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## DIRECTING INTELLIGENCE





# ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

## Unofficial Intelligence Center Organizational Listing

	DSN	Commercial
<b>Brigadier General Charles W. Thomas</b>	<b>821-1140</b>	<b>(520) 533-1140</b>
<b>Command Sergeant Major Randolph S. Hollingsworth</b>	<b>821-1146</b>	<b>(520) 533-1146</b>
<b>Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence</b>		
Mr. James A. Chambers (Acting)	821-1173	(520) 533-1173
<b>111th Military Intelligence Brigade</b>		
Colonel Norman L. Williamson	821-1154	(520) 533-1154
<b>Directorate of Operations, Training, and Doctrine</b>		
Colonel Robert C. White, Jr.	821-2928	(520) 533-2928
<b>Directorate of Combat Developments</b>		
Colonel Seth F. Nottingham, Jr.	821-2415	(520) 533-2415
<b>326th Military Intelligence Battalion</b>		
Lieutenant Colonel Dennis A. Lowery	821-6522	(520) 533-6522
<b>Deputy Assistant Commandant</b>		
Dr. Gregory M. Kreiger	879-7303	(520) 538-7303
<b>Noncommissioned Officers Academy</b>		
Command Sergeant Major Albert L. Gray, Sr.	821-4240	(520) 533-4240
<b>Battle Command Battle Lab—Huachuca</b>		
Colonel Reid S. Huff	821-4661	(520) 533-4661

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MIPB is pleased to announce the Writer of the Quarter is Major John F. Lady for his article, "Directing Intelligence I: 'To Link or Not to Link' PIR."

Congratulations to Major Lady, and thanks to all of our authors for their great articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. It is your contribution that makes MIPB the professional forum for Military Intelligence.

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### STAFF

Commanding General:  
Brigadier General  
Charles W. Thomas

Director of Operations,  
Training, and Doctrine:  
Colonel Robert C. White, Jr.

Editor:  
Captain Stephen B. Leeder

Associate Editor:  
Elizabeth A. McGovern


Contributing Editors:  
Sergeant First Class  
Michael C. Taylor and  
Sharon E. Murphy

Art Director:  
Corporal Jeff Preuninger

Contributing Designer:  
Marvin H. Marcroft

Administration:  
Cruz M. Martinez

By Order of the  
Secretary of the Army:  
**GORDON R. SULLIVAN**  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff

Official:   
JOEL B. HUDSON

Acting Administrative Assistant to  
the Secretary of the Army  
00196

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by Brigadier General Charles W. Thomas

## The Information Age and the Coming Training Revolution

*The Army is very hard to change. After all, it is a...Second Wave Institution. It's a factory. The idea is that our Industrial factories will produce and produce and produce weapons. The army will run men through a training factory. Then it will bring the men and the weapons together and we'll win wars. The entire approach is Second Wave. It needs to be brought into the Third Wave world.*

—General Donald Starry quoted in *War and Anti-War*  
by Alvin and Heidi Toffler

The coming of the information age has had a dramatic impact on all walks of life. The explosion of information technology and the vast increase in our skill at using the power of information have forever altered old methods of communication, analysis, and even human thought. Nowhere has this change been more pronounced than in the military. Our new ability to use information has profoundly affected all operations, from intelligence to the platoon assault. To operate in the information age, we must explore, and eventually execute, revolutionary ideas in training. Our soldiers will survive and prevail in future conflicts only if they stay "out front" of the sometimes "undefined" demands of the information battlefield. Cyberspace is not just science fiction any more—it is here. Our soldiers must prepare to live, fight, and win within it. We owe it to ourselves and our nation to continually strive to stay ahead of the "Third Wave."

While we meet the challenges of defining our information age responsibilities and training soldiers to conquer these responsibilities, we must operate within the realities imposed by decreasing budgets and increasing readiness requirements. The force projection Army of 10 divisions—supported by the drawn-down force of 495,000 active soldiers—must be ready to go to war, or into operations other than war, at a moment's notice, whether from Fort Bragg, Fort Hood, or Fort Drum. We can no longer rely on institutional training to update soldiers on new technology and doctrine. This training is expensive, requires long periods of temporary duty, and removes the soldier from the unit, thus reducing unit readiness. Our challenge is to capitalize on the power of information technology to stay current in the information age. The goal is to increase the level of training while decreasing the cost, both in terms of dollars and readiness.

I want to emphasize that **the only sacred element of this challenge is that we produce highly trained soldiers: officer, warrant officer,**

**noncommissioned officer, and enlisted.** Nothing else is untouchable. If we are to truly join the information age, we cannot selfishly protect structure, doctrine, or even jobs at the expense of the future.

Two very promising new strategies have begun to take shape here at the Intelligence Center, and within the larger Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). These two developments, called the "School Without Walls" and the "Hub-and-Spoke" concept, represent the beginnings of new thought on how we train.

*The Army faces a unique set of challenges as it adapts to a world that has changed more broadly and fundamentally than at any other time since the end of World War II. The Army must continue to adapt to ensure success in a rapidly changing strategic environment.*

—FM 100-5, Operations

### School Without Walls

Revolutionary technologies such as interactive software, full-motion video-transfer capability, "on-line" services, and video teleconferencing present a promising alternative to the old classroom training strategy. Called "Distance Learning," this concept incorporates interactive software, electronic bulletin boards, and on-line networks. It allows students to continue training, on what were formerly institutional training subjects, from their home stations. It increases readiness both by providing continuous career lifecycle training and by leaving soldiers where they are needed—with their units—for greater periods of time. As described by General Hartzog, Commanding General, TRADOC, distance learning provides a "system in which the separations between the three pillars of professional development—institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development—are diminished due to increased information connectivity."

Additionally, this continuous access to information holds the promise of correcting the "data dump" problem that affects many students once they leave the schoolhouse. If they need training refreshers, soldiers can go back and repeat previous lessons, or even ask questions of the trainers using the on-line service. While the investment in hardware and software may be high initially, this concept will eventually lower costs by reducing the travel and temporary duty expenses associated with institutional training.



Intelligence  
Synchronization



Broadcast  
Dissemination

Split-based  
Operations

Tactical  
Tailoring

Finally, distance learning strategies force reluctant warriors into the information age. **To complete career training, soldiers must become familiar with the technology that is driving the revolution.** No longer can old soldiers claim "computer illiteracy" as an excuse for living in the past. To succeed, everyone must ride the wave of the future.

While the "School Without Walls" may never completely replace institutional training, it is a promising development that will help us meet the challenges facing us, both in information readiness and cost reduction. The Intelligence Center has already started this project and is currently building the data for the World Wide Web. (Anyone can reach this service on the Internet at "http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil.")

### The "Hub-and-Spoke" Concept

Another promising concept under consideration is the "Hub-and-Spoke" concept. The focus of this strategy is increasing the Army leader's scope of knowledge while maintaining the branch-specific skills needed to serve at the tactical and strategic levels. While still an infant concept, the theory calls for a series of "hubs"—school clusters organized around combat functions—where students of all branches, or of related branches (such as intelligence and signal), would go for combined training on core competencies. After this training, students would spend a shorter time at "spokes" to learn the technical and specific tasks expected of soldiers in their branch or military occupational specialty (MOS).

The "hub-and-spoke" concept provides five potential benefits over current branch-specific schooling. These benefits are—

- First, the development of new "hubs" provides an opportunity to realign the core competencies around information age requirements. This realignment of both competencies and subsequent curriculums will cause, by demand and design, new courses. The idea is to better adapt these courses to the new realities of the information battlefield.
- Second, by combining students within several "hubs," we would have to achieve an "interoperability of knowledge" that will improve the ability of the different branches to work in concert toward a common goal. The Army recognizes that some of the most beneficial training we currently conduct draws its strength from mixing different branch personnel (such as the Combined Arms and Services Staff School and the Command and General Staff College). The idea is to make this

"mixing" more widespread and more institutionalized.

- Third, the concept potentially increases readiness. Like distance learning, "hub-and-spoke" learning should decrease the time soldiers are away from their units, thus meeting the increased readiness requirement of the force projection Army. The combination of the two concepts could vastly reduce the time spent at institutional training facilities during the average soldier's career.
- Fourth, the concept creates a more "collegiate" system because of the mixing of branches, and possibly ranks, for common training at the "hub." All students will be taught at similar levels in each course. This may allow us to move toward a system where a mix of students at one school would attend a common class taught by one instructor. These efficiencies should save spaces and dollars and create a common body of knowledge shared among ranks and branches.
- Fifth, by ending redundancy in curriculum among the different schools, we can reach further efficiencies, thus reducing costs.

All of these potential benefits and more are in this very new and unrefined concept. Again, better soldier training is the only goal. While "hub-and-spoke" training will require some major institutional changes, we will continue to explore the concept and see where it takes us.

*A very safe rule to follow is that in case of doubt, push on a little further, and then keep pushing...*

—General George S. Patton, Jr., *The Patton Papers*

### Conclusion

The advance into the information age is full of unknowns. In every aspect we are struggling to discover what we will be expected to do, what we will be required to do, and what we will want to do. This struggle is also occurring in the area of training. In the coming training revolution, nothing is sacred because a revolution dictates sudden, radical, and complete change. The ideas presented above, in some of the articles in this issue, and the coming October-December 1995 issue of **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin** (dedicated to intelligence training) represent only the beginning of the training revolution. My task to each MI professional is to be a contributor, not a spectator. Make it your mission to contribute to the exchange of ideas that will result in the training strategies for the information age. The only bad idea is the one not stated.

**ALWAYS OUT FRONT!**

## by Command Sergeant Major Randolph S. Hollingsworth

In Newton Crossroad, North Carolina, the town where I grew up, we had an old saying. The saying went: "To build a good home, you must have good and strong wood." That is true when we talk about the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps and the path that it must pave into the future. The wood that must carry our MI Corps into the next century is a strong and competent (technically and tactically) Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Corps. This cadre will lead our soldiers, the MI Corps, and our Army.

Our NCOs must be the new pioneers of the future—the people that will make a difference in the defense of our nation. Our challenge is to ensure we never tarnish the respect we enjoy. Every NCO must continually perform at the level of excellence that our senior leaders expect from the "backbone of the Army." We must improve on that performance.

How do you improve the quality of a good product? You make sure that the fundamentals of transforming a good soldier into a good NCO receive reinforcement through the chain of command and the NCO support channel. We must maximize our use of the critical tools of soldier development.

### Counseling

NCOs sometimes tell me they did not have initial counseling, so they did not understand their jobs. Every MI NCO has received direction. The "Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer" tells us—

*"I will not forget, nor will I allow my comrades to forget that we are professionals, Noncommissioned Officers, leaders!"*

This creed sets the standard by which every NCO should live, work, and die. It is a creed of commitment, a creed of excellence, and a creed with which all NCOs must begin and end their day.

The NCO Creed by itself does not replace face-to-face counseling. Nothing will ever replace one person looking another in the eyes and telling the soldier his strengths and weaknesses. Every NCO must understand that counseling is a tool to set personal and professional development goals. We cannot afford to have NCOs who are afraid, unwilling, or unable to tell soldiers about their part in the success of the team.

Brigadier General Thomas, the MI Corps Commander, counsels me face-to-face and in writing. Quite often (normally to my pleasure but sometimes my displeasure) fellow sergeants major, senior NCOs, and family members give me wise and timely counsel on ways to improve the MI Corps and my-

self. If the great officers and NCOs I had the chance to work for had not taken the time to counsel me, I seriously doubt that I would be the MI Corps Command Sergeant Major. This is what counseling does for everyone; it charts a path to success and diverts soldiers from heading down the wrong road.

### The NCOES

The Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) is another Army tool to build and strengthen the foundation of the NCO Corps. Yes, it is part of our promotion system but is no guarantee of promotion by itself. We earn promotions through working hard, serving in demanding leadership positions, taking care of our soldiers, maintaining technical and tactical competence, and earning NCO enlisted ratings that set us apart from our peers. NCOs should not look at any school as a certification for promotion but rather a gateway to growth.

Attendance at professional development schools is essential. When we defer a soldier from the Professional Leadership Development Course (PLDC), Basic and Advanced NCO Courses (BNCOC and ANCOC), Sergeants Major Course, or any professional development school, we deny that soldier a chance for further growth. We also deny the MI Corps and the Army that piece of strong wood which we will need to build our house in the future. A sergeant major takes part in selection of an NCO for promotion or a professional development school; the same should be true when we defer a soldier's schooling.

Similarly, if we send soldiers to BNCOC and ANCOC mentally or physically unprepared, we have failed as leaders. NCOs must not be afraid to stand up and tell soldiers they cannot send them to PLDC, BNCOC, or ANCOC because they are destined for failure. One of our responsibilities as NCOs is to ensure that our soldiers succeed not only in the Army but in life as well.

### Technical and Tactical Competence

The MI Corps and the Army are moving into an unexplored technical age. We cannot afford to have one dimensional NCOs who know only their piece of the puzzle. MI NCOs must put the puzzle together and give the commander intelligence that the warfighter can use to win battles and wars. All NCOs must take every opportunity to learn about and train on our new systems. As new systems become

*(Continued on page 44)*

## Shaping Intelligence Doctrine

How do intelligence professionals help shape the doctrine and training that underpins intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations? In our last several issues, the Doctrine and Publications Division (DPD) of the Directorate of Operations, Training, and Doctrine asked you, our readership, to contribute to future issues of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)* and emerging doctrinal manuals. To date we have received minimal input.

An area that continues to foster discussion and confusion is battle damage assessment (BDA). What is the difference between BDA, IEW support to the assess function of the targeting process, and estimates of enemy combat effectiveness (during situation development)? A clear distinction between the above and adequate tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for these three topics does not exist.

**1. BDA:** The definition of BDA was significantly improved in our capstone manual, **FM 34-1, IEW Operations**. **FM 34-1** provides a more mature description of BDA than did **Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**, and **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**. One source that explains this change is a U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca publication titled **Proposed Doctrine for Army Battle Damage Assessment**, dated 9 July 1993.

The critical distinction made in **FM 34-1** is that "The commander uses BDA to determine if his operational and targeting actions have met his conditions for initiating subsequent COAs [courses of action] or beginning the next phase of an operation.... These areas form the commander's BDA-related PIR [priority intelligence requirements] and must be prioritized against his other PIR developed during [the] targeting process." However, the definition still requires additional refinement. **FM 34-1** starts the definition by stating, "Intelligence supports the assess phase of the targeting process through the BDA process." This could lead one to believe BDA is a part of all support to targeting.

The final draft of **FM 6-20-10, TTP for the Targeting Process**, causes further confusion. Although it correctly defines BDA, it places it attributes all intelligence support to the assess function as BDA. It is critical to understand that while IEW always supports the assess function of targeting and performs estimates of enemy combat effectiveness, the commander may direct his G2 or S2 to perform the complex task of BDA. The distinction is that the commander has directed IEW support for a specific decision through BDA-related PIR.

**2. The assess function:** Unlike BDA, IEW operations always support targeting to include the assess function. Sections of **FM 6-20-10** lay out some doctrine to accomplish this support under various discussions of BDA. Both **FM 34-1** and **FM 34-130** contains very brief segments on this topic.

**3. Combat effectiveness:** As with support to targeting, intelligence must continually provide estimates of enemy combat effectiveness (during situation development). **FM 34-1** briefly discusses these estimates and links them to continuous IPB and operational decisions. The **FM 34-1** discussion leaves out any specific link between these estimates, PIR, and information requirements. **FM 34-130** very briefly addresses this topic.

To stimulate input on these three topics consider the following:

- It is worth the time to clearly define and thoroughly discuss these three topics in the echelon manuals. Each echelon needs unique, comprehensive, and systematic TTP for these three topics.
- Only echelons above corps intelligence organizations can perform BDA because it is time and personnel intensive.
- Neither comprehensive manual procedures nor a single automated mechanism exists to pass BDA, estimates of damage from the assess function, and estimates of enemy combat effectiveness to and from the division or corps ACE.
- The most detailed TTP should focus on division, brigade, and battalion intelligence support to the assess function of targeting and estimates of enemy combat effectiveness as opposed to BDA.

We are currently starting to revise our critical echelon manuals (battalion and brigade to corps level IEW operations) and **FM 34-3, Intelligence Processing, Production, and Dissemination**. Several manuals to include **FM 34-1** and **FM 34-130** provide a solid foundation for the future. However, the revision of the echelon and other manuals will also play a critical role in shaping intelligence in the future. With your input, we can write quality manuals that thoroughly address the complexity of IEW operations.

*Stephen B Linder*



# Directing Intelligence Operations I:

## "To Link or Not to Link" PIR

by Major John F. Lady

**M**ilitary intelligence (MI) doctrine has linked, with varying emphasis, priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and the commander's tactical decisions. Most recently, **FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning**, renewed this primary purpose of PIR and provided essential techniques to solidify the relationship. Unfortunately, this linkage has remained largely undiscovered. Perhaps this occurred because key guidance in **FM 34-2** is only found in the appendices and the **FM 100-series** of manuals does not yet articulate the operational responsibilities of the new PIR doctrine. Three years of Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) warfighter exercise (WFX) observations reveal that corps and division staffs typically do not apply the doctrinal PIR concept before a WFX.

The solution to this problem is not complicated. MI doctrine has charted the course and identified the necessary techniques. G2s and S2s must apply the doctrine by first linking each PIR to its related decision point (DP). Then they provide the answer to the decisionmaker by the time he specifies (latest time information is of value—LTIOV). Additionally, they must convince combat unit commanders of their crucial role

in supporting PIR development. This article will briefly review historical trends and current PIR doctrine, discuss the responsibilities of the participants, and recommend how to implement the doctrine.

### Historical Trends

A review of PIR history puts current doctrine in perspective. The current linkage of PIR and DPs did not emerge recently. More than 50 years ago, MI doctrine linked essential elements of information (EEI—the previous term for PIR)<sup>1</sup> to the timely support of the commander's decision-making process. The 1940 version of **FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence**, described EEI (on page 7) as that information on the enemy that a commander needs at a particular time to make a sound decision. The 1951 version of **FM 30-5** said that EEI comprise the specific information on an enemy which a commander needs in a particular situation, EEI focus on specific information required at a particular time (page 114). The 1973 manual described EEI as "those critical items of information regarding the enemy and environment needed by the commander by a particular time... to assist him in reaching a logical decision" (page 3-5).

The first **FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations** (1984), fundamen-



tally altered the long-standing relationship between EEI and the commander's decisionmaking process. This field manual replaced the term EEI with PIR. It also effectively removed PIR from supporting the commander's decisionmaking process and made PIR development a G2's task. **FM 34-1** defined PIR as "those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decisionmaking" (page 2-10). Although **FM 34-1** emphasized a general relationship between PIR and the decisionmaking process, it blurred the linkage of each PIR



to a DP and omitted the need to provide answers by the commander's suspense timelines. FM 34-1 further stated that "any enemy capability, [or] course of action . . . which will significantly impact on the commander's tactical decisions is a PIR" (page 2-10). This emphasis on many enemy capabilities, coupled with the previous factors, effectively "delinked" PIR and tactical decisions. The new definition ignored the fact that the commander must make decisions as particular events occur or timelines are met. It also did not emphasize providing answers to PIR within those same timelines or events.

### Current Doctrine

The new FM 34-series of manuals replaced most of FM 30-5 and substantially altered the application of doctrine in corps and divisions. In practice, the Army discarded FM 30-5 in its entirety.<sup>2</sup> Alas, we threw the baby (PIR and DP linkage) out with the bath water (the old manual). As often happens, it would take a war to resurrect a time-tested concept.

During the Gulf War, Brigadier General John Stewart, G2, Third U.S. Army, restored the former linkage of PIR and DP through his concepts of intelligence synchronization and the "key read." These concepts reoriented the intelligence effort toward providing timely support for decisions. He wrote after the war<sup>3</sup> that his intelligence and electronic warfare synchronization plan focused on precisely what intelligence each corps commander needed and at what time. The G2 worked with G3 to synchronize intelligence at each crucial decision. He called the deliverable, the crucial intelligence judgment, a key read.<sup>4</sup>

After the war, Major General Paul Menoher Jr. and later Major General Stewart as Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, incorporated these ideas into PIR doctrine. The process began in September, 1992, with FM 34-8, **Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence**, and

continued with FM 34-2 in 1994. FM 34-2 defines a PIR as "an intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will affect the complete success of the command's mission" (page G-6). More important, it states that a good PIR "asks only one question, focuses on a specific fact, event, or activity, and provides the intelligence to support a single decision" (pages D-1 and -2).

### Responsibilities

The commander has three key responsibilities regarding PIR:

- First, his most important role is to identify those decisions that require intelligence support.
- Second, he must state when he needs that intelligence to make his decision.
- Third, he alone approves PIR.

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### The G2 recommends PIR for the commander's approval based on the commander's DPs and guidance.

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Unfortunately, FM 100-5, **Operations**, only generally addresses the commander's responsibilities in PIR development. It says that "the commander drives the intelligence effort. He must ask the right questions and focus the intelligence work" (page 2-12). The new FM 34-1 (1994) contains the specific guidance that the commander must give the G2. It states on page 2-17 that the commander drives the intelligence effort by stating "what he wants (intelligence required), why he wants it (dependent decision), when he wants it (LTIOV), and how he wants it (format, method of delivery)."

The G2 recommends PIR for the commander's approval based on the commander's DPs and guidance. Besides discussions with the commander, the G2 has several sources from which to draw. Wargaming yields a list of

intelligence requirements that support potential decisions, typically giving the G2 plans officer a role in PIR development. During operations, the G2 operations officer gains insight on current decisionmaking requirements through close coordination with the G3 operations officer. Additionally, the chief of the analysis and control element (ACE) tracks decisionmaking requirements for deep operations planning and employment of attack helicopters. When the commander locates at the tactical command post, the G2 officer there becomes a source for insight into the commander's decision requirements. If the G2 delegates PIR development to a subordinate, he should select one of these officers for the task.<sup>5</sup>

The G2 develops the LTIOV (if the commander's guidance is incomplete) and the intelligence synchronization plan to answer each PIR. The G2 uses his intelligence synchronization matrix to track the internal actions that must occur to meet the commander's LTIOV. We must consider the applicability of the LTIOV concept. It is indeed an essential tool but it may not be applicable in every situation. Sometimes it may be more practical to describe LTIOV in terms of events. Thus, LTIOV would become "LEIOV" (latest event at which information is of value).

The G2 must educate the commander on his role in PIR development, particularly since operational manuals contain no detailed guidance. He must also help the commander become accustomed to those circumstances in which the unit will have no PIR (for example, the lack of decision points).

The G2 also has two significant pitfalls to avoid. If the commander does not identify decisions requiring intelligence support, the G2 must refrain from describing any intelligence requirements as PIR. In those instances the G2 articulates the command's intelligence needs as information

requirements (IR). Secondly, the G2 must avoid using the term PIR for any intelligence tasks that do not directly support the commander's decisions. Again, IRs should describe those tasks.

### Implementation

Each PIR must show the DP and LTIOV (or LEIOV) associated with it. This essential technique cements the linkage between the PIR and its timely support to a decision. I offer two examples:

- Will the 20th Motorized Rifle Division artillery group locate vicinity named area of interest (NAI) 36 (NB 0405) by 252300 July (DP 15, LTIOV: 252100 July)? (See Figure 1.)
- Will the 5th Armored Brigade attack our 3d Brigade along avenue of approach 3? (DP 11-1, LEIOV: two maneuver battalions cross Phase Line STEADY)

The advantages of this technique are obvious. The tactical decisionmaking linkage for each PIR is clear for all to see. The commander ensures that a PIR addresses each decision require-

ing intelligence support. Additionally, the PIR alerts the staff to the timeline to submit the intelligence product that will support each decision.

### Conclusion

We face a challenge in implementing PIR doctrine. Intelligence doctrine has designed PIR in a way that today's commanders are not accustomed to seeing. We must implement the new doctrine so that PIR effectively support the commander—clearly link PIR to the timely support of his DPs. In the application of PIR doctrine, we face an important choice. One path, continuing the current trend, leads to inefficient and unfocused intelligence support. The other path, applying the new doctrine, will effectively provide timely intelligence support to the commander's decisions.

I am extremely grateful to General (Retired) Richard Cavazos for his review of my article. In addition, I greatly appreciate comments from: LTC James Leach, LTC Carl Meinke, LTC Richard Riess, LTC Quentin Schillare, MAJ James Boardman,

MAJ Maurice Guyant, MAJ Kenneth Watras, CW3 Alan Jones, CW3 Joseph Okabayashi, and SFC Manuel Gomez.

#### Endnotes:

1. EEI is still the current joint doctrinal term. See **Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**.
2. The first **FM 34-1, IEW Operations**, did not supersede chapters 5 and 7 or appendix T of **FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence**.
3. "Operation DESERT STORM, the Military Intelligence Story: A View from the G2, 3d U.S. Army."
4. The term "key read" never became a doctrinal term. The current definition of PIR in **FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning**, incorporates the "key read" concept.
5. No matter who has the task of PIR development, that officer must ensure the placement of appropriate emphasis on the commander's decision points to include the entire battlefield framework (close, deep, and rear operations).

*MAJ John F. Lady, Senior Intelligence Observer and Controller, Operations Group A, is beginning his fourth year with the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), DSN 552-9929. With nine years of experience in corps and divisions, MAJ Lady has served as a divisional MI battalion S3, air assault brigade S2, and corps all-source production section chief. MAJ Lady holds a bachelor of science degree in engineering from the U.S. Military Academy and a master of studies degree in Modern Israeli Studies from the University of Oxford.*




Figure 1. 46th Division Enemy Situation.



# Directing Intelligence Operations II:

## The Case for Meaningful Information Requirements

by Major John F. Lady

**R**ecent intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) doctrinal publications place an appropriate heavy emphasis on priority intelligence requirements (PIR) development. PIR now own an exclusive doctrinal link to the commander's decisions that require intelligence support, and top priority in the G2's collection and analysis efforts. Conversely, little doctrine or professional writing discusses information requirements (IR). The IR doctrinal discussion that does exist contains apparently contradicting perspectives. The specific relationship of PIR to the commander's decisions now makes a meaningful IR concept necessary.

IR should receive almost as much emphasis and significance as that given to PIR. Just as PIR exist for the commander, IR must exist for the G2. Since PIR only support the commander's decisions, IR articulate the G2's effort to answer every remaining intelligence requirement that supports mission accomplishment. The purpose of this article is to survey current doctrinal perspectives regarding IR and to recommend techniques for the appropriate origin, role, and management of IR.

### Competing Perspectives

Current doctrine contains five differing views of IR. None of these views, taken individually, provides sufficient guidance for IR development and use. These views are found in the following field manuals (FMs):

- FM 34-1, *IEW Operations*, September 1994.
- FM 34-2, *Collection Management and Synchronization Planning*, March 1994.
- FM 34-3, *Intelligence Analysis*, March 1990.
- FM 34-8, *Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence*, September 1992.
- FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, July 1994.

### **An obsolete manual identifies the proper role of IR....FM 30-5, *Combat Intelligence*, published in 1967.**

FM 34-1 holds that IR (along with PIR) are a subset of intelligence requirements. The manual's primary guidance regarding IR is that they are "of lower priority than the PIR of lowest priority" (page Glossary-6). One can infer from its discussion of intelligence

requirements that IR must support decisions, because "each [intelligence] requirement supports a decision expected to occur during . . . [a course of action] (COA)" (page 2-17).

FM 34-2 contains the same definitions as those in FM 34-1. It mentions IR indirectly by showing an IR register (page 3-5). From that register, one may conclude that IR can originate from subordinate unit or other staff section requests.



The **FM 34-3** discussion from 1990 states that IR can either support PIR or exist as stand-alone requirements of a lesser priority than PIR. It contains a confusing definition, describing IR as "those items of information regarding the enemy and his environment that need to be collected and processed to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander" (page 2-2). This definition causes confusion because the **FM 34-3** discussion conflicts with the information requirements discussion in the other four field manuals. Additionally, this definition implies that IR are subordinate to or different from intelligence requirements.

**FM 34-8** further complicates the picture by abbreviating intelligence (instead of information) requirements as IR. The FM states that "every intelligence requirement is linked to a specific enemy action that requires a friendly response" (page A-1). This perspective agrees with **FM 34-1** and **FM 34-2** that all intelligence requirements support friendly decision points (DPs). **FM 34-8** does not mention information requirements. However, it does contain one reference to downgrading "PIR to IR" (page 2-22), in which it apparently means information (not intelligence) requirements. (If it meant intelligence requirement, it would contradict itself. Since all PIR are subsets of intelligence requirements, it is not necessary to upgrade or downgrade a PIR to an intelligence requirement.)

**FM 34-130** contains one indirect reference to IR. It says that the commander approves the list of intelligence requirements (therefore, all PIR and IR) prepared after wargaming a COA (page 1-10).

We should reject each of these conclusions and design a meaningful IR concept. One could draw several conclusions from this survey of doctrine. For example, all IR, as a subset of intelligence requirements, must support decisionmaking. IR are derived only from wargaming. IR can support



PIR satisfaction. The commander must approve all IR. We should reject each of these conclusions and design a meaningful IR concept.

### Recommended Techniques

Just as the current linkage of PIR to DPs (see previous article) has its roots in a superseded manual, an obsolete manual identifies the proper role of IR. We find this guidance in **FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence**, published in 1967. That manual contains the first mention of the predecessor term for IR—the other intelligence requirement (OIR). It defines OIRs as "enemy capabilities or area characteristics that may affect but will not prevent the accomplishment of the mission. OIRs develop from command requirements which do not qualify as essential elements of information (EEI)<sup>1</sup> and from staff requirements. The formulation and announcement of OIR and the allocation of collection means to meet these requirements are staff responsibilities of the intelligence officer" (page 33). This passage provides an excellent framework for the origins, roles, and management of IR in current doctrine.

IR should originate from requests that require further intel-

ligence collection. The commander's intelligence requirements that do not directly support his decisions must be considered IR rather than PIR. The deputy or assistant commander may identify decisions that require intelligence support. Higher and subordinate headquarters, other staff sections, and the G2 section typically will originate requirements, to include many identified during wargaming. In each instance, those requests validated for collection become IR.

IR must support decisions by officers other than the commander, but we must not exclusively link IR to decisions. To do so would avoid the G2's responsibility to conduct situation and target development regardless of whether the commander or his subordinates have identified decisions requiring intelligence support. As the commander's subordinates identify decisions, they should receive support from high priority IR. The G2 can focus any remaining collection capability requirements identified by the staff or G2 section ensuring that supporting mission accomplishment remains the top consideration.

The G2 validates and consolidates only as many IR as organic collection systems can support



and non-organic systems will support. This task requires the collection manager to carefully track the unit's specific order and request (SOR) "saturation level," which is the number of SORs that the collectors can reasonably "service."<sup>2</sup>

One must consider IR as stand-alone requirements. They do support PIR satisfaction. The doctrinal collection management process described in **FM 34-2** answers each intelligence requirement, whether PIR or IR. This is done by developing indicators and specific information requirements (used for tasking collectors).

IR should encompass every relevant "enemy capability or area characteristic" not addressed by a PIR. The unit's IR should support both situation and target development requirements. The situation in Figure 1 of the previous article (see page 8) shows how PIR typically address only some key situation and target development tasks the G2 faces in an operation. In this scenario, the 46th Infantry Division is defending against three divisions of the 2d Combined Arms Army. The G2 is tracking 214 committed and reinforcing enemy battalions in the division area of interest. The commander has identified two DPs requiring intelligence support: one addresses commitment of attack helicopters against the enemy first-echelon division artillery groups; the second addresses commitment of the division reserve based on actions of enemy second-echelon regiments and divisions. These decisions rely on the actions of nearly half the enemy battalions. The G2 uses IR to track and develop targets in the remaining enemy battalions.

When IR support specific target development or operational requirements or when there is an associated "latest time information is of value" (LTIOV), you should note this information after the IR. For example—

- Locate enemy 240-mm multiple rocket launcher battery or larger size units in named area of interest (NAI) 31 (center of mass ND 239098) (high-payoff target list priority two, LTIOV: ongoing).
- Determine whether bridges at CR 135167, CR 223180, and CR 241159 are intact (CG request, LTIOV: 251700 July).

Note that in the first example, the LTIOV is "ongoing." This IR provides an example in which IR demand greater flexibility than that given to PIR.

Current PIR doctrine states that each PIR "asks only one question and focuses on a specific fact, activity, or event" (**FM 34-2**, page D-1). The G2 must give IR the same degree of specificity.

The G2 must have sole authority to manage unit IR. He accomplishes this task by approving, prioritizing, and allocating intelligence collection in support of the unit's IR, and by keeping all consumers informed of the unit's current IR. No other option is acceptable. This approach contradicts the guidance in **FM 34-130** that the commander approves all intelligence requirements.

The increased emphasis on IR proportionately increases the collection manager's task of validating and consolidating requirements. Typically, a division or corps G2 must manage such a large number of IR that the task will become overwhelming if the unit omits this essential task.

The firm linkage between PIR and DPs means that when the commander has no DPs requiring intelligence support, the unit will have no PIR. For example, the commander may specify no decisions during unit deployment from a debarkation port to an assembly area. Even the temporary lack of PIR will not affect the activity level in the G2 section. The G2 will continue to answer the IR list with the same level of effort until the commander approves new PIR.

Finally, it is unfortunate that military Intelligence discarded the

term "other intelligence requirement." It seems better to call information requirements by their previous name to eliminate confusion regarding whether IR means "information" or "intelligence" requirement. This approach would also preserve the logic of subdividing the broad category of intelligence requirements into "priority" and "other" intelligence requirements.

## Conclusion

Current doctrine presents a confusing picture of the vital subject of IR. This situation requires revision. The strict use of PIR for the commander's decisions means that the G2 must use IR to articulate intelligence collection to satisfy the commander's remaining intelligence requirements. While there may be times when the unit has no PIR, we should never find a unit without IR. Fortunately, previous doctrine provides appropriate guidance for IR development and use. We should adopt this guidance and give the IR the significance it deserves.

The author gratefully acknowledges reviews by Lieutenant Colonel James Leach and Chief Warrant Officer Three Joseph Okabayashi.

## Endnotes

1. EEI stands for essential element of information, which is the predecessor term for priority intelligence requirement in Army doctrine and remains the valid term in joint doctrine.

2. I purposely borrowed a field artillery term here ("service").

*MAJ John F. Lady, Chief Intelligence Observer and Controller, Operations Group A, is beginning his fourth year with the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). Interested readers can reach MAJ Lady at DSN 552-9929 or commercial (913) 684-9929. With nine years of experience in corps and divisions, MAJ Lady has served as a divisional MI battalion S3, air assault brigade S2, and corps all-source production section chief. MAJ Lady holds an engineering degree from the U.S. Military Academy and a master of arts degree in Modern Israeli Studies from the University of Oxford.*

# MI and the CAVALRY



by Second Lieutenant Robert E. Goodson, Jr.

*The major-general commanding directs me to say that it is of the utmost importance to him that he receives reliable information of the presence of the enemy, his forces, and his movements.*

—General George G. Meade's orders to the Union Cavalry,<sup>1</sup>  
30 June 1863.

Since early American military history, both the cavalry and intelligence have played vital roles in American victories. Today, both cavalry units and intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) assets provide the commander with complete and accurate combat information and intelligence. This objective mandates a close relationship between the cavalry and military intelligence. The division cavalry squadron S2 sits at this critical juncture between combat information and the intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS).

FM 34-8, **Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence**, says that "the intelligence BOS provides timely, relevant, and accurate IEW support to the tactical...commanders across the operational continuum." Substitute the word "cavalry" for the "intelligence BOS" and "reconnaissance" for "IEW support," and

you have identified one of the primary and traditional missions of the cavalry. (Security and economy of force are the other traditional missions of the cavalry according to FM 100-5, **Operations**.) This article attempts to provide a basic description of the unique relationship between the cavalry and intelligence. With an understanding of this relationship, intelligence professionals can provide better support to both the division and cavalry commanders.

## The Cavalry

The 5th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment (5-17th), serves as the division cavalry squadron for the 2d Infantry Division in the Republic of Korea. This is the largest battalion-level maneuver unit in the Army today (after a restructuring that started in 1993). Many cavalry units have unique organizations (armored, air, or light).

Specific examples of capabilities in this article apply to the 5-17th Cavalry Squadron; the squadron consists of three ground and two air troops. Examples of a threat force apply to a mature threat like the threat 2d Infantry Division faces.

**Armored cavalry troops:** composed of 27 M1A1 (Abrams) tanks and 41 M3A2 (Bradley) Cavalry Fighting Vehicles, provide the 2d Infantry Division with an all-weather, all-terrain, 24-hour source of combat information. Armored cavalry troops can—

- Occupy a named area of interest (NAI) or simply observe it from observation posts and hide positions.
- Avoid contact with the enemy or force him to deploy his forces early.
- Operate day and night with thermal-imaging systems that can range out to 2000 meters.<sup>2</sup>
- Retain versatility and flexibility with the superior firepower and 3000 meter range of the M1A1.<sup>3</sup>
- Dismount and travel on foot if their vehicles cannot reach a piece of terrain.

Despite the mission, the ground cavalry troops provide the squadron S2 with vital combat information. He can analyze it (as time permits) and disseminate the product to the division G2.

**Air cavalry troops:** allow the squadron to operate across a 30- to 40-kilometer front.<sup>4</sup> With its composition of 16 OH-58D (Kiowa, armed) helicopters, the air cavalry of the 5-17th Cavalry Squadron provides the division with a combination of lethal firepower and a superior reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) capability. OH-58D equipment includes a—

- Mast-mounted sight and thermal-imaging system that can acquire targets at 10 kilometers and identify vehicles at 5 kilometers, day or night.<sup>5</sup>
- Laser rangefinder and designator along with an inertial navigation system that can provide eight-digit grid coordinates of enemy locations.<sup>6</sup>
- 50-caliber machinegun, 2.75-inch rockets, and Stinger air defense missiles or the Hellfire missile.<sup>7</sup>



- Videotape recorder that can record up to 2 hours on an 8-mm tape<sup>8</sup>—an excellent debriefing tool.

The air cavalry troops provide the squadron S2 with real-time and near-real-time information. As with other information, the S2 can, as time permits, analyze and disseminate the intelligence or information to the division G2.

### Reconnaissance, Combat Information, and Intelligence

The cavalry is a critical combat-information collection asset. According to **FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations**, cavalry units have a decisive advantage over IEW sensors because they—

- Work through and counter enemy deception efforts better than any sensor system.
- Provide the fastest, most reliable means of assessing the terrain that the enemy is trying to use to his advantage.
- Are not a passive source of information. The cavalry not only finds the enemy but can further develop the situation revealing more information.
- Can more effectively disseminate information to commanders with an immediate need (for example, by monitoring the cavalry commander's radio net or through a liaison officer).

**FM 100-5**, tells us that "the commander drives the intelligence effort"; nowhere is this more true than in the cavalry. In a cavalry squadron, the S2 must answer his commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IR) so that the cavalry can develop the close battle. Additionally, the squadron S2 must help answer division PIR and IR.

As a great source of human intelligence, the cavalry is a critical part of the division collection plan. The cavalry squadron S2 focuses the squadron collection effort in support of the division through

R&S taskings and intelligence awareness. The cavalry squadron receives R&S taskings from the supported brigades (through the division G3) and in support of the division. Due to its unique combined arms organization, the cavalry can meet this challenge quite capably. The cavalry is truly the "eyes and ears" of the commander.

Working as a combined arms team, the cavalry provides intelligence officers and commanders at every level with valuable knowledge during intelligence preparation of the battlefield, situation development, and other intelligence tasks. The cavalry provides the warfighter critical combat information and intelligence that will support his tactical decisionmaking. The cavalry squadron S2 "pushes" combat information and intelligence to the G2 while he "pulls" intelligence from the division. This exchange facilitates a "common understanding of the battlefield." The cavalry squadron S2 is then able to provide his commander and the division with an accurate and reliable assessment of the enemy situation.

### Tasking Tips

As with all intelligence assets, the quality of the information is proportionate to the user's ability to focus the asset. A few tips to help focus and maximize the cavalry's effectiveness include—

- The G2 section should ensure that R&S taskings are realistic. Often the G2 section assigns the cavalry squadron an NAI that is much too large for the squadron to effectively observe without degrading its total mission. Remember that the cavalry is, by its nature, an economy of force.<sup>9</sup> The squadron is responsible for division, internal squadron (for force protection), and often the brigade NAIs. Frequently the squadron assigns only one aircraft or scout team to a divisional NAI.

- Since the cavalry squadron develops the division's close battle, it cannot answer a PIR that concerns a "deep battle enemy unit" (for example, the army artillery group). However, the cavalry will most likely identify reconnaissance elements, the combat reconnaissance patrol, the forward security element, and the advanced guard main body. Additionally, they can find forward outposts, combat outposts, obstacles, and bypass routes.
- Do not specifically task an air or ground asset. The squadron commander is the best judge of how to meet squadron requirements. Cavalry units work best as a combined arms team—split the team and you reduce its effectiveness.

### Conclusion

Through realistic and valid taskings you will allow the cavalry to operate at its peak and provide you with quality combat information and intelligence. Do not hinder the squadron commander's ability to maintain flexibility. Together the cavalry and military intelligence will provide the commander with timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive combat information and intelligence.

### Endnotes

1. **FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations**, 19 September 1991, 2-37.
2. Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 7-1-31, Infantry Leader's Reference Card, June 1987.
3. GTA 7-1-31, June 1987.
4. **FM 1-116, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Air Cavalry/Reconnaissance Troop**, 1.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*
9. **FM 17-95**, 1-1.

*2LT Goodson is currently a collection and jamming platoon leader in the 101st MI Battalion, Fort Riley, KS (DSN 856-9445). He served as an assistant S2 and S2 for the 5-17th Cavalry Squadron. 2LT Goodson received his BA from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.*

# Keys to the S2's Success: The NTC Experience

by Captain Joel R. Phillips

As the S2, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, I knew the performance trends for battalion task force S2s at the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin. The horror stories were everywhere. The observer-controllers (O/Cs) first grilled the task force S2s and then raked them over the coals at the After-Action Reviews (AARs). The "party line" among S2s was that it did not matter how well you prepared, planned, and executed your S2 mission, you would not be able to meet the NTC standard.

From discussions with past and present intelligence O/Cs, the battalion task force S2s failed at NTC because they lacked a complete understanding of—

- Army doctrine.
- Opposing forces (OPFOR) doctrine and NTC tactics.
- Task force intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

The intelligence O/Cs at the NTC know our doctrine, OPFOR doctrine and tactics, and intelligence TTP. They have also expanded on this knowledge by observing and analyzing the results of many rotations. The O/Cs measure unit performance by the Army standards described in FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)*, and other doctrinal manuals. When you meet these doctrinal standards, you meet the NTC standard. Successful battalion task force S2s know and train to the doctrinal standards before their rotations.

My S2 section and I never believed the party line. Based on the O/C's comments for our rotation, we met the doctrinal standards and succeeded in our S2 mission at the NTC (see Figure 1). Of the O/C's intelligence trends and recommendations, 85% of the comments recommended that we "sustain" our current IPB, battle tracking and assessment, and standard operating procedures. The comments reflected the success of our training methods.

## Conditions for Success

As in almost everything we do in the Army, we must set the conditions for success. To succeed we developed three steps to focus training:

1. Integrate intelligence training into the officer professional development (OPD) program.
2. Prepare the S2 section tools.
3. Crosstrain the entire section.

## The OPD Program

Our first step was to focus on a well-developed OPD program. Using the IPB process as a framework, we concentrated on the doctrine, composition, and capabilities of an OPFOR motorized rifle regiment (MRR). We focused the training and the IPB process on company commanders' and platoon leaders' needs. The task force divided the OPDs into a series of five classes:

- Steps of the IPB process.
- Artillery and air defense: tactics, composition, employment, and purpose in offensive and defensive operations. This included the phases of artillery fires in offensive and defensive operations.

- Reconnaissance; nuclear, biological, and chemical; engineer; and electronic warfare: tactics, composition, employment, and purpose of each element in offensive and defensive operations. This included division and regimental reconnaissance and use of chemical agents (both persistent and nonpersistent).

- Offensive operations and movement: tactics, composition, employment, and purpose of each element in the OPFOR MRR. This included discussions on the combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP), forward patrol, forward security element (FSE), advance guard main body (AGMB), antitank missile units, air assaults, ground assaults, and the regimental main body. (See Figure 2.)

- Defensive operations: tactics, composition, employment, and purpose of each element to include the combat security outposts, patrols, security zone, deception positions, antitank missile reserve, company or battalion reserve, and the combined arms reserve for the regiment.

The key to the OPD training was to relate each class to a specific NTC scenario. We did this by following the doctrinal discussions with a terrain board exercise. Using the terrain board, we would "bend" the doctrine to depict the situation for the various scenarios, terrain, and courses of action. We would wargame through an OPFOR and friendly master events list (MEL), concentrating on the OPD's specific topics. Figure 2 is a sample of an



## A. Define the Battlefield Environment

### 1. Sustain

- a. Identify the area of operations and the area of interest.
- b. Analyze time and space to focus the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process on potential battle space.
- c. Identify gaps in intelligence holdings and formulate potential priority intelligence requirements (PIR) early.
- d. Delegate this task to section personnel identified in S2 section tactical SOP (TACSOP) and integrate it into the IPB prior to mission analysis.

## B. Describe the Battlefield's Effects

### 1. Sustain

- a. Integrate terrain analysis into the task force (TF) planning process (terrain products).
- b. Identify all available avenues of approach (AAs) and mobility corridors into and through the area of interest (AI).
- c. Identify potential enemy decision points based on AA and mobility corridors into and through the AI.
- d. Briefing techniques (articulation) of terrain and weather effects on friendly and enemy courses of action (COAs), maneuver formations, and reconnaissance efforts (especially mission analysis brief, COA development, and operations order (OPORD)).
- e. Delegate this task to section personnel (identified in S2 section TACSOP) and integrate it into IPB prior to mission analysis.

### 2. Improve

- a. Training level of section personnel in terrain analysis, to include determining defensible terrain and discussion of cover and concealment relative to mobility corridors.

## C. Evaluate the Threat

### 1. Sustain

- a. Training level of section personnel in threat doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and equipment. Order of battle holdings include graphics and threat publications specific to potential contingency areas.
- b. Delegate this task to section personnel (identified in the S2 section TACSOP) and integrate it into IPB prior to mission analysis. Completely identify threat weapon system capabilities and employment norms.

### 2. Improve

- a. Training level of battle staff officers on threat counterpart equipment, capabilities, and employment norms for potential contingency areas.

## D. Determine Threat COAs

### 1. Sustain

- a. Integrate enemy battlefield operating systems (BOS) combat multipliers, identify enemy COAs and decision points, and produce a timely (prior to mission analysis brief) initial situation template.
- b. Conduct continuous IPB to produce additional situation templates (as necessary), an event template, and an event analysis matrix to help focus reconnaissance, wargaming, and battle tracking and analysis.

### 2. Improve

- a. Integrate battle staff personnel into the production of the situation template. The Collection Management Officer, Fire Support Officer, Air Defense Officer, and Engineering Officer must provide assessments of the enemy integration of combat multipliers into the S2 section's COAs. Battle staff officers must understand threat counterpart equipment and employment and then provide this assessment to the Battlefield Information Coordination Center (BICC) no later than mission analysis.

## E. Perform Battle Tracking and Analysis

### 1. Sustain

- a. Improvements in preparing the tactical operations center to perform tracking.
- b. Provide assessments to the TF and company commanders based on information received and analyzed.
- c. Early analysis of reconnaissance asset status and location to determine viability of reconnaissance structure. Determine potential data gaps, reorient (cue) other collection assets, and adjust the event template as necessary to enable continuous, timely, and predictive analysis. This in turn allows time for a hasty planning process prior to the line of departure (if necessary) based on reconnaissance results.

## F. Maintain an Effective Field SOP

### 1. Sustain

- a. Identify IPB sub tasks and delegate tasks to S2 section personnel.
- b. S2 focus on managerial skills and technical and tactical competence.
- c. Training and cross-training of all section personnel on the IPB steps.

Figure 1. Intelligence Trends and Recommendations.

OPFOR task and purpose chart used for these OPDs.

After completing the five OPD sessions in garrison, we moved the program to the field. Each company commander backbriefed the battalion commander on his first mission using a terrain board and the IPB process. We placed the emphasis on both the friendly and OPFOR perspectives. What did this terrain hold for the

OPFOR and therefore what would it hold for me? We analyzed the different observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA) factors from both perspectives. One should use this analysis to show where the OPFOR wants to destroy friendly forces and, based on that, how you can best destroy it. "Thinking red" is important to

grasp the application of OPFOR doctrine. This enables you to see how the OPFOR would adjust its tactics for the given mission.

Going through the OPFOR's most likely, most dangerous, and least likely courses of action (COA) and then looking at this from a friendly perspective, enables a soldier to plan the most effective way to counter each OPFOR COA.




Figure 2. Task and Purpose Chart.

### Prepare the S2 Section Tools

We developed the following tools to assist in operations order (OPORD) development and to convey that information to the commanders and the rest of the battle staff. We mounted all charts on a 24- by 40-inch piece of poster board and laminated each chart so we could quickly enter and erase information.

1. The **OPFOR Mission and Friendly PIR Development Chart** allowed the section to show all decision points (DPs) and the corresponding priority intelligence requirements (PIR). An answer to those PIR helped the commander make decisions. The chart listed the OPFOR's task

and purpose, and all of your commander's intents, the endstate desired, and the high-value targets which together aid the section in defining DPs.

2. **Solid mission-analysis briefing techniques** proved an invaluable tool during our NTC experience. The mission analysis was the first briefing the S2 gave and it set the tone for mission success. At "change of mission", the S2 had 15 to 45 minutes before the O/C started the AAR. After that the S2 section had about 30 to 60 minutes before the commander was ready for the mission analysis briefing.

The first part of the S2's portion of the briefing should be a detailed analysis of the terrain. We did not spend a long period of

time on terrain already covered. I focused on the terrain specific to the mission. First, we described the effects of the terrain from the OPFOR's perspective from one end of the area of operations to the other. Second, we did the same from the friendly perspective. (We used the OCOKA method for both). When there was limited time, we concentrated on the terrain in OPFOR and friendly engagement areas—these would become the commander's decisive points. For weather and light data we hit only the highlights and concentrated on the effects to friendly and OPFOR operations. Next, we went into the heart of the briefing. Our section briefed:

- The OPFOR Mission.
- Items on the S2 briefing agenda (see figure 3).
- The OPFOR COA concept
- The Reconnaissance Asset Status.

It was important to have a good copy of the situation template to use during the briefing. A COA concept sketch gave the commander the big picture; however, a 1:50,000 scale map was necessary to brief the details of the OPFOR COAs.

3. **Solid OPORD briefing techniques** were the last of our S2 section tools. This briefing was the company commanders' first real look at the OPFOR situation and we directed the brief to them. We used a technique for OPORD briefings that was similar to the mission analysis brief. This time the Battlefield Information Coordination Center (BICC) briefed the effects of terrain and weather using the same technique discussed under the mission analysis briefing techniques. Again, because of the very limited time, the BICC concentrated on the commander's decisive point or OPFOR engagement area for a deliberate attack. The order for the rest of the briefing was similar to the mission analysis and includes the OPFOR MEL, doctrinal



Terrain and Effects	Page	BICC					
Weather and Effects							
OCOKA							
Current Enemy Situation	Page	S2					
Commander's PIR							
Total Number of Tanks/BMPs/AT-5s		///					
Combat Ratio Without Artillery	TF	Enemy					
Combat Ratio With Artillery	TF	Enemy					
Division Recon	TK	BRDM	BMP	GSR	CHEM		
Regiment Recon	BMP	ENG	BRDM	GSR	CHEM		
Air Assault / Dismounted Infantry							
Forward Detachment							
Reserves (MRB, AT, CAF)							
Artillery / Phases of Fire							
FASCAM							
Air: Fixed and Rotary Wing							
NBC: Persistent and Non Persistent							
Smoke							
Air Defense Artillery							
Electronic Warfare							
Engineers							
Rear Area Threat							
COA Briefing							
Enemy Master Events List (How the Battle Unfolds)							
COA 1							
COA 2							
COA 3							
COA 4							
Recap	Most Likely Is						
	Most Dangerous Is						
Peculiarities / Weaknesses							
R&S Plan							
Concept of the Operation							
Task							
Purpose							

CAR: Combined Arms Reserve  
EW: Electronic Warfare  
R&S: Reconnaissance and Surveillance  
FASCAM: Family of Scatterable Mines

**Figure 3. S2 Briefing Agenda.**

battle formations (as needed), and a review of the COAs.

The company commanders had countless other things on their minds and had not slept in quite some time. To keep their attention, we talked specifically to each company commander. For example, in a movement to contact, the S2 told the lead com-

pany commander, "a CRP of three BMPs will probably be set in here in a support-by-fire position. The FSE will attempt to fix you here while the AGMB maneuvers to the flank." We used this method of briefing throughout the OPFOR COA discussion.

Each OPFOR action listed on the OPFOR MEL normally corre-

sponded to a specific company or slice element (for example air defense, engineers, or fire support). The OPFOR MEL chart walked the company commanders through the battle from start to finish. This was the key to the S2's predictive analysis.

In describing different COAs we highlighted only the actions that differed from the first COA. At the end of the brief we quickly summarized the most likely COA. This refreshed everyone on the big picture as you expected it.

### Crosstraining

Without a solid team in the S2 section all of the detailed work would not have been used. The assistant S2, intelligence sergeant, and analysts prepared to take charge and accomplish all of my tasks to include briefing the order.

To do this we started to teach the assistant S2 the orders drill process early, first with the S2 and then by himself. Company- and task force-level computer-simulation exercises were the next step. Then we used company lanes, force-on-force, and other simulations. Setting the standard early for the rest of the S2 section payed big dividends after our first mission at the NTC.

### Conclusion

If you develop an OPD program, prepare the tools necessary to guide you, and crosstrain your section, you will succeed. The brigade or battalion task force leadership will understand how the battle unfolds and can make the necessary decisions. Intelligence will truly support the commander and the tactical decisionmaking process.

*CPT Phillips is currently attending the MI Officer Advanced Course. He recently served as the S2, 1-16 Infantry Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mech) at Fort Riley, KS. Previous assignments include the 102d MI Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, in the Republic of Korea. He graduated from the University of Iowa in 1989.*

# Operation CONTINUE HOPE: Maintaining Intelligence Credibility



by First Lieutenant Troy M. Potkovic

In intelligence, the intelligence analyst's credibility is crucial. Soldiers' lives and ultimate victory rely on intelligence. If the commander has no faith in intelligence, his operations are at risk. However, timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence support strengthens the credibility of all intelligence.

Somalia was a highly complex environment during Operations RESTORE and CONTINUE HOPE. The threat to U.S. and coalition forces included warring factions, banditry, and looting. We understood the threat; we did not understand the Somali culture and Somali attempts to meet their basic needs. Our tendency to view situations in a conventional military context often led to inaccurate reporting and "false alarms."

This article contains some "common sense" lessons, for both U.S. and coalition forces, based on my observations from

the Joint Operations Center (JOC), Joint Task Force (JTF)-Somalia. I grouped these lessons into four areas: inaccurate and incomplete reporting, situational awareness, cultural understanding, and circular reporting.

## Inaccurate and Incomplete Reporting

Soldiers deploy throughout the depth of the battlefield. They are a vital collection resource that can provide critical real-time information. Size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) reports require quick reasoning and an understanding of the local population—its needs and culture—and the operational environment. Too often soldiers in Somalia generated useless reports. These reports would often state, "We are receiving small arms fire." That report obviously lacks rudimentary details. Training should underscore the necessity for complete and accurate reporting. Although it is understandable when soldiers generate incomplete and inaccurate first

reports, all subsequent reports should contain each element of the SALUTE report.

The soldier "on the ground" must have an intelligence awareness and focus on these crucial details. An understanding of priority intelligence requirements, the commander's intent, and the importance of accurate reporting is crucial. Although every manual on common tasks addresses SALUTE reporting and Army courses teach this task, units must emphasize its importance.

## Situational Awareness

One critical intelligence task is situation development. During step four of intelligence preparation of the battlefield at the joint level, the J2 determines threat courses of action (COAs). Based on these COAs, the J2 develops proposed information requirements, named areas of interest (NAIs), and indicators. Then the J2 section develops a collection plan to either confirm or deny each COA.

To perform situation development, it is implicit that you define what is "normal." Continuous information is needed to define what is normal. U.S. aircraft and special operations' snipers (who often observed NAIs) were usually an excellent source of continuous surveillance in Mogadishu. These two assets were invaluable.

However, reports from soldiers who had left their compound for the first time were often inaccurate and displayed a lack of situational awareness. These incidents also illustrated the **importance of disseminating all information** to maintain the sol-



diers' situational awareness. Thus some examples are—

- We received a report from some "untrained eyes" about a large Somali assembly (roughly 200 people). A scout weapons team (an OH-58D, Kiowa and AH-1, Cobra helicopter) was tasked to observe this large assembly. The report then came back, "normal activity—about 75 Somalis waiting in groups for jobs at a U.S. logistical base."
- When aviation units first arrived in Mogadishu, their lack of situational awareness was apparent. For instance, most soldiers knew there were several abandoned and un-serviceable anti-aircraft weapons in the area. Invariably, the new pilot would report several Somalis at the weapon, rotating it toward him. The new flight crews did not know that the Somalis were children playing.
- Some soldiers reported mortar explosions impacting in another compound. We then informed those soldiers that U.S. tanks were conducting live-fire training a few kilometers to the south and told them to recheck the situation. They later acknowledged that there were no mortar impacts and the explosions were caused by the U.S. tank training.
- An intelligence organization reported that a large number of hostile *technicals* (pickup trucks carrying heavy machine guns or similar weapons on a rotating pedestal) and armored vehicles. The grid coordinates in the report matched the location of a United Nations (UN) strongpoint. After requesting imagery, we learned all of the vehicles had UN painted on their sides.

Accurate reporting is difficult. An analyst must consider technological capabilities, the local culture, and basic human needs to perform accurate analysis and

synthesis. Analysts cannot rely solely on technology. Accuracy is impossible, regardless of excellent high-technology products, without understanding basic human nature.

### Cultural Awareness

According to Abraham Maslow's theory of hierarchical needs, a person must satisfy life's necessities—food, clothing and shelter—before fulfilling higher social needs. During this period most Somalis were trying to survive. Although the militias were active, intelligence analysts were often eager to report any activity as militia activity. For example—

- An infrared video operator downlinked his coverage of Mogadishu into our operations center. One night he monitored a Somali standing near a car for nearly 30 minutes. The operator perceived the Somali as a threat engaging in a suspicious activity. He overlooked the facts that Mogadishu is a large city, it was early in the evening, and there was no curfew.
- U.S. forces monitored the Mogadishu stadium after receiving conflicting reports about unusual activity. One report was that a soccer league was restarting. The other report was about militia activity and *technicals* sighted in the stadium. The duty officer suspected militia activity because earlier monitoring revealed the appearance of tracks circling the field and crossing it in a few places. Daylight observation revealed the Somalis had dragged and drawn soccer lines on the field.
- Often, Somalis penetrated UN compounds and stole weapons, clothing, food, water, and other supplies. Intelligence reports often stated, "The militia is gathering arms and supplies for the next round of fighting," or "...to stage organized attacks against UN compounds." A few days later, civil

affairs teams would find the stolen weapons and buy them back for \$300 to \$500—a very healthy paycheck for a Somali.

I took the initiative to leave the headquarters to learn the terrain and develop a sensitivity to the culture. Participating in reconnaissance missions and monitoring unmanned aerial vehicle missions helped me to understand the culture and gain an appreciation for the soldiers' and aviators' capabilities. I did not realize how accustomed I was to Mogadishu until I redeployed.

### Circular Reporting

FM 100-5, *Operations*, clearly states the importance of unity of command: "For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort." We violated this crucial principle of war in Somalia.

A coalition of nearly 30 nations was complicated. Additionally, the separation of the complex U.S. forces' command, control, and intelligence structure from the UN force organization added to the confusion. There were three U.S. intelligence organizations:

- JTF J2.
- Central Command Intelligence Support Element (CISE).
- Joint Operations Support Element (JOSE).

Each organization had a separate reporting chain. For example, the JTF J2 reported to the Commander, JTF-Somalia, while the CISE reported directly to the Commander in Chief, Central Command. The chain of command was finally unified near the end of the operation under the U.S. Forces Somalia, JTF-Somalia command.

This complex structure facilitated circular reporting. Instead of one report from a single source, an organization would often originate a report and then the other organizations would generate additional reports based on the original report.

Too often circular reporting caused false alarms based on

false, incomplete, or unconfirmed information. For example, one organization reported "possible *technical* vehicles sighted near the Polytechnic Institute." Then another agency would incorporate this report into an intelligence summary and change it to, "*Technical* vehicles sighted...."

The primary intelligence organization supporting the theater commander, the JTF J2 section, was austere—17 soldiers at its largest, no organic collection assets, and limited analytical capability. The CISE was therefore an indispensable organization. It provided in-depth analysis, comprehensive databases, and many significant intelligence products. Unfortunately, the J2 and CISE

disagreed over many topics and acted as rivals during the early months of the operation. Friendships that developed at orientation briefings were instrumental in removing this barrier. By the end of the operation, the two divergent intelligence organizations developed into a more coordinated, productive, and supportive intelligence entity divided only by name.

### Conclusion

The intelligence professional plans and directs, collects, processes, produces, and disseminates intelligence in support of the commander. We need to tell it like it is, to ensure intelligence support is timely, relevant, accu-

rate, and predictive. In Somalia, intelligence organizations caused false alarms too often. We can correct this deficiency if soldiers send us complete and accurate reports, analysts maintain situational awareness and strive to understand the local culture, and intelligence organizations reduce circular reporting.

*1LT Potkovic is an officer in the S3 section of the 110th MI Battalion (DSN 341-7117). He served as J2 Watch Officer in the JOC, JTF-Somalia, then deployed to Haiti as the S2, 41st Engineer Battalion. 1LT Potkovic stated, "I am happy to say intelligence support was significantly better in Haiti. Some of the J2 staff were members of the J2 staff in Somalia, and the experience showed."*

# Targeting During Operations UPHOLD and MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY



by Captain David H. Carstens

During both Operations UPHOLD and MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY in Haiti, the role of the brigade and battalion S2s in targeting was very important. The 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division modified the targeting process as part of a staff "team effort." These modifications were required to support an operation other than war (OOTW) in an ur-

ban environment against a less than apparent threat.

The targeting process our brigade combat team applied was nothing new. It was a modified application of the doctrine outlined in **FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process**. Some terms differ from their exact doctrinal definition.

The S2 is responsible for the target acquisition program. To support the commander's intent,

intelligence initially focused on targeting weapons caches. This focus affected both current and future operations. We consistently used intelligence to obtain targets for cordon and search operations by subordinate infantry units. To develop a secure environment, we identified and nominated weapons caches as priority high-payoff targets (HPTs).

We defined the majority of our targeting as indirect target acquisition or target development.



**FM 34-80, Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**, states target development is "the detection, location, and identification of suspect, probable, or confirmed targets as a result of the process of analyzing and correlating information from more than one information collection means."

**Every member of the team played an active role in determining...targets.**

This article describes our development of HPTs, all-source collection planning, and resulting cordon and search operations. We supported the targeting functions—decide, detect, deliver—through intelligence preparation of the battlefield as outlined in **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**.

*Editor's Note: The most current version of FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, identifies four targeting functions: decide, detect, deliver, and assess.*

**Decide**

The brigade targeting conference was the first step in this function. Chaired by the brigade executive officer, other staff par-

ticipants in the "targeting team" included the S3, S2, fire support officer (FSO), direct support (DS) military intelligence company team commander, military police liaison officer (LNO), and aviation LNO. Every member of the team played an active role in determining which targets to acquire and eventually cordon off and search. The conference began with a review of recent target indicators from the J2. These indicators were usually single-source reports from human intelligence (HUMINT) assets in a general support (GS) role and the brigade's counterintelligence (CI) teams.

The targeting team established selection criteria to focus the collection effort. We set the following standards to graphically display information alongside the corresponding named areas of interest (NAIs). The brigade then used these graphics on the targeting overlay to assess future targets. (See Figure 1.)

- Number of Reports:** This number helped establish the likelihood that a cache was at that target location. An increase in reports indicated a greater possibility of weapons existing at the target location.
- Date of most recent report:** This information helped to establish the likelihood that

the target was still at that location.

- Association:** Specific links to a right-wing, paramilitary, or other group could help determine the "threat" located at the target location.
- Number of Sources:** This number was the most important criterion for confirming a target and establishing its priority on the HPT list. Information derived from multiple sources proved far more reliable than information from a single source.


Once the targeting team reviewed the potential targets, the S3 and S2 examined the area of operation (AO) and prioritized specific collection areas. The brigade divided its AO and numbered numerous battalion- and company-size sectors in Port-au-Prince. These sectors were standard throughout the brigade, easily identified on the city graphic maps, and used for targeting as well as to focus collection.

The DS MI company team commander and S2 closed the meeting with a review of collection plan changes. This usually included a listing of new potential targets (NAIs which we could develop into target areas of interest), collection timelines, and a listing of available collection assets (both DS and GS). After the executive officer's initial approval, the staff briefed all decisions and targeting changes to the brigade commander for his approval and his intent.

**Detect**

The brigade targeting team established a four-day timeline during which they would effectively detect and neutralize targets.

**D-4** (four days prior to the operation): The J2 provided targeting information and the brigade established battalion and company AOs. We passed the initial assessment and target analysis to the Joint Targeting Cell during a daily meeting at the joint task



**Figure 1. Targeting Graphic Legend.**

force (JTF) headquarters. During the meeting, the brigade S3, S2, and FSO requested approval for operations against caches, passed on brigade collection priorities, and requested collection by the division to fill gaps in the brigade collection plan.

**From D-3 to D-2:** The brigade directed the collection effort in prioritized target areas. CI teams and imagery intelligence (IMINT) platforms such as the Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) and OH-58, Kiowa helicopters (with onboard cameras) provided target resolution. The mounted and dismounted traffic in the dense urban area of Port-au-Prince made ground surveillance assets ineffective for the majority of the operation. Signals intelligence platforms were rarely beneficial due to the low use of threat communications, signal masking by buildings, and the use of low-power transmitters.

**At D-2:** The brigade S3 issued a fragmentary order to one or more subordinate battalions to conduct cordon and search operations against specified targets based on current information about the target area. Collection assets (primarily HUMINT) supported the battalions and provided additional information on possible targets "up to the last minute."

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**There is a delicate balance...between an aggressive collection effort and...compromising the operation.**

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The brigade provided the battalion S2s with target folders. These folders included at a minimum: recent imagery of the AO, CI target summary reports, directions to the target area displayed on city maps, and a summary of the suspected threat. Due to congestion in the urban environment and the possibility of collateral damage, detailed house descriptions

and strip maps to the target location were the commander's most important information requirements.

The battalion S2s developed their own collection plans after mission analysis and receipt of brigade NAIs (target areas) and priority intelligence requirements. HUMINT assets accompanied dismounted patrols through the area, conducted a follow-up of initial source leads, and confirmed or denied target locations. If target locations changed significantly from the initial report, OH-58s flew last minute reconnaissance missions to get "eyes on" the AO.

Commanders need to remain extremely flexible during the detect phase and accept intelligence driven "from the bottom up." We learned that from the planning through the execution phase, target specifics changed considerably as a result of brigade and battalion collection and analysis. Targets pinpointed to an eight-digit grid in initial reports often moved several houses or even blocks after collection assets "worked the area." We canceled some missions at the last minute, after subsequent reconnaissance found no indicators of threat activity.

Time is the essential element needed to properly execute the detect process and develop the specific information necessary to confirm or deny a particular target. There is a delicate balance, however, between an aggressive collection effort and the possibility of compromising the operation. Too much reconnaissance around the target location often results in the threat's hasty withdrawal.

### **Deliver**

On D-day, an infantry unit (we evaluated the mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time available to decide on the size) deployed and cordoned off the target area. HUMINT and psychological operations assets actually deployed with the executing

unit and helped to pinpoint the target. Collection assets continued to work the area throughout the operation to gain possible leads for future cordon and search operations. CI teams questioned individuals within the cordon. IMINT platforms such as ARL, observed potential threat vehicles and personnel moving into and out of the target area. Once the unit searched the target, located any equipment, and detained appropriate personnel, "battle damage assessment" intelligence (if applicable) went to the brigade and JTF using standard reporting procedures.

### **Conclusion**

The key to this targeting process was the commander's acceptance of target resolution from the "bottom up." There was often a tendency to execute operations quickly based on information from one or two sources. On a dynamic, rapidly changing battlefield, this may be necessary. However, during OOTW when the threat is not well defined, a more methodical approach is required to prioritize, track, and neutralize targets. Intelligence best supports the commander when you develop specific collection guidance; a detailed collection plan (to include target indicators); and some techniques to produce timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence.

The targeting process is not the sole responsibility of the S2, S3, FSO, or any other staff section—it is a team effort. The Army developed this process to identify, prioritize, and successfully attack targets critical to the success of the operation. During OOTW, it is also the responsibility of the targeting team to review established doctrine and modify it to adapt to the situation.

*CPT Carstens is currently the S2, 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (DSN 341-6041). He has a bachelor's degree from Kent State University in political science. CPT Carstens has served in numerous positions in the 6th Infantry Division (Light) and 10th Mountain Division.*

# Have Gun (and Much More) Will Travel

by Lieutenant Colonel John Neubauer and Captains Rob Givens and Mark Duffield

*Editor's note: Reprinted from The Air Land Sea Bulletin, Bulletin No. 95-1, February 1995, published by the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center. Readers should not consider this article as the official position of any of the Services.*

**D**id Operation DESERT STORM provide a new impetus for close air support (CAS)? Has the CAS mission changed in level of importance or is this just another shot in the roles and missions controversy? Or, could there actually be a fundamental change in Air Force CAS capabilities that is prompting yet another article by an A-10 pilot looking for immortality and a job?

Although it was not a classic CAS battle, Operation DESERT STORM did shed light on the entire spectrum of support for ground troops. Figures show that a relatively small percentage of the fighter sorties flown were in direct support of ground forces. This occurred for two reasons. First, there was so little close opposition from the enemy. Also, coalition ground forces possessed sufficient organic capability to easily overwhelm an enemy already devastated by airpower. As a result, most U.S. Air Force (USAF) support of ground forces occurred in more of an interdiction role. DESERT STORM highlighted the A-10's capabilities and ensured a place for the "hog" (A-10) in aviation history. Most important though, DESERT STORM exposed some limitations in USAF CAS capabilities and resulted



in the fielding of several significant improvements to the A-10.<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately, war planners from all the Services may not be aware of recent changes in the training and makeup of A-10 squadrons. These changes along with hardware and software upgrades show the Air Force is serious about the CAS mission. The dual purpose of this article is to inform the reader of A-10 capabilities and advocate deliberate planning for the employment of the A-10 in conventional and unconventional combat operations.

## A/OA-10 Capabilities

The A-10 was originally designed to fill a void in CAS capability that became apparent during the Vietnam War. With a dependable "low tech" design, the A-10 emerged as the premier air-to-ground weapons platform—able to meet the needs of U.S. ground forces. The A-10 has an internally mounted 30-millimeter cannon and carries a wide range of munitions including free-fall bombs and precision-guided Maverick missiles. The aircraft is also heavily armored and built to survive combat damage, a capability greatly appreciated by several pilots during the war with Iraq. There are some A-10 capabilities overlooked by today's

planners. These include the ability to deliver resupply containers, employ laser-guided bombs, and most important, to operate from either short or unprepared fields. Planners have significantly neglected this last capability. A-10s have successfully operated from highways in Europe and from dry lake beds in Nevada. The aircraft can take off and land from runways as short as 4000 feet. This capability greatly simplifies planning when longer fields are unavailable in remote areas. It also allows forward deployment in situations where U.S. Army units are on the offensive. For example, A-10s could have used captured Iraqi airfields had the coalition forces continued to Baghdad. This could have afforded ground forces continuous CAS support and reduced the demand for air refueling needed elsewhere.

The A-10 ground support role recently expanded with the redesignation of many A-10s as OA-10 forward air control aircraft. The mission of OA-10 pilots is to find targets the ground commander wants destroyed and control aircraft attacking those targets. While A-10 and OA-10 missions vary, the airframes are identical—hence the designation A/OA-10. Squadrons who possess a mix of both aircraft conduct inte-




grated CAS support training daily. The value of this training is immense because A/OA-10 units now regularly train the way they plan to fight. Most important, though, A/OA-10 pilots train almost exclusively in the CAS mission and most have served on the ground with U.S. Army units as battalion air liaison officers. This ground experience is most valuable when the time comes to positively identify potential targets as enemy or friendly.

## High Technology Improvements

While ground commanders have been pleased with the A/OA-10 in the past, more has been done in the last year to improve A-10 capabilities than had been done in the previous 15 years of its life. This has been an immense step and war planners must understand these capabilities and ensure they are incorporated into our plans. These "hi tech" improvements include a constantly computed heads-up display, the Light-Weight Aircrew Recovery System (LARS), and night vision goggles (NVGs).

The constantly computed bomb sight on the heads-up display significantly increases accuracy during free-fall weapons employment and simplifies the task of locking on to targets with the Maverick missile. A/OA-10 pilots can now consistently drop a "dumb bomb" within 20 meters of a target. This accuracy provides flexibility in matching ordnance to targets especially during situations where friendly ground forces are in direct contact with the enemy. The new bomb sight is accurate at high altitudes. It increases the accuracy of the 30-millimeter cannon at long ranges, allowing pilots to avoid most threats by attacking from high altitudes or from slant ranges of more than 12,000 feet. In sum, the improved heads-up display makes a proven system even more lethal and fills a significant void left by attack helicopters.

The introduction of the LARS receiver into the A/OA-10 provides an all-weather, secure data burst, electronic search capability. The radio



receiver is capable of storing up to ten codes and providing range and bearing to the appropriate survival radio carried by all pilots. This replaces the old UHF radio homing technique that was exploitable by enemy forces. In addition, the LARS can operate in a minimum communications environment because voice transmissions are not necessary. LARS is used primarily for combat search and rescue missions and greatly enhances A/OA-10 search capabilities.

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### In any future conventional war, planners can count on the A/OA-10 to expand its roles.

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
The most significant change to the A/OA-10 is the ongoing conversion to NVGs. Now compatible with the Army's night battle, A/OA-10 pilots with NVGs can find and destroy CAS targets at night and during daylight. They may accomplish this independently or with the assistance of infrared (IR) marking devices currently used by U.S. ground forces. A/OA-10 pilots can provide around the clock CAS support from medium and high altitudes where aircraft are undetected by anything except radar. Visual reconnaissance, combat search and rescue, and joint air-attack-team operations at night are also now possible.

Other improvements are coming. First, the installation of datalink technology will allow ground commanders to transmit target data directly to aircraft without using long

verbal descriptions on the radio and with a reduced possibility of jamming by the enemy. Second, the incorporation of global positioning system equipment for navigation and targeting will be a significant improvement over the current inertial navigation system. It will also greatly improve the A/OA-10's lethality. Finally, the Air Force is evaluating the carriage of 300-gallon external fuel tanks and will likely fund them. This extra fuel extends aircraft target area loiter time by 20 to 30 minutes, further increasing the aircraft's combat effectiveness. Considering these new capabilities, how should war planners task the A/OA-10? Three areas in which planners should consider A/OA-10 employment are in conventional war, operations other than war (OOTW), and support of special operations.

## Conventional War

For purposes of this article, we define conventional war as combat between major military forces consisting of "heavy" units. Examples include the coalition's war with Iraq or a second war in Korea. In these scenarios, U.S. aircraft can expect to fly missions against targets probably protected by some form of integrated air defense. Current U.S. doctrine then calls for the achievement of air superiority through the destruction of the enemy's ability to resist an air attack. It is reasonable to expect success in this endeavor. Thus, in any conventional war, planners will face a wide range of targets and can expect local air superiority at a minimum. With these



parameters established, how should you task the A/OA-10?

The A/OA-10 can support a variety of missions in such a conventional war. These include, but are not limited to, the more traditional missions of CAS support, air interdiction, and forward air control. In the war with Iraq, A/OA-10s flew and were successful in a variety of taskings. A/OA-10s were not only successful in traditional roles, but also provided armed escort, suppression of enemy air defenses, combat search and rescue, and attacks on mobile SCUD launchers. A-10s inflicted heavy damage on the Iraqi military and were critical to the war effort in all phases of the campaign including the early strategic phase.<sup>2</sup>

In any future conventional war, planners can count on the A/OA-10 to expand its roles. Additional roles could take the form of coordinated attacks with U.S. Army attack helicopters. Warfighters can use massed joint air attack teams of A-10s and AH-64s in raids against enemy ground forces and installations well beyond the front lines. Such attacks occurred and were effective in the war with Iraq.<sup>3</sup> Now, however, the increased night capability of the A/OA-10 allows more use of integrated operations with the attack helicopters at night. F-16s can support this type of attack by suppressing enemy air defenses and providing air cover. OA-10s can provide reconnaissance and escort for the attack helicopters as they move through enemy territory. Once they reach the engagement area, A-10s attack the targets in coordina-

tion with the AH-64s and provide cover for their movement. The lethal fire power placed on the enemy is sufficient to engage major ground elements up to division size. The advantage of this type of attack against echelons moving toward the battlefield is that it allows flexibility in targeting and real-time damage assessments. Warfighters can use this tactic to engage attacking enemy units or to prepare for a friendly ground offensive.

### Operations Other Than War

While the A/OA-10 has proven valuable in conventional war, it can be even more valuable in operations other than war (OOTW). Combat against a relatively unsophisticated adversary with few air defense assets characterizes this type of scenario. Possibilities include conflicts in Africa, Southeastern Europe, or the Caribbean. Ground involvement in these situations could include forced entry operations, special operations, and noncombatant evacuation. The A/OA-10 is essential to the support of such operations because it can provide ground forces with timely reconnaissance, cover, and firepower. This type of support is critical given the nature of the ground forces most likely involved. Current planning calls for light, mobile forces for use in these situations.<sup>4</sup> These forces, by design, lack significant firepower. The addition of A/OA-10s to these operations affords the U.S. Army significant and responsive firepower.

How should you use the A/OA-10 in this scenario? A/OA-10s in this type of conflict can and should support reconnaissance, escort, cover, and attack missions. These missions provide maximum security to ground forces at a relatively low cost and risk. A/OA-10s can reconnoiter routes of travel and suspected enemy areas and alert ground forces of an enemy presence.

Depending on the rules of engagement in the operation, the commander can choose to avoid or attack the enemy positions. Pilots equipped with night vision goggles can now easily conduct such reconnaissance at night.

Once the ground element begins to move, A/OA-10s can provide continuous reconnaissance, radio relay for command and control, and timely and accurate firepower. Such operations would have proved valuable in the U.S. intervention in Panama where ground forces were often forced to disperse throughout the country to disarm Panamanian defense forces.<sup>5</sup>

This falls under the traditional CAS support mission but needs emphasis due to the A/OA-10's unique capability to provide "danger close" strikes.<sup>6</sup> In situations where infantry units fight from house to house, the ability of the A/OA-10 to safely deliver ordnance within 100 meters of friendly troops is invaluable. With night vision goggles and state-of-the-art IR target-designation capability, the pilots can also accomplish this at night. The possibility of recovering the Army's downed helicopter crews in Somalia would have greatly increased if there had been A/OA-10s with NVGs on alert at Mogadishu International Airport or on airborne alert.

The A/OA-10's accuracy and ability to limit collateral damage would have also been of great value. The threats that hindered helicopter operations would have only been a minor factor to low-flying A/OA-10s. In any similar future operation, A/OA-10s should be present to provide a continuous umbrella of protection for U.S. ground forces.

## Special Operations

The last area where the A/OA-10 can have a significant impact is in the arena of special operations. Potential A/OA-10 roles in such operations include, support of infiltration/exfiltration, resupply, reconnaissance, and attack. A/OA-10 support of infiltration and exfiltration operations offers cover to special forces in higher threat situations. A/OA-10s can provide visual reconnaissance, route security, and preplanned or reactive suppression of enemy air defenses. A/OA-10s can enter an objective area, examine the defenses and make threat and security assessments of the situation. From there, the A/OA-10 mission commander can either suppress the defenses, redirect the package, or abort the mission.<sup>7</sup> Support of infiltration and exfiltration operations can be either emergency requests or preplanned. Properly trained, A/OA-10 pilots can and should fly in support of both situations.

One of the greatest challenges in support of special operations is resupply of forces in the field. Presently this is done through a variety of assets to include fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. One factor that limits helicopters in this resupply method is the threat level. A/OA-10s in an escort role could provide greater security and protection. The A/OA-10 also can carry and deliver resupply containers to provide resupply independently. Planners can consider use of this option in areas where the threat level is too high for other assets. A/OA-10 pilots currently practice these operations as preplanned air interdiction missions.

Tactical reconnaissance is another mission that A/OA-10s can accomplish in support of special operations. By scouting areas before an operation, A/OA-10s can provide intelligence for special operations forces (SOF) teams before operations. This type of mission is also useful in situations where military operations are ongoing. During the war with Iraq, SOF elements tasked A/OA-10s to overfly and report on potential engagement areas.<sup>8</sup> Such information may not always be

available from other sources but if required, A/OA-10 pilots can obtain it.

Besides the unique missions that support special operations, the A/OA-10 can conduct traditional attack missions for SOF teams. The A/OA-10 is well suited for this role given its ability to provide precision attack in "danger close" proximity to friendly forces with their 30-millimeter cannon. The need for "danger close" CAS support would be the rule rather than the exception during special operations missions where direct contact is unavoidable. The speed and maneuverability of the A/OA-10 allow pilots to identify prevalent target types and difficult targets such as small infantry units in concealment. A/OA-10s can also provide antiarmor capability allowing great flexibility in special operations—more important now due to the proliferation of armored vehicles in many Third World countries.

## Conclusion

The war with Iraq may have given us a preview of how we will fight in the future. However, it would be a mistake to write off CAS as an unneeded capability based on experience from Operation DESERT STORM. The absence of CAS capability puts the entire ground force at risk—a gross error we could never explain to the American people. This article is not an attempt to "replow" roles and missions ground, highlight a lack of vision by others, or justify an increased A/OA-10 force structure. We intended to highlight the criticality of CAS, show how the USAF is addressing gaps in capability, and describe how warfighters should task A/OA-10 squadrons. The Air Force takes CAS more seriously than ever and recent improvements have been the "proof in the pudding." CAS is truly a way of life in A/OA-10 squadrons and we have more to offer today than at any other time in our short history. Call us collect—we deliver.

### Endnotes

1. Interview with Major General Ad Oelstrom, Vice Commander, 9th Air Force/USCENTAF, Shaw AFB, SC.

2. The Honorable Les Aspen, **Defense for a New Era, Lessons of the Persian Gulf War** (House Armed Services Committee, United States Congress, Brassey's Inc., Washington, DC, 1992) 11.

3. Bruce W. Watson, et al., **Military Lessons of the Gulf War**, (Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1993), 100.

4. Robert R. Leonhard, **The Art of Maneuver**, (Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1993), 100.

5. Interview with Captain Russell J. Myers, USAF, Battalion Air Liaison Officer, 7th Infantry Division (Light), during Operation DESERT STORM.

6. *Editors' Note:* According to **Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Associated Terms**, danger close is "In artillery and naval gunfire support, information in a call for fire to indicate that friendly forces are within 600 meters of the target." In this context the urgency of the ground situation requires release of bombs or other CAS ordnance less than 600 meters from friendly ground forces, increasing the risk.

7. Major Robert H. Brown, USAF, **Expanded A-10 Support of Special Operations**, (Fort Leavenworth, KS, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Paper, 1993), 29.

8. Interview with Captain Curtis J. Viall, USAF, A-10 Pilot, 74th Tactical Fighter Squadron, during Operation DESERT STORM.

*The authors are A/OA-10 pilots assigned to the 55th Fighter Squadron based at Shaw AFB, SC. They were all initial cadre instructor pilots for their squadron's recent conversion to night vision goggles. You can contact Captains Givens and Duffield at Shaw AFB at DSN 965-3066.*

*LTC Neubauer was the squadron commander and has more 1900 hours in the A/OA-10. He is attending the Navy War College in Newport, RI. LTC Neubauer has a bachelor of science (BS) degree from the USAF Academy and a master of science degree in mathematics from the University of Southern California.*

*CPT Rob Givens is a flight commander and recently received the Air Combat Command's "Flight Commander of the Year" award. He has 1700 hours in the A/OA-10 and 40 night combat missions during Operation DESERT STORM. CPT Givens has a BS in political science from the USAF Academy.*

*CPT Mark Duffield is the wing's Chief of Weapons and Tactics. He has 1300 A/OA-10 hours and 25 missions over northern Iraq during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. CPT Duffield earned a BS degree in mechanical engineering from Lehigh University.*



# Theater BDA and Support to Wargaming

by Captain James V. Davis  
and Warrant Officer One  
Gerald Leverich

This article addresses two specific issues within the Army targeting process: the decide, detect, deliver, and assess phases of the targeting process and battle damage assessment (BDA). (See **Field Manual 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process**.) Historically, there has been a shortfall in timely and accurate reporting in support of BDA both up and down military reporting channels. This became evident during the Gulf War with the conflicting military and media reports on enemy strengths.<sup>1</sup> The seriousness of this shortfall led to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's study of BDA processing by the Depth and Simultaneous Attack (D&SA) Battle Lab.

## Battlefield Coordination Element

The Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) is the focal point for the Army forces' exchange of operational and intelligence data within the joint arena.<sup>2</sup> A key function of the BCE, normally performed by the fusion section, is to provide feedback and BDA on air interdiction (AI) targets nominated by the Army. These are missions against AI targets beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL) flown by the other Services.

The receipt of BDA data is essential to the commander's assess phase of the targeting process. BDA provides the commander a decision-making tool to determine if his operational conditions have been met.

Exercises have never fully tested the BCE fusion section's ability to provide accurate BDA. Low sortie levels and the ease of telephonic relay of these processed U.S. Air Force Mission Reports (MISREP) to

the Army forces (ARFOR) fire support element (FSE) makes the reporting process simpler. Operation DESERT STORM, on the other hand, proved that this is an extremely difficult task for the four-man BCE fusion section. Dedication one person to this task is nearly impossible given the section's many other responsibilities. This severely hampers the land component commander's ability to thoroughly assess enemy strengths and capabilities. Most important, this can degrade the commander's ability to shape the battlefield for future operations.

## BCE Interface Methods

After identifying this problem, the Army spent three years developing an automated system to synchronize the battlefield (see Figure 1). The Standard Theater Army Command and Control System (STACCS), a computer system, simplifies the exchange and management of information throughout the targeting process and BDA at echelons above corps (EAC).

During Exercise BLUE FLAG 94-2 (in conjunction with 9th Air Force and Third U.S. Army), the Army fielded the STACCS in the

BCE from 21 to 30 March 1994. The exercise generated a sortie rate of approximately 2,000 per day. This system enables the Army to track targets throughout the Air Tasking Order (ATO) process. Either an Army or a corps headquarters can serve as the ARFOR. However, the Army is fielding STACCS at Army level only while the corps must rely on a personal computer (PC). An accredited PC equipped with TARSTAT (a Third U.S. Army-developed targeting program) and the STACCS software can also simplify the exchange of targeting information. In theory, we could also install the software on the maneuver control system (MCS). This would permit maneuver brigades to access the system and further streamline the reporting chain. The integration of the STACCS and software from EAC to brigade level would lessen the circular and double reporting that occurred during the Gulf War.

The wide area network (WAN) provides STACCS connectivity over long distances. The WAN is simply mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) or a telephone line and modem-type communications. The




Figure 1. Reporting to Support BDA.

local area network is hard-wired and used for shorter distances, such as within a headquarters or command post.

## Targeting Process

The STACCS simplifies the targeting process at EAC:

- Decide function.** The ARFOR Deep Operations Cell (DOC) (G3 FSE and G2 Targeting) updates a target card in the STACCS terminal. The target then gets an Army request number and is passed to BCE Plans. Based on the ARFOR commander's targeting priorities and guidance, the target nominations are added to the ATO. The Air Force assigns the selected attack targets Air Force mission numbers and publishes the targets in the ATO.
- Detect and deliver functions.** The ARFOR DOC (G3 FSE and G2) validates the target eight and four hours before aircraft time-on-target. Validation is the process by which the collection assets aid in determining the location and status of a nominated target. The DOC reports target status to the BCE fusion section which, in turn, relays the information to the Air Force. Next, aircraft engage those selected targets
- Assess function.** The Wing Operation Center responsible for engaging the target generates a mission report (MISREP). A pilot debrief, conducted by an intelligence officer, forms the basis of this report. The intelligence officer submits the report within six hours of the aircraft landing. The MISREP goes to the Air Operations Center where the BCE fusion section receives it.

## BDA Reporting

Besides MISREPs, the BCE fusion section receives other reports to use for BDA. These include—

- Inflight reports based on real-time sightings by aircraft crews.
- Reconnaissance exploitation reports based on rapid review of imagery, which are fused with crew debriefs and published ap-

proximately 45 minutes after aircraft shutdown.

- Initial photographic interpretation reports based on a second look at imagery and published within four hours after the aircraft lands.
- Supplemental photographic interpretation reports, the final and most accurate report, published approximately 24 hours after the aircraft lands.

Once the BCE receives all of these reports, the fusion section cross-references the Air Force mission number with the Army request number. Then they input the contents of the report on the automated target card screen, which instantly updates all the STACCS terminals. Although the Air Force produces these additional reports, the result is a tradeoff of accuracy for timeliness. This integration of MISREPs into BDA and then into the targeting process helps complete the ATO cycle. The ARFOR commander now has a method to assess a target and decide whether an operational condition was met.

This STACCS BDA reporting system becomes complicated when the Air Force uses a "kill box" engagement system. With this method, the Airborne Command and Control Center directs the aircraft to targets within a specified area of the battlefield. The probability of striking a target increases, but the question remains whether it was the same target nominated by the Army.

Although the STACCS facilitates and speeds BDA reporting, it does not correct all the shortcomings in the BDA process. First, it works exclusively for AI targets; it does not integrate close-air-support input to BDA. That process still requires a soldier's "eyes on the target." Second, the validity of the report is only as accurate as the subjective evaluation by the Air Force pilots. Third, aircraft approach speed, terrain, and the air defense threat may hamper the pilots' ability to visually monitor a target.

Nonetheless, the introduction of the STACCS has greatly enhanced interoperability in joint Army-Air

Force operations. It has also simplified synchronization of the air and land battles.

## Conclusion

BDA reporting has always been an issue within the targeting community. Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM spotlighted this deficiency. The solution to this problem rests in centrally maintaining the reports, automating the distribution system, and further developing BDA distribution procedures. The introduction of the STACCS and pertinent software appears to address each of these issues. As the system is "worked," integrated, and reaches its full capabilities, the solution to BDA reporting will finally become reality.

*Editor's Note: For more information on the BCE, see "Intelligence Support in the BCE" by CPT Richard E. Nock in the October-December 1994 issue of Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (PB 34-94-4) and Appendix D of FM 6-20-10.*

## Endnotes

1. Norman Friedman, "Desert Victory, The War for Kuwait," Naval Institute Press, 1991, 186 and 187.
2. William G. Welch "Observations on Joint Operations at Echelons Above Corps," *Field Artillery*, June 1992, 16 through 21.

*CPT Davis is currently working on a master of business administration degree at Webster University. He was recently assessed into the Army acquisition program for research and development. CPT Davis's most recent assignment was Imagery Requirements Officer, Analysis and Control Element, XVIII Airborne Corps. Other assignments include Fusion Officer, 1st Battlefield Coordination Detachment at Fort Bragg and Chief of Intelligence, Combined All-Source Intelligence Center, VII Republic of Korea Corps.*

*WO1 Leverich is currently assigned to the 302d MI Battalion in Heidelberg, Germany. Prior to the Warrant Officer Basic Course, WO1 Leverich was the Fusion NCO, 1st Battlefield Coordination Detachment at Fort Bragg. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, SSG Leverich served as the Senior Intelligence Analyst, All-Source Production Section, G2, 1st Cavalry Division.*

# Vigilant Knights: The Army's First Power Projection MI Brigade

by Captain Drew Moores

**October 1994:** Saddam Hussein again threatened Kuwait by moving Republican Guard Forces Command divisions toward the Iraq-Kuwait border. In response, the President of the United States directed the rapid introduction of U.S. ground forces to Southwest Asia. U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT) sent the Division Ready Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, and prepared to deploy follow-on forces as part of Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. The ARCENT Analysis and Control Element (ACE) from the 513th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade initiated 24-hour operations and prepared to reinforce its forward elements in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

With its Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM experience and a force projection mission, the 513th MI Brigade ACE was well suited for this mission. The ACE possessed the technically skilled personnel and modern systems to ensure that the CENTCOM and ARCENT commanders would have the ground forces intelligence they needed to accomplish the mission.

## Power Projection

The 513th MI Brigade, "Vigilant Knights," is the principal intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) organization providing operational level IEW support to ARCENT. As the future Power Projection Brigade East, it is also the first of two Army Intelligence and Security Command brigades dedicated to IEW support of Army force projection operations.

Headquartered at Fort Gordon, Georgia, the brigade consists of a mixture of tables of distribution and allowance and tables of organization and equipment (TOE) units stationed throughout the United States and the CENTCOM AOR. The 513th MI Brigade normally has about 40 to 50 soldiers deployed in the CENTCOM AOR for 4- to 6-month rotations all year. Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR in October 1994 provided the brigade with an opportunity to apply the five principles of force projection IEW operations and test its tier deployment concept.

The battalions of the 513th MI Brigade support theater level multidiscipline IEW, force projection, and information operations in support of ARCENT and other deploying forces across the range of military operations:

- The **201st MI Battalion** contains the brigade's technical control and analysis element (TCAE) and electronic warfare (EW) systems. These assets perform signals intelligence (SIGINT) analysis and ground-based high frequency EW (collection, direction finding, and jamming) operations.
- The **202d MI Battalion** performs interrogation, strategic debriefing, document exploitation, and counterintelligence operations.
- The **297th MI Battalion** provides the ARCENT ACE and intelligence support elements (ISEs) to ARCENT major subordinate commands.
- The **Foreign Material Intelligence Battalion (FMIB)** is the U.S. Army's only Active Component technical intelligence (TECHINT) unit. This battalion

provides foreign material exploitation as well as foreign equipment and weapons training at the National Training Center.

- The **MI Battalion (Low Intensity)** performs communications intelligence (COMINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) operations using the Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL). The battalion is currently under the operational control of U.S. Southern Command but will become part of the 513th MI Brigade in Fiscal Year 1995.

## Commander Driven

The ARCENT ACE provides all-source intelligence, collection management, imagery exploitation, dissemination, and targeting support to ARCENT and deploying forces. The ACE's primary focus is on situation development and targeting. The ARCENT G2 directs the ACE's garrison operations through his quarterly focus messages. These messages direct the ACE to concentrate on priority CENTCOM AOR countries and develop products tailored to meet the ARCENT commander's priority intelligence requirements.

During Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, the ACE was a focal point for intelligence support to ARCENT and other ground forces in Kuwait. After the ACE initiated 24-hour operations and began to prepare for deployment, its priorities shifted from scheduled projects to the priority intelligence requirements of the commander of ARCENT (Forward). During the operation, the ACE produced daily intelligence summaries and assessments describing Iraqi unit



movements, capabilities, political trends, and future activities. It disseminated these reports to all Active and Reserve Component Army units involved in the operation and, most importantly, to commanders forward deployed in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In addition, analysts within the ACE answered or managed approximately 200 requests for intelligence information from units at all echelons. The ARCENT ACE remained the primary source of intelligence support for the participating division and corps until the ARCENT (Forward) commander returned to ARCENT headquarters at Fort McPherson, Georgia, on 7 December 1994.

### Synchronized Support

The ARCENT ACE is functionally organized to provide the best possible intelligence support to the warfighter (see Figure 1). Most of its 100 soldiers are assigned to the Production Section and the Collection Management and Dissemination Section. Both sections contain teams with specific missions in designated areas

of the CENTCOM AOR. This enables the ACE to effectively support the ARCENT G2 by developing tailored intelligence products and synchronizing the IEW effort with the supported operation.

*Editor's Note: The ARCENT ACE organization is not currently in accordance with the ACE Concept or the Final Draft of FM 34-25-3, All-Source Analysis System and the Analysis and Control Element. Its basic structure remains the echelons above corps Intelligence Center described in FM 34-37, Echelons Above Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. Unlike the ACEs at corps and division, the 513th MI Brigade's technical control and analysis element (TCAE) remains in the SIGINT battalion and separate from the ACE.*

### Tactically Tailored

The force projection mission of the brigade drives its tier deployment concept and training. This concept consists of three tiers

(tactically-tailored IEW packages) that can build sequentially upon one another based on mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time available. Tier I is a minimum-essential package designed to reinforce the brigade's current intelligence capability in the AOR. Tier II is a battalion-sized package with greater operational and sustainment capabilities. Tier III includes the remainder of the brigade to fully support ARCENT operations. The ACE always provides a major element to every tier package.

The flow of U.S. ground forces into the theater placed additional demands on the ACE. In response to the increased requirements for intelligence support, the ACE deployed, on short notice, selected soldiers to reinforce the forward-deployed ISEs in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In addition to this individual augmentation, the ACE prepared to send an ISE as part of a Tier I package to meet the ARCENT (Forward) commander's requirements for timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence.




Figure 1. ACE Organization.

If the situation in theater had not stabilized, a robust ACE (Forward) would have deployed with the brigade's Tier II package to support an even larger contingent of U.S. ground forces. When this occurred, the ACE (Rear) at Fort Gordon would have maintained constant connectivity with the ISEs in theater. Once established in theater, the ACE (Forward) would have assumed primary responsibility for intelligence support to deployed forces.

### Split-based Operations

The ACE maintained daily connectivity with the ARCENT G2, the ISEs deployed in the CENTCOM AOR, and the two stateside contingency corps (through their Corps MI Support Element (CMISE)). During the initial stages of Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, the ACE contacted the III Corps and the XVIII Airborne Corps CMISEs. The ACE also reached the G2, 24th Infantry Division. The 24th Infantry Division G2 immediately sent a G2 liaison cell to work in the ACE as both units prepared for deployment.

During Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR forces deploying into theater required continuous intelligence support. The intelligence architecture was already in place prior to deployment and ensured

achievement of this requirement. Through this architecture, the ACE provided numerous intelligence products to the ARCENT (Forward) commander via the brigade's forward deployed ISE in Camp Doha, Kuwait. The ACE also briefed these products to the U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait, the Kuwaiti Land Forces Commander, the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 24th Infantry Division, and the British battalion task force commander.

### Broadcast Dissemination

The ACE has the ability to rapidly access ("pull"), process, and disseminate ("push") intelligence from multiple organizations and IEW systems. This capability provides the commander with the means to focus and synchronize the intelligence battlefield operating system in accordance with his intent and concept of operations.

The ACE is also the commander's organization for receiving broadcast SIGINT and IMINT products from national and theater systems such as the U.S. Air Force RIVET JOINT aircraft and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System. Analysts within the ACE "pull" information from local, theater, and national databases and then fuse it into a tailored intelligence product which they can "push" to the warfighter.

For example, the ACE SIGINT analysis team provides a direct link to the brigade TCAE, which facilitates ACE access to national level SIGINT. This enables the ACE, along with the CMISE, to form a seamless intelligence bridge between the national intelligence community and the combat forces. Figure 2 illustrates this seamless intelligence architecture.

### Conclusion

The 513th MI Brigade is a robust organization which provides daily intelligence support to the warfighter. Its mission demands that the ACE remains ready to focus on any potential contingency in the CENTCOM AOR and to deploy tailored packages on short notice. With vital U.S. interests in the region at risk, the Vigilant Knights stand ready to execute this mission.

*CPT Drew Moores is currently a company commander in the 297th MI Battalion (DSN 780-8545). During Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, he was the ACE operations officer. CPT Moore is a distinguished military graduate from the University of Central Florida Reserve Officer Training Corps Program. He earned a master of science in Strategic Intelligence through the Defense Intelligence College's Post Graduate Intelligence Program in 1993.*




Figure 2. Seamless Intelligence Architecture.

# The INTELLIGENCE GO TEAM

by Major Yvette D. Nonté

The mission of an echelon above corps (EAC) military intelligence (MI) brigade is to—

- Provide the theater Army commander timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence.
- Plan and direct Army intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations in support of the theater commander in chief (CINC).

The Republic of Korea is a unique operational environment. The absence of a corps and its intelligence unit in Korea illustrates the importance, to tactical Army units, of an EAC bridge to establish theater and national level connectivity. The Intelligence Go Team (IGT), an intelligence support element as defined in **FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**, is a major step in that direction. The 532d MI Battalion (the "Blackhorse" Battalion), 501st MI Brigade, is the architect and information mechanic in this effort.

## Background

The IGT is a concept in line with Intelligence Center objectives but tailored to warfighter needs in Korea. Specifically, the IGT is built upon developing technologies in intelligence communications systems, broadcast dissemination systems, and processors. This article will discuss the evolution of the IGT.

Planning began with the commander's vision of developing a mobile, self-contained vehicle capable of establishing and maintaining theater and national intelligence connectivity, synchronizing intelligence collection, and providing enhanced capabilities directly to the CINC's priority force. The

brigade commander, Colonel Wayne Hall, issued two guiding principles:

- Experiment with innovation and build the IGT in a framework that allows for progression.
- Use "crawl, walk, run" phases to improve synergy of information and to provide lessons learned to the Intelligence Center.

Subsequent mission analysis of potential CINC priorities identified a high probability of developing and pushing forward advanced capabilities (like the capabilities in the IGT) to combat commanders. Our overall focus was to provide advanced intelligence to existing killing systems. We used the external evaluations for the attack helicopter battalions (Apache helicopter equipped) of the 17th Aviation Brigade to test the IGT and modify the concept. The inherent complexity of helicopter deep operations requires specialized intelligence training and resources.

In our case, the goal to provide both theater and national level intelligence hinged around designing an intelligence communications architecture and processing a high volume of single- and all-source intelligence. The key components of this architecture are: analytical workstations, broadcast dissemination systems, and several critical intelligence communications systems. Furthermore, these communications links would have to provide direct access to imagery databases and near-real-time electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT). The architecture then allows the IGT to produce the very specific and timely all-source products the commander required. Chief Warrant Officer

Three Keith Hall designed our unique architecture by integrating in-theater intelligence processors and communications systems that span over 20 years of technology.

## The Backbone

The backbone of the IGT architecture are Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) systems ("The Net"), the TROJAN Data Network (TDN), and one All-Source Analysis System (ASAS)-Warrior local area network (LAN). Several state-of-the-art intelligence processors (some under the TENCAP umbrella) and communications systems facilitated an architecture that provides tailored intelligence to the warfighter. These systems include ASAS-Warrior, Forward Area Support Terminal (FAST), and TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT). The effort to harness the great power of these systems and synchronize operators, analysts, collection managers, and intelligence planners was a great challenge.

The mobile backbone of this system is "The Net." Frequency and channel restrictions in theater limit broadcast dissemination. Therefore, TENCAP equipment in Korea operates in a half-duplex net configuration. The Electronic Processing and Dissemination System (EPDS) serves as the net control station (NCS) and broadcasts data to the Enhanced Tactical Users Terminal over a designated UHF channel. The other subscribers that receive NCS transmissions include the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT) and FASTs. These TENCAP processors filter and process information relevant to their supported unit's intelligence requirements (IR). The strengths of "The Net" are mobility, flexibil-



ity, and combat survivability. In the event the EPDS or other processors become combat ineffective, the next most capable processor assumes the NCS mission. The TROJAN SPIRIT and TDN provide a parallel backbone and additional capabilities.

By creatively using TROJAN SPIRIT capabilities, the IGT can access virtually any intelligence product that might support planning and operations. Accessing the TROJAN SPIRIT and TDN serves four functions—

- TDN provides a larger bandwidth (64 to 256 kB) and connectivity to national intelligence organizations. This capability makes TDN ideal for the "push" and "pull" of strategic imagery and national intelligence databases.
- TDN affords connectivity to more common communications networks like Defense Secure Network (DSNET)-1 and -3.
- TROJAN SPIRIT provides access to theater level collectors on platforms like the U2 and RF4C by placing a communications terminal at the Korean Combined Operations Intelligence Center.
- TROJAN SPIRIT gives the IGT the ability to access almost any intermediate processor or database using a bulletin board methodology and DSNET-1 and -3 gateways. That intelligence is then integrated with information from "The Net" and other in-theater intelligence links (like the intermediately processed GUARDRAIL Common Sensor (GRCS) reports over the Improved Commanders' Tactical Terminal (ICTT)), and processed in ASAS.

## ASAS

The ASAS is an automated intelligence fusion system that helps intelligence analysts rapidly gather, record, analyze, and disseminate the overwhelming volume of available data. Our



TROJAN SPIRIT II provides worldwide secure voice, data, facsimile, video, and secondary imagery dissemination capabilities.

ASAS-Warrior LAN divides the workload among the signals intelligence (SIGINT), IMINT, and fusion workstations. At the SIGINT workstations, analysts receive, process, and produce intelligence derived from SIGINT messages (like the ICTT and FAST broadcast COMINT messages from GRCS and "The Net" via an ethernet). The same workstation also receives ELINT messages from intermediate processors over "The Net." Using the enemy electronic order of battle and other SIGINT information, analysts can tailor products to the commander's needs. Analysts can produce intelligence such as a graphic display or text report of enemy air defense radars and pass those products directly to the consumer or the fusion workstation.

The IMINT workstation imports both soft copy and imagery reports through the ethernet from the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) Ground Station Module which displays moving target indicators (MTIs). Analysts can track MTIs on a screen along routes or avenues of approach. The second source of imagery is through TROJAN SPIRIT connectivity. For

example, our IMINT workstation can access imagery at the National Ground Intelligence Center. Further, the analyst can acquire any image posted on DSNET-1, and -3 or loaded on our theater dissemination system, the Demand-Driven Direct Digital Dissemination (5D) system (resident on the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System—JDISS). Just like the analyst at the SIGINT workstation, the IMINT analyst can send a graphic display or text report directly to the consumer or to the fusion workstation.

The fusion workstation receives both single- and all-source information and intelligence through all of the intelligence communications and broadcast systems already mentioned. IGT soldiers analyze this information and produce intelligence products to support the commander's mission. In the example of intelligence support to a deep operation, aviation commanders often request and consume a high volume of graphic intelligence summaries (INTSUM) and overlay them on potential ingress and egress routes.

## Deployability

After extensive testing and several adjustments, this architecture proved to be an excellent combination of intermediate processors, broadcast dissemination systems, intelligence communications systems, and analytical workstations. The architecture allowed the IGT to tailor intelligence support for the warfighter. The next step was to incorporate this architecture into a tactical framework.

To meet the commander's guidance of a rapid deployment capability, we developed a mobile configuration capable of performing sustained operations. We adapted a five-ton truck with an expandable van. The five-ton, a TROJAN SPIRIT shelter, and a 30-kW power generation unit served as our self-contained configuration.

The IGT requires more than just connectivity, intelligence systems, and the physical configuration—it requires soldiers. Currently, the 532d MI Battalion is insufficiently staffed to operate the IGT as an independent element. Therefore, the IGT consists of analysts and operators from our battalion S2 and S3 sections, a J2 collection manager, and additional brigade soldiers on an ad hoc basis.

## Training

To maintain combat proficiency the IGT must train and fight together. We developed a comprehensive training program to build and maintain the IGT's proficiency. At a minimum, training should include assisting the supported S2 (for our example, an aviation brigade S2) to—

- Develop IR and use priority intelligence requirements.
- Develop intelligence acquisition tasks.
- Perform collection and requirements management.
- Perform analysis and create detailed intelligence products (such as pre-mission target folders, the intelligence parts of the decision support template, and the intelligence synchronization matrix).

Additionally, the team must train on automation skills, information processing, maintaining connectivity, tactical skills, and intelligence analysis. To maintain proficiency in all these areas requires an aggressive "crawl, walk, run" training program.

We attacked this challenge by using the brigade's Information Situation Training Exercises (INFO STXs). Each quarter (since August 1994) we participate in an INFO STX designed to train IGT members on basic and advanced skills. The INFO STX has evolved from TENCAP mobility drills to an exercise to test direct support (DS) of counterfire operations through theater imagery. Finally, we deployed the IGT in DS to the theater's aviation brigade to support a deep operation. The 72-

hour standard, established by Colonel Hall, requires that soldiers remain proficient on their assigned systems and master the tactical crew drills.

Our IGT job certification program, still under development, includes tasks, conditions, and standards for each intelligence system and all documented IGT crew drills. We believe standardizing the certification program improves IGT operations. Additionally, it will facilitate the training of all soldiers integrated into the theater from the time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL). Our certification program is an evolutionary training tool and we will constantly revise the program from our lessons learned.

## Lessons Learned

To date, our lessons learned fall into three categories. They are maintaining connectivity, operations, and command and control.

**Connectivity:** Mission accomplishment relies on resident technical expertise on the entire architecture and many systems. That expertise includes fabricating "novelty" cables and frequency deconfliction. To maintain connectivity, the IGT must dedicate a soldier as the "connectivity czar." This soldier's primary responsibility is to develop, coordinate, synchronize, and execute all communications links. An information synchronization officer must orchestrate and carefully track the information flow. The IGT must protect each physical connection, preparing and properly tagging the multiple cables. We believe that commanders in the information age will need a large volume of computer-related logistics.

Finally, the complexity of state-of-the-art intelligence processors and communications systems requires that civilian maintenance personnel deploy to trouble-shoot technical problems. These technicians must test each system individually and in conjunction with

the other systems to resolve potential problems like "crypto incompatibility" and frequency interference.

**Operations:** The lessons we learned in our intelligence operations fall into three subcategories. These lessons are—

1. Simulating intelligence operations that accurately reflect the modern battlefield relies on a sophisticated computer driver and an adequate scenario. As the complexity of each exercise has grown, so has the need for robust simulation drivers to replicate adequate realism in the enemy's movement and actions in the simulation. Drivers such as the Tactical Simulation (TACSIM), National Wargaming System, and Secondary Imagery Generation System (SIGS), in combination with the maneuver simulator, provide great collection management and analytical training. The complex scenarios and high volume of data these drivers generate can adequately replicate a "real-world" operation. We preferred to design our INFO STXs around TACSIM.

2. The IGT must work to integrate itself into the supported commander's intelligence section. To integrate itself, the IGT must talk to the commander, understand his operational needs, and tailor intelligence products to support those requirements.

3. The IGT can perform a vital role in support of the commander through collection management. While the IGT cannot always deploy a theater collection management soldier as part of the IGT, dedicated collection management is essential to the success of the IGT.

**Command and Control:** As stated earlier, members of the IGT come ad hoc from different battalions and, in some cases, different brigades or Services. The ad hoc staffing creates a command and control challenge for the IGT leadership. One of the

*(Continued on page 45)*





# JICPOA: Joint Intelligence During WWII

by Jeff M. Moore

When World War II began, American military forces in the Pacific had no effective military intelligence organization. The Fleet Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Commander Edwin T. Layton, and his small staff were the primary Pacific intelligence organization when hostilities began. However, Layton and his staff were ill-equipped to provide the full intelligence needs for the entire war. Besides, this office specifically served the Commander in Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC)—Admiral Chester Nimitz after the attack on Pearl Harbor.<sup>1</sup>

Planners in the Pacific eventually created the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA) to simplify this intelligence support. JICPOA filled the intelligence void in the Pacific, contributed to the effectiveness of military operations, and helped bring a quick end to the bloody Pacific war. Its genesis, however, did not occur overnight. JICPOA formed because of the constant expansion and merging of other intelligence agencies.

## A Plan

Shortly after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, the leadership in the Pacific began to plan for a large-scale intelligence agency. On 24 March 1942, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb,<sup>2</sup> wrote a letter to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet (COMINCH), Admiral Ernest J. King, proposing a joint intelligence center at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The Commandant additionally suggested staffing the center with Marine, Navy, and Army personnel and supporting it by four smaller intelligence organizations scattered throughout the Pacific.<sup>3</sup> The COMINCH concurred with the joint intelligence center suggestion and advised the commandant to develop

an implementation plan. Lieutenant General Holcomb then submitted the plan to Admirals King (the COMINCH) and Nimitz (the CINCPAC). Admiral Nimitz approved the plan on 28 May 1942 and recommended delaying the establishment of the four smaller centers until the one at Pearl Harbor was operational. Admiral Nimitz further suggested that the center include Army and Navy radio intelligence sections, and offices dealing with estimates, information filing, photographic interpretation, mapping, and the tracking of naval activity. The CINCPAC requested that a naval officer command the unit and the Army, Navy, and Marine provide officers plus a contingent of approximately five yeomen.

Meanwhile, the 14th Naval District's Combat Intelligence Unit (which covered the Pacific area) handled most intelligence matters. The U.S. Navy organized the Combat Intelligence Unit just before the war began in 1941.<sup>4</sup> By 1942, the unit was operating at full capacity and took on specific tasks such as plotting the location of enemy ships and analyzing enemy military charts and maps. Communications intelligence (COMINT) provided most of the Combat Intelligence Unit's intelligence. Technically, this unit belonged to the U.S. Navy's operations communications unit, OP-20. It expanded with the outbreak of war and grew to include a cryptographic (decoding) element, changing the designation of the unit to OP-20-G.<sup>5</sup> The Combat Intelligence Unit consisted of a few U.S. Navy and Marine personnel. Each officer had a specific task (such as analyzing Japanese ground forces, naval forces, merchant fleets, or air power).

U.S. Navy Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, the first unit commander, was credited with developing the idea that tricked the Japanese into revealing their plans to assault Mid-

way Island in the summer of 1942.<sup>6</sup> As the war continued, it became clear that the Combat Intelligence Unit could not produce sufficient strategic intelligence to conduct large-scale offensive operations. Radio intelligence provided by the unit played a big part in the American victory at Midway, but in the long run, it was not enough.

In July 1942, they formed a larger intelligence organization—the Intelligence Center/Pacific Ocean Area (ICPOA)—which absorbed the Combat Intelligence Unit.<sup>7</sup> This was the joint organization suggested four months earlier. However, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO), Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne,<sup>8</sup> did not completely agree with the CINCPAC's March recommendations for the intelligence center. In a letter dated 26 June 1942, he said that a joint program hindered expedient implementation. He further stated that because of this, the center should exist "primarily [as] a naval center."<sup>9</sup>

## ICPOA

ICPOA began functioning on 19 July 1942 using all of the CINCPAC's structural suggestions along with a few additional offices suggested by the VCNO. These included an enemy documents office for captured literature, a prisoner of war (POW) interrogation office, and a dissemination office to ensure the information reached the proper personnel. From its inception, ICPOA employed approximately 190 men (officers and enlisted) and operated in an administrative building at Pearl Harbor. ICPOA, however, was not a consolidated organization. It had to borrow the services of other intelligence units within the Navy such as the Photographic Reconnaissance and Interpretation Intelligence Center (PRISIC) on Ford Island.



For the next 14 months, ICPOA expanded so rapidly it had to relocate twice into larger buildings. It also added four new sections: enemy air combat, enemy equipment evaluations, enemy translations, and a liaison office to the Army and Marine Corps. Meanwhile, ICPOA was processing intelligence for naval operations. At that time, most military activity revolved around blocking further Japanese expansion and stabilizing lines of communication between Pearl Harbor and Australia.

ICPOA's cartographic limitations resulted in a reliance, until 1943, on the U.S. Army's 64th Engineer Topographic Company. In a CINCPAC directive dated 7 September, ICPOA became a joint organization—JICPOA. The head of the 64th, then Colonel Joseph J. Twitty, effectively took command and brought his important topographic company with him. Twitty spoke Japanese and was the liaison between the U.S. Army and ICPOA.<sup>10</sup> His second in command, Naval Commander W. Jasper Holmes, knew the intelligence business having served in both the Combat Intelligence Unit and ICPOA. The Pacific's intelligence machine finally became a joint operation after a year and ten months of trial and error. JICPOA moved into its own complex located on the heights above Pearl Harbor in spring 1944.

## JICPOA

JICPOA's task was gathering, analyzing, and distributing tactical and strategic intelligence throughout the fleet. Its staff reviewed and "re-reviewed" information, vigilantly monitored enemy radio traffic, and spent large amounts of time documenting information.<sup>11</sup>

JICPOA distributed intelligence in regularly published bulletins to keep the theater's officer corps abreast of enemy activities, tactics, and new developments. An example of this type of bulletin was the "Know Your Enemy" series; its publication ran irregularly. These bulletins furnished essential intelligence on Japanese antitank tactics, radio communications procedures, and unit organization and weapons capabilities.<sup>12</sup>

JICPOA functioned primarily to meet the specific operational needs of the U.S. Navy. General Douglas MacArthur, who commanded the Army and Marine Corps elements operating in the Western Pacific, relied little on JICPOA and more on his own intelligence network.

At that time, the Navy was comprised of the 3d and 5th Fleets, commanded by Admirals William Halsey and Raymond Spruance respectively (both were subordinate to the CINCPAC). Admirals Halsey and Spruance rotated the command of both fleets in the Pacific. One admiral commanded the fleets; at Pearl Harbor, the other and his staff planned the next offensive campaign. When a fleet command came to Pearl Harbor to plan operations, it requested JICPOA support.<sup>13</sup> The admirals deemed most information vital, such as enemy troop location and strength, the location of Japanese fleet units and submarines, hydrographic conditions for future amphibious landings, Japanese breakthroughs in technology, and enemy merchant shipping.

Upon receipt of a formal request for such information, JICPOA and the operational planners agreed upon an intelligence deadline. By that deadline, they would complete analysis of all data and publish that intelligence for final review and use by the fleet commander. JICPOA personnel and other reconnaissance assets in the Pacific then began collecting information on enemy targets. Collection relied on aerial and submarine photographic reconnaissance, POW interrogation, enemy document analysis, beach reconnaissance, and radio intercept.

## Sources of Intelligence

Photographic intelligence was the best intelligence source for the JICPOA because it produced a large volume of raw data about Japanese-held islands, such as hydrographic conditions, enemy order of battle (OB), and defensive plans. The Navy fleet and Army photographic squadrons carried out aerial photographic reconnaissance. Photoreconnaissance aircraft carried up to three cameras. The cameras' angles fo-

cused down, to port, and to starboard,<sup>14</sup> used telephoto lenses that ranged from 4.5 to 40 inches; and produced images that ranged in size from 4x5 to 9x18 inches.<sup>15</sup> Pilots also used hand-held cameras.

Submarines used German Primaflex cameras specially mounted on their periscopes for photoreconnaissance. Navy photographers accompanied submarine crews and photographed the coastlines of Japanese-held islands.<sup>16</sup>

JICPOA language officers at Pearl Harbor and throughout the fleets conducted POW interrogations and translated captured documents. Language officers mainly translated captured documents (few Japanese POWs were captured).

Underwater demolition teams and Marines reconnoitered beaches and the surf conditions of islands before an invasion. They collected soil samples, noted current patterns, observed enemy beach defenses, erected buoy markers for landing craft, and destroyed mines and other obstacles to amphibious vehicles.

JICPOA and other intelligence agencies in the Pacific used MAGIC and ULTRA to monitor Japanese diplomatic and military radio transmissions. Communications intelligence was one of the most innovative intelligence tools of the war.

## Analysis

JICPOA personnel integrated incoming data with existing information. Analysts then scrutinized the integrated data. Some information, like hydrographic information on tides and beach conditions, merely needed organization and publication. Other data, however, demanded more intense analysis. For example, if aerial photographs revealed Japanese troop locations on a particular atoll, analysts would closely scrutinize the photographs for evidence of things like enemy defenses. Photographs often revealed enemy defenses through troop location, numbers, and fortifications; the location of fire support units, and other information. The integration of this type of data into reports de-

manded constant updates. This entire process began months before the actual invasion.

From the earliest publication of intelligence on a target, operational planners immediately used the intelligence. Hydrographic intelligence helped planners determine whether tracked vehicles could traverse. Tide reports dictated exactly when an amphibious assault could take place. Intelligence on enemy defensive plans dictated how many Marines were needed, what types of special equipment they might need, how to attack the enemy, and where to direct preliminary and supporting fire. Planners adjusted these plans based on new intelligence.

Accurate intelligence was vital. Sometimes, as with Tarawa, faulty intelligence caused dire consequences. From their surveys of combat conditions, JICPOA operational intelligence teams that landed with invasion forces corrected inaccurate information with the most current intelligence. An example of this was the correction of inaccurate information on Japanese troop locations on Okinawa. However, operational intelligence officers mainly collected information from battlefield interrogations and military documents.<sup>17</sup>

JICPOA's massive effort to analyze information took place under an organized system of coordinated spe-

cialized offices or "sections." By the end of the war it employed 1,767 intelligence experts.<sup>18</sup> There were four groups of sections. Each group focused on a particular type of intelligence task (see Figure 1).<sup>19</sup>

### Internal Organization

**Group One** consisted of eight sections. It was concerned with static information concerning enemy terrain, peoples, health, industries, and hydrography.<sup>20</sup>

The Geographic Section concentrated on enemy land holdings, including enemy bases such as Iwo Jima. The office housed a large reference section with maps of all kinds (including hydrographic and topographic)—most produced internally. Geographic analysts also reported on enemy defense structures, building materials of bunkers, and any past patterns of enemy defense. Generally, this section published its reports in a three-volume set. They based two volumes solely on research while photographic reconnaissance supported the third. A full staff of graphic technicians provided technical illustrations of land masses and targeted buildings.

The Photographic Section reportedly provided Group One the most useful form of intelligence. Sometimes, photographic intelligence

served as the basis for all target information.

The Terrain Model Section, which made large-scale topographical models of targeted areas, worked with two other related sections: the Hydrographic and Cartographic Sections. Similarly, in deciding what targets to bomb, the Target Analysis Section benefited from information provided by its sister sections and the Joint Target Group in Washington. The target analysis staff assessed the weaknesses of various Japanese military buildings and industrial centers. They also suggested what kinds of ordnance to use.

The Reference and Medical Sections were the remaining sections. The Reference Section acted as the JICPOA's library; they constantly added information to their holdings including about 5,000 new maps and 4,000 intelligence bulletins each month. Medical intelligence efforts revolved around analyzing Japanese medical methods and technologies and investigating possible enemy use of biological<sup>21</sup> or chemical warfare. They also planned for medical facilities in areas under consideration for attack.

**Group Two** consisted of five sections that focused on Japanese capabilities, firepower, and resupply—collectively known as order of battle (OB). It also concerned itself with up-to-date intelligence on unit locations and future locations.

The Enemy Shipping Section dealt with intelligence on all Japanese naval craft, shipping lanes, dock facilities, shipyard production capacity, and harbor layouts. They collected this information from photographs, POW interrogations, captured enemy literature, and other current intelligence sources. The Enemy Air, Land, and Flak Sections relied on the same sources of information. These sections analyzed information on Japanese air power, ground troop capabilities, and anti-aircraft capabilities respectively.

The last section in Group Two was the Estimates Section. This office was the backbone of the old Combat Intelligence Center. The Estimates Section primarily focused on





Figure 1. JICPOA Organization.



the location and capability of enemy land, air, and naval forces (categorized as operational intelligence). One method through which the estimates office collated information was on a graphic map overlay that concentrated on Japanese naval forces. The Estimates Section also had a well organized hard copy filing system.<sup>22</sup>

JICPOA's radio intelligence specialists intercepted enemy radio traffic which revealed the location of the signal. Translated message content helped pinpoint locations and identities of ships, aircraft, and submarines. Based on the picture of confirmed and probable enemy locations and movements in a given area, the section estimated enemy intentions and possible courses of action.<sup>23</sup> For example, whether a force was sailing to reinforce an island garrison or launch an offensive.

**Group Three** consisted of the Psychological Warfare and Escape and Evasion (E&E) Sections. The Psychological Warfare Section published propaganda, disinformation, and engaged in other efforts designed to demoralize and confuse the Japanese. The E&E Section assisted separated allied soldiers in enemy territory. They published manuals and established networks of allied military units and indigenous peoples throughout the Pacific designed to funnel missing soldiers back to friendly territory.<sup>24</sup>

**Group Four** consisted of six sections. Three of the sections dealt with publication and management (while the others engaged in collection, research, and analysis). The Bulletin Section published their

"Weekly Intelligence Bulletin"—published when possible—to provide general intelligence information. For example, bulletins contained information regarding enemy air capabilities or the bases of operation for enemy air squadrons. Similarly, the Production Section compiled, finished, edited, and published intelligence reports. The Administration Section oversaw JICPOA's entire process and kept it running. It handled mail, ordered special materials such as MAGIC equipment, kept personnel files, and handled security for JICPOA and the transfer of vital intelligence reports.

Group Four also included the Interrogation Section, which interviewed all POWs and the Translation Section, which took on the tremendous task of translating all enemy documents. Additionally, the Operational Intelligence Section that accompanied engaged forces to provide current information to operational commanders was part of this group.

In January 1945, JICPOA expanded and formed the Advanced Intelligence Center at Guam. This happened out of necessity and in accordance with the original suggestion to form smaller, advanced intelligence centers in the Pacific under JICPOA command (to support CINCPAC's advanced headquarters). The war ended shortly afterwards and the advanced center never realized its full potential.<sup>25</sup>

### Operational Support

The organization's success rate was remarkable considering the conditions. From November 1943

through June 1945, JICPOA produced intelligence for offensive operations against Japanese-held islands in the Central Pacific—the Gilberts, the Marshalls, the Marianas, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. In the same period, the center also produced intelligence for offensive operations in the Western Pacific for the Palau Islands, and nearly all of the target information for the bombing campaigns in the Central and Western Pacific, China, Formosa, and the home islands of Japan. They also provided information on Japanese naval activity to support key strategic naval battles like the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot."

Providing this information was no small task. The members of JICPOA had to learn the intelligence business and build the organization while simultaneously producing intelligence. Intelligence personnel in the Pacific did not have an organization to mimic like the U.S. Office of Strategic Services did in Europe—the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). The JICPOA evolved according to theater needs and mostly educated its personnel on-the-job under wartime conditions.

The center's efforts positively influenced many campaigns. For example—

- An accurate photographic analysis of Roi-Namur Island in the Marshall Islands allowed naval gunners to pulverize enemy weapons positions. Gunfire was so effective that it only took the Marines a day-and-a-half to overrun the island in February 1944.
- Precise hydrographic intelligence produced by JICPOA ensured smooth ship-to-shore movement and troop disembarkation in several campaigns including Kwa-



jalein, Peleliu, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, and Iwo Jima.

- In the summer of 1945, JICPOA operational intelligence teams pinpointed the location of main-force troop locations on Okinawa by interviewing Okinawan civilians and Japanese POWs.

On the other hand, JICPOA made its fair share of mistakes. The center produced inaccurate hydrographic intelligence for the Tarawa assault in November 1943 that contributed to a very difficult landing and many Marine deaths. JICPOA also produced inaccurate OB intelligence and misread Japanese defensive strategy for the Iwo Jima campaign in February 1945. However, on the whole the JICPOA performed well.

One reason the organization performed so well was due to its joint structure. Brigadier General Twitty thought highly of this characteristic and claimed that intelligence itself was a "joint function."<sup>26</sup> He said that having members of the various Services working cooperatively in the same building greatly enhanced JICPOA intelligence products. This occurred because the three Services pooled their assets and drew from the others' different perspectives of warfare.

The U.S. Navy undoubtedly enhanced JICPOA's performance because the Pacific war was mainly a naval conflict. The Navy's expertise included carrier warfare, undersea warfare, and enemy shipping.

Navy personnel analyzed Japanese naval capabilities and fleet movements to determine intentions or to set up U.S. submarine ambush sites of Japanese convoys. The Navy also used its submarine reconnaissance assets to help meet the Marine Corps need for periscope perspective photographs of potential landing beaches. Navy language officers intercepted and translated Japanese radio communiques and served as POW interrogators.<sup>27</sup>

The Marine Corps was especially helpful in analyzing information on Japanese Naval Special Landing Forces—the approximate Japanese equivalent to the Marines. They also headed up a part of the Enemy Land

Section that studied Japanese firearms. In addition, the Marine Corps offered a special perspective on the Japanese defenses of islands scheduled for invasion. They understood amphibious warfare better than anyone else at the center and looked for defensive measures that would impede amphibious landings.

The U.S. Army offered much to the JICPOA's diversity. It, like the Navy, provided Japanese-language officers for POW interrogation and document translation. Army personnel were especially useful for analyzing enemy OB data and infantry defenses. Army officers supervised the estimates of Japanese ground force strengths before the campaigns on Guam and Saipan. Their perspective on OB coupled with that of the Marine Corps provided JICPOA with quality OB intelligence.

Most important, the U.S. Army had a superior system of distributing ULTRA material. JICPOA came to rely heavily on the Army's distribution system through its Estimate Section (which included 15 Army personnel). The Estimate Section worked closely with the Army's Signal Intelligence Service (SIS)—which was responsible for Army ULTRA activity. The result was the regular exchange of intelligence between the SIS and JICPOA.

## Conclusion

JICPOA disbanded after the war because the fleet no longer needed an operational intelligence entity. Many of its personnel went to similar offices in the Pacific such as the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey and some went home.<sup>28</sup> Still others remained involved with intelligence, helping to improve the community. Many intelligence agencies owe a debt of gratitude to the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific. These organizations include the Central Intelligence Agency, DIA, the National Security Agency, and the recently formed theater intelligence organizations such as the Joint Intelligence Center-Pacific (JICPAC).

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*Mr. Moore earned bachelor of arts (BA) and master of arts (MA) degrees from East Carolina University. His BA was in political science with a history minor; he concentrated on international affairs. The MA is in American history, with a focus on military history.*

# Training the MI Unit in the 21st Century



by Captain Kevin J. Degnan

*Training the intelligence BOS means training commanders, MI leaders, MI soldiers, and organizations.... MI soldiers must master the technical, tactical, and leadership skills required to employ and maintain sophisticated intelligence systems on the battlefield.*

—FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations

Picture yourself taking command of a direct support (DS) company team in a military intelligence (MI) battalion. Five years ago, you were a platoon leader of a collection and jamming platoon, but the systems have changed dramatically. You understand the principles in **FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training**. After reviewing the field manual, you face the challenge of identifying all the distinct tasks for the intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) systems organic to your unit. As you prepare for the change of command ceremony, you realize the tremendous responsibility you will have—caring for and training America's finest women and men. It does not matter what position you hold, 21st-century training challenges are here!

Future advanced electronic warfare systems will not replace fundamental battle focused training at unit level. These systems will not substitute for rock-solid leadership at the team, section,

platoon, and company levels. The electronic battlefield will demand more technically competent leadership, that is committed to preserving fundamental warfighting soldier skills, while also conducting realistic battle focused training on technologically advanced systems.

## Battle Focused Training

MI intelligence units are diverse both in soldiers' military occupational specialties (MOSs) and IEW systems. Unlike an armor or infantry company, most MI companies have a variety of MOSs and IEW systems for different missions. Some of these missions may include—

- Electronic surveillance.
- Electronic attack.
- Electronic protection.
- Ground surveillance.
- Aerial reconnaissance.
- Intelligence support to a split-based operation.

A single direct support company team commander is responsible for synchronizing the intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS) with the brigade's other BOSs.

Intelligence systems currently undergoing development and fielding will comprise the intelli-

gence BOS of the 21st-century. Our current and future MI soldiers will require a well-planned, detailed training program in the 21st-century company teams. The more complex the systems, the more detail you must add to the unit training programs.

Commanders must institutionalize a training base within their units to develop highly trained soldiers on the advanced technology systems. The unit must also remain ready to execute their mission essential task list (METL) on demand. This is no small task in today's force projection Army where limited resources are stretched in many directions.

## Commander's Challenges

The commander will face many challenges in training and maintaining his unit in the future. The challenges will include to—

- Teach IEW system capabilities and how the systems are synchronized into the intelligence BOS.
- Develop a "trained" unit, versus having a few trained soldiers who serve as subject matter experts (SMEs). (Avoid relying on a few SMEs to achieve mission success.)
- Develop tasks, conditions, and standards for new IEW systems as they relate to the unit METL.
- Identify individual soldiers' strengths and weaknesses by task, condition, and standard.
- Build balanced teams of "T" (trained), "P" (needs practice), and "U" (untrained) rated soldiers. Train the "P"s to "T"s, and the "U"s to "P"s.
- Create system operator depth on both software and hard-

ware applications for all assigned IEW systems.

- Train soldiers on both software and hardware applications for each IEW system, and institutionalize this knowledge by building "smart-books."

As a company commander five months into my command, I found myself searching for a better way to assess and manage training within the unit. The unit was going through IEW system fielding (for example, TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT)) and modification work orders on several systems (including TEAMMATE, TRAILBLAZER, and TRAFFICJAM). We accomplished this while simultaneously conducting institutional training support to the 111th MI Brigade; providing contingency support to Korea, Somalia, and Europe; performing a real-world daily intercept mission; supporting the Initial Operations Test and Evaluation for TROJAN SPIRIT II; and giving occasional support to the Joint Task Force-6 (JTF-6) counternarcotics mission. I found myself trying to manage training for a very diverse organization operating at a fast pace, with limited time to plan and execute missions.

### **Soldier assessments help the command assess the METL and identify training needs....**

As competing missions for limited resources converged, I realized I needed a training system that could assess, develop, and sustain more depth within the unit on the variety of IEW systems. This system had to allow me to "flex" to meet changing mission requirements. When I received a mission requiring five TROJAN SPIRIT teams (with a table of organization and equipment authorization for only two teams), I identified several training weaknesses:

- **Program.** We lacked a thorough, detailed training program designed to assess, develop, and sustain highly trained soldiers and increase our unit depth on the varied systems.
- **Assessment and development.** While unit leaders did a good job of dividing the unit METL into collective, leader, and individual tasks, we were falling short in assessing soldier proficiency levels. We were conducting battle focused training in support of the battalion and brigade METLs, but we needed a formal system to assess, record, and then develop the proficiency of each individual soldier assigned.
- **Depth.** There was no measure of operator depth on the variety of systems organic to the unit.
- **Sustainment.** Finally, once soldiers attained a proficiency level, we needed a training system designed to sustain their skills and further develop them in their career fields.

### **MGTP: A 21st-Century Solution**

The Master Gunner Training Program (MGTP) is a unit-level training management program that enhances battle focused training. The MGTP helps leaders in—

- Developing tasks, conditions, and standards.
- Assessing soldier proficiency levels.
- Ranking soldiers by individual proficiency on each IEW system.
- Identifying strengths and weaknesses by soldier, team, squad, platoon, and unit.
- Increasing IEW system depth within the unit.

The MGTP does this by developing soldiers through the "apprentice" and "journeyman" levels into the "master gunner" level for those soldiers who excel. These

proficiency levels are defined as—

**Apprentice.** An apprentice can complete from 50% to 80% of assigned tasks on a specific IEW system to standard without assistance. This soldier may lack experience with an IEW system, be new in the unit, or undergoing cross-training on a system to increase unit depth.

**Journeyman.** A journeyman proficiently complete from 80% to 99% of the tasks on a specific IEW system to standard without assistance.

**Master Gunner.** A master gunner is a subject matter expert on a particular IEW system and can independently complete all tasks to standard without assistance. The master gunner is also an expert trainer on the IEW system.

Soldier assessments help the command assess the METL and identify training needs, strengths, and weaknesses by ranking the proficiency level of each soldier. Using the MGTP a commander can systematically "crosswalk" assessments from the individual soldier through team, squad, platoon and the unit METL assessment.

The chain of command directs the soldier assessment process. The team or squad leader will recommend a soldier for MGTP assessment when he feels the soldier is ready for the base level (apprentice) or the next level (journeyman). The platoon leader and platoon sergeant evaluate each soldier proficiency assessment through the journeyman level. When the platoon leader and platoon sergeant feel a soldier is ready for the master gunner assessment, the company commander and the first sergeant conduct that assessment. The assessment is primarily a hands-on test based on tasks, conditions, and standards and a written exam containing information appropriate for each assessment level.

MGTP has no rank requirements a soldier must meet to attain a certain level. It is



METL Supporting Tasks		
Battalion METL: Conduct Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Company METL: Conduct IEW Operations		
Platoon Collective Task	Leader Tasks	Soldier Tasks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Establish baseline.</li> <li>- Perform intercept operations.</li> <li>- Conduct direction-finding operations.</li> </ul> <p>Note: This is an abbreviated example</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Select specific operating site.</li> <li>- Select primary and alternate route to site.</li> <li>- Establish site.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Operate AN/TRQ-32 (TEAMMATE).</li> <li>- Operate AN/TSQ-138 (TRAILBLAZER).</li> <li>- Operate AN/TLQ-17 (TRAFFICJAM).</li> <li>- Locate and identify active targets.</li> <li>- Tip-off non-tasked targets to DS Company Team.</li> </ul>

Figure 1. Sample METL Supporting Tasks.

completely performance oriented. Recognition and stringent standards are an essential part of the program.

### MGTP Components

The MGTP includes three components. They are the unit METL and the assessment of specific tasks, training depth charts, and a recognition program.

The unit METL, derived from the unit mission(s), is the foundation of the unit training program. Platoon collective tasks support each METL task. Squad collective tasks support these platoon collective tasks; leader and soldier

tasks support the squad collective tasks. Figure 1 shows an example of a METL task.

The Training Depth Chart (TDC) is a training management tool that helps leaders focus their training efforts. It identifies strengths and weaknesses at the soldier, team, squad, platoon, and company level. The best organization of the TDC is by platoon, section, or function. The TDC consists of two types of charts: a Training Depth Matrix and a TDC Soldier Assessment Packet.

1. **Training depth matrix.** This matrix lists soldiers' names on the vertical axis and the platoon's

IEW systems on the horizontal axis (see Figure 2). The matrix lists the assessed proficiency of each soldier as master gunner, journeyman, or apprentice for each system. If the soldier does not have at least 50% task proficiency on a system, that cell is left blank.

2. **TDC soldier assessment packet.** The company constructs a packet for each organic IEW system. The packet consists of a list of the tasks, conditions, and standards for the system and a soldier assessment worksheet for each task. Upon completing a soldier assessment, it becomes part of the unit's training records.

First Platoon Training Depth Matrix								
NAME	RANK	MOS	ACT Ops	TRQ-32	TSQ-138	TLQ-17	ASAS-W	TSQ-190
Beale, M	SFC	98G		Apprent	MG	Journey		
Steele, P	SSG	98C	Journey				Apprent	Apprent
Burke, J	SSG	98G		Journey				MG
Cassel, D	SGT	98C	Apprent				Journey	Apprent
Collins, K	SPC	98H				Journey		
Healy, B	SPC	98G			Journey			
Strand, R	SPC	98C	Apprent				Apprent	
Thoma, A	SPC	98G		Apprent				

KEY: ACT = Analysis Control Team Ops = Operations  
 Apprent = Apprentice Journey = Journeyman MG = Master Gunner  
 TRQ-32 = TEAMMATE TSQ-138 = TRAILBLAZER TLQ = TRAFFICJAM  
 ASAS-W = All-Source Analysis System - Warrior TSQ-190 = TROJAN SPIRIT

Figure 2. Sample Training Depth Matrix

**3. The recognition program.** This program is perhaps the most important MGTP component. Good units recognize their exceptional soldiers for their outstanding achievement.

Our soldiers want to excel. Adding a few incentives makes it more interesting and brings out the competitor in everyone. By advancing to the master gunner level, the soldier proves he has mastered that trade or skill. Master gunners deserve every bit of recognition you can give them!

I was fortunate to have led a company in a command climate where senior leaders believed in recognizing and rewarding soldiers. The incentives for earning a master gunner ranking were as follows:

- At Company Level.** Soldiers received a three-day pass and

a "brick." The "brick" was a cinder block in the Alpha Company "Hall-of-Fame Wall." It bears the name of the master gunner, the system (or language), and the date.

- At Battalion Level.** The battalion commander recognized master gunners at the monthly battalion awards ceremony with a battalion coin and certificate.
- At Brigade Level.** The brigade commander recognized master gunners with a "super soldier" plaque at the weekly command sergeant major's meeting.

After receiving all of the incentives, one incentive stood apart: the "brick." I discovered that the soldiers were striving for their own brick and a piece of the company "Hall-of-Fame Wall."

## Conclusion

**FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**, clearly articulates the principles of IEW support in the 21st century. These principles of IEW force projection include—

- The commander drives intelligence.
- Intelligence synchronization.
- Split-based operations.
- Tactical tailoring.
- Broadcast dissemination.

As trainers, we must ensure the preparedness of our soldiers and leaders to execute these principles and information operations. Synchronizing a DS company team into the intelligence BOS is more complex than just coordinating electronic warfare support during wargaming. It involves an ability to balance a very limited

## A Sample Soldier Assessment

Staff Sergeant Steele serves with one of the TROJAN SPIRIT (AN/TSQ-190) teams in the unit. TROJAN SPIRIT includes software compatible with the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS). Staff Sergeant Steele's initial training on the ASAS-compatible software spanned 90 days. Then both his team leader and platoon sergeant felt Staff Sergeant Steele was ready for a training assessment on this software. During the assessment Staff Sergeant Steele received a "T" rating on 27 of the 36 tasks, scoring 75%. This placed him at the apprentice level. His assessment sheet records the following individual task deficiencies (see Figure 3).

After 120 additional days of training, Staff Sergeant Steele's team leader and platoon sergeant felt he could test for the journeyman level. Staff Sergeant Steele felt he was ready to be a master gunner. After testing again on the ASAS-compatible software, Staff Sergeant Steele's assessment sheet revealed he improved on five of the nine tasks in which he was deficient, lost proficiency in one task, and still needs practice in five other tasks. Staff Sergeant Steele improved from an apprentice ranking to journeyman status, receiving a "T" on 30 of 36 tasks and scoring 84% on his individual task proficiency. At this time the section updates the TDC to reflect that Staff Sergeant Steele has reached journeyman level on the ASAS-compatible software and must improve his proficiency to earn a master gunner rating.

<b>Soldier Assessment Sheet</b>	
<b>NAME</b>	SGT Steele
<b>NEEDS PRACTICE</b>	6a. Use File Transfer Protocol 8. Access File Utilities 10a. Use Printer Control Menu 11a. Set up IP Address in Table 13. Use Secure Screen Function on ASAS Software
<b>UNTRAINED</b>	6b. Use Kermit Send, Receive, and Server Functions 10. Use System Supervisor Functional Identity 11g. Remote Login on Distant End
Key: IP = Internet Protocols Kermit = A Communication Protocol	

Figure 3. A Sample Soldier Assessment Worksheet.

number of IEW systems manned by teams with differing levels of proficiency. A major challenge for the company commander is tasking—

- The right IEW system.
- At the right time.
- At the right place.
- With the right team to execute the mission.

The Master Gunner Training Program both enhances unit-level battle focused training and gives the commander a new training tool. As stated earlier MI units must remain ready to execute

their METL to support force projection operations. It is a very valuable tool that assists unit leaders in evaluating all strengths and weaknesses at the soldier to company levels. It also helps him ensure full IEW system depth in the unit. Future IEW and communications systems will not replace fundamental, common sense battle focused training.

As the fielding of complex 21st-century MI systems continues, commanders and leaders must keep the training focus at the soldier and unit levels. Con-

currently they must capture and use the lessons learned and institutionalize this new knowledge.

*After enlisted service, CPT Degnan was commissioned via the ROTC program at Wright State University. He also earned a master of science degree in Strategic Intelligence through the Postgraduate Intelligence Program. CPT Degnan commanded Alpha Company, 304th MI Battalion, 111th MI Brigade. He currently serves as an instructor in the 326th MI Battalion, 111th MI Brigade. Interested readers can contact him at DSN 821-6363 or commercial (520) 533-6363.*



## Vantage Point

*(Continued from page 4)*

available to the field MI units, our NCOs must seek the knowledge and technical expertise to operate these systems and teach our soldiers how to operate them. We must turn on all of our computers that are off and learn those systems. The NCO Corps must know the relationship between information management, the All-Source Analysis System, the Battle Labs, new systems, new doctrine, intelligence training, and great soldiers. NCOs who run from the new age of intelligence cannot effectively lead the soldiers that make up the MI Corps.

The NCO that knows and understands our intelligence battlefield operating system is the NCO that can survive on the battlefield. That same NCO must be able to defeat the opposing forces at the Joint Readiness Training Command, the National Training Center, the local training areas, and in a garrison environment. We can no longer expect NCOs to spend their entire careers in either tactical or strategic assignments. A smaller force projection Army with diverse missions requires experienced NCOs to help deploy their units throughout the world. Then these NCOs must lead their soldiers and provide timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence. We cannot afford to send unprepared and untrained NCOs to support our Army's complex missions. American lives depend on their ability to function as effective leaders on the battlefield. All NCOs must have strong tactical and strategic backgrounds and senior NCOs must make our soldiers understand the importance of the consummate noncommissioned officer. The NCO support channel must ensure that every NCO is prepared to serve under all types of conditions.

## Standards

The Army sets standards that ensure units and soldiers achieve success. All soldiers regardless of rank must enforce and live up to these standards. Soldiers from the rank of private to general expect NCOs to be the standard bearers that never weaken the enforcement of standards. The one person that must never be afraid to tell a soldier that they fail to live up to the Army standard is the NCO. Standards enforcement is a responsibility inherent in our stripes. Any NCO that looks the other way when our soldiers do not fulfill mission tasks, fails to grade an Army physical-fitness test correctly, or does anything that lowers standards tarnishes the NCO creed.

*"We are the standard bearers, the backbone of the Army, until regulation and policies are changed, our job is to enforce them and stop complaining."*

—CSM Victor J. Robinson, 26 April 1995

## Conclusion

I could continue talking about the greatest weapon I feel the Army has—the Noncommissioned Officer Corps. However, I will wait for the next issue of the **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin**. By the time you read this article, many changes will have taken place within and around the MI Corps. The one thing that will not and cannot change is the Noncommissioned Officer Corps. We have many valleys to cross before we reach the highest peak. The NCO must continue to lead, train, maintain, teach, and take care of soldiers.

**ALWAYS OUT FRONT!**



## Intelligence Go Team

*(Continued from page 34)*

most significant lessons learned from Exercises EAGLE WATCH I and II is that it is difficult to assimilate, train, and deploy an IGT created from different intelligence organizations within 72 hours.

We believe a single chain of command should train, deploy, and execute the IGT. A single chain of command would facilitate training, maintenance, and deployability which would improve the IGT's tactical and technical proficiency.

This unified command and control structure could then provide a sturdy foundation for the integration of TPFDL units. Not all TPFDL units possess identical capabilities, such as TENCAP

systems, TROJAN SPIRIT, and ASAS systems. Our architecture, the flexibility of "The Net," and the capabilities of the TDN allow us to support a corps (if deployed) and subsequently transfer some processing and dissemination responsibilities to that command.

## Conclusion

In summary, the IGT shows great promise. The IGT, a DS intelligence support element, is well on its way to providing a robust national and theater intelligence capability to the CINC's priority maneuver forces. Technical enhancements in intelligence processing and communications, the development of a unique IGT architecture, and rigorous training

will continue to improve IGT support to the commander.

Future plans for the IGT include a flat display to replace the working map board and a remote fusion workstation to eliminate hand distribution to the supported S2. We are also improving our flexibility by designing light, medium, and heavy IGT packages that will lead intelligence into the 21st century.

*MAJ Nonté is currently the S3, 532d MI Battalion, 501st MI Brigade. She has served in a variety of positions to include in the U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center as an analyst. MAJ Nonté was commissioned through ROTC at Illinois State University. She completed the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Her E-mail address is: IABDK-TE-P@EMH2. Korea. Army. Mil.*

# LETTERS

## To The Editor:

The "Center of Gravity" is a term often heard in discussions concerning military planning and intelligence. The poor S2 is always told to find the enemy's center of gravity and to synchronize things. The authors of these articles invariably wander all over the "buzzword landscape" without ever giving their readers anything concrete to bite into.

What was the coalition's center of gravity during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM? Saddam and his advisors correctly picked one of the two possibilities. Iraqi attacks on Israel showed that Saddam believed that if he could goad Israel into retaliating for the SCUD attacks, he stood a chance of breaking the coalition. Saddam failed to discern (or for some reason could not or did not attack) the United States' principle center of gravity—public opinion. It is difficult to know with certainty how

extremely high U.S. casualty rates would have affected public opinion (but you can guess).

Iraq's center of gravity? Without a doubt was their command and control system. The destruction of that system was a key element in the successful 100-hour ground war.

Other recent adversaries have not treated the U.S. quite so kindly. Clearly the Somali warlords (one in particular) recognized that U.S. public opinion was the key element to the U.S. presence in Somalia. Killing a few American soldiers, defiling their bodies, and then dragging them through the streets while allowing Cable News Network to film the entire incident certainly had a tremendous impact on the American will to continue our humanitarian operations in Somalia.

What is the center of gravity of an infantry company defending a fortified position? The battalion

S-2 who spends his time searching for the enemy company's elusive center of gravity is probably engaged in a futile activity. The defending company's position probably has potential weaknesses or may be more vulnerable to a given offensive tactic. These are the elements that the S2 must focus upon to support his commander. The center of gravity at the national or strategic level is much more readily identified than at the tactical level. In addition, at the national or strategic level (the National Command Authorities), the theater or joint task force commander, and the corps and division commanders have the intelligence resources available to find and attack the enemy's center of gravity. This effort properly belongs in their hands and those of their capable G2s and J2s.

**MAJ Eric L. Lamberson**  
USDAO Argentina

## U.S. Army Intelligence and the Information Age

by Captain William E. Buppert

The world has entered a revolutionary new era in warfare popularly referred to as "Third Wave" warfare or conflict in the information age. The "First Wave" ranged from the beginning of organized conflict to the Napoleonic Wars in the early nineteenth century. Characteristic of this age is the goal of defeating enemy forces in the field. The "Second Wave" covered the period from the American Civil War to the war in Vietnam; it added defeat of the enemy industrial complex to First Wave objectives. We now enter the Third Wave where control of information becomes an additional and increasingly important component of successful military operations.<sup>1</sup>

The veritable explosion of information and communication technologies over the last quarter century has revolutionized the way the world works. Cellular technology has made relatively cheap portable communication widespread. In concert with this is the ability to fax data around the world from portable laptop computers, even while sitting in an airliner 35,000 feet above the ground. Cable News Network uses a sophisticated satellite transmission system to relay real-time feeds from trouble spots around the globe. All of this and a host of other advances have presented the national security community with a double-edged sword. It provides an information dominance edge over less sophisticated adversaries yet it provides the poorest nations with astounding capabilities (because of decreasing technology costs).

A more enlightening description of the new era may be the "Age of Connectivity." Not only does this age provide instant access to data, but also instant feedback to information operations.

### Intelligence Revolution

The old way of warfighting required a grease pencil and acetate. New technology applications such as the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) have ushered in an era of automation and data synthesis. Additionally, new intelligence collection systems such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) and the family of unmanned aerial vehicles have emerged. New fiscal realities have forced downsizing while emerging threats have radically changed the way the intelligence community operates. Split-based operations have enabled U.S. forces to project limited assets forward. New technology enables us to "pull" from needed databases and resources in the support base to deliver a total product. The use of open-source information has expanded the ability of intelligence organizations to create timely and accurate information to support military operations. We now need to ask the right questions as opposed to merely answering questions. The intelligence community will provide both traditional enemy order of battle and courses of action and relevant political, economic, and cultural intelligence in support of force projection operations.

The new model emphasizes the targeting of decisionmakers and information processes. We now seek to both out-think and out-

communicate our adversary. We need to get "inside" his decision cycle and actively seek to destroy or neutralize his information infrastructure. Increasing global visibility and the complexity of missions (such as peace operations and humanitarian assistance) have added new dimensions of subtlety unknown in most U.S. military operations until recently. The axiom that war is an extension of politics has proven the dominant principle in the post-Cold War world. We must strike delicate balances to accomplish our politically sensitive missions (such as those in Haiti and Rwanda). The increasing interdependence of policy, strategy, operational art and tactics in "Third Wave" warfare requires Army intelligence to pioneer entirely new ways to process information and synthesize intelligence for the warfighter.

### Conclusion

Army intelligence is uniquely well-positioned to lead the way in "Third Wave" warfare because information is our business and we are a key contributor to all facets of military operations. The Force XXI and Intelligence XXI initiatives have laid the groundwork for the task ahead of us. We have the skills, structure, and ability to exploit technology to meet the challenge. The MI Corps has put a high priority on soldier training to include increased computer literacy and the ability to analyze complex information. We are restructuring to meet the new challenges of a changing world and pursuing the technology to win. In the technology arena, for instance, we are using the Battle Command Battle Lab-Huachuca







# Military Intelligence

Brigadier General George J. Walker became the Honorary Colonel of the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps at the June 1995 MI Corps Hall of Fame ceremonies. He replaced Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson Jr. who had held that position since July 1994.



**Brigadier General  
George J. Walker**

Brigadier General Walker, the new Honorary Colonel of the MI Corps, has been a Hall of Fame member since his induction in 1990. He retired from active duty in 1989. The hallmark of his distinguished career is vision and pragmatism.

General Walker began his MI service in 1963 with the 502d MI Battalion, Korea. Before that he served seven years in the Quartermaster Corps. His MI service brought him to Fort Huachuca on three occasions.

From 1972 to 1974, he was a staff officer and later Commander, 3d Battalion, Intelligence School Brigade. In 1980, he was Director

of Training Developments at Fort Huachuca before becoming G2, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas. From 1983 to 1985, he was Chief of Staff, and then Deputy Commanding General at the Intelligence Center and School.

General Walker's earlier years in military intelligence included work as an imagery officer in the Defense Intelligence Agency and service in Vietnam and Europe. He also served as G2, 3d Armored Division in Germany. Following a tour as Chief, Combat Intelligence Division, U.S. Forces Command, he attended the Air War College in 1979.

General Walker was instrumental in reorganizing the Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), serving as the chief of staff from 1985 to 1987. He also consolidated the INSCOM headquarters staff at Arlington Hall Station, expanded multidiscipline intelligence support to the Southern Command, and created the MI Battalion (Low Intensity Conflict).

As J2, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), from 1987 until his retirement from military service, he energized and improved the Non-Developmental Initiatives Program. This program enables faster deployment of state-of-the-art intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) systems. Brigadier General Walker led a successful campaign to include FORSCOM in the Theater Intelligence Architecture Program. He also strengthened FORSCOM's position for interacting with other Services and national agencies.



**Lieutenant General  
Phillip B. Davidson Jr.**

Lieutenant General Davidson had served as the Honorary Colonel of the MI Corps since July, 1994. He has had a long and distinguished career in Army intelligence. General Davidson was the first MI Corps officer to attain flag rank. He has been a member of the Hall of Fame since 1988.

In 1942, he became Assistant G2, 96th Infantry Division. From 1943 to 1946, General Davidson was a squadron commander and group executive officer in the 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group, Mechanized. Following World War II, he studied at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and became a CGSC instructor at the Intelligence School upon graduation. In 1948, General Davidson was Chief, Plans and Estimates Branch, G2 Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command. He held this position throughout the Korean War.

# Corps Hall of Fame



Following the Korean War, he had a series of assignments not related to intelligence. From 1963 through 1969 General Davidson became Commandant, U.S. Army Security Agency Training Center and School, Fort Devens, Massachusetts. He also served as G2, U.S. Army Pacific; and J2, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

From 1971 until his retirement in 1974, Lieutenant General Davidson served as the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, on the Department of the Army staff and then as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.



**Chief Warrant Officer  
Three Ann M. McDonough**

Chief Warrant Officer Three McDonough was a respected and highly regarded member of the MI Hall of Fame and Distinguished Member of the MI Corps since her induction in 1988. She

passed away on April 26, 1995. She was a staunch supporter and goodwill ambassador for the Military Intelligence Corps. Her contributions to the Corps began with her military service in 1949.

Chief Warrant Officer Three McDonough's illustrious career began in 1942 when she entered the Civil Service. In 1949 she left civil service to join the Women's Army Corps (WAC). She received intelligence analyst training and broke the gender barrier as the first woman assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in 1952. She was later assigned to Internal Affairs at the Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Maryland.

Her professionalism and persistence earned her enrollment as the first female enlisted student in the CIC's Basic Agents Course. As a superlative student, she dispelled any doubts about the Army's use of female agents. She further distinguished herself by graduating from the course with honors.

She served as a special agent between 1952 and 1955 in the 902d Counter Intelligence Corps Group in Washington, DC. After studying French at the Army Language School in 1956, she again broke new ground by serving in the 66th MI Group as the first female special agent assigned overseas. For the next five years she completed several covert assignments in East and West Germany, in addition to attending the German Language School in Oberammergau, Germany.

Upon her return to the United States in 1963, Chief Warrant Of-

ficer McDonough was appointed a warrant officer. She again opened new areas to women in the counterintelligence field with the approval of her request to attend the Polygraph School. She was the first woman to attend this course. She then added Vietnamese to her linguistics qualifications and took an assignment in Vietnam with the Military Assistance Command from 1966 through 1968. There she earned a Bronze Star for meritorious service as a polygrapher operating throughout that country. Her long career ended prematurely in 1974 when she retired due to a medical condition.

Although retired from the MI Corps, her contributions continued. Chief Warrant Officer McDonough remained active in the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. She provided a coup for the counterintelligence community by locating and providing a 30-volume history of counterintelligence, written and edited in the 1950s. One of the editors was a close friend of hers, Special Agent (Major) Ann Bray (Hall of Fame 1989). Chief McDonough assisted in editing Bray's manuscript "Spycatchers," a dramatic synthesis of the 30-volume CIC history during World War II. The manuscript eventually became the book, **America's Secret Army: The Untold Story of the Counterintelligence Corps**.

Chief McDonough was truly a legend in the counterintelligence community. Her contributions and remarkable abilities helped pave the way for future female officers.

# PROPONENT NOTES



## Language

In June 1995, the Army Language Committee (ALC) announced that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) had approved a linguist proficiency proposal. This initiative will award promotion points for linguistic proficiency to qualified Army soldiers eligible for promotion to sergeant and staff sergeant. The requirement is a current (within one year) Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) score of at least the minimum standard of "2" in listening and "2" in reading in their foreign language. This initiative applies to the same languages approved for Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (currently 130). The Personnel Command is working the initiative to develop detailed implementation directives, including the promotion point spread. Once they develop detailed procedures, they will send an implementation message to the "field."

DCSPER disapproved an initiative to place mandatory language proficiency comments on non-commissioned officer evaluation reports (for enlisted linguists) and officer evaluation reports (for linguist warrant officers). However, DCSPER recommended that raters and senior raters continue to consider the overall language performance of the rated soldier. The rater comments should reflect applicable comments about the current language proficiency of the rated soldier.

Responding to Department of the Army (DA) level concerns about language training costs and poor retention of soldiers in non-language-dependent military occupational specialties (MOSs), the Office of the Chief of MI (OCMI), has proposed that the Army reduce the overall number of MOS 98CL and 97BL language

identifier codes (LICs), especially at skill level 1. The OCMI also recommended that the Army code all additional skill identifier (ASI) positions that are presently coded T9-cryptanalysis (for MOS 98C), N7-strategic debriefer, and S7-foreign counterintelligence with a LIC. The remaining 98CL and 97BL positions should be fully justified. Currently, the Army is surveying the field to ascertain the impact of the proposed LIC reductions.

## Hall of Fame Activities

The Military Intelligence Corps honored five professionals and dedicated five buildings during the Hall of Fame activities 29 and 30 June 1995.

The 111th MI Brigade conducted a demonstration of equipment for the new Hall of Fame inductees and VIPs, following the welcome address by Brigadier General Charles W. Thomas. The June 30 activities began with the induction ceremony at Alvarado Hall and a luncheon after the ceremony at the Lakeside Officers' and Civilians' Club. The 1995 Hall of Fame activities culminated with the MI Ball that evening.

The 1995 Hall of Fame inductees were Ms. Mary Elizabeth Bowser, Lieutenant Colonel Gero Iwai, Chief Warrant Officer Five Robert P. Oliver, Major General Charles F. Scanlon, and Lieutenant General Harry E. Soyster. Ceremonies also included the dedication of five facilities in the new Intelligence Center academic complex: De Pasqua Barracks, Revere Barracks, Hitt Hall, Davis Hall, and O'Neil Hall.

The Intelligence Corps created the Hall of Fame in 1988 to commemorate the MI Corps soldiers and civilians who have dedicated

their lives and careers to the defense of our country.

## TRADOC Course Cuts

A DA action to reduce the cost of institutional training will increase the training responsibilities of unit commanders. In July 1994, the Army Vice Chief of Staff directed the Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to redesign training to reduce 2,100 military positions and eliminate over 400 courses TRADOC-wide.

U.S. Army Intelligence Center cuts include the elimination of 23 functional courses plus shortening of the MI Advanced Individual Training (AIT) courses by ten percent. The cuts are effective beginning FY 96.

Most functional course cuts involve maintenance courses for such low-density duties as TEMPEST testing, CLASSIC WIZARD maintenance, and variable configuration antenna repair, which are effectively learned on the job. The Army eliminated the GUARDRAIL operator course because low attendance resulted in a high number of class cancellations with no reports of adverse impact on unit operational capabilities. The Intelligence Center is taking steps to incorporate GUARDRAIL operator training into other institutional courses.

The ten percent cut in AIT courses (except 98H10, which is a multi-Service course) will have a wider impact. First, the Intelligence Center will have to change the way it trains. We are modifying our institutional training courses to incorporate subjects which we previously taught separately. For example, we will teach analysis to intelligence analysts at the same time they learn to operate the All-Source Analysis System.



There is a limit to how much lost time we can absorb by refining training methods. Eventually, the Army will feel these cuts in the quality of our product—a trained MI soldier. MI is introducing more sophisticated and complex systems into the intelligence battlefield operating system; therefore, we are incorporating these systems into institutional training courses. We are also incorporating the expanded intelligence functions of supporting a force projection Army into our AIT courses. Ultimately, we will produce entry-level soldiers untrained in some critical tasks and trained to a lower field entry standard in others.

We have already reviewed our critical task lists and redesignated some critical tasks from institutional to unit training. This will increase the training burden on the unit. This shift in burden will create additional training development support requirements. The Intelligence Center will support the increased unit training load by developing training support packages and other training materials.

In a separate action, TRADOC reduced the MI Officer Basic Course from 23 weeks to 18 weeks. We have made every ef-

fort to maintain the integrity of critical task training in this course. The impact of this reduction on the course's content and effectiveness is minimal.

The Army continues to discuss the possibility of additional institutional training course cuts. The impact on operational readiness, as reflected in unit reporting, is causing a relook of institutional training and training development. However, it is not yet certain whether the Army will reverse the current reduction trend soon. The Intelligence Center is committed to making every effort to support units in meeting the challenge of their increased training responsibilities.

### Military Intelligence Corps Association (MICA)

MICA was organized on 2 November 1994 at Fort Huachuca. It is a worldwide military intelligence professional, fraternal and educational organization.

The purpose of MICA is to band together intelligence professionals by providing a forum in which members can share ideas and experiences with the goal of continually upgrading the many facets of MI. As a result, members of MICA experience and maintain a

high degree of "esprit de corps" among themselves and with others in the intelligence profession. MICA wants to create a medium for ideas and growth across the intelligence community, reaching into areas previously untapped to help MI become the leader in information warfare. MICA's mission essential task list (METL) is to—

- Serve as MI's professional organization.
- Encourage esprit de corps.
- Broaden education and professionalism.
- Educate the rest of the Army.
- Preserve our past and link lessons learned to the future.
- Provide a forum for ideas and growth.
- Promote leadership in information warfare.

MICA plans to establish and sponsor the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Museum at Fort Huachuca. The museum will be dedicated to the preservation of the history of Army military intelligence units, past and present. It will also honor the memory, service, and accomplishments of military intelligence professionals.

## PROFESSIONAL READER

**Honor by Fire: Japanese Americans at War in Europe and the Pacific** by Lyn Crost (Navato, California: Presidio Press, 1994), 368 pages, \$24.95.

On 2 September 1945, General Douglas MacArthur accepted the formal surrender of the Japanese Empire aboard the battleship USS Missouri. Along with officials from the warring countries, Lieutenants Sakamoto, Yoshimura, and Yokoyama were present to witness the event. The lieutenants were U.S. Army Military Intelligence Service veterans of the war in the Pacific. They were also second generation Americans of Japanese descent—Nisei.

For those too young to remember World War II, there is nothing startling about Nisei being at the surrender ceremony. Why would not Americans who understood the Japanese language and

culture be there? In **Honor by Fire**, Lyn Crost explains the "why" as she records the history and personal experiences of Nisei soldiers of the 100th Infantry Battalion, 442d Regimental Combat Team, and the Military Intelligence Service. She describes how fear and racism compelled the President to sign Executive Order 9066 singling out Americans of Japanese descent as a threat to national security. The order authorized the relocation of over 120,000 Americans and resident aliens from the West Coast to internment camps. The order also classified all draft age Nisei as 4-C (enemy aliens), initially denying some of America's best assault troops and linguists the opportunity to fight for their country.

Many know of the achievements of the 100th/442d Regimental Combat Team, the most decorated unit of its size during World War II. Few, however, know the role Nisei played in military in-

telligence. Crost puts names to deeds as she traces the contribution of Nisei to winning the war in the Pacific. She describes the Philippine exploits of future Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame selectee Richard Sakakida. She tells how, despite being mortally wounded, Sergeant Frank Hachiya delivered critical information gathered from enemy prisoners and earned the Silver Star. These are but two of the many personal stories about these unsung military intelligence soldiers that Crost brings to life in **Honor by Fire**.

I believe reading this book is important. **Honor by Fire** is more than an account of Nisei soldiers in battle. It is a testimony to the faith and devotion of Americans to their country. It reminds us that we are Americans based not on race, color, or religion but on our way of life, values, and democratic ideals. Though as a nation we may stumble along the road to the American dream, this book reminds us why it remains a road worth the fight.

SFC Michael C. Taylor  
Fort Huachuca, AZ

# TOTAL FORCE

This is the third in a series of articles regarding the ongoing restructure of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) military intelligence (MI) unit force. The mechanism that drives the restructure is the Reserve Component (RC) MI Force Design Update (FDU).

**1. Force Design Update.** The FDU process began in 1993 when the Active Component (AC) was given the task to identify and report their wartime requirement for RC MI support during war. In May 1995, the Vice Chief of Staff Army, General John H. Tilelli Jr., approved the RC MI FDU. The new structure stands up in Fiscal Year (FY) 1997. A carry-back option to FY 96 will give the soldiers of deactivating units a chance to find a place in the new structure. The ARNG and USAR are working the backfill and stationing piece.

**2. Supporting the AC Corps and Theater.** The dedicated mission of the restructured USAR MI force and the ARNG's MI linguist battalions will be to service the AC's wartime requirements. This force will be totally a cellular or

modular construct. It is accessible to the team level via a derivative unit identification code (UIC). The unit organization of the basic team elements will be a traditional military structure through battalion and brigade or group level for peacetime command and control, retention, promotion, and accession. During contingency and war, the RC MI teams flow to AC units as and when required.

Every team element in this RC MI structure exists to meet a specified AC need for augmentation. This new RC MI force focuses naturally to either the East or West Major Regional Contingency. Central management of certain functions would answer the worldwide strategic requirement. (See Figure 1.)

**3. Supporting the ARNG.** In the future, all RC ground combat forces will reside in the ARNG. Responsibility for combat support to the ARNG combat units also goes to the Guard, including the MI companies and battalions associated with their 15 enhanced

brigades and 8 combat divisions.

The Army will base the ARNG enhanced brigade MI company structure on the AC's divisional brigade MI direct support (DS) company. The single exception is the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Tennessee ARNG) which receives a separate brigade or armored cavalry regiment (ACR) MI company. (See Figures 2 and 3.)




Figure 2. Enhanced Brigade.




Figure 3. ACR.

Seven of the eight ARNG combat divisions will have a cadre MI battalion. The 29th Infantry Division (Light) (Maryland and Virginia ARNG) will maintain its existing full-up MI battalion. The cadre battalions would be brought to full strength prior to deploying to theater. The peacetime cadre MI battalion is built around the Analysis and Control Element structure. (See Figure 4)




Figure 4. Cadre Level MTOE.




Figure 1. Corps and Theater RC MI Force.



# 341st Military Intelligence Battalion (Linguist)

Washington Army  
National Guard

*MI blue and silver set the background for the shield. The lightning bolt denotes swiftness and accuracy; the rosetta stone indicates the unit's linguistics role; the book and quill symbolize knowledge; and the sword represents the unit's combat role. The raven on a crown over a wreath is the family crest of George Washington. The unit motto is Vigilance and Valor.*

Activated 1 December 1989, the 341st Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (Linguist) is one of six national guard linguist battalions in the Army. It is part of the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist), located in Draper, Utah. The 341st MI Battalion currently has three companies with elements stationed throughout Washington state.

The mission of the battalion is to deploy skilled linguists and intelligence personnel in support of U.S. interests and contingency operations worldwide. Battalion linguists receive further training in interrogation, counter-intelligence, or signal intelligence operations and analysis. An additional peacetime mission of the battalion is to serve as a center for language training and development. Personnel of the 341st use their foreign language(s) in nearly all their additional duty training: weapons, NBC, first aid, and so forth.

Currently, the battalion has linguists fluent in more than a dozen languages, most of which are in the Pacific Rim family (Russian, Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Tagalog). There are also many Spanish and German linguists.

The 341st MI Battalion (Linguist) supports dozens of missions every year. Most recently, the battalion has sent Japanese linguists to Yama Sakura/KEEN EDGE and Spanish linguists to Panama to provide assistance in the Cuban-refugee camps. Linguist missions can be very diverse. In the past year, the battalion supplied Russian linguist support to a Christmas toy drive, Portuguese language assistance for the Air National Guard on duty in Portugal, and interpreter support for visiting dignitaries at Fort Lewis. The battalion even helped an escrow company close a home purchase for a Russian immigrant family.

The battalion is always seeking qualified linguists. Interested personnel can contact Master Sergeant Trent Lutey, the operations sergeant and designer of the unit crest, at commercial telephone (360) 779-3110.

**VIGILANCE AND VALOR**



Commander  
U.S. Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca  
ATTN: ATZS-TDL-B (12)  
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000

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