is to assist our AC teaming partners. Shortfalls in MI soldier retention have forced many AC units to seek qualified National Guard personnel that can step into a job and hit the ground running. Teaming Guard divisions with AC units and giving them the experience of a joint exercise have established a trend that can enable the Army to meet its future requirements.



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Enduring Freedom

Managing Editor's Note: The tragic events of 11 September 2001 drew an immediate response from the people and government of the United States, one that now seems to have exceeded the expectations of those perpetrating the attacks. President George W. Bush vowed to punish those responsible, later identifying the Al Qaeda terrorist group under the leadership of Osama bin Laden. Founded in 1989 by bin Laden and Muhammad Atef, Al Qaeda was dedicated to opposing non-Islamic governments with force and violence. One of its principal goals was to force the United States military out of Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and other Moslem states, using force as its means. Even before the attacks, American intelligence had verified that the group's senior leadership were located in Afghanistan and under the protection of that nation's ruling party, the Taliban. Following the attacks, both the United States and Great Britain demanded the Taliban apprehend Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda's senior leadership and turn them over to the United States. This demand was refused and following President Bush's vigorous and generally successful coalition building effort, on 7 October 2001 U.S. and British forces initiated the bombing of Taliban facilities and units and Al Qaeda training facilities. This military campaign, given the designation, Operation Enduring Freedom, now includes military forces from a dozen nations with support from most of the member states of the United Nations. Due to the critical importance and the numerous impacts on both the civil and military sectors of our nation, *MIPB* has established "**Enduring Freedom**" as a sub-theme. The contents are to be treated as a department within the bulletin's format. We will publish articles on a wide

variety of related and relevant topics under this sub-theme and continue to do so through the operation's successful resolution. However, as this is a quarterly publication, with editing and publishing suspenses set by contract, it is impossible for us to keep pace with the operation's rapidly changing tactical and strategic environment. We will, however, provide relevant background information on Operation Enduring Freedom, its impacts at home and abroad, and more focused impacts on its effects on Military Intelligence professionals. The articles within the Enduring Freedom department reflect what we currently believe to be some of the most important issues. The timeline is provided to identify key milestones in the attack, subsequent reactions, and Enduring Freedom. It should be expected that as new issues of *MIPB* are published the type of information provided may change, based on the focus on a given area of operations, or even the type of campaign being conducted. We will do our best to provide the best and most current information. To assist in our efforts, and within security constraints, we request that those directly involved in Enduring Freedom, provide us with relevant articles that will benefit the Military Intelligence Corps.

Timeline, Operation Enduring Freedom

- ❑ 11 September 2001: Terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
- ❑ 15 September 2001: Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist organization becomes the focus on the U.S. investigation.
- ❑ 20 September 2001: The United States and Great Britain demand the Taliban apprehend Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda's senior leadership and turn them over to the United States. The Taliban refuse.
- ❑ 25 September 2001: The U.S. military response to the terrorist attacks is dubbed "Operation Enduring Freedom."
- ❑ 28 September 2001: The United Nations Security Council passes a U.S. sponsored anti-terrorism resolution requiring each member nation to cut off terrorist-related funding, prevent terrorist training and other activities on its territory, and make it a criminal offense to support a terrorist organization.
- ❑ 5 October 2001: Mr. Robert Stevens, an employee of American Media, Boca Raton, Florida, becomes the first to die of anthrax. As of 19 November 2001, eighteen cases have been reported with five deaths.
- ❑ 7 October 2001: U.S. and British aircraft and missiles target Taliban facilities in Afghanistan. U.S. aircraft continue strikes on Taliban facilities through 20 November 2001.
- ❑ 8 October 2001: U.S. President Bush signs an executive order creating the Office of Homeland Defense.
- ❑ 26 October 2001: The U.S. Congress passes the Patriot Act (see below) focused on combating terrorism.
- ❑ 15 November 2001: Advances by the Northern Alliance cause the Pentagon to begin thinking about counter-guerrilla operations.
- ❑ 20 November 2001: The Taliban now controls less than a third of Afghanistan with the Northern Alliance, supported by U.S. air strikes, poised to take the last Taliban stronghold in the north, Konduz.

Collecting Information on U.S. Persons

by Lieutenant General
Robert W. Noonan, Jr

Editor's Note: Given the recent passage of a number of bills to control terrorism by Congress, there has been concern over individual freedoms and the military's role in the new judicial legislation. This article is extracted from a memorandum, Subject: Collecting Information on U.S. Persons, dated 5 November 2001, and signed by LTG Robert W. Noonan, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.¹

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on America has presented the United States and the U.S. Army with unprecedented challenges. Both our nation and our Army are responding vigorously to these challenges and will ultimately be victorious over international terrorism. Achieving this victory will not be easy, however. Our adversary is not a clearly defined nation-state with fixed borders or a standing army. It is, instead, a shadowy underworld operating globally, with supporters and allies in many countries, including, unfortunately, our own. Rooting out and eliminating this threat to our freedom and way of life will call upon every resource at our disposal. I am proud to say that Army Military Intelligence (MI) will play a pivotal role in helping to defeat this threat.

Many of the perpetrators of these attacks lived for some time in the United States. There is evidence that some of their accomplices and supporters may have been U.S. persons, as that term is defined in Executive Order (EO) 12333. This has caused concern in the field regarding MI's collection authority. With that in mind, I offer the following guidance:

a. Contrary to popular belief, there is no absolute ban on intelligence components collecting U.S.

person information. That collection, rather, is regulated by EO 12333 and implementing policy in DoD 5240.1-R and AR 381-10.

b. Intelligence components may collect U.S. person information when the component has the mission (or "function") to do so, and the information falls within one of the categories listed in DoD 5240.1-R and AR 381-10. The two most important categories for present purposes are "foreign intelligence" and "counterintelligence." Both categories allow collection about U.S. persons reasonably believed to be engaged, or about to engage, in international terrorist activities. Within the United States, those activities must have a significant connection with a foreign power, organization, or person (e.g., a foreign-based terrorist group).

EO 12333 provides that "timely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons, and their agents, is essential to the national security of the United States. All reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the United States will receive the best intelligence possible." That said, my staff has received reports from the field of well-intentioned MI personnel declining to receive reports from local law enforcement authorities, solely because the reports contain U.S. person information. MI may receive information from anyone, anytime. If the information is U.S. person information, MI may retain that information if it meets the two-part test discussed in paragraph b, above. If the information received pertains solely to the functions of other DoD components, or agencies outside DoD, MI may transmit or deliver it to the appropriate recipients, per Procedure 4, AR 381-10. Remember, merely receiving information does not constitute "collection" under AR 381-

10; collection entails receiving "for use." Army intelligence may always receive information, if only to determine its intelligence value and whether it can be collected, retained, or disseminated in accordance with governing policy.

Military Intelligence must collect all available information regarding international terrorists who threaten the United States, and its interests, including those responsible for planning, authorizing, committing, or aiding the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. We will do so - as EO 12333 directs - "in a vigorous, innovative and responsible manner that is consistent with the Constitution and applicable law, and respectful of the principles upon which the United States was founded."

Key ODCSINT numbers for intelligence oversight questions are (703) 601-1958/1551, or through the 24-hour Intelligence Watch at (703) 697-5484/5485.

Endnotes

1. LTG Noonan's memorandum, especially regarding the impact of AR 381-10, deserves more study. This is provided by Mr. Michael H. Varhola's article, "AR 381-10, An Enabling Regulation."

Attention NCOs

Send us your articles and book reviews. If you have any experience you can share on MI doctrine, professional development, or "how-to" tips, please send them to **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin**. Topics of interest for future issues include: analysis, global conflicts, MI skills training, and tactical operations. E-mail them michael.ley@hua.army.mil and brett.vanhooose@hua.army.mil or call (520) 538-1004 and (520) 538-0979 or DSN 879-1004.

AR 381-10, An Enabling Regulation— A View From An Intelligence Oversight Officer

by Michael H. Varhola

In our zeal to enforce compliance with regulations, we sometimes forget what they are about. This is particularly true in the area of intelligence oversight. Vigorous enforcement, particularly in the 1970s, resulted in a misperception that lingers to this day: that the intelligence oversight program exists to prevent Military Intelligence (MI) from collecting information on U.S. citizens. Nothing could be further from the truth. The purpose of the regulation is just the opposite; it enables intelligence components to carry out their authorized functions effectively while ensuring that they perform the activities that affect U.S. individuals in a manner that protects their constitutional rights and privacy. Any intelligence oversight inspector who does not understand this may be doing more harm than good, and certainly will not be furthering combat readiness and mission accomplishment.

In my 30 years working in MI, I have never seen a situation in which **AR 381-10, U.S. Army Intelligence Activities**, prevented an intelligence component from collecting information on U.S. citizens that it needed to accomplish its mission. What I have seen is intelligence components being rightfully prevented from doing the mission of others. This was particularly true after the Oklahoma City bombing when some MI components shifted their focus to domestic extremism. This violated **AR 381-10**, not only because the extremists were U.S. persons, but more fundamentally because it is not MI's mission. It is the mission of civilian law enforcement, the Provost Marshal and the Criminal Investigation Command, and sometimes, quite frankly, MI got in the way.

When it is MI's mission, **AR 381-10** is there to provide procedures that enable the collection of the informa-

tion on citizens of the United States. *Procedure 2* gives thirteen criteria under which MI can collect information on U.S. persons. These are all-encompassing. I cannot think of a category of information on citizens that MI would need that one of these criteria does not cover. Unfortunately, some individuals find it easier or safer to avoid the issue altogether by simply not collecting the data on citizens they may need to do their complete jobs. What I hear regularly is, "*I'd rather err on the side of caution.*" This is unfortunate and defeats the purpose of the regulation. I have even seen units destroy information in individual security clearance files in preparation for an intelligence oversight inspection, not realizing that such information is "administrative," as **AR 381-10** defines that term, and that the regulation does not cover its retention.

The other side of this coin is just as bad or even worse. A small number of MI soldiers, not understanding the regulation, and perhaps having had exposure to heavy-handed enforcement in the past, have come to believe that it is an outdated regulation or is simply stupid. While there is obviously a continuing need to reinterpret the regulation as information technology advances and the Internet becomes a bigger part of our lives, I believe that the regulation is sound and its principles are easily transferable. It is not a big intellectual leap to go from collecting open-source information from newspapers to collecting the same information from websites. The same considerations apply to the involvement of U.S. citizens: **mission, mission, and mission!**

As the Cold War sinks into the distant past and we move into a future of smaller and more varied deployments, it becomes increasingly important that MI soldiers understand the fundamen-

tal purpose of **AR 381-10** and use it as the tool the Army intended it to be. U.S. citizens will be operating in many capacities in every area to which we deploy; some may even be members of the opposing force. We cannot anticipate every situation. When MI needs to collect information about citizens of the United States to accomplish its military mission, **AR 381-10** provides the procedures that enable it to do so while protecting their constitutional rights and privacy. Mission first, constitutional rights and privacy always! Erring on the side of caution is not a viable option.

As Mr. Varhola's article was written before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, **MIPB** asked for any change in his position. Mr. Varhola provided the following comment: "As far as I have seen, EO 12333 is standing up quite well in the post 9/11 world. Regarding collection on U.S. persons, I have seen no problems. The terrorist attack came from a foreign source, and **AR 381-10** allows the collection of military and military related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence concerning the activities, intentions, capabilities, MO, etc of international terrorists. The key thing is cooperation and info sharing among all the players: strategic CI, installation security, tenant units, PMO, CID, FBI, local authorities, etc. If everybody is working together, then the authority that is needed will be resident in at least one of the players."

Michael Varhola is currently an Intelligence Oversight Officer with the Department of the Army Inspector General. Mr. Varhola earned his commission in Artillery through the Reserve Officer Training Corps at Gannon University in Erie, Pennsylvania, where he majored in Russian and German. He entered the Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program (MICECP) in 1979 and worked with the 511th as a CI Operations Case Officer. Readers may contact Mr. Varhola via E-mail at michael.varhola@daig.ignet.army.mil.

Editor's Note: In mid-October the U.S. House Judiciary Committee met to discuss adoption of the "Patriot Act" and on 26 October 2001 it was approved by Congress. The Patriot Act greatly increases the government's ability to conduct surveillance and wiretapping operations as well as give it greater authority to detain suspects. The act is controversial, however, in that civil libertarians see the changes as a danger to our personal freedoms. The following items are the key components of the Patriot Act and are included to supplement LTG Noonan's and Mr. Varhola's articles.

The Patriot Act would —

- ☐ Give any U.S. Attorney or state attorney general the power, in "emergency situations," to install the Carnivore e-mail snooping system without obtaining a court order.
- ☐ Allow law enforcement agencies to obtain telephone voice mail messages with a search warrant, which is issued with less court scrutiny than the previously required wiretap warrant.
- ☐ Expand the definition of "terrorist" to include non-violent protesters at an anti-war rally.
- ☐ Make it easier for the government to tap multiple phones as part of a "roving wiretap" warrant.
- ☐ Allow the government to detain legal immigrants for seven days based only on the accusation of terrorist activity.

The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

by Ali Ahmad Jalali and
Lester W. Grau,
Foreign Military Studies Office,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Reprinted with permission from *The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan*, Grau, Lester W., Editor (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996).

PREFACE

Afghanistan, a multi-ethnic state in southwest Asia, is home to diverse social communities that share common experience through interaction with dominant states, empires, invading armies, trade and cultural movements that traversed the land during their thousands of years of history. The different ethnic groups in modern Afghanistan (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmans, Persian-speaking Hazaras, Balochis, etc.) straddle the boundaries of the state. However, their national identity is mostly defined by their differences with their ethnic kinsmen across the borders rather than their national commonalities. About 99% of Afghanistan's over 17 million population are Muslim, of which 85% are followers of the Sunni sect while the rest are Shia. About 85% of Afghans

live in rural communities in a land dominated by mountains and deserts. Modern travel is primarily restricted to a highway ring connecting the various cities. There is no railroad network.

Afghanistan has mostly been a loose collection of tribes and nationalities over which central governments had varying degrees of influence and control at different times. The country has been historically known for its remarkable Islamic and ethnic tolerance. However tribal rivalries and blood feuds, ambitions of local chieftains, and tribal defiance of pervasive interference by the central government have kept the different parts of the land at war at different times. In such cases the kinship-based identity has been the major means of the community's political and military mobilization. Such identity places far greater importance on kinship and extended family than ideology.

Afghanistan stands at a geographic crossroads that has seen the passage of many warring peoples. Each of these has left their imprint on the ancient land and involved the people of Afghanistan in conflict. Often this conflict got in the way of economic devel-

opment. What has developed is a country composed of somewhat autonomous "village states" spread across the entire country.¹ Afghans identify themselves by Qawm—the basic subnational identity based on kinship, residence, and sometimes occupation. Western people may refer to this as "tribe," but this instinctive social cohesiveness includes tribal clans, ethnic subgroups, religious sects, locality-based groups, and groups united by interests.² The Qawm, not Afghanistan, is the basic unit of social community and, outside the family, the most important focus on individual loyalty. Afghanistan has, at times, been characterized as a dis-united land driven by blood feuds. The feuds center on family and Qawm. Yet, the leaders of the various Qawm have resolved feuds and held the land together. Village elders can put feuds on hold for a decade or longer and then let them resume once the agreed-on time has expired and the matter is still unresolved. Afghanistan's ancient roots and strong ties of kinship provide an anchor against progress, but also the means to cope when central authority has collapsed. Historically, the collapse of the central government of Afghanistan or the destruction of its

standing armies has never resulted in the defeat of the nation by an invader. The people, relying on their decentralized political, economic and military potential, have always taken over the resistance against the invaders.³ This was the case during two wars with Great Britain in the 19th century (1839-1842, 1878-1880). This happened again in the Soviet-Afghan War.

The tactics of the Mujahideen reflected this lack of central cohesion. Their tactics were not standard, but differed from valley to valley and tribe to tribe. No more than 15 percent of the guerrilla commanders were military professionals. However, Afghanistan had a conscript army and virtually ever 22-year-old male served his two year obligation. This provided a basic military education which eased cooperation between the various Mujahideen groups. The Mujahideen were true volunteers—unpaid warriors who fought to protect their faith and community first and their nation next. As true volunteers, fighting for their Qawm and religion, the Mujahideen looked down on the professional soldier (asker) as a simple mercenary who was either the victim of a press gang or too stupid to ply any other trade.⁴ This disdain did not attach to the professional officer, who enjoyed a great deal of prestige.

Afghanistan was not a guerrilla war ala Mao Tse Tung or Vo Nguyen Giap. The Mujahideen were not trying to force a new ideology and government on a land. Rather, they fought to defend their Qawm and their religion against a hostile ideology, an atheistic value system, an oppressive central government, and a foreign invader. It was a spontaneous defense of community values and a traditional way of life by individual groups initially unconnected to national or international political organizations.⁵

The Great Game⁶

Russian expansionism and empire building in Central Asia began in 1734 and Moscow's interest in Afghanistan

was apparent by the late 1830s. The Great Game described in Afghanistan was apparent by the late 1830s. The Great Game described the British and Russian struggle for influence along the unsettled northern frontier of British India and in the entire region between Russia and India. Afghanistan lay directly in this contested area between two empires. Russia described her motives in the Great Game as simply to abolish the slave trade and to establish order and control along her southern border. The British, however, viewing Russian absorption of the lands of the Caucasus, Georgia, Khirgiz, Turkmens, Khiva and Bukhara, claimed to feel threatened by the presence of a large, expanding empire near India and ascribed different Russian motives. The British stated that Russian motives were to weaken British power and to gain access to a warm-water port. Britain claimed that her own actions were to protect the frontiers of British India.

The Great Game spilled into Afghanistan when British forces invaded during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842). Britain claimed that the invasion was supposed to counter Russian influence. After hard fighting, the British withdrew. By 1869, the Russian empire reached the banks of the Amu Darya (Oxus) River—the northern border of Afghanistan. This caused additional British concern. In 1878, the arrival of a special Russian diplomatic mission to Kabul led to another British invasion and the Second Anglo-Afghan War. The British Army again withdrew. In the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907, the Russians agreed that Afghanistan lay outside its sphere of interest and agreed to confer with Britain on all matters relating to Russian-Afghan relations. In return, Britain agreed not to occupy or annex any part of Afghanistan nor interfere in the internal affairs of that country. Although the Amir of Afghanistan refused to recognize the treaty, Russia and Britain agreed to

its terms and honored them until 1919 when Afghan troops crossed into British India, seized a village and attempted to raise a popular revolt in the area. The British responded with yet another invasion and the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The political settlement resulted in Afghanistan's full independence from Great Britain.

Afghanistan's foreign policy from 1919 and 1978 balanced the demands of her immediate neighbors, and external powers such as the United States, Germany and Great Britain. Normal relations with her northern neighbor, the Soviet Union, led to increased Soviet investment and presence in Afghanistan.

In April 1978, a small leftist group of Soviet-trained Afghan officers seized control of the government and founded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, a client state of the Soviet Union. Civil war broke out in Afghanistan. The putsch installed President Nur M. Taraki, a Marxist who announced sweeping programs of land distribution, changed status for women and the destruction of the old Afghanistan social structure. Disregarding the national social structure and mores, the new government enjoyed little popular support. The wobbly Taraki government was almost immediately met by increased armed resistance as the Mujahideen ranks grew. In 1978, religious leaders, in response to popular uprisings across Afghanistan, issued statements of *jihad* (holy war) against the communist regime. This was an appeal to the supranational identity of all Afghans—a fight to defend the faith of Islam. The combat readiness of the Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan plunged as government purges swept the officer corps. Soldiers, units and entire regiments deserted to the resistance and by the end of 1979, the actual strength of the Afghan Army was less than half of its authorized 90,000. In March 1979, the city of Herat revolted

and most of the Afghan 17th Infantry Division mutinied and joined the rebellion. Forces loyal to Taraki reoccupied the city after the Afghan Air Force bombed the city and the 17th Division. Thousands of people reportedly died in the fighting, including some Soviet citizens.

Soviet Intervention

The Soviet-Afghan War began over the issue of control. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was nominally a socialist state governed by a communist party. However, the state only controlled some of the cities, while tribal elders and clan chiefs controlled the countryside. Furthermore, the communist party of Afghanistan was split into two hostile factions. The factions spent more time fighting each other than trying to establish socialism in Afghanistan. In September 1979, Taraki's Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin, seized power and murdered Taraki. Amin's rule proved no better and the Soviet Union watched this new communist state spin out of control. Meanwhile, units of the army mutinied, civil war broke out, cities and villages rose in revolt and Afghanistan began to slip away from Moscow's control and influence. Leonid Brezhnev, the aged Soviet General Secretary, saw that direct military intervention was the only way to prevent his client state from disintegrating into complete chaos. He decided to intervene.

The obvious models for intervention were Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Soviet General Staff planned the Afghanistan invasion based on these models. However, there was a significant difference that the Soviet planners missed. Afghanistan was embroiled in a civil war and a coup de main would only gain control of the central government, not the countryside. Although participating military units were briefed at the last minute, the Soviet Christmas Eve invasion of

1979 was masterfully planned and well-executed. The Soviets seized the government, killed the president and put their own man in his place. According to some Russian sources, they planned to stabilize the situation, strengthen the army and then withdraw the majority of Soviet forces within three years. The Soviet General Staff planned to leave all fighting in the hands of the army of the Democratic Republic. But Afghanistan was in full revolt, the dispirited Afghan army was unable to cope, and the specter of defeat following a Soviet withdrawal haunted the Politburo. Invasion and overthrow of the government proved much easier than fighting the hundreds of ubiquitous guerrilla groups. The Soviet Army was trained for large-scale, rapid-tempo operations. They were not trained for the platoon leaders' war of finding and closing with small, indigenous forces which would only stand and fight when the terrain and circumstances were to their advantage.

Back in the Soviet Union there was no one in charge and all decisions were committee decisions made by the collective leadership. General Secretary Brezhnev became incapacitated in 1980 but did not die until November 1982. He was succeeded by the ailing Yuri Andropov. General Secretary Andropov lasted less than two years and was succeeded by the faltering Konstantin Chernenko in February 1984. General Secretary Chernenko died in March 1985. Although the military leadership kept recommending withdrawal, during this "twilight of the general secretaries" no one was making any major decisions as to the conduct and outcome of the war in Afghanistan. The war bumped on at its own pace. Finally, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. His first instinct was to order military victory in Afghanistan within a year. Following this bloodiest year of the war, Gorbachev realized that the Soviets could not win in Afghanistan without unacceptable interna-

tional and internal repercussions and began to cast about for a way to withdraw with dignity. United Nations negotiators provided that avenue and by 15 October 1988, the first half of the Soviet withdrawal was complete. On 15 February 1989, the last Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan. Soviet force commitment, initially assessed as requiring several months, lasted over nine years and required increasing numbers of forces. The Soviet Union reportedly killed 1.3 million people and forced 5.5 million Afghans (a third of the pre-war population) to leave the country as refugees. Another 2 million Afghans were forced to migrate within the country. The country has yet to recover.

Initially the Mujahideen were all local residents who took arms and banded together into large, rather unwieldy, forces to seize the local district capitols and loot their arms rooms. The DRA countered these efforts where it could and Mujahideen began to coalesce into much smaller groups centered around the rural village. These small groups were armed with a variety of weapons from swords and flintlock muskets to British bolt-action rifles and older Soviet and Soviet-bloc weapons provided to Afghanistan over the years. The guerrilla commanders were usually influential villagers who already had a leadership role in the local area. Few had any professional military experience. Rebellion was wide-spread, but uncoordinated since the resistance was formed along tribal and ethnic lines.

The Soviet invasion changed the nature of the Mujahideen resistance. Afghanistan's neighbors, Pakistan and Iran, nervously regarded the advance to the Soviet Army to their borders and began providing training and material support to the Mujahideen. The United States, Peoples Republic of China, Britain, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates began

funneling military, humanitarian and financial aid to the Mujahideen through Pakistan. Pakistan's assessment was that the Soviet Union had come to Afghanistan to stay and it was in Pakistan's best interests to support those Mujahideen who would never accept the Soviet presence. The Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency began to funnel aid through various Afghan political factions headquartered in Pakistan. Eventually there were seven major Afghan factions receiving aid. The politics of these factions were determined by their leaders' religious convictions—three of which were Islamic moderates and four of which were Islamic fundamentalists. Pakistan required that the various ethnic and tribal Mujahideen groups join one of the factions in order to receive aid. Over time, this provided the leaders of these factions with political power which they used to dominate the politics of post-communist Afghanistan. The Pakistani authorities favored the most fundamentalist groups and rewarded them accordingly. This aid distribution gave the Afghan religious leaders unprecedented power in the conduct of the war. It also undermined the traditional authority of the tribal and village leaders.

The Mujahideen were unpaid volunteers with family responsibilities. This meant that they were part-time warriors and that spoils of war played a major role in military actions. Mujahideen sold mostly captured weapons and equipment in the bazaars to support their families. As the war progressed, mobile Mujahideen groups emerged. The mobile Mujahideen groups were larger and consisted of young (under 25), unmarried, better-trained warriors. Sometimes the mobile Mujahideen were paid. The mobile Mujahideen ranged over a much larger area of operations than the local Mujahideen and were more responsive to the plans and desires of the factions.

The strategic struggle for Afghanistan was a fight to strangle the other's logistics. The Mujahideen targeted the Soviet lines of communication—the crucial road network over which the Soviet supplies had to travel. The Soviet attack on the Mujahideen logistics was two phased. From 1980 until 1985, the Soviets sought to eliminate Mujahideen support in the rural countryside. They bombed granaries and rural villages, destroyed crops and irrigation systems, mined pastures and fields, destroyed herds and launched sweeps through rural areas—conscripting young men and destroying the infrastructure. The Soviet leadership, believing Mao Tse Tung's dictum that the guerrilla lives in the population like a fish in water, decided to kill the fish by draining off the water.⁷ As a result, Afghanistan became a nation of refugees as more than seven million rural residents fled to the relative safety of neighboring Pakistan and Iran or to the cities of Afghanistan. This Soviet effort denied rural support to the Mujahideen, since the villagers had left and most of the food now had to be carried along with weapons and ammunition and materials of war. The Mujahideen responded by establishing logistics bases inside Afghanistan. The Soviet fight from 1985 to withdrawal was to find and destroy these bases.

Terrain, as any infantryman knows, is the ultimate shaper of the battlefield. Afghanistan's terrain is varied and challenging. It is dominated by towering mountains and forbidding desert. Yet it also has lush forests of larch, aspen and juniper. It has tangled "green zones"—irrigated areas thick with trees, vines, crops, irrigation ditches and tangled vegetation. It has flat plains full of wheat and swampy terraces which grow delicious long-grained rice. It is not ideal terrain for a mechanized force dependent on fire power, secure lines of communication and high technology. It is terrain where the

mountain warrior, using ambush sites inherited from his ancestors, can inflict "death from a thousand cuts". The terrain dictates different tactics, force structure and equipment from those of conventional war.

This book is not a complete history of the Soviet-Afghan War. Rather, it is a series of combat vignettes as recalled by the Mujahideen participants. It is not a book about right or wrong. Rather, it is a book about survival against the overwhelming firepower and technological might of a superpower. This is the story of combat from the guerrilla's perspective. It is the story of brave people who fought without hope of winning because it was the right thing to do.

About the Book

Author Les Grau, regularly travels back and forth to Russia. He received a book from the History of Military Art department at the Frunze Combined Arms Academy in Moscow. The book was intended for students' classroom use only and, as such, shows both the good and the bad. With Frunze Academy permission, Les translated this book and added commentary before it was published by NDU Press as *The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan*. Author Ali Jalali, helped in the editing process. "The Bear" showed the tactics of the Soviets, but the Mujahideen tactics were absent. Charlie Cuthbertson and Dick Voltz of the USMC in Quantico agreed that both sides needed to be presented and sent Ali and Les to Pakistan and Afghanistan to interview Mujahideen commanders for a companion volume.

Author Ali Jalali has the perfect credentials to do this book. Ali was a Colonel in the Afghan Army and taught at the Afghan Military Academy and Army Staff College. His foreign education included the Infantry Officer's Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Georgia; the British Army

Staff College at Camberley; and the Soviet Frunze Academy. Many of Ali's officer students were key resistance figures. Ali was also a member of the resistance and an accredited journalist during the conflict. Now Ali works as a journalist and has covered Afghanistan and Central Asia over the last 15 years. Ali is respected by all the factions and has exceptional entre to the Mujahideen.

Ali and Les arrived in Pakistan in September 1996 and were preparing to go into Afghanistan when the Taliban advance on Kabul closed the borders to American citizens. Ali interviewed some 40 Mujahideen during a month in Peshawar, Quetta, and Islamabad, Pakistan. Our colleague, Major Nasrullah Safi, conducted interviews for another two months inside Afghanistan for this book. The interviews are the basis of this book. In those interviews where we have several sources for the same vignette or where we have lots of supporting written reports and material, we have written the vignette in the third person. In those cases where the person interviewed is the primary source, we have written the vignette in the first person. The vignettes are arranged chronologically by type of action. Occasionally, when the actions occur at the same place over time, we lump those actions together instead of chronologi-

cally. We have tried to make the book as accurate as possible, but realize that time and retelling may have altered some of the facts. We have limited the span of the book from the Soviet invasion until their withdrawal. The war started before the Soviet invasion and continued long after their departure. We plan to write about these battles in a future book.

We used edition 2-DMA series U611 1:100,000 maps from the U.S. Defense Mapping Agency for the final preparation of the material. For those who wish to consult the map sheets, map sheet numbers are given with each vignette. We have numbered each vignette within the chapter and started each chapter with a country map showing the rough location of each vignette. The interviews were long and exhaustive, so many details are available. Many of the interviews were conducted at different times and places, with different people who had been part of the same battle or operation. This allowed us to check and compare details and sequences of events. Map elevations are given in meters. Contour intervals are not consistent and merely show elevation. Place and name spelling is based on Ali Jalali's best transliteration efforts. Consistency in spelling is difficult when two alphabets are involved—some spellings are different than in other books on Afghanistan. Al-

though the Mujahideen always say 'Russian' instead of 'Soviet', we have used 'Soviet' throughout unless it is a direct quote.

We use Russian map graphics on the maps. The Afghan Army used the Soviet graphics system and most Mujahideen were familiar with them. Russian graphics are more "user friendly" (flexible and illustrative) than Western graphics. The Russians can show the sequential development of an action by adding times or identifying lines to their graphics. These lines are explained in the legend. A table of Russian map graphics is located in the back of the book. Mujahideen forces are shown in blue and Soviet/DRA forces are shown in red.

Endnotes

1 Ali A. Jalali "Clashes of Ideas and Interests in Afghanistan", paper given at the Institute of World Politics, Washington, D.C., July 1995, page 4.

2 Ibid, 3.

3 Ibid, 4

4 Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994, pages 158-159.

5 Jalali, 1

6 Section derived from Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins (editors), *Afghanistan Country Study*, Fifth edition, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1986, pages 22-73 and Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game*, New York: Kodansha International, 1994.

7 Claude Malhauret, *Afghan Alternative Seminar*, Monterey, California, November 1993.

Air Assaulting and Blocking the Enemy in the Lar-Mandikul' Valley

by Major V.G. Chabanenko¹

On 16 March 1985, our intelligence organs received reports of a concentration of guerrilla forces in the Lar-Mandikul' Valley, some 30 kilometers northeast of Kabul. The division commander ordered my regimental commander to destroy them.² My commander decided to air land the regiment some six kilometers away from the guerrillas and

then sneak up to the valley, block off its exits and then conduct a hunt with part of the regiment, while the rest would cover their movements. Aviation would provide fire support as would some MRLS located some 15 kilometers from the valley with our *bronegrupp*a. Illumination support would be planned and on call and be furnished by illumination flares, artillery illumination rounds, and air-delivered flares. After accomplishing our

mission, the regiment would walk to our *bronegrupp*a.

On 19 March, we hit the LZ and were immediately spotted by the enemy. The enemy opened up with a heavy volume of fire and began rapidly pulling his units out from under our air and artillery strikes. Only the forward subunits of our 1st and 2d battalions managed to reach their blocking positions and they did not have sufficient combat power to stop

the enemy main body. During the next 48 hours, our search groups found and destroyed weapons and ammunition caches. Our covering subunits managed to occupy the dominant terrain, support the search groups, and repulse enemy attempts to clear away the blocking forces.

Over in an adjacent valley, a similar situation had developed. The enemy managed to extricate his subunits away from the strike of the regiment and conduct a march through the valley. This was because we landed at the tail end of the enemy column and we could not get to the blocking positions designated by the regiment. In addition, once again our landing had been discovered and we had been put down in the wrong place. This was because rather than landing at the designated sites, we landed in places safe from enemy fire and large enough (2 by 2 kilometers) for easy landing. It took two hours to assemble my battalion's subunits and, consequently, I was unable to move to the correct positions in an organized fashion in time. The enemy escaped.

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: This operation underscores the necessity of conducting continuous reconnaissance of the enemy and, depending on the existing situation, fine-tuning your plans and, if necessary, changing your LZ. A company should have one LZ, a battalion should have two or three LZs that are no farther than a kilometer or a kilometer and a half apart. You must shield LZs from enemy fire. Of course, there must be a reserve LZ as well.

Combat action in Afghanistan, and in particular this operation, demonstrate that evacuating the assault force after mission accomplishment requires particular attention, since it is during this stage of the operation that the subunits receive their most significant casualties. During the return to the assembly areas on helicopters, pay particular attention to ensuring that the enemy has not

placed weapons around them. In order to keep the enemy away from evacuation points, use air-delivered or MRLs-delivered RDM on enemy approach routes (see Figure 1). When covering a region from dominant terrain, evacuate the force by establishing a series of perimeter posts around the LZ. After evacuating the main force, evacuate the posts simultaneously. When moving the assault force to seize an evacuation zone, cover the movement with overwatching forces and aviation, move in precombat formation, and lead with reconnaissance.

Start helicopter load plans immediately upon receipt of the evacua-

tion order and refine them when at the pick-up point. Pull mortar crews and mortars out first and riflemen last. The air assault commander directs the evacuation and is on the last helicopter out along with the last part of the perimeter security posts. Hold supporting helicopter gunships in full readiness or fire on the enemy along their climbing paths. Air assault troopers, once on board the helicopters, must be ready to conduct small arms fire through aircraft openings.

Experience shows that helicopters should spend the minimum possible time at the air evacuation point as personnel and equipment are already




Figure 1. Air Assaulting and Blocking the Enemy in the Lar-Mandikul' Valley.

concentrated there as a tempting target. Helicopters can spend a maximum of one and one-half minutes on the ground.

Airborne and air assault forces can return to their initial assembly areas after mission accomplishment on helicopters or in their armored vehicles. In this operation in the Lar-Mandikul' Valley, the regiment withdrew mounted in their *bronegruppa* after fulfilling their mission. They pulled out at night. In order to navigate at night, commanders used compasses and parachute flares. During the day, they could have used route reconnaissance. The regiment's various *bronegruppa* moved by bounds as subunits provided overwatch for the main body. Once the main body had passed through a covered segment of the route, the overwatching

forces would rejoin the main force and other subunits would move forward to the next overwatch positions. In this manner, the regiment maintained a high tempo of movement and suffered minimal casualties during encounters with the enemy.

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: Pulling out the mortars prior to the infantry is a commander's call and depends on the tactical situation. However, there are times when the mortars will be the final system a commander wants to evacuate.

Many commanders prefer forming an uninterrupted "collapsing ring" for evacuation zone security. This ring gets tighter with each lift-off. The collapsing ring has a better chance of preventing enemy infiltration of the perimeter and evacuating the security personnel

than establishing a series of far-off posts as this vignette recommends.

The withdrawal of the force mounted in its *bronegruppa* appears to be a withdrawal under pressure. Night movement of a mechanized column through the Pandshir valley using parachute flares and compasses seems to be an option that a commander would adapt only under pressure.

Endnotes

1. V.G. Chabanenko served in the Republic of Afghanistan from December 1983 through June 1985 as a battalion commander.
2. The 103d Airborne Division (according to Mr. Grau).
3. Reprinted with permission from **The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan**, Grau, Lester W., Editor (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996).

Extract from the President's Executive Order 13228: Establishing the Office of Homeland Security & the Homeland Security Council

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
October 8, 2001

Mission & Management: The President will establish the Office of Homeland Security that will be headed by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security — Governor Tom Ridge. The mission of the Office will be to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The Office will coordinate the executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States.

National Strategy: The Office will work with executive departments and agencies, state and local governments, and private entities to ensure

the adequacy of the national strategy for detecting, preparing for, preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from terrorist threats or attacks within the United States and will periodically review and coordinate revisions to that strategy as necessary.

Detection: The Office will identify priorities and coordinate efforts for collection and analysis of information within the United States regarding threats of terrorism against the United States and activities of terrorists or terrorist groups within the United States.

Preparedness: The Office of Homeland Security will coordinate national efforts to prepare for and mitigate the consequences of terrorist threats or attacks within the United States. In performing this function, the Office will work with federal, state, and local agencies, and private entities.

Prevention: The Office will coordinate efforts to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States. In performing this function, the Office shall work with federal, state, and local agencies, and private entities to facilitate the exchange of information among such agencies relating to immigration and visa matters and shipments of cargo; and, working with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, ensure coordination among such agencies to prevent the entry of terrorists and terrorist materials and supplies into the United States and facilitate removal of such terrorists from the United States, when appropriate; coordinate efforts to investigate terrorist threats and attacks within the United States; and coordinate efforts to improve the security of United States borders, territorial waters, and airspace in order to prevent acts of

terrorism within the United States, working with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, when appropriate.

Protection: The Office will coordinate efforts to protect the United States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks.

Response and Recovery: The Office will coordinate efforts to respond to and promote recovery from terrorist threats or attacks within the United States.

The Homeland Security Council: The President's Executive Order establishes a Homeland Security Council which will be responsible for

advising and assisting the President with respect to all aspects of homeland security. The Council will serve as the mechanism for ensuring coordination of homeland security-related activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation of homeland security policies.

Geography and Transportation of Afghanistan

Extract from The World Factbook 2001 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence, 2001).

Location: Southern Asia, north and west of Pakistan, east of Iran, in a box bounded by 29° to 39° North, 060° to 075° East.

Area: 647,500 square km or 250,000 square miles (slightly smaller than Texas). Area is 100% land, 0% water.

Boundaries: Total 5,529 km or 3,436 miles, all land with no coastline (landlocked). Bordering countries and length of shared borders are People's Republic of China 76 km, Iran 936 km, Pakistan 2,430 km, Tajikistan 1,206 km, Turkmenistan 744 km, and Uzbekistan 137 km.

Climate: Arid to semiarid, cold winters and hot summers.

Terrain: Afghanistan consists mostly of rugged mountains, with plains in the north and southwest. The lowest point is Amu Darya at 258 meters. Nowshak at 7,485 meters is the highest point. Twelve percent of the land is arable, but the country has no areas of permanent crops. Nearly half the land area is permanent pasture, and another 3% is forests and woodland. Much of the remaining forest land is being cut down for fuel and building materials, and deforestation is a current environmental issue. There are also problems with soil degradation, overgrazing, and desertification. Approximately 30,000 square km have been

irrigated (1993 estimate). Damaging earthquakes occur in the Hindu Kush mountains to the northeast. Flooding and droughts also threaten the area.

Transportation: Afghanistan has a total of 21,000 km of highways. Of that total, 18,207 km are unpaved (1998 estimate). The total railway length is only 24.6 km (broad gauge rail at the borders with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). There are 1,200 km of navigable waterways, mostly the Amu Darya River, which forms part of the country's northern border. There are 45 airports (2000 estimate). Ten of these are paved and only three of these have a runway length over 3,047 meters. There are also three heliports.

Applicable NIMA Products Covering Afghanistan and the Middle East

The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) has produced standard hardcopy and digital map and imagery products covering Afghanistan. Army logistics elements (S4s) can assist in the requisitioning of these products. You may obtain them from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) through a variety of ordering methods, although electronic ordering is preferred. DLA's Defense Supply Center-Richmond (the map facility in Richmond, Virginia) requests that you use the Military Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) and submit orders via

the Defense Automatic Addressing System (DAAS). Electronic ordering allows Geospatial Information and Services consumers to take advantage of their intraservice or agency logistics systems to electronically transmit their orders to Richmond. In lieu of intrasupport systems, the Defense Automatic Addressing System Center (DAASC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, offers alternate electronic methods that greatly reduce order processing and shipping time. One such method used by customers for DAAS connectivity is Web Requisitioning (WebReq), a

DAAS system that allows customers to order mapping products via an Internet website. Refer to the Richmond Map Facility Website at <http://www.dscr.dla.mil/pc9/> and follow the links to Ordering Info and Web Ordering.

NIMA standard product coverage of Afghanistan, as of September, 2001, includes hardcopy topographic and aeronautical products available from the NIMA Library (see Figure 1). There are no hydrographic products at this time. NIMA also offers six standard digital products and an additional one (see Figure 2).

Topographic.

- ❑ Series U611, 1:100,000 scale (Topographic Line Map). There are 505 sheets available, covering the entire country.
- ❑ Series U911, 1:25,000 scale (City Graphic), Kabul sheets 1 and 2. No other city graphics for Afghanistan are currently available.

Aeronautical.

- ❑ Series 1501A (aeronautical) & 1501C (combined aeronautical and ground), Joint Operations Graphics (JOG) 1:250,000 scale. There are 65 sheets available that cover Afghanistan.
- ❑ Series TPC (Tactical Pilotage Chart), 1:500,000 scale, 7 sheets.
- ❑ Series ONC (Operational Navigation Chart), 1:1,000,000 scale, 4 sheets.

Figure 1. NIMA Hardcopy Products on Afghanistan.

Standard Products.

- ❑ VMAP1 (Level 1 Vector Map) Vector-based geospatial data in Vector Product Format (VPF). Data separated into ten thematic layers, each of which contains thematically consistent data. A reference library provides general information to orient the user. All data are topologically structured, and each coverage contains a set of files that describes the features in that thematic layer. VMAP1 contains medium resolution data at the 1:250,000 scale. There are 5 compact discs (CDs) that cover Afghanistan. Currently, we offer no coverage of the Kabul area. UVMAPAFGHANISTA is a city-scale vector map of the city of Kabul.
- ❑ DTED1, Level 1 elevation data (90-meter post spacings), 2 CDs, TCDXXDTED135 covers most of the country, south tip is on TCDXXDTED149.
- ❑ CIB5, Controlled Image Base-5 meter. In Raster Product Format (RPF), which is compatible with the National Imagery Transmission Format (NITF) standard. 12 CDs available. The Kabul area and other parts of the north and east are not yet available.
- ❑ Arc-Digitized Raster Graphics (ADRG), a 254-dots per inch (dpi) scan of NIMA hardcopy products.
 - Series ARC9 Kabul 1 & 2 (City Graphics)
 - Series ARC1, 1:500,000 (Tactical Pilotage Charts). 7 CDs.
 - ARC1XU611x0001, 45 CDs (most of AF)
 - ARC5, 16 CDs (most of AF)
- ❑ Compressed Arc-Digitized Raster Graphics (CADRG) Also in RPF format. A 169-dpi downsampling of ADRG. Provides a 55:1 compression ratio. Series is CDRG. CDRGXAF100K, 1 CD with entire country at 1:100,000 scale (Topographic Line Map), 2 CDs at the 1:250,000 scale (Joint Operations Graphics). CDRGXONCTPC, 2 CDs, containing both 1:1,000,000 and 1:500,000 scale aeronautical charts.
- ❑ Digital Feature Analysis Data (DFAD) Level 1 and 1C. Vector data consisting of selected natural and manmade features classified by size and composition. Format is sequential (spaghetti) vector and data is segregated into 1° x 1° geographic cells. DFAD 1 is from imagery, DFAD 1C is from cartographic source. Density of detail approximates that of medium scale (1:250,000). Stock number TCDF1WORLDREG6 is both DFAD 1 and 1C and covers Afghanistan and much of the Middle East.

Nonstandard Products.

- ❑ Feature Foundation Data (FFD). Vector data at medium scale in VPF. Along IR Border, 1° x 1°, available on NIMA secure websites.

Figure 2. Available Afghanistan-Related Digital Products from NIMA.

Army Intelligence Master Plan

by Keith Masback

The immediate challenge for Army Intelligence is to meet the myriad challenges associated with the global war on terrorism and emerging homeland security issues while simultaneously proceeding with the ambitious Army Transformation process. The Army Intelligence Master Plan (AIMP) is at the nexus of Army Intelligence Transformation, and the AIMP team is heavily engaged in responding to the current crisis. AIMP integrates and synchronizes the efforts of diverse organizations, both inside and outside the Army.

Established in 1986 through a unique partnership of the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, AIMP comprises a government and contractor integrated concept team (ICT) and integrated product team (IPT). The AIMP principal office is in Falls Church, Virginia, with additional locations at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, the Pentagon, and Fort Meade, Maryland. AIMP, while focused on the future, daily engages in issues that span the full spectrum of Army Intelligence issues.

The AIMP charter is: *"To provide a single, synchronized strategy for the evolution of Army Intelligence, at all echelons, to successfully support Army Transformation to the Objective Force."* Enabled by resident subject-matter expertise and an extended network of consultants and advisors, the AIMP coalesces the efforts of all the important players in Army Intelligence to build a coherent strategy for achieving Army Intelligence Transformation. Since Army Intelligence Transformation extends far beyond the

Army, AIMP's critical linkages to joint and national agencies and organizations are crucial.

AIMP Areas of Focus. AIMP's focus areas are intelligence futures, data management, and decision support tools.

Intelligence Futures. The AIMP employs a methodology and process to articulate the vision of Army Intelligence for the future, a frank assessment of where we are today, and an analysis of the "delta" that results in a plan to move forward, focused on the envisioned end-state. The Army Intelligence Transformation Campaign Plan (AITCP) codifies that result. Embedded within the AITCP is an action plan that identifies the high-level goals and objectives as well as the organizational responsibilities for refining and executing the actions. Ultimately, this will serve to synchronize the activities of the entire Army Intelligence community on the journey that is Army Transformation.

Crucial to the AITCP is a sound assessment of our shortcomings and desired capabilities. By examining the doctrine, training, leadership, organizational, materiel, soldiers, and policy (DTLOMS-P) impacts, we begin to identify solutions that, considered in the light of other intelligence issues, lead to solidified Army positions. In turn, the output, the electronic AIMP (eAIMP), is the primary means of disseminating the established Army positions on intelligence-related issues. The eAIMP is the virtual home of the AITCP. As the eAIMP evolves, it will foster sharing and facilitating discussion among the Army Intelligence community. The eAIMP website (<http://aimp.dami.army.smil.mil>) is a valuable resource for all military intelligence (MI) professionals.

Data Management. The AIMP pulls data from more than a dozen disparate Army corporate databases to assess issues critical to the MI force and to provide answers on force struc-




Figure 1. The AIMP functions of the primary participants.

ture, manpower, and programmatic. This AIMP program, called the Analytic Assessment Tool (AAT), provides a detailed analysis of MI programs for the current year through the Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) years and enables action officers and senior leaders alike to make informed decisions on the future MI force. It is the data warehouse for Army.

Intelligence – the “one-stop shop” for documenting and facilitating analysis about how we want to look in the future. The ability to derive the right answer at the right time to enable a decision is key to enabling Army Intelligence Transformation.

Decision Support Tools. The AIMP has developed automated decision support tools to map future Army Intelligence requirements against projected budgets. These tools help identify unfunded requirements and assist action officers and decision-makers to determine “bill payers” for the future force.

The first of these tools is the National Foreign Intelligence Program Investment Strategy (NFIPIS) which is a prototype deci-

sion tool designed to support program development for those elements and activities of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) that fall under Army supervision.

The second decision support tool is the Force Development Intelligence Investment Strategy (FDIIS), a robust prototype software tool to support analysis and presentation of the Army Total Obligation Authority by portraying funding data from the appropriate Army databases. Although developed and used for Army Intelligence, in recognition of its powerful analysis capability, the Army has mandated FDIIS for use by every battlefield functional area in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs to build the Army's POM.

Final Thoughts. The MI leadership presented the Army Intelligence Vision and essential parts of the AITCP at the September 2001 Army Worldwide Intelligence Conference (held at Fort Huachuca). The presentation documents are available on the eAIMP. AIMP encourages all MI professionals to become involved in the transformation of Army Intelligence. You must speak the language, understand, and embrace Army Transformation so you can help

define and implement Army Intelligence Transformation. AIMP, through the AITCP and eAIMP, will facilitate the discussion and document the effort. We need the involvement of the entire MI Corps to transform Army Intelligence to achieve the goal of providing the Army with decision dominance on the battlefields of the future. We must remain “*Always Out Front*” and the AIMP is integral to that challenge.

Keith Masback is the Director of the Army Intelligence Master Plan (AIMP), Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT). During his Army service, Mr. Masback was an Infantry officer with the Berlin Brigade, transitioned to the Military Intelligence Branch and then served with the XVIIIth Airborne Corps. He served in the ODCSINT Initiatives Group and as the Military Assistant to the DCSINT. In his final position as an active duty officer, he managed requirements and resourcing for the Army's Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) Program. Most recently, Mr. Masback served as the Deputy Director of the Director's Initiatives Group at the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from Gettysburg College, completed the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program, and is a candidate for a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency.



New Website for Future Leaders

CompanyCommand.com is a website dedicated to company-level leaders who want to learn and share their ideas on command issues from a myriad of topics ranging from leadership to Army policies. Eight Army officers currently assigned as staff and faculty at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, operate CompanyCommand.com during their off-duty hours without remuneration. The website offers many interesting topics such as command philosophies, Army policies, leadership counseling, officer professional development (OPD), and even a recommended professional reading program.

The website's goal is to improve the institutional knowledge at the company-level of Army leadership by improving the lateral flow of information. Its purpose is to serve as a user-driven forum in which former and current company commanders share their best ideas, products, and lessons learned to benefit current and future company commanders. Infantry Majors Nate Allen and Tony Burgess, the site founders, commented that their sole purpose is helping leaders to grow great units and soldiers.

CompanyCommand.com has established a section organized by branch that links unique experiences and competencies of former and current commanders. For the intelligence community, the website lists military intelligence contacts including three former MI company commanders who are volunteer mentors. The operators of the site plan to expand it with platoon leader tools for those junior leaders.

Among the site's other offerings are the “command tools” section with professional presentations, lessons learned, surveys, and stories from the contributors. There are quizzes, after-action reviews, tactical scenarios, monthly updates, and more. The web site also provides its users with links to other military websites.

CompanyCommand.com's popularity has increased since its debut in February 2000. The number of “hits” has increased from 11,114 hits in February to more than 600,000 hits as of 30 September.

Doctrine Corner

Even before 11 September 2001, the end of the Cold War; the proliferation of regional, ethnic, and religious confrontations; and the increasing number of stability operations and support operations had forced a change in the way the Army's intelligence analysts conducted business. The tragedies in New York and Washington, the anthrax menace, and the still unknown threats posed by terrorist organizations have again changed the way the intelligence analyst must think. Today's threats and missions span all aspects of full-spectrum operations. Even worse, the analyst might face several of these threats simultaneously. This was not the case during the Cold War when the focus was on the Soviet Union and both nations faced the same threats and, for the most part, addressed them in the same manner.

The soldiers of the Gulf War understood Warsaw Pact doctrine well and the United States had, over the years, refined the analytical processes to address it. Today's analysts must seek innovative solutions to increasingly complex problems and threats. "The Doctrinal Corner" will serve as one means to identify potential solutions to these problems by providing intelligence professionals with the latest in emerging doctrine. Future issues of the **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)** will focus on homeland defense, counterterrorist operations, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and other topics. Its accomplishment, however, requires input from two sources. The Doctrine Division, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), will provide the baseline or emerging doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for your review. You, the intelligence professional, must then respond by addressing, through your submission of articles to the **MIPB**, the effectiveness of this doctrine and identify new methods and TTP that may have merit. Together, through the **MIPB** medium, all will benefit.

The Intelligence Analyst and Unique Environments

by Michael P. Ley

For the analyst, the types of operations conducted since the Gulf War have followed no particular pattern; each operation offered its own unique challenge not only to the National Command Authority (NCA) but also to the analyst tasked with providing intelligence for the decision-makers. The unique environments could include any combination of mission and location ("unique" being both a physical environment and a "type" of operation for which there is a lack of current operational experience by U.S. military forces). Such operations and environments might include—

- ☐ Urban.
- ☐ Mountain.
- ☐ Littoral.

- ☐ Counterterrorist.
- ☐ Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC).
- ☐ Many others.

For the intelligence analyst, the order to prepare to deploy in support of an operation in a unique environment often presents the problem of "where to start?" Focused training opportunities such as the mission readiness exercises (MREs) that prepare our units for deployments to Bosnia and Kosovo may be missing. Instead, the intelligence analyst's experience may be more along conventional lines, such as force-on-force offensive and defensive operations. As well trained as he may be for the conventional battleground, he may find he is ill-prepared to cope with the threats

identified on 11 September 2001. One example is preparing for operations in an urban environment in which, according to Marine General Charles C. Krulak, he may find the "three-block war,"¹ an environment in which peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and full-scale combat operations may occur simultaneously and within blocks of each other.

The physical environment may also offer unique challenges. For example, a study of the Fulda Gap might include its vegetation, elevation, and percent of slope datum, location of water sources, and others. Now overlay those physical elements with the population, layout, infrastructure, and cultural aspects of a major metropolitan area and you begin to see the challenge.




Figure 1. Sample Urban Analytical Framework.

What was necessary was an analytical tool that allowed analysts to focus on the important elements of the target environment (mission, terrain, and threat). They must do so in a timely manner, and accomplish it while working within the four-step IPB process.

The result was development of the Analytical Framework and Analytical Worksheet (shown in Figures 1 and 2, respectively). The analytical framework and worksheet are inter-dependent, the framework providing

a graphic aid showing both the critical elements and a process for reaching understanding of a situation. Note that the framework identifies this process through labeling each element as a "step." This step process will provide a logical methodology in identifying the critical details of the urban areas. Like the rest of the framework design, however, the user defines and modifies it as desired. Finally, the analytical worksheet serves as the data-recording element of the framework-worksheet combination and is be

maintainable in both analog and digital formats.

The Urban Analytical Framework in Figure 1 reflects use of this methodology and process. We chose to discuss the urban environment because of its complex nature and the fact that since 1995 the larger Army contingencies have been in and around urban areas. The twelve elements identified on the framework resulted from lengthy discussions held at the Joint level. Participants included representatives of the British Army,

Urban Analytical Worksheet

Step 1. Key Terrain	Lvorno River, Lvorno Bridge, walled fortifications, Lvorno Venice Highway.	The Lvorno River carries barge traffic; the Lvorno Bridge is the only remaining standing bridge over the river for 34 km in both directions. The 16th century city walls are 32 ft high by 35 ft wide and are comprised of stone with an earth filler. The wall encircles the city except at two gated locations. The Lvorno-Venice highway is a two-lane blacktop road, and above the city has been cut at the Tuscan River and Padiero Pass.
Step 2. General Urban Description	City of Lvorno	The city of Lvorno had a pre-war population of 55,600. It is located on the Tuscan Plateau and lies on the banks of the Lvorno River.
Step 3. Zoned Areas and Patterns	City of Lvorno	The city of Lvorno is of the "A" pattern, with dense, random construction intermixed with "C" pattern close residential areas. Two "E" industrial areas are apparent while the city is ringed by a single "F" pattern medieval wall.
Step 4. LOC	City of Lvorno	Table 5-2 depicts the most important LOCs identifiable in the image. These include the Lvorno Bridge, the two primary access streets leading to the Lvorno Bridge, the Lvorno River, and the Lvorno Venice highway.
Step 5. Urban Patterns	City of Lvorno	Figure 5-4 depicts a city of the segment or pie-slice pattern.
Step 6. Street Patterns	City of Lvorno	Figure 5- depicts a city employing a combination of radial-ring and irregular patterns.
Step 7. Pattern Effects	City of Lvorno	Figure 5-7 depicts a funnel-pattern effect that may concentrate or canalize forces without immediate fanning. This effect will occur primarily because of the impact of the old city walls in limiting access to the city core.
Step 8. Structural Types	City of Lvorno	Key structure includes an old city wall, constructed primarily of stone and earth, the heavily damaged Ansaldo truck works at the upper center of the image and the OTO weapons works at the center right of the image. Both industrial complexes are heavily damaged.
Step 9. Mobility Corridors and Avenues of Approach	City of Lvorno	Heavy damage to the city's infrastructure has left large amounts of rubble and unknown resulting mobility corridors. Intact structures may include all six of the mobility corridors. Primary AAs are restricted by the Old Wall but include the four gates (north, south, east, and west) with the south gate being restricted by the narrow confines of the Lvorno Bridge.
Step 10. OKOCA Factors	City of Lvorno	Locational dependent but applying to all OKOCA factors.
Step 11. Other Significant Characteristics	City of Lvorno	The city is 90 percent Catholic with two primary churches: Palacio del Camen and Avenida Santa Maria. The Chapel del San Marcos lies just outside the city at the Fabrique Marceau clothing works which is believed to be 70 percent damaged.
Step 12. The Threat	City of Lvorno	Elements of the 2nd Reggio di Calabria Regiment are defending Lvorno. Key locations include blockhouses on both sides of the Lvorno Bridge, checkpoints at each gate, light anti-tank weapons along the eastern side of the Old Wall, light anti-tank weapons along the Old Wall's boundaries, and the regiment's headquarters and assembly area believed to be the Pedro del Sforza Park and Sports Complex.

Figure 2. Sample Urban Analytical Worksheet.

the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), and all U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) proponents under the guidance of the Combined Arms MOUT (military operations on urbanized terrain) Task Force. One should not, however, assume that these elements were the only ones identified. This framework focused on those elements deemed most critical to planners and analysts at the operational level. The division and brigade levels should develop additional frameworks and worksheets. Below brigade, the level of detail more accurately reflects elements identified by the OCOKA (observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, avenue of approach) factors.

We must emphasize that we intended the twelve elements only as a blueprint. The elements employed in any framework are user defined. The intelligence analyst should carefully choose the framework's elements in such a manner as to allow him to address an existing need. We should also note that work on the framework might begin in garrison, at the first indication that a unit will deploy, or even as part of contingency planning. Initial data sources may include the various readiness packages, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) products, commercial publications, or other sources.

As seen in the framework, the first eight elements identify the physical attributes of the urban environment.

These would seem to place more emphasis on the physical properties than on the remaining elements; however, we developed this sample framework specifically to support a study of Pristina, Kosovo. Other situations may call for the identification of different elements. Any element may develop additional frameworks at any time to show a higher resolution for that specific element as needed. This would hold true especially through a corps level exercise where the G2 wished to see the points of focus not only at corps but also at each division and brigade. By netting and linking the various frameworks to show the focus of the information collection and analytical efforts, we can accomplish this easily. Additional information on this process will be available in Chapter 5, **ST 2-01.3-1**. (Untitled).

In using the analytical framework and worksheet process, the analyst determines the details of the element identified on the framework and records the information on the worksheet where it is available for later analysis. When he has identified and recorded the details of all elements, the analyst has not only an initial framework portraying his environment but also has achieved focus on his efforts. Additionally, this provides both a tool and a methodology within the IPB process to accomplish the analysis mission. Other uses of these tools include—

- ☐ Providing the potential for rapid response to the commander's

initial priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

- ☐ Serving as a ready-made briefing tool.
- ☐ Providing user-defined level of detail on any element or subelement under study.
- ☐ Identifying information gaps.
- ☐ Identifying patterns (pattern analysis).
- ☐ Assisting with visualization and understanding.
- ☐ Providing a graphic illustration of the urban operations critical elements.

More work is necessary to refine this process, and the author solicits input and recommendations from users. Additional research may be conducted at the Doctrine Website at <http://usaic.hua.army.mil/DOCTRINE/dlbs.htm> and at the MOUT Homepage, <http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453>.



Endnotes

1. Remarks for The National Press Club on 10 October 1997.

*Mr. Michael Ley is a doctrine writer and the Managing Editor, **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)**, in the Doctrine Division, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. He served two tours in Vietnam as a Military Advisor, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) Team #62, and later served in a variety of electronic warfare, collection management, operational testing, and topographic positions. He retired from the U.S. Army in 1990. Readers may reach him via E-mail at michael.ley@hua.army.mil and by telephone at (520) 538-0979 or DSN 879-0979.*

Writer of the Quarter

MIPB is pleased to announce the Writers of the Quarter are 1st place, Major Christopher J. Tatarka for his article "**Overcoming Biases in Military Problem Analysis and Decision-Making**" and runner-up is, Dr. Thomas M. Kane, Ph.D. for his article "**Strategic Analysis: To Hear the Thunder.**" Congratulations to winners and thanks to all of our authors for their articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. Contributions like yours make **MIPB** the professional forum for military intelligence professionals.

Analysis the Prophet Way

by Colonel Kevin C. Peterson

Prophet is the U.S. Army's next generation, multispectrum, multi-discipline collection, jamming, processing, and reporting system. The Prophet system will be modular, scalable, deployable, and tailorable to address the full range of conflict required of the U.S. Army.

The initial version is the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV)-mounted Prophet system. Prophet also has a dismounted manpack capability, which is uniquely suitable for airborne insertion and early entry into the battlespace. Prophet's primary mission will be to provide around-the-clock, all weather, enhanced situational awareness and situational understanding to maneuver commanders in near-real time (NRT). It will do this through the detection, collection, and exploitation of radiofrequency (RF) emissions (Blocks I through V), as well as collected signatures and measurement data (Blocks IV and V). Prophet's secondary mission will be to provide an array of nonlethal technology (Blocks II, IV, and V), which will be able to interrupt, spoof, disrupt, or disable select target command and control (C²) nodes.

Prophet will consist of ground RF and measurement collection platforms that operate in direct support of the maneuver unit. The system will provide "niche" sensor coverage to support full-spectrum operations. Prophet's "niche" coverage will provide reinforcing and NRT intelligence to tactical maneuver commanders under a variety of deployed configurations (division, brigade, regiment, task force, etc.). This intelligence will provide—

- ☐ Perceptive environmental surveys.
- ☐ Indications and warning.
- ☐ Location, tracking, and identification of hostile forces and equipment.
- ☐ Determination of enemy plans and intentions.

It will also serve to cross-cue other battlefield sensors (e.g., Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle [TUAV], the Future Combat System of Systems [FCSS], and Firefinder radars), as well as to provide amplifying data to confirm indications and collection from other battlefield sensors.

Prophet disseminates intelligence information on the battlefield through a Prophet control (PC) element collocated with the brigade tactical operations center (TOC). PCs will perform emitter mapping and nodal analysis on Prophet-derived intelligence, and then forward timely and accurate targeting information, intelligence products, and predictions on probable enemy courses of action to the brigade commander. The Prophet control element will provide reports to higher echelons using standard, digital reporting formats and voice reporting functionality. Envisioned to operate at the Secret collateral level only, PC will provide C² and technical steerage to Prophet systems and receive situational updates and supplementary tasking from higher echelons. We will field each set of Prophets with a PC operated by four soldiers: two signals intelligence (SIGINT) Analysts (military occupational specialty [MOS] 98C) and two Communications Intercept/Locators (MOS 98H).

Since the Prophet program design is for a five-block, acquisition strategy program, PC will include follow-on block preplanned product improvements (P³Is) over the next five years. The initial phase PC will only consist of automation and communications equipment. Two All-Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS-L) workstations will complement the PC. ASAS-L workstations connected through a local-area network (LAN) will provide a distributed processing environment for accessing and managing intelligence data and information. These workstations will host a core set of common applications, services, and tools that appropriate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensor planning, management, and presentation software can augment or update. This software tool set will—

- ☐ Enable analysts to research and determine traffic densities and network structures.
- ☐ Locate emitters.
- ☐ Display historical trends in electronic order of battle (EOB).
- ☐ Produce tactical, multiple intelligence discipline ("multi-INT") reports.

These tools will also assist the operator in interrogation and the retrieval, processing, and correlation of intelligence information from multi-INT databases. Operators will use these workstations to receive and process Prophet's digital intelligence reports and to provide technical tasking.

As we add the P³I upgrades, PC will migrate into a multi-INT processing role and possess the capability to

conduct operations mounted on-board a single vehicle. The PC vehicle will have a small but capable analysis, control, and technical steerage ability. This capability will permit system operators to receive large amounts of incoming data—such as lines-of-bearing (LOBs) and measurement and signature data from seismic, acoustic, or infrared sensors—and efficiently fuse this data with non-Prophet sensor data, such as moving target indicator data from the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS). Prophet analysts will be able to convert the “blobology” of undefined data intersects into solid identifications, verified by fusing target matches in and across several databases.

The PC will have an on-the-move (OTM) capability that gives the tactical commander the flexibility to monitor new developments during highly fluid operations and while re-deploying a TOC. Objectively, the PC element will also serve as the exfiltration node for remoting selected voice-grade channels to higher echelons for further exploitation. Remoting is essential to extend collection baselines to maximize collection, exploitation, and lethality.

The PC element will be capable of digitally interfacing with the supported division well as the tactical warfighter “at the point of the spear.”

The Army will upgrade PC’s workstations to be interoperable (information exchange) with the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) suite and the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) baselines. As the extended battlespace grows and the speed of operations increases, PC will be able to provide for the rapid processing, analysis, and throughput of ISR information. PC’s primary interface will be the signals and signatures enclaves of the Division Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A). At the brigade level, PC will preprocess Prophet-derived intelligence for subsequent digital injection into the supported battle command system enroute to the applicable DCGS-A enclave. PC workstations will interface with automated C² and intelligence processing systems over various battlefield communications systems. These communications are vital to the exchange of information with other Prophet systems, brigade operational and intelligence elements, ISR integration cells, and applicable DCGS-A. We will accomplish all multi-sensor (SIGINT and measurement and signature intelligence [MASINT]) tasking, reporting, cross-correlation of databases, algorithm updates, and remoting of signals within this framework.

Additionally, P³I will include a PC element with the ability to receive

collateral Integrated Broadcast System (IBS) data digitally, as well as the ability to inject Prophet-derived intelligence data and reports into IBS. Increasing the commander’s ability to leverage and cross-cue available sensors, PC’s ability to transmit reports enables the sharing of Prophet-derived data with other ISR assets operating in-theater, thus enhancing the supported commander’s overall operational effectiveness.

Maneuver commanders on the high-speed battlefield of today require the capability to respond rapidly to changing operational scenarios that PC and the Prophet suite of systems provide. PC will be the critical link between Prophet, its supported commander, and higher echelons. The PC element’s ability to process, correlate, fuse, and display Prophet-derived intelligence data will meet these demands and will ensure the lethality and survivability of U.S. forces in the field.



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The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) at DCX II

by Michel M. Strack

In October 2001, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager (TSM) ASAS participated in the successful Division Capstone Exercise Phase II (DCX II) held at Fort Hood, Texas. This was a good opportunity to observe the prototype ASAS Remote Workstation (RWS) Version 6.2.1 software in a command post exercise (CPX).

While much work remains to be done, the results were encouraging. Presented below is a brief discussion of some problem areas and possible solutions.

Problem Areas and Operator Concerns

The most significant problem continues to be with the stability of the common tactical picture (CTP). DCX II produced 38 known trouble reports

generated due to problems with the CTP; these reports described the system’s inability to send, receive, or plot operational overlays from the CTP Explorer due to lock-up and booting problems. Throughout the CPX, the tactical operation centers (TOCs) observed that when the CTP was stable and operational, the analysts sometimes had to input graphics multiple times. Thus, aside from probing into the various stability is-

Soldiers experienced with the RWS Version 4.3 systems were generally disappointed with the Version 6.2.1. The common complaint was that the intelligence functions in the Version 6 system did not meet the standard set by the earlier version and the overriding concern was that the Version 6 system is inflexible and unreliable. However, many of the soldiers' concerns were actually with the Army Battlefield Command System's (ABCS) foundation software rather than the Version 6 ASAS. Observations of the RWSs revealed unexplained lock-ups and screen freezes when multiple operations and pro-

Solutions

TSM ASAS is committed to support the digitalized Army. To shift our focus from the “boxes” to the battle, we are examining improved ways to transfer data between computers and systems. We will overcome the software complexities and improve the reliability and stability of our systems. In doing so, we focus on supporting

the transformation effort at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center. One area that must continue to evolve is the training of competent digital operators—at both the initial entry and advanced levels—who are proficiently trained on ASAS with good understanding of the total ABCS Version 6 environment. Training should start with a familiarity of the ABCS products and later include the basic cross-system troubleshooting.



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Distance Learning

Broadband Intelligence Training System

The Training Development Directorate, Futures Development Integration Center, USAIC&FH, is introducing a broadband intelligence training system designed to provide high fidelity adaptive training with collaborative learning environments to soldier and civilian homes that will not compromise operational security. The training available includes counter-intelligence, intelligence analyst, force protection, and foreign language training for active and reserve component military professionals.

The commercial broadband technology will be used as a way to provide high bandwidth for Internet-based training and collaboration to soldier and civilian homes. The Internet Protocol Direct Broadcast Satellite (IPDBS) technology, combined with software for asynchronous and synchronous learning environments, exploit the technology and implement cost savings, particularly when bundled with existing communications and entertainment services.

The proposed initiative complements The Army Distance Learning Program by extending training from the classroom to the entity level. We postulate that integrated services to the home will allow training to become part of the user's lifelong culture in a convenient environment that facilitates growth, and optimizes time. One advantage is the advancement of warfighters from analog to the digital environment.

In addition to delivering courseware, the Intelligence Center is challenged

to teach soldiers to effectively adapt to unknown and/or rapidly changing environments. The courseware created in this authentic environment requires collaboration and can be media intensive when using a significant bandwidth requirement. To produce courseware, the Constructivist Learning Theory by J. Bruner is used as the basis for instructional design strategies. Analysis showed IPDBS technology as the most efficient way to meet audience requirements globally and deliver high fidelity products combined with full motion multi-point collaboration. In theory, constructive and virtual simulations could also be distributed to the home.

We can ascertain that those who are most successful in the information age warfare and global commerce are those immersed in the information age techniques as a culture. Integrating our training with communication and entertainment in the home will in turn mature the user base needed for global competition. Soldiers and civilians will become globally ready when the information age is commonplace, just as the telephone and television are today.

The benefits will transfer from elementary to higher education, and on into the business sectors nationwide providing an industrial base that will allow the United States to be more competitive in a global economy. An ancillary benefit could be an increase in the number and quality of potential recruits who may be introduced to

the military ethos in their formative years.

The Intelligence Center is proposing a government and industry arrangement that would implement a 1000 user pilot over two years. This will validate the potential to capitalize on IPDBS return path technology in conjunction with courseware platforms optimized for real-time delivery. The business model will provide the impetus needed to sustain industry support as economies of scale create competitive pricing that will lower the government cost to distribute in-home training to more users. This results in higher quality products and services delivered to more users for considerably lower cost than the Army currently spends for distance learning, a pervasive market base for industry, and a technically competent, competitive country.



Distance Learning Update

New! Anti-terrorism training is now available at the MI Distance Learning Website. Lessons are web-delivered and self-paced; instruction that you can download includes anti-terrorism, intelligence in combating terrorism, and SAEDA (subversion and espionage directed against the Army). You may access some of this training via the Distance Learning Website at www.intel.army.mil/. Some lessons are currently available on CD-ROM only and can be requested via E-mail at dlo@hua.army.mil. You can reach the DL point of contact, Mike Dascanio, at Michael.dascanio@hua.army.mil.

Professional Reader

The Principles of War for the Information Age by Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Leonhard, Novato, CA, (Presidio Press, Inc., 1998), 287 pages, paperback 1995.

by LTC Rich Holden

Why do we need principles of war? According to LTC Bob Leonhard's book, **The Principles of War for the Information Age**, "Principles serve to make us do things that we would otherwise not naturally do of our own accord. Principles are intended to change behavior." Well, that is exactly what he proposes, and demands, with his new set of principles of war—to change our military behavior in order to fight and win in the information age. LTC Leonhard sets the stage for introducing his new principles by conducting a great forensic analysis of the current principles, how they came to be, how some should never have been principles, and how all but two are no longer relevant.

Our steady transformation from analog to digital is changing the way we operate in new and different ways every day. If we are truly "in the midst of a 'revolution in military affairs'" then part of this revolution needs to start with the Industrial Age principles of war, according to LTC Leonhard. This book is even more relevant now that we have begun to use the new contemporary operational environment (COE) with its new opposing force (OPFOR) as the framework against which we plan all Army training. LTC Leonhard issues a challenge to the reader "to question...175 years of military convention and usage." It is a challenge that we must take up if we are to be successful in information age warfare.

The principles of war are a mental framework developed to address problems in warfare. The currently accepted Principles, better remembered by the acronym MOSSMOUSE (mass, objective, surprise, maneuver, offensive, unity of command, simplicity, economy of force), are a set of tactical ideas we have extrapolated, over time, to operational and strategic levels. A problem with the current principles is trying to determine to what level of conflict they should be applied, given that all of the principles started at the level of the tactical battle. Since every problem is different, military professionals have to apply and adapt their own experience and judgment while following the principle's guidance. However, this application by military leaders throughout history has varied greatly, and LTC Leonhard's examples from World War I highlight some of the worst cases of not adapting (the Battle of the Somme, for example).

With the principles of war being one of the foundations of our doctrine, another important issue that LTC Leonhard raises throughout the book is this: Which comes first, doctrine or technology? He states that "Doctrine typically lags behind

technology...sometimes leading to disaster," which he highlights in his discussion of the principle of *Surprise*. He shows how *Surprise* will remain a principle that applies to not only tactical surprise, but also to technical surprise (the extreme example is the atomic bomb use which led to the defeat of Japan in World War II—their "disaster"). With a view toward the new **FM 3-0, Operations**, the ongoing Army Transformation and the development of the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), the various Battle Labs, and the Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), has the Army finally realized the need to get doctrine up to technology's speed? The AWEs include the Task Force XXI AWE in March 1997, the Division AWE (DAWE), in November 1997, the Joint Contingence Force AWE in 2000, the Division Capstone Exercise (DCX) I this past March at the National Training Center (NTC), and the November 2001 DCX II at Fort Hood, Texas.

Since a large part of the exercises mentioned above revolve around simulations, LTC Leonhard hits the nail on the head concerning simulations and their effects on the results of "doctrinal degeneration" on the Army. A commonly heard phrase within Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) is that "BCTP has taught the Army as many bad ideas as good ones." Since BCTP primarily uses simulations for its brigade through ARFOR level exercises, this concern about simulations is well founded. However, as the Chief of Staff of the Army has stated at numerous after-action reviews regarding simulations used, "It is about warfighting, it is not warfighting." As LTC Leonhard correctly points out, part of this "doctrinal degeneration" derives from the fact that OPFOR in simulations have always fought to the very last soldier. This has caused us to become target-and precision strike-centric in order to destroy the OPFOR down to that last soldier while not taking into account the synergistic effects of combined-arms warfare or the moral dimensions of war. Fortunately, this approach is changing. Coding changes are in the works so that the COE OPFOR will not fight to the last person, and we are building several levels of disengagement criteria into the current and future versions of simulations (the corps battle simulation specifically).

LTC Leonhard uses an interesting framework for discussing the necessary changes from the current Principles to his new set. His use of a Civil War battle in western Maryland in September 1862 works very well by highlighting the differences between the current and proposed principles in terms of known and potential outcomes of the battle.

With that framework in place, and after dissecting all of the current principles, LTC

Leonhard lays out his three *Laws of War* and his seven *Principles of War*. As a result of his analysis of the current principles, he describes for the reader why there are three Laws of War which have risen from and above the principles: the *Law of Humanity*, the *Law of Economy*, and the *Law of Duality*. The first law exists because all warfare is a human endeavor in one form or another. Warfare is a most "wasteful enterprise," since "one must economize as much as possible," to win and hence we have his second law. Nested within his second law is an intriguing truth on the purpose of intelligence: "Information leads to a precise expenditure of resources, and therefore to economy. Indeed, the entire purpose of intelligence in warfare is to economize—to inform our efforts in order to gain effect at the least cost."

His final proposed law, the *Law of Duality*, lays the foundation for his proposed *Principles of War*. A senior observer in a BCTP exercise recently highlighted this duality of warfare by stating, "If you ain't attacking, you're defending!" Therefore, all of LTC Leonhard's principles have a dual, double-edged nature. There is one independent principle, *Knowledge and Ignorance*. This principle underlies the reason we have intelligence professionals. Additionally, LTC Leonhard, while an apparent fan of Military Intelligence, also issues some serious challenges to us with the statement "Our intelligence doctrine and processes—arguably the best in the world—are inextricably bound up with this idea: We are fundamentally ignorant of the enemy's whereabouts and intentions, and so we estimate the future." With this challenge, he proposes that we need to change from "estimate-based" planning to "truth-based" planning. This needs to happen to a degree; however, we will still have to estimate our enemy's future intentions. The rest of his proposed principles are—

- ❑ Aggression: dislocation and confrontation, and distribution and concentration.
- ❑ Interaction: opportunity and reaction, and activity and security.
- ❑ Control: option acceleration and objective, and command and anarchy.

In conclusion, **The Principles of War for the Information Age**, is worth reading and discussing in a variety of forums. His analysis of the current principles of war is outstanding. His proposed new principles of war are worthy of incorporating into our doctrine as we develop our 21st century information age military behavior.

LTC Leonhard includes a great annotated "Works Cited" that contains one of the best comments from the whole book. On the oft-quoted Karl von Clausewitz's **On War**, he states, "Many commentators on Clausewitz have missed the tremendous application of his thought to future warfare, fixed as they are on endless semantic debate. Read Clausewitz; he is smarter than his interpreters. [Emphasis added]"



From Out Front

How to Submit an Article



This is your magazine and we need your support in writing articles for publication. When writing an article, select a relevant topic to the Military Intelligence community; it could be historical or about current operations and exercises, equipment, TTP, or training. Explain lessons learned or write an essay-type thought-provoking piece. Short “quick tips” on better use of equipment, personnel, or methods of problem solving and articles from “hot spots” are always welcome. Seek to add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Propose changes, describe a new theory or dispute an exciting one, explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or explain how a new piece of technology will change the way we operate.

Consult DA Pamphlet 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders, and be clear, concise, and complete in your writing.

Maintain the active voice as much as possible. Make your point. Avoid writing about internal or organizational administration. If your topic is a new piece of technology, tell the readers why it is important, how it works better, and how it will affect them. Avoid lengthy descriptions of who approved the new system, quotations from senior leaders describing how good the system is, reports your organization filed regarding the system, etc.

The **MIPB** staff will edit the articles and put them in a style and format appropriate for the magazine.

You can send the articles via E-mail to michael.ley@hua.army.mil or brett.vanhooose@hua.army.mil with a courtesy copy to stephen.leeder@hua.army.mil, or mail (with a soft copy on disk) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-FDR-CB, Bldg 61730, Room 103, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. (Please do not use special document templates and attach the graphics separately. We can accept articles in Microsoft Office 97, Word 6.0, Word Perfect 6.0a, and ASCII and PowerPoint or Corel graphics.) Please include with your article:

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Apr-Jun	Force Protection	5 Jan 03
Jul-Sep	Information Operations	5 Apr 03

743d Military Intelligence Battalion

The distinctive unit insignia for the 743d MI Battalion is a silver-color metal and enamel device consisting of a medium blue oval gridlined silver delta flight symbol, enclosed in base by a black scroll inscribed with the unit motto in silver; overall, a diagonally crossed black dagger and yellow lightning flash. Oriental blue and silver gray (silver) are the traditional colors of the Military Intelligence Corps. Black and white/silver denote the day and night continuous operations conducted by elements of the unit, as well as the covert and overt nature of the battalion. The black dagger symbolizes stealth and military preparedness, as soldiers of the battalion are continually prepared for worldwide deployment with and for warfighters. The flash denotes speed and accuracy, as well as the battalion's ability to provide worldwide communications and intelligence support. The gridlined oval represents the global mission of the unit and its soldiers' widespread deployment. The delta flight symbol extending beyond the boundaries of the globe symbolizes the unit's association with space and its mission to exploit space-based assets, and underscores the unit's motto, "Beyond All Boundaries."



The 743d MI Battalion traces its lineage back to 1954 when the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Detachment Army Security Agency (ASA) Troop Command, and 7200th Administrative Area Unit organized at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. On 8 November 1963, the ASA Troop Command redesignated the Army Security Agency Support Group. With the redesignation of the ASA as the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) in 1977, the ASA Support Group became the Continental United States Military Intelligence Group on 1 November 1977. In March 1980, the Army redesignated the group as the 704th MI Brigade.

On 3 October 1989, the 743d MI Battalion provisionally activated and the Department of the Army formally approved it in 1990 as a subordinate unit of the 704th MI Brigade. In July 1998, the Battalion underwent major reorganization as the Headquarters moved to Colorado. With the move came a marked change in mission.

The 743d MI Battalion's mission is to support the joint military support activity at the Buckley Air National Guard Base. They provide continuous worldwide signals and technically derived intelligence operations to satisfy national, joint, combined, and Army information superiority requirements. The Battalion has supported every contingency operation in which the United States has participated since 1989.

The unit achieved the award of two National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citations and the National Security Agency-sponsored Travis Trophy in recognition of service sites and units making significant contributions to the national cryptologic effort. The 743d MI Battalion also earned the Cypher Wheel Award.

Beyond All Boundaries!

Commander

U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca

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