Joint General Intelligence Training Architecture

by Edward A. Giarusso


The United States learned many lessons from the Gulf War. Lessons not only on doctrine and joint warfare but also on the importance of joint training in conducting joint warfare. The Joint General Intelligence Training Architecture is an outgrowth of the intelligence community's effort to better prepare Service personnel for joint operations and assignments.

Background

Analysis conducted after Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM identified some areas for improvement in joint operations. One area that surfaced quickly during the war was the joint targeting process. This was not unexpected in hindsight as there was no established joint doctrine or related systematic training architecture to teach Service personnel how to fuse their skills into a cohesive staff on such short notice. Hard work and long hours eventually worked through the problems but certainly at a price.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) J2 and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) formed a Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned (JULLs) action team to study and recommend solutions for joint targeting. They reported that the problem with joint targeting resulted in part from the assignment of Service personnel to the targeting cells who possessed differing levels of training and experience in the targeting process. In an effort to fix the targeting problem, members of the intelligence training community identified the necessary skills for joint targeting. They also developed a fuller understanding of the problems and requirements in the assignment of personnel for joint force missions.
DIA recognized that the JULLs initiative could serve as a basis for reviewing much larger issues. These issues included
The General Joint Intelligence Training Committee (GITC), comprised of senior personnel from all the Services, unified commands, and other general intelligence community members, had asked these questions previously. After the Gulf War, the concept of a joint training architecture took on new meaning and increased tempo. The regular meetings of the GITC addressed the architecture and supported ongoing work to develop other courses for joint duty assignments. The effort to develop the architecture was now well under way.

GITC--Vehicle of Change

Under the auspices of DIA, the GITC undertook a review of the training requirements for joint assignments. In identifying how the Services do business in support of joint operations, it became clear that support of joint warfighters required a uniform level of knowledge and experience that most military personnel do not acquire during their normal career assignments.
The problem of a uniform joint targeting process evolved into a requirement to develop several courses of instruction to prepare Service personnel for work in a joint headquarters of a unified command or a separately established joint task force. While that may seem simple, the effort required months of meetings by the Services and the intelligence community. Along with representatives from the unified commands, they developed a plan of action that answered the basic questions of joint intelligence training:
In moving toward a training solution, it became clear that a systematic approach to resolution of several interrelated problems was emerging. The GITC recognized that it was unreasonable to expect the Services to assume total responsibility for preparing military personnel for joint assignments. The Services might be willing, however, to pool assets and develop joint intelligence courses to be taught in joint environments. Thus, the concept of a Joint General Intelligence Training Architecture was born. The next step was the development and application of the architecture.

Centers for Joint Intelligence Training

In June 1994, GITC contracted a study of joint training requirements. The study provided the outline and direction for the Services' joint training requirements and built a relational database. The database included information on current Service instruction and curricula that supported personnel assignment to joint service positions.
The study also documented the need to continue the joint courses of instruction under development to train personnel for joint duty billets. These courses include the Joint Task Force Management Course, the Joint Targeting Training Course, the Joint Intelligence Course, and the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System course. Also included in the study were courses offered by the Joint Military Intelligence College such as the Collection Management and the Indications and Warning Courses.
The authors of the study also identified the need for unified command intelligence training to meet area-unique missions and responsibilities. Accordingly, the GITC approved the Regional Joint Intelligence Training Facility (RJITF) concept. Under the concept, selected unified commands would develop a training facility to conduct joint and command-specific intelligence training. Currently, the U.S. Pacific and Strategic Commands have established RJITFs. The U.S. European, Atlantic, Central, and Special Operations Commands are in various stages of RJITF development.

The Army Role in Joint Intelligence

The Army vision for intelligence in the 21st century, Intel XXI, includes the concept of providing warfighters a "dynamic, common understanding of the battlefield, enabling them to train, plan, rehearse, and execute missions." From the foxhole to the warfighting commander in chief, commanders will be able to conduct their respective tasks with a shared situational awareness throughout the range of military operations to include joint missions.
The Army doctrine for analyzing the battlefield is found in FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). As described in FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, IPB is a "systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area." IPB is one of the Army's cornerstone contributions to joint intelligence doctrine. Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, has accepted IPB as a common intelligence technique because it is a flexible process that can adapt to a broad variety of situations. The IPB process and systems training methodology serves as the framework for the Joint Targeting Course. Scheduled to begin in October 1995, the Joint Targeting Course has great potential and will serve as a model for future joint intelligence courses. The success of the Joint Targeting Course may very well have long term impact on the emerging Joint General Intelligence Training Architecture.

Conclusion

The emerging training architecture and the respective Army role will require the incorporation of new techniques, equipment, and methodologies as the Army moves towards Force XXI. The Army and its sister Services, along with the Joint Staff, DIA, the unified commands, and the other national intelligence agencies must resolve a host of issues to foster better working relationships within the intelligence community. The following are some issues presently under examination that will improve intelligence support:
The Joint General intelligence Training Architecture will foster many changes on the Army of today and tomorrow. Army intelligence will evolve to meet the mission requirements of the joint commander. After all, the Military Intelligence Corps' motto is "Always Out Front!"
Edward A. Giarusso is currently an intelligence specialist in the Training Division, Plans and Operations Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army Staff, the Pentagon. His previous assignments include: international military training specialist in the Pentagon; education specialist at the Army Engineer School, the Intelligence School-Devens and the Army Education Center, Fort Devens; and an Army Internship at the Intelligence School-Devens. Mister Giarusso earned a Bachelor of Arts in history from Roger Williams College and a Master of Science in instructional media systems from the University of Bridgeport.