Information Dominance for Army XXI: Battlefield Visualization
by Captain Harry E. Jones, II
I want to fight the enemy deep. We need to leverage our
technologies to see, target and destroy the enemy when he is far
from the FLOT and when the remaining elements close, it should be
a foregone conclusion we will win the close fight, with minimal
casualities. Focused intelligence, precision strike, and
dominant maneuver are keys to success.
Lieutenant General John M. Keane, Commanding
General, XVIII Airborne Corps
America's Army is in the midst of a remarkable
change change driven by information age technologies that will
forever alter the way we fight. Let's take a look at a future
battle vignette.
Southwest Asia, December 2005: ARFOR "Movement to
Strike"
While the U.S. Army Force (ARFOR) moves quickly across the
sands, the commander stares at a large, flat panel display
depicting his area of operations. Two armor-heavy mobile strike
forces are moving abreast, 30 kilometers ahead, their combat
vehicle positions depicted on the display. Windowed in a corner of
the display is a logistics screen from the Combat Service Support
Control System, showing the force's status by critical classes of
supply. Windowed in below that is a live video feed from an
Outrider unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) orbiting 50 km ahead. A red
icon blinks on the flat panel display an intelligence sensor has
detected an enemy force ahead. "Two, zoom in on that l want to see
what they're up to."
The S2 clicks on the zoom button and the enemy element is quickly
portrayed in a high-fidelity, three-dimensional (3D) virtual
rendition of the battlespace 50 km ahead. The high-resolution view
of the terrain indicates a small valley through which the enemy
will have to move perfect killing ground. Simultaneously, the
Analysis and Control Team dynamically retasks the UAV to orient its
sensor on the threat. An automatic target recognition (ATR)
algorithm in the acquiring sensor's preprocessor indicates T-90
tanks and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles. "S2 assessment?" barks
the commander. "Sir, lead element of an advanced guard
battalion remainder of the battalion is probably 30 minutes behind
this force, and the parent regiment 45 minutes to an hour behind
them."
"S3, net call, bring the strike force commanders up on video. I
want to do a white-board driIl and use that valley to establish an
engagement area." With the strike commanders up on a video
teleconference, the commander, S3, S2, and Fire Support Officer
(FSO) quickly outline a hasty attack fragmentary order (FRAGO)
using a John Madden-style "white-board" application on the Maneuver
Control System (MCS). The commander outlines his plan, and adjusts
boundaries and attack axes to fit the terrain. The S2 quickly
refines the probable enemy course of action (COA) based on the raw
intelligence while the S3 completes and issues the warning order
digitally to the task force (TF). The FSO and Air Liaison Officer
request long-range fires and close air support to attack the
regimental main body and second echelon forces. Using the S2's
refined template, the TF staff quickly wargames the plan. Satisfied
with the plan, the commander directs a TF rehearsal of the
execution engagement area using the 3D view of the terrain. An
artificial intelligence application indicates a proposed
support-by-fire position should be moved to optimize the terrain
advantage; the S3 modifies the FRAGO accordingly and issues it
digitally across the force.
Realizing he has a situational awareness advantage over the
oncoming enemy, the commander requests the general support MI unit
to degrade the enemy's communications. At the same time, two
Comanche helicopters engage and destroy the enemy's reconnaissance
elements. Minutes later, the mobile strike forces attack the enemy
battalion from the flanks while Army tactical missile fire begins
to attrit the follow-on regiment. In his burning command vehicle,
the enemy battalion commander is completely dumbfounded he is under
attack from a force he could not see, could not track, and could
not engage beyond direct-fire range.
Battlefield Visualization
Far-fetched? Perhaps not. Many of these capabilities addressed in
the vignette are in development under the auspices of the Army's
Battlefield Visualization Initiative, now under way at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, and Fort Hood, Texas. Though still in its infancy,
the development of battlefield visualization (BV) applications, and
their subsequent migration to the Army Battle Command System
(ABCS), will forever change the way America's Army trains, plans,
wargames, and executes missions across the operational continuum.
Despite much recent attention on the subject of BV, it is not a new
concept. On the contrary, the ability to visualize the battlefield
has existed since humankind first engaged in conflict. The U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command's TRADOC PAM 525-70, Battlefield
Visualization, defines BV as
the process whereby the commander develops a clear under-
standing of his current state with relation to the enemy and the
environment, envisions a desired end state, and then subsequently
visualizes the sequence of activity that will move his force from
its current state to the end state.1
Implicit in this is an understanding of the terrain,
the current location of friendly and enemy forces, the effects of
weather, and the enemy commander's available COAs. BV, therefore,
is both an art and a science the art of battle command, enabled by
science and technology to gain and maintain the advantage over an
opponent. BV is far more than intelligence it applies to and must
integrate data from every battlefield operating system. While the
BV system cannot completely clear the fog of battle, it can empower
commanders and their staffs to operate consistently inside the
enemy's decision cycle, keeping the opposing commander off balance.
Throughout history, the very best commanders have been able to
mentally visualize their battlefields. Based on training,
experience, and warfighting intuition, they understand the terrain,
how the weather will impact their fight, and how the enemy
commander will present his force. Brigadier General John Buford
clearly had the ability to visualize his battlefield in the opening
hours at Gettysburg. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur at
Inchon had the same clarity of vision again, in his mind's eye.
These were exceptional commanders. As we approach the 21st century,
however, technology will allow us to empower all commanders with
the ability to visualize their battlefields, and to see battles in
areas not yet occupied. Coupled with the degradation of the enemy
commander's ability to visualize his battlefield through lethal and
non-lethal attack and deception operations, we can truly gain
information dominance at critical times and places on the
battlefield. This dominance will enable a smaller force to rapidly
overwhelm a larger foe, and allow a single brigade to enforce an
extended zone of separation or to conduct humanitarian relief
operations across a distributed, compartmentalized "battlefield."
Key Technologies
We require the integration of seven key technology areas (see
Figure 1) to refine and mature our BV capability: displays, both
large flat panels to replace the wooden map boards in our tactical
operations centers, and private "heads-up" or retinal displays for
individual fighting vehicles, aircraft, and soldiers. BV requires
accurate sensors to collect enemy force activity and friendly force
locations. We need broad bandwidth networks to rapidly move data
across the battlespace. BV also requires extensive databases,
including high- resolution digital terrain elevation and features
data, entity level simulations, and 3D environments. Computer
hardware and software provide the technological engine for most BV
applications. Finally, BV requires an ATR automatic target
recognition capability to speed the analysis and identification of
objects in the battlespace, to speed sensor-to-shooter links, and
to decrease the risk of fratricide. TRADOC's Program Integration
Offices for Army Battle Command (TPIO-ABCS) and terrain are central
to the synchronization of activities across these technology areas.
We are making great progress in each of these areas. Due to the
superb efforts of the soldiers of the XVIll Airborne Corps, 4th
Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the Experimental Force (EXFOR),
Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM), National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Joint Precision Strike Demonstration,
Topographic Engineering Center, TRADOC, and many others, the Army
is rapidly prototyping a BV capability.
The Army's BV initiative began in Panama in September 1995 in an
exercise called Fuertas Defensas. The NRO provided imagery from
national systems to produce high-resolution digital terrain data of
a portion of the XVIII Airborne Corps' "exercise box." The Corps
intelligence team then overlaid the enemy situation data on the 3D
terrain data so the commander could see the fight in a
high-resolution, 3D view of the battlespace.
During Exercise Joint Task Force (JTF) 96-1 at Fort Bragg in
November 1995, the NRO again provided national systems support to
produce digital terrain data of a larger exercise area. Based on
feedback from Exercise Fuertas Defensas after-action reviews, the
Corps intelligence team added the capability to overlay red and
blue data as well as mission planning and rehearsal capabilities.
The wooden map boards and paper maps were replaced by two six-foot
by eight-foot displays, which provided the commander's "window to
the world."
During the 82d Airborne Division's Battle Command Training Program
(BCTP) Warfighter exercise at Fort Bragg in February 1996, the
prototype BV system linked with the All-Source Analysis System and
the MCS was fully integrated into the Corps Deep Operations
Coordination Cell (DOCC). The BV system portrayed enemy and
friendly data in real or near-real time in a 3D, high-fidelity,
virtual battlespace replication in support of corps deep operations
planning and execution. Using modular semiautomated forces (ModSAF)
software which moved enemy units independently, the Corps' planners
wargamed against multiple enemy COAs to drive development of
branches and sequels.
In XVIll Airborne Corps JTF Exercise Royal Dragon in May 1996, the
Corps intelligence team incorporated live sensor feeds for the
first time. Air Force U2-R and Army Guardrail Common Sensor and
OV-1D Mohawk aerial sensors down-linked through their preprocessors
to the BV system. The long-range surveillance unit teams passed
spot reports via satellite communications into the ABCS
architecture which fed the BV system. Additionally, Grenadier
beyond line-of-sight reporting (BRAT) emitters provided real-time
updates of friendly force locations. The real-time overlay of red
and blue data in a 3D view of the battlespace provided Royal Dragon
warfighters with a high-fidelity, virtual view of their fight.
Finally, during the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration
(JWID) in August 1996, the BV capability was demonstrated to Army
senior leadership. In October, Joint Precision Strike
Demonstration's Rapid Battlefield Visualization Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration (RBV ACTD) began. This is a $56 million
dollar ACTD that will provide high-resolution digital terrain and
features data which are the cornerstone of the BV initiative. The
RBV ACTD will also leverage the efforts of CECOM's Battlespace
Command and Control Advanced Technology Demonstration (BC2 ATD).
This ACTD has produced a BV workstation that is interoperable with
existing ABCS, the Army Global Command and Control System (AGCCS),
that uses high-resolution terrain and features data to provide a 3D
view of the battlespace.
Conclusion
Battlefield visualization shows great potential for the future.
XVIll Airborne Corps' aggressive prototyping effort has enabled a
running start for the fiscal year 1997 RBV ACTD and rapid
integration of two BV prototypes within the EXFOR. The BV system
will provide commanders the ability to see their physical
battlefield and the disposition of friendly and enemy forces
arrayed on it in a high-fidelity, virtual environment, and to plan,
wargame, and rehearse an operation before ever making contact with
an adversary. This capability will give the Force XXl commander a
significant advantage over any opponent, and provide the critical
enabling technology to gain information dominance at critical times
on the battlefield.
Captain Jones is currently the Operations Officer in
the Office of the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(DCSINT) Initiatives Group. He has a bachelor of arts degree in
Public Relations from the University of Georgia and a master of
science degree in Personnel Management from Chapman College.
Readers who wish more information may contact the DCSINT
Initiatives Group via E-mail odcsint@access.digex.net and at (703)
695-2968 or DSN 225-2968.