The Evolution of AMERICAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

PREPARED FOR USE
BY THE US ARMY
INTELLIGENCE CENTER
AND SCHOOL, FT. HUACHUCA
AZ. 85613

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UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER AND SCHOOL
FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA 85613
May 1973

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER AND SCHOOL
FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA 85613

ATSI-CO

4 May 1973

SUBJECT: American Military Intelligence

All Students
Military Intelligence Officers Advanced Course

1. The attached supplementary reading has been prepared as a chronological and analytical account of American military intelligence, with the goal of engendering some insight into the significant trends and developments of this aspect of the military profession, as it has been practiced in the U.S. Army.

2. This reading was prepared by two U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School instructors, Major M. B. Powe and Major E. E. Wilson, for use in the MI Officers Advanced Course. The authors have made considerable effort to achieve an accurate and balanced account. It is possible, nonetheless, that there may appear errors in fact and in interpretation, inasmuch as the reading was prepared exclusively from unclassified data. Readers of this material are encouraged to offer suggestions and additions, which should be directed to the USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-DI-TIMS.

3. The history of American military intelligence has been marked by significant advances occurring during each American war followed by periods of relative disinterest in intelligence. Yet, in a comparatively short span of time, the United States has progressed from a nation devoid of a formal intelligence apparatus to a world power possessed of one of the most advanced and successful intelligence organizations in the world. This progress has been made possible by extremely able and farsighted personnel in the intelligence profession and by a variety of brilliant military and civilian leaders who recognized the essentiality of intelligence. I am confident that you will find this account to be important and interesting reading.

Elvin Dalton

ELVIN DALTON
Colonel, MI
Commandant

U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER AND SCHOOL
Supplementary Reading

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THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

"Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert workman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion--which is usually too late . . . . Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck."

Thomas E. Shelling, Foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor Warning and Decision, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1962.

Colonel Ralph H. Van Deman, 1923

PREFACE

Who has not heard the famous remark from George Santayana that "those who fail to learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them." Unfortunately, this adage has applied all too often in the history of American military intelligence. Mistakes are made in one war, only to be repeated in the next. The theme that runs through this history is that only in very recent times has there been an appreciation in the United States of a need for a continuing professional effort upon which decisions could be based.

Modern military intelligence in the U.S. Army has developed as a result of a variety of experiences. First, it has generally progressed in wartime and lain fallow in peacetime. Second, the evolution of our tactical intelligence capabilities has not always kept pace with our strategic intelligence. Third, the experience of the intelligence collectors (cryptologic, human and aerial and ground surveillance) differs considerably from that of those charged with producing and disseminating that intelligence, though both have made their contribution. It is inherent in this study that the combination of these strains produced the Army intelligence profession, exemplified today in the Military Intelligence Branch. While not neglecting the significance of national intelligence operations, this history concentrates on intelligence support to tactical forces since, in truth, this is where military intelligence, per se, receives its greatest visibility and its greatest importance.

This history cannot claim, in any way, to be a complete record of American military intelligence. There are two reasons for this. First, the information for this paper is drawn from unclassified data, whose authors, as the present ones, had no access to the related classified materials, or chose purposefully to ignore them. It should be recognized, therefore, that the facts, or their interpretation, might suffer revision when compared with official, and still classified, materials. Secondly, this history is not complete because this is a field ripe for investigation. Much additional information is available in unclassified sources and far more in classified materials. This history, moreover, is not an official one and does not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Army Intelligence Center and School or those of the Department of the Army.

This present history is divided into these chronological segments:

Historical Background to 1885
1885 to the End of World War I
The Period Between the Wars
World War II
The End of World War II to 1963
1963 to the Present

In these periods, developments in the military intelligence profession will be considered in five interlocking lines of descent:

National Intelligence Activities
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
The Counterintelligence Corps and the Intelligence Command
The Signal Intelligence Service and the Army Security Agency
Tactical Support and the Military Intelligence Organization

This particular history was prepared in an initial draft edition with a request for personal experiences and suggestions for improvement. Though formal interviews with some individuals are footnoted, the volume of the response precludes any extensive listing of those to whom the authors are indebted. They must, nevertheless, express their gratitude to their seniors and elders in Army intelligence for making freely available a vast experience and knowledge; to their current superiors for encouragement in this study as well as for the benefit of their knowledge; to their colleagues for their kindly, but critical reviews; to friends who located documents in far away places; to the USAICS library and editorial staffs for patient understanding; to their students for encouragement and for studies of particular aspects of intelligence history; and to Mr. Jerry Whitehead for graphics. Finally, the authors, one of whom is married and one is not, have always wondered why wives always receive the final expression of thanks; now they know, and reserve their last words of gratitude for their patient wife, friend and critic.

The authors emphasize again to the reader that this is not an official history and does not necessarily represent the views of the United States Army or the United States Army Intelligence Center and School.

Fort Huachuca, Arizona
May 1973

Marc B. Powe
Edward E. Wilson

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IF YOU KNOW THE ENEMY AND KNOW YOURSELF, YOU NEED NOT FEAR A HUNDRED BATTLES. IF YOU KNOW YOURSELF AND NOT THE ENEMY, FOR EVERY VICTORY YOU WILL SUFFER A DEFEAT. IF YOU KNOW NEITHER YOURSELF NOR THE ENEMY, YOU ARE A FOOL AND WILL MEET DEFEAT IN EVERY BATTLE.



CHAPTER 1

CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNINGS (TO 1885)

To appreciate contemporary military intelligence, it is helpful to look briefly at the high spots in the background of intelligence, how some successful military leaders prior to our own Revolution were organized for military intelligence, and what some important thinkers have said on the subject of intelligence. By tracing U.S. military history, it is possible to see the evolution of military intelligence, until World War I caused everything to jell. Since World War I, very distinct functions and organizations have existed and warrant more detailed analysis.

We know that among primitive man warfare was quite unorganized. If a distinct leader did emerge, he certainly had no need for a staff, and the only intelligence capability he needed was the ability to see what he wanted. As warfare became more complicated, and one leader controlled more men than he could see at one time, it became necessary to develop an elementary staff function in the form of a messenger to take orders to a detached group and bring back a report on the situation in the area in which it was operating.

The first organized army of which we have a written record was that of the Egyptians in the period 3000-2000 B.C. From what few records are available, it appears that they had a fairly well-developed staff system by 1500 B.C., and that this staff was, to a significant extent, concerned with intelligence.[1]

The Old Testament contains some ten or twelve stories related to intelligence. In one of the best known of these, Moses gathered together the leaders of the twelve tribes of Israel and told them to go into Canaan to "see the land, what it is and the people that dwelleth therein, whether they be strong or weak, many or few . . . ."[2] Certainly the primary reason for Joshua sending two spies into Jericho was to gather intelligence that would be helpful in the upcoming battle. It is also interesting to note that one of the better domestic spying operations was run in Greece by the priests of Delphi. This operation gave the Oracle of Delphi accurate information on which to base prophecies.[3]

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[1]James D. Hittle, The Military Staff: Its History and Development, The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, Pa., 1961, p. 15.

[2]Numbers 13:20

[3]Allen W. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, Harper and Row, New York, 1963, p. 12.

About 500 B.C., a Chinese thinker named Sun Tzu wrote a treatise known as The Art of War, in which he showed an excellent grasp of the importance and intricacies of intelligence work. One entire chapter and several smaller portions were devoted to the field. In one instance, he said:

> If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear a hundred battles. If you know yourself and not the enemy, for every victory you will suffer a defeat. If you know neither yourself nor the enemy, you are a fool and will meet defeat in every battle.[4]

Alexander the Great, who conquered most of the known world in the fourth century B.C., had a fairly complex staff system and also made good use of his intelligence forces - generally in the role of reconnaissance. Alexander's staff performed primarily administrative and logistical functions, while he served as both intelligence and operations officer. Alexander also considered weather and terrain intelligence and used it to his advantage.[5]

In Julius Caesar's time, each Roman legion of approximately 5000 personnel had ten men, known as speculators, assigned specifically to intelligence duties. Here was a recognition of the need for full time intelligence personnel that has frequently been lacking in some of our more recent organizations.[6]

Around 400 A.D., Flavius Vegetius wrote a military treatise, The Military Institutions of the Romans, which in many ways has had a great deal of influence in military thinking up until recent times. His insight into the importance of intelligence was excellent:

> Our spies should be constantly abroad. We should spare no pains in tampering with their men, and giving encouragement to deserters. By these means we may get intelligence of their present or future designs.[7]

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[4]Sun Tzu, The Art of War, tr. Samuel B. Griffith, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p. 84.

[5]Hittle, op. cit., pp. 22-24.

[6]Ibid., pp. 26-29.

[7]Thomas R. Phillips, Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics, Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, Pa., 1940, p. 81.

Throughout the Middle Ages, while there was constant feudal warfare and use of spies, there were no real or continuous organizations dealing with intelligence in the West. On the other hand, in the thirteenth century, the Mongol general Subotai, a disciple of Genghis Khan, used a highly organized intelligence system to facilitate his invasion of Europe. As one historian noted:

> The Mongols are reputed to have first demonstrated to Europeans the deadly uses of gunpowder . . . . Their further introduction of efficient military secret service, intelligence, and staff communications was an example not soon hammered into the thick, warlike skulls of Western captains and kings.[8]

In the sixteenth century, the modern nation states began to emerge, and developments in several countries during this period were to have a profound effect upon the history of military intelligence. One significant part of that history was the intelligence organization headed by Sir Francis Walsingham, Secretary of State under Elizabeth I of England. This was the first permanent peacetime intelligence apparatus known to have existed. Although not a military organization, it did perform military-related intelligence operations. Walsingham, whose motto was "Knowledge is never too dear," and who used his own funds so extensively that he died in poverty, is considered a master of both internal security and foreign intelligence operations. Domestically, he used confusion operations, employed agents provocateurs, and organized mail intercept, aggressive counterespionage and subversion. He was largely responsible for implicating Mary, Queen of Scots, in a conspiracy against Elizabeth so that the latter could have Mary executed.[9]

In foreign intelligence, Walsingham's greatest success was a third country operation against Spain that placed in Spanish ports reliable agents who, in turn, reported the assembly of the Spanish Armada, its movement plans, and its objective. Interestingly, their reports were being sent out in the diplomatic pouch of the Ambassador of the Italian state of Tuscany, perhaps without his knowledge. The importance of this intelligence was that England, a small weak nation, knew what the Spanish were going to do, and could mass its forces at the right time and place. One other skill available to Walsingham was that of his staff cryptographer and cryptanalyst, Thomas Phelippes, who made secure codes for his chief and broke those of his enemies, including Mary, Queen of Scots.[10]

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[8]Richard W. Rowan, The Story of Secret Service, Doubleday, New York, 1937, p. 53.

[9]Richard Deacon, A History of the British Secret Service, Taplinger Publishing Co., New York, 1970, pp. 12-22.

[10]Allison Ind, A Short History of Espionage: From the Trojan Horse to Cuba, McKay, New York, 1963, pp. 27-30. Cited hereinafter as Short History.

One of the earliest of the modern staff systems to develop was that of Gustavus Adolphus, who became King of Sweden in 1611 and is sometimes titled the Father of Modern Warfare. His influence was felt throughout the armies of Europe for the next 300 years. In his higher level units, intelligence was given recognition as a separate staff function, while in the smaller units it remained as an extra function of the Quartermaster General.[11]

The Prussians drew their system from the Swedes. Their first staff officer was the Quartermaster General. In his function of preceding the Army in order to make logistic arrangements, he soon was given the additional duty of bringing back intelligence concerning the area into which the Army was going. But this was not the only additional staff duty assigned to the Quartermaster General. As additional staff functions arose, including those in operations, they all went to the Quartermaster General. He was provided with assistants in lieu of creating distinct new staff positions. Thus, the Chief of the Quartermaster General's staff became the equivalent of the chief of the general staff. The members of the Quartermaster's Staff Corps were professional, well-rounded staff officers who usually had a great deal of expertise in intelligence. But the haphazard way in which the staff developed meant that intelligence was not given emphasis in the staff organization itself. The fact that individual staff officers became intelligence experts, while there was no organizational recognition of an intelligence staff function, had an important effect on Washington's intelligence operations during the American Revolution.[12]

The French, in the meantime, were also developing a staff system which was to evolve along very definite functional lines. This also had its influence on U.S. staff organization, but not until well after the American Revolution.

At this point in time, it is proper to move to the New World and take a look at early-day American intelligence. While formal organization of all military intelligence functions into one agency did not occur for nearly two more centuries, the need for military intelligence has been recognized ever since our Armed Forces came into being. It is also interesting to note that there is some debate about the birthdate of the MI Branch. Some feel that MI began at this very time, in 1776. Those who support this view feel that it is logical and historically accurate, and they say that, loose-knit or not, intelligence has been serving the U.S. Army since the Revolution.

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[11] Hittle, op. cit., pp. 35-49.

[12] Ibid., pp. 50-71.

General Washington had an excellent appreciation of intelligence, gained in part because of what happened to the British against the Indians prior to the Revolution. Unfortunately, Washington was not given complete freedom in organizing his staff; instead, it was imposed upon him by the Continental Congress, and was organized along the lines of the British staff, which, in turn, was influenced by the Prussians. As a result, Washington was not provided with an intelligence officer. He did eventually obtain the services of Von Steuben who, as a product of the Prussian staff system, was experienced in many fields, including operations, training and intelligence. Von Steuben effectively served as Washington's combat intelligence staff officer during many revolutionary campaigns.[13]

In 1776 our first intelligence and reconnaissance unit was established. Known as Knowlton's Rangers, it was a handpicked, all-volunteer unit; among the officers of this unit was a young school teacher named Nathan Hale. As is well known, Hale volunteered to go behind the British lines to obtain information for Washington. He volunteered on 11 September 1776, a date which has been proposed as the birthdate for MI Branch. His capture and hanging, within two weeks, however, is not considered a very auspicious beginning.[14]

As a consequence of this tragic failure, Washington decided a better organization, a secret intelligence bureau, was needed. It was to be the highly successful Continental Secret Service commanded by Hale's friend, Benjamin Tallmadge. Tallmadge's principal subordinate was Robert Townsend who ran the agent net targeted against New York, a strong Tory area at the time. The organization provided Washington with a great deal of useful intelligence and functioned well for more than five years, despite British counterintelligence efforts. Another early American intelligence success--though possibly by accident--was the uncovering of Benedict Arnold's conspiracy. On the other hand, identifying Arnold's disaffection and his recruitment was a British intelligence success.[15]

At the combat intelligence level during the Revolution there were some successful agent operations, but there was no overall intelligence theory or coordination of intelligence operations. Whether or not the individual commanders had an intelligence officer depended upon which European army they were most familiar with and, therefore, used as a pattern for a staff.[16] What intelligence operations there were tended to be done on an ad hoc basis and sometimes worked against each other.

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[13]Ibid., pp. 166-183.

[14]George S. Bryan, The Spy In America, Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1943, pp. 56-57.

[15]Ind, Short History, pp. 63-70.

[16]Hittle, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

Washington, who often dispatched his own agents, is known to have spent $17,000 during the war on secret intelligence. About the only person Washington trusted in the secret intelligence effort was Alexander Hamilton, who worked primarily with secret writing and ciphers.[17]

Acting at times as his own intelligence analyst, Washington showed a fine regard for the use of weather and terrain, particularly in the battles of Trenton (overwhelming the Hessians at night) and Princeton (decamping and arriving at the British main supply route in a snowstorm).

After the Revolutionary War, the Army practically disappeared for a time, and nothing was done in the way of actual military intelligence. Some of the intelligence-related activities participated in by the Army were the Lewis and Clark expedition into the Northwest, the expedition of Captain Pike to Colorado, and several other mapping projects. These missions, needless to say, were also used to gather intelligence. In this connection, it is interesting to note the mission given to one of the explorer soldiers, Captain Benjamin L. E. Bonneville, for an expedition beyond the Rockies in 1832:

> "It is desirable . . . that you note particularly the number of warriors that may be in each tribe or nation that you meet with; their alliances with other tribes and their relative position as to a state of peace or war . . . their manner of making war; their mode of subsisting themselves during a state of war, and a state of peace; their arms, and the effect of them; whether they act on foot or on horseback; detailing the discipline and maneuvers of the war parties; the power of their horses, size and general description; in short, any information which you may conceive would be useful to the government."[18]

In the War of 1812, the United States Army had little or no formal intelligence organization, although there was extensive use of scouts. Even the skills developed at the strategic level during the Revolution were gone. The reasons for this included the fact that there was no dynamic and intelligence-conscious leader in 1812, like Washington at the time of the Revolution, and the generally unprofessional state of the American Army. We paid a price for this poor intelligence posture, suffering a stinging setback at Detroit, and another in an abortive effort to invade Canada from New York. The British and their Indian allies proved much more adept than the American soldiers in both intelligence and the use of deception.[19]

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[17] Rowan, op. cit., pp. 149-158.

[18] Fairfax Downey, Indian Wars of the U.S. Army, Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1963, p. 153.

[19] Rowan, op. cit., p. 253.

There was no improvement after the war. In fact in 1845, on the eve of the Mexican War, the Quartermaster General found that he did not know if wagon transportation would be usable in Mexico, and no one in Washington could tell him. Considering that war was expected shortly, and considering the proximity of Mexico, the lack of such a basic piece of intelligence as whether or not the roads of Mexico could handle wagons is surprising.

Once involved in the Mexican War, a rather effective intelligence organization was formed at the insistence of General Winfield Scott. This was the Mexican Spy Scout Company under Colonel Ethan Allen Hitchcock. Made up of local bandits hired on a temporary basis, this unit provided information which was instrumental in the downfall of Mexico City, The plan was quite simple--have the scouts change to civilian clothes and go to town.[20]

The idea of aerial surveillance was first introduced in this country during the Mexican War. John C. Wise, a civilian balloonist, had offered his services to the War Department to observe and, if necessary, bomb Mexico City. The War Department turned him down, viewing the idea as ridiculous.[21]

In the Civil War, neither side was prepared for military intelligence work. Although some effective steps were taken during the war in this field and some innovations were introduced, the Civil War was not a war in which intelligence played a major part. "No great battles were won or lost or evaded because of superior intelligence. Intelligence operations were limited for the most part to more or less localized and temporary targets."[22]

In explaining the lack of intelligence, Dulles points out that there were no existing intelligence organizations, nor was there a body of experience within the military in the field. Unlike the Revolution, which had been preceded by years of conspiracy and espionage against the British, the Civil War erupted into actual conflict rather suddenly. There was, moreover, no general on either side who had the feeling for intelligence possessed by General Washington. Finally, the trend toward set-piece battles with large forces remaining in one place for prolonged periods--as opposed to the war of movement in the Revolution--meant that operational security was nearly impossible.[23]

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[20]Ind, Short History, pp. 76-79.

[21]Harry K. Staub, "A History of U.S. Surveillance, 1794-1945," unpublished paper, Advanced Course Department, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 1972, pp. 7-8.

[22]Dulles, op. cit., p. 37.

[23]Ibid.,

When Lincoln was elected in 1860, he hired Allen Pinkerton to protect him on the way to Washington. Pinkerton's uncovering of the "Baltimore Conspiracy" established him in the President's esteem and led to his working for General McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac. Pinkerton was not a notable success at collection of military intelligence, and he left the Army of the Potomac shortly after McClellan was fired. (Since McClellan's greatest shortcoming was his hesitancy, and since Pinkerton habitually overestimated enemy strength, this was a partnership doomed from the start.)[24]

After Pinkerton departed, a Bureau of Military Information, under Colonel George H. Sharpe, was established and provided considerable useful information to the Army of the Potomac.[25] The fact that Sharpe was working only as the intelligence officer of the Army of the Potomac, and that he was uniquely able among his contemporaries, meant that there was still no overall intelligence system available to all Union forces. Nonetheless, Sharpe's contributions to the successes of the Army of the Potomac, culminating in the resounding defeat of General Lee at Gettysburg in July of 1863, were one of the bright spots in Civil War intelligence efforts.[26]

There were many successful spying operations on both sides during the Civil War. Among them, one of the best agents working for the Union was Lafayette Baker, who visited Confederate camps posing as a photographer. Baker later headed a War Department organization known as the National Detective Police. Among the responsibilities of that organization was protection of the President, and it was Baker's organization which failed to protect Lincoln from the assassin, John Wilkes Booth.[27]

Aerial reconnaissance, in the form of balloon observers, was a common method of intelligence collection for the Union Army, and a rather successful one. The best of the Northern balloonists was Thaddeus S.C. Lowe, who impressed President Lincoln by sending him a telegram from 500 feet above Washington (the first time for an electrical message to be sent from an aerial vehicle), describing what he could see. This was in June, 1861. Lincoln saw to it that Lowe was immediately employed by the Union Army--despite some high-level foot dragging by General Winfield Scott. Lowe was the first to adjust artillery from air, telegraphing corrections back to the Union cannoneers. He was also the first to effectively use a camera from a balloon, and the first to operate from a

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[24] Ibid., p. 38.

[25] C.T. Schmidt, "G2, Army of the Potomac," Military Review (June 1948), pp. 55-88.

[26] Gregg M. Schrader, "The Battle of Gettysburg: Was there Enough Intelligence," unpublished paper, Advanced Course Department, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, 1972, passim.

[27] Dulles, op. cit., p. 40.

waterborne platform (a barge in the Potomac). Despite his successes, Lowe and the other Union balloonists were never actively supported by the Army, and he left the service in May, 1863.[28]

The Confederacy ran numerous effective agent operations, especially in Washington, D.C. Another of the South's very productive sources of intelligence was available for the taking: the Union newspapers. In the South as in the North, there was no unified intelligence organization of effort, even though the reconnaissance and surveillance contributions made by General J.E.B. Stuart were lauded by General Lee. The Confederacy evidently also used aerial surveillance, but only had one balloon. In terrain and weather intelligence, there were some notable successes (Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign) and some dismal failures (the Battle of Gettysburg, fought by both sides with little regard for the environment, with tragic results for many units).[29]

In summary, many new intelligence techniques were used during the Civil War with some excellent results, but there was little effective organization, doctrine, or coordination of disparate efforts. What organization was developed was again completely disbanded after the war. For the next couple of decades, the only intelligence-related activity in the Army was that of the Indian Scouts.

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[28]Glenn B. Infield, Unarmed and Unafraid: The First Complete History of the Men, Missions, Training and Techniques of Aerial Reconnaissance, MacMillan, New York, 1970, pp. 25-26.

[29]Schrader, op. cit., passim.

1 Observation Balloon at Santiago, 1898

2 Lieutenant Benjamin D. Foulois at the Controls of Army Aeroplane No. 1 in 1900

3 General John J. Pershing and his Staff, Mexican Punitive Expedition

4 Aerial Photography, World War I

5 Lt Herbert O. Yardley and co-worker, Paris, C. 1919

6 Mobile Laboratories Supporting World War I Aerial Photography



CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER II

THE MID, THE GENERAL STAFF AND THE AEF (1885-1919)

The modern history of American military intelligence begins in 1885, for it was in that year that an unbroken lineage begins.

The War Department

According to tradition, in 1885, the Secretary of War asked for a piece of very basic information about a foreign army and was told by the Adjutant General, General Drum, that this type information simply did not exist in the War Department files. The Secretary was amazed at this, and directed that corrective action be taken. In response to this requirement, General Drum detailed one officer and one clerk for duties of filing intelligence received from such sources as the embassies, and perhaps from newspapers. This activity later became known as the Military Information Division (MID) of the Miscellaneous Branch of the Adjutant General's Office, and from that date in 1885 until the present, there has always been some provision for an intelligence effort in the Army at the national level, though frequently it was little more than a paper organization.[1] The Army was preceded by the Navy, which, in 1882, had established an office of intelligence in their Bureau of Navigation.[2]

In 1889, Congress approved the Army's first permanent military attaché system. This was another very important step: this time toward establishing a strategic collection effort - and it should be noted that it was the backbone of the national peacetime foreign intelligence effort until about 1940. Originally an attaché was sent to each of the five major western capitals (Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London and St. Petersburg). The problem with this arrangement was that attachés frequently had to be selected for their financial means, since there was little government money to support them, rather than for their

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[1]Ralph H. Van Deman, "Memoirs," Unpublished Manuscript, Library, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Part 1, p. 2. Elizabeth Bethel, "The Military Information Division: Origin of the Intelligence Division," Military Affairs (v. XI, no. 1), Spring, 1947, pp. 17-24. (The authors are indebted to Mr. D. Finke, Chief, General Reference Branch, Office, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, for bringing the Bethel article and other valuable information on this period to their attention.).

[2]Charles H. Andregg, Management of Defense Intelligence, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 6.

military skills or interest in what we now think of as strategic intelligence.[3] Eisenhower comments about these men:

> . . . since public funds were not available to meet the unusual expenses of this type of duty, only officers with independent means could normally be detailed to these posts. Usually they were estimable, socially acceptable gentlemen; few knew the essentials of intelligence work.[4]

The MID and the Spanish-American War

By 1892, the function of the MID was accepted as worthwhile by the War Department, and a General Order that year gave MID clear-cut orders to "collect and classify information" on both the U.S. and foreign countries, and to prepare instructions for officers serving abroad. These were important orders because MID now had a definite intelligence mission. (Additionally, MID was charged with monitoring the status of preparedness for mobilization of the militia and national guard.)

In about 1890, MID had adopted a card file system for recording incoming information. By 1894, the files contained 30,000 entries; by the start of the war, there were close to 50,000. Preparation of maps was also an MID responsibility, and during the 1890's MID began to correct the long-term War Department deficiency in maps by providing authentic maps of Mexico, Canada, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Studies were prepared on various foreign armies (one of the first was Germany) and on geographical areas. Considering that the personnel strength of MID was not very great during the period (12 officers, 10 clerks, and two messengers at the outbreak of the war), and the limited budget ($3,640 annually from 1894 until the war began, which included funding the attachés), the amount of work done by MID is remarkable.

MID's contributions to the Spanish-American War were significant. For example, the attaché in Spain (there were now 16 attachés) provided data on movement of men and materiel, which allowed MID to arrive at very accurate figures for the War Department.[5] Moreover, in reponse to a request from the White House, a study was prepared on the weather and terrain of Cuba. As a result, a recommendation was made not to commit troops until winter to try to reduce the debilitating effects of that tropical environment on American troops. The Chief, MID, Colonel Wagner, briefed this report at the White House to the President, the Secretary of War, and senior military officers. One of Wagner's subordinates noted that this report had a sobering effect on the President, who decided to postpone active campaigning until the winter months. The Secretary of War, who was anxious to get into this "splendid little war," was quite displeased with Wagner. Upon leaving

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[3]Alfred Vagts, The Military Attaché, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1967, p. 34.

[4]Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1948, p. 32.

[5]Bethel, op. cit., p. 17-24.

the Oval Office, the Secretary of War informed the Chief of MID: "Colonel Wagner, you have made it impossible for my plan of campaign to be carried out. I will see to it that you do not receive any promotions in the Army in the future." The Secretary made good on his promise and Colonel Wagner was promoted brigadier only on his deathbed.[6]

It is interesting to note here also that the famous "message to Garcia," during this war, was carried by a Lieutenant Rowan, who was a member of MID.[7] The message arranged for a meeting between the U.S. commander, General Shafter, and General Garcia of the Cuban insurgent forces, to coordinate their efforts against the Spanish.

The Spanish-American War had its use for air reconnaissance as well. General Shafter, in planning to attack San Juan Hill, requested a balloon be used to observe Spanish positions. Shafter got his balloon and located it along the only trail by which his troops could advance toward the Spanish positions. Although the location served the enemy forward observer well, the observer did provide some information to Shafter before the balloon was shot down.[8]

Ralph H. Van Deman

It was at this point, at the turn of this century, that a very important man to the history of American intelligence appeared; he was Captain Ralph H. Van Deman. Van Deman is widely considered to be the father of American military intelligence.[9]

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[6]Van Deman, op. cit., I, p. 5. Wagner wrote several books, among them, The Service of Security and Information. In discussing spies, he reports that a Lieutenant Henry H. Whitney, 4th Artillery, sailed through the Caribbean disguised as a crewman of a British merchantship in early 1898, " . . . gaining much information, which was of great value in the subsequent campaign in that theatre." (Arthur L. Wagner, The Service of Security and Information, Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co., Kansas City, 1903, pp. 180-181.)

[7]Van Deman, op. cit., I, p. 6.

[8]Jack Cameron Dierks, A Leap to Arms: The Cuban Campaign of 1898, Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1970, pp. 101-102.

[9]Dulles, op. cit., p. 41.

Van Deman was an extremely interesting individual, as well as a true intelligence zealot. Born in Ohio in 1865, Van Deman graduated from Harvard University in 1889, read law for a year, then entered medical school. He was commissioned in 1891, then finished medical school in 1893. In 1895, as an infantry lieutenant, he attended the Army Infantry and Cavalry School at Ft. Leavenworth. Thus, he had varied experience when he was assigned to MID in early 1898. He went to Cuba for MID later that year. This first taste was to inspire a lifetime interest in intelligence.[10]

During the period 1901-1903, Van Deman had served in the Military Information Section of the Philippines Department under General Arthur MacArthur. This Department had established, a year before, an intelligence officer in all its posts, camps, and stations.[11] Van Deman was very active in both intelligence collection operations against the natives and the Japanese, who were already interested in China and Southeast Asia. Using undercover agents, Van Deman kept General MacArthur fully informed about what the guerrillas were doing; and, by an interesting coincidence, he discovered and foiled in 1903 an insurgent plot to seize Manila and assassinate General MacArthur.[12]

During this period the Military Information Division of the Philippines Department got into a dispute with the Provost Marshal of the Department, General Franklin Bell, over some documents. A U.S. national who had had a questionable relationship with the Japanese government had provided his correspondence and other documents to the Philippines Department to reassure it of his loyalty. The Department MID recognized their intelligence importance and wished to retain them, but General Bell felt the gentlemanly thing to do was to return them to their owner. MID won, but General Bell did not forget. More will be heard of him later.[13]

Van Deman himself shortly returned to Washington to attend the Army War College. He then was sent to China in 1906 to conduct a covert reconnaissance of the lines of communication. This work was of considerable importance, reflecting U.S. concern about China. His trip was interrupted and three other mapping teams were sent to China to complete the work. Van Deman also kept bumping into Japanese agents in China, just as he had in the Philippines. This early indication of Japanese interests was not lost on Van Deman.[14]

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[10] San Diego Tribune, 22 January 1952, p. 1.

[11] Van Deman, op. cit., I, pp. 8-15.

[12] Ibid., I, pp. 11-12. In 1945, the CIC was to uncover a similar plot against the old general's son, Douglas.

[13] Ibid., I, pp. 13-15.

[14] Ibid., I, pp. 16-20.

Organization of the General Staff

In 1903, Secretary of War Root had finally succeeded in getting Congress to authorize, for the first time, a general staff of the Army. A major element of that staff was the old Military Information Division, which had grown since the end of the Spanish-American War and was now separated from the Adjutant General's Department. This became the "Second Division" of the General Staff, and this is sometimes pointed to as the origin of our present term "G2." The term "G2," however, actually originated during World War I, as will be seen later. The term Second Division was merely a coincidence.[15] As a sidelight, a Captain Dennis E. Nolan, later G2 for Pershing, was assigned to the attache section of the Second Division.[16]

On the General Staff, the First Division was the Adjutant General's Division and dealt with the administration of the Army, including training and mobilization. The Third Division, or War College Division, dealt with war plans and operated the War College to train officers for general staff duty.[17]

It might be well to digress here for a moment to look at European staff systems as they developed at the end of the nineteenth century, because of their effect on U.S. staffs and the intelligence function. There were, essentially, two types: the Prussian (and British), which allowed dominance to the operators; and the French, which was a coordinated staff of equals. The German General Staff had five sections:

First:	Operations, Intelligence, Supply and Training.
Second:	Adjutant General.
Third:	Judge Advocate.
Fourth:	Services, such as Medical, Pay, Quartermaster.
Fifth:	Chaplain.

Practically speaking, however, this staff operated in three groups:

Tactical Group:	Operations and Intelligence (from Section 1).
Supply Group:	Supply (from Sections 1 and 4.)
Personnel Group:	Sections 2, 3, and 5.[18]

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[15]Hittle, op. cit., p. 203.

[16]Otto L. Nelson, Jr., National Security and the General Staff, Infantry Journal Press, Washington, D.C., 1946, p. 67.

[17]U.S. War Department, Records of the General Staff, Record Group 165, Selected Documents, The National Archives, Washington, D.C., unpaged. Cited hereinafter as Records.

[18]"Military Staff," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1970 ed., v. 21, pp. 75-79.

Much later, in World War II, the Japanese and Soviet General Staffs were patterned after that of the Germans. But, as a result of the experience of World War II, the Red Army staffs have been restructured into two dominant sections, operations and intelligence, and three or more minor general staff sections, always including signal, cryptographic and topographic. Logistics is not considered a Red Army General Staff function, but is handled by a Deputy Commander for the Rear. And what the U.S. considers as counterintelligence functions are not the responsibility of the intelligence staff, but of the Deputy Commander for Political Affairs.[19]

Similar to the Prussian staff, the British staff is organized into a "G," or General Staff, for operations and intelligence; an "A," or Administrative Staff, for personnel; and a "Q," or Quartermaster Staff, for supply. Interestingly enough, except at the highest echelons, there is no chief of staff, the senior officer of the "G" staff acting for the commander in his absence.

The French staff system envisioned four equal, coordinating staff members:

Premiere Bureau:	Personnel
Deuxieme Bureau:	Intelligence
Troisieme Bureau:	Operations
Quatrieme Bureau:	Logistics

Obviously this is the system eventually adopted by the Americans, though the descriptions of the duties of the primary staff officers seem to have come from the Prussians.

An interesting combination of these two systems was used by General Eisenhower for his combined American-British staff in his Allied Forces Headquarters in North Africa and in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe. His Chief of Staff was an American (General Walter Bedell Smith, later Director, CIA), so he appointed two British deputy chiefs of staff: one, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Intelligence, to direct his G2 and G3 (the British "G" staff); and one, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Administration and Logistics, to direct his G1 and G4 (the British "A" and "Q" staffs). This mixture of the two systems has been carried over today in the staff organization of SHAPE and its subordinate NATO commands.[20]

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[19]Hittle, op. cit., pp. 279-293.

[20]Encyclopaedia Brittanica, loc. cit.

Turning back to the development of the American General Staff, in 1907 it was decided to move the War College Division of the Staff away from the War Department out to Washington Barracks (now Fort McNair). Since the War College had been very dependent upon the library and files of the Military Information Division, the War College president convinced the Chief of Staff that the Military Information Division should move with them, though remaining an independent staff section. Nevertheless, within a month the War College president told the Chief of Staff that it was not practical for the two sections to remain independent in the same building, and recommended that the Second Division be absorbed into the Third Division.

The Chief of Staff was General Franklin Bell, ex-Provost Marshal of the Philippines Department, and he remembered intelligence work with a certain distaste.[21] Quite a dispute took place in the General Staff. A quote from the Chief of the War College Division may serve to indicate the level at which the battle was waged. He wrote:

> As an example of the work needed . . . the letter of General Young is cited, in which certain information about Venezuela is called for. Examination appears to disclose the fact that most of the information could better be collected by clerks at a small salary rather than by highly paid and highly educated officers.[22]

This sort of argument fell on welcome ears in General Bell and he rapidly approved, and soon all of the personnel, files, maps, and books of Military Information were redistributed throughout the War College. Military Information remained, on paper, as a "committee" of the War College, but in practice no intelligence work was done from 1908 to 1915.[23]

Early Years of the Airplane

The Spanish American War ended the era of the balloon for the Army. Within four years of the peace, the Wrights had achieved the first successful heavier-than-air flight. The Army did not recognize the possibilities of aviation until France indicated an interest in purchasing the patent. President T. R. Roosevelt, remembering perhaps the balloon at San Juan Hill, ordered the War Department to investigate the potential of aviation and, if necessary, to purchase an aircraft. In 1909, the Army established the Heavier-Than-Air Division, United States Aerial Fleet, consisting of Aeroplane Number 1. Aeroplane Number 1 and its crew were

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[21] Van Deman, op. cit., I, pp. 23-26.

[22] Records.

[23] Van Deman, op. cit., I, pp. 23-26.

sent to Fort Sam Houston, evidently with some hope that they would never be heard of again. The pilot, Lieutenant Benjamin D. Foulois, had been given the missions of "teaching himself how to fly and keeping out of trouble." Foulois, long an advocate of aerial surveillance, set out immediately to learn to fly and to awaken the Army to just what aviation could do. By 1911 Foulois had been heard and the Signal Corps had purchased a total of eleven airplanes and established an aerial photography course.[24]

The Mexican Punitive Expedition

The MID had for all practical purposes ceased to exist within the War College Division, and yet the U.S. in 1916 found itself in a rehearsal for the Great War. On the tenth of March of that year, the day after President Wilson's second inaugural, the Secretary of War ordered the Chief of Staff to send a Punitive Expedition, commanded by Brigadier General Pershing, into Mexico, to pursue the bandit Pancho Villa. Pershing was given a three-brigade force of around 6,000 men. From the point of view of intelligence, the Punitive Expedition was scarcely a success. First, Pershing was to operate in terrain just to the south of the U.S. border and he had virtually no maps. Second, he was assigned the First Aero Squadron (Signal Corps) for aerial reconnaissance and photo mapping and used it as a courier service. Third, he had an intelligence officer, but evidently this man concerned himself only with organizing espionage nets (which were, however, reasonably effective).[25] Finally, Pershing had some mobile communications intercept activities operating in wagons on the U.S.-Mexican border, but the code-breaking was done at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and the results sent to the Expedition over quite unreliable communications.[26]

Without regard to its other problems, the intelligence operations and their staff handling in the Punitive Expedition were still uncoordinated. One can only wonder if General Pershing was concerned by this, accounting for the emphasis and reliance he placed on his intelligence staff and their operations in Europe in 1917-1919.

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[24]Staub, op. cit., pp. 7-8; see also Benjamin D. Foulois, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts: The Memoirs of Major General B. D. Foulois, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1968.

[25]Robert J. McFarland, "Intelligence Aspects of the Pershing Punitive Expedition," unpublished paper, Advanced Course Department, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, 1972, pp. 1-11.

[26]Van Deman, op. cit., I, p. 62. David Kahn, The Codebreakers: History of Secret Communication, Macmillan, New York, 1967, p. 322.

Re-establishment of the Second Division

Back in Washington, in May 1915, the now Major Van Deman had been assigned to the War College Division, but not to intelligence duties. In fact, he quickly discovered that no one was doing intelligence work. He took it upon himself to read and file military information reports coming in from General Pershing's Mexican campaign and from the European war front, reports which were simply being ignored until his arrival. He also initiated a system of summarizing the incoming information for distribution to interested staff sections. Keep in mind that this was less than two years before America entered World War I; it is little wonder that all the great powers of Europe considered U.S. intelligence work extremely primitive. Van Deman started campaigning, unsuccessfully, for the re-establishment of the Military Information Division of the General Staff.[27]

Even after the declaration of war in 1917, Van Deman could not convince the Chief of Staff, General Hugh Scott, that we should have a working intelligence organization. The Chief of Staff did not see the need for such a thing as intelligence, and said that if it were really true that the British and French had such an effort, we could simply go to them and say "Here we are now ready for service - we would be pleased if you hand over to us all the necessary information concerning the enemy which your intelligence services have obtained." Van Deman could not, of course, accept this and kept after the Chief until the latter refused to see him again and forbade him to see the Secretary of War.[28]

Van Deman, however, was not a man to be thwarted and immediately found another channel. He had a couple of friends - a woman novelist and the Chief of the Washington Police - who were also friends of the Secretary of War. These two advised the Secretary of the situation, and he immediately called in Van Deman. Within forty-eight hours, but a full month after war was declared, Van Deman was in charge of a newly formed Military Intelligence Branch of the War College Division. The Branch was still subordinate to the War College Division, but at least it was a functioning element and Van Deman was given the power and funds to get things accomplished. This was, incidently, the first time that such a War Department section was labeled "Intelligence" rather than "Information." "Intelligence" was the word that the British were using, and since the Army would be working with them, it was felt that the terminology should be standardized.

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[27]Van Deman, op. cit., I, pp. 28-33.

[28]Ibid., I, pp. 33-37.

Van Deman quickly established a rather extensive organization. In fact, by the end of the war, MI Division included 282 officers and 1100 civilians, and controlled counterintelligence offices throughout the United States. It was so large that it was necessary to take over a seven-story apartment building in Washington. Of course, Van Deman was handicapped by the fact that there just simply was no pool of personnel with intelligence experience upon which he could draw; but, being very aggressive and resourceful, he requested and was given the authority to grant direct commissions. He did not recruit indiscriminately, however, but always chose an individual who had specific qualifications for a particular job that he had in mind. For example, to provide manpower for the counterintelligence offices that had been established around the country at this time, Van Deman approached major city police departments to send him some of their best personnel to perform investigations and he got them.[29]

Scarcely had the U.S. entered the war when spy scares caused the creation of dozens of organizations devoted to running down spies. Van Deman decided to organize these for MID purposes. He consolidated them all into one huge outfit - the American Protective League - eventually with some 65,000 members. The organization devoted itself to denouncing actual or supposed spies to the MID.[30]

Borrowing again from the British military intelligence service, Van Deman also made a major choice concerning the subdivision of the intelligence effort: MI Branch was divided into two principal sections, Positive and Negative. Negative intelligence was the term for counterintelligence at the time, and Positive was everything else.[31]

There is possibly a clue in that decision to one of the persistent ideas controlling the American military intelligence effort. Specifically, throughout U.S. military history it can be seen that intelligence capabilities for wartime spring from a nucleus of counterintelligence. Between wars, what little intelligence effort was preserved was normally only defensive in nature, at least until the time of the Cold War era. While the reason for this is not entirely clear, it could be hypothesized that Americans traditionally abhor "spies" or "spying" and that it reflects the public will that only "counterspies" are acceptable in peacetime.[32]

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[29] Ibid., I, pp. 38-39, 56.

[30] Ibid., I, pp. 50-51.

[31] Ibid., II, p. 14.

[32] Cf. D. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 32.

This was a period of growth and experimentation in the military intelligence community. From the War College proper, Van Deman inherited the maps and photograph files and the supervision of the attaches. He was immediately assigned responsibility for the security of the War Department offices in the Washington area. This he accomplished by implementing an alert guard system, an identification card check, and attempted penetration by his agents. Then, as requirements arose, Van Deman added functions: for example, the protection of the order of battle of the Army by stopping publication of the "Army List"; countersabotage, counterespionage, and countersubversion - through passport control, port security, an industrial security organization, and performance of personal security investigations. MID also developed tactical intelligence doctrine, topographical intelligence studies, and established a code and cipher section and the Corps of Intelligence Police. Finally, Van Deman maintained situation maps in the White House and the Capitol.

Functionally, then, Van Deman's MID was the predecessor of much of the modern intelligence community, including the Army Map Service (now the Defense Map Service), the attache system, the Counterintelligence Corps (later the Army Intelligence Command and the Defense Investigative Service), the Industrial Security Organization, the Combat Developments Command's Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Army Security Agency (and the National Security Agency), and, of course, the whole tactical intelligence organization (including the Military Intelligence Organization). With next to no experience factor for Van Deman, one must be impressed with this performance.[33]

Ultimately the MID came to have twelve sections under the Positive and Negative Branches. The Positive Branch had these sections:

MI-1: Administration.
MI-2: Information.
MI-5: Military Attaches.
MI-6: Translation.
MI-7: Maps and Photographs.
MI-8: Codes and Ciphers.
MI-9: Combat Intelligence Instruction.

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[33]Van Deman, op. cit., I, pp. 38-64.

The Negative Branch had these functions:

MI-3: Army Section (Counterespionage).
MI-4: Foreign Influence (Counterespionage within the civilian community).
MI-10: News (Censorship).
MI-11: Travel (Passport and Port Control).
MI-13: Fraud.[34]

When Van Deman organized his MID, he realized that one of its elements would have to be a cipher bureau. Checking, he found that the Army Signal Corps could claim only five code and cipher specialists on enemy diplomatic systems--and that none of these could be made available for detail to the General Staff.[35] Van Deman, using his commissioning authority, picked a State Department code clerk and amateur cryptologist, Herbert O. Yardley, and, making him a lieutenant in mid-1917, charged him with setting up MI-8, the MID Cipher Bureau. Yardley, choosing his staff heavily from among the linguists of the academic community, established his section with a cryptanalysis, shorthand, and secret inks capability and proceeded to concentrate on communications of Latin American countries and those of German agents.[36]

One of MI-8's greatest successes came in 1918 when a suspected German agent, one Lothar Witzke (alias Pablo Wiberski), was captured on 18 January in a hotel in Nogales, Mexico. In his luggage was a cipher letter, later broken by MI-8. The letter was from the German Minister in Mexico City identifying Witzke, indeed, as a German agent with instructions to operate in the U.S. The decrypt, read to Witzke's court-martial by a member of MI-8, was the key element in his conviction for espionage. Witzke was the only German spy sentenced to death by the U.S. during World War I, though President Wilson did commute his sentence to life imprisonment and he was released in 1923.[37]

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[34]Nelson, op. cit., pp. 264-265.

[35]George Raynor Thompson and Dixie R. Harris, The United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services: The Signal Corps: The Outcome (Mid-1943 through 1945), Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, Washington D.C., 1966, p. 329. Cited hereinafter as Thompson and Harris.

[36]Kahn, op. cit., pp. 352-353.

[37]Kahn, op. cit., pp. 353-354, and Van Deman, op. cit., I, pp. 62-63.

In short, the MID was, under Van Deman, an effective General Staff operation. We should turn now to the war in Europe and see how developments there affected the growth of American intelligence.

America Enters the War

Early in World War I British intelligence achieved a remarkable coup. During the early morning hours of 5 August 1914, the first day of war, the British cable ship Telconia was sailing in the North Sea, apparently trolling for fish. The steel lines suddenly became taut, the ship shuddered, and the Telconia had found her catch: Germany's underwater telegraphic cables, her primary means of communications with the rest of the world. They were quickly severed and dropped back to the sea.

Thus Germany was forced to communicate with the outside world by radio or over lines of communications controlled by her enemies. To uncover Germany's combat and diplomatic plans, the British had only to break the codes and ciphers that protected them--which they did. Rear Admiral Henry F. Oliver and later Admiral Sir William Reginald Hall, both Directors of Naval Intelligence, and Sir Alfred Ewing, Director of Naval Education, established the communications intelligence organization for the Royal Navy during the early months of hostilities. Admirals Hall and Oliver and Sir Alfred are men of great importance in the history of American and British cryptologic intelligence. With the assistance of ham radio operators, they established fourteen intercept stations along the coast of England. This coordinated cryptologic effort, set up before the war. and culminating in the Telconia voyage, was an all-too-infrequent example of peacetime intelligence planning. The British also had several strokes of good fortune, enabling them to recover German code and cipher books and eventually the plain text versions of the Central Power's communications.[38]

In large measure, it was this British success in communications intelligence that brought America into the war. As a matter of fact, if historians had to single out the one individual responsible for bringing the United States into World War I, they would most likely select Admiral Hall. The U-boat war against Allied shipping had infuriated some of the American people, and public opinion of Germany was at it lowest ebb, yet most of the people sided with President Wilson in staying out of the war. On 17 January 1917, the cryptanalysts of Hall's British communications intelligence organization deciphered a diplomatic message from German Foreign Affairs Secretary Zimmerman to the German Minister in Mexico. It said that Germany intended to begin unrestricted submarine warfare, but would endeavor, in spite of this, to keep the United States neutral.

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[38]Kahn, op. cit., pp. 266-282.

Should this fail, Germany proposed to Mexico an alliance to make war together: Mexico was to reconquer the lost territory of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. When this message was released to the American people, the European war became a fearsome reality to the Mid- and Far-West, who envisioned an invading army moving on them from the south. The uproar was so great that President Wilson's request to Congress for a declaration of war - the request specifically mentioning the Zimmerman telegram - was overwhelmingly approved.[39]

American Expeditionary Force, France

With the arrival of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe in 1917, General Pershing tried to determine the best staff structure to operate against the enemy and with his Allies. He sent observers to the British and French to study their systems. Ultimately, the AEF adopted elements of both, taking the French concept of a coordinated, four-part staff of equals, and adopting the British intelligence service system for tactical support. Thus, intelligence for the AEF was on the same plane as operations and was designated the second section, from the French Deuxième Bureau. The prefix "G" was taken from the British. Pershing also directed that similar staffs be established at all levels, so that each army, corps and division had a G2; each brigade, a B2; regiments, R2; battalions, Bn2, and for squadrons, there was an S2. The manning of these various "2" organizations generally followed the British system.[40] The G2 of the AEF itself was divided into five branches, lettered A through E, each of which was further divided into numbered sections. A section could then be referred to by an alphanumeric designation: for example, G2A1 was Order of Battle.

G2A (Information) had these sections:

1 - Order of Battle and Strategic Intelligence.
2 - Translation/Interpretation and Technical Intelligence.
3 - Situation Maps and Aerial Reconnaissance.
4 - Summaries and Terrain Studies.
5 - Artillery Target Development.
6 - Radio Intelligence and Carrier Pigeons.
7 - Dissemination and G2 Journal.

G2B (Secret Service) had sections with these duties:

1 - Counterespionage Policy and Investigation of Atrocities.
2 - Dissemination of Information from Secret Sources and Control of Intelligence Contingency Funds.
3 - Index of Suspects, Control of the Civil Population and Counterespionage Operations.

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[39] Ibid., pp. 282-297.

[40] Hittle, op. cit., pp. 210-214; Nelson, op. cit., p. 264; Records.

G2C (Topography) was not divided into sections but was responsible for the preparation of maps and for sound and flash ranging.

G2D (Censorship) had these sections:

1 - Press Relations and Press Censorship.
2 - Censorship Regulations and Postal and Telegraphic Censorship.
3 - Photograph and Movie Censorship and Visitors.

G2E (Intelligence Corps) administered the Corps of Intelligence Police.[41]

The organization for intelligence that Pershing had created was another milestone in American military intelligence. It was, of course, the climax of what Van Deman had been striving for - an intelligence apparatus oriented on, and capable of, meeting the tactical commander's requirements. A contemporary participant put it this way:

> There is nothing new in a recognition of the necessity of having ample information of the enemy upon which to base military plans. The successful plan of campaign always has been and always will be based upon knowledge of the strength, situation, plans and intentions of the enemy.
>
> What is new, however, is that in recent years there has been such an increase in the amount of information of the enemy to be gathered, and so many changes in the means and methods of collecting and utilizing it, as to make necessary the creation of an entirely new organization or system to keep track of it. . .
>
> Before America entered the World War the Military Intelligence Service, as a coordinated and cooperating system, did not exist in our military establishment . . . there was no conception of the modern Intelligence Service which, with specially trained personnel, would make systematic and continuous effort to find out and record the strength, position, situation, and movements of the enemy. . .
>
> During the World War, under the name of Military Intelligence, there was built up in the American forces a carefully organized system represented by an Intelligence Service group at every headquarters from that of the battalion on up to include the War Department.[42]

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[41] General Order #8, HQ AEF, France, 5 July 1917, as published in U.S. Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919: Bulletins, GHQ, AEF, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1948, pp. 13-24.

[42] Walter C. Sweeney, Military Intelligence, A New Weapon in War, Frederick A. Stokes Co., New York, 1924, p. 1-4.

The basic elements of the combat intelligence system that had evolved were the intelligence personnel working with the line elements--the battalion and regimental intelligence sections. The Battalion Intelligence Officer (Bn 2) had a section of 28 men, including scouts, observers, and two snipers. The scouts accompanied all patrols and trench raids, while the observers were primarily charged with manning the unit's observation posts.[43] The manning of the regimental intelligence section was similar, though it was slightly smaller than the battalion.

As we have seen, scouts have been used for intelligence-gathering throughout American military experience, normally working directly for the commander. It is interesting to note that, as soon as the intelligence function had evolved to provide an intelligence staff officer at all levels, the scout section was placed under his control. As we shall see, the identification of reconnaissance and scouting with the intelligence section of a given unit has been a trend in the Army since at least 1917.

Considering all of this newly acquired sophistication, it is not surprising that the American Army's intelligence work made a favorable impression on previously skeptical European allies. General Pershing himself was sufficiently pleased that he recommended both the AEF G2, Colonel Dennis E. Nolan, and Colonel Van Deman for promotion to brigadier general.[44] (Nolan was promoted, but the war ended before Van Deman could get his star; both men were soon returned to the permanent grade of major.)

The Corps of Intelligence Police

Another milestone along the path to a separate professional intelligence corps occurred early in the American intervention in World War I; Colonel Nolan sent a message to Van Deman requesting fifty sergeants for duty in France.[45] They must speak French, be very trustworthy, and have investigative experience. Van Deman assembled the chiefs of the three largest detective agencies in the country to ask for their assistance in recruiting such men. Allan Pinkerton promptly growled: "There ain't no such animal."[46] Fortunately, that view was unduly pessimistic; the men were found, trained, shipped off to Europe, and the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) was born. They were an interesting group, this first fifty,

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[43] Ibid., p. 106.

[44] Van Deman, op. cit., App. E.

[45] U.S. War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff Memorandum, subject: Intelligence Service, 11 August 1917. This document discusses the request itself and various alternatives open to the War Department.

[46] Van Deman, op. cit., I, p. 64.

including a French murderer and Foreign Legion deserter, a Russian train robber, and a deposed Belgian nobleman.[47] This selection of manpower did cause Nolan some problems. Late in 1917 he requested spaces for nineteen of his agents in a school being run by the French Sûreté. The Sûreté, being somewhat unsure of the American security procedures, decided to do their own check. They found that many of the nineteen had signed up under false names and that five of them were being sought for draft-dodging and desertion by the French - and, of course, that train robber turned up. The Sûreté refused entry to the course to the Americans. Later, however, the French conceded that the Americans had created an effective intelligence organization.[48]

The mission assigned the CIP is clearly identifiable with contemporary counterintelligence: to contribute to the successful operations of the Army through detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity and disaffection, and the detection and prevention of enemy espionage and sabotage.[49] Although the CIP was only about 400 strong during its service in World War I, precedent was established for a continuing military intelligence organization. As such, its activation on 13 August 1917 is one of the dates proposed as the official date of birth of Military Intelligence Branch.

Overseas, the contributions of the CIP were significant, if not dramatic. Attached down to division level, CIP conducted interrogations of line-crossers and refugees, investigated incidents of possible espionage or sabotage and gave security lectures. CIP was also active in the tactical counterintelligence field; for example, conducting sweeps of friendly areas to round up all unauthorized personnel. (Later, complaints from the German General Staff about a lack of intelligence in these areas indicated that the effort was worthwhile.) Finally, the CIP became involved to some extent in criminal investigation, including breaking up a morphine peddling operation involving American aviators in 1917. This particular operation came back to haunt the CIP and its successor organizations, because many Army personnel automatically associated intelligence investigators with criminal investigation.[50]

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[47]U.S. Army, The Founding of the Army's First Counterintelligence Organization, U.S. Army Intelligence Command, n.p., 1967, unpaged. Cited hereinafter as USAINTC Pamphlet.

[48]Lee Kennett, "The A.E.F. Through French Eyes," Military Review, LII, 11 (November, 1972), pp. 7-8.

[49]A Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ, SWPA, and Affiliated Units, General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, n.p., 1948, v. VIII, p. 2. Cited hereinafter as History, G-2, SWPA.

[50]USAINTC Pamphlet.

A major factor in the establishment of the CIP was that everything about the organization was classified. The result of this, of course, was that relatively few people actually knew what the CIP had done. When the war ended, CIP was to have a hard time justifying its existence, and these same limitations remained until after Pearl Harbor.

The Radio Intelligence Section, G2, AEF

The overseas cryptologic effort was under the AEF GHQ organization and was known as G2A6 (or Radio Intelligence Section of G2), headed by Major Frank Moorman. This section was charged with (1) policy on the preparation of U.S. codes and ciphers; (2) "enemy's wireless and ciphers"; and (3) "examination of enemy's ciphers." Here can be seen an early association of the signal security and signal intelligence functions - under the authority of the G2 - and the predecessor organization to the Army Security Agency.[51]

Like his later colleagues, the doughboy of 1917-1918 was not fond of using codes; in fact, Major Moorman stated: "There certainly never existed on the Western Front a force more negligent in the use of their own code than was the American Army." It was so bad that Moorman established a Security Service with four stations to monitor friendly radio and telephone transmissions and to report compromises to the offending command for correction. This Service was able, for example, to establish by its monitoring, the entire American order of battle for the assault on the Saint Mihiel salient. The reported time of that attack was 24 hours off, simply because one of the offending operators was misinformed.[52]

G2A6 was located in a barracks next to GHQ at Chaumont and was organized into four subsections: traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, telephone intercept of enemy air artillery spotters, and the Security Service, mentioned above. This was the analytic effort, but, in addition to collaboration with their British and French colleagues, G2A6 maintained a team of cryptanalysts at each Army headquarters, five intercept stations, and eight direction-finding stations. Among its successes may be included identifying through traffic analysis the formation and location of two new German armies, thus giving warning of a new drive, and frequent intercept by the air intercept teams of enemy aircraft giving targets to firing batteries, thereby allowing warning to friendly troops and, not infrequently, directing counterbattery fires.

G2A6 at its peak had at Chaumont seventy-two men, including two lawyers, a reporter, a music critic, a language professor, an architect, a chess expert, and an archaeologist.[53]

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[51] Kahn, op. cit., pp. 326-327.

[52] Ibid., pp. 331-332, 334.

[53] Ibid., pp. 333-350.

Tactical Aerial Surveillance

When World War I broke out in Europe, aerial surveillance and the airplane began to prove their value. It was not, however, until Germany placed great emphasis on the value of aerial photography that the United States authorized an increase in the number of Aero Squadrons.

When the United States entered the war in April, 1917, its Aerial Fleet had only 131 pilots and observers and 15 airplanes. None of these craft could be considered a "combat" aircraft and, in order to equip the 1st Aero Squadron, Congress authorized the purchase of British and French aircraft until American production could meet the demands.

The first American reconnaissance flight over enemy lines was made on 15 April 1918, by Major Royce of the 1st Aero Squadron. Major Royce also had the distinction of being the first American Army pilot to fly an airplane in combat.

During the first few weeks of reconnaissance the American pilots relied primarily on visual observation of enemy positions. The 1st Aero Squadron, however, soon followed the British example and cameras of all shapes and sizes were carried on surveillance missions.

Photographs taken from the air were not new, but it was during this period that the aerial camera had its principal development. Beginning in 1893, several technical advances had been made and oblique and vertical photographs both became common. Oblique photographs were made with the axis of the lens inclined to the surface of the earth while the vertical pictures were taken with the lens perpendicular to the earth's surface. Initially both types of photographs created problems for the aerial cameraman, since the cameras weighed as much as 75 pounds, and had to be handheld and manually operated. Later, the more inventive observers devised mounts on the side of the cockpit and some even cut holes in the floor of the aircraft, using parts from truck tires and even bicycle frames for cushioning and mounting. Many of the techniques devised during this period were still to be found in use when the Allies invaded Europe in 1944.[54]

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[54]Staub, op. cit., pp. 8-10.

AEF Siberia and North Russia

After the armistice, in France, the Allies sent an Expeditionary Force into Siberia and one into North Russia, both in 1918. The American contingent for AEF Siberia came from the Philippine Department and thus brought its intelligence section, later augmented from the United States. However, due to personality clashes between the G2 and the Chief of Staff and between the Commanding General and the War Department MID, little effective intelligence work was done.[55]

The American element of the AEF North Russia came from France, but the G2 section was not organized until two months before the deactivation of the force and had no time to be active. Americans were, however, assigned to an active Allied intelligence organization supporting the whole of this AEF.[56]

Summary

To recap the milestones of this period, the year 1885 saw the creation at the War Department level of the first true Army Intelligence activity and 1889, the organization of an attaché system. During the 1890's MID made a number of important advances and contributed significantly to War Department readiness for the Spanish-American War.

Following the Spanish-American War, there was a decline in the role of the MID, even though it was given full stature in the General Staff when the latter was created in 1903. The merger of MID with the War College Division in 1907 meant that there was relatively little intelligence work done in the years leading up to World War I. A concurrent lack of men trained in intelligence work existed, and this shortage of qualified intelligence men at the start of a war has been a characteristic in Army intelligence development. Van Deman found himself organizing a wartime General Staff intelligence capability from a situation of no personnel, no knowledge, no experience, and no enthusiasm in the Army-at-large. The years before the First World War had seen, however, the creation of the Army General Staff, both at the War Department level and with troops. This created planners and advisors for the commander, allowing, for the first time, deployment and control of large forces by the United States. At the same time, there was created a General Staff Corps who were considered to be interchangeable pieces for any General Staff position, whether personnel, intelligence, operations or logistics. It remained for General Pershing to place a functional organizational form over this Staff Corps.

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[55]Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff, Department of the Army, n.p., 1961, part 2, p. XXVII-25.

[56]Ibid., part 2, p. XXVII-42.

Though the War Department MID and the AEF's G2's were staffed by individuals without previous intelligence experience, they developed an effective system, including the predecessors of USAINTC and USASA. When one compares the conceptual advances made by Army Intelligence personnel and organizations between 1917 and 1919 with those made between 1919 and the present, one can only be astounded. Note these concepts that seem relatively "new" today: tactical counterintelligence operations, signal intelligence and signal security parallelism, CONUS counterintelligence operations of an extended degree including cooperation with the civil authorities, "all-source" intelligence at all echelons, and the control of scout sections for intelligence purposes.

Essentially then, the years before World War I saw the genesis of an MI agency at the War Department level and the creation of an Army General Staff. The entrance of the U.S. into World War I brought the arrival of what must have been the most innovative men in this business: Yardley, Nolan, those in MID and G2 AEF, and, above all, Van Deman. The essential principles and methods were established. Surely, after this success, all would not be forgotten and a bright future was in store for Army intelligence.

William F. Friedman c. 1930

Lieutenant George W. Goddard, 1922

CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER III

SOME DISAPPOINTMENTS AND PERSISTENCE (1919-1941)

War Department General Staff, G2

It should be recalled that the Military Intelligence Division had been re-established in 1917 as a separate staff element. In 1918, following the end of the war, a board was formed to recommend a reorganization of the War Department General Staff. It was proposed that Pershing's organization be adopted at the War Department level, as well as throughout the Army. As a result, in 1921, the MID became known as Intelligence, G2, and was established in principle as an equal with the other War Department staff sections.[1]

The intelligence lesson of World War I was summed up in 1920 by Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill, a protégé of Van Deman and his successor in Washington as Director of Military Intelligence in 1918:

> At present, the Military Intelligence Division is one of four coordinate divisions of the General Staff . . . This staff organization is essential to success. It is especially vital in intelligence administration, [since] . . . it is obvious that national policy must depend on correct predictions concerning the international future . . . [or, in short] there must be a G2 in the War Department [just as in a combat unit] . . . performing a similar function, not only with the War Plans Division in the initiation and perfection of plans, but concurrently with the State Department in the work of prediction upon which national policy is based.[2]

This was one of the first statements recognizing the role of military intelligence in national, strategic planning.

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[1]Hittle, op. cit., p. 215.

[2]Nelson, op. cit., p. 265.

This change is another of those critical to American military intelligence. It meant that the need for a separate, equal staff intelligence officer at every level of the Army had at last been recognized. This need was satisfied by providing in peacetime, a War Department staff officer, the G2, equal with the planners and operators, for the first time. Essentially this staff structure remained unchanged until the end of World War II.[3]

In the late winter of 1920, General Churchill, the War Department G2, held a series of training sessions for his staff. His speakers were the former key officers of G2, AEF, and its subordinate armies and corps. Rereading their talks today, one finds in them many appropriate comments on intelligence operations; moreover, several quotes from these conferences are still pertinent. For example, General Nolan, the ex-G2, AEF, commented:

> My fear is that in the pressure of many things, claiming time for training, our Army may lapse into the pre-war days in its attitude toward the whole question of combat intelligence and that information regarding the enemy for our tactical problems and in our maneuvers will be based on the old and easy assumption that all information needed of the enemy is obtained from an enemy inhabitant.[4]

How soon General Nolan's fears were to be realized.

Later in the conference, General Churchill summed up after the remarks of Lieutenant Colonel Moorman, the former chief of the radio intelligence section, by saying:

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[3]Hittle, op. cit., pp. 214-215. For a discussion of the recurring organizational difficulties of the War Department G2, see U.S. War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division, G2, Memorandum for the Commandant, Army War College, subject: Military Intelligence Organization (G2 10560-653), 2 August 1938, passim. Cited hereinafter as G2 Memo 10560-653.

[4]Records.

> We are very much indebted to Colonel Moorman for stimulating our instructive training, which, without boasting, I think we can call our Intelligence University Course. In addition to that particular phase of the work that his section handled, he has given us important things to think about which concerns not only intelligence as a whole, but the General Staff work, and the Army as a whole. As far as intelligence work is concerned, he has told us why he had to generally preach the intelligence gospel, one chapter at least a day, and how he had to work against ignorance and to a certain extent preach and train. We know all of us that anyone who has ever had anything to do with intelligence has had to preach that same gospel, and I want to impress this strong [sic] that simply because the war is over, we cannot stop preaching that gospel. Everyone that knows anything about intelligence has to keep preaching that national doctrine, so that when we begin the next war, we won't begin it like the last.

Despite the enthusiasm of these intelligence officers, bad times were in store for Army intelligence. Though the General Staff continued, the other intelligence activities atrophied, and the War Department G2 was not to be spared. When General Pershing became Chief of Staff, he wanted his five-sectioned staff from the AEF, instead of the four sections of the War Department - that is to say, the addition of a War Plans staff officer. Now Congress had authorized only four general officers for the General Staff, and thus it happened that the rank of the G2 became colonel, the others being brigadier general.[5]

During the twenties, the War Department G2 was convinced it was important that it continue to watch hostile radical movements in the U.S., but, because of the associated bad publicity, it could not do so, and had to rely on the Division of Investigations (later the FBI) of the Department of Justice. But by the thirties, the depression was upon America and the Bonus Marchers were on the move. The War Department G2 was specifically instructed to watch this activity and moved back into the counter subversion field.[6]

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[5]Nelson, op. cit., p. 299.

[6]Bidwell, op. cit., part 8, pp. I-21-I-25.

In the area of war plans, the War Department G2 conceived its position as that of providing the intelligence estimates and annexes to these plans. The War Plans Division, however, did not see it this way and established its own shop to provide intelligence estimates and annexes. This went on until 1937 when the Chief of Staff specifically designated the G2 as responsible for this function.[7]

The Corps of Intelligence Police

It will be recalled that the Corps of Intelligence Police had come into being in 1917. As a result of CIP's successful employment in World War I, Van Deman envisioned a bright future and warned, after the Armistice, of the dangers of demobilization. Nonetheless, within less than two years the CIP was down to six men, all eligible for discharge. Despite the personnel situation, the CIP in 1920 became a functioning, permanent part of the Army Establishment, and noncommissioned officers from other branches were "detailed" to the CIP. It is also true that the few NCO's of the CIP and those detailed to it sometimes languished. One potential area of investigation for the CIP was the growth of radicalism in the United States. Until 1929, despite the efforts of the War Department G2 to get permission for the CIP to collect information on these radicals, such collection was prohibited by the Chief of Staff.[8] By 1932, however, the Bonus Marchers were moving on Washington, and the CIP was authorized a more active role. In June and July of 1932, the Bonus Marchers were in the capital in force and the G2 was functioning as an operational intelligence center, processing the reports of the CIP agents, who proved capable of "furnishing information which was obtainable in no other way, because of their ability to associate with the veterans on terms of equality."[9]

The events of 1932 proved, if proof was needed, the value of the CIP. Actually, throughout the twenties, the Zone of the Interior (ZI) corps commanders and the commanders of the overseas departments were demanding CIP sergeants: The Panama Department was, perhaps, typical in its needs, although its counterintelligence man was scarcely typical:

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[7] Ibid., part 8, pp. I-26--I-27.

[8] USAINTC Pamphlet.

[9] Bidwell, op. cit., part 8, pp. I-21--I-25.

> Finally, in 1927, a highly capably Military Intelligence Reserve lieutenant, versed in four languages, was obtained and became a staff sergeant CIP. Six years later he was still a staff sergeant although his G2 reported he was a man of "most unusual experience and ability; quiet, discreet and intelligent," and performing "several men's work." . . . This agent served undercover, and through fraternal offices and contacts with local organizations, operated a widespread information net. In addition, he was an able draftsman, cartographer, translator and area specialist, . . . and editor of the bi-weekly intelligence summary.[10]

Promotions were a particular sore point. One of the CIP sergeants had a supporter in his boss, the G2 of the Hawaiian Department. The G2, the then Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton, finally wrote, in exasperation, to the Executive Officer of the G2 War Department:

> Dear Charley: I am sending a letter to G2 War Department on the subject of getting Tech. Sgt. Luth promoted to Master Sgt. prior to his retirement a year from now. Luth is an exceptionally good man and has much more than pulled his weight since he has been in this office. It would be hard luck if owing to the fact that he is an M.I. man he could not get this step. The A.G. here says it is up to the War Department. If it is do your damndest. If you can't work it, get the dope and write me what crooked work we can do here to put the deal over. Please give this matter your personal attention!!![11]

It is not known whether Sergeant Luth and his soon-to-be-famous chief were successful, but certainly they had recognized a significant problem.

By 1940, the effects of the war in Europe were manifested in the CIP. The personnel authorization was increased in that year to 188 men, and in 1941 officer personnel were authorized for the first time. In 1940, two officers detailed to counterintelligence were sent to the FBI school, then were made part of a new CIP training school in Chicago. They, along with mobilized FBI and Treasury agents, formed the first faculty.

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[10]U.S. Army, The History of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the United States Army 1917-1950, HQ, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Md., 1959, v. IV, p. 60. Cited hereinafter as CIC History.

[11]Ibid., v. IV, p. 80.

About the same time, a former customs agent who was at the time the district supervisor in New York for the Bureau of Narcotics, a reserve infantry major, was mobilized. In January 1941, this man was assigned as the first chief of the CIP. He was Major Garland H. Williams, who headed the CIP for around 18 months, then moved on to the OSS.

By the end of 1941, the CIP had reached a strength of 400 and was authorized 1000.[12]

Before the war, primary counterintelligence concern had been with the Japanese, and, to a lesser degree, the Germans. But what turned out to be a potential espionage foe gained a little attention. In 1938 the Soviet Intourist representative in Los Angeles, Mihail Gorin, sent a suit to the dry cleaners. Regrettably for him, he had neglected to clean out his pockets and the delivery man found several interesting papers. The delivery man's boss was also interested and sent him immediately to the Hollywood police station, where copies of the documents were laboriously made by hand. In the meantime, the highly exercised Comrade and Mrs. Gorin arrived at the dry cleaners. The manager tried to calm the Gorins, though he arranged to warn the driver at the police station to return to the store, acting as if all were normal. He did and Gorin received his originals back.

The Hollywood police, however, seeing their copies, alerted the chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Los Angeles Police Department. This gentleman decided to call in a retired Army major general living in San Diego, Ralph H. Van Deman. The general, after looking over the police copies, called in a fellow intelligence officer, Captain Zacharias, the intelligence officer of the 11th Naval District, who found the documents to be copies of papers from his own office. Zacharias located and plugged his leak - aided by the most influential man in the history of American military intelligence.[13]

Cryptologic Activities

What was the fate of the other group of professionals put together by Van Deman - the cryptologists of MI, headed by Yardley?

In August 1918, Yardley was sent to Europe to visit the Allies' cryptologic efforts; he was then retained in Europe after the Armistice to head the cryptographic bureau supporting the American Delegation to the Peace Conference. Returning to the U.S. in 1919, he had no desire to return to his humdrum job in State's code room, so he convinced State and the War Department to set him up in a peacetime, strategic cryptologic

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[12]USAINTC Pamphlet.

[13]Ellis M. Zacharias, Secret Missions, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1946, pp. 203-205.

operation - the famous "American Black Chamber" - in New York City.[14] His first assignment was the solution of the Japanese diplomatic systems. By 1921, his operation had solved sixteen of these and they were soon to be used. A Naval Disarmament Conference was called in Washington for that year to limit tonnage of capital ships by a ratio among the five great powers: the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. Japan messaged its delegate in Washington three positions, each to be insisted upon as long as possible before falling back to a lower ratio with the U.S. and Britain. These positions were (1) 10:7; (2) 10:6.5; and (3) 10:6. Yardley's Black Chamber had solved this cipher system, placing the U.S. Secretary of State in a position to press until the Japanese had reached their final position of 10:6.[15]

Yardley's work continued until 1929, when, in an excess of morality, the new Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, closed down the Black Chamber, stating: "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail." Yardley, embittered and out of a job in depression America, wrote of his experiences in a best-seller, The American Black Chamber - wrote so thoroughly and completely that some nineteen nations changed their code systems.[16]

The job of starting all over again fell to the Army and the Navy. In 1921 the Army Signal Corps had hired William F. Friedman to serve as its chief cryptographer. Friedman, a civilian who had served on active duty with the AEF radio intelligence section, retained a Reserve commission.[17] His new organization was charged primarily with code and cipher development for the Army, but was to plan for wartime signal intelligence operations.[18] With the demise of the Black Chamber, Friedman's operation, with its Navy counterpart, received the job of starting again on foreign systems. Shortly before Yardley's dismissal, on 10 May 1929, the Signal Corps' War Plans and Training Division created the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) with Friedman as its civilian head, and the start was made. By 1935, an Army officer, Major Haskell Allison, was assigned to head the SIS with Friedman remaining as chief of the cryptologic activities.[19] In the thirties, while analysis was done in Washington, intercept was decentralized to the 1st Radio Intercept Company at

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[14]Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1931, p. 240. Since the State Department funds provided could not be spent legally in the Washington, D.C. area, New York was selected for this activity.

[15]Kahn, op. cit., p. 5.

[16]Ibid., pp. 359-362.

[17]Ibid., pp. 384-385.

[18]Thompson and Harris, op. cit., p. 331.

[19]Kahn, op. cit., pp. 386-389.

Fort Monmouth and the radio intercept platoons of five Signal companies, in Texas, California, the Canal Zone, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands.[20] With the onset of increased tension in Europe, the SIS was the first activity of the entire War Department establishment to be augmented, seen organizationally in the formation on 1 January 1939 of the 2d Signal Service Battalion to command all the dispersed radio intercept companies and platoons in their strategic intercept mission.[21]

It might well be noted here that it was Friedman and his staff in the SIS who solved the Japanese Purple Code, completing it in August of 1940.[22] This code - actually a machine system - was the one to figure so prominently in the events leading to Pearl Harbor.

Aerial Surveillance Emerges

Even though aviation in the First World War is remembered today primarily for the feats of the fighter aces, aerial surveillance was the most important function of the Air Corps. Military leaders on both sides of the front realized that the airplane now held the "high ground."

With the end of World War I, the size of reconnaissance units was reduced drastically and funding for equipment cut off. Many reconnaissance pilots and photographers who had done outstanding work during the war were released from service. George Goddard fortunately was not one of them.[23] Graduating from the Army's Aerial Photography Course at Cornell University in 1918, too late to get to Europe, Goddard undertook to keep the field alive in the post-war period. "Goddard, more than any other man, molded the photo-reconnaissance effort in its thirty years from 1920 to 1950."[24]

Goddard was placed in charge of aerial photographic research in 1919. Operating on a limited budget, he designed and experimented with many projects, including infrared and long-range photography, special cameras for long-range reconnaissance, plans for aircraft to be used only for photo-reconnaissance work, image interpretation techniques, and procedures for night aerial photography. He specialized in aerial reconnaissance from this time until he retired as a USAF brigadier general in 1953, spanning a career so successful that he is personally credited with almost every advancement in the field during the period.[25]

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[20]Thompson and Harris, op. cit., p. 333.

[21]Kahn, op. cit., p. 389.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Staub, op. cit.

[24]Infield, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

[25]Staub, op. cit., pp. 8-10.

Summary

The twenties were a bad time for Army intelligence. One can only imagine the disappointment of the newly developed professionals. But the whole Army suffered; the cry was for a return to "normalcy" and the impoverished Army shrank to its miniscule pre-war size. In intelligence, we saw the National Army intelligence officers demobilized and lost; the CIP virtually disappeared; the intercept service initially successful, then suddenly destroyed by a sense of misplaced morality; and, finally, G2 assignments viewed by the Army generally as the "dumping ground" for the less capable and a positive deterrent to a successful career.

The thirties, despite all the indications of the twenties, saw the beginnings of the renaissance that would lead to World War II intelligence operations - though G2 assignments gained little in prestige. But the CIP was increased in size, the SIS was created and, under the leadership of Friedman, developed a professional approach again. But in the shambles of Pearl Harbor, we found ourselves totally without a field intelligence effort; the CIP and the SIS were strategic in nature and had no tactical counterparts; G2 shops were formed under rigid TOE's and were incapable of meeting the requirement; and worst, most of the Army's experience in division, regimental, and battalion "2's" existed in the weaker officers of the establishment. Once more a wartime intelligence structure had to be created.

CHAPTER 4

Japanese Photo Taken During the Attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941

General W. J. Donovan, 1942

Major General Charles A. Willoughby (center) and Brigadier General Elliot Thorpe (right) inspect a CIC Combat Detachment in Australia in 1943.

Germans surprised by a Reconnaissance Aircraft while improving Beach Defenses in Normandy just before D-Day, 1944

Signal Intelligence Service Men assigned to Seventh Army perform traffic analysis in France, 1944.

German Soldiers captured by U.S. Forces during the Battle of the Bulge, December 1944

CHAPTER IV

ANOTHER WAR, ANOTHER TRIAL, ANOTHER SUCCESS (1941-1945)

Pearl Harbor

By way of introduction to Army intelligence activities in World War II, it might be well to look at the widely denounced intelligence "failure" at Pearl Harbor. Tension had been increasing between Japan and the U.S. for some years and the intelligence apparatus of the U.S. - such as it was - had been concentrating on Japan, and particularly its military expansion. By late 1941, there were many indications of an outbreak of hostilities, but no clear evidence of when, where, and how; and, moreover, a Japanese delegation was in Washington, negotiating a lessening of tension.

The instructions to this delegation were being sent in the Purple System - and, of course, being read by the SIS and its Naval counterpart. The results were being provided to the President and the Departments of State, War, and Navy, but major commanders, like those in Hawaii, did not receive distribution, being informed only in reports from "highly reliable sources." The Navy communications intelligence unit in Hawaii had been following the Japanese carrier fleet, but on 1 December 1941 had noticed an unusual callsign change, the increased use of the fleet broadcast, and, finally, loss of all direction finding results on the Japanese carrier fleet.

On the evening of 6 December, Washington time, the first thirteen parts of a fourteen-part message to the Japanese negotiators were intercepted, broken, and distributed. A breakdown of negotiations was indicated, but nothing specific as to time or nature. Finally, in the early morning hours, the Navy station near Seattle got the fourteenth part and sent it to Washington. Navy broke it out into Japanese plaintext, but the translators of SIS had the duty that night, so the Army received it for translation into English. The message instructed the Japanese Ambassador to deliver an ultimatum to the U.S. Secretary of State at 1300 hours, Washington time. It read, in part: "The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations." Thirteen hundred hours Washington time, was 0730, Honolulu time. This fourteenth part reached the President at 0945 Washington time.

The Chief of Staff, Army, General Marshall, decided to alert General Short, commanding Hawaiian Department, and General MacArthur, commanding Philippine Department. As for Hawaii, however, the Army circuits were out and the duty signal officer sent the warning via Western Union and RCA. Transmission time was 62 minutes, but it was not released in Washington until 1201, thus arriving at RCA Honolulu at 0733, at the start of the attack. The warning then had to be hand-carried to Fort Shafter, in the

midst of an air attack. The signal office received it at 1145, the decoding office at 1420, and General Short at 1500, whereupon he threw it into a wastebasket as of no further use.[1]

Was Pearl Harbor an intelligence failure? Was it a failure to integrate intelligence information from multiple sources and analyze it? Was it a failure to establish an adequate and responsive distribution system? Or can these be summed up as a failure of the intelligence staffs of the War and Navy Departments, despite their best efforts, to develop a professional intelligence system?

The most authoritative studies of the Pearl Harbor disaster are in agreement that the problem was not a lack of intelligence but an absence of a system to make the intelligence that was available understandable to the national-level decision makers. In retrospect, there was ample evidence available to Washington that the Japanese were prepared to attack American forces on very short notice, somewhere in the Pacific, and that their most likely course of action was to do so on a surprise basis. But no agency or person was able to see the picture clearly enough, or able to appreciate the impact of what they were seeing, and thus no order to go on full alert was sent to the Pacific until too late. Neither was it recognized that an intensive collection effort needed to be undertaken to ascertain exactly what the Japanese capabilities were.

To be fair, even if an intensive collection effort had been ordered, it is doubtful that much more could have been done than was already being done; and, on the strategic level, more information would probably not have been any better used than what was already available. The American intelligence system was that primitive. As General Marshall described it: "Prior to World War II, our foreign intelligence was little more than what a military attaché could learn at dinner, more or less over the coffee cups."[2]

An even more damning indictment of the pre-war intelligence situation was rendered by General Eisenhower:

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[1]Kahn, op. cit., pp. 1-67.

[2]Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970, p. 48.

> Within the War Department, a shocking deficiency that impeded all constructive planning existed in the field of intelligence. The fault was partly within and partly without the Army. The American public has always viewed with repugnance everything that smacks of the spy: during the years between the two World Wars no funds were provided with which to establish the basic requirement of an intelligence system--a far-flung organization of fact finders.[3]

Eisenhower continues down the list of problems that plagued intelligence: total reliance on attaches for foreign intelligence (" . . . estimable, socially acceptable gentlemen; few knew the essentials of intelligence work."); the quality of the War Department G2 (" . . . the situation was not helped by the custom of making long service as a military attache, rather than ability, the essential qualification. . . ."); the shortage of intelligence officers ("we had few men capable of analyzing intelligently such information as did come to the notice of the War Department . . . . ."); intelligence training in the service schools (" . . . the broader phases of the work were almost completely ignored."); finally, the ineptness of G2 ("initially the Intelligence Division could not even develop a clear plan for its own organization . . . . [the G2] could do little more than come to the planning and operating sections of the staff and in a rather pitiful way ask if there was anything he could do for us.").[3]

It is to the inestimable credit of the system, and of the intelligence men who were developed during the war, that these problems were overcome.

Coordinator of Information

As a matter of fact, the problem had been recognized by at least one important American by the summer of 1941. This man was Colonel (later Major General) William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan. Donovan, a Medal of Honor winner from World War I and an influential New York lawyer between the wars, had been acting as Roosevelt's personal representative to visit world leaders during 1940-41 to assess the war in Europe and the chances of the British. In addition to urging successfully that the President lend fifty destroyers to the embattled Royal Navy, Donovan also identified for Roosevelt an important advantage possessed by the British - a coordinated intelligence, propaganda, and uncoventional operations effort. The world had already had a taste of the German use of propaganda as an arm of the military, and Donovan was convinced that our government should be prepared to conduct the same type of operations. Furthermore, he pointed out to the President, U.S. government intelligence was being collected and handled by not less than eight agencies (G2, ONI, FBI, State, the

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[3]D. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 32.

Customs Service, the Secret Service, the Immigration Service, and the Federal Communications Commission). The product of all this collection, whether raw or processed, was being placed daily on the President's desk, forcing Roosevelt to be his own intelligence officer.[4]

The President welcomed the idea of a single agency which would serve as a clearinghouse for all intelligence, a counterpropaganda agency, and a training vehicle for sabotage and subversion. Although initially reluctant to take the job himself, Donovan was soon convinced that he should head the new bureau. The name chosen was deliberately vague - Coordinator of Information or COI - and the mission assigned to its first director on 11 July 1941 was equally obscure: "To collect and analyze all information and data which may bear on national security, to correlate such information and data . . . and to carry out when requested by the President such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for the national security. . . ."[5]

The COI, which reported directly to the President, was not greeted with enthusiasm by the other intelligence agencies, and both the War Department G2 and the Director of Naval Intelligence fought hard against the new agency and Donovan himself.[6] Their animosity was caused in part by jealousy, but another important concern of the War Department and the Navy was that a centralized intelligence effort would not paint the threat picture that would result in allocation of money for more troops, tanks, battleships, or airplanes. One of the realities of the situation in 1941 was that the various government agencies collecting information were producing "promotional intelligence," that is, intelligence that would serve the interests of the producer.[7]

In any event, COI was established and began immediately to set up the research and analysis foundation which served it so well and which made it unique among Amercan intelligence organizations established until this time. The effort that first year was largely aimed at gathering and collating strategic intelligence, and in the area of psychological warfare. One of the brightest ideas Donovan had - and he had many - was bringing to COI the best minds and greatest experience available in

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[4]Corey Ford, Donovan of OSS, Little, Brown, Boston, 1970. pp. 96-108.

[5]Ibid., App. A, p. 337.

[6]Ibid., p. 129.

[7]Franklin J. Bithos, personal interview with authors, 10 April 1973.

civilian society and having them establish offices and directorates and rules of operation to meet the charter granted to the COI.[8]

By summer, 1942, it had become evident to both Donovan and Roosevelt that the Coordinator of Information contained more incompatible functional areas than should be left in one agency. Thus, by executive order of 13 June 1942, two separate agencies were created. One, the Office of War Information would handle all overt or "white" propaganda. The other, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) would continue to handle the covert, or "black" propaganda. Furthermore, the old functions of COI of collecting and analyzing strategic intelligence and of preparing for "special operations" went to OSS. The man selected to head OSS, not surprisingly, was Donovan. The major organizational change was that, instead of reporting directly to the President, the OSS was under the operational control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[9]

The establishment of OSS under military control did not diminish the antagonism felt by many [though not all] Army G2 and Naval intelligence officers. They continued to resist cooperation in the strategic intelligence collection field, presentation of integrated intelligence to the Joint Chiefs, and training of men for unconventional operations. The FBI, in addition, demanded and got a prohibition against OSS operations in Latin America.[10]

It is appropriate to point out here that there seems to be an important relationship between OSS and today's Military Intelligence Branch. It is generally claimed that the Central Intelligence Agency is the child of OSS, and that is certainly true as far as it goes. But as will be shown, the concepts of military intelligence support to the Army in the field were affected importantly by the work of OSS during World War II. For example, many of the Operational Groups had positive or negative intelligence functions supporting tactical operations.

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[8] Ford, op. cit., pp. 148-152. This proselyting policy did not extend to cryptographer Herbert O. Yardley. Reportedly, Yardley had worked for the Chinese and the Canadians after writing The American Black Chamber. He was denied employment by the OSS. (R. Harris Smith, OSS: The History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency, University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1972, p. 245.).

[9] Ford, op. cit., pp. 121-128.

[10] Ibid., pp. 108-134.

War Department General Staff, G2

At the same time as OSS was presenting its case to the Joint Chiefs for aggressive and centralized intelligence work, the War Department G2 was depending essentially on the same approach employed since its birth in 1921. Efforts had been made to establish a collection capability under G2, but did not work out well and in September 1941, the Army G2 recommended that all the specialized collection assets be centralized under Donovan's organization.[11] The main source of unique Army intelligence remained the attache system, which had traditionally been a lucrative program.[12] The lack of urgency in the peacetime Army for wartime intelligence work and the continuing poor regard for peacetime military intelligence in the field virtually insured that we would be unprepared in the tactical intelligence area for World War II.

Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, chief of the planning staff for the Normandy invasion, commented:

> As regards intelligence, there was at that time no doubt in anybody's mind that British developments were far ahead of American developments. The British had been at war 3 1/2 years and had, therefore, had time to perfect their intelligence network throughout the world . . . . The United States, on the other hand, had had little more than a year of war so far, and, moreover, I understand that their neglect of military intelligence in peacetime had been even more glaring than our own, which is to say a good deal.[13]

The problem existed on both the strategic and tactical level. As mentioned above, efforts were undertaken immediately to try to overcome the strategic problem, but similar glaring deficiencies soon surfaced in the tactical area. The biggest was hardly a surprise to anyone: There were few officers on active duty when the war broke out who were prepared to do G2/S2 work. The poor-relation treatment of peacetime tactical intelligence officers was widely recognized and just as widely ignored during the period between the wars. General Omar Bradley saw it this way:

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[11]U.S. War Department, Strategic Services Unit, "War Report, Office of Strategic Services," 5 September 1947, Vol. I of 2 Volumes, p. 14.

[12]Nelson, op. cit., p. 522. For additional information of G2 Organizations see G2 Memo 10560-653, cited previously.

[13]Frederick E. Morgan, Overture to Overlord, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1950, p. 32.

> The American Army's long neglect of intelligence training was soon reflected by the ineptness of our initial undertakings. For too many years in the preparation of officers for command assignments, we had overlooked the need for specialization in such activities as intelligence . . . . In some stations, the G2 became the dumping ground for officers ill-suited for command. I recall how scrupulously I avoided the branding that came with an intelligence assignment in my own career. Had it not been for the uniquely qualified reservists who so capably filled so many of our intelligence jobs throughout the war, the Army would have been pressed . . . .[14]

In short, the need for a professional intelligence officers corps on active duty in peacetime was clearly seen by senior military men early in World War II, but nothing was done about it until another war had come and gone. The relative lack of American knowledge and skill in intelligence work led to Eisenhower's selection of British officers as G2 from North Africa on throughout the war. It was recognized, however, that, after the Americans had been at war for a time, they became quite proficient at intelligence work.[15]

In addition to the lack of qualified intelligence officers, a similar problem existed in respect to enlisted specialists. Since there was no career program in intelligence, except for counterintelligence and signal intelligence, for either officers or enlisted men, all the various other specialists of intelligence had to be recruited and trained.

The War Department G2 had established an operating agency to control personnel in the Zone of the Interior in March 1942 - the Military Intelligence Service.[16] From the start of the war, the G2 had grown rapidly in personnel, but not in efficiency; it was overwhelmed by the volume of information pouring in. Furthermore, there was a good deal of rivalry

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[14]Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story of the Allied Campaigns from Tunis to the Elbe, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1951, p. 33.

[16]U.S. Forces, European Theater, Report of the General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, no pub., n.p., n.d. Study #14, "Organization and Operations of the Theater Intelligence Service in the ETO," p. 12. Cited hereinafter as ETO General Board, Study #14.

[16]It should be noted here that the U.S. Army has never had since World War I, and does not have today, a single, integrated military intelligence support activity; i.e., an umbrella over all positive and negative intelligence activities like that provided by Van Deman's MI Division and AEF G2. Despite many studies which, by implication, recommend such, only Van Deman and Nolan were able to create one. The MIS was an abortive start in this direction.

between G2 and the other War Department staffs, as well as within G2 itself, and neither of these facts improved efficiency. By March 1942, a reorganization was clearly in order: The G2 was divided into a small, directive General Staff section and the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), the operating element. This reorganization was more theoretical than actual, since the two tended to remain the same. Nelson aptly comments: "Organizationally, the G2 was a mongrel . . . ." By 1944, the problems were so great that a board was appointed to straighten things out. This board initially decided that intelligence production was similar to news production and sent a team to study the operations of the New York Times and Time magazine. Ultimately, however, the board fell back on clarifying the 1942 reorganization. The General Staff element and the MIS were clearly split, the general staff receiving directive responsibility and the MIS, operations.[17]

The responsibilities of the MIS at the War Department level included overseeing the operations of the CIC within the Zone of the Interior. While the MIS concept was adopted in the overseas theaters of operations, the CIC supervisory function was evidently less clearcut.

Two unique MIS functional responsibilities, created in the ZI in 1942, were duplicated in both Europe and the Pacific and are worth discussing here. The first of these, designated MIS-X, was concerned with the problems created by the capture of U.S. personnel by the enemy. Its functions included training in escape and evasion and conduct while held prisoner. The intelligence studies engendered by the program are obvious: Where are the enemy's PW camps? What types of interrogation does he use? Who in the enemy-held area will help the Allied soldier? Who will not? One interesting aspect of the training provided by MIS-X was in the use of code so that, if taken prisoner, the soldier could transmit information about the enemy in his letters home. Finally, MIS-X planned for the rescue of captured personnel and those who were evading the enemy, and debriefed the returnees.[18]

The other special responsibility was MIS-Y. Its function was high-level interrogation of prisoners of particular interest. These interrogations were conducted by MIS-Y personnel both in the ZI and in the overseas theaters.[19]

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[17]Nelson, op. cit., pp. 521-535.

[18]History, G-2, SWPA, Introductory volume, pp. 86-87.

[19]U.S. Forces, European Theater, Report of the General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, no pub., n.p., n.d., Study #12, "The Military Intelligence Service in the European Theater of Operations," p. 1. Cited hereinafter as ETO General Board, Study #12.

One of the more important contributions of the War Department G2 was in the area of training. In order to provide the specialists who would be required, G2 recommended establishment of a training facility; this led to the Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC) at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, opened in June 1942. The courses there were eight weeks long, and produced prisoner-of-war interrogators, military interpreters, photo interpreters, and order of battle specialists. These personnel were then grouped into MI specialist teams and deployed overseas, principally to Europe.[20]

In the ZI, even before the establishment of the Training Center, there had been an argument between the War Department G2 and G3 over who should train the intelligence personnel assigned to combat units going overseas. The G3 felt that this could be handled by the unit involved, while all experience indicated to the G2 that these unit intelligence personnel needed some formal intelligence instruction. By the beginning of 1944 (that is, before the invasion of the continent), the Army Chief of Staff had ordered that all of these S2/G2 personnel would attend a four-week course at Camp Ritchie.[21]

Censorship

Concerning the War Department G2's counterintelligence responsibilities, it is important to mention censorship. Based on experience in World War I, the Army recognized that any large-scale effort at censorship would take considerable management. In 1940, the responsibility for planning was given to the War Department G2 who developed a plan, which was approved by President Roosevelt. In August 1941, a censorship school was established at Fort Washington, Maryland. In practice, during the war, civilian mail within the ZI was censored only when it was going across international boundaries; however, mail from overseas military personnel was vigorously censored throughout the war.

Recognizing that censorship in any form is alien to the American system, the comments of Byron Price, first Director of Censorship in World War II, are interesting:

> Any approach to censorship in a democratic country is fraught with serious difficulties and grave risks . . . the word itself arouses instant resentment, distrust, and fear among free men. Everything the censor does is contrary to the fundamentals of liberty. He invades privacy ruthlessly, delays and mutilates the mails and cable and

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[20]Nelson, op. cit., p. 525.

[21]See discussion in Bidwell, op. cit., part 8, pp. I-42--43.

> lays restrictions on public expressions in the press . . . The censor's house is built on sand, no matter what statutes may be enacted or what the courts declare. The first and last principle to be remembered, then, is that censorship should come into being solely as an instrument of war.[22]

Counterintelligence Corps in the ZI

As for the Army's counterintelligence agency, the CIP had been preparing for war since 1940. On 1 January 1942, the name of the organization was changed from CIP to CIC - Counterintelligence Corps.[23] Security restrictions were loosened somewhat, making it possible for the Army not only to admit to the existence of the CIC, but also to make public its general missions. During the war, more than 13,000 men were trained for CIC duty and served in literally every corner of the world, in about 300 CIC detachments.[24]

The CIC found itself embroiled in the argument about training. At issue was whether the CIC detachment which would support a given division overseas should join that division while it was training in the United States. CIC felt that it was unproductive use of agent manpower, but those who believed that the intelligence units needed to train with the outfit they were to support won out.[25]

Operationally, CIC was very active. According to its history, CIC "pushed nearly a billion doorbells, making more than two and a quarter million background investigations and running down leads for thousands of complaint cases." Immediately after Pearl Harbor, CIC took part, with the FBI and ONI, in raids on known Nazi sympathizers here in the United States. These raids netted a variety of weapons, explosives, radios and propaganda material. It was felt that these raids contributed significantly to the fact that no fifth column movement got off the ground here.[26]

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[22]Byron Price, A Report on the Office of Censorship, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1945, p. 1.

[23]USAINTC Pamphlet.

[24]Ibid.

[25]CIC History, v. VII, p. 75.

[26]USAINTC Pamphlet.

As mentioned previously, the MIS had some supervisory relationships with the CIC. As time passed, for a variety of reasons, this function declined considerably. The headquarters of the CIC had been established initially in Washington, but was moved in January 1942 to Baltimore. The cause of that move, interestingly enough, was a War Department order forbidding any agency in Washington from having more that one-third of its officers under the age of 35. This would have ruined the fledgling CIC main office, so CIC decamped to a Baltimore address on North Charles Street, a former girls' dormitory near Goucher College.[27]

On 1 January 1944, as a result of dissatisfaction in some Washington circles with the methods of operation of CIC, control of that body was taken from the G2 and given to the Army Service Forces. This decision resulted from a study of the work of both the CIC and the Provost Marshal General investigators. It was concluded that, in the ZI, there was needless duplication of effort in routine investigations.[28] CIC was, therefore, merged with the criminal investigators (in the ZI only), and the resulting organization was known as the Security and Intelligence Corps (SIC). The SIC was operationally controlled by the Provost Marshal General and under the supervision of the local commanders. SIC training was done at Camp Ritchie.[29]

Manhattan and ALSOS

An exception to this decision was made for the CIC elements assigned to the Manhattan Project. CIC was responsible for security for both the efforts to build the atomic bomb and for the "ALSOS" Mission, the scientists who followed the infantry across Europe examining newly occupied areas for signs of German progress on "the bomb."[30] The history of the Manhattan Project described overall security as the "Counterintelligence Corps' greatest triumph." The ALSOS Mission was an interesting one, since it took the men of CIC into the thick of things, right behind the combat troops. When Rome was liberated, part of the "S" Force went in with the assault battalions and its ALSOS team seized three important scientists. This process was repeated all over Europe.[31]

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[27] CIC History, v. V, p. 5.

[28] U.S. War Department, Office of the Inspector General, Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Subject: Intelligence Activities in Service Commands (33.9-Intelligence Activities), 6 November 1943.

[29] John D. Millett, The United States Army in World War II: The Army Service Forces: The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1954, p. 358.

[30] Samuel A. Goudsmit, ALSOS, Henry Schuman, New York, 1947, pp. 111-116. For further information, see also Boris T. Pash, The ALSOS Mission, Award House, New York, 1969, passim.

[31] USAINTC Pamphlet.

General Van Deman Again

Although a retired Major General since 1929 and living in San Diego, Van Deman never lost his interest in intelligence work. When the Japanese attacked in December 1941, the old patriot immediately got to work to help defend the country in the only way he could. Apparently falling back on his World War I experience with the civilian volunteers whom he had mobilized into the American Protective League, Van Deman organized volunteers who provided "material aid to the Army, Navy, Marines and FBI during the war" through "accumulation and evaluation of confidential intelligence information."[32]

Although not yet entirely clear, it seems likely that Van Deman throughout his retirement maintained a personal set of files on those whom he considered subversives. He spoke out frequently after World War II and until his death in 1952 against the menace of communism to the United States.[33] In any event, his papers on alleged American subversives came to light in Congressional hearings in 1971 and were dubbed the "Van Deman Files."[34]

Signal Intelligence Service

As for cryptologic activities, it will be recalled that the SIS had a strategic mission before World War II. The 2d Signal Service Battalion was the intercept organization while the analysis and reporting was accomplished by the headquarters of the SIS in Washington. The position of battalion commander and Chief SIS were held concurrently by the same man. These two organizations grew from a manpower of 331 on 7 December 1941 to 10,000 at war's end. The SIS itself suffered several name changes during the war, going in 1942 to Signal Security Service (SSS) and in 1943 to Signal Security Agency (SSA).[35] Its operations were then considered to be a Signal Corps function, though its primary customer was the G2, War Department. In December 1944, the G2 assumed operational control, leaving administrative control with the Chief Signal Officer. This trend was a matter of some disappointment to the Signal Corps since it tried several times throughout the war to become a General Staff agency by virtue of its intelligence operations instead of on the basis of its own rather significant normal functions.[36]

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[32] San Diego Union, 20 July 1946. Van Deman received a Legion of Merit from the War Department for his World War II performance of duty.

[33] San Diego Tribune, 30 May 1962.

[34] New York Times, 9 July 1971, p. 5.

[35] Kahn, op. cit., pp. 574-575.

[36] Thompson and Harris, op. cit., pp. 348-349.

The 2d Signal Service Battalion, though growing to over 5,000 personnel remained just that - a battalion. Attempts to raise it to a regiment failed since the approving authority in the Army Service Forces was not deemed to have a need-to-know about the battalion's mission, and he would not approve the change in status without that knowledge. The battalion eventually established collection sites in the U.S., Alaska, the Aleutians, Hawaii, Australia, India, and Ethiopia.[37] The station in Asmara, Ethiopia, had an interesting responsibility. The SIS was not reading many high-level German ciphers, but found that the Japanese Ambassador (and former Attaché) in Berlin was using the Purple Code, which had been broken in 1940. The Germans were providing their Axis ally full access to military information and their ambassador, in turn, was reporting this to Tokyo by radio, encrypted in the Purple system. The Asmara station was evidently placed just right to intercept them. It did and returned them to Washington where they were read with ease - and great interest.[38]

Security was a continuing problem for the product of the SIS - everyone was recalling the results of the publication of Yardley's American Black Chamber in 1931.

As a matter of fact, these security problems had an influence even on politics near the end of the war. Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican presidential candidate in the summer of 1944, planned a blistering series of attacks on the Roosevelt administration for what he considered to be its gross mishandling of the war. In particular, Dewey was aware that the Japanese Purple Code had been broken prior to Pearl Harbor, and he planned to attack Roosevelt for ignoring the supposed clear warning provided by the intercepted Japanese messages. What could have resulted from this disclosure would have had a deleterious effect on the war effort. Since the Japanese still had no clue that their codes were broken, they were providing the Allies with information not only about their own activities, but about German war plans as well.

With characteristic decisiveness and forthrightness, General Marshall wrote a personal appeal to Governor Dewey asking him not to use the issue of the Japanese codes in his campaigns. Because General Marshall took action without asking either President Roosevelt or Secretary of War Stimson, Dewey could not help but believe that there was no political motivation involved. In an act of great patriotism, Dewey did not bring up the subject of codebreaking during his campaign, even though it might have made it possible for him to defeat Roosevelt.[39]

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[37] Ibid., p. 341.

[38] Kahn, op. cit., p. 508.

[39] Ibid., pp. 601-608.

Intelligence Operations, Europe and North Africa

The sequence of American involvement in combat operations began with the invasion of North Africa (Operation TORCH), and continued through the invasion of Sicily (HUSKY), the invasion of Italy, the cross-channel invasion (OVERLORD), the invasion of Southern France (ANVIL), and the drive across France and into Germany.

A sampling of some of the operations of CIC gives an insight into the contribution it made to victory. In North Africa, agents captured a high-level planning group composed of several German and Italian civil officials and seized a list of collaborators and apprehended several enemy agents. In Sicily, CIC captured an overlay of landmine locations in time to pass it to assault battalions going into the area, thus saving many lives. The 36th CIC Detachment went ashore with the first waves of the 36th Infantry Division at Salerno. The CIC Detachments with Fifth Army participated actively all the way up the Italian peninsula, seizing enemy agents, collaborators, capturing documents and critical facilities, and generally acting as an action agency of the G2's for whom they worked.[40] Many CIC men were part of an Allied intelligence group of 1000 personnel, known as the "S" Force (later known as "T" Force), who were among the first Allied soldiers into Rome in June 1944.[41]

A few remarks concerning tactical SIS units in the European Theater of Operations are appropriate. Organic radio intelligence companies were part of theater and army headquarters with radio intelligence companies and platoons assigned to signal battalions and companies down to division level. This existed until October of 1943 when the radio intelligence platoons of division signal companies were withdrawn and their functions assigned to the corps signal battalions. These units were organic and were for all practical purposes working for the G2 of the appropriate echelon. The units were organized under many different names, partly for security and partly to outflank rigid tables of organization, though the word "service" was usually a part of the name.[42]

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[40]John Schwarzwalder, We Caught Spies, Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, New York, 1946, p. 67.

[41]CIC History, v. XII, p. 38.

[42]Thompson and Harris, op. cit., pp. 346-347.

In North Africa, lift space was not available initially for support troops, so the radio intelligence companies went ashore as assault troops, assuming their normal function later. Eventually five radio intelligence companies supported in the Tunisian campaign, the 128th Signal Company (Radio Intelligence) being the first intelligence agency to uncover the German withdrawal from the Kasserine Pass.[43]

The 849th Signal Company (RI), supporting II Corps in the Tunisian campaign, was able to provide significant information before the German attack on the First Division at El Guettar. At 0400 on 23 March 1942, the Corps G2 watch officer, Colonel Koch (later to be G2, Third Army), received the following report from the 849th: "Based on our analysis, there are indications that the 10th Panzer Division is moving south." Koch reported this to all units and by 0558 the First Division was under attack by elements of the 10th Panzer. This attack failed, but the 10th did not withdraw. At 1500 another intercept indicated a second attack was ordered for 1600. A third intercept, at 1545, postponed the attack to 1645 due to difficulties with artillery support. By 1638 the First Division reported enemy tanks moving into position and by 1800 a full attack was in progress.

> As details became available in Corps headquarters, it was learned that the attack had come as ordered, at the appointed place and at the appropriate time - and had been received in ready and open First Division arms with devastating and deadly effect.[44]

In England, CIC cooperated closely with the British intelligence service in conducting an active SAEDA program for the U.S. troops in the United Kingdom awaiting the invasion.[45] As the great day approached, CIC was fully committed to preserving the security of both the invasion date and the location of the assault. The work was mundane - sitting in English pubs listening for loose talk from the GI customers gets old in a hurry, as does checking out hundreds of well-meaning but false reports of signal lights sending messages to German U-boats offshore, illegal transmitters, and the like. But it was essential to the lives of those who were to hit the beach at Omaha, Utah, Juno, Sword, and Gold.[46]

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[43]Kahn, op. cit., p. 507; George R. Thompson, et al., The United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services: The Signal Corps: The Test (December, 1941--July 1943), Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1957, p. 386. Latter cited hereinafter as Thompson.

[44]Oscar W. Koch, with Robert G. Hays, G2: Intelligence for Patton, Whitmore Publishing Company, Philadelphia, 1971, p. 18.

[45]Subversion And Espionage Directed Against the Army.

[46]CIC History, v. XIV, p. 1.

Based in part on experience in Italy, in January 1944 a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) was developed for CIC. It provided cellular teams that would be used to create the right type of CIC detachment to support the unit to which it was attached.[47] This is significant because it presages the flexible MI support concept employed by the Army today.

There were CIC detachments with the assault divisions in Normandy. For example, agents jumped into the lodgment area with both the 82d and 101st Divisions. Of the eight men who jumped with the Screaming Eagles, three were killed in action and two more wounded and captured.[48]

In Europe, from OVERLORD on, MI specialist support was provided from an organization known as the MI Service Detachment, ETO. During the North African and Sicilian Campaigns, the MI personnel had been attached directly to the units they supported. The MIS Detachment was later designated the Field Intelligence Detachment and served as a central manpower pool until the end of the war.

Once in Europe, the MI specialist teams were given more training, using real prisoners or documents or photography whenever possible. When they were further deployed to the units they were to support, they were assigned as teams to the division, corps, or whatever unit. As will be seen, this system proved to be rather successful and the MI men were well appreciated in Europe. It should be noted, however, that the orientation at Camp Ritchie was on the environment to be faced in Europe and not that of the Pacific.[49]

The MI specialist teams were assigned to the tactical units they supported on the basis of fixed ratios (e.g., the divisions were authorized two IPW teams, and one each of MI interpreter, photo interpreter, and order of battle teams).[50]

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[47]U.S. Forces, European Theater, Report of the General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, no pub., n.p., n.d., Study #13, "Organization and Operation of the Counterintelligence Corps in the European Theater of Operations," p. 1. Cited hereinafter as ETO General Board, Study #13.

[48]CIC History, v. XIV, p. 2.

[49]ETO General Board, Study #12, pp. 1-4. Gerd S. Grombacher, personal interview with the authors, 18 December 1972. This orientation probably grew out of the positive commitment from the highest governmental levels to conduct a holding action in the Pacific and seek victory first in Europe.

[50]ETO General Board, Study #12, p. 26.

> "What the division lacked in collecting enemy information was usually provided by attached intelligence specialists who served as extremely efficient helping hands. Each division had at least fifty auxiliary intelligence specialist personnel attached in the form of teams . . . The Corps would have at least twice as many specialist teams as its divisions, including the same types plus others, better organized and equipped to serve a large command: a mobile weather detachment which could forecast weather for the entire corps area for example, and specialized engineers with map reproduction facilities. By the time all these teams were totalled up at field army headquarters, the number of attached specialists rarely fell below 2,000--and on many occasions it was double that number."[51]

The G2 of Patton's Third Army, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Oscar W. Koch, found the MIS personnel to be invaluable to the intelligence operations of the tactical units. He also noted that these teams were initially unpopular with the tactical commanders, presumably because they were more mouths to feed and people to be transported, bedded, and the like. As soon as they went into combat, however, and the MIS personnel began to produce, "they not only were welcome, they were in demand."[52]

The role of MIS-X and MIS-Y was important in the ETO. As a matter of fact, the transfer of MIS-X and MIS-Y to England in February 1943 marked the beginning of the MIS in Europe.[53] MIS-X is credited with assisting some 16,000 U.S. personnel to return to Allied control in Europe. MIS-Y, through the long range and detailed interrogation of selected PW, was responsible for much important intelligence, including, for example, that German U-boats were negotiating a passage between the North Sea islands that had been believed impassable.[54]

Ground reconnaissance was a function of the G2 and S2 within tactical units in all theaters in World War II. The infantry division was provided with a cavalry reconnaissance troop, while each infantry regiment had an Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) Platoon, working for the S2.

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[51]Koch, op. cit., p. 136.

[52]Ibid., pp. 137-138.

[53]ETO General Board, Study #12, p. 1.

[54]War Department G2 Memorandum, Subject: Establishment of a permanent CPM (Captured Personnel and Materiel) Branch, 3 July 1947. Cited hereinafter as G2 Memo, CFM Branch.

The ETO General Board found that the infantry division cavalry troops were principally engaged in intelligence and counterintelligence misssions, and that the troops should be increased in size to a cavalry squadron. The Board noted that many divisions were reinforced for reconnaissance and intelligence work by the attachment of cavalry squadrons from corps or army controlled cavalry elements.[55]

As for the regimental I&R Platoon, whose mission was to serve the regiment as "the special intelligence agency" collecting information, operating patrols and observation posts, and "coordinating the intelligence activities of the regiment," the Board found that it needed more personnel. It recommended an addition of some 13 personnel.[56]

CIC men were used habitually in "S" Force operations to take part in the liberation or occupation of key cities. Their success in this type of operation, as well as their active role in producing combat intelligence for the G2's they supported, did much to enhance the reputation they made for intelligence.[57]

In the counterespionage area, the success of the agents varied with the level at which they were found. Divisional detachments seldom engaged in anything but tactical CIC work directed toward combat intelligence production. On the other hand, the corps and higher detachments were rather effective in locating enemy agents. For example, the first German spy caught by the Americans in France was bagged by CIC. CIC agents captured him the second week of August 1944, he was tried within three days, and hanged in early October.[58]

During the Battle of the Bulge, CIC agents captured a copy of German Colonel Skorzeny's famous raid plan, which called for German soldiers equipped and dressed as Americans to penetrate the Allied lines and conduct sabotage and terrorism. The capture of this plan, and the rapid

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[55]U.S. Forces, European Theater, Report of the General Board, United States Forces European Theater, no pub., n.p., n.d., Study #15, "Organization, Equipment and Tactical Employment of the Infantry Division." Cited hereinafter as ETO General Board, Study #15.

[56]Ibid., p. 5.

[57]CIC History, v. XV, pp. 33-36.

[58]Ibid., v. XV, p. 207.

development of a counterplan, enabled security forces to react in time to capture most of the Germans and deny them success.[59] The only fly in the ointment was that CIC security for General Eisenhower against an assassination attempt got on his nerves:

> I was irritated at the insistence of the security corps that I definitely circumscribe my freedom of movement, but I found that unless I conformed reasonably to their desires, they merely used more men for protective measures.[60]

Their enthusiasm also led to some agents getting pretty far out on a limb. During the final days of the Third Reich, acting on a tip, CIC raided the hidden country home of the German Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, and secured the complete Foreign Ministry files from 1871 to 1944, just before they were to be destroyed. It took 200 trucks to haul away this gold mine, after the frontline troops had caught up with the CIC raiders. At about the same time, three agents of the 104th CIC Detachment found themselves the only Americans in a German-held town in the Ruhr valley. They were captured by SS troops, spent three days being threatened, interrogated, and, in one instance asked by an SS officer about his chances of getting a job with the Americans after the war. When the first friendly troops arrived, the agents just barely talked their captors out of executing them. They found that that was not the end of the problem, since the advancing GI's tended to shoot first and ask questions later. The CIC rose to the occasion, however, by selecting the prettiest German girl they could find and sending her out in the street to tell the infantry that some CIC guys wanted to come out of hiding. They reasoned that no GI would shoot her, and that proved to be true.[61]

As the last resistance ended within Germany, the CIC mission was a fascinating mixture of locating German war criminals, running down some of the fanatic Nazis who were determined to establish a resistence movement within the shell of the Third Reich, helping the military government officials restore order, and looking for documents. CIC agents even managed to locate more than thirty tons of gold bullion hidden by Nazi officials. This gold was buried within the French zone of occupation, but the CIC men snagged it from under the French and turned it in to the U.S. Seventh Army.[62]

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[59]USAINTC Pamphlet.

[60]D. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 359.

[61]Ibid., v. XX, p. 43.

[62]Ibid., v. XX, p. 93.

Summarizing CIC experience in the ETO, the General Board found the quality and quantity of CIC personnel assigned were quite satisfactory. The flexible TOE was deemed to be an effective system of tailoring support. Only two major problems were noted, the first of which was that many CIC men did not know enough about being soldiers and operating in a combat environment when they arrived in the theater.[63] The other major problem for CIC, noted in Italy as well as after Normandy, was the lack of Italian and German-speaking CIC men.

The 849th Radio Intelligence Company, now simply the 849th SIS, moved on to Great Britain and across the beaches in Normandy, assigned to the Twelfth U.S. Army Group. By early August of 1944, Patton's Third Army was stretched along the Cotentin Peninsula, preparing to break out of the bridgehead at Avranches, and Hodges' First Army was holding back the Germans along the landward side. On the seventh of August, the 849th intercepted a message indicating the Germans were to assault a weakly held part of the First Army front to break through to sea and isolate Patton's army to the south. The intercept allowed time to reinforce and to defeat the German attack, permitting the breakout to go on as scheduled.[64]

By December of 1944, the 849th was located in Luxembourg and reading messages indicating movement of German armored divisions behind the Ardennes front.[65] This, like much other information indicating the Battle of the Bulge, was not properly integrated, and the German attack was an intelligence surprise.

Operating in the ETO were many other radio intelligence units, of which the 849th is only an example. Little is revealed, however, about the others in open, published sources.

At the SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force) level, the G2 office had a small Signal Intelligence Sub-Division charged with coordinating the operations of both the British and American signal intelligence operations and coordinating with the counterintelligence staff on signal security matters.[66]

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[63]ETO General Board, Study #13, p. 22.

[64]Koch, op. cit., pp. 63-64; Kahn, op. cit., p. 509.

[65]Kahn, loc. cit.

[66]ETO General Board, Study #14, p. 27.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, the United States had several reconnaissance squadrons and a photographic group, in addition to several visual observation units. The observation units flew short-range missions in support of ground forces, while the reconnaissance squadrons flew with the Army Air Corps bombardment groups. By early 1942, the system was proving a failure, because of the old aircraft and equipment being used.

In April of that year, the Army Air Corps realized that the entire reconnaissance concept was outmoded and needed restructuring. The reconnaissance/bombardment squadrons were dissolved and independent "tac recce" groups were established. Obsolete, slow-flying aircraft were replaced by high-speed pursuit or high-altitude bomber aircraft. Operational training units were established and new doctrine for surveillance was formulated. By 1943 there was a marked change in the effectiveness of what the photo-reconnaissance squadrons were producing since trained pilots and faster airplanes were allowing the cameras to do their job.

Goddard's techniques and equipment were being improved almost daily. Aside from the usual photographic equipment, reconnaissance squadrons were being equipped with airborne radar to locate their targets. Radar, a product of the war technology, gave the unarmed reconnaissance aircraft an all-weather capability, and pilots could now fly above light cloud cover to the area of interest, then descend to take photographs. This greatly reduced the casualties sustained by aircraft flying long distances at low altitudes to get under the weather.

Later, weather reconnaissance units were organized to provide meteorological reports based on pilot observations and aerial radar. When the Eighth Air Force attempted the first daylight bombing mission against Berlin in 1944, Hitler boasted that the raids had missed the city entirely. To disprove the German propaganda, a Major Weitman of the 95th Bomb Group flew over Berlin the next day and brought back pictures of the damage. The fact that a lone aircraft had flown to Berlin and back in foul weather demonstrated radar's usefulness as a surveillance device. Weitman had remained above the weather the entire time, with the exception of the short time required to take the actual pictures of Berlin.

Even before Berlin was being bombed, aerial reconnaissance groups were looking for lucrative bombing targets. Dresden, Keil, and Dortmund were all flown over and photographed by the air reconnaissance people long before a bomber ever saw the places. Without the aerial surveillance provided, the success of bombing missions during World War II would have been considerably smaller.[67]

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[67]Staub, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

General Patton and his G2 found aerial reconnaissance and surveillance to be an extremely valuable and important source of information from the invasion of North Africa onward. Koch noted that the growth of the aerial surveillance business was "almost phenomenal"; in Tunisia, immediately after TORCH, he received two air recce missions in a month; in Sicily, the number of missions jumped to 140 in just over a month, and in Normandy, during September 1943, 223 photo missions produced half a million prints.

This dramatic growth made it necessary to create a new section in the G2 at Army and Corps, the G2 Air. This section, established in 1944, proved to be a necessary and valuable arm in managing the assets available to the tactical units.[68]

Intelligence in the Southwest Pacific Theater

The war in the Pacific, unlike the campaigns in North Africa and in Europe, began in a nearly total information vacuum. The lack of intelligence was so serious that a call went out for anyone with pictures or maps of the islands of the Pacific to send them to Washington. This program became known as the "Aunt Minnie" system at OSS headquarters, because of all the pictures of "Aunt Minnie" in Manila, or looking at the New Guinea palm trees. Another valuable source of information was the National Geographic Magazine articles and maps on the area.[69]

Faced with this kind of information gap, General MacArthur, as the senior Army commander in the Pacific, decided to build his own intelligence service for his Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA).[70] This decision led to something of a controversy.

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[68]Koch, op. cit., pp. 138-140; also see U.S. Forces European Theater, Report of the General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, no pub., n.p., n.d., Study #19, "The Utilization of Tactical Air Force Reconnaissance Units of the Army Air Forces to Secure Information for Ground Forces in the European Theater," passim.

[69]Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage, Reynado Hitchcock, New York, 1946, p. 17.

[70]Roughly, the SWPA consisted of Australia, the Solomons, New Guinea, Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines.

MacArthur recognized that he had special problems: He was operating in a little known area of the world, the enemy was as alien to American forces as if he had come from outer space, and the language of the enemy was one of his greatest assets. At the same time, there was in existence already a number of agencies, Dutch, British, Filipino, and, of course, the famous Australian Coastwatchers, which were collecting intelligence against the Japanese. MacArthur's G2, Colonel (later Major General) Charles A. Willoughby caused a big umbrella to be put over those existing agencies.[71]

Allied Intelligence Bureau

The umbrella organization, the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB), was officially established in July 1942. It came to be the best known of the intelligence agencies in the Pacific, and was called in some circles, "MacArthur's OSS." The AIB mission was, in fact, quite similar to that of the OSS: to collect intelligence behind enemy lines, as well as to organize the natives of the area to conduct sabotage and contribute to the intelligence gathering mission. AIB even had an active psychological warfare element known as the Far East Liaison Office. The exploits of the AIB, while not widely known, make interesting and exciting history: rubber boat landings at night from a submarine on a (hopefully) deserted beach, long-range patrolling through trackless jungle, information gathering from (again, hopefully) friendly natives. A dramatic example of AIB success was the early warning from the Coastwatchers of Japanese air raids on newly captured Guadalcanal, information considered by both Navy and Marines as critical to their victory. For sheer audacity, though, AIB's Operation Jaywick, in September 1942, would be hard to top. With the Allied forces falling back throughout the Pacific and on the Asian continent before the Japanese onslaught, the British urgently requested MacArthur to attack Singapore to tie up the Japanese Navy and keep the Japanese out of the Indian Ocean. Since Singapore was out of range of Allied aircraft and friendly Naval elements could not be spared, the mission appeared to be out of the question. An AIB planner, however, suggested a raid be conducted from a Japanese fishing boat the AIB just happened to have stashed away. With little hope of success, MacArthur's people agreed to the plan, and raiders (headed by Captain Ivor Lyon) set out disguised as Japanese fisherman. They sailed for ten days through 2,000 miles of enemy-controlled seas, then off-loaded into canoes for a midnight dash into Singapore harbor. They attached magnetic mines to the hulls of more than ten ships, then slipped away again. The results:

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[71] Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-1951, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1954, p. 144.

more than 46,000 tons of shipping sunk and Captain Lyon and his raiding party returned safely to Australia. As a reminder to intelligence planners, Lyon attempted a similar mission exactly one year later with the loss of all 22 AIB personnel.[72]

The controversy mentioned above was whether or not the OSS should have been employed in MacArthur's area. It was not. Willoughby sums up the view of the discussion held in MacArthur's headquarters this way:

> In Washington, from 1942 on, "Wild Bill" Donovan's Office of Strategic Services operatives had a fixed idea that they were arbitrarily kept out of MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Theater. Actually, MacArthur had to go along without the help of the Office of Strategic Services because he couldn't afford to wait for it. Unlike the war in Europe, the U.S. war in Asia was a shooting war from the start. Where the OSS in Washington had come to gather information about North Africa, about the "soft underbelly" of the Axis in the Mediterranean, and about Europe in general, long before a single landing craft or soldier was ever risked in battle, MacArthur had to improvise his intelligence from scratch with the Japanese breathing down his neck. He couldn't sit back and ransack libraries, even assuming the data was there; he had to have his reports from a 3,000 mile battle arc long before Roosevelt had even given Bill Donovan his basic directives on Europe.[73]

On the other hand, the view held at OSS headquarters was that Donovan's people were, in fact, not welcome, because OSS would not relinquish operational control of its personnel to Willoughby. In any event OSS did not work in the Southwest Pacific area, nor was it involved in the final assault on the Japanese home islands. It was, however, quite active in China, Korea, and in Southeast Asia.[74]

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[72]Allison Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War Against Japan, MacKay, New York, 1952, p. 10. Cited hereinafter as Ind, AIB.

[73]Willoughby, op. cit., p. 144.

[74]Ford, op. cit., pp. 252-254. There is a story that OSS Headquarters in Washington made a written criticism of a SWPA plan, which was then seen by MacArthur's people. They sent OSS a message, "Our experts state that your experts are obviously mere superficial observers." Smith, op. cit., p. 251.

Allied Translator and Interpreter Section

Another of MacArthur's special activities was the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), organized in September 1942. Using primarily American Nisei soldiers, ATIS neutralized what had been one of the greatest advantages possessed by the Japanese, their language. Linguist teams accompanied assault landing forces across the beachhead, and on inland. They conducted spot interrogations, read out captured maps and plans, and gave the psychological warfare planners excellent insight into the morale problems of the enemy soldiers, through exploitation of letters, diaries and the like.[75]

Allied Geographical Section

An Allied Geographical Section (AGS) was formed to assemble and evaluate the limited geographic information available, determine what additional information was needed, and to turn out a product that planners could use. As a secondary function, AGS published hundreds of different terrain handbooks for the use of the troops on the ground.[76]

Counterintelligence Corps

As mentioned previously, the CIC was also active in the Southwest Pacific Theater. There were CIC personnel - as well as SIS - on Corregidor, and they were among the first Americans available for duty in Australia, in early 1942, as MacArthur planned the war against the Japanese.

An early problem, symptomatic of the War Department's focus on the European Theater, was that MacArthur's people could not get requisitions for CIC men filled by Washington. Finally, and in desperation they began to recruit and train CIC agents from the American troops arriving in Australia. The SWPA CIC school was opened in Brisbane in June 1943, and it apparently operated until the end of the war.

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[75] U.S. Army, Reports of General MacArthur, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., n.d., v. I, p. 53. Cited hereinafter as MacArthur Reports.

[76] Ibid.

Responsibility for counterintelligence became an issue in MacArthur's area because of a dual headquarters arrangement, and because of the personalities involved. The headquarters was split into a forward element (Headquarters, SWPA) and a rear element (US Forces, Far East). Each had a staff, and thus there were two G2's. At SWPA, as mentioned already, the G2 was Willoughby; at USFFE the G2 was Colonel (later Brigadier General) Elliott R. Thorpe. Willoughby was charged with positive intelligence collection, while Thorpe had the counterintelligence reponsibilities. Willoughby protested this division of responsibilities as "absurd," but it was not until June 1945 that the two headquarters were merged and all intelligence responsibilities placed under Willoughby.[77] Thorpe, for his part, was rather critical of Willoughby's performance as a G2.[78]

Thorpe established centralized control of the CIC in the theater both because it fitted the pattern of operations best and because there was some initial misunderstanding of the role and mission of CIC. Division commanders and G2's distrusted CIC at first, and CIC men had a tendency, Thorpe reports, to think of themselves as judge and jury. He had to convince them that uncovering subversion, not criminal investigation, was their business. These problems eventually were ironed out and the CIC performed efficiently and well in the Pacific theater.[79]

> In combat and occupied areas, the CIC was reponsible for search of enemy headquarters, inspection of public facilities, seizure of telephone exchanges, stoppages of civilian communications except those of an emergency nature, the impounding and delivery to censorship teams of all mail, prevention of looting, checking of security, reporting on rumors and morale, and interrogation of enemy agents and sympathizers in conjunction with ATIS teams . . . .[80]

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[77] History, G2, SWPA, Introductory volume, pp. 77-80.

[78] Elliott R. Thorpe, East Wind, Rain: The Intimate Account of an Intelligence Officer in the Pacific, 1939-49, Gambit, Boston, 1969, p. 95.

[79] Ibid., pp. 98-99.

[80] History, G2, SWPA, Introductory volume, p. 80.

The theater level CIC unit was the 441st CIC Detachment, which had a long and distinguished record in the Pacific area. It provided the security for the headquarters and logistics base in Australia (which was considered to be the equivalent of the Zone of the Interior by MacArthur), as well as providing the personnel to form what were known as CIC combat detachments. The first CIC man killed-in-action in the Pacific, Sergeant Woodrow G. Hunter, was a member of the 5227th CIC Detachment, supporting a task force from Sixth Army. He was killed 18 May 1943 on Insoemoar Island, in the New Guinea group.[81] These combat detachments frequently were integrated with the ATIS interrogators and interpreters, hitting the beach with the assault waves. In the Philippines, CIC was engaged first in combat intelligence, then later in rooting out the collaborators, stay-behind agents, and finally the Communist-dominated Huk guerrillas.[82] On Okinawa, CIC was again in the thick of things, mostly engaged in combat intelligence. As a matter of fact, by the end of the campaign, CIC had taken more Japanese prisoners than any single infantry regiment, among their PW being almost the entire Japanese secret police organization (the Kempei Tai) for the island.[83]

Central Bureau

MacArthur received radio intelligence support from an organization known as the Central Bureau, or CB. CB detachments were assigned to all field units for operations and rapid reporting, including for a short period, the flagships of Admirals Halsey and Spruance. The latter was so taken by this direct support operation that he carried his CB soldiers afloat with him when he assumed command of the Fifth Fleet.

The CB was a combined Australian-American operation, activated on 15 April 1942, under the supervision of the Theater Chief Signal Officer. The Australian component was the Special Wireless Group and the American, the Signal Intelligence Service. There were also small British, New Zealand, and Canadian components. All of the components maintained detachments with the operating forces throughout the theater.[84]

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[81]Details of this and other actions in the SWPA are contained in CIC History, v. XXIII.

[82]Thorpe, op. cit., pp. 151-167.

[83]CIC History, v. XXIII, p. 127.

[84]History, G2, SWPA, v. I, pp. 66-69.

One CB unit, the U.S. 138th Signal Company (Radio Intelligence), received a surprise mission in 1944. Operating near the front in Leyte, the 138th was mistaken for a headquarters because of its many antennas and Japanese paratroops dropped in on the unit. The startled men of the 138th dropped their pencils, grabbed their rifles and "engaged in rather more direct action against the enemy than that to which they were accustomed." The enemy paratroopers were driven off, but not before the security-conscious 138th had implemented its emergency destruction plan.

At least one man of the 138th got revenge - in his own way. On Biak, north of New Guinea, the unit learned that messages on a certain frequency always preceded an evening air raid. That sort of analysis of the "most likely course of enemy action" allowed regular collection on a sure-fire bet with a sergeant of a nearby unit.

The 138th could conduct direction-finding, intercept Japanese Morse Code, perform cryptanalysis and traffic analysis, and, using its some twenty Nisei, make translations and intercept clear-text voice.[85]

At the GHQ level, the product of the 138th and her many sister companies was consolidated and produced by a special section of the G2 staff. This section dovetailed its product into the total estimates and disseminated it to a "discreet but distinctly liberal" distribution list. The section was assisted by a group of War Department security officers.[86]

Aerial Surveillance in the Pacific

Although the war in Europe gets most of the attention from aviation historians, the Pacific theaters did present quite a challenge for intelligence. During the months just after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese moved freely across the ocean areas. The large areas to be covered by aerial surveillance were a marked disadvantage to Allied intelligence. Unlike Europe where high-speed, pursuit-type aircraft could fly the short distances to targets and return in relative safety, the Pacific required aircraft which could cover as much as 2,500 miles in a single mission. Although large aircraft such as bombers and transports could fly long ranges, their slow speed and large profile greatly handicapped collection. As the war progressed, the capture of islands close to the Japanese homeland permitted use of the same type aircraft as in Europe.[87]

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[85]Kahn, op. cit., pp. 151-167.

[86]History, G2, SWPA, v. I, pp. 35-36.

[87]When the faster fighter aircraft arrived from the ETO, several SWPA aerial reconnaissance squadrons ran up impressive combat records in addition to performing their primary mission.

Ground Reconnaissance - The Alamo Scouts

A long-range, ground reconnaissance organization was created by Sixth Army, a major element of SWPA, in November 1943. This special unit, designated Alamo Scouts, was established in response to the concern of 6th Army commander, Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, about lack of information of the enemy.[88]

Responsibility for organizing, training, and employing the Alamo Scouts was given to G2, Sixth Army. After six weeks of training, the Scouts were employed in teams of about six men. "Only too often, the scouts are mistaken for 'commandos' or 'rangers'; this is erroneous, as the scouts are specifically indoctrinated with the idea of avoiding combat except when essential to accomplishment of their mission."[89]

In all, more than 300 men were trained as Scouts, performing nearly 100 missions. They were inserted into their patrol areas from seaplanes, submarines or PT boats. Missions varied from pure reconnaissance to raids. An example of the former is the undetected landing in July, 1944, of a patrol from a PT boat on the coast of New Guinea, where it determined that a 6,000-foot runway could be built for the supporting tactical air forces. As for raids, Alamo Scouts provided the intelligence needed to mount a raid to release Allied PW on Luzon, the Philippines, in January 1945. Additionally, the Scouts were the liberating force who slipped into the prison camp while the guards were distracted by an infantry attack nearby. More than 500 Allied prisoners were freed without casualties.[90]

Intelligence Success in SWPA

An interesting comparison between the support given to Allied forces in the Pacific and their opponents resulted from Japanese assessment of their intelligence. A captured senior staff officer gave a common complaint to interrogators:

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[88]Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, Combat Forces Press, Washington, D.C., 1953, p. 29.

[89]HQ, Sixth U.S. Army, Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January - 30 June 1945, no pub., n.p., n.d., Vol III, "Report of the General and Special Staff Sections," p. 15.

[90]Krueger, op. cit., p. 117, 237.

> Allied intelligence activities were responsible in great part for our losses . . . . They were very effective and the Allies seemed to know our strength and dispositions beforehand, for it always seemed to me that they continually attacked our weak points and by avoiding our concentrated strong points managed to obtain their objectives with minimum losses. I always felt Allied Intelligence gained its greatest effectiveness through the failure of our own intelligence to combat it.[91]

At least part of the explanation for Allied intelligence success was the tailored and integrated MI support provided by the CIC, AIB, Central Bureau, and related agencies. This served to substantiate Army intelligence experience in the European theater, and both areas seemed to prove that military intelligence support at every level was imperative.

The Office of Strategic Services

By far the best publicized military intelligence work done in World War II (at least in open sources) was that of the OSS; and, to be truthful, the best stories also seem to belong to OSS. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but it was likely caused in part by the fact that many of the OSS men were highly literate to start with (Arthur Goldberg, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., John Ford, John W. Gardner, and Stewart Alsop, among their members) and further, by the fact that many OSS operatives left the service immediately after the war. At any rate, it is relatively easy to trace the broad outline of the activities of the OSS in the war.[92]

It will be recalled that the mission given to OSS was to coordinate national intelligence, to conduct "black" propaganda activities, and to prepare to conduct special operations.[93]

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[91] MacArthur Reports, v. I, p. 54.

[92] Ford, op. cit., p. 132. See also Office of Strategic Services, Interoffice Memorandum from Director, 13 September 1945, which tells OSS personnel what might and what might not be discussed in public. The authors are indebted to Colonel Richard S. Friedman, Headquarters, Department of the Army, for providing this and other OSS documents, as well as much useful advice and information.

[93] Ibid., App. B, p. 337.

Perhaps OSS' greatest success was in the first area - national level intelligence coordination and production:

> The cloak-and-dagger exploits of agents infiltrated behind the lines captured the public imagination; but the prosaic and colorless grubbing of Dr. Langer's [head of Research and Analysis] scientists, largely overlooked by the press, provided far and away the greater contribution to America's wartime intelligence. From the files of foreign newspapers, from obscure technical journals, from reports of international business firms . . . .[94]

The research and analysis team created beginning in 1941 had no prior parallel in American history, and it is often pointed to as the greatest legacy of OSS. It was built into CIA at birth and is likely the backbone of that agency as well. An example of the importance of the research and analysis aspect comes from the studies to determine how long Germany could continue to fight. It was widely assumed that the crunch would come first for the Nazis in the area of food production, while it was felt that German manpower was virtually unlimited. OSS scientists, after scrutinizing European farm journals and foreign export market statistics, concluded correctly that food supplies would never decisively affect the German ability to go on. At the same time, R&A statisticians, working with small local German newspapers smuggled out of the country were able to predict from obituaries that manpower was going to become a critical problem long before there were any other indications. It should be noted that the Defense Intelligence Agency does this type of work today, and it is still considered to be one of the more important sources of military intelligence.[95]

It would be wrong, of course, to dismiss the importance of the clandestine work of the OSS; its impact has been felt in both the short and long run, since it was the first American effort at foreign espionage on any sort of scale. The lessons learned and the expertise developed in such areas as sabotage, subversion, organizing partisans, not to mention the support for such operations, have been invaluable to military intelligence.

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[94] Ibid., p. 148.

[95] Ibid., p. 151.

As an example, the matter of false documentation was of critical importance to anyone being dispatched into German-occupied territory. The documents were turned out by OSS men in London, along with the right clothing, food stamps, railway schedules, and similar items. They were evidently very successful, since a favorite OSS story is that of the agent who returned to London from a successful mission, told how he had been arrested on suspicion by the SS, how the Kommandant had minutely examined his papers, then held up the agent's pass to this assistant, shouting: "At last, one of these verdammt things is filled out correctly."[96]

The clandestine operations of OSS in Europe almost always involved parachuting in, so the men and women of OSS were given a three day airborne course. Many of the frills were abandoned, but the graduates normally managed to get to the ground in one piece and complete their missions.[97]

Major OSS operations in the ETO normally fell into one of two categories: espionage or partisan operations. Many of those who went into occupied Europe as agents were never heard from again: They could depend on a slow and painful death if captured by the Germans. Fortunately, many more went in, returned, and went again. One such successful agent, a Frenchman working for OSS, found himself, a suitcase full of radios, and Field Marshal Rommel all in the same private railway car, owing to the agent's getting on the wrong train. They shared tea and small talk for an hour, the Field Marshal wished him well and left the car.[98]

The OSS men who worked with partisans found themselves everywhere in occupied Europe from Norway to Greece. The common denominator for these operations was the hated German occupier. This seemed to bring out the best in the people of the resistance: courage, pride, and a sense of honor. The nonchalance of the partisans about the risks they took was summed up by one Italian, briefly in England to pick up new equipment, who was asked by an American expecting to join him soon in Milan how to get in touch: "If you are in civilian clothes, go to the German headquarters in Milan and ask the garrison commander for my telephone number. He and I are very good friends."[99]

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[96] Ibid., p. 143.

[97] Alsop and Braden, op. cit., p. 143.

[98] Ibid., p. 30.

[99] Ibid., p. 36.

Not all of the people recruited by OSS were naturally inclined to be friendly to the Allies. The charter of the OSS even allowed for the use of enemy soldiers. Take the case of Karl, the SS sergeant, who was captured after Normandy, and who then volunteered to jump back into Germany for OSS to obtain information. He was accepted, but there was, not unnaturally, a certain amount of reluctance among the other OSS personnel scheduled to jump in with Karl. "He is an SS man, in uniform. As soon as we hit ground, all he has to do is go to the nearest German officer, and say, 'Look what fools the Americans are. They captured me, hired me as a spy, and now I'm back, and I have brought some of their spies with me.' They will give him the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves and the rest of us will hang." Since this confrontation occurred on the runway beside an airplane that needed to depart within minutes, the OSS case officer had to make a rapid decision. He decided to talk to Karl about the problem: "Karl, what do you think of Hitler?" "Only a month ago I had the honor to be a member of his personal guard. A heroic man. His face shines. It is as an angel's." "My God. How about Himmler?" "A bad man. Not a good man like Hitler." "Look, Karl, I know your name. I have your picture. The Americans are going to win this war. If you rat on us in Germany, I promise to have you hanged." "You do me no honor, sir. I was loyal to Hitler, but I surrendered, and now I am loyal to you. You have ordered me to go to Germany and return. I do not disobey orders." In point of fact, he went, came back with valuable information, and managed to bring out an American airman with him.[100]

The role of OSS in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater was similar to that in the ETO in many respects, but there were differences. In the CBI, the famous Detachment 101 was originally conceived for intelligence gathering behind Japanese lines, using radios and natives from the hinterlands. This proved to be only a part of the mission, as it evolved, however, since the natives the OSS men recruited turned out to be some of the finest jungle fighters ever seen. The tribe was known as Kachins and were personally offended by having the Japanese operating in their jungle home. Before it was over, the Japanese were, in effect, completely surrounded by a force one-one hundredth their size. The Kachins introduced the punji stake to the Japanese and impressed the Americans with their apparent ability to smell the enemy.[101]

General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, a man not given to throwing bouquets, credited Detachment 101 and the Kachins with "services rendered . . . of great value." All involved agreed that the success of Merrill's Maurauders in seizing the vital Japanese airstrip at Myitkyina was dependent on the support of Detachment 101. Tenth Air Force credited Detachment 101 with

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[100] Ibid., p. 38.

[101] Ford, op. cit., p. 218.

obtaining 85 percent of all intelligence for Burma. But in the final analysis, perhaps the most impressive thing about the Americans and their stalwart Kachin troops was the casualty figures: 5,447 confirmed Japanese killed, with an estimated twice that number killed or wounded but not confirmed. General Stilwell once questioned a Kachin headman about these statistics, thinking them inflated. The native simply poured the contents of a bamboo tube in front of Stilwell. The contents were dried ears, and the chief explained that one only need divide by two to confirm the casualty figures. Stilwell was satisfied. Detachment 101 losses for the same period were 18 Americans and 184 Kachins killed.

Perhaps the OSS function of greatest significance to military intelligence today was the tactical support OSS provided. Lyman Kirkpatrick, later the executive director of the CIA, served in one of the three OSS detachments supporting 12th Army Group on the ETO. One of these, an unconventional warfare unit (the Jedburghs) working with the French Maquis, was attached to G3. The other two, a counterintelligence detachment and an intelligence unit, worked for the G2, Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert. The CI element worked with CIC, while the intelligence detachment commanded by Kirkpatrick was in direct support of the Army Group's G2 operation. The efforts of Kirkpatrick's detachment were a mixture of liaison between OSS headquarters in London and the Army Group, coordination and integration of all intelligence, and special operations, such as recruiting agents as directed by the G2.[103] For those who do not think that OSS had any real relationship with the Army in the field, it is noteworthy that Kirkpatrick became the G2's primary briefing officer and an assistant operations officer, in addition to commanding the detachment.[104]

This was not a unique OSS role. Teams were found with every Army and Army Group, and sometimes even lower. At Salerno, the invasion by the 36th Infantry Division was supported directly by an OSS detachment and a CIC detachment. This demonstrated to those who doubted it that intelligence specialists belong with the front-line troops.[105]

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[102] Ibid., pp. 218-227.

[103] Coordination, even within the OSS, was not perfect. There is a story that an OSS CI man burst into the office of the Secret Intelligence chief in London, shouting "One of your espionage officers has arrested one of my agents." (Smith, op. cit., p. 186.)

[104] Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., The Real CIA, Macmillan, New York, 1969, p. 40.

[105] Ford, op. cit., p. 165.

This type of direct support was rendered from top to bottom: Against orders, the irrepressible Donovan went ashore right behind the assault troops at Normandy. He and David Bruce, the OSS chief in the ETO and later ambassador to Britain, suddenly found themselves under German fire, without poison capsules, debating how to do themselves in to avoid capture. Fortunately that extreme step was not required.[106]

Illustrating the fact that OSS support was often very tactical in nature, General Alexander Patch, Commanding General of Seventh Army, credited OSS with providing sixty percent of the intelligence used for ANVIL (the invasion of Southern France). This intelligence was critical since the invasion force was relatively weak and dependent on the Germans being unable to mount an effective counterattack against the beachhead.[107] Following the invasion, OSS teams were active in front of the on-coming American divisions, conducting reconnaissance and surveillance missions against the Germans, and establishing contact with French resistance to keep a constant supply of intelligence coming into the tactical units. One such OSS team, known as Mission Marcel-Proust, operated all the way to the German border with the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 36th Infantry Division. Its activities were exclusively oriented on providing information to facilitate the operations of the 36th Division, as well as its parent VI Corps.[108]

In China also, OSS had as one of its primary missions tactical intelligence support. OSS went into China initially in 1943 with the concurrence of the Chinese Nationalist (Chiang Kai-Shek) government. The original organization was a tripartite element composed of OSS, the U.S. Office of Naval Investigation, and the Chinese secret service. The unit was known as the Sino-American Cooperation Organization (SACO) whose mission was to train guerrillas and conduct espionage and sabotage against the Japanese. Because of various organizational difficulties within SACO, it was determined by OSS that another unilateral organization was needed. Thus, the OSS established the Air and Ground Forces Research and Technical Staff, AGFRTS, under the 14th U.S. Air Force.

As an example of tactical intelligence work done by OSS in that theater - although not restricted to helping the Army - it should be noted that observation teams worked in China. By observing Japanese ships hugging the coast of China on the route between Southeast Asia and the home islands, it was possible to orient submarines to intercept and destroy

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[106]Smith, op. cit., p. 186.

[107]Alsop and Braden, op. cit., p. 228.

[108]Waller B. Booth, Mission Marcel-Proust, Dorrance and Company, Philadelphia, 1972, passim.

them. A particularly lucrative target was provided by a civilian OSS operative (now Colonel) David A. Owens, off the coast of Che Kiang Province, in early 1945--four freighters were sunk. Owens also supplied the 14th Air Force with target information about Japanese transport aircraft that flew a daily schedule over his position. Because of the distance from the normal American fighter strips, only a specially equipped P-51 could make it to Owen's area and could only remain ten minutes. In the first try, the P-51 arrived simultaneously with the enemy aircraft, shot down two, and departed again in less than ten minutes.[109]

MIS-X was also represented in China by an Army element working under cover of the Air Ground Aid Service. AGAS helped rescue nearly 1,000 U.S. personnel.[110]

It would be misleading to portray OSS support to the forces in the field as flawless. The ETO General Board noted after the war that OSS sometimes did not keep the SHAEF G2 informed of all of its activities: "Better results would have been obtained from the Office of Strategic Services had this agency been under direct control of [G2] . . . and had its efforts been more closely coordinated with those of the military forces." Additionally, many intelligence officers serving at division and lower found the OSS uncooperative in many situations.[111]

Technical Intelligence

A field that received relatively little attention in the Army until World War II was well along was Technical Intelligence. It was not until November 1942 that the War Department established procedures for evacuating and exploiting materiel of intelligence value. The chain of custody was originally from the capturing troops to the combat service support elements to theater to the ZI, where it was exploited by the appropriate service; e.g., an enemy bulldozer would have been taken to Ft. Belvoir for engineer examination. To overcome this time-consuming and inefficient system, the first technical intelligence (TI) team was shipped to the SWPA in December 1942. These TI personnel were an immediate success, and many more teams were dispatched to the SWPA in support of MacArthur's forces.

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[109]David A. Owens, Deputy Commandant for Combat and Training Developments, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, personal interview with the authors, Fort Huachuca, 6 April 1973.

[110]G2 Memo, CPM Branch, op. cit.

[111]ETO General Board, Study #14, p. 37. Grombacher, interview cited.

Despite their successes, there were some obvious disadvantages to having the TI personnel working for six different special staff sections of MacArthur's headquarters. The most obvious problem was the inflexibility of the system.[112] In January 1944, the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company (Separate) was formed to provide an integrated evaluation unit for TI. The company was under the general staff supervision of the G2. The mission assigned the unit called for analysis of enemy materiel, estimates of the enemy war-making capability, countermeasures development, exploitation of enemy technical advances, and training of friendly personnel as appropriate.

> The principle of having a coordinating unit for TI proved highly satisfactory in the coming months of the war. Central control made it possible for teams containing representatives of the six services to be fused into and to function as composite field units. This enabled the members to assist one another during the first days of an operation when speed was all important . . . .[113]

The TI teams of the 5250th Company were frequently employed with CIC teams, often in the assault waves. It was considered essential to get the TI personnel in as close behind the infantry as possible, because of the foot soldier's tendency to loot, take souvenirs, or simply destroy potentially important materiel. Training classes were conducted for the troops, both to acquaint them with the characteristics of enemy equipment and to impress upon them the necessity of preserving new types of equipment. Nonetheless, looting and destruction remained a problem facing the TI teams.[114]

One of the major efforts of the TI teams was the collection of nameplate data, "and the information gleaned from them was utilized to plan future targets for air raids and to determine the economic status of the enemy."[115] To take the invasion of Mindanao, in the Philippines, as an example, it was learned that a Japanese portable wireless telephone was capable of intercepting certain American tactical radio communications, and Signal Corps personnel were advised. Rocket motors for launching

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[112]The six staff sections were Ordnance, Chemical, Quartermaster, Medical, Transportation, and Signal.

[113]History, G2, SWPA, v. VII, p. 11.

[114]Ibid., p. 12.

[115]Loc. cit.

60 kilogram bombs were found and evaluated. A number of Japanese-produced radar sets and a multiple transmitter were found in a cave. They were only partially exploited, however, before enemy demolition teams got into the cave and destroyed the transmitters.[116]

The 5250th Company took part in the occupation of Japan and was busily engaged in evaluating many types of materiel for at least two years after the end of the war. One of their conclusions, interestingly, was that the Japanese electronics were of very poor quality.[117]

In China, a composite unit of Army Air Corps, Navy and Marine personnel operated throughout the country, wherever they could find a downed Japanese aircraft. Often tipped off to a crash site by the OSS, the technical intelligence team would come in to determine if there were any new or unusual features about the crashed enemy plane. If it seemed worthwhile, they were apt to hire peasant laborers and have the entire engine carried out for eventual shipment back to the ZI. Metallurgical analysis, for example, could determine the source of the ore the Japanese used, where and when the engine had been manufactured, and whether it had an exploitable weakness.[118]

In the ETO, technical intelligence was also of great importance, but it apparently never achieved the degree of organization found in the SWPA. A TI Section of G2 was established in SHAEF, but it merely coordinated the technical information coming in from the field. The teams themselves apparently worked for the various technical services' staff sections, much as had been done originally in the SWPA. This was not entirely satisfactory as indicated by the fact that the General Board recommended that G2 be provided with general supervisory control of the technical intelligence effort from the outset, and that trained TI personnel be included in a proposed military intelligence system.[119]

In short, little thought was given to technical intelligence until the war was long underway, and it was found to be a critical problem in both Europe and the Pacific.

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[116] Ibid., pp. 25-26.

[117] Ibid., p. 72.

[118] Owens, interview cited.

[119] ETO General Board, Study #14, pp. 24, 37.

Transportation Intelligence

Another area which had been of no concern for intelligence men previously was that associated with transportation. The year 1942 saw the birth of what was called Transportation Intelligence, under the chief of that service. Since the Chief of Transportation was being called upon for estimates of highway capabilities in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East--frequently in areas denied to the Allies--some system had to be established to develop requirements, satisfy them, and publish the results. This was the mission of the Transportation Intelligence Branch. Later, contracts were awarded to Georgetown University to conduct target country studies to fulfill Transportation's requirements. These strategic studies, the first of their kind done by the Army, were originally sent overseas for in-country evaluation. Those studies, updated through the years, are now a part of the National Intelligence Surveys.

When the famous "Red Ball Express" was formed to support Patton's rapidly advancing Third Army, Transportation Intelligence people provided data on the characteristics, condition, organization and construction of transportation systems of France capable of carrying this traffic.

CIC personnel were assigned directly to Transportation Intelligence for port and harbor security, to give security briefings to troops being readied for shipment overseas, and for the counterintelligence aspects of handling enemy prisoners being brought back from overseas.[120]

CIC On Occupation Duty

On both sides of the world, the end of the war brought with it a changed, but no less important, responsibility for intelligence. The primary agency seems to have been the CIC, often assisted by MI interrogation and linguists, which played an important role from the day the war ended and for years to follow.

Within Germany itself, CIC responsibility was assigned to the 970th CIC Detachment, composed of nearly 1,500 personnel. The missions assigned to the 970th included internal security for the occupation forces, war crimes investigation, and collection of intelligence about the activities of the Soviets. Internal security problems included assisting military goverment in establishing which German officials could be trusted, and weeding out those who could not be.[121] Of greater concern, at least

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[120]C.H. Perry, Chief Engineer, U.S. Army Transportation Engineering Agency, Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service, personal telephonic interview with authors, February, 1972.

[121]ETO General Board, Study #13, p. 27.

immediately, was the threat of a fanatic resistance movement within Germany, known as the Werewolves, an organization dedicated to staging a campaign of terror against the occupying forces. Due in part to the active efforts of the CIC, this proved not to be a major problem.[122] As for collection against the Soviets, it will be recalled that with the end of the war, the OSS was terminated, leaving no agency but CIC to handle the problem of foreign intelligence collection.

In Austria, the 430th CIC arrived in May 1945, and it was assumed that they would remain only long enough to complete de-Nazification, and arrest those who were guilty of war crimes. They soon found out that the job would be much more complicated.

By four-power agreement, Austria was occupied by the Americans, the British, the French, and the Russians. Each was given a sector of the country, and all four were occupying Vienna - one of the traditional spy centers of the world. The CIC soon found that not only had the devastation of the war and subsequent occupation not destroyed all the espionage nets, but more had grown out of the wreckage. By June 1948, CIC estimated that there were not less that 15,000 Austrians actively working for Soviet intelligence, and this figure did not include the more than 400,000 Austrian Communist Party members.

The first order of business was de-Nazification, and an interesting example of this operation was the arrest of August Eigruber, former Gauleiter of the Upper Danube district of Austria and one of the top Nazis in the country. Having gone into hiding with his bodyguard at the time of the German surrender, and after a period of movement to avoid arrest Eigruber was betrayed to the CIC. The itinerary of a planned move was given to the Americans, and an ambush location was carefully selected. The problem was to act so swiftly that Eigruber would not be able to commit suicide, since he was wanted alive for the Nuremburg trials. At the appropriate time, at a narrow place on the mountain road the Nazi was using, the CIC men staged an auto accident. When Eigruber's car arrived, it was quickly boxed in, and the German driver was asked to come up to assist in untangling the accident. Another agent went up to the car and demanded that Eigruber and the bodyguard also come help. They got out and were instantly seized by a number of agents who had been hiding in the bushes. Eigruber went on to trial at Nuremberg and, ultimately, the gallows.

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[122] D. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 397.

As for the espionage problem, as early as July 1945, a periodic report from the 430th stated that the Communists had held a secret meeting in Linz, but "CIC did not interfere with this meeting, as two of our agents were present as members." Through the continuous, aggressive counter-espionage activities of the CIC, in conjunction with the British and French intelligence services, they were able to keep the Russians reasonably statemated. During the period the Soviets actively engaged in sabotage, blackmarketing, subversion of Allied military personnel, and kidnapping--including one CIC man, who was snatched in Vienna in 1948, held for a day, beaten up, and finally released. A particular kidnapping target of the Russians was Austrians who were working with the CIC, and many of the victims never returned after the Soviets grabbed them.[123]

All in all, it was one of the more exciting periods for American intelligence, and many Europeans still associate U.S. intelligence with the CIC.

On the other side of the world, CIC was also on occupation duty. The 441st CIC Detachment was assigned to provide support to MacArthur's occupying forces. As it turned out, it was a stroke of good fortune that the 441st was there five years later.

Like its counterparts in Europe, the 441st was charged with apprehending those Japanese wanted for war crimes. The most spectacular arrest made by CIC was that of General Hideki Tojo, former prime minister, on 11 September 1945, just preventing his suicide. He was hanged later after conviction by a U.S. military tribunal as a war criminal.[124]

Unlike the situation in Germany, CIC was not faced with rooting out any sort of die-hard resistance movement within the defeated Japanese population. On the contrary, CIC was soon asking for help from the Far East Command G2 in obtaining materials on government, since, all over Japan, the relatively isolated CIC offices were being approached by civilians who wanted an explanation of the American system of government and the meaning of democracy. It is interesting to speculate how much CIC contributed to the democratic government that Japan has today.[125]

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[123] CIC History, v. XXV, passim.

[124] History, G2, SWPA, Introductory volume, p. 118.

[125] Thorpe, op. cit., p. 212.

Responsibility for enforcement of many of the occupying force's directives and investigations of war crimes against American PW's held in Japan fell to the CIC; arrest power was also given to the CIC personnel.[126]

Meanwhile in CONUS, CIC was reestablished as a separate entity under the War Department G2. A CIC chief was named and a peacetime school was established at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Later in 1945, the school was moved to Fort Holabird in Baltimore, Maryland. It remained the CIC School until 1955, when the intelligence school function of the Army Ground General School was moved from Fort Riley to Fort Holabird. Oddly enough, the first efforts to move away from Holabird began within a year of arrival. In 1946, the Chief of CIC recommended without success to the War department, that, because of the poor facilities at Holabird, the Center move to Fort Warren, Wyoming.

Summary

In discussing military intelligence, and particularly intelligence for the Army in the field, World War II is sometimes thought of as being a "Stone Age." This line of thought, which holds that the Army had to begin from scratch to create any semblance of military intelligence, is not surprising; nor is it accurate. Especially for those individuals who had to put the pieces of our intelligence effort together so as to meet the minimum requirements for survival of American forces in the early stages of the war, it may have seemed as if they were inventing the wheel.

As has been shown, however, the work done by Van Deman, Yardley, Churchill, and others during the previous war had provided a point of departure which was absolutely vital to the establishment of the efficient intelligence system which the U.S. had by the end of the war. The fact that the World War I developments had been nearly lost through disinterest before 1940 does not alter their importance to the intelligence men of World War II. What would have been their situation if they had had to invent - more or less under fire - signal intelligence, a counterintelligence arm, aerial surveillance, and the concept of MI specialist personnel?

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[126]Krueger, op. cit., p. 352-354. There is a fairly detailed account of CIC activities contained here.

It is quite true, of course, that America entered World War II with an appalling deficiency in the ability to collect, appreciate, and disseminate intelligence. There was next to no recollection of what had been done during the Great War in intelligence; only the nucleus of some agencies like the CIP and the SIS carried forward the experience.

In the light of these handicaps, the progress made in five short years was remarkable. In that brief span of time, a system was created that kept field commanders, their superiors at theater, the War Department, and ultimately the President, constantly informed of a broad spectrum of intelligence collected by every available means. Secret agents, scientists, linguists, daredevil operatives from OSS and AIB, and analysts from signal intelligence all played their parts.

Equally important, in the long run, was the fact that the national leaders, as well as Army commanders at all levels, perceived that this type of intelligence support was essential for the vital interests of the United States. This point is no place better illustrated than in the results of the ETO General Board, which concluded:

> 1. That the failure of the United States to establish and maintain a highly developed intelligence organization, world wide in scope, resulted initially in the lack of intelligence data, and trained personnel necessary for the conduct of operations in the European theater.
> 2. The British influence was predominant in the G2 Division, SHAEF, during the planning phase of the campaign in Europe and continued in only slightly lesser degree throughout the operation on the Continent.
> 3. That subsequent to the invasion of France, the greater portion of the tactical intelligence furnished the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, came from agencies operating in the field. During this period, the United States furnished its rightful share of this type of intelligence.[127]

Although it appeared at times that these points were going to be lost, they really were only misplaced for a time between the end of World War II and Korea. The rapid demobilation following the war created serious gaps in our tactical intelligence capability, but it was not like the aftermath of World War I. Intelligence was not to be so neglected again; in fact in a very few years, claims were to be made that the United States had too much intelligence and that it was too good.[128]

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[127]ETO General Board, Study #14, p. 37.

[128]Dulles, op. cit., pp. 256-264.

Some shortcomings remained: The various intelligence organizations created to meet the requirements in Europe, North Africa, the Pacific, were not coordinated by the War Department. No adequate provision was made for foreign intelligence collection after the demise of the OSS. The problem of obtaining qualified linguists was recognized during the war, then forgotten again. And no provision was made, despite recommendations, for active duty status for career military intelligence men in the Army.

What did happen was that World War II promoted the professionalization of the Signal Intelligence Service, the Counterintelligence Corps, and the new breed from the OSS. It established conclusively the value of aerial surveillance. Moreover, it validated a requirement for knowledgeable intelligence officers serving as G2's and S2's of tactical units supported by trained MI specialists.

If there was any great intelligence genius in World War II - a man of the dimensions of Van Deman - it must have been Donovan. Like Van Deman, Donovan was a zealot, a "hard charger" with a tremendous sense of need to gather information and a personality that would not be denied. Certainly the modern American intelligence community owes Donovan a great deal for his creation of our first national intelligence organization.

CHAPTER 5



North Korean Soldiers preparing for the surprise attack on the South, 1950 (Communist Propaganda Photo)

The Landing at Inchon, 1950

U.S. Soldiers Headed North Along Roads Choked with Refugees, 1950

The North Korean Introduction of the T-34 Tank came as a technical surprise. Major General W. F. Dean was captured while leading a Tank-Killer Team.



Chinese Communist Forces secretly move into North Korea to surprise the United Nations Forces, 1950. (Communist Propaganda Photo)

CCF Prisoners Increased the Language Problems Facing the UN Forces.

CHAPTER V

STRATEGIC AGENCIES, TACTICAL SURPRISES AND MORE LESSONS LEARNED (1945 - 1963)

National Intelligence Organization

In view of the great contributions to Allied victory in World War II made by intelligence, it is not surprising that intelligence figured largely in the thinking of those concerned about national security and the post-war structure of our government. President Truman notes:

> The war taught us this lesson . . . that we had to collect intelligence in a manner that would make the information available where it was needed and when it was wanted . . . in an intelligent and understandable form.[1]

Immediately following the end of hostilities, a board was convened under the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert Lovett. This board addressed itself to several problems, one of which was how to transpose the OSS into the peacetime government. It was recognized that the concepts developed by Donovan and his organization were too important to let die. As a matter of fact, Donovan had written to President Roosevelt expressing his hope that the OSS would be used as the nucleus of some permanent, centralized national intelligence organization. This letter, unfortunately, fell into the hands of one of Donovan's enemies and was fed to the press, along with hints that such a proposal would be inimical to the national interests. A chorus of screams about "an American Gestapo" were heard from certain newspapers and congressmen. This tempest did nothing to make the planning for the post-war intelligence effort any easier, but fortunately it did not cause the whole subject to be dropped.[2] The other task the Lovett Board undertook was reorganization of what would be left of Army intelligence with the dissolution of OSS.

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[1]Ransom, op. cit., p. 76.

[2]Ford, op. cit., p. 304.

Army Intelligence

Before discussing the formation of the CIA, it would be well to look at the picture for Army intelligence. Intelligence had a very good reputation, across the board, coming out of World War II. Tactical commanders at all levels had had good experiences with American G2's, S2's, and MI specialist units (as the CIC and SIS).

One legacy of the war was a recognition that the Army needed some sort of enemy force built into its training. In conjunction with putting combat intelligence into the Army Ground General School at Fort Riley, an Aggressor Center was also established, remaining there until it was closed in June 1963.[3] The preparation of Aggressor doctrinal materials has continued as a function of the Army Intelligence Center and School.

One Army board recommended in 1946 that an intelligence college be established as a permanent part of the Army schools system; thus, in 1947, the Strategic Intelligence School was established.[4] Another board recommended in early 1947 the establishment of a "Military Intelligence Corps," which presumably would have evolved as a separate career branch. The War Department G2 felt that this was too radical a step and opted instead for establishing a program of detailing officers from other branches to intelligence work. This plan was implemented and became the source of intelligence careerists until a Regular Army branch was established nearly twenty years later.

Another decision was made which was of critical importance to tactical intelligence support to the Army. The MI Training Center at Fort Ritchie was closed in October 1945 as a cost-reduction measure, and it was decided by the War Department not to replace it. Apparently, it was believed that the intelligence specialist (except for counterintelligence and signal intelligence) did not need to be trained in peacetime. A price was paid for that decision in just five short years.

Once again the principal standard bearers for military intelligence during the years between World War II and Korea were the CIC and ASA. It is much to the credit of the men in charge at the time that they pushed hard for a career branch, even when the War Department G2 was not in favor. As an example, a 1949 proposal from the Chief of CIC called for an intelligence career field in CIC, ASA, and "intelligence."[5] Though the proposal represented a rather strong emphasis on CIC and ASA to the detriment of other professionals, it was at least an effort in the right direction.

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[3]Bidwell, op. cit., Part 6, p. VII-29.

[4]Ibid., Part 6, p. VIII-17.

[5]CIC History, v. XXIV, p. 14.

As for CIC, its mission after the war was strictly defined to avoid any repetition of the wartime merger with the Criminal Investigation Division. The mission looked very similar to the mission of CONUS CI today; that is, personnel security and security services. The organization that existed until 1972 was also established, with a CIC Detachment (108th, 109th, 111th, etc.) supporting each Army area. A WAC CIC detachment, with a woman commander, was established at Fort Lee in 1949, and was given the same mission of support to the post that a male unit would have had.[6] Another important step taken was the establishment of the Central Records Facility (now the Intelligence Records Repository) at Fort Holabird, when the Central Registry of the 970th CIC in Europe was microfilmed and sent back to the CIC Center for safekeeping. This was easily done and it was decided to expand the system worldwide.[7] Overseas, the CIC mission was broadened to include some positive collection. With the termination of the OSS, there was no agency left to support the Army charged with that responsibility and, since there was no real tradition of foreign intelligence collection, other than by the attachés, it was a rather loosely organized effort. But an effort had to made, what with the Soviets becoming increasingly bellicose and the Chinese Communists coming to power. The CIC got the call.

For the signal intelligence people, at the end of the war, the War Department directed consolidation of the Signal Security Agency, all field radio intelligence units, the Army Air Force mobile radio squadrons, and the radio intelligence platoons of the signal aviation companies.[8] The resultant organization, activated on 15 September 1945, was the Army Security Agency, under the operational control of the War Department G2.[9] Before the organization of the ASA in 1945, the SIS, or SSA, with its 2d Signal Service Battalion, was a strategic activity and the field radio intelligence units were assigned directly to tactical units. With the end of the war and the rapid demobilization of the US field forces, no requirement was foreseen for tactical support units, so their resources were consolidated with SSA and its 2d Battalion into ASA to perform the continuing strategic mission.

The creation in 1947 of a separate Air Force, from the Army Air Corps, was to have a number of significant effects on aerial surveillance. It allowed the air reconnaissance personnel to concentrate on their field, developing the doctrine to suppport many of Goddard's ideas. Less

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[6] Ibid., v. XXIV, p. 150.

[7] Ibid., v. XXIV, p. 52.

[8] Thompson and Harris, op. cit., p. 349.

[9] Kahn, op. cit., p. 576.

positively, however, the attention of the USAF was directed toward strategic missions, and Korea was to find the United Nations Forces initially without any satisfactory aerial surveillance capability and the Army without a truly responsive resource. The latter situation was ultimately to lead to the development of Army platforms to handle certain aspects of this aerial surveillance mission.[10]

Central Intelligence

In reviewing the creation of a national, civilian intelligence apparatus, it is necessary to examine the concepts for preserving what had been learned and achieved with the OSS. Donovan, in his controversial 1944 letter to Roosevelt, said: "Once our enemies are defeated the demand will be equally pressing for information that will aid us in solving the problems of peace." He then outlined three principles he felt should govern a peacetime national intelligence organization:

(1) The supervision of this central agency should be accomplished by the President;
(2) It should have central authority to oversee the entire national intelligence effort;
(3) It should have no police or law enforcement powers.[11]

These proved to be a capsule description of the marching orders that were given to the CIA.

In early 1946, the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) was created by President Truman. The action arm of the NIA was the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the first such formal and official centralized intelligence apparatus in our nation's history. An organization known as the Strategic Services Unit had been created within the War Department, but it was basically a caretaker agency for the secret intelligence agencies of the OSS until the CIA was born.[12] The CIG lasted only a year and was replaced by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The founding document for the CIA, as well as for the current armed forces, was the National Security Act of 1947. Though modified slightly since, CIA's mission remains essentially what Donovan wanted it to be: a central intelligence activity, run by the executive branch of the government, with authority to coordinate all intelligence, but without police powers. The first CIA Director was Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, who was succeeded by General Walter Bedell Smith in 1950.[13]

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[10]Staub, op. cit., pp. 8-10.

[11]Ford, op. cit., App. D, p. 340.

[12]Smith, op. cit., p. 364.

[13]Kirkpatrick, op. cit., pp. 73-85.

An interesting sidelight to the formation of the CIA is provided by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. He reports that Mr. Truman had strongly desired that the State Department take the lead in foreign intelligence, but, because State could not agree internally on how to organize the intelligence apparatus, and faced with both military department and Congressional objections, the President went along with a new agency instead.[14]

The National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments in 1949 were to impact greatly on the military intelligence community. First, out of the foundations of the OSS and the CIG, the Central Intelligence Agency was created.[15] Next, in 1949, the Army Security Agency, and its counterparts in the Navy and Air Force, were combined at the top into the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), which assumed coordinating responsibility in the cryptologic field. The tactical signal intelligence effort was essentially left to the services, though the tactical support role had effectively died with the demobilization at the end of the war.[16]

War Again

Scarcely had the American intelligence community reorganized itself for routine peacetime operations when it was disrupted by another war - this time in Korea. It should be noted that there is a parallel between the beginning of American participation in World War II and in Korea - that is, the similarity between the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the surprise attack by North Korea against the Republic of Korea (ROK) on 25 June 1950. Was this another "intelligence failure"? Many say it was, while others hold that the failure was not in the collection of intelligence information so much as in its use.

Certain facts seem to be undisputed. The intelligence collection system was poor, at best. Immediately following the defeat of Japan and the occupation of Korea, the Americans had established a collection net in North Korea that was providing some information; but, by 25 June 1950, American interest in Korea had cooled, and the original espionage network had folded. Far East Command had just initiated another net when the war began; its personnel disappeared without a trace. Thereafter, a school was established to train more indigenous agents, but the military situation was so fluid that the school had to be moved every week or so. One example of the quality of training is that, in the absence of parachutes with which to practice, potential agents were introduced to the parachute landing by stepping out of the back of a speeding jeep.

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[14]Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, Norton, New York, 1969, p. 158.

[15]Andregg, op. cit., p. 8.

[16]Kahn, op. cit., pp. 674-675.

Those who were graduated from the course were shortly dropped, at night, behind enemy lines, infiltrated by rubber boat, or in a few instances sent directly through the lines. The results were generally the same: most were never heard from again. Of those few who returned, most had valuable information which, unfortunately, usually conflicted with the findings of their fellow agents and with the holdings of the various intelligence sections. At the very least, it was difficult to determine the next North Korean move. The seriousness of the whole problem is illustrated by the fact that one of the best agents in this period was a Korean woman who simply walked back and forth across the lines, with her year-old baby strapped to her back. "It is not a pleasant picture - the power of the United States using a Korean weanling as a shield. But though it is not pleasant, in that hour it was the device that best served."[17]

The North Koreans, more or less with the knowledge of Far East Command (FEC) and Washington, had built up a force of more than eight divisions armed with first-line Soviet equipment. They were known to be at a state of increased alert shortly before the invasion, and MacArthur had been expressing alarm to Washington about some sort of adventurism by North Koreans since 1947. The state of the ROK armed forces was considered by most of the U.S. advisors to the ROK to be inadequate to face the North Koreans in a showdown.[18]

From this point, the dispute over whether Korea represents an intelligence "failure" can be analyzed from two viewpoints: First, did FEC appreciate and pass on to Washington the nature of the threat posed by North Korea to the ROK in early summer, 1950? Second, had policy decisions and statements made by Washington encouraged the North Korean aggression and undermined the United States and FEC position? Only the first question is pertinent to this paper; moreover, it is clearly the more important issue.

General Matthew B. Ridgway, commenting on an intelligence report sent by a CIA unit from Korea to FEC in Tokyo six days before the invasion - a message with clear imminence of hostilities indicators - remarked:

> How anyone could have read this report and not anticipated an attack is hard to fathom. Yet this report was not used as the basis for any conclusion

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[17]S.L.A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1953, pp. 3-4.

[18]Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1967, pp. 9-14; Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 350-356.

> by G2 at General Headquarters in Tokyo and it was forwarded to Washington in routine fashion, with no indication of urgency. Later GHQ was to disclaim all responsibility for failure to interpret these almost classic preparations and to insist that it had "forwarded all the facts" to Washington. But this does not explain the fact that, six days before the North Korean Army struck, GHQ sent this interpretative report to Washington: "Apparently Soviet advisors believe that now is an opportune time to attempt to subjugate the South Korean government by political means, especially since the guerrilla campaign in South Korea recently has met with serious reverses."[19]

Statements by General Willoughby, the FEC G2, appear to confirm partially the Ridgway interpretation, in that he remarks:

> In the critical six months before the outbreak of the war, 417 special reports were filed. Tokyo headquarters held receipts indicating their arrival in Washington. This total represents an average of one hundred reports a month, or three reports every single day. . . .[20]

Going on to quote from a number of these reports, which do appear to spell out a serious threat to the ROK, Willoughby does not discuss what interpretation he gave to the reports he was receiving. Instead, he takes the approach that Korea was not officially MacArthur's responsibility, and that Korea had been written off by the State Department.[21]

It is true that FEC was not charged with collecting or producing intelligence on Korea. This responsibility lay with the Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG). In fact, the American military in Korea reported directly to Washington, not to Tokyo. Prior to the North Korean invasion, Willoughby had taken steps to obtain information for MacArthur from the scene by establishing a collection activity known as the Korean Liaison Office (KLO). The KLO apparently did report evidence of North Korea's potential aggression, but it does not seem to have been given much credence in either Tokyo or Washington. Thus, the situation was that, in effect, no agency acknowledged primary responsibility for intelligence in Korea. KMAG felt reponsible only for passing data. FEC believed the intelligence

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[19]Ridgeway, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

[20]Willoughby, op. cit., p. 351.

[21]Ibid., pp. 354-355.

problem was being handled by Washington. In Washington, the Pentagon felt that the State Department was overseeing the situation, while State apparently believed that they could depend on the Defense Department and the CIA. And, moreover, all agencies believed that, in spite of the evidence that North Korea was ready to overrun the ROK, it did not intend to do so in the summer of 1950.[22]

The primary intelligence lessons to be learned from this potential disaster seem to be twofold: First, responsibility for intelligence operations must be as clearly and carefully delineated as it is for security or offensive operations. Secondly, no intelligence agency may allow itself (except at the peril of all it serves) to fall into the habit of merely passing information reports back and forth. Analysis and interpretation are integral to intelligence production.

Intelligence Operations in Korea

The first intelligence reinforcement on the scene in Korea was the CIC. Because of cutbacks made after World War II, CIC ranks had been badly depleted, and it took two years to attain authorized manning levels. Nonetheless, when the call went out for help, the 441st CIC Detachment (later Group), on occupation duty in Japan, was able to send personnel for provisional detachments. As U.S. divisions were sent to Korea, they received personnel for their CIC detachments from the 441st, including the 181st Detachment attached to the 1st Marine Division. The task facing CIC was a mammoth one since the war was highly mobile for the first year. Much of the time the United Nations Forces were on the defensive, and, worst of all, the North Koreans had placed an estimated 5,000 agents in the south before the first shot was fired.[23]

Little information is available in open sources concerning signal intelligence support during the Korean War. What is known is that, following World War II, no provision was made for tactical support and what units and activities existed were oriented for the most part on fixed-station strategic collection. Thus, in June 1950, there were virtually no tactical units available. It is possible that the first ASA unit deployed to Korea was a signal security unit from Japan, the 50th Signal Service Detachment, which was told to provide what intelligence it could. By September of 1950, the 60th Signal Service Company had been relieved of its strategic mission and deployed from Fort Lewis. In Korea it joined with the 50th Detachment in the former overseas radio terminal area of a news wire service near Seoul. Their mission was general support to Eighth Army, though for particular operations teams would be deployed to lower formations. Also around this time a group headquarters had been deployed, the 501st

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[22]James F. Schnabel, U.S. Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year, Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., 1972, pp. 61-63.

[23]USAINTC Pamphlet.

Communications Reconnaissance Group. As for the 60th Company, it echeloned north to Pyong-yang in late October and soon was planning an additional move to the Yalu River. By the end of November, however, it was receiving small arms fire on the perimeter; checking, the commanding officer found that they had been forgotten in the withdrawal. A rapid move south was indicated and the 60th crossed the bridge south of Pyong-yang just ahead of the rearguard, the Turkish Brigade. With the ensuing stalemate in the vicinity of the old 38th parallel boundary, the 60th Company set up operations in Seoul. Throughout the war other communications reconnaissance units were deployed into country under the command of the 501st Group, the 60th Company being an early example of the type.[24]

Lack of tactical intelligence specialists was a serious problem. When the MI Training Center at Camp Ritchie closed in 1945, MI specialist training virtually ceased. As an example of the problem, and while estimates vary, it seems that there were fewer than twenty Korean linguists in the entire U.S. Army when the war began. One former interrogation officer reports that he conducted his first interrogation of a Chinese PW using two interpreters; he spoke English to a Korean-speaking Japanese-American, who spoke to a Korean/Chinese interpreter, who talked to the PW.[25]

Military photo interpreters were almost nonexistent. Technical intelligence had been forgotten. Before order of battle analysts could be trained, they had to be recruited or drafted. But it scarcely mattered that there was no one to be trained, because there was initially no place to train them.

The war had scarcely begun when a failure in technical intelligence occurred. The Soviet T-34 tank, an excellent medium tank which had been in service since early in World War II, was employed in great numbers by the invading North Koreans. Despite the T-34's known strength, and the fact that it was known to be in the hands of the North Koreans, the Americans and ROK soldiers were equipped with 2.75 inch rocket launchers, which could not stop the T-34's. Only the introduction of the 3.75 inch "bazooka" allowed the infantry to defend itself.[26]

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[24]James Scherck, personal interview with the authors, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 19 December 1972.

[25]Grombacher, interview cited.

[26]Bernard F. Halloran, "Soviet Armor Comes to Vietnam", Army Magazine (v. 22, No. 8) August, 1972, p. 19.

The Army Ground General School created an Intelligence Department in early 1950, but had so little to begin with that the process of creating a program of instruction was a slow and tedious one. For example, the most complete records of the old MITC were found to be in the possession of a demobilized intelligence officer, Shipley Thomas (a former officer of the MITC). Mr. Thomas provided the records, other information was obtained from the War Department archives, and a starting point for the Intelligence Department at Fort Riley existed. But its founders still had to rely in large part on their recollections of World War II operations and their training at Fort Ritchie.

Once established, the Intelligence Department at Fort Riley trained interrogators, interpreters, photo interpreters, technical intelligence men, and censorship personnel. The Aggressor Center provided simulated enemy personnel to train with. The training at Fort Filey was considered effective and the intelligence specialists were as ready as they could be expected to be when they arrived in Korea.

MITC's European orientation in its training at Fort Ritchie was to affect Korean intelligence operations, especially in interrogation. Interrogators in the Pacific in World War II were "less well-trained and their techniques less sophisticated" than their colleagues in Europe. This lack of sophistication in interrogating Orientals influenced training for Korea and, coupled with the linguistic barrier, meant that intelligence from Korean War PW was of less significance than that obtained from PW in World War II. Additionally, there were fewer PW taken in Korea than in comparable situations in Europe. The result in the view of one former tactical intelligence officer: The most lucrative sources of intelligence in Korea were "everything but PW," and were principally photo intelligence, agent reports, and signal intelligence. This was not entirely adverse in effect, and it raised the status of the order of battle officer in the G2. Someone, in this instance the OB Officer, had to put together reports from various sources and agencies, reports that were often less clear-cut than the similar interrogation reports of World War II.[27]

One of the major counterintelligence coups of the Korean War was accomplished by the 441st Detachment in Japan. On 9 September 1950, six days before the Inchon landing, agents of the 441st arrested a huge North Korean intelligence net which had been operational in Japan for years, and under surveillance almost from its inception. Among the more than 300 documents captured, a reference was found to "Inchon - 15 September." With 50,000 men at sea and on the way to the beachhead, it was essential to learn immediately if the operation was "blown." Interrogation indicated that there had been no time for enemy agents to communicate the information to Pyong-yang. The landing operation was permitted to go ahead, and was a brilliant success.[28]

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[27]Grombacher, interview cited.

[28]USAINTC Pamphlet.

Another dramatic intelligence operation, run by MacArthur's G2, made the successful landing at Inchon possible. In an effort to fill the large gaps in the United Nations' intelligence on Inchon, a U.S. Navy lieutenant, Eugene F. Clark, was landed on a small island just outside Inchon harbor. For two weeks, Lieutenant Clark, accompanied by two South Korean agents, conducted reconnaissance of the harbor, its approaches and the seawall; moreover, they organized friendly inhabitants and actually went on the offensive against the North Koreans. Clark's most important contribution may have been his discovery that a critical navigation light on the narrow and winding approach channel was operational. He calmly rowed in and lit the light just before the invasion began.[29]

An interesting footnote to the Inchon operation was that, when the 1st Marine Division went ashore, it was supported by elements of the 441st CIC and by the 163d MI Service Detachment.[30] This latter named unit is now the 163d MI Battalion, supporting the 1st Cavalry Division and Headquarters MASSTER, at Fort Hood.

Following the Inchon landing, the pursuit of the North Koreans toward the Yalu was soon a rout. General MacArthur's gamble that cutting supply lines would force the enemy to retire was resoundingly justified. Friendly infantry units scarcely left the road, and it was commonplace in Eighth Army to have two CIC men and an interpreter go into the hills and distant villages to contact the local authorities, notify them that the Communists had fled, and frequently to accept the surrender of armed North Korean soldiers.[31]

One of the first U.N. forces to arrive in the North Korean capital of Pyong-yang in October 1950 was Task Force Indianhead, a two-company-sized element of the 2d Infantry Division, with heavy CIC support, and under temporary command of the division G2. His mission was the classic counterintelligence raid to seize enemy intelligence unit files and buildings, as well as the local government offices and their files. The raid was executed snappily, with hardly a shot fired, and the result was a bonanza of information. Hundreds of thousands of documents pertaining to both the North Korean government's operations and its intelligence apparatus were evacuated for exploitation and a number of significant prisoners were taken.[32]

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[29]Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1955, v. II, p. 61.

[30]USAINTC Pamphlet.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Roy E. Appleman, U.S. Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong North to the Yalu (June-November, 1950), Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961, p. 654.

Suddenly, in late October, the race to the Yalu River was briefly interrupted by the near destruction of a ROK unit by elements of a Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) division. As quickly as it appeared, this CCF unit disappeared. Strangely, at the time, the intervention did not cause widespread alarm. It was not until a month later, 26 November 1950, when the CCF struck in force, that the recriminations began about another "intelligence failure." Was there a failure? Did MacArthur have enough intelligence available to warn him of possible large-scale CCF intervention?

Like the debates over Pearl Harbor and the original surprise attack by North Korea, the issues involved in the CCF "surprise" intervention into the Korean War are complex. Our purpose here is simply to try to outline the facts and see if any conclusions can be drawn for the military intelligence discipline.

The facts seem fairly straightforward. There was considerable intelligence available, both strategic and tactical, that the Chinese were capable of military intervention. The issue ultimately resolved itself into whether the Chinese intended to become involved militarily in Korea.[33]

Willoughby makes a persuasive case that the intelligence reports being sent from FEC to Washington indicated clearly that the CCF might well intervene.[34] Ridgway is confident that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington were concerned about that possibility.[35] It seems that Tokyo did not believe " . . . the Chinese would dare intervene," and Washington was too uncertain to take a definite position.[36] MacArthur stated, after the fact, " . . . that the intelligence that a nation is going to launch war, is not an intelligence that is available to a commander, limited to a small area of combat. That intelligence should have been given to me."[37]

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[33]Bobby E. Gipson, "Intelligence Available to the Eighth United States Army Concerning the Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea," unpublished paper, Advanced Course Department, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, 1972, passim. It will be recalled that U.S. Army doctrine for tactical intelligence is to estimate enemy capabilities and not intentions.

[34]Willoughby, op. cit., p. 387.

[35]Ridgway, op. cit., pp. 51-63.

[36]T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness, Macmillan, New York, 1963, p. 283.

[37]Schnabel, op. cit., p. 275.

A clue to the solution of this apparent dilemma is found in the official Army history of the Korean War:

> Of all the intelligence levels of the U.N. Command and the American government, perhaps the most decisive in evaluating the intention and capability of the Chinese intervention. . . was that of the Far East Command in Tokyo . . . . But apparently the Central Intelligence Agency . . . did not evaluate the available intelligence so as to reach a conviction on the question . . . different from that held by General MacArthur. It must be inferred that either Washington was undecided or that its view coincided with that of MacArthur. . . since it did not issue directives to him stating a different estimate.[38]

There seems little doubt that MacArthur, in point of fact, was making most of the evaluations of available intelligence himself and Willoughby does not appear to have attempted to dissuade his chief from his conviction that the Chinese would not intervene.[39] It also seems clear that Washington, although concerned, was unwilling to override a brilliant general who had been right so many times before:

> FECOM, a subordinate command, was a collective agency only, not an evaluative one. Yet throughout the fall of 1950, Washington continued to permit FECOM to evaluate not only its own intelligence but also that collected in other parts of the world as well. The eternally dangerous lack of insight into the aims and aspirations of hostile governments was to continue in Washington. Military intelligence, quite competently, can determine the number of divisions a nation has deployed. Military men never can wholly competently decide, from military evidence alone, whether such nation will use them. Such decision is not, and will never be, within the competence of military intelligence.[40]

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[38]Appleman, op. cit., p. 757.

[39]Schnabel, op. cit., p. 200.

[40]Fehrenbach, op. cit., p. 273.

Ridgway sums the whole thing up this way:

> Yet our intelligence reports were not really wanting. In retrospect, they turned out to be remarkably close to the mark. The failure lay once more in the interpretation of the facts rather than in the gathering of them. As early as November 10, GHQ G2 (Willoughby) had reported that the CCF buildup in the area of the reservoirs on the plateau north of Hamhung "even now may be capable of seizing the initiative and launching an offensive which might take the form of a concerted drive to the south - to cut off U.N. forces north and northeast of Hungnam."[41]

It is possible to derive a number of lessons from this experience. First, it is imperative that information be analyzed as it comes in against all information being held. This must be done at every level, tactical through national (if the information is important enough to reach the highest level). Every level is obligated to accompany intelligence reports being disseminated with an appreciation of their significance. This is a responsibility of the intelligence officer, and separates him from the Western Union messenger. Further, intelligence officers must do their best to get their commanders to consider all the intelligence available before making critical decisions. Finally, all concerned must try to avoid allowing preconceptions to dictate the interpretation of intelligence. An effective way to avoid this trap is to evaluate the enemy's capabilities and avoid guessing as to his intentions.

In any event, with the sudden entrance of the Chinese Communists into the war, and in the subsequent heavy fighting for X Corps and Eighth Army, friendly forces were forced to withdraw back to South Korea. Many CIC units, notably the 2d CIC, took heavy casualties during that withdrawal.[42]

As the war became stalemated, the mission of the CIC became the normal one of counterespionage and countersabotage in areas behind the front. Counterguerrilla operations were another major mission of the CIC, involving search and clear operations, document checks, and screening of indigenous personnel - operations to become familiar later in Vietnam. Division CIC detachments provided teams down to regiment level, to give the S2 his own

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[41]Ridgway, op. cit., p. 63.

[42]USAINTC Pamphlet.

intelligence operatives. Since the teams usually had interpreters, they were able to conduct immediate interrogations and, possibly, exploit valuable PW. CIC also maintained teams in the PW cages to assist in screening the PW.[43]

Another CIC role involved the return of the American prisoners of war at the time of the Armistice. Known as Operations Big Switch and Little Switch, the exchange of PW raised a number of security questions. Were all the returning Americans bonafide? Were any of them now working for the Communists? Had any acted against the national interests while in the PW camps? After extensive screening and interviewing, the vast majority was given a clean bill of health. Those cases with questions still unresolved, or where prisoner misconduct was indicated, were turned over to the appropriate commands for disposition.[44]

There were several MI specialist units in Korea (for example, the 500th MI Service Group and the 163 MI Service Detachment) serving the tactical units in the same way they had in Europe in World War II. Photo interpreters, interrogators, and order of battle analysts were trained at the Army Ground General School at Ft. Riley. They were sent as teams to Korea, where they were assigned to the 500th MIS. MI teams were attached from the 500th Group down to division level. Thus, there were MI specialist detachments, CIC detachments, and, frequently, ASA elements with each division.[45]

The importance of photographic intelligence was recognized very early in the Korean conflict. In dealing with so many unknowns (enemy, weather, terrain), aerial photography was an invaluable source of information. For example, the decisions made as to when and where to land at Inchon were based in large part on aerial photography.[46] The rapid demobilization after World War II, had, however, left the Army short in this area; and it was many months before sufficient photo interpreters were available. This intelligence gap was important enough to be emphasized by Ridgway: "The Air Force . . . reduced potential for photo reconnaissance and the crucial lack of photo interpreters placed the ground forces under severe handicaps."[47]

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[43]The Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1951-1952, Toppan Printing Company, Ltd., Tokyo, n.d., p. 195.

[44]Walter G. Hermes, U.S. Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and Fighting Front, Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1969, p. 497. For further information, cf. CIC History, v. I, App. 6.

[45]Grombacher, interview cited.

[46]Infield, op. cit., p. 137.

[47]Ridgway, op. cit., p. 13.

The G2 of the 8th Army in 1951, Colonel (later Major General) Thomas F. Van Natta, remembers being desperately short of photo interpreters. He sent an urgent request to Fort Riley and received a promise that all of the next class would be sent to 8th Army. Only one or two of these men ever arrived, and Van Natta eventually learned that most had been diverted by FECOM in Japan to serve as clerical personnel.

Van Natta was extremely concerned about the PI men because 8th Army had found photo intelligence to be one of its most lucrative sources. He believed that the best information was obtained from interrogation; other good sources were low-level agents and tactical signal intelligence.

An example of integrated intelligence work was the discovery that mysterious circular designs in the snow within the Chinese lines were the result of a CCF practice to exercise headquarters troops at regiment and above with daily calisthenics. Thus, the more circles, the bigger the headquarters.[48]

It has been said that,

> Military intelligence was so degenerated by 1950, only five years after the end of the war, that it took until 1952, or nearly two years of effort in Korea, to bring our military intelligence capability up to a level of effectiveness approaching that of World War II. It should be noted that World War II effectiveness of the military intelligence system was never reached, only approached.[49]

The intelligence pattern, then, during the Korean conflict resembled that of the two World Wars. It started with no active tactical intelligence capability. This capability was organized and put into the war zone as rapidly as possible. The analysts, however, had to be located and trained and lagged behind their colleagues in collection. The war ended nonetheless, with a competent Army field intelligence structure. The structure itself soon disappeared, but the concepts it engendered did not. The reorganization of intelligence, started before the war, continued apace.

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[48]Thomas F. Van Natta, personal telephonic interview with the authors, 5, April 1972.

[49]Andrew D. Pickard, "An Intelligence Branch," unpublished paper, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1961, p. 3.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence

In 1956 the War Department G2 was redesignated the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, or ACSI. The War Department, by then the Department of the Army, had decided upon a reorganization of the General Staff under a deputy system. Essentially, this meant that the deputies to the Chief of Staff were authorized to develop and promulgate policy in their specific areas without reference to the Chief, while the assistants to the Chief of Staff merely implemented his policy. Congress had authorized only three lieutenant generals for the General Staff - and it was 1921 over again. The G1 became the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel; the G3, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Military Operations; and the G4, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics - all three-star billets. The G2 became the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, and a major general. Although Congress later authorized other lieutenant generals for the General Staff, Intelligence remained a two-star job and an assistant chief of staff. When the Defense Intelligence Agency was created in 1961, the ACSI lost his vote on the U.S. Intelligence Board and his control over much positive intelligence, though he was still charged with managing the Army's interests in all areas of intelligence.[50]

The lower ranks of the ACSI might not seem too important. With Vietnam in mind, everyone recognizes the need for intelligence on the battlefield. It should not be forgotten, however, that there has been a general tendency in this country to stop thinking about intelligence, at least military intelligence, as soon as the shooting stops. After a few years of peace, without a voice at the Department of the Army level demanding that tactical intelligence get enough emphasis to be viable, the Army could easily find itself in the condition that John Eisenhower described in his book, The Bitter Woods:

> Particularly during the years leading up to World War II, intelligence technique in the U.S. Army suffered to a marked degree. The American Army was deployed almost exclusively in the U.S. and the Philippines, where intelligence was remote from everyone's mind. Understandably, other problems took precedence, and intelligence was too often relegated to the background. As a result, intelligence officers suffered greatly in prestige. The unlucky G2 or S2 had to confine his activities largely to security matters, clearances, and, if he was in luck, study for the day when combat intelligence would be a real need. The unit G2 had little to do with supplies, with operational and training selection in addition to his other duties as post exchange officer, club officer, and officer for the control of social diseases.[51]

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[50]Hittle, op. cit., pp. 214-222.

[51]John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1969, p. 198.

Joint Intelligence Activities

It will be recalled that direction of strategic cryptologic activities had since 1949 been coordinated by the Armed Forces Security Agency. Because it proved essentially unworkable, AFSA was disestablished on 4 November 1952, and the National Security Agency (NSA) was created and given greater directive authority.[52]

As a result of the Defense reorganization in 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were given an Intelligence Directorate, J2, and the United States Intelligence Board was created, with the ACSI appointed one of its voting members. By 1960, however, a special task force was created to study the organizational and managerial aspects of the intelligence community. This study resulted in the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency on 1 October 1961. The DIA then assimilated these functions from the service intelligence agencies:

(1) Defense intelligence collection requirements and management functions.
(2) Defense current intelligence and indications activities.
(3) J2/JCS estimates functions.
(4) The service attache systems.

This left the ACSI and his Navy and Air Force colleagues with:

(1) Intelligence training.
(2) Doctrine for combat intelligence.
(3) Internal department security and counterintelligence operations.
(4) Technical intelligence.
(5) Mapping, charting and geodesy.
(6) Intelligence support for General Staff studies.
(7) Performance of collection duties assigned by DIA.
(8) Research and development for systems for combat intelligence missions.

Later some of these functions would also be transferred to joint activities. It was not long before the redundancy of both a DIA and a J2/JCS was recognized, and the J2 was disestablished on 1 July 1963.[53]

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[52]Kahn, op. cit., 674-675.

[53]Andregg, op. cit., pp. 10-17. For a somewhat controversial view of the relationships between DIA and other intelligence producers and consumers, see Daniel O. Graham, "Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job" Army Magazine (v. 23, no. 84), April, 1973, pp. 14-18.

Army Intelligence Activities

The CIC, in the tense Cold War environment following the Korean War, was not drastically reduced in strength. In fact, hundreds of CIC personnel were maintained throughout the world. In 1961, CIC was redesignated as the Intelligence Corps, and positive intelligence collection became part of its mission; in 1965, it was again redesignated, this time as the Intelligence Corps Command, since it had become a major field command of the Army. During the period following the Korean War, the operating agencies of the Intelligence Command (as it was ultimately named) were designated "Military Intelligence." In CONUS, there was an MI Group supporting each Army area, and the groups were then subdivided into regions and field offices throughout the U.S. The mission of these groups was primarily personnel security investigations, although they also provided physical, document, and technical security support - the traditional counterintelligence functions.[54]

The Army Security Agency was designated a major Army field command in 1964, and the scope of its functions and missions as well as its size has broadened over the years. Following the Korean War, ASA continued to maintain relatively formal centralized control from its headquarters just outside Washington to its farthest operating agencies. This was accomplished by providing various operating headquarters in CONUS and overseas in each theater for the strategic mission and for its tactical support mission. ASA, like the CIC/Intelligence Command, has provided continuity of MI support to the Army from 1917 until the present in peace and war.[55]

Despite various reorganizations and undoubted improvements in our strategic intelligence gathering capacity and in the counterintelligence area, the combat support system was still a good deal less than perfect. The United States had found itself unexpectedly at war in Korea without adequate MI specialist support. The same personnel problems found confronting ASA and CIC in Korea were experienced in the tactical specialist area. Again reservists were necessary to flesh out many of the intelligence positions both in Korea and at the Far East Command headquarters in Japan. Once more, a crash program to train intelligence specialists had to be initiated. And once again there was a costly delay in providing the intelligence support desired by commanders in the field. Following the war, there was a recognition within the Army that a more flexible type of intelligence support was required. The assignment of intelligence specialists directly to the supported combat unit had not proven to be the answer and, in fact, there had been considerable use of MI specialist units in World War II (OSS, AIB, MIS, CIC, and SIS) and in Korea (MIS, ASA, and CIC). Out of this established need and limited experience, the Army determined that a new concept should be examined.

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[54]U.S. Army Intelligence School, "History, Traditions and Philosophy of Military Intelligence," LP 67511 (D/NRI), US Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Md., 1968, p. 61. Cited hereinafter as USAINTS LP 67511.

[55]Kahn, op. cit., p. 678-679.

The concept to be examined was called initially the Integrated Intelligence System (IIS), which merged into composite tactical support MI units all of the specialties (OB, IPW, PI, positive collection, CI and ASA) which had been proven necessary for the Army in the field. The concept was tested as part of "Operation Sagebrush" in Louisiana in 1954. "Sagebrush," a major two-sided field training exercise, tested many new ideas, with IIS figuring prominently. The tests indicated clearly that this was the proper direction for tactical intelligence to take. ASA did not feel, however, that it could or should be a part of the IIS and the follow-on concepts, and so a separation in Army Intelligence continued.

"The results of 'Sagebrush' were extremely important to the future of Army intelligence," in the view of General Van Natta. By putting all of the specialties into one unit and getting them to work together, the specialists themselves saw vividly what they could do to assist one another in producing better intelligence. New ideas were tried, including the insertion of patrols by helicopter and the idea of an Army-flown surveillance airplane (ideas that were later incorporated into the OV-1, Mohawk).[56]

As for the tactical intelligence organization, the next step was to create a system that would provide flexible MI support (less ASA) for whatever situation the Army might encounter. By 1956, the then Captain (now Brigadier General) Gerd S. Grombacher, who had prepared, monitored and evaluated tests of the IIS with "Sagebrush," had formulated what had become known as the Military Intelligence Organization (MIO) concept. The MIO, officially adopted in 1958, provided for the tailored intelligence support that had been identified as necessary. Although following a separate path, ASA has also provided for tailored support, not unlike the MIO concept.[57]

The organizations that resulted from this new, tailored approach to intelligence clearly presaged the support to be provided in the Vietnam era. In Europe, the 66th MI Group (ex-CIC), headquartered in Stuttgart, looked very much like the type MI battalion that doctrine prescribed as support for the field army. The 66th supported 7th Army G2 with the various specialists it needed to function, while subordinate units of the 66th existed for collection, interrogation, technical intelligence, and counterintelligence support throughout the field army area. The various corps, divisions and armored cavalry units subordinate to the 7th Army were supported by their own tailored MI detachments. The 513th MI Group, headquartered near Frankfurt, was given a theater-level collection mission that was also prescribed by the new doctrine. The 2d MI Battalion, Aerial Reconnaissance Support (MIBARS), in Kaiserslautern provided 7th Army with

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[56]Van Natta, interview cited.

[57]Grombacher, interview cited.

specialists to handle US Air Force-flown imagery. Certain other MI units were also found in Europe in the 1960's, but all of them were a part of this intricately tailored support picture.

In the Pacific, a similar approach emerged. The 500th MI Group, with headquarters in Japan (in Hawaii after 1965) provided theater level collection support. In Korea, 8th Army was given the 502d MI Battalion for support. Similar MI support arrangements were found wherever US Army units were garrisoned overseas.

Cryptologic support paralleled that just described. In Europe, the 7th Army was supported by the 507th ASA Group, which in turn had the 318th and 319th ASA Battalions each supporting a corps. In Korea, the 508th ASA Group supported 8th Army.[58]

In CONUS, the concept was modified somewhat. Each Army division was provided with an organic MI detachment, which had the specialties (IPW, II, OB, and CI) that characterized the MIO. At Fort Hood and Fort Bragg, there were MI Battalions (the 319th and 519th) of the field army type. Similarly, ASA units were stationed in CONUS and dedicated to support Army field forces. All of these CONUS based units were insufficient in both numbers and capabilities to meet the need for the sudden expansion of the Army brought on by Vietnam, but they provided an excellent base for mobilization and made it possible to meet the requirements of the war in Southeast Asia rapidly.

Aerial Surveillance and the Cuban Crisis

Although not a strictly Army contribution, imagery intelligence was a key ingredient in the international crisis of 1962, when offensive missiles were introduced into Cuba. U2 photography of 14 October convinced President Kennedy that a crash program of low-level aerial surveillance was needed. When the USAF found that the quality of the photography was not what it required, the then retired General Goddard was called in by air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay. Goddard quickly explained that the Air Force was using the wrong equipment, detailed where the cameras needed were stored, and how to install the cameras in a RF-101.

It is widely considered that President Kennedy's effective handling of the crisis was made possible by the quality of the intelligence he was receiving. Certainly a large part of that intelligence is a direct result of the efforts of Goddard in creating an aerial intelligence gathering capability.[59]

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[58]It should be also noted that the organization and interrelationships between the 66th MI and 513th MI groups were not as clearcut as described here. Ultimately the 513th was absorbed by the 66th. Nonetheless, the basic concepts were in line with the MIO. Similarly the roles of the 507th and 508th ASA groups and their battalions were not "pure" in accord with the concept.

[59]George W. Goddard, with DeWitt S. Copp, Overview: A Lifelong Adventure in Aerial Photography, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1969, p. xi-xii.

The MI Branch is Established

Following close on the heels of the birth of the MIO concept was the step that potentially would tie the profession together: the establishment of the Military Intelligence Branch. As early as 2 April 1921, the Military Intelligence Officers' Reserve Corps (MIORC) had been formed and an insignia was authorized. It provided a pool of officers with experience and interest in intelligence, and significant numbers of World War II intelligence officers came from the MIORC. As mentioned previously, following World War II, there were several attempts to establish an intelligence branch, with one of the strongest coming in 1950. The resistance of the G1 and G3 at the Department of the Army, however, postponed action for twelve more years. In 1951, Congress did authorize reserve branches and in 1952 the Military Intelligence Reserve Branch was formed, the reservists continuing to wear the old MIORC insignia. Also, in 1952, the AS, or Army Security Reserve Branch, was formed, with its own insignia. In 1958, the MI Reserve Branch was redesignated the AI, or Army Intelligence Reserve Branch.[60]

It was on 1 July 1962 that the names of the two reserve intelligence branches were combined into the Regular Army branch of Army Intelligence and Security (AIS); and at that time the current insignia was authorized. Interestingly, this insignia is somewhat similar to that of the British Intelligence Corps, though the British insignia is smaller and has a scroll at the bottom. The first of July 1962 is now considered the official birthday of the branch, but, as noted, there is some debate about moving it back to a time when one of the significant intelligence activities of the U.S. Army was established.

In 1966, the Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, acting at the request of the ACSI, appointed the Norris Board to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the Army Intelligence effort. Among the recommendations of that board which were approved by General Johnson the following year were a number that have great importance today. The name of the branch was changed, effective 1 July 1967, from AIS to the more historical Military Intelligence. MI was redesignated from a combat service support to a combat support branch. It was recommended, and approved by the Chief of Staff, that further study be initiated of the feasibility of moving the US Army Intelligence School (USAINTS) from Ft. Holabird to a post large enough to accomodate both USAINTS and the ASA school as a true Intelligence Center. The MI career branch was charged with nominating MI officers for division and higher G2 positions, worldwide. An extensive education program within the Continental Army Command's service schools on military intelligence was ordered, leading to assignment of MI officers

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[60]Pickard, op. cit., passim.

to these schools as instructors and branch representatives. An increase in the Regular Army strength of the branch and an increase in the number of annual allocations for the Command and General Staff College were approved. And, finally, the Norris Board addressed the thorny subject of designation of MI units and their commanders: New MI command MOS were established for the unit commanders, and it was recommended that the practice of having lieutenant colonels command MI companies and majors commanding detachments be examined with a view toward redesignating the units as battalions and companies.[61]

Summary

Having looked at the Army's working intelligence activities - ACSI, ASA, CIC, and what may be broadly thought of as the MIO concept - and at the MI Branch itself, the next logical step is to examine the era of the Vietnam war.

The close of World War II saw the end of any sort of tactical intelligence capability - and the CIC went to a strategic-type mission; the SIS became ASA and the tactical support units were disestablished; G2's again became dumping grounds. But strategic intelligence was not forgotten - the OSS was metamorphosized into CIA. ASA joined its Navy and Air Force counterparts in AFSA, and later NSA. The CIC received an active peacetime mission. Korea came with the suddenness of World War II and the old tactical organizations had to be recreated from their strategic counterparts and from the reserves. Korea was scarcely ended when the tactical support capability was, once more, lost. But a lesson had been learned: A plan had to exist for a wartime capability. The MI and AS Reserve Branches were created, ASA developed a tactical support concept, and the MIO concept was articulated. Ultimately, tactical intelligence units, both MIO and ASA, were established, at least in cadre strength, and the MI Branch was created as a Regular Army branch. Finally, the capabilities of the professional MI officer and enlisted man were recognized by the Norris Board, as were the complexities of modern intelligence work. Army intelligence was ready for Vietnam.

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[61]U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Memorandum for Heads of Army Staff Agencies, subject: Report of Review of Army Intelligence and Security (AIS) Branch Progress (CS 350.09) [Norris Board Report], 15 May 1967.

CHAPTER 6



1 Early Days of the Advisory Program in Vietnam

2 The Army's OV-1 Mohawk (with SLAR Boom underneath)

3 1st Cavalry Division Troopers Advance During Operation Thayer - Irving in 1966

4 The Problem of finding the Enemy led to many solutions in Vietnam

5 A Search-and-Clear Operation encounters Punji Stakes around a VC Controlled Hamlet, IV Corps, 1967

6 NVA Soldiers, surprised by a Reconnaissance Aircraft, run for cover

7 An Intelligence Advisor, IV Corps, 1967

8 Gunships Operating in the Central Highlands of Vietnam

9 A Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Moves into Position

10 NVA Soldiers Surrender



CHAPTER VI

MI COMES OF AGE (1963 TO THE PRESENT)

Vietnam[1]

What is the background of the Army's intelligence involvement in Vietnam? To be accurate, any analysis must begin with the French War in Indo-China which ended in 1954. From that time until the actual commitment of U.S. combat troops in Vietnam eleven years later, Washington was quite concerned about developments in the area. The primary source of information for most of the period from 1954 until after 1960 was the Army attaché system.

But in 1959 it became apparent that more intelligence was needed than the attaché could provide, so an agreement for a bilateral intelligence system in Vietnam was reached with the Saigon government. Additionally in 1961, the 3d Radio Research Unit, an ASA organization, was deployed to Vietnam. Later that year, the first U.S. casualty of the Vietnam War, Specialist Four James Davis of the 3d RRU, was recorded. In 1962 the 704th MI Detachment was assigned to the Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG), Vietnam, with the mission of advising the Vietnamese Military Security Service (MSS).

In early 1962 the first province intelligence advisors went to Vietnam. Primarily officers from the Armor and Field Artillery branches, they received a quick course at Ft. Holabird and then deployed to Vietnam. (The use of combat arms officers was, in part, made necessary because there were no intelligence personnel knowledgeable in combat intelligence work. Infantry branch was already providing many of the advisors for Vietnam, so the other two combat arms were tapped.) In Vietnam, the recent Ft. Holabird graduates were married up with newly arrived graduates from military assistance training and sent out to form province advisory teams. Other intelligence advisors were sent to Vietnamese Army units (division, corps and the Joint General Staff in Saigon). There was some reluctance on the part of a few senior Vietnamese officials to have an American "intelligence advisor" working in their areas - this is, after all, a traditionally sensitive subject for all governments - but these problems were smoothed out and soon most provinces had full-fledged advisor teams.[2]

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[1]AUTHORS' NOTE: It is with a certain amount of trepidation that we undertake the topic of the Vietnam War. After all, it is just barely over at this writing. It was a war of many types - depending on where you were and when. It was, moreover, a highly controversial war, not only on political but also military grounds. Yet we feel obligated to try, if only to provide the interested student something with which to argue.

[2]Richard A. Perry, personal interview with the authors, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 30 April 1973.

In September 1962, the first contingent of the Army's new surveillance aircraft, the OV-1 Mohawk, arrived in Vietnam and was stationed at Nha Trang (in coastal II corps.) The missions they performed were in direct support of various Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) divisions throughout the country. The Mohawk unit was the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment (later redesignated the 73d Aerial Surveillance Company).[3]

Later, in about 1964, district advisory teams were created in most of Vietnam. This program, which eventually placed a heavy emphasis on intelligence work, was quite important in that the advisor program extended from the national level in Saigon to the lowest level of formal government. With this system, it was possible to focus major attention on the district, whether it was in the area of statistics on rice production or intelligence gathering.

The American Build-up

By 1965, the Army had begun to prepare in earnest for the Vietnam War. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the MIO concept and subsequent deployment of tactical MI units provided the basis for both the early deployment of MI personnel to Vietnam and expansion to meet the total requirement.

The 172d MI Detachment was probably the first tactical intelligence unit in the country, arriving with the 173d Airborne Brigade in May 1965 from their base on Okinawa. Back at Ft. Bragg, the 525th MI Group, the 519th MI Battalion, and the 1st MIBARS were readied and deployed to RVN. The Continental Army Command Tactical Intelligence Center (CONTIC) was established in 1965 at Ft. Bragg and given the mission of preparing and deploying units to Vietnam. Eventually, CONTIC was to ship more than 30 units.

In similar fashion, ASA units were rapidly established, manned, equipped and provided some training before deployment to the war zone. During the early summer of 1965, detachments were formed from existing division support companies and deployed with the first combat units deployed into country. The 10th Radio Research Company, supporting the 1st Cavalry Division, was the first complete ASA unit to be deployed, arriving in September 1965. The 10th RRU, which had been assigned to the 1st Cavalry at Fort Benning, was reorganized as an air mobile unit, like its division. The second RR company into Vietnam was the 11th, which deployed from Ft. Campbell to join the 1st Infantry Division. In Vietnam the 11th was augmented with a detachment that had deployed earlier with one brigade of the 1st Division. The same procedures were followed in deploying the majority of RR units into country.

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[3]William J. Morris, personal interview with the authors, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 1 May 1973.

As each of the initial units arrived, they were assigned to the 3d RRU, while remaining attached to the tactical unit they supported. In April 1966, the 3d RRU was redesignated as the 509th RR Group, with intermediate headquarters, the 303d RR Battalion at Long Binh and the 313th RR Battalion in Nha Trang. Ultimately, more that 20 radio research companies and detachments were providing direct support to the tactical units in Vietnam, while the 224th Aviation Battalion (RR) and fixed facilities such as the 8th RR Field Station at Phu Bai provided general support to forces throughout the country.

On the advisory side, in 1965, the need for an intelligence advisor at district level was recognized to the extent that an operations/intelligence NCO was assigned. Intelligence personnel were assigned to 5th Special Forces Group as required. At Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV, the successor to the MAAG), the intelligence section, J2, evolved into a large organization which both provided the advisory staff for the Vietnamese J2 and served as the intelligence staff for the American MACV commander. To provide the manpower for J2, elements of the 319th MI Battalion had been sent to RVN in 1965. After the 519th MI battalion arrived later that year, it provided augmentation personnel for MACV J2 and, initially, the manpower for intelligence advisor slots throughout the country (i.e., corps, province, and district teams).

In 1966, the 135th and 149th MI Groups (with a counterintelligence and intelligence collection mission respectively) arrived in the country from Ft. Bragg and were subordinated to the 525th MI Group. They took over the theater-level intelligence mission that had been handled by the 500th MI Group and 704th MI Detachment since the early 1960's.

Theater Intelligence

Another 1966 development of considerable importance was the creation of a group of combined, theater-level intelligence centers in Saigon. The MACV Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, Major General J.A. McChristian, had felt since his arrival a year earlier that there was a need for facilities, run by both the Vietnamese and Americans, where the products of all intelligence collection could be pulled together. Analysis was computer-assisted in many cases, and the resulting intelligence was then made available to the highest levels of authority in Saigon (and in Washington) as well as to the units out in the jungle. The centers were: the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV), the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC), the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC), and the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC). The centers were, incidentally, a direct product of the MIO concept, having been created using cellular teams.[4]

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[4]Lloyd H. Norman, "Westmoreland's J2", Army Magazine (v. 17, no. 8), May 1967, pp. 22-25.

A large number of intelligence personnel was employed in the combined centers during the five or so years of their existence, and many non-MI personnel were brought into the centers because of related skills. On the basis of size alone, the combined centers would have been an important intelligence addition to the war effort. But their importance was far greater than that: The combined centers represented the ultimate refinement to date of the idea of getting the specialists required to address whatever intelligence problems the war presents, in a timely manner. At the same time, they also provided for integrating intelligence at the top in a way that would allow it to be disseminated as an integrated product to every other level. Finally, the centers were probably the first large scale use of computers in a war zone, suggesting many ideas for future computer use in the intelligence field.

The intelligence produced by the J2 combined centers came in various forms to the "consumers." For example, in response to an urgent request from the 1st Infantry Division, special aerial photographic missions might be flown, the imagery analyzed, and mosaics created from the photography on a suspected enemy base area, such as War Zone "C". Then, when the operation in the area would begin, as documents were captured, they would be immediately flown to CDEC for overnight translation and analysis, with results made available to the tactical unit planners. The next day's operations could be targeted on information from the documents. Prisoners might be handled in the same way, with the best interrogation personnel available piecing together the information possessed by the enemy soldiers with other intelligence holdings from that area. Again, the initial and subsequent interrogation reports would be provided immediately to the G2 of the 1st Division, while the troops were still scouring the enemy area. The analysis of captured items of equipment, done by CMEC, might result in targeting information for the units out in War Zone "C", requesting that the 1st Division try to obtain some specific items of associated equipment that CMEC anticipated would be present in the area. In large measure, the reputation for rapid response acquired by intelligence in Vietnam was a result of the kind of teamwork that existed between the combined centers and the tactical units they supported.

By 1966 the MI organization for combat had completely evolved. Intelligence advisors were assigned from the 519th MI throughout the country (later they were assigned directly to the MACV teams at corps and province level); ASA support was provided by the 509th RR Group and its subordinates; theater-level collection and CI was handled by the 525th MI group (which absorbed the 135th and 149th Groups in 1967, and which at times had subordinate battalions in each corps area); and each division and separate brigade and regiment had its own tactical intelligence support. This clearly was an improvement over the procedures required in getting the necessary intelligence support to the war zone in our previous wars.

The nature of the problem facing commanders and intelligence personnel at all echelons is indicated by an observation from S.L.A. Marshall on a 1966 operation of the 1st Cavalry Division on the coast of II Corps:

> We have here in Thayer-Irving a phenomenon that is recurrent in operations against irregular forces though uncommon in conventional war. The surprises are constant and the too-frequent ambushing, though always painful and embarrassing, is the lesser part of them. However sedulous the collecting and collating of intelligence by our field force may be, the realities of the situation that can be developed only by hitting are rarely, if ever, what one went forth expecting to find.
>
> The sure thing proves to be an empty bag. The seeming flash-in-the-pan turns into a major explosion. Elephant guns are used to bang away at rabbits. Tigers are hunted with popguns. Thayer and Irving taken together are prime illustrations of the point. In the one there was a tremendous windup that led only a demoralizing letdown. In the other, a fluke shot into a bush killed a grizzly.[5]

Division Intelligence Operations

Faced with this sort of problem, how was intelligence to assist the commander to improve his probabilities? It might be instructive to look at the experience of one division.

The 4th Infantry Division deployed to Vietnam from Ft. Lewis in 1966, taking with it the 4th MI Detachment. The division established its base camp near Pleiku and was joined there by the 374th Radio Research Company.

II Corps is dominated by the mountainous area known as the Central Highlands, with its thick jungle, swift rivers, and cool nights. The area assigned to the 4th Division lay at one of the major exits to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the enemy was intensely interested in seizing control of the area. The rather sparse population, a mixture of ethnic Vietnamese and Montagnards, was basically apathetic to both sides. Since 1965 this whole area of the border had been the scene of many battles between the VC/NVA on one side and the Americans of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 173d Airborne and the 4th Division on the other. For example, intelligence reports in the fall of 1967 indicated that a major enemy headquarters was moving its subordinate regiments from Cambodian bases into Kontum Province, near the town of Dak To. Careful development of the situation confirmed the intelligence, and a major battle resulted. As was generally

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[5] S.L.A. Marshall, The Field of Bamboo, Dial Press, New York, 1971, pp. 2-3.

the case when U.S. Forces had good intelligence on the situation, the 173d Airborne and 4th Division elements inflicted much more damage on the enemy than they received.[6]

Intelligence was provided to the 4th Division from a number of sources and agencies. In addition to that produced by the efforts of the division's own reconnaissance agencies (the S2's of the battalions, brigades and division artillery, the radar teams and later more sophisticated sensor systems), much intelligence came in from outside agencies. There were liaison elements attached to the division from the 525th MI Group, and information came in from the MACV Advisory teams at district, province and II Crops. The 374th RR Company, in addition to producing intelligence itself, was a channel for intelligence from other elements of the 509th RR Group. The 12th ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) MID assisted the 4th MID in the area of IPW and document exploitation. ARVN divisional and regimental formations provided data through their advisors, and Republic of Korea forces also sent intelligence reports to the 4th Division.

The 4th MID (later company) was typical of divisional MI support units. It was organized into a headquarters and four operational sections (Counter-intelligence, Interrogation of Prisoners of War, Imagery Interpretation and Order of Battle).

The 4th MI had come to Vietnam with a TO&E strength of about 80 personnel; with it had been deployed another MID, the 583d, which has been sent from CONTIC at Ft Bragg and whose only purpose was to provide a carrier vehicle to get augmentation teams from the MIO to Vietnam for the 4th Division. Although the 583d MID was not officially inactivated until 1970, the personnel and equipment were completely merged with the 4th MID.[7]

The G2, 4th Division, was always located with the division headquarters. The functional organization of G2 varied over the years, but it always provided for G2 Operations, Air and Counterintelligence. Operational control of the 4th MI's sections lay with the G2 (whose manning required augmentation by the MID in order to accomplish its mission). The CO of the 4th MI served as both the leader of the unit and as an advisor to the G2 on the best ways to employ the unit's capabilities. The 374th RR Company also provided direct support to the 4th Division, though its operational control was split between the division G2 and other radio

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[6]Allan W. Sundstrum, "Three Companies at Dak To", Seven Firefights in Vietnam, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1970, pp. 85-108.

[7]Fourth Infantry Division, Memorandum, subject: Lessons Learned, CO of MI Company, 25 July 1970. Total strength of the company varied from about 120 to 155 personnel.

research units. The point where analysts from the 4th MI and the 374th RRC came together was called the Current Intelligence Section. This provided integrated intelligence to the command.[8]

Teams from the 4th MI frequently were attached to the brigades and the armored cavalry squadron on a semi-permanent basis. Teams typically were composed of representatives of the CI and IPW sections. Although less frequent, operational teams from the 374th RRC were attached to the brigades for particular missions.

In many respects, the May 1970 incursion of U.S. forces into Cambodia typifies the best of the intelligence support provided to the 4th Division. The G2 of the division at the time, LTC (now Colonel) William F. Strobridge found that the preparations to operate in Cambodia tested fully the flexibility and skill of all intelligence personnel.

> The division, which had been operating generally from west to east, had to reverse direction completely for the Cambodian operation. It also required a change from interdiction tactics to more conventional assault techniques. In the sixty hours that it took the division to deploy westward and to make its first landing in Cambodia, supporting intelligence produced and distributed a complete intelligence package. The initial burden fell on the Order of Battle Section, 4th MI Company, which in seventeen hours, with no advanced notice, compiled and gave to the brigades information on enemy units and locations in Cambodia. They were fortunate to be able to draw on the work of the Chief of the 4th MI's IPW Section, a Vietnamese linguist who had earlier obtained detailed information on NVA supply points and trails in Cambodia from a prisoner with whom he had established a good rapport. The II Section of the 4th MI flew as observers to gain landing zone locations and other information for the division. Finally, the CI Section implemented a crash program to keep the division's movement to Cambodia as secret as possible.
>
> The 525th MI Group flew an area specialist to us who had knowledge of Cambodia, and their Pleiku detachment gave us a hand with document translations as we moved west again. The 374th RR Company and its higher headquarters, the 313th RR Battalion, put on a special effort for the division, and the G2, I Field Force, personally went to Saigon to get us a Cambodian linguist.

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[8]William F. Strobridge, written interview with authors, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 27 March 1973.

> Bullet holes in the lead helicopters told us that the 4th Infantry Division had entered Cambodia knowing where the enemy was situated and would not have to thrash about for days looking for him. The CG was pleased with our work.[9]

Comprising another prime source of information were the division's unattended ground sensors (UGS), which were emplaced and monitored by the division Dufflebag Platoon. The Dufflebag (nickname for the Army employment of UGS in RVN) Platoon was attached to the 4th MI Company, which proved to be quite a successful marriage. The sensor-derived intelligence they acquired dovetailed nicely with the work of the organic sections of the 4th MIC, giving G2 a greater integrated intelligence gathering capability.

One other area of interest in this paper, where the experiences of the 4th Division might be useful, was the employment of MI officers as G2 or S2's of subordinate units. Colonel Strobridge, one of several MI/G2's of the 4th Division, found that:

> . . .possibly unlike the non-MI Branch officer, I felt as an MI officer working as a combat division G2 that I was at the zenith of my professional and personal satisfaction. I was playing first fiddle for a varied and skilled assemblage of intelligence players that were part of my chosen career field. I felt as an MI officer, I had greater command of the multiple types of intelligence support I could get for the division. As an MI officer, I could talk nose-to-nose with other MI people on the quality and timeliness of their support, and as an MI officer I could eradicate any hangups MI personnel might have about supporting an infantry division. There is no question in my mind that the MI specialists, sergeants, warrant officers, lieutenants, captains, and majors that I worked with each day passed the test in the 4th Infantry Division, because when the division commander received a richly deserved promotion, he specified he wanted another MI officer for his G2.[10]

Another MI officer serving as a G2, LTC (now Colonel) L.A. Spirito, G2 of the 9th Infantry Division in the Mekong Delta in 1968, found that the key to success in tactical intelligence was response.

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[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

> Any intelligence system that is going to serve a tactical commander must have built into it the capability to provide rapid and flexible response to his requirements. If it can't do that - if it can't give him information in near real-time - then it is history and not worth the effort. And this is true, not only in a Vietnam environment, where targets tend to be fleeting, but it is equally true in any kind of combat. The intelligence officer must tailor all his thoughts, all his efforts, and all his talents to one thing - serving the commander he works for.[11]

The intelligence problem facing the 9th Division was more like the classic one of counterinsurgency: separating the enemy from the friendly population so that he may be engaged and defeated. Because IV Corps is heavily populated in most of its areas, the enemy could frequently hide within the population; and, if he found it expedient, he was quite likely to use them as a shield against attack by Allied forces.[12]

Ground Reconnaissance

Another type of intelligence agency used extensively in Vietnam was the long-range reconnaissance unit. As employed by the Army, the mission was frequently called a LRRP (Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol). Most divisions had attached to them an LRRP company, all of which were designated as part of the 75th Rangers in 1969 (e.g., the 4th Division had Company K, 75th Rangers). The selection of the 75th Rangers designation was interesting, since its lineage is traced to the force known as "Merrill's Marauders" in World War II.[13] The Rangers were frequently and advantageously used in four- to six-man teams for either static observation in enemy territory or reconnaissance of a suspected area. Missions were clearly intelligence-gathering rather than combat, and these missions were normally provided by the G2. LRRP were also used for battle damage assessment in hostile areas, following engagement of a suspected enemy position or unit.

Other Army LRRP missions were accomplished by 5th Special Forces Group and by agencies subordinate to the MACV J2. Military Intelligence Branch's first (and only, so far) Medal of Honor Winner, Lieutenant George K. Sisler, received the nation's highest award for his actions while serving on such a mission. Cut off by a much larger enemy force on

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[11]Leonard A. Spirito, written interview with the authors, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 30 April 1973.

[12]Ibid.

[13]John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Part I: Regular Army Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 761.

7 February 1967, Lieutenant Sisler's platoon fought off successive attacks by the enemy force. In an effort to break up one such assault, Sisler charged the enemy with rifle and hand grenades. Although mortally wounded, he stopped the enemy, killing at least 25 of them.[14]

The other services also employed the LRRP concept. The Marines deployed a reconnaissance battalion with each division, which could then conduct long-range reconnaissance with sub-elements. The Navy's SEAL (Sea, Air, Land Commando) teams were used extensively in the Mekong Delta. The missions varied considerably, depending on where and when they were used, but they were nearly always intelligence-related.[15]

Technical Intelligence

Intelligence surprise on a tactical scale, reminiscent of the early days of the Korean War, apparently occurred in early 1968. The Lang Vei Special Forces camp, on the Laotian border some 35 miles south of the demilitarized zone, was overrun by NVA PT-76 tanks. Not only did the Americans and their indigenous soldiers not expect the introduction of tanks, but the principal anti-tank weapons available to them (the light anti-tank weapon - LAW) proved ineffective against the lightly armored PT-76. The similarities between this tactical and technical intelligence surprise at Lang Vei and that in Korea in 1950 are somewhat disconcerting. Obviously, the practice of military intelligence was still imperfect.[16]

The Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program

Returning again to the advisory side of the MI function in Vietnam, a noteworthy development occurred in 1967, when the foundations for what became known as the Phoenix/Phung Hoang program were laid. This program involved an MI lieutenant or captain (later assisted by an intelligence NCO) at district level, who, in conjunction with his Vietnamese counterpart, was oriented on identifying the Viet Cong (VC) political and military structure. The Phoenix/Phung Hoang program was also found at all levels of government above the district. From the perspective of counterinsurgency success, such as the British effort in Malaysia, this type of work was considered essential.

One former Phoenix/Phung Hoang advisor felt that the great benefit of the program was that the Americans had demonstrated to the Vietnamese the value of the concept of systematically compiling and integrating information on the VC undercover personnel, using all available agencies

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[14]Department of the Army, General Order 35, 16 July 1968.

[15]A discussion of some of the missions and employment rationale for these units may be found in an article by Francis J. West, "Stingray '70," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (v. 95, no. 11), November 1969, pp. 26-37.

[16]John A. Cash, "Battle of Lang Vei, 7 February 1968", Seven Firefights in Vietnam, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1970, pp. 109-138; Halloran, op. cit., p. 18.

and exchanging that information between agencies. Before Phoenix/Phung Hoang, there was no real system, and the Vietnamese agencies charged with counterintelligence collected information, collated it, and made arrests in isolation from one another. The advantage of having intelligence trained American advisors working with the Phoenix/Phung Hoang District Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (the DIOCC; there was also a PIOCC at province) is obvious. Two significant shortcomings in the program were training for the American advisors and the reporting requirements imposed on the DIOCC/PIOCC by higher headquarters.[17]

The training deficiency was corrected by the creation at Fort Bragg in September 1970 of a Military Assistance Security Advisor course. This made it possible for the first time to provide trained advisory personnel for the program. The reporting shortcoming remained until the end of the program; it was essentially the old problem of keeping all echelons of an organization fully informed without tying up the lower echelons with red-tape. Additionally, the American introduction of computers into the program demanded that the DIOCC/PIOCC keep highly formated files, which ran contrary to the nature of the situation and of the Vietnamese being advised.[18]

An example of a successful Phoenix/Phung Hoang operation occurred in the old capital, Hue, in April 1972, at the time of a major North Vietnamese assault in the South. As soon as the enemy attacked, the undercover VC cadre in Hue were supposed to begin sabotage and terror attacks within the city, adjust enemy artillery fire in the city as the enemy forces neared, and finally act as guides to lead the assault columns into the key points of Hue.

> Before the enemy agents could be activated, about 1000 of them who had been long identified by the PIOCC (for Thua Thien Province) were arrested. Our intelligence indicated that the NVA commanders were blind in Hue, due to this timely Phung Hoang operation. They could not place effective fire on city defenses, they could not conduct assassination and sabotage, and they could not rely on their agents to lead them into the city. All but a handful of these enemy cadre were in jail and the remaining agents were too frightened to act. This operation played an important role in denying the enemy success in and around Hue.[19]

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[17]Robert W. P. Condon, written interview with the authors, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 3 May 1973.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid.

All indications are that the performance of the MI personnel involved was effective and all that could have been hoped for. That the program itself has not been considered a complete success does not appear to have been a fault of the U.S. military personnel involved. Additionally, it offered a real benefit to MI, since it gave many young MI personnel, officer and enlisted, an opportunity to become intimately involved in tactical operations at the "rice-roots" level. The district intelligence advisor program was terminated, beginning in 1971, but, as indicated above, advisors continued to serve in many areas until almost the end of the war.

Combat Testing for New Concepts

Against the combat backdrop of Vietnam, the Army launched a landmark field test and evaluation of intelligence operational and organizational concepts designed to improve the timeliness, accuracy, and volume of information and intelligence available to the commander.

The field test was designated the Target Acquisition and Combat Surveillance in Vietnam (TACSIV-II) Evaluation and was conducted by the 1st U.S. Infantry Division in 1968. The concepts tested were derived from the 1967 Tactical Reconnaissance and Surveillance 1975 (TARS-75) Study and included a division-level combat intelligence battalion.[20]

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[20]The Combat Intelligence Battalion included a headquarters and headquarters company, an intelligence operations company, a ground reconnaissance and surveillance company, and an aerial target acquisition and combat surveillance company. The headquarters and headquarters company provided command and control, communications, organizational communications, radar, remote sensor and vehicle maintenance and logistical support. A materiel exploitation platoon in the company provided for the receipt, training and employment of selected items of ground surveillance equipment; e.g., ground surveillance radars and remote sensors. The intelligence operations company manned the BICC/BIC's and provided counterintelligence and interrogation support for the division. The ground reconnaissance and surveillance company provided long-range reconnaissance patrols for deployment throughout the division's area of operations. As evaluated in TACSIV-II, however, it was reported that the long-range reconnaissance patrols could not be gainfully employed on a sustained basis and that the intelligence return from these patrols was minimal. Long-range reconnaissance patrols were not included in the post evaluation combat intelligence organization recommended for the division. The aerial target acquisition and combat surveillance company provided utility and armed rotary wing aircraft, an aerial electronic surveillance capability, and an imagery interpretation platoon.

The heart of the intelligence system as envisioned in the intelligence battalion was the battlefield information control centers (BICC) and the battlefield information centers (BIC). The BICC/BIC's participated in intensive planning, management, evaluation, production and dissemination of intelligence in direct support of the division, brigades, maneuver battalions and direct support artillery battalions. A significant and indispensable feature of the intelligence battalion was its dedicated communications which linked all of the BICC/BIC's and resulted in the timely transmission of information and intelligence throughout the division.

While the exigencies of combat and other circumstances precluded the evaluation of the combat intelligence battalion in its entirety, the major thrust of the TACSIV-II field test is summarized as follows:

> The TACSIV system proved more effective than the existing system in every facet of the intelligence cycle. This improvement resulted primarily from the addition of trained intelligence specialists and dedicated communications means at division, brigade, maneuver battalion, armored cavalry squadron and direct support artillery battalion levels. The TACSIV concept of intelligence resources can achieve the expected degree of improvement without the centralized assignment and control of collection means envisioned by the concept.[21]

Furthermore, this new system was employed without interrupting the traditional command and control functions of the 1st Infantry Division. This is an essential requirement for any intelligence (or any other combat support) system.

Since 1968, a series of field evaluations of the intelligence concepts tested in Vietnam have afforded greater insights into the combat intelligence system to include command and control, communications, technological developments, and perhaps most important of all, intelligence management. The results of these tests and evaluations are expected to have long-term effects in developing an intelligence system more fully responsive to the commanders' combat intelligence requirements.[22]

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[21]U.S. Army Vietnam, "Combat Evaluation Report on Target Acquisition and Combat Surveillance in Vietnam (Short Title: TACSIV-II)", 10 November 1968, Vol 1, p. III-108.

[22]The authors are indebted to Mr. Carl Miner, USAICS, who provided them the data on TACSIV-II.

New Combat Surveillance Systems

Vietnam strongly emphasized the need for improved combat surveillance. As an example, LTG Harry W.O. Kinnard commented:

> "When I took the 1st Cavalry Division to Vietnam in 1965 I knew that finding the enemy would be one of our toughest jobs. It occurred to me that perhaps we would be able to identify the guerrilla, a farmer by day and a fighter by night, by the dark circles under his eyes. . . . As it turned out, our surveillance was just about that unsophisticated."[23]

The problem led to a multitude of different surveillance systems being deployed to Vietnam during the later 1960's. Among these, one of the most productive was the Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) system. An early, and highly important, use of UGS was made by the Marine Corps in 1968 at Khe Sanh Combat Base, where the UGS were considered by the Marine commanders and intelligence officers involved to be key to the successful defense of that base.[24] The next several years saw UGS develop from a relatively crude system to a highly sophisticated tool for intelligence.[25]

As mentioned above, the OV-1 Mohawk arrived in Vietnam in 1962. The first unit, the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment, deployed six aircraft into country. Equipped only with conventional photo systems, the unit divided into three flight teams of two aircraft, a photo processing facility, flight crew and laboratory technicians. The flight teams normally worked in direct support of an ARVN division, allowing the Mohawk crew to become acquainted with the specific needs of the unit (and its American advisors) and the supported unit to learn how to employ the Mohawks. The aircraft were based with the divisions they supported, returning to Nha Trang only for maintenance.

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[23]Harry W.O. Kinnard, "Narrowing the Intelligence Gap: Army Magazine (v. 19, no. 8), August, 1969, pp. 22-25.

[24]U.S. Senate, "Investigation into Electronic Battlefield Program," hearings before the Committee on Armed Forces, 18, 19, and 24 November 1970, Washington, D.C., UGS had been used earlier by the U.S. Air Force in an anti-infiltration mission called Igloo White.

[25]U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Supplemental Reading 02707, "Unattended Ground Sensors," Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, July, 1972. A discussion of many of the new sensor systems can be found in "Electronic Reconnaissance in Vietnam," International Defense Review, (v. 5, no. 4), August, 1972. Also see Robert J. McClintic, "Turn Back the Night," Army Magazine (v. 19, no. 8), August, 1968, pp. 28-35.

The original detachment commander, Major (later LTC) William J. Morris, felt that these close support relationships between the aerial surveillance unit and the supported unit were essential to success.[26]

The first six aircraft were all armed with machine guns and rockets for self-defense. Morris emphasizes that - despite the notion in some circles that the Mohawks went out to shoot ball ammunition in preference to film - his pilots only returned fire and then only if necessary to accomplish the photo mission. The aircraft normally worked in pairs after enemy gunners became accurate enough to down a lone Mohawk in early 1963.[27]

The 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment became the 73d Aerial Surveillance Company in 1964, after receiving a number of new aircraft with additional sensor systems (infrared and side-looking airborne radar, SLAR). Other Mohawk companies that served in Vietnam included the 131st Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC), the 225th SAC, 244th SAC and 245th SAC.

Another surveillance innovation in the Vietnam War - one that had been foreseen by Operation Sagebrush back in the mid-1950's - was the extensive use of air cavalry elements for reconnaissance and intelligence collection. Missions varied, according to the location, using unit, and information sought. But, in general, they involved the use of lightly armed scout helicopters working at ground level, with a command and control (C&C) helicopter above the scout helicopters orienting their search, and attack helicopters higher still, ready to pounce on any enemy discovered. An night, the pattern was often changed to have the C&C ship doing a low-level search, using flares or searchlight, with the Cobra gunships flying blacked-out close behind. Other missions were flown using a device that could detect chemically the presence in the air of ammonia or carbon monoxide (which could indicate human activity). Cooperative prisoners could be flown back into an area where they had been operating with the enemy, and they could sometimes point out from their airborne vantage point where a command post or supply caches were. In each mission, intelligence was both a requirement in selecting an area for reconnaissance, and a product of the missions.

Many implications for the future of intelligence seem at this point in time to have been drawn from the Vietnam War. The trends are often related to two new concepts that developed from the Vietnam experience. One of these is the STANO (Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Night Observation) program, first announced in late 1969, which aimed at providing intensive management for surveillance developments (and the aassociated problems of using the surveillance-produced information).

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[26]Morris, interview cited.

[27]Ibid.

The other concept, known as the Integrated Battlefield Control System (IBCS), was established to come to grips with the problems of using all the new technology to aid the commander in making decisions, using effectively all his assets, and supervising the implementation of his decisions.[28]

Trends for the Future

The STANO and IBCS concepts, combined with the experience of MI in support of tactical forces in Vietnam, offer both opportunity and challenge to MI in the 1970's. The role of intelligence seems to have been generally well received, and it appears that MI personnel were generally well accepted by tactical commanders throughout the war. It is essential, of course, that the lessons learned and new technology be considered as the system of MI support continues to evolve.

MI support was provided in Vietnam from almost the very beginning - a goal sought ever since the CIP was deployed to Europe in 1917, after AEF itself had gone into action. This early deployment in Vietnam seems to demonstrate a point often made by those who examine the history of military intelligence: Only by having knowledgeable intelligence personnel aboard from the outset will it be possible to ameliorate the circumstances which caused a Pearl Harbor and Chinese Communist intervention type of intelligence "surprise."

The only real disappointment, as far as intelligence preparation for the war was concerned, was that many needed units were not on active duty. In many cases, they had to be created in much haste, then deployed to Vietnam to join and support units with which they had never worked. Despite this shortcoming, the marriage of the supporting unit with the various tactical formations was relatively painless. At its top strength, MI Branch had more than 7,000 commissioned officers. It became (and remains) the fifth largest branch (1973 strength is approximately 5,800 officers). Officer personnel of the branch are placed in three general functional areas (Cryptologic - 19%; Human Intelligence - 28%; Tactical and Strategic Intelligence - 47%; other intelligence skills - 6%.[29]

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[28]U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Supplemental Reading 02708, "Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Night Observation," Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, September, 1972. For further information on the whole problem of surveillance, reconnaissance, information flow, and MI support to take advantages of the new technology, see U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, "Tactical Surveillance and Reconnaissance 1975 (TARS-75), HQ, USACDC, Ft. Belvois, Virginia, passim.

[29]Figures provided by MI Branch, Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army, in April 1973.

Summary

Unlike 7 December 1941 and 25 June 1950, Vietnam came slowly on the American scene. Army intelligence had some units, a branch, some trained personnel, and above all, time. Additional personnel were trained, units brought up to strength or created and trained. Collection and radio research units were deployed and intelligence personnel assigned to staff advisory jobs. Then, the Tonkin Gulf Incident occurred and U.S. tactical units - with their supporting intelligence units - were deployed. The intelligence history of Vietnam is not in the operations of the 525th or the 509th, or in the myriads of MI companies and radio research companies and battalions, or in the MI officers serving as intelligence staff officers - but in the facts that intelligence came ultimately to be an accepted and demanded element of combat operations, and that the G2 with all his agencies was heard first. The various division support units, as well as the 519th MI Battalion and 1st MIBARS, have returned from Vietnam with both honor and experience. Other MI units, inactivated at the end of their Vietnam service, piled up an impressive record of achievement.

The end of the First World War saw the virtual death of an intelligence effort by the Army; the end of World War II, the loss of a tactical intelligence capability, but not the concept. The end of Vietnam has come. What will be the fate of American intelligence now? And what is the role of the Military Intelligence Branch in determining it?

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, it should be possible to develop some trends that have characterized the American experience with military intelligence to date.

As for the establishment of the military intelligence function at the national level, the official historian of the War Department G2 (ACSI), characterized the problems very well:

> The most striking feature in regard to the progress of the Departmental MI Agency from the time of its original inception during 1885 through the signing of the Korean Armistice . . . seems to be that it was almost constantly under attack and usually on the defensive. Even its formal establishment was preceded by a rather lengthy period of heated discussion throughout American military circles, concerned with whether or not it would be a good idea to form such an agency.[1]

This appreciation, written in 1959, accurately portrays the reluctance felt in many circles about a high-level G2. Nonetheless, after World War I, there was no discussion of abolishing the office; the debate really was about what the job of the War Department G2, or ACSI, should be. This was a victory for the efforts of Van Deman and Churchill, and reflects the strides made during the First World War era.

The establishment of the CIP and the SIS are important milestones for MI, because they were to be the standard-bearers during the lean years following World War I, following World War II, and, to some extent, following Korea. These two organizations, which evolved into the CIC and ASA, provided a home for the professionals of MI, and ultimately proved to the Army leadership that an MI branch, made up of professionals in all the specialities of intelligence, was essential.

It is true that certain specialist considerations have habitually been unaccounted for; the worst seems to be the linguist problem. In each war of this century, the Army, and MI, have found themselves without

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[1]Bidwell, op. cit., part 8, p. II-1.

the necessary ability to speak the languages necessary to wage war wherever it was. This led to rather frantic training and to stopgap solutions. But the next war then found us with the same problem again. Another area that had received step-child treatment is the field of technical intelligence, both in terms of not providing for a core of experienced TI men on active duty until very recently and not insuring that they have a means of staying proficient in their craft.

A problem which is hard to define, but real nevertheless, is that our ability to deal with information we collect has scarcely progressed since Van Deman's time. The relatively unsophisticated collection systems employed by the G2, AEF, were managed by a few G2 personnel and the information hand-recorded on maps and in journals. Over fifty years later, having experienced a revolution in our ability to gather data, we still employ a few personnel to manage these assets and hand-record the information they produce on the G2 Situation Map and in the G2 Journal. This is by no means a tragedy, nor does it doom our efforts to failure in the next war. What it does do is indicate rather clearly an area where improvements should be made.

The breakwater for intelligence was quite clearly World War II. In every respect, what MI has or does today is directly traceable to some development in that war. From the establishment of our first national intelligence system by Donovan (the OSS), through the concept of tailoring MI support down to the lowest level, the 1940-45 era was the key. The path that had been laid out by Van Deman, and explored to some extent in World War I, was fully exploited during World War II.

All of the specialty areas that characterize the intelligence profession today - technical intelligence, interrogation, and positive collection, as well as the more traditional fields like counterintelligence and signal intelligence - were developed; moreover, the functional responsibilities of intelligence were widened far beyond what we had seen before, to include such areas as escape and evasion, all forms of censorship, psychological warfare, research and analysis on warmaking capabilities of an enemy, and the black arts of sabotage and subversion.

There were shortcomings arising from this broad new range of responsibilities: following the war, the G2 of the War Department was to have difficulty keeping these many areas of wartime concern alive in peacetime. The lack of an MI Branch made this job considerably more difficult, and if it had not been for the reservists who learned the skills in wartime and were willing to keep the spark alive in their reserve units, the task might have been impossible.

Similarly, the war/peace cycle that the United States goes through with its military establishment has made the problems of the intelligence planner much more difficult. Since we habitually have a massive strength and money cut following each war, there is a concomitant drawdown among intelligence units and personnel and loss of experience. The inability to maintain on active duty the units, at least in cadre status, required

to support our standing tactical forces has meant that each war is ushered in with a frantic expansion of intelligence units, calling up reserves, issuing of often obsolete equipment, and, finally, shipping they out to join their units. Except in Korea, we have been blessed with enough time to get these units put together in more or less good order, and they have then had time to get to know the unit they will serve during the war. A solution for this problem needs to be found, hopefully prior to the beginning of another war.

Another trend that has had an impact over the years, and one that is being felt again at the time of this writing, is an apparent feeling in American society that it is not appropriate to collect intelligence about other people or other nations. It is, conversely, acceptable to prevent them from spying on us, and so we have experienced occasionally the situation that only counterintelligence was left to carry the banner, since all other intelligence art forms were in mothballs. This is ironic, since, as Dulles points out in The Craft of Intelligence, once committed to the idea of intelligence work, Americans are quite good at it and capable of a high degree of professionalism.

What is needed in this situation, it might be suggested, is an acceptance by all Americans that our national interests require an intelligence capability second-to-none, both national and tactical in scope, so that we may be able to remain the nation of peace we desire to be.

As for the future of MI, it looks as bright as it must have to Van Deman, Nolan, Churchill, and company in 1920. The years of devotion to intelligence by the specialists of the CIC and ASA; the proven essentiality of support to the tactical forces in areas of order of battle, linguistics, technical intelligence, interrogation; the excellence of the support rendered by S2 and G2 at every level in World War I, World War II, and Korea; and perhaps above all else, the generally outstanding support rendered by MI professionals to the Army in Vietnam appear to have born fruit. As long as MI keeps its sights set clearly on the mission of the Army, and devotes itself without equivocation to supporting the Army in the field, it is hard to see how the Branch can fail to maintain the niche that so many have worked so hard to earn.

In short, it looks as if the Army has achieved the recommendations of the ETO General Board, made over 25 years ago:

> That an intelligence organization in the United States be formed to operate in time of peace as well as in time of war, to produce military intelligence world wide in scope, and to provide the trained intelligence personnel necessary for

its operations. Such an organization should be prepared in the eventuality of war to provide the military intelligence data and trained intelligence personnel necessary for the conduct of intelligence operations and planning in any theater in which United States forces might operate.[2]

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[2]ETO General Board, Study #14, p. 38.

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