To the Editor:
In the April-June 1995 issue of the Military Intelligence
Professional Bulletin, you published an article by two Officer
Advanced Course instructors on the subject of "Center of Gravity."
In this article, the authors encouraged battalion and brigade S2s
to seek out the enemy's center of gravity in their threat analysis
and evaluation. They argued that this process of determining the
enemy center of gravity was the key to conducting successful
intelligence analysis and targeting at the tactical level. I
believe that they were wrongfully applying this doctrinal concept.
They have misused the terminology, and in espousing this as
military intelligence doctrine, have put the credibility of our S2s
at risk. Please, set the record straight and get us back on the
path of doctrinal accuracy.
In our branch, information is our primary weapon and words are our
primary tools. We must be careful the application of doctrinal
terms. The authors selectively pulled a quotation from FM 100-5,
Operations, to support their thesis. Context, critical to
understanding the meaning and use of the term "center of gravity,"
comes from the preceding and subsequent paragraphs. The preceding
paragraph on page 6-7 states, "Several key concepts of campaign
planning design guide theater- and operational-level planners in
their efforts." This passage clearly places the use of the center
of gravity in the operational realm. Although this term is also
used at the corps-level, in transitioning from the operational to
tactical-level of operations, the term may not be meaningful at the
tactical-level. The following extract from page 6-7 of FM 100-5
further clarifies the use and meaning of center of gravity stating
"The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects
against the enemy's main source of power his center of gravity,
which he seeks to protect. At any given time, however, a center of
gravity may not be immediately discernible. For example, the center
of gravity might concern the mass of the enemy's units, but that
mass might not have been formed. Additionally, the center of
gravity may be abstract, such as the enemy's national will or an
alliance structure, or concrete, such as strategic reserves, C2, or
industrial bases and LOCs."
Our doctrine for intelligence operations at the tactical level is
clear and concise. Battalion and brigade S2s conduct intelligence
preparation of the battlefield to support tactical engagements. At
this level of threat analysis, the S2s are dealing with enemy
capabilities. The focus should be on the enemy's doctrine, tactics,
and procedures. The end results of the intelligence preparation of
the battlefield process where rubber meets the road are products
that support the commander's fire and maneuver. The threat model
produced by the battalion and brigade S2s must be useful to the
commander, supporting his application of combat power on the
battlefield. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield, clearly establishes the need for an evaluation of the
threat strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities, including an
evaluation of typical high value targets. Center of gravity just
does not meet the needs of the tactical commander. At the battalion
and brigade level of operations, the enemy's source of power are
generally his combat forces. When tank meets tank or infantryman
meets infantryman on the battlefield, center of gravity becomes
esoteric.
I am not saying that we must always stay within the confines of the
doctrinal definition. There may be situations, especially in the
operations other than war arena, where new or unusual methods of
analysis are not only acceptable but necessary. We must, however,
be extremely careful in what we say and write. When applying
doctrinal terms in a new or unusual manner, we must explain this
carefully. Always place the "nondoctrinal" use of terminology in
context and carefully consider what it is you are trying to
portray. Remember, information is our main contribution to the
combat commanders. Words are our projectiles and cannot be launched
without careful consideration and accuracy.
Major George J. Franz
Student
School of Advanced Military Studies
Lansing, Kansas
To the Editor:
Probably the most valuable piece of information that I have come
across recently, for our community, I have found in the Military
Intelligence Professional Bulletin, April-June 1995 issue: notably
the "JTF JIC Operations: Critical Success Factors," "Joint
Intelligence Courses at NMITC" the entire issue. A job well done!
M.E. Idrogo
Naval Reserve JIC Pacific Unit 1070
Naval Air Station, Dallas, Texas